IEPRODUCED RT THE NATIONAL MICHIVES I a Aummir 524 I a Copy #41 September 26 1964 TU w The Secretary THROUGH 8 8 5 FROM SIP - W W Boston SUBJECT Tho Handling of a Possible Chinese Communist Nuclear Test Following up on our conversation yesterday I con- vonad a meeting yoaterday afternoon of representatives of FR 1N3 and Hito considot what further actions were necessary to prepare for tho possibility that tho chin-no Communist may test 3 nuclear dovioa on or about October 1 Tha following actions were agreed upon and are submitted for your consideration 1 Some time in tho next two or three days thorn will be included in a speech by a highylavcl official a statemant along tho lines of Tab A which will auto clear that up are anticipating the possibility of a Chinese Communist nuclnar toot Tho present possibilities are a apnooh to bc given by Governor Harrimnn on the Far East on Monday or a tpaoch by Sonata Humphrey We are rather inclined toward tho latter possibility This statement would be GROUP 3 Downgraded at lZ-yoar intorVIla not automatically daoloalifiad SECRET IEPRODUCED AT THE IMTSONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIFIED M1 remmawN I D m 534 mom fd 2 would be followed up by press backgrounding ohich would not predict a test on October 1 but would point to the Isct that there is always possibility that the Chinese might choose this anniversary of the revolution to make their first test We have chosen this device in order to avoid getting too far out on limb in predicting any particular time for a test 3111 Jordan is taking responscibility for action Approve Disapprove 2 We propose to send out a new circular telegram to appropriate posts requesting our missions to point out to host governments the fact that the October 1 anniversary would be a logical time for a Chinese Communist nuclear test and seeking information as to specific plans of govern- ments for reaction in such an eventr Posts would restate the 0 8 views on the significance of a Chinese Communist nuclear test and nuclear capability on the basis of pre- vious guidance furnished to them on this subject would outline briefly the general character of the planned v 3 reaction to a first test A draft of such circular telegram is attached as Tab Be This telegram will require further clearanceqr We ask only for your general concurrence in this pr0posld course of action and to the general line to be in the guidance As noted belon 'we may have some difficulty with the Pentagon on this Approve__g Disapprove 3 r The draft standby statement prepared for issuance at the time of a Chinese Communist nuclear test st C will he I 1 IEPRODUCED AT AREHIVEE AumorityN KDQ 5317 4 9 2 5913 me Date we 3 will be reviewed and Ire-cleared urgently an en inter-agency basis This statute use cleared in substance in October 1963 and again in My 1964 by the Interdepartmtel legml Politieel Group chaired by 3111 Jon-den and Rollie white We would appreciate yew concurrence in eubsteme to the tent of this draft Approve Iii-approve 4 One of the met important possible dangers with teepect to tuttiee to Chinese Commie nuclear test arises within our own government There is some real danger that the various agencies of the Murmur will describe the imputation of eChineu cumin tent and mmleer capability in a divergent manner This danger has increased it a result at views tbet be been developing in the Pentagen see below In order te reduce this likelihood it is imartent that the different agencies talk rm the belie script in dealing with m Eat-em officials etc after a China test The inter Intel emittee that has hem writing on the problm of the implication of Chicane melee capebilit has prepared and cleared at staff law including DOD my Itetment of Major Conclusions which it attached at Tab De I have just sent this statement ta Hue My en a part of the basin paper of the interdepetmentel mitten I remained that Fundy be asked to obtain appropriate high-level clearance of these 3330 Gonclulim ahead of the tilt of the report and tut they be diumimted inside the Executive Branch end to putt abroad as initiate in diam-sing the implicatth of Chime Cumin nuclear capability Approve Dilepprwe eager Aulhotiry r ECLASSIHEW MM shl IEPRODUCED AT NATIONAL ARCHWES l 935M eh Dee 1 fo A Discussion of Possible Diifermcee of View One of the important objectives of the interdepartmental emittse under SIP chairmanship has hem to achieve com- mon View within the govth as to the implications of a Chinese Commie nuclear capability As long ago at last tell a large degree of success ceased to have been achieved with respect to this objective More recently Wet there has been growing View in that the prior analysis understated the purely military significance of ChiCom capability This ISA View seems to be disputed even within the Pentagon itself by the 108 organization We have to come to grips with this new view both within the interdepartmental comittee itself and in the Flaming Group The ISA View is reflected John Hellsughton has just sent to it he expresses disagremt with the which has been going to our posts abroad for more than a on this subject He proposu private al inquiries which would include the assessment that vowing Chinese stockpile of atomic weapons will present so get-imr%c% threat to the rede and security of nations on would include an FYI While we wish to restrain or limit the Wine impact we fully recognise the major tion of nuclear weapons These are greatly overstated and over-simplified pro- positiont They would produce to avoid if used Ibresd In our work we that a Chime nuclear test and capability could for us of pounce-military kind the reaction to the first test my be one of believe that the Pentagon tends to mutate the entmt of slam in Min es whol - The cam my tut the utility of a nuclear capsbi ity as an tor limited military probing operations All - diete IEPRODUCED AT TI IE ARCHIVES Authority ND 53 By t ll u-I- u'm Daia In 5 diata danger in this regard is the possibility that the Chinese mists xnay exploit their test if it ocean now to create the impression that their new capa- bility is a major factor in deterring the 0 5 from acting in the present Southeast Asian situation Over the longer tum pressures my ha created on 8 3 bases as a result of this and othnr factors Ind it may become more difficult to manifest tho 11 3 military presence in the area W the great and continuing disproportion between 11 5 and ChiCom nuclear capabilitiaa and vulnerabilities makes Chinese first-use of nuclear mm highly unlikely except if Cumin China's survival worn threatened This is a mammal fact and will be a basic dot-eminent limiting merely the direct military significnme at a Chines- 0am- munist nuclear capability Thi- viuu in to lected in the statmt at Tab of mjor Conclusions Sims this state- mam rail-acts antenna of a considerable debate on the ism raised by non it lean to us to provide bolt basis 1m guidance for backgromd discussion both here and abt'oad m Clearances I 2 6 54 0 f' FE - Mr Green V Whig aim-Hr Gartho f Ir 0 Jan Ht 1q Copy to - Governor Earrim - nals-do Mam FE - Hr Green IKE Ma Ma - Hr Jordan Hr White This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu