p CLASSIFIED r mantis lig silt - - we aspnonucen ATTHE memes i NARA Date - In d FOREIGN DISSEM 5 3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE a BUREAU OF AND RESEARCH - i Research memorandum 5 FILE COPY Inn-17 Hay-'6 1 953 go The Secretary ssom s s v17 ma George 0 Denney Jr a 3 1 9v SUBJECT Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation This paper based on contributions to a Policy Planning Council project is our most comprehensive effort on this subject to date Itconsolidates Far Eastern aspects which have been treated in greater detail in earlier Research memoranda in addition it discusses South Asia the Communist bloc and certain overall aspects ABSTRACT Even as it develops a nuclear capability Peiping's awareness of its relative weakness the risks of nuclear retaliation and the uncertainty of Moscowis support in a showdown will probably make it eschew rash military actions Moreover Peiping will pro- bably try to avoid courses that would tend to consolidate an opposition front within and among its Asian neighbors Thus Peiping probably will use its nuclear capability primarily as a political weapon to earn respect to promote neutralism to encourage revolutionaries More than ever it will attempt to pose as a peaceful benevolent and powerful supporter of Afro- Asian aspirations for independence and peace and to portray United States support as the prime danger to both But Peiping will also make political-military probes when and where it believes there are soft spots in the local situation and in united States firmness and resolve to contain China's power The Soviet Union is reluctantly resigned to Peiping's becoming a nuclear power but is concerned that this will strengthen Communist China's challenge to Soviet leadership within the international Communist movement and increase the danger of Soviet involvement in nuclear war Peiping s position will be strengthened in North Korea and to a lesser extent in North Vietnam Although the North Koreans are unlikely to move militarily against the south as a result Hanoi might seek to step up the level of its violence in both South Vietnam and Laos The critical variable in such consideration will be the anticipated United States response Taiwan will probably come under heavy and political pressure but an assault on the island is unlikely Peiping might bring renewed military pressure against the offshore islands but if GROUP 3 FOREIGN DISSEM Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified REPRODUCED NAHONAL ARCHIVES it ND sn o _ $1 131 er n-Ia sooner no FOREIGN DISSEM - 1i - and internal stability on Taiwan The morale of the Chinese Ration- alists themselves will be shaken by Poiping's development of a nuclear capability-and they will seek increased assurances of pros tection including nuclear weapons for themselves from the united States A corrosion of resistance to mainland appeals for defection The Chinese Communists will hope to increase Japanese fears of the consequences'of military ties with the United States and to strengthen neutralist sentimentsJ Popular reactions may tend to develop along these lines but no sharp shift in political orientation is likely All political parties will react adversely to a Peiping detonation except the Communists among whom differences may he intenn sified Official gavernment sensitivity to crises in the Far East itself is unlikely directly to affect Japanese decisions concerning the establishment of official relations with Communist China - defense and possibly nuclear weapons for its armed fbrces In general Korean resiliency may reassert itself and things go on very much as at present However in the longer run if the Koreans come to fear that united States support may be less reliable because of the Chinese nuclear-capability they may consider fundamental foreign policy readjust ments which depending on prevailing conditions might range from rapprochement with Japan to some kind of settlement with the Communists The aligned countries of Southeast Asia -- Thailand South Eietnam the Ehilippines and the Mhlaysian area -- will probably all seek renewed'UN defEnse assurances and may'express greater interest in regional defense arrangements There will he some_in- creased neutralist sentiment'inzeach country but it is unlikely to be dominant in any unless a maJor loss of confidence in the united States or a fundamental shift in internal political forces -- par- ticularly in Malaysia and South Vietnam -- occurred Little change-in the policy of the non-aligned countries of Southeast Asia is likely Their respect for Peiping's power will be enhanced and they are increasingly likely to support Peiping's par- ticipation in the United nations and other international forums assess N0 FOREIGN DISSEM 1 Anthem Mm if FOREIGN DISSEM India will probably face Chinese nuclear power with determination I to strengthen its military defenses but not to seek a nuclear capa- bility itself Under Nehru and probably under his successor it will seek to adhere to a non-aligned policy Nehru will expect the United States to protect India with its nuclear umbrella in its own policy interests without the necessity of a formal alliance However under threat of Chinese attack or if military leaders gain increased authority in a post-Nehru government India might seek both closer military relations with the Nest and a limited nuclear weapons program India's attitude tomrd Pakistan and Kashmir are not likely to be fundamentally affected by a Chinese Communist nuclear capability so long as the threat from the north does not appear imminent Pakistan will probably continue to view India as a greater mili- tary threat than Communist China While maintaining its alliance with the United States it will continue to seek friendly ties with Peiping So long as India remains a non-nuclear power Pakistan will probably not press for United States nuclear arms in order not to upset its relations with China Pakistan's attitude toward the Kashmir dispute like India is unlikely to be fundamentally affected by Peiping's nuclear capability In Australia and New Zealand a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation might help 5 TR the domestic political balance and bring Labor govern- ments to power which would favor increased contacts although not necessarily recognition with Communist China and a softer line on nuclear disarmament than Conservative governments Nevertheless neither country is likely to change its attitude toward defense coordination with the United States and United Kingdom or toward SEATO European countries would be disturbed by a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation but their policies would not be affected However a sense of increased urgency would be felt for progress in reaching some international agreement on disarmament and arms control The impact of a detonation in Africa and Latin American would be minimal FOREIGN DISSEM asmooucso MDEELASSMEDW 115 1 Twas - A FOREIGN DISSEM iv 11 4 TARIE OF COMES Abstract i' I Peiping's Probable Line of EsploitationGeneral considerationsRipm s use Of FOICBTheSovietComponentPeiping's Estimate of the United States B Application of Peiping' Nuclear Capability Toward Policy ObjectivesContinuity of Program Detonation to DgJ-iveryI Actions Aimed at the United States 3 Actions Aimed at NeutralsActions Aimed at RevolutionariesImplicatipns for MO-BCOVI SinO-SOViet 36131310118Asian Comunist PositionsNorth KoreaRelations with Peiping and MoscowNortlj Korean PoliciesNorth VietnMI Relations with Peiping and MoscowNorth Vietnamese Policies2 33 A Chinese Commist StrategyGenaalIBlandBRepublic of' China Reactionswam no FOREIGN 0 003 REPRODUCED ARCHIVES DeciAssmEo d- i yf4Qr M50 lump Dale 511 11 - 1 8Y0 Slam no 3033mm ir VI JapanI Paiping's Phature and TacticsGeneral11'- 2 The Dangers of-Cam1'hmentThe Lure of Common InterestsProbable Japanese neactionsGeneralThe Political ReactionThe Defense IsgueThe China IssueVII Republic Of KoreaCommunist Feature end TacticsReactions in Kbreasoutheast General Chinese Communist78trategyAligned comtriBSI EGeneral ConsiderationsWilmaSouth VietnamThe PhilippineNqn-m ed COun brieBGeneral Non-alignment considerationsPeiping's General trntegirGeneral Beectionnehru's PoliciesPost-Nehru Implicntionsmistceylon NepalFOREIGN 33mm ELAN Anthea 3 0MB NARA Daie n 253 no New 23 5r J - at 0213 -- Abund- Db- mwnL ln LL' mud- - - FOREIGN DISSEM -1- I PROBABEE LINE OF EXPLOITATION A General Considerations 1 Peiping's use of Force Peiping sees its ultimate status as an international power with hegemony in Asia as deriving more its potential leadership of the world revolutionary movement than from its geopolitical position as the largest country in Asia With this viewpoint it discounts the importance of the traditional instruments of power politics such as military might and economic strength In these areas Peiping is aware of its inferiority relative to the Free World coalition and will probably remain so even after acquiring a limited regional nuclear capability Pursuit of its objective requires the removal of Western and particularly United States power from the immediate area This is unlikely to be exclusively or even primarily through direct exercise of force however lest a confrontation with United States power lead to unacceptable retaliatory risks Therefore Peiping will put major emphasis on undercutting the united States position by encouraging local Opposition to it Following this Peiping hopes to subvert the local governments through incitement and covert support of armed insurrection exploiting racial linguistic and socio-economic points of cleavage within and among the newly emergent societies of the AfTOfASian world Essential to this program is Peiping's avoidance of actions which would impel these societies to coalesce against it in common defense under united States protection Peiping can miscalculate in its estimate of societal response but as a general rule will probably continue consciously to avoid those military actions which for the Afro-Asian community would manifestly cast Communist China in the role of an overt military threat or active aggressor This does not mean that Peiping will feel proscribed from the use of conventional force or from employing its nuclear capability in political efforts to impress friends and deter enemies As shown by its invasion of India the regime will resort to force when it believes it can successfully pose befbre the AfrOaAsian audience as the threatened or injured party defending its borders and when such action carries a low risk of US military response - The critical variable in Peiping's resort to force is the risk of United States response Peiping may feel it can afford-some miscalculation of political reactions but not a United States military reaction which might involve nuclear strikes against the Chinese mainlan Nevertheless the political component is not to be ignored as a constraint on Peiping's use of force Thus Communist China is not likely to take the initiative in employment of nuclear weapons because of the political damage this would inflict on its aspirations for leadership in the Afro-Asian FOREIGN DISSEM FOREIGN Dream - 2 - world Similarly Paiping is likely to be inhibited from indulging in nuclear blackmail and rocket rattling at least so long as it hopes to extend its influence through exploiting indigenous revolutionary forces as opposed to the conventional means of intimidation and conquest 2 The Soviet Component It appears that the Soviet Union has not served as a primary constraint on Peiping's use of force but that Peiping has acted primarily on its own assessment of the gains and risks 5 in a particular situation at least since 1958 when Sinc Soviet strategic differences moved to the fore With the sharpening of these differences especially in recent months Peiping has had reason to doubt the a reliability of Soviet support in an escalating conflict in which Chinese A rather than Soviet interests were primarily involved or were antithetical Therefore we believe that a more definitive Sino-Soviet break would if anything increase Peiping's caution in the use of force conventional or nuclear so long as it had reason to believe that the United States would react By the same token a major reconciliation between Moscow and Peiping at some future time might enhance Peiping's willingness to use force by restoring its confidence that escalation would be deterred by politicalemilitary'backup of nuclear blackmail In such circumstances Mbscow for its part might make available to Peiping advanced weapons systems which would improve its defenses if not directly contribute to its offensive capability For example once Communist China had acquired a small stockpile of nuclear weapons and begun to develop sophisticated delivery vehicles the USSR might place anti-missile missiles or other defensive systems in Chinese hands thereby transferring more of the responsibility for China's security by strengthening Peiping's hand while enhancing the bloc's overall nuclear threat Short of this unanticipated contingency however Peiping will probably discount in advance its ability to persuade or press Mbscow into supporting and defending Chinese Communist military action where a credible threat of United States retaliation is present The depth of distrust with which present and foreseeable Chinese Communist leaders view Soviet policy and promises is determined in large part from the relations between Mbscow and Peiping in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis the 1960 withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the 1962 crises in Cuba and Sins-Indian affairs Given this background Peiping is unlikely to stake its security against US retaliatory action on Mbscow's responses with anything less than an explicit and secure exchange of guarantees 3 Peiping's Estimate of the united States Thus the primary deterrent to PEiping's use of its nuclear capability will be the likelihood of effective US counteraction either locally or against vital mainland targets mac's admonition to strategically despise and tactically respect the enemy has so far operated as a restraint on the Chinese Communist willingness to confront united States force directly and is FOREIGN DISSEM REPRODUCED AID-E mom WCLASSIFIED DE ngi 1 FOREIGN DISSEM likely to govern Chinese Communist military behavior through the remainder of this decade It is ritualistically instilled into all levels of military and civilian indoctrination It has served Chinese Communist armies well in exploiting situations of opportunity'without suffering catastrophic reverses whether in the struggle for victory during the civil war or in military forays outside traditional Chinese territory since winning power in 19h9 It conforms with classical Chinese doctrine with basic Bolshevik belief and with the circumstances of united States military superiority Therefore rash adventurism is unlikely to accompany or follow Peiping's acquisition of a nuclear capability assuming that United States policy is sufficiently clear and consistent that Peiping is not confused about the consequences of employing force This does not rule out recurrent testing of United States responses Although Peiping' paranoia tends to make it interpret all indicators of United States military intentions as preparations for a vast coordinated attack its confidence in the inevitable course of history I makes it unduly encouraged that revolutionary forces are on the march whenever opposition to United States policies arises Especially if Peiping sees signs of United States vacillation or ambiguity in its commitments it can therefOre be expected to exploit its newly acquired nuclear threat in conjunction with political and economic moves to probe for areas on its periphery where the United States political or military position might be whittled down Whether through the protection of proxies as in Southeast Asia or the direct threat of force as in the Taiwan Strait Peiping is likely from time to time to test the firmness and resolve of United States commitments throughout the area 3 Application of Peiping's Nuclear Capability Toward Policy Objectives 1 Continuity of Program Detonation to Delivery Peiping will probably seek to identify its initial nuclear tests with an Operational capability and to foster impressions of being further ahead in its nuclear program than it is Therefore we can expect a continuity in its exploitation of the development through much of the remaining decade with no sudden changes at particular points in time The major caution against assuming such continuity lies in the contingency that a very successful testing program combines with a relatively smooth production schedule of delivery vehicles Should such success occur within an environment of rising economic expectations it might well infuse the leadership with an element of cockiness such as prevailed in Peiping' 1958 approach to domestic and international problems Under these circumstances Peiping's policies might veer toward somewhat greater risk-taking It might accelerate the revolutionary struggle in South and Southeast Asia because of the new turning point in histonr' marked by Peiping' acquisition of nuclear weapons ENen so its sooner no FOREIGN DISSEM bgRADnel 1 meadow 1 Mi 0 most 11 1 -u g season no FOREIGN DISSEM - willingness to take greater risks would be only relative and would_ remain subject to a cool calculation of the prdbable united States response the Soviet position and the risk of coalescing opposition Clearly Peiping's nuclear program is neither the only nor even the most important variable affecting the leadership's self-appraisal and world view At one extreme for example the regime might feel its political and economic circumstances were so depressing that only a dramatic demonstration of power could restore morale at home and discourage enemies abroad This could impel Peiping to unleash a vigorous overt and covert campaign of warfare aimed at appearing strong while it avoided actions which would reveal its basic vulnerabilities At the opposite extreme the regime might feel so encouraged by improvements in its political and economic situation as to undertake steppeduup subversion and insurrection without however stressing its nuclear I strength in a fashion to belie its overall protestations of peaceful co-existence Moreover Peiping's leadership moves with manifest flexibility from one course to another depending upon the alternative opportunities of recouping failure with success From the Bandung blandishments of 195h to the militant posturing of 1958 PGiping showed a variety of faces to its Asian neighbors Thus our description of likely courses of Chinese Communist action against particular targets must be offered as only one projection out of several possibilities depending upon existing circumstances and Feiping's view of them Any such description is necessarily limited to the initial phase of Chinese Communist action subsequent moves depending upon outside'responses and the changing context 2 Actions Aimed at the United States Milit Position Peiping prob- ably recognizes the potential danger of heightened Asian willingness to seek United States protection if not nuclear weapons as a reaction to a Chinese Communist nuclear threat Certainly its public handling of the question to date especially for Japanese audiences suggests some awareness on this point However Peiping's isolation from and ignorance of important sectors of public opinion in these countries may tend to make it underestimate opposition to its growing power and exaggerate its support abroad In any case Peiping will try to turn Asian sentiment against United States military bases and the United States military presence in general By propagandistic proposals for zone and'by descriptions of nuclear war it will try to bolster pacifist views while intensifying fears of involvement in wer It may assert its willingness to forego further development of its nuclear capability provided that the United States nuclear threat to its security is removed from the area united - FOREIGN DISSEM 1 '4 It -- BLQ umoae FOREIGN DISSEM -5- States bases will be portrayed as attracting an attack because of their ag h shive use In Japan Peiping's left-wing supporters will be directed to demonstrate against United States bases and for a peaceful policy toward China While Peiping may renew its peaceful overtures to Taiwan it will stress for other Asian audiences the aggressive threat of the United States-Chiang Kai-shah plotters By linking the fate of those who tolerate united States bases with tension in the Taiwan Strait the Chinese Communists will try to exploit fear of involvement in a civil war as leVerage for splitting apart United States allies in Asia Peiping may even offer non-aggression pledges to Thailand the Philippines and Japan as it has with Burma Afghanistan and Cambodia on condition that they renounce military agreements directed against China 3 Actions Aimed at Neutrals Peiping may be expected to utilize its nuclear capability in projecting an image of peaceful power for Asian neutrals For these audiences the atomrfree zone prOposals may become peaceful zones denoting the absence of foreign bases and military alliance systems The regime will claim the power to protect Asia against United States imperialism and assert that a new turning point in history proves that East Wind prevails over West Wind This reminder to lesser countries such as Burma and Cambodia will attempt a multiple appeal based on an identification of racial and regional interests as well as exploitation of opportunism and fear At the same time Peiping will support neutral grievances against neighbors allied with the united States especially if it discounts the prospects of weaning the latter away from the United States Thus it will encourage Cambodian complaints against South Vietnam and expand its offers of assistance to Phnom Penh It may not pursue this tactic with respect- to Thai-Cambodian relations however should it feel hapeful of_ encouraging Thai neutralist sentiment Similarly Peiping may exacerbate Indonesian-Malayan relations in hepe of building a favorably oriented neutralist state which can be transformed into a Communist satellite at the expense of a Western oriented Malaysia In short we must not assume a single formula to be applied simultaneously to all Asian neutrals by Chinese Communist policy Moreover relations with particular neutrals will vary according to unrelated factors such as the situation of the overseas Chinese their border relations with China their internal security prospects local Communist strength etc So far as a general thrust of Chinese Communist policy can be discerned it will be to avoid panicking neutrals into alliance with the United States and to encourage their acceptance of'Chinese Communist benevolent hegemony over the so-called Afro-Asian world FOREIGN DISSEM FM - DECLASSWIED 1 rumo uwwm Dale 1 SECRET REPRODUCED no FOREIGN DIssnM - 5 1L Actions Aimed at Revolutionaries When and from support for neutrals to a from country to country The and Burma It may be to encourage uprisings against where covert Comunz s support of progressive movements as in Nepal might offer hope of advancing one step further as in Indonesia to spur a strong Communist party to risk armed insurrection if prospects of further appear on the wane Meanwhile Peiping ssident groups throughout aligned as well as Communist takeover It may be advance through peaceful means will seek to penetrate and subvert potentially di the area so as to undermine the stability of non- aligned regimes These endeavors will undoubtedly appear more promising to Chinese Comnunist strategists following acquis And to the degree that Moscow fails to amp militant revolutionary line will vary shift may take the form of splitting off separatist groups along racial or linguistic lines as in India how Peiping moves feudal regimes ition of a nuclear capability loy its military power in support of the world revolution Peiping may feel the more compelled to prove that it can succeed However it will confr problem which faced Moscow -- how to threaten nuclear United States intervention in an insurrec risking a United States strike on the heartland As ont exactly the retaliation against tionary situation without in the early days of Soviet nuclear blackmail Peiping may experiment with various levels of verbal bluff but is unlikely to risk exposing the Chinese mainland to United States nuclear strikes for the sake of revolutionaries or otherwise elsewhere in Asia If United States reaction against Communist moves in Laos or South Vietnam JeOpardized the security of North Vietnam Pe locally to protect its own defensive compelled to engage its forces interests as well as its claim to leadership over iping might feel all Communist parties Asian and otherwise Even in these circumstances however Peiping would not abandon all constraints and invite unlimited escalation As in Korea it would probably employ testing periods and limitations on action so as to reduce the risk of United States retaliation against the mainland However the uncertainties of Peiping s sense of political as a consequence of attaining depend on its estimate of Unit to back it up such a situation would be very great equirements and military capabilities may change a nuclear capability Its actions would also ed States objectives FOREIGN DISSEM and of the Soviet willingness omin m o 0 amuse M REPRODUCED MTIONAL ARCHIVES i FOREIGN 1313st II THE SOVIET POSITION A Implications for Mbscow If it had a choice the Soviet union'would much prefer that Communist China did not become a nuclear power Mbsoow's preference appears to be based on two interrelated considerations First Peiping's acquisition of a nuclear capabilit -- and even the promise of a nuclear capability inherent in the detonation of a device will contribute to the prestige of Mbscow's rival for leader- ship of the international communist movement and for influence throughout the less-develOped areas of the world the more so since it will have been achieved despite Soviet opposition Even if there is some rapprochement in Sino-Soviet relations a strong element of rivalry will remain'whereby the enhancement of Communist China's claim to great-power status will be unwelcome from the Soviet point of view Second Moscow probably calculates that Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of Soviet involvement in nuclear war Moscow must realize that in the past Peiping has not been grossly reckless or irrational in using or threatening to use force and therefore prehably does not expect the Chinese deliberately to'provoke a nuclear conflict with the united States simply because they come into possession of a very modest nuclear force of their own Moscow probably believes that Chinese calculations of risk will continue to depend ultimately upon the likelihood of Soviet support in the event of a confrontation with the United States and that the implied or explicit threat to withhold such support will therefore continue to exert a restraining influence even if Sino-Soviet relations deteriorate further Nevertheless the Soviets almost certainly believe that the Chinese Communists are more prone than they to risk-taking in decisions affecting possible use of nuclear weapons And they probably foresee the possibility that a Chinese miscalculation might precipitate a confrontation which would require Mbscow either to come to Peiping's aid or Openly leave an ally in the lurch In such a dilemma the Soviets would have to choose between assuming unwanted risks and potentially reducing their deterrent to Western actions in eastern Europe moreover the Soviet dilemma would be heightened in situations involving Nerth Korea and North Vietnam since withholding support would be tantamount to abandoning the smaller Asian communist countries to Peiping's exclusive sphere of influence FOREIGN DISSEM IT- k zrac all 1 FOREIGN DISSEM Sino-Soviet Relations Although Noscow ceased in 1960 to lend any further aid to the Chinese which might be applicable to the development of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union appears to have little hope of preventing Communist China from eventually becoming a nuclear power moscow has no reason to believe that at any time in the near future it can secure Chinese acquiescence in a test ban agreement or adherence to an agreement on the non- dissemination of nuclear weapons All that either type of agreement could do would be to provide the Soviet Union a talking point in denying the Chinese a renewal of Soviet nuclear aid -- a consideration which has ceased to have much meaning in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations Soviet interest in continuing negotiations on a testuban or non-transfer agreement appears to be based on other considerations than their potential effect on Communist China and at the same time Mbscow appears to be prepared to pursue its interests in negotiating with the West on these subjects without regard for Chinese disapproval Once China has in fact acquired a capability the result will probably be an additional strain on Sino-Soviet relations as Communist China becomes a more effective rival to the Soviet Union The possibility of more or less tacit Soviet cooperation with the'United States and other Western powers in efforts to contain Communist China in Southeast Asia will grow But even if an open split in the international Communist movement should occur at that time or earlier it is unlikely that Moscow would wish to conclude any form of open alliance with the West against an at least nominally allied communist regime ASIAN COMMUNIST POSITIONS A Korea 1 Relations with Peiping and Moscow A Chinese Communist nuclear capability would strengthen North Korean willingness to take its chances with Psiping For Pyongyang Peiping's combination of massive conventional power abutting Korean borders and its limited nuclear capability would seem adequate deterrence against South Korean attacks jMoreover it would provide added proof that the East Wind prevailed over West Wind as an appeal for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peOple under Pyongyang's away This does not mean that North Korea would initiate a break with the Soviet Union 0n the contrary it wouldfcontinue to exploit the'advantages of ties with moscow so'long as the latter permitted it do so despite its alignment with Peiping in continued Sine-Soviet strife The nuclear development would however provide a firmer foundation for Chinese Communist mutual assistance guarantees Should a decisive choice be forced on the Korean leadership under these circumstances it would probably choose Peiping over moscow mar N0 FOREIGN 13133va Jaw - 1 meme QUEEN By mh Dale f FOREIGN DISSEM 2 'North Korean Policies How may increase its fulminations against United States imperialism and its appeals for unity with Seoul but it is unlikely to resort to military action so long as United States forces remain in South Korea It will share with Peiping a sober estimate of the actual balance of power in the Far East through expressing the contrary in public propaganda PyOngyaug is unlikely to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability While it has at least one nuclear reactor and nuclear physics laboratory provided under the Soviet-North Korean peaceful uses of atomic energy agreement of September 8 1958 the few North Koreans who have participated in the Dubna Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in the USSR lack sufficient technological and material support to promote a meaningful nuclear program The strain such a program would place on North Korean resources would probably appear intolerable to the leadership when placed against the gains as well as against higher priority objectives of economic development Moreover it is unlikely that Peiping would be anxious even if it were able to help PyOngyang in this direction B North Vietnam 1 Relations with Peiping and Moscow while a Chinese Communist nuclear capability would tend to strengthen Peiping' influence in Hanoi it would add to the complexities of Hanoi's position without necessarily inclining i't decisively toward either Peiping or Moscow Hanoi's position is different in important respects from that of Pyongyang Apart-from questions of leadership bias Hanoi needs both Soviet and Chinese support more probably than does nngyang This is true because Hanoi is and for the indefinite future prospectively will continue to be engaged in actively'_ supporting powerful insurgent movements in the relatively favorable environment of Laos and South Vietnam and will be doing so in part as a proxy of Moscow and Peiping both of which are also involved in international accords on these areas Hanoi faces the livelier possibility of a threat to its own security from a possible United States action triggered by developments in the insurgent areas In diplomatic logistic and ultimate security terms therefore Ha'noi's involvement in expan ive insurgency impels it to try to straddle the Sine-Soviet rift Even if Hanoi came to conclude that Peiping could offer more support in pursuing its insurgent efforts Hanoi would still seek to retain the option of' Soviet support in safeguarding its own security Another consideration is that North Vietnam apparently fears more than does North Korea the possibility of Han Chinese domination perhaps partly for historical reasons partly for geographic seem Ho FOREIGN 'nIssmi inns 3 31 t me I A 300 lily TL Wino- seasonuceo ATTHE NATIONAL i i 1 am earner no FOREIGN Ostensibly Peiping' developnent of nuclear capability would strengthen its in uence in Hanni since it would be in a better 1 position than before to extend the umbrella of Chinese power over a both Hanoi-supported insurgency and Hanoi itself On the other hand Hanoi would have to ask itself how much Soviet logistic and diplomatic I support would it cost to lean toward Peiping and Chinese militancy 5- How good would the Chinese umbrella be unless covered by the Soviet 1 15 umbrella How much could the Soviet Union be counted upon in a crisis not directly involving vital Soviet interests It would appear that Hanoi faces a continuum of tortuous 1 calculations of all the relevant factors the status of Sine-Soviet relations the respective leverages of Peiping and Moscow the opportunities and obstacles confronting-the effort in Ines and South - Vietnam and above all the degree of risk it can safely afford Thus 9 Hanoi's prospective position though influenced toward Peiping by reason' of its nuclear capability will probably remain largely an independent variable 2 North Vietnamese Policies Thus the Soviet cmnponent is likely to remain an important factor in Hanoi's thinking Even if the tie with Moscow should break the North Vietnamese leadership would probably not move rashly lest its isolated dependence on Communist China prove insufficient to deter a United States response While Peiping ultimately saved Pyongyang from extinction it did so only after the near-total destruction of North Korea Therefore Hanoi is unlikely to alter its basic policy via-a-vis Inns and South Vietnam simply because of a limited Chinese Communist nuclear capability At the same time Hanoi will seek to identify Peiping's new strength with its own power in appealing to Saigon sentiment for ramification and neutralization Assuming that neither side has turned the corner toward decisive victory in the South this appeal will be designed less to intimidate than to offer an escape for dispirited sectors of the Saigon govermnent and public Hanoi will not slacken its insurgent effort in the South but it will probably try to avoid exaggerating the nuclear backup threat much less dictate an ultimatum which might impel the United States to escalate its response For Hanoi's clients in Laos however the situation may appear more promising if by this time partition is wearing thin and resumed military action seems hepeful of attaining power and territory otherwise denied the Pathet Lao Here the multiple influences of Peiping Hanoi and perhaps Moscow must be assessed in a manner impossible at the time of this writing In general however it seems more likely that Hanoi will be under pressure from the Pathet Lao to sanction or support greater violence As elsewhere the critical variable will be the estimates of all concerned on the likelihood and form of a United States response FOREIGN nIssnM Maurie wqj f FOREIGN DISSEM - ll - IV REPUBLIC OF CHINA A Chinese Communist Strategy 1 General Among the situations confronting Peiping the Taiwan situation may seem the-one calling most urgently and most promisingly for Peiping's attention - - - The main thrust of Peiping's effort will he to undermine morale on Taiwan especially among the mainlander elements to paralyze the Government-of the Republic of China to induce defections and to speed the day of communist takeover Presumably Psiping will intensify its appeals for a peaceful resolution of the civil war It will argue the hopelessness of retaking the mainland in the face of Chinese'Communist nuclear weapons It will point-to the increasing disparity of military power between Communist and nationalist China It will attempt to sow doubt that the United States would back Taiwan effectively should conflict arise arguing in effect that Washington would not accept the risks to its military and political interests elsewhere in the Far East for the sake of Chinese nationalist interests Without direct threat of military takeover or the explicit use of nuclear blackmail Peiping may attempt on the one hand to imply the destruction it could wreak_on Taiwan and on the other to evoke admiration for the achievements of the bretheren in the homeland Peiping may accompany this overt program with covert efforts to subvert Chinese Nationalist officials Rumors of negotiations between the two Chinas mayzbe spread in Hong Kong to undermine confidence in the Republic of China both atrhome and abroad and to increase the receptivity of audiences on Taiwan to mainland propaganda keyed to this theme any actual nationalist defections would be publicized as the harbinger of things to come Any evidence of Taiwanese independence movement activity in Japan or elsewhere might be exploited as a United States plot to cut its losses with the Chiang regime while retaining a puppet rule on the island 2 The Offshore Islands In view of the Taiwan Strait crises of 195M and 1958 it might seem that Peiping would certainly move to take the offshore islands That it will in fact do so however is not necessarily more likely after Peiping_has deve10ped a nuclear capabilityiand may be even less likely - First Peiping's object is not simply the military seizure of the offshore islands If this alone were accomplished it would hold for Peiping the danger of increasing internatidnal acceptance of a two- - China situation Peiping would probably expect many nations to consider that a ma or provocation and danger point had been removed and that the -situation_could therefore stabilize with 100 miles of the Taiwan Strait FOREIGN DISSEM u'l nu- 930011659 arms mm mm i wildness L- FOREIGN DISSEM separating the two Chinas Rather Peiping' purpose in a future crisis as in the previous crises would be to test the strength of the United States commitment with the objective of demoralizing the Republic of China breaking its alliance with the United States and bringing Taiwan under communist control Second Peiping would have to be confident that it could manage the crisis so as to avoid the danger of nuclear strikes on the homeland This would be true both if Peiping relied primarily on conventional weapons with the threat of nuclear blows in the background or in the much less likely eventuaJity that it envisaged a direct nuclear threat to the offshores As a third -- but far less compelling factor -- Peiping would weigh the risk to its political objectives elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world if as a nuclear power -it initiated a new Taiwan Strait crisis even if it claimed to be acting in legitimate self-defense in what remains essentially a civil war If the foregoing factors militate against a nuclear-supported move to seize the offshores they do not preclude Peiping' again testing the Taiwan Strait situation by initiating military pressures of blockade and bombardment to see how far its confrontation with the United States could be safely and profitably pursued while holding open theawenue to disengagement as it did on the two previous occasions In such an event Peiping' nuclear capability would play a background role of political and pressure since to employ it overtly in a military manner would raise unacceptable political _d military risks as seen by Peiping Whether Peiping would even undertake such a new test would depend on a number of variables chief of which would be Peiping' estimate of United States intentions and of the relations between Taipei and Washington In addition Peiping would assess morale on Taiwan especially among the mainlander elements who would be the chief target of the propaganda campaign linked with renewed Taiwan Strait tensions For example propitious circumstance from Peiping' S'point of view would be depressed economic conditions on- Taiwan tense mainlander-Taiwanese relations growing strains between Taipei and_Washing-ton and serious doubt prevailing among United States allies -- if not within the United States itself -- concerning the wisdom of defending Republic of China interests on Quemoy and Matsu at the risk of nuclear warfare Were Chiang's successors in a state of internal strife or the leadership unstable Peiping might be even more disposed to renew pressure on the offshore islands hOping thereby to precipitate a prolonged hassle with the United States which might break the unstable leadership apart and result in significant defections DISSEM Faun i - 1 1 1i mums 0 SM and By OEJARA Dale fl 2L 5 FOREIGN DISSEM -13- 1' B Republic of China Reaction Chinese Communist detonation of a nuclear device would probably produce a sense of shock and setback in Taiwan even though the leadership had dis- counted the event in advance and taken steps to offset its impact The initial effect would subside with the realization that Peiping s material power had not been immediately increased and the time lag between the detonation and develOpment of a nuclear capability would give the Republic of China opportunity and stimulus both to adjust to the changed environment and to try to minimize the effects on its position Taipei would redouble its efforts to maintain its international identity and to offset the tendency to accept the existence of two Chinas In this connection it might renew its interest in organizing a league of East Asian anti-communist governments Taipei is likely to fear that Paiping's attainment of a nuclear capability1would cause the United States to conclude that there was no further possibility for a successful Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland and that consequently the United States would increasingly'move to restrict preparations and activities to this end The Republic of-China for its part would also tend to feel that time was running out in terms of Peiping's prospective further development of its nuclear capability Therefore it would increase pressure for as much United States support as possible Taipei might continue or even increase independent small- scale efforts at subversion and sabotage on the mainland but would be unlikely to undertake large scale landings unless it believed United States support would be forthcoming The Republic of China would almost certainly seek renewed'United States guarantees for the defense of Taiwan although it would probably feel relatively secure from would eXpect Peiping to be inhibited bygfear of United States reaction and by doubt about Soviet support in the case of war with the United States Taipei might also argue that the threat of nuclear attack'now required American commitments to defend the offshore islands and to use nuclear weapons_in the event of a nuclear attack In any case the Republic of China would prObably press at least for shared nuclear weapons if not its own nuclear counterforce Taipei would also want the United States to increase the tempo and force of its public statements of support for the Republic of China as a deterrent signal tolPeiping If as time goes on Peiping shows technological progress and economic improvement some mainlanders on Taiwan might become sufficiently dis- heartened by'Taiwants prospects and tempted by Peiping's tenders to-seek an accommodation with Peiping A Chinese Communist nuclear capability would not in itself trigger defections but in conjunction with other indicators 1 FOREIGN DISSEM - - - - ui - am DECEASSIHEDW ll - Au HOW L om 3Y0 JNWI 0218 eraser no FOREIGN DISSEM -1h- of mainland viability might accentuate the seeming hopelessness of the raison d'etre of the Republic of China If in addition there is a background of growing divergence with the United States on such questions as activities against the mainland improvement of nationalist military capabilities and perhaps defense of the offshore islands resistance to mainland blandishments might be corroded There is no group among those standing as heirs apparent to Chiang Kai-shah which poses an obvious danger in this regard So long as the United States remains obligated to defend Taiwan economic prosperity and political stabilit sy continue on the island and a crisis of confidence in relations with the United States is averted the danger of defection will remain latent IsOlated instances of defection would be relatively unimportant to Taiwan's security and general orientation so long as they occurred'in an overall context of the status guo which has prevailed over the past decade In a different setting perhaps combining an unsettled succession crisis after the passing of present m1 leadership with prolonged Chinese Cenmnnist political-military' pressures in the Taiwan Strait the problem of morale and defection could become more serious In such a situation the reaction of the Republic of China will be vitally affected by the nature of united States support A drift toward accommodation with Paiping is neither inevitable nor irreversible should it appear In fact it is highly unlikely given Peiping's seeming inability to pursue a consistently successful program at home much less a credible reunification gambit toward Taiwan V JAPAN A Peiping's Posture and Tactics 1 General Given Japan' 5 importance as a bastion of United States power and as a potential counterweight in its own right Paiping will place a very high value on exploiting its new nuclear capability to make progress toward the solution of the Japanese problm Some fresh approaches to Japan are indicated but given an inevitable uncertainty as_ to the Japanese reception Peiping' efforts will probably continue to be largely of the semi-official variety involving the Japanese Govern ment only indirectly Communist China's primary aim will continue to be the undermining of the United States position and influence in Eastern Asia The approaches may be varied and flexible but will all seek essentially to exploit Japan' 5 existing fears -- primarily fear of involvement in hostilities secondarily Japan's fear that it may find itself economically isolated At the same time Peiping will seek to avoid creating fears of its own intentions which might spur the Japanese into closer defensive alignment with the_United States or even into a Japanese nuclear weapons program The Chinese Communists will from the first seek acceptance as a nuclear power in dealings with Japan A propaganda and publicity campaign to inflate Peiping' supposed military capabilities and to induce among the sacsrr no FOREIGN DISSEM - 11 1 meme 5 By 1 0E more - - - - -- new F u aEPaooucan mugs mm moms FOREIGN DISSEM -15- 7 Japanese peOple an uncritical acceptance of these claims may ensue Quite probably Paiping will follow sharply divergent tactics showing caution and restraint in its dealings with the Japanese Government while seeking to induce a wave of the future attitude among the public The plan would be to develop public pressures which would force changes in Japanese Government policies that probably could not be achieved by direct means The Chinese will hope that even if these tactics should not be entirely successful the effect will be to strengthen existing elements favoring neutralism and accommodation with Peiping It will be hopedl that at a_minimum this sort of pressure will-limit the effectiveness of the United States bases in Japan and contribute to an atmosphere of friction 2 The Dangers of Commitment Poiping will emphasize the dangers which Japan courts inlits continued association with the United States arguing The Chinese nuclear detonations prove that the Uhited States can no longer threaten unilateral nuclear warfare'in the Far East 'As a result China is the stronger by virtue of her conventional forces 2 Japan is adopting a quasi-belligerent position by granting base rights to the United States 3 The removal of United States military bases and forces would eliminate the threat of nuclear war The prospect of - negotiated political settlements and of an Asian nuclear free zone will be held out as additional inducement to the Japanese to accept Peiping' self-portrayal as a peaceful power seeking only the defense of its legitimate interests against aggressive American imperialimm If the Chinese are sufficiently perceptive and imaginative they may single out Okinawa for particular attention By picturing United States military installations there including nuclear weapons as not only the main source of the danger of nuclear war in the Far East but also as' potential targets whose existence puts the Byukyuan population in grave danger Peiping might seek to intensify pressures in Japan and in Okinawa for demilitarization of the islands and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty i I 3 The Lure of Common Interests The Chinese Communists may seek to use their nuclear developments as added evidence of China's economic potential and accordingly to underscore the importance to Japan of trade with the mainland It will be suggested that closer economic relations with mainland China are'a desirable hedge against economic isolation among the advanced'Western countries Apart from the common interest of trade Ieiping can'be expected to dwell heavily on the common interest in peace in eliminating foreign domination and influence and in promoting the general welfare of the Afro-Asian peOples It may particularly emphasize its proposal of an atompfree zone in Asia in an effort to appeal both to Japanese pacificism and to fears of a recrudescence of militarism FOREIGN Dream Z 'Aumo w m 3 1 3 0E FOREIGN DISSEM -16- B PrObable Japanese Reactions 1 General The Japanese Government and the more knowledgeable sectors of the public are snare that Peiping may explode a nuclear device at anm'time The detonation'will not come as a complete shock The 3 circumstances of the cold'war the status of international negotiations a for nuclear disarmament and the internal political balance prevailing at the time of the explosion will however condition the Japanese response In general the more exacerbated and tense the circumstances of the cold war the more tentative cautious and hedging is apt to be the Japanese response If general negotiations for nuclear disarmament and a test ban are proceeding favorably or if a_g _facto suspension of nuclear tests is in effect at the moment of the Chinese explosion the official and popular reaction in Japan would prObably be positive unusually uniform and strongly opposed to the Chinese action In any case the initial shock period is likely to be fairly short Public discussion of the possibility that the Chinese would soon explode a nuclear device has aroused mmoh interest but no hysteria The leaders of the press and other public media have been following more responsible and less emotional tactics over the past two years The Japanese public too is apt to react more calmly3'recent Soviet and'United States nuclear testing have somewhat deflated the feverish attention vith which such developments were once followed While the initial reaction is therefore not likely to be panicky it is certain to be one of apprehension disapproval and disquiet The primary influence of a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation will be political and rather than military Apart from the almost automatic popular opposition to nuclear testing the prospect that a United States-Chinese nuclear clash could occur will reinforce existing apprehensions and will certainly increase the public appeal of proposals for a negotiated settlement of Far Eastern political problems or the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Asia 2 The Pulitical Reaction The political scene will probably witness a consolidation of existing positions rather than sharp shifts in orientation The immediate response to a detonation Will be one of dis- approval on the part of all political parties same the Communist The detonation may further differences within the Japanese Communist Party especially if the Soviet Union s position is reserved or critical But the event will prObably strengthen the party's pro-Peiping orientation and will presumably echo the Peiping line even if its service as an apologist for Communist as opposed to Western nuclear testing further isolates it In somewhat the some may the detonation will add to the differences in the nonmcommunist left between the more extreme and the more moderate elements In this case however it will tend to strengthen the hand of FOREIGN DISSEM REPROOUCED arms mow moms I I l Assam ND 1 SIM 939% J I 1' -17- FOREIGN DISSEM the leadership of the Socialist Party and Sohyo its supporting labor federation who have been gradually moving away from past policies of virtually automatic support of Communist China and of pro-communist foreign policy causes It could also contribute to closer collaboration between the Socialist Party and the more responsible socialist elements now represented by the Deomocratic Socialist Party - best to exploit the new development to the disadvantage of the government On this question all elements will probably agree on intensifying the campaign for disengagement from the United States and for a neutralist foreign policy The organized political left thus can be expected to bring renewed vigor to its advocacy of international agreements in which Psiping would participate to ban nuclear tests and'weapons to bring about general disarmament and to secure a denuclearized Pacific zone It may also raise the specter of the unforeseeable escalation of even small con- flicts with direct risk for Japan because of its alliance with the United States and the military bases this affords The essential question for the non-communist left will be how The Liberal Democratic Party -- now and for the foreseeable future the governing party -- will strongly denounce the initial Chinese deto- nation ZBut the event will also contribute to differences within the party since it will inevitably focus attention -- even without help from the Socialist opposition -- on the question what modifications if any should be made in Japan s defense and China policies These are among the polite ically most sensitive issues and on them the government and LiberaleDemo- cratic Party have often found it difficult to reach internal agreement This is attributable not only to the intra-party diversity of opinion -- which runs all the way from strong support of the United States alliance and Open advocacy of nuclear armament for Japan to support for at least much closer economic relationships with Peiping and Mbscow -- but also to the dynamics bf the intra-party struggle for influence and hence for succession to the Prime Ministership The sum total of these considerations militates against any marked or rapid alteration of government policy 3 The Defense Issue The Chinese nuclear detonation will focus public attention on Japan's defense posture and stimulate'discussion of problems that the Japanese have generally preferred to ignore-- most importantly what to do about Japan's defenses against and counters to nuclear attack Powerful elements on the right wing of the Liberal Demp- cratic Party would use the event to seek support for strengthening Japanese military capabilities These elements might initially press for arming Japan's defense forces with dual capability weapons and would be prepared to allow the United States to introduce defensive nuclear weapons into Japan It appears unlikely however that they could rally much support for this program in the short term Preppnderant conservative opinion will probably'believe that the United States alliance continues to provide maximum'security - -t at minimum cost and without entailing unacceptable risks that the threat un t-3m hon s i ts-aim mam 51336 'i Date FOREIGN DISSEM - 18 - 1 to Japan was not markedly increased and that there was no pressing incentive to increase Japan s defense efforts especially in view of E the political complications of an attempt to do so It is possible that the Chinese detonation or more specifically the efforts of Peiping and the Japanese political left to stimulate public concern over United States bases in Japan will prompt the government to seek to increase its controls over United States use of these bases The government would probably be even more sensitive than it is already to military staging through Japanese territory for operations which are not considered of prime importance to Japanese interests In case of a new Taiwan Strait crisis the Japanese Government not only would be likely to exert pressures for a negotiated settlement but also might seek some sort of assurances which it could use publicly to offset charges that Japanese bases were being used directly for operations against the mainland Depending 5 upon the nature of the crisis in the Strait and upon the Japanese domestic political situation the Government might also give something less than the full protection of which it is capable against organised leftnwing her-- assment of the United States bases in Japan While the Chinese nuclear detonation is not likely in the short term to be regarded as a challenge which demands a new Japanese response such as a nuclear deterrent or an Asian anti-cammist alliance by the latter sixties Japan may adopt a somewhat more selfwassertive posture The Japanese Self Defense Forces are likely to continue to gain in public esteem and may secure support for an expanded defense program Continued nuclear pro- liferation and particularly the public displays of night which Peiping may be expected to stage once its nuclear delivery systems are develcped may convince many reluctant Japanese that they should take practical protective measures Others may come to view a nuclear capability as a requisite for any advanced nation This does not mean that Japan can be expected to embark on an intensive nuclear armamBnt program for' while conservative leaders inclined toward a strong line may head the government from time to time the prevailing tendency will be to continue the low posture tactics of avoidinga head-v01 clash with the left However as 1970 approaches a climate may develop in which the public could be brought to accept some sort of arrangements in which the United States and Japan collaborated in nuclear defensive measures as for example the installation of defensive missiles armed with nuclear warheads or Joint training programs through which the Japanese armed forces could be familiarized with United States nuclear weapons It might be possible to conduct such training programs through the participation of Japanese crews in the Operation of United States Polaris submarines in Far Eastern waters Arguments for and against a nuclear program would take place against the backdrop of a more fundamental debate regarding the United States alliance which is expected to build up as 1970 the earliest time at which either signatory is authorizedto prOpose revisions of termination of the present nan-OHM smears no FOREIGN DISSEM -19- security treaty becomes imminen At this point public concern over the _Chinese nuclear power is likely to become merely another factor in a general debate on Japan s defense posture the utility of alliance versus disengage- ment and neutralism and consideration of what strategy will best serge Japan's interests in world affairs h The China Issue As with the defense issue in the short term the Chinese nuclear detonation will probably tend to consolidate Japan's politr ical parties in their respective positions on the issue of policy toward China To the extent that the event enhances respect for the Peiping regime an belief that it must be embraced in international agreements_ governing nuclear weapons and tests there will prObably be a strengthening of general sentiment that recognition or at least official contact would be desirable The Socialist Opposition would seek to use this sentiment to further its neutrality and_di$engagement campaign But because the Chinese nuclear capability will prospectively arouse a general public antipathy and because the Socialists themselves are increasingly seeing the political necessity to disengage themselves from their identification with communist causes they may pitch their case for relations primarily on grounds of realistic Japanese self-interest with undertones of regret and even criticism for Peiping s move If Peiping as expected urges a nuclear-free zone the Socialists will find it a saving grace and support it strongly For the government and the Liberal Democratic Party the Chinese nuclear-detonation may make it somewhat easier to temporize further on any change in its relatively ambiguous and vague China policy which is characterized'by an unwillingness to come into official relations together with a desire to promote more extensive and lucrative economic relations It should be able to argue effectively that Peiping s intentions remained to be Seen that a softening in Japan's position alone would not help that the China question was more than ever an international question At the same time Japan's leaders would predictably seek close consultation with United States leaders both to eval- uate the event and to consider policy responses In the longer range broad economic and political factors will weigh far more heavily in determining the evolution of Japan' 5 China policy than does the development of Peiping's nuclear capability alone The predominant emphasis in Japan's foreign policy is economic and while economic factors will reinforce a Western and particularly'United States alignment for the foreseeable future they will also operate to open the China trade door wider if possible There will always be the question of the Chinese terms and of overall advantage but communist reorientation of Chinese trade away from the Soviet Union and Japanese dissatisfaction with the trading opportunities given it in the West could operate to move Japan closer to Communist China nuclear capability or not A relationship of some sort with Communist China could'be used as a threat to improve Japan's bargaining position vis a-vis the United States and the Common Market powers or as a channel for diver- sifying markets and sources of supply -- though at best the China market FOREIGN Dream amusement Recommending Armada JED mil 2 3 0E six-moan ascent mo FOREIGN DISSEM -20- will be additive rather than alternative And even if Peiping tarnishes its image in the eyes of many Japanese China will continue to occupy a special emotional niche in the Japanese Therefore so long as Peiping avoids overt and direct threats to Japan's security 3 its move into the nuclear ranks will not necessarily adversely affect its interests in Japan and could help them a good deal VI REPUBLIC OF KOREA A Communist Posture and Tactics If the present close ties between the Chinese Communist and the North Korean regimes continue through the time of the Chinese nuclear detonation the NOrth Koreans will quite possibly take the lead in a major offensive designed to move South Korea toward nonmalignment and thereby to undercut the United States position there North Korean propaganda has characteristically been strident and hectoring but in this case more sephisticated tactics seem likely The Obvious threat will be softened by persuasive arguments focussed on the educated elite of South Korea and particularly on the student group The majority of university students are too young to share the common bitterness against the communists which was a most striking result of the Korean Wer In the comparatively free exchange of opinion which characterized the Chang Myon regime manr students seemed greatly interested in promoting the unification of Korea This interest was less apparent but still evident among the leaders of the socialist parties some newspapermen and other elements of the intelligentia Assuming a continued ban on communication between South Korea and communist countries strict police controls and the absence of leftist social cultural and political grOUps which often provide conduits for propaganda the communist campaign seems likely to be restricted largely to radio broadcasts These will however have a relatively large audience whose interest will reflect the generally high level of education and the concern stemming from Korea's exposed position Es a mainland China In communist propaganda the military aspects of the Chinese accomplishment will be indicated although direct threats of action against South Korea will be avoided The Nerth Koreans will depict a situation in which the ability of the united States to protect South Korea has been erased They will claim that Chinese nuclear power cancels out the American nuclear deterrent and tilts the military'balance of East Asia in favor of China Thus they will argue that a compromise settlement with North Korea is not only necessary but also the sooner done the better the possible terms In this context Pyongyang will demand the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea on the basis that they block the peaceful unification of the Korean peeple and entail needless risks of involv- ing Koreans in a nuclear holocaust In addition to these tactics of intimidation the communists are likely to 1 claim that this great scientific achievement was possible only'because of the superiority of the socialist economy 2 emphasise that this victory is an Asian accomplishment which promises to raise not only the Chinese but also other nm if I I Li I Resaonucsmmemnommca-wes BY 04 Dale FOREIGN DISSEM 21- Asian people to a level of technical parity with the western powers and 3 that comunist purposes are entirely peaceful and defensive B Reactions in Korea The South Korean public would be surprised and discouraged by a Chinese nuclear detonation and these attitudes are likely to extend to the higher level of the government South Korea is not prepared for a Chinese nuclear explosion and the effect is likely to be disproporticnately great The same measures which are intended to prevent Communist subversion and limit hostile propaganda have to a great extent prevented the dissemi- nation of iany general knowledge of the communist bloc Paradoxically communist achievements such as Sputnik seem to make a greater impression under these circumstances than such notable failures as the commune program agricultural production etc The South Koreans will understandably believe themselves directly and immediately concerned by any development which might reduce United States influence or improve the Communist position in Asia they are dependent upon the United States to a great degee for economic and military support- and they have been able to secure only a measure of international recognition Therefore in the inmlediate aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test the Republic of Korea leaders may be expected to seek additional United States support possibly asking for a public reaffirmtion of United States backing as a means of reassuring the public and perhaps demanding that their armed forces be equipped with dual purpose 'or tactical nuclear weapons - This -demand for atomic weapons would be an opening bargaining position however and the Republic of Korea leaders might be happy to settle for an arrangement under which the United States would retain control of the nuclear warheads In the longer run South Korean resiliency is likely to assert itself The South Koreans have been exposed to the full impact of a modern but non nuclear war and have developed a considerable understanding of the factors which influence military decisions They are likely to conclude that the Chinese will not use nuclear weapons in Korea However they may fear that the development of the Chinese capabilities over a number of years will reduce the United States freedom of action in the Far East Consequently the Republic of Korea leaders mayube tempted to take steps independently of the United States to protect their own interests Thus while no immediate crisis is likely very fundamental changes may be set in motion These changes would probably not include serious consideration of either an attack on or an early settlement with the North Korean regime Depending upon the internal situation of mainland China at that time _the relations between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists and the United States position the Koreans could consider rapprochement with Japan promote the concept of a United States-backed alliance of anti-commist Asian nations or study the possibility of an eventual settlement with the Communists -- Koreans Soviets Chinese or some combination of the three -- as a means of BurViVB-lo FOIEIGH DISSEM - name OE magnatel I I pun-r n I FOREIGN DISSEM VII SOUTHEAST ASIA A Eneral Chinese Communist Strategy Peiping undoubtedly sees Southeast Asia as its number one avenue of Opportunity for advancing its influence through subversion and insurrection Its exploitation of its new nuclear capability is likely therefore to be even more subtle in this area than in those so far discussed Seen from Peiping the area is rife with intra-regional disputes which can be exacerbated at almost no cost or risk By isolating its targets for pressure one from another Peiping can hope to play on these divisions to preclude regional cooperation under Western aegis Then as opportunity permits it can aid and abet local Conscunist insurrections or national liberation struggles th more hope of success against the isolated regime and less risk of response by outside powers The range and flexibility of possible Chinese Communist tactics within this overall expansionist strategy is noteworthy Peiping can advance armed revolution but prOpose a cease-fire or neutralization should its gains appear jeopardized by further action Nor is a United States ally necessarily beyond the pale for Chinese Comunist blandishments as Opposed to threats Overseas Chinese communities may support local cmnnunist parties or be held in reserve as isolated enclaves of Peiping's power impervious to outside view and seemingly compliant with local authority Bilateral diplomacy may further the divide and-rule strategy or it may be supplemented by periodic calls for Afro-Asian conference wherein Peiping can play the role of compromiser as well as leader With this array of means at its disposal the Chinese Comunist leadership will probably employ its nuclear capability selectively and perhaps deftly as compared with the early years of Soviet rocket rattling The goal will not merely be the gross intimidation of particular regimes That exists already throughout much of Southeast Asia as a consequence of China' preponderant superiority of conventional military power Rather it will be the orientation of these regimes Burma Cambodia and Indonesia in the first instance toward Peiping and against imperialism and its stooges through emphasis on increased Chinese Communist protective not destructive capabilities Lines will not be drawn hard and firm since membership in this protective association will be open to Thailand Malaya and the Philippines should they so desire Nothing so formal as an alliance is likely to be proposed nor is Peiping necessarily going to insist on renunciation of SEATO Its present relations with Pakistan illustrate the elasticity with which the Chinese Cosmunist regime can woo United States allies while warring with the non-aligned scorer no FOREIGN DISSEM - mam 5119 11 111N051 ls b It By 0f fl 17' FOREIGN DISSEM Should this strategy reduce Western and especially United States access to the area Peiping may then hope to convince local separatist and insurrectionary groups that they will be immune from imperialist intervention if they strike at their ruling elites But the transition from political maneuver to armed action will pose particularly acute problems for Peiping 0n the one hand it must exploit its nuclear capability to deter other regimes within as well as out of the area from assisting the beleaguered government On the other hand it must preserve an appearance of benevolent non-involvement in the uprising lest its latent threat become manifest and congeal the region if not the Afro-Asian world against Communist China And in any case it must move so as to avoid serious risk of United States counteraction against mainland China In this context from the Western viewpoint Communist China s nuclear capability will remain secondary in importance compared with the vulnerability of Southeast Asian societies to subversion and insurrection and the lack of cohesion of the area as a whole Infiltration and guerrilla war will remain Peiping's chief instrument of aggression Separatism disaffection and frustration will remain its chief avenues of opportunity Its goal is domination of the area by political not military conquest through satellites not annexation To achieve the pol tical and impact it desires Peiping may'be expected to accompany its nuclear detonation with heavy propaganda emphasis on its peaceful intentions and the defensive nature of its nuclear capability It will stress its scientific and technological prowess and attempt to promote an exaggerated image of the potential for peaceful uses of its nuclear power Thus it will endeavor to enhance respect for itself while leaving it to Asian imaginations to draw the proper conclusions as to the potential military significance of its new nuclear capability As elsewhere it is likely to eschew a threatening tone in order to avoid alienating Southeast Asian audiences or moving them closer to the West In this connection it may place new emphasis on proposals for zoning Asia against nuclear weapons foreign bases and military alliance systems B Aligned Countries 1 General Considerations Among the aligned countries of Southeast Asia informed reactions to a Chinese Communist nuclear capability will focus on two problems 1 for each country the effect of this capability on the present and potential threat to its own security and 2 its effect on the stance of the Opposing power blocs in the cold war and on the prospects for general hostilities FOREIGN DISSEM mama Brio omi REPRODUCED arms NATIONAL memes I 1 I I eraser no FOREIGN DISSEM an The aligned countries of the mainland recognize that the Chinese Communist military capability is already overwhelming in terms of their 3 own unaided defensive strength They will therefore continue to regard their effective defense in the event of major hostilities as completely dependent on the United States Although equally recognizing this a dependence the insular countries especially the Philippines will regard the Chinese Communist military threat as having come close to their own territories and as perhaps indicating the need for a review of defense planning and arrangements 2 Thailand The Thai leadership will not regard a Chinese nuclear capability in itself as basically altering already overwhelming Chinese Communist military power via-anvis Thailand Their concern for their own security accordingly will lead them to look for reassurance that the United States commitment to the defense of Thailand remains firm Their estimate of the degree to which they can count on the United States will depend very importantly upon the degree to which they regard United States policy in Laos South Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia as indicating that the United States retains the will and capacity to resist Communist aggression in all its forms At the same time they are likely to seek more specific reassurances in the form of United States commitments for increased military aid They might also revive proposals for a bilateral defense agreement or call for strengthening SEATO along NATO-like lines To the extent however that the Thai are basically confident of the validity and effectiveness of their defense arrangements with the United States they are unlikely to push proposals for reorganizing SEATO or Openly abandoning it Even within the context of a continuing proJWest orientation a developing Chinese Communist nuclear capability might induce Thailand to seek closer relations with the USSR as a hedge against growing Chinese Communist power especially if Sine-Soviet relations continue at their present level of deteriorate further Only a major loss of confidence in the United States however would lead to a Thai shift toward neutralisms 3 South Vietnam Reactions within the government and among the elite to a Chinese nuclear capability will be shaped by three inter related factors the status of the war in Vietnam presumed effects on North Vietnamese policy and presumed effects on the United States commitment If there has been no major alteration in South Vietnamfs favor and Chinese Communist enhanced power is reflected or seems likely to be reflected in overt North Vietnamese intervention or expanded support to the Viet Cong some weakening of morals and increase in neutralist sentiments is likely not only among the non governmental elite but also within government ranks Although with Diem in power a major change in South Vietnam's orientation is unlikely he can he espectcd to press for a greater United States commitment to the defence of Vietnam including probably a formal scones no FOREIGN DISSEM REPRODUCED ATnEmnorw ARCHIVES Us swim FOREIGN DISSEM - 25 bilateral defense agreement Any apparent unwillingness of the United States under these circumstances to underscore its commitment to South Vietnam would increase the prospect of an anti Diem comp The Philippines Philippine political leaders although recognising the gap between a nuclear detonation and the development of a weapons system will nevertheless regard the detonation as symbolic of the continuously decreasing protection offered them by their insular position The Philippine Government therefore unless its Confidence in United States intentions has been severely shaken by other developments -- will see the detonation as signalling the need for expanded mutual security arrangements with the United States Philippine military leaders may press for a complete review of the Military Assistance Program to reshape it for the new threat They will certainly press for more modern weapons and for iron clad United States assurances of immediate action in response to an attack on the Philippines 'Local neutralists who constitute a small but extremely vocal group will undoubtedly exploit the detonation to support their arguments for non-alignment If the detonation occurs while Macapagal and the Liberals are in power however neutralist pressures will intensify Philippine Government efforts to secure additional defense commitments from the United States rather than prompt it to consider a shift in government policy 5 The Malaysian Area The Chinese Communist detonation will tend to reinforce rather than undermine the Malayan sense of dependence upon the West for effective defense The Malay ruling elite already pushed to a closer reliance on the British because of Indonesian hostility might consider entering SEATO a move it has contemplated for some time Ameng the Chinese population especially in Singapore and to a lesser extent in Malaya and Sarawak the detonation will however undoubtedly arouse a feeling of pride and identification with China as past Chinese Communist successes have tended to do The leftist-influenced segment of the Chinese population might take a more militant posture against the Malay leadership As Peiping moves into the capability stage of its nuclear program Malaysia may seek to promote a firmer association of Asian states so as to offset the two-sided pressure from mainland Communist strength and Indonesian nationalist forces Whether this effort could surmount intra regiona rivalries would depend upon factors beyond our view at this time such as the post Sarit situation in Thailand the eventual course of Philipp attitudes and the trend of nationalist and Communist Party relations'in Indonesia One thing seems certain however to the extent that Malaysia fails to attain sufficient viability to fend off its neighbors and to maintain internal stability Peiping's nuclear potential will tend to enhance the disruptive capability of the overseas Chinese pepulation and particularly its pro-Communist element FOREIGN DISSEM sameness musty Mm b ay jmoml 12 FOREIGN DISSEM 26 C Non-Aligned Countries 1 General Non alignment Considerations Given the relative acceptability of non-alignment for Peiping's immediate and short-range objectives particular members of this group are unlikely to receive special attention from Peiping at least insofar as is predictably relevant to this inquiry Therefore they are discussed as a group These countries have deliberately chosen nonmalignment as seeming to offer weak unstable and newlyhindependent states the best available protection against what they would regard as helpless involvement in a world power struggle Already conscious of the great disparity between their power and that of Communist China they would not regard this disparity as qualitatively changed by Peiping's development of a nuclear capability As this capability affects the great power confron- tation in the area moreover it would most likely be seen as reinforcing the arguments for non alignment rather than otherwise The detonation will certainly enhance respect for Peiping's power It may also enhance concern over Peiping's ultimate intentions and thus lead the non-aligned leadership to adopt_a more benign view at least privately toward the Western presence in Asia But even if this is so the non aligned leadership would probably consider any marked modification of their policies in favor of the West unnecessary if not counterproductive The residue of anti colonialist sentiment the Marxist tinge of thought and the embarrassment of softening long-standing neutralist positions 'would bias them against any such modification Moreover they would find rationale for hewing to the neutralist line in the thought that the non aligned get most of the benefits of protection and support from the major powers that the small aligned countries do anyway While the non aligned countries are therefore unlikely to make any shift in orientation because of Peiping s nuclear detonation they may be expected to press harder for Communist China's admission to the United Nations and other international councils They will prdbably be prepared to support Peiping's demand for Taiwan if this were to be its prerequisite for accepting United nations membership They may actively promulgate their own or' Peiping's preposals for an Asian nuclear-free zone They may also renew demands for an immediate cessation of nuclear testing and for an international disarmament agreement in which Peiping would participate The neutrals might advance these demands in forums where the United States is not present such as a Bandung conference or other Afro-Asian gatherings They might thus expand the support for such positions among countries normally remote from Peiping's direct influence If at the same time there were a gradual increase in the number of countries recognizing Communist China the cumulative pressure to bring it into the United Nations might_be difficult to counter Given the pretensions of individuals such as Sihanouk and Sukarno to leadership of the Afro-Asian world this possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand FOREIGN DISSEM - 511' EMAIL E7 310 imam Date REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES FOREIGN DISSEM -27 SOUTH ASIA A Peiping's General Strategy In South Asia Peiping's ultimate goal is to turn the sub-continent into a satellite empire under the influence but not the administration of Communist China Its emansionist ambitions south of the Himalayas look first to detaching Nepal Sikkim and Bhutan from India's influence by playing on anti-Indian sentiments and exploiting racial and economic tensions Toward Pakistan Peiping' strategy is to promote its dis- content with the West its conflict with India and its willingness to do business with Communist China Beyond this Peiping may eventually hope to promote national liberation struggles and the development of indigenous revolutionary forces for seizing power throughout the area Given this general strategy here as elsewhere Peiping will probably see to use its nuclear detonation to promote respect and undermine opposition without assuming a threatening mien that might be counter- productive In much the same vein as elsewhere Peiping will emphasize its peaceful purposes and defensive posture its socialist triumph and its new capability to deal with any threats which may be brought against it It is unlikely to offer non-aggression pledges to India or Pakistan without a Quid p _o 3_o such as a border settlement with India or Pakistan' 5 leaving SEATO but may well make vague allusions to the desirability of an Asian atom free or peace zone B India 1 General Reaction For years many of India's leaders have privately recognized the implicit threat posed by a unified militarily powerful China So long as India's national interests were not directly threatened by China however Prime Minister Nehru sought to establish a basis of friendship with his great neighbors and his conciliatory approach conditioned public opinion in large measure Following the Chinese Comunist repression of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 the Indian public learned something of thei Chinese moves into territory claimed by India as part of Iadakh but it was the border conflict which erupted in late 1962 that brought home to the Indian public the threat posed by Communist China If the Chinese Comunists had detonated a nuclear device prior to the border conflict Indian public reaction to the detonation might well have been apathetic This is no longer the case despite a perceptible return to normalcy since the cessation of hostilities on the border the Indian public continues to regard Communist China as a prime threat It would therefore presumably view a Chinese nuclear detonation with FOREIGN DISSEM it Beasts l mm -my Of amoral - duo- - um J - - secular no FOREIGN DISSEM - 23 - concern Judging from the precedent of India s reaction to Chinese Communist aggression in late 1962 this concern would probably take the form of increased displays of national determination and unity rather than panic 2 Nehru's Policies Prime Minister Nehru like other well informed Indians is aware of the possibility of Communist China's early detonation of a nuclear device As late as December 1962 he spoke publicly of this possibility conceding that Peiping might with great effort have a nuclear test but observing that it is another thing to have a nuclear force He also Observed Although we are not going to make nuclear bombs in nuclear science we are much more advanced than China In the event Nehru would try to play down the significance of a Chinese nuclear detonation Rehru'would probably believe and he might seek explicit assurances that he could rely on United States' nuclear power to deter the Chinese The ready'response to India's requests for help after the Chinese Communist incursions in October-Nevember 1962 has no doubt strengthened Indian belief that the united States would not permit Communist China to dominate India by nuclear force or the threat of nuclear force Nehru would probably calculate that even in the event that Communist China achieved a substantial nuclear weapons capability a nuclear stalemate would prevail in Asia Thus Nehru would continue to see an increase in India's conven tional military strength as essential to India's security It is ingmebable that he would undertake the massive diversion of resources from India's economic development which a serious attempt to make India a nuclear power would require 0n the other hand he might be unable to ignore totally demands from the public and from the Indian military that India respond with a nuclear weapons program of its own A modest and relatively inexpensive weapons pregram intended primarily as a prop to India's prestige and to meet political pressures at home would therefore be a possibility Nehru probably would be as determined as ever to retain a posture of non-alignment for India He would expect that the United States in its own security interests would shelter India under its nuclear umbrella and would not exact any Quid pro 322 for this in the form of an alliance He would continue to find good relations with the Soviet Union highly useful no matter how its relations with Communist China may develop India's concern to promote nuclear controls or disarmament would become even more urgent than at present It would no doubt continue to seek to bring Communist China into the United Nations and other inter- national forums where pressures could be brought to bear to curb Chinese nuclear power FOREIGN DISSEM z -- DECLASSIFIED i - Authority LND emit 53H 06 um seem REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARMS FOREIGN DISSEM -29- No very dramatic changes in Indian regional and Asian policies would be likely to occur following a Chinese nuclear detonation Because of the heightened public awareness of the disparity between Indian and Chinese power the government might find it politically feasible to adopt a somewhat more conciliatory posture in its border dispute with China 0n the other hand India would become even more concerned than at present that China might supplant India as the dominant influence in the northern border states The Nehru government's policy instituted last November of preventing Nepalese anti regime forces from operating from Indian soil would be reinforced since it would be clearer than ever that Indian influence in Nepal was no longer sufficiently dominant to permit risk of antagonizing the current Nepalese regime Growing doubts in Nepal and the other border states as to the efficacy of Indian protection would be further strengthened Assuming that initially at least Chinese delivery capabilities would be confined to aircraft and that Indian leadhrs would be aware of this fact their already great desire for Western assistance to create an effective air defense would be further increased They would not be satisfied with the development of a modern ground environ- ment into which Western fighter aircraft could be introduced in times of danger but would feel an even greater need than now for a defense system of their own'which could respond on very short notice to a threat of nuclear attack Thus the leverage of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to the Indian position on the Kashmir issue might be increased to some extent The Indians might be prepared to offer somewhat more generous concessions to Pakistan if they felt that Western aid would be favorably affected thereby Aside from this factor India would be influenced mainly by its assessment of the contribution which Pakistan could make to the sub-continent's defense Thus should Western assistance in creating a defense against nuclear attack be offered within the context of a coordinated air defense system for the sub-continent the inducement to the Indians togyeach a rapprochement with Pakistan might be substantially increased - As at present India s prime concern in Asia would remain with the sub-continent Its understanding of the danger of Chinese expansionism is already high and would not be increased by the exploding of a nuclear device by the Chinese Indian parochialism and unwillingness to adapt postures which might alienate the non-aligned countries would continue to limit India's role in containing the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia 3 Post-Nahru Implications The nature of the government which will succeed that of Nehru cannot be foreseen with any certainty It is conceivable that Nehru might be shelved as a result of some disaster such as new military reverses at the hands of the Chinese In that event the general outlines of India's foreign policy might undergo fundamental 3 7 This inducement might be diminished if the supplies sun to India as seems to be a distinct possibility or as the Chinese require a missile capability FOREIGN DISSEM - ATTHENATIUML men-was muons Minis r-r i Bf Of NARA 033% FOREIGN DISSEM 3o changes Its response to the development of a Chinese nuclear capability would probably be to seek a de facto alliance with the United States and open reliance on the United ates' nuclear deterrent In the more likely event that Nehru passes from the scene because of infirmity or death there is little reason to believe that the new government would differ greatly from the present one either in 'its general foreign policy posture or its reaction to a nuclear threat from Commist China In the absence of Nehru' a towering influence there would be some difference in style and emphasis It is probable that the new government would be content to play a somewhat lesser role on the world stage than Nehru has sought and would confine its interest more completely to domestic affairs and matters directly affecting India' a security Whatever the pro-Western predilections of Nehru's successors however it is unlikely that when faced with the responsibility for India's foreign affairs which Nehru has borne almost alone for 15 years their solutions to India' 5 foreign policy problems will be greatly different from Nehru's It is possible that the military point of view might carry more weight in the government which follows Nehru This would almost certainly be the case should Nehru quit under fire In any event the prospects for a substantial increase in the size and coat of the armed forces and the probable greater influence in the absence of Nehru of younger men intent on rectifying what they regard as past mistakes in defense policy may well provide the military with greater influence Should this develop the possibility would increase that India would attempt to counter a Chinese nuclear capability with an effective weapons program of its own In the face of an incipient or actual Chinese nuclear capability a new government might be somewhat less intransigent than Nehru has been on the Kashmir diapute with Pakistan A number of his colleagues and public opinion generally appear to be somewhat more flexible than he is on this issue However a tough line tomard Pakistan is probably good politics in India as long as the threat from China does not appear to be too ilmninent In the intensified scramble for power and influence which would follow Nehru's demise great political difficulties might be encountered in pushing a compromise settlement through the Cabinet and Parliament and in getting the acquiescence of the Kashmir government Pakistan A basic assumption of Pakistan's national security policy is that India is a greater and certainly a more imminent threat to Pakistan than Communist China Until and unless there is prospect of an acceptable settlement of the Kashmir issue Pakistan s view of the danger from India will be reinforced In its security interests Pakistan could be expected to follow a policy of duality in its approaches to the United States and FOREIGN DISSEM REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHVES 0Et umssxiiED 31 3Y0 Dalel FOREIGN DISSEM - 31 - Communist China 0n the one hand in order to sustain some sort of military balance with India on the sub-continent Pakistan would hope to maintain its alliance with the United states to insure the continued supply of military hardware 0n the other hand Pakistan would continue to pursue a policy of accommodation towards Communist China China's detonation of a nuclear device would probably not result in any significant changes in this Pakistani policy While it would regard its formal alliance as assuring United States protection against any nuclear threat from Communist China Pakistan like India would probably calculate that United States protection was available to the aligned_ and the non-aligned alike Therefore Pakistan' 3 regard for CENTO and SEATO is unlikely to be increased by clear indications that Communist China was in process of becoming a nuclear power As long as India remains without a nuclear capability Pakistan is unlikely to seek direct nuclear sharing with the United States since it would fear that such an arrangement would damage its relations with Communist China 0n the other hand should India develop the capability to explode a nuclear device Pakistan would demand United States assistance to further the development of its own nuclear capabilities The subject of United States use of tactical nuclear weapons in the CENTO area including Pakistan has been discussed by Pakistan in the CENTO forum In bilateral discussions with the United States Pakistan has suggested that its army be furnished under the United States Military Assistance Program with artillery capable of firing nuclear shells that its troops be trained in the use of this artillery and finally that formal military planning for possible use of United States nuclear weapons in certain contingencies be initiated Nb final decisions have been taken on any of Pakistan's suggestions The explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China would have an ambivalent effect on Pakistani attitudes with respect to the Kashmir dispute with India On the one hand the increased threat from the north which such an event would signal would tend to act as an inducement to Pakistan to settle the dispute as a prerequisite to the development with India of a coordinated air defense of the sub-continent On the other hand the Pakistanis would reckon that this new Chinese threat was directed more at India than at Pakistan they would therefore feel that their position in the dispute had been strengthened and they might be inclined to stiffen their terms for a settlement Moreover in the face of what they would regard as a great increase in Chinese power the Pakistanis might wish even more than at present to curry favor with Communist China On balance it is doubtful whether the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese would have a significantly favorable effect overall on Pakistani attitudes with regard to the dispute seem so FOREIGN DISSEM 1 Hensonucsoarnsm 1 WARM lemma i 3 0f - U r FOREIGN DISSEM - 32 - D Ceylon and Nepal Neither Nepal nor Ceylon would be expected to make major revisions in foreign policy in reaction to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation The Nepalese would probably regard a Chinese nuclear detonation as indicative of a significant shift of the balance of power in Asia and some diminution of Indian and Western influence in Katmandu might follow It is unlikely however that the Government of Nepal'wouhd deviate markedly from its basic policy of striving to maintain an ostensibly neutral stance as between India and China The Government of Nepal would probably put even more emphasis on its current tactic of maintaining a smiling diplomatic face toward Communist China but would be unlikely to seek materially closer relations with Peiping simply because the latter had hchieved a nuclear detonation While the Ceylonese would not be pleased to learn of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation they would prdbably quickly reassure themselves that they are in no particular danger in view of their consistently good relations with Communist China In any case their basic attitude toward Peiping would not be likely to undergo any material change However for reasons of discretion the Ceylonese might become less disposed to make public demonstrations of their friendly ties with India IX AUSERAIIA AND NEW ZEALAND The military and political alignment of Australia and New Zealand 'with the United States and the United Kingdom may be taken as firmly established This has been formalized in the Commonwealth in ANZUS and in SEATO accepted by the major political parties and leaders of both countries Cooperation and coordination of defense activities within the framework of these ties may be expected to increase regardless of a nuclear detonation by Communist China Nevertheless there is a strong and apparently growing distaste for nuclear testing particularly in New Zealand and its close associate the new state of Western Samoa but also to some extent in Australia The United States tests on Johnston Island were visible and helped to underscore the fact that the nuclear age is approaching their corner of the world French plans to conduct some kind of test possibly nuclear on an island Mangareva in French Polynesia some 1600 miles northeast of New Zealand are likewise ruffling public attitudes in the subject A large body of public opinion appears to be negative on nuclear testing by anyone and somewhat Open to proposals for a nuclear-free area for the southern hemisphere One effect of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation will probably'be to reinforce these general views FOREIGN DISSEM newsman SW Auh o yLm 3Y0 lump Dale REPRODUCED NATIONAL ARCHIVES FOREIGN DISSEM 33 At the same time in both Australia and New Zealand public awareness of a direct security interest in Southeast Asian developments and of Chinese and Soviet efforts to expand their influence there has continued to develop This awareness will presumably grow further during the rest of the decade and make it possible for the governments of these countries to have a more informed and alert public support for policies they may adopt to cOpe with the Communist threat However commerce with Communist China especially in Australian wheat will presumably be a sufficiently important factor to support continuing relations at least economic with Communist China Against this background Chinese development of a nuclear capability may generally enhance concern about the expansion of Communist influence but also possibly to support further steps toward regular contacts with Communist China While out of power both the Australian and New Zealand Labor parties have made a particular point of an anti-nuclear policy and have generally criticized the conservatives' policies of full collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom in military and political containment of Communist China While in power however New Zealand's Labor Party did nothing to change these commitments In the most recent Australian general election the Australian Labor Party dropped from its platform a plank calling for the recognition of Communist China The Australian Labor Party moreover is seriously divided between a left and right wing While the left wing is subject to considerable Cemmunist pressure in the recent past the right wing has apparently gained the asbendency and the general trend of labor politics has been toward the right In Australia the conservative Liberal-Country Party-coalition has a working majority of only one in the House of Representatives and given the fact that conservatives have been in power some 1A years a change to a Labor government is a distinct possibility A Chinese nuclear detonation would undoubtedly become a campaign issue in Labor's effort to unseat the conservatives The Labor Party would probably argue that it could represent the Australian interests better than the conservatives in stopping nuclear proliferation and testing The impact of such an argument however remains in doubt Such a detonation would make increasingly clear Australia's interdependence with the Western nuclear powers for her own self defense In New Zealand particularly if a Chinese detonation should occur during the 1963 Federal election campaign it could play a similar role in Labor's efforts to turn the National Party out of office In the event of a Labor victory in either country while close ties with the United States and the United Kingdom would be maintained the new Labor governments would probably follow a Chinese nuclear detonation with increased pressures to develOp international nuclear control and disarmament agreements including Communist China They might be more disposed to explore the possibilities of a nuclear-free zone covering Australia and New Zealand and might consider expanding contacts with Communist China even if not going so far as diplomatic recognition smear no FOREIGN DISSEM rem-w Ascot la Of NmADate M7 MI o-REIgnFOREIGN DISSEM 31 In sum a Chinese nuclear detonation might help tilt the balance for labor against the conservatives and Labor governments might consider a softer line than they would otherwise on nuclear issues and on questions of relations with Communist China At the same time they wouhd continue to support measures for their own defense and the security and stability 1 p of the surrounding area In the latter connection however a Labor government might face a dilemma over specific questions of military collaboration with the United States For example it might regard United States military installations as a strategic danger and yet consider them essential to their parochial defense needs Similarly an increased Chinese threat could lead a new government either Labor or conservative to consider accepting United States nuclear weapons or developing its own nuclear arsenal at the same period in which it was seeking international controls over nuclear arms It seems unlikely that labor governments in either country would flag in support of SEAEO so long as they believe SEATO is performing a useful function in checking Communist expansion 0n the other hand they'may show more interest in encouraging supplemental organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia if these show practical and constructive potential A Chinese Communist nuclear detonation would probably cause dismay but not surprise among most informed governments inaWestern Europe Latin America and the Rear East and Africa This dismay'weuld in many cases be as much over the fact of nuclear proliferation itself as over the fact that Red China was the country involved A wastern Europe Within western Europe it appears unlikely that any country would significantly change its present stance on nuclear weapons France would view a Chinese detonation as a further Justification of its decision to develop its own independent nuclear striking force Smaller nations of Europe would probably see the detonation as being of little immediate con- cern to them except to the extent that it furthers proliferation but as a serious problem for the united States Sweden whose decision on developing her own capability will depend in part on the outlook for effective disarmament agreements might look upon a Chinese detonation as an important factor in favor of going ahead with her own program since it would'be a large step toward still further proliferation A Chinese detonation would probably create in most coun- tries a still greater sense of urgency to achieve progress toward disarm- ament and arms control agreements accompanied by increased pessimism as to the prospects for such agreement roaster DISSEM maceucsoumsmnom memes nauseating 1 Wu 131 nuxuuel FOREIGN DISSEM - 35 - There appears little likelihood of changed positions on other international affairs France and Germany both would view it as a derelop- ment which might widen the breach'between Communist China and the Soviet Union and nudge the Soviets toward reapprochement with the West European opinion currently favoring the admission of Communist China to the United nations would use the detonation as further Justification for admission opposing opinion would probably continue to oppose A Chinese detonation as such would probably have little impact on European willingness to use military force if necessary in the Far East and South and Southeast Asia Only the United Kingdom and France have such a capability to any significant extent at this time -- and both are reluctant to use it France has used no force in the area since l95h The United Kingdom except for the provision of military forces to Thailand in the 1962 Laotian crisis has used force only in incidents directly involving Commonwealth countries -- the anti-terrorist campaign in Nalaya and the revolt in Brunei In similar cases in the future and others like the Sino-Indian controversy where Commonwealth interests are at stake the United Kingdom would probably continue prepared to intervene as it com- siders necessary Over the longer period when Communist China has devel- oped a delivery capability as well as a nuclear weapon it is impossible to predict with accuracy the willingness onEuropean countries to take military action in the Far East and South and Southeast Asia European countries with interests in the areas would probably become increasingly reluctant to not there militarily without support from the United States and would in all likelihood rely increasingly on the United States to take the lead in protecting and advancing western interests in the area B Latin American Reactions The impact within Latin America would probably'be similar to that in Europe -- no significant policy changes but reenforcement of present trends Brazil already striving to obtain a nuclear-free zone for the hemisphere might be expected to increase its efforts in this direction and thico among others might be expected to back the Brazilian scheme more strongly For the rest the development of a Chinese nuclear capability would have the pri- mary effect of enhancing Chinese Communist stature especially within the communist parties without significantly influencing government attitudes In the Special case of Cuba the immediate impact would be to strengthen the hands of the activists within the party Until China comes into a position where it can provide a replacement for both the military and economic assistance now obtained from Moscow however it would not shift the cuban - government's alignment from the Soviet Union to Communist China C The Hear East and Africa There'seems little likelihood of significant political impact resulting from a Chinese detonation in any of these countries China is far away and exercises only limited influence The Soviet Union plays the larger role arcane N0 FOREIGN DISSEM We FDEBLASSIFIED i ma By 04 NARA Dam - If - -lI l - 3H- Foreman-mam - 36 - anetheleas an all these countries are on record opposing nuclear tests particularly in the Sahara where they might have a domestic effect it is probable that they would call once again for an international test tan with Communist China then included as a participant This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu