slat ABORTING THE CHICOM NUCLEAR CAPABILITY Problem To deVelop a sequence of progressively-scheduled coordinated moves to abort the ChiCom nuclear capability Assumptions The US and USSR are agreed that elimination of a ChiCom nuclear capability or potential is mutually de sirabie and are prepared to work in common to achieve this end an The NATO nations are sympathetic to such an under taking and will support it at least in its economic aspects Discussion In a sequence of cooperative US-USSR moves to abort a ChiCom nuclear capability respective US and Soviet roles should 'be worked out in advance as far as possible Actions taken by either government shonld be agreed beforehand by'the other Some sort of combined can operation would probably have to be set up The USSR would serve best as the principal initial advocate visaawvis the ChiComs as would the US in discussions aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation in the West Application of DECLASSIFIED E O 12958 Sec 3 6 Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals Not automatically Declassified DOD Dir 5200 10 SECRET economic and possibly later of physical sanctions against the ChiComs would involve coordinated mutually underwritten but not necessarily always joint action The USSR can more convincingly than the US initiate discussions with the ChiComs concerning a quid pro quo for their abandonment of nuclear weapons development and the USSR might just possibly be able to negotiate an adequate and facewsaving formula acting somewhat in the role of a double agent or honest broker Collaterally the US could seek through indirect channels to backstop the Soviet presentation and to signal clearly the determination to carry the matter as far as necessary to achieve the objective If it became clear that discussions on the political level would not be productive by themselves which would probably be the case then later successive phases of increasingly strong concrete pressure by the on the ChiComs would follow each taken so closely in step that neither principal would be 'able credibly at any point to dissociate itself from the process The sequence of applications of incentives and pressures progressively emphasizing the latter would be designed to achieve through as low a level of coercion as possible the abortion of a ChiCom nuclear capability With the progressive raising of the ante the public commitment of ChiCom prestige 2 SECRET SECRET would mount resistance would stiffen and the risk of an irrational ChiCom response would correspondingly increase First Level Political Persuasion The initial level of pressure would involve principally persuasion Moscow speaking for itself and the US but also as one element of the Sine Soviet Communist axis would seek to demonstrate to Peking the general advantages of an overmall curtailment of nuclear proliferation The persuasiveness of this argument would be strengthened if the USSR could point to a US Soviet agreement to cut back progressive 1y existing stocks of strategic nuclear weapons The Soviets could make attractive specific offers the removal of US and Soviet nuclear weapons from the Far EastI and the offer of steps toward easing both Soviet and Western trade controls and barriers ChiCom UN membership should be included as a possibility The US meanwhile would have the task of giving firm and convincing reassurances to the 686 the ROK and US SE Asian allies Underlying the Sovietsl effort at persuasion would be a clear intimation of the firmness of the collective resolve to halt nuclear proliferation Privately through appropriate channels the US could complement the Soviet approach corrobor ating both the determination on the main point and the readiness to offer valuable and meaningful advantages in exchange It would be a surprise however if the ChiComs did not scream bloody murder They would tax the Soviets with final 3 SECRET SECRET total apostacy with cynicism with white supremacy Among themselves as well as publicly they would almost certainly not consider the quid comparable to the one The ChiComs could be expected to strike a righteous pose seek to compromise the 0888 s Communist standingl proclaim themselves the legitimate leaders of world Communism and logically counterpropose imm mediate total nuclear disarmament and US withdrawal from the Western Pacific Second Level Embargo The second level of pressure involves the application of economic sanctions not through blockade but through a range of political and economic measures to control China's foreign trade China imports somewhat over a third of the POL she uses The US USSR and NATO countries control most world petroleum sources These countries and Japan control almost all tanker shipping Appropriate pressures and incentives should be avail able if needed to restrain the few independent producers Indonesia from furnishing petroleum A POL embargo would be damaging but not fatal to the Chinese economy The ChiComs-depend on annual imports for about 6 million tons of food grain Canada Australia and France are the chief suppliers The cooperation of these and other producers of consequence could be secured without undue difficulty Depend ing upon weathers loss of this grain to China would produce grave but probably not catastrophic nutritional problems The 4 SECRET SECRET ChiComs making the propaganda best of a bad thing would Cry genocide China depends on foreign sources for technology and capital goods chiefly on the Bloc Europe and Japan A tight and Sustained embargo here would decelerate if not alw most stall economic progress To organize and maintain such an embargo would be more complex than cutting off petroleum and grain but it could probably be made effective An embargo on Chinese exports if reasonably effective would deprive China of foreign exchange Most shipping is controlled directly or indirectly by the US the NATO nations the Bloc and Japan With persuasion by the US and USSR a reasonably effective shipping embargo could be organized The ChiComs will be alert to judge how determined how comprehensive and how sustained an embargo their opponents will be able to mount They will probe for and exploit soft spots or signs of faltering or even indications of distaste for the pndertaking They will intensify their allmout efu fort to discredit the Russians to world Communism They will seek to mobilize at least moral and some political support among former colonial nations At-the same time they will seek to strike at their opponents' economies and policies by fomenting widespread economic and political disruption and sabotage in such regions as Latin America and Malaysia There would be a marked step up in aid to the Viet Cong and 5 SECRET SECRET Pathet Lao-in SE'Asia A policy of sweet reasonableness toward India would seem reasonable at this juncture The ChiCom capacity for economic reprisal is not great They would try however by attractive economic offers to split off fragments from the opposing camp perhaps taking advantage of the resentment of countries like Israel which also would be undergoing denuclearization If the embargo became thorough and sustained Hong Kong could expect harass meat possibly insurrection conceivably direct attack If the embargo held and circumstances began to seem desperate the ChiComs might reason that a major military clash between them and the West principally the US could generate sufficient US Soviet strain to bring about a rupture or at least to overshadow and perhaps stymie the joint anti proliferation enterprise An attack on the offshore islands could be the prelude An attack through Korea though the North Koreans might demur or a deliberate invasion as against support to locals of SE Asia are other possibilities separate paper setting forth ChiCom military capabilities is being prepared and will be available shortly Third Level Blockade A third level of pressure would be a physical blockade of China This would close loopholes in the embargo'and would increase the pressure on China It would also markedly raise the level of commitaent and of danger of an armed clash By conventional standards of international law 6 SECRET SECRET it would be provocative and indefensible It would have to be identified by_a clear and persuasive exposition as a measure in the powerful and overriding international interest to prevent nuclear proliferation The blockade should if possible be mounted by a multi national force the more participants in addition to the US and USSR the better including if possible Japanese Initiation of 8 blockade should be accompanied by political and physical moves to provide clear evidence of a determination to defend China's neighbors against aggression It is emphasized that initiation of a blockade would be the most decisive step thus far in the sequence of moves under discussion It commits almost irrevocably the US and the USSR and their principal associates Not to carry through there after to neutralization of the ChiCom nuclear assets would not diminish the enmity already generated but would only earn contempt Initiation of a blockade should hasten the tempo of events It might precipitate a violent Chinese reaction There is an outside chance that it might bring the Chinese to the point where a negotiated and reasonably face-saving settlement could be undertaken and the effort to achieve this should be made with all permissible urgency at this point perhaps with the good offices of a third power This exploration should not 7 SECRET SECRET however compromiSe our freedom of action If however the Chinese take no major moves and seem to be determined and able for some time to sit out the blockade the US and the USSR must decide whether their own combination a rather an stable entity in many ways can in fact outlast the primitive and basically tough society which they seek to bring to its knees They may well determine that an endurance contest contains too many dangers This would lead to the fourth level of action ua the surgical excision of the nuclear installations Fourth Level Destruction of Nuclear Installations The fourth level of action thus might be taken either do liberately or in connection with a containment of ChiCom offensive action Jointly coaducted USmSoviet air strike% asing conuentional rather than nuclear weapons would destroy a selected minimum complex of installations in China that would together constitute the actual or potential nuc lear capability This action would not involve invasion or land combat in China ChiCom military initiative taken at any point before this fourth phase would ease the justification for the strikes Continuing Responsibility w The US and USSR task of policing China would not necessarily end with the 8 SECRET destruction of the nuclear installations So long as the ChiComs continued intransigeant the need would remain to contain them through continued application as necessary of selective military and economic sanctions Prepared byz Zander Dep Dir Sine Soviet Region 12 June 1963 A Enforced Non-Proliferation Agreement - 4 the probable positions of the FBG France Italy Norway Belgium and the Netherlands 1 Norway Netherlands Belgium Italy The positions of these four countries would be essentially similar None of them seeks national nuclear forces of its own each of them is con- cerned about the consequences of German nuclear weapons Although precise positions would vary depending upon the breadth of the treaty the methods of its enforcement the manner of its negotiation and the nature of any other and US-NATO country agreements which might be associated with it factors discussed below - their positionS'would be favorable and probably strongly so The reactions of Norway given its strongly anti-nuclear views would be least equivocal Some elements in the Netherlands and more importantly in Belgium La Libra Belgique would be responsive to the likely French argument that any such agreement was proof of a special relationship between the US and USSR and wish to dominate Europe Neither the Netherlands nor Belgium however would regret the almost certain death of the MEE which such an agreement wouhd involve Belgian Francophile elements in fact would take satisfaction in it Italy though more deeply involved in MlF planning would also welcome its demise as the price of an assurance against FRO nuclear weapons And such a development might well strengthen the centernleft coalition by dampening the difference of views between its two wings as to Italy s military posture DECLASSHWED so 12958 Us - 9 Sana 3'5 Bijmuz_waea omejd1hp As to each of these countries however although a nonmproliferation agreement would be viewed as an inherently favorable development almost irrespectiae of its_terms the manner of its negotiation would be important The greater the degree of prior consultatiou'with the US the smaller the possibility of its bilateral nature having a divisive effect upon the alliance 2 Exagge It is necessary to distinguish the probable French government position toward a Non Proliferation Agreement from the probable French internal reaction to it the letter would be largely favorable the former is not likely to beg A variety of French interests would be well served by such an agreement Assuming that it was addressed to stopping additional nations from becoming nuclear powers and not to stopping the present nuclear powers of which France deems herself one from producing additional or more sophisticated'weapons such an agreement'would suit French interests in the following major respects First it would solidify the French position as a member of the now exclusive nuclear club and in doing so appear to justify the expensive effort to qualify Second in preventing German acquisition of national nuclear weapons it would solve a problem which has concerned the French as deeply as the other NATO nations Third in pre cluding as presumably it would creation of the MLF it would eliminate a device which'would have tended to isolate France from the Five and especially from Germeny Fourth in placing responsibility for German exclusion from the nuclear club on the US it would tend to orient more firmly toward France those German elements which favor a nuclear role for the PEG and might increase German interest in sharing at least in the tech- nology - and in the costs - of the French nuclear program Finally such an agreement could he used to a greater or lesser extent depending on its terms and methods of negotiation as a further proof of US collusion with the USSR at the expense of its Allies and US desire to maintain its nuclear dominance and hence as a lever for the further reduction of US as against French influence on the Continent The official position taken by France might therefore be highhy critical of the form of the agreement especially if there is little prior consultation with France and if'bilateral enforcement provisions put the US in the role of monitor over the other NATO nations It seems certain at least that France would insist on the inapplicability to itself of any such agreement to which it had not been fully a party While both reserving its rights and gaining whatever propaganda points it could however France would probably not seek to oppose the substance of the agreement or its implementation If this analysis is correct it suggests that seeking to make France a party to such an agreement would pay substantial dividends and involve little cost French interests themselves argue for its support and such support would undercut many if not all of the anti US arguments that could be based upon it If French concurrence were made conditional upon US nuclear concessions the concessions reqnired would probably be relatively minor and agreements to provide a limited number of Polaris or Minuteman missiles for example or Polaris submarine technology'would probably be both sufficient and given the usefulness of French support 3- am- Of all the NATO nations the PEG would be most sensitive to the consequences of such an agreement among the Western nations it would be directed primarily at Germany It is therefore necessary to distinguish more exactly the context of such an agreement and the other arrangements both between the US and the USSR and the US and Germany or NATO which might accompany or follow it If the Hen-Proliferation Agreement were restricted solely to the prevention_of new nuclear forces wholly controlled by nations not now possessing nuclear weapons the FBG would probably neither oppose it nor seek significant new US-FRG or US-NATO arrangements as the price of its support Germany formally renounced independent nuclear weapons in the WEU Agreement and a variety of high officials have since reiterated that pledge both publicly and privately The CSU is even more firmly committed to this policy than is the government Although there are undoubtedly German elements which will not be satisfied with anything short of absolute German control of nuclear weapons and although there is industrial interest in the technology and in the profits of a German nuclear program it seems clear that the mass of German opinion would look with eqnanimity upon an agreement which precluded inde- pendent German nuclear forces so long as German military security seemed unimpaire This is the key point the German government and military establishment are now convinced that the effective defense of Germany against any significant Soviet attack requires the early use of nuclear weapons The ownership and control of these weapons is of little importance so long as their use is assured It would seem therefore that so long as such an agreement did not preclude a continued buildup and modernization of the nuclear forces under bilateral and multilateral control which were deemed necessary to German defense German agreement could be secured This would be as true for the renunciation of an MLF as for the renunciation of inde pendent national nuclear forces In return for such renunciation the Germans would probably seek at least the continued and perhaps increased presence of nuclear weapons on German soil and closer and more comprehensive German involvement in overall NATO and US nuclear planning and targeting In addition new US assurances of German security probably extending beyond the 1969 termination of the initial NATO Treaty period might be necessary Both would seem acceptable prices assuming that no new treaty commitments were to run more than 10 or perhaps 15 years It is important to note again that the manner in which such an agreement were negotiated and the nature of the provisions related to its enforcement might be critical These are related problems it is difficult to see how the US could agree to assure or to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement against the FRG without prior German agreement at a minimum and formal German accession to the agreement itself would be prefer- able and might be necessary Although this paper is addressed only to the problem of a Non- Proliferation Agreement alone it seems fair to speculate that unless prior to such an agreement the USSR had become convinced that Communist China must be dealt with as a potential enemy rather than as an ally the Soviets would be unlikely to undertake the burden of enforcing or participating in the enforcement of such an agreement against China unless it achieved from the West at the same time a number of additional agreements These might range from a N mowwarsaw Non-Aggression Pact upward through modest European force reductions or a de nuclearized Central Europe through some form of general and complete disarmament agreement The German reaction to any such package cannot be even crudely estimated within the compass of this paper but it is relatively clear that depending upon their terms any of these agreements and particularly one creating a de nuoleariaed zone to include Germany might so undercut German confidence in the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in her defense as to make the whole package unacceptable unless the US were prepared to make very sweeping guarantees of German security SWEDEN 1 Estimate of the Situation Sweden has thus far avoided making any clearucut decision in regard to a nuclear weapons program but basic nuclear research is of such high quality that the country is clearly nearing the threshold of a'Wespoas capability Sweden around l965 will be faced with the decision whether or not to go ahead vith the development of nuclear weapons If the decision to continue is made the Swedes could start testing by 1967 68 Moreover if the Swedes decide to press ahead after the first detonation Sweden could prObably have a weapon deliverable by aircraft by about 1968 and a missile system carrying compatible fission warheads by 1970 am I a Reactors Sweden has been operating research and test reactors for several years A 651MW'nstural uranium fueled power reactor is expected to reach full power by'mid 1963 while a 385 ms power reactor is scheduled for com- pletion by l967 A plutonium separation plant is under construction b Personnel Sweden is generously endowed with nuclear personnel of high caliber c Industrial Resources Sweden s economy can provide a base for develOping a nuclear weapons capability without serious dislocation d Foreign Assistance Sweden's peaceful atomic progresihes bene fitted from U S assistance and European cooperation but is headed toward at least partial self sufficiency No military assistance 3 Political Motivation The present Social Democratic Government which is likely to remain in power for several more years at least has indicated that some time this year and possibly again in 1965 Sweden will consider whether or not to direct its nuclear production toward the production of weapons Given Sweden's strong disinclination to develop nuclear weapons it is likely that the government will procrastinate in a final decision until the very last moment The basic pressures for and against Sweden's entry into the nuclear weapons field are qpite evenly balanced Favoring development of nuclear weapons is the argument that Sweden should not be without a nuclear den terrent capability to protect its independent status in Europe Pressures against developing a nuclear capability rest in part on an expressed con cern about the implications for arms control and disarmament and more basically on a rarely spoken but deep awareness of implications for Sweden's delicate balancing act between Eastern and Western Europe and particularly on concern about Finland s position a Agreement on Non Proliferation Sweden has been an active preponent of nuclear disarmament measures including some going beyond desires She has been careful however to reserve her final decision on nuclear weapons until the final context of the decision becomes clear With a tradition of armed neutrality and a pervasive concern for her own and Finland s independent position between the bigger powers Sweden will not rashly commit itself to forage these possibly effective arms A nonnproliferation agreement might face Sweden with the necessity for a final decision which it is not prepared to make When a choice is demanded however Sweden would most likely go along with the proposal In any event Sweden may be trusted to make the choice which it believee will best support its tenumle position between East and West The direction of this choice could be effectively dictated by the Eastern and Western major powers of whose ability to exert pressures Sweden is only too well 8 er SWITZERLAND 1 Estimate of the Situation Switzerland has a capability of acquiring nuclear weapons sometime after 1970 Despite internal pressures to Obtain a nuclear capability the Swiss have declined to do so in order to pursue their neutralist peaceful policy as has done Sweden 0n the other hand they recently rejected by popular vote a proposed laW'which'would have forbidden the development of atomic weapons 2 a Reactors 1 teaching reactor negligible power 1959 2 1 megawatt reactor 1959 3 1-20 watts reactor 1959 1 KW reactor 1959 5 1 20 MN reactor 1962 GTest reactor Nuclear power program planned b Personnel Adequate scientific and technical personnel are available for a modest atomic weapon program c Industrial resources In a good economic position to support such a program Has large industrial resources but dependent on imports of critical raw materials d Foreign assistance The U S has provided assistance to the Swiss in establishing a teaching reactor in 1958 and has built three of the four operable reactors In addition it is supplying fuel subject to U S safe- guards No military-nuclear assistande 3 Political Motivation Has relatively low motivation for acquiring weapons capability However tradition of armed neutrality could spill over 10 SEERH SW into drive for atomic weapons if Swiss felt their neutrality threatened by an atomic power Their position is less tenuous than that of Sweden with which there are many parallels h agreement on Non Proliferation As with Sweden can act independently in acceding to any agreement and would probably accede if agreement is reached Some chance that the Swiss could take a eecond_look at atomic weapons and perhaps try to save the option of producing them if a neighboring country such as Germany gained atomic weapons and adopted a more aggressive foreign policy Landlocked position and reliance on foreign imports provide almost ideal circumstances to exercise sanctions although unlikely that they would be required This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu