i 5 i SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 13-4 64 The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion gl 13-4-64 Handle Via NOTE This is the estimate as approval by the United States Intelligence Beard No further distribution will be made Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A Indicated overleaf 26 August 1964 t'l'OP 26 August 1964 Controls Jointly TOP ET The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate The Control Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments of State Defense and NSA Concurring I Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State Director Defense Intelligence Agency Director of the National Security Agency Abstaining- The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the U513 and the Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation the subiect being outside of their jurisdiction Th urnent contains classified information effecting the notional secority of the United State in the meaning of the esoionage laws Code Title 18 Secti 794 and 798 The rehibits its transmission or the revelation contents in GENT RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 26M3ult 196k mm semis-ILA To assess the likelihood that the advanced stage or construction at a probable nuclear test site in Western China indicates that the Chinese Commists will detonate'their first nuclear device in the nexti ew months conclusion On the basis or new overhead photography we are now convinced that the previaasly suspect facility at Lop low - in western China is a nuclear test site which could be ready for use in about two months _ Onthe other - hand the weight of available evidence indicates that the Chinese will not have suf cient fissionable material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few months Thus the evidence does not permit a very confident eatimte of the chances of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few enshmemar 6 - months Clearly the possibility of such a detonation before the- end or this year cannot be rulnd out -- the test'mey' occur during thie'period 0n beleaoe however we believe that it will not occur until somtime after theendocflsa 1 Overhead photograplnr on 6-9 Ausust shows that the previously suspect facility near Lop Nor in Sinkieng is almost certainly a nuclear testing site Developments at the facility include 9 ground seer forming about 60 percent of circle 19 600 feet in diameter around a tower rst seen in April 1961 photogephy and work on bunkers near the tower and instrumentation sites at appropriate locations is endow lthe outward appearance and apparent rate on construction indicate that the site could be reeds for test in two months or so The characteristics or the site suggest that it is being prepared tor both diagnostic and weapon effect merimnts 2 Melanie or ell available evidence on ficeioneble materiel pro- duction in China indicates -- it does not prove -s that the Chinese will not have sufficient material for test of e nuclear device in the next few months The on Chinese production reactor identified to date is the smell sir-cooled reactor at Poof-t'ou As of September 1963 Construction was continuing throughout the site including some fairly substantial work around the building which houses the reactor Photography of March 1961 indicated 7 that under constructionst the site -- including service roads end auditions security had apparently'been comleted Thus we believe the reactor went into operation possibly in l the latter port 01 1963 but more probably in curly-1961 We estimate that even 11 no radar obstacles were it would take at least l8 I months anti more likely two years after the etei-ting up or the Poo-t'ou reactor before a nuclear device would be resdyior testing Thus if the Pao-t'ou reactor started operation no earlier than late 1963 and 1 it is - China's Only operating production reactor the esrliest possible date for testing is mid-l965 _ 3 It is or course possible that the Chinese have snothersource oat fiesioneble mteri Such a facility might have with Soviet em as 3 result or the 1957 Soviet-Chinese on W probe ny about theseme time as the gaseous diffusion building We would meet this reactor to be fairly large production reactor There are areas particularly parts or ammo which are suitable tor such a reactor and have not been photographed Since it is doubtful that 35% 33W creactoroi thie tnecoulxi have'been niehedbefore Soviet technicians in 1960 its completion would have depended on a native Chinese effort a difficult but not impossible teak Such a reactor might - have started oyemtiOno in 1962 or 1963 than making available sufficient plutonium for a test by the end or this year h Virtually all Incations where A-B activity 18 indicated and about half of all locations that new be geographically suitable for reactor cites Apart from Pao-t'ou no operating jproduction reactor or isotope neparation plant has been found We believe it unlikely -- though clearly not impossible -- that such an Operating facility exists 5 It is also possible that the Chinese may have acquired material from a foreign amrce lie for the Soviete ve do not believe that in the past they have transferred appreciable amounts or veapon-grade material to the Chinese In the current state or their relations with the Chinese they would almost certainly not furnish fissiona ble- materials to than 6 Obviously it is incongruous to bring a testsite to a state or readiness described in paragraph 1 without having'a device nearlp- ready for testing -It would be technically mdesireble to install much of the 1115m- tation more than a few weeks hd'ore the actual test We cannot tell from available photography whether the installations have yet reached this point -- it scents unlike that they have mainlybeeause some heavy con- struction is still going on However it is possible that the basic workr will soon be completed and that final preparations could be made this fall 7 0n the other hand in such a complex undertaking as advahced- weepons development -- especially when it is almost certain that-there is heavy political pressure for at least some results -- it would not be sur- prising if there were uneven progress among various phases of the magi-em In a number out instances in the past Peiping has been unable to prevent -- and has seemed willing to tolerate -- uneven development in various important magi-one indeed in other parts or their advanced weapons program we have already observed this Sonora-mung seem to be behind schedule notany the incomplete gaseous diffusion plant at ethereal-e T-O- larger and more elaborate then present Chinese capabilities warrant -- for smile the possible nuclear weapons complex near Eeko Nor 8 As for the test one itself Lop nor is extremely remote with poor transportation and comnicetion facilities and we might expect to see the Chinese taking a long leeatim in preparing this metalletion They have relatively few men with the necesaery scientific competence and end they cannot be fully confident that unexpected difficulties will'not amour We believe the Chinese would do everything in their power to prevent a last minute hitch on the testing facility from delaying even briefly China's advent asanmclear power I I 9 The evidence and argument reviewed above do not permit a very confident oetimte'ot the chances 01' a Chinese Commist nuclear detonation in the next few months Cleerh f the possibility of such a detonation berm-e the end or this yeer cannot be ruled out -- the test my occur nut-instant period On bedence however we believe that it will not occur until some - time after the end of 1961m -2 commist China's Advanced Weapons Prom scheduled - for October 1961 V111 address all eepecte of the Chinese prom-am CENTRAL AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE I This document vrae dielerninated lay the Central lntelIIgence Agency This copy is lot the Information and use of the recipient and of persons under his iuriedictlan on 0 need to Irrtow hallo Additional may be authorized by the knowing olIicIole within thelr reepective department It Dlrectar of Intelligence and lor the Department at State It Director Delenee intelligence Agency for the Office of the Secretary at Defense and the orgeelxetlon oi the Jotnt Chief el stat Aaeletont Chlel of Sta lor Intelligence Department at the Amy tor the Depart tnent of the Anny d Chletot oval Operarlene Intelligence for the Department of the Navy e Aeeletant Chlel oi Sta Intelligence USAF for the Department ol the Alt Farce I Director at tnteIligence AEC tor the Atomic Energy DIrectot FBI lor the Federal Bureau Investigation 5- Director of mm for the National Security Agency I Director NetIonaI hotographic interpretation Center for the Central Intelligence Agency 2 This nl may lie retained or destroyed hy burning In accordance with appli- caItIe security raga a or returned to the'CentraI Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the National Photographic etotton Center - 3 When this document Ie oven over-nae recipiente may retain it let a perIad not In eecee e at one year At the end a led the document should either be destroyed returned to the agency or penniu Id be requested at the Iorwotding agency to retain It In accordance with MOD-69A 22 June DISTRIBUTION White House National Security Council Department el State Department oI Deienee AtornIc Energy Cotnrnilelon Federal Bureau at Inveetlgetlon This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu