MDECLASSIFIED Auh c tym WW My 3 moses g eV w i REPRODUCED IE2 Memorandum some - Mr Bundy FROM myGrant SUBJECT Policy Implications of Far Eastern Rea ions to CONE Attached to Wiener-ammo are country by com1try analyses of reactions to the ONE with reamendations as to US action These were prepared by the appropriate desk officers Reactions You have seen summaries of initial reactions There are certain patterns which deserve - flagging There was no panic With the exception of the GRC whose fortunes are most directly involved most leaders and editors seen to have thought through the replications of a CONE and to have decided they could live with than Much credit should go the twenyear old US effort to prepare opinion for the event It is widely assumed that the Chicoms will have to be brought into the UN orat least that there will be great pressures in that direction Even the friendly press shares this assumption A certain pride in explosion is reported from Indonesia Malaysia and Cambodia Thellackiof such a reaction elsewhereis heartening evidence of the degree to which even such governments as that of Burma see the world in terms of their own national identities rather than as As 5 Nevertheless there is probably a strong undercurrent of pride at 138% among overseas Chinese communities everywhere and this may be shared 'b host country nationals 3 In divided countries there is deep concern that the explosionw l advance the fortunes of the Cozmnunist competitors The GEO called upon to renemnine our policies and the press echoed the line There was bitter criticism of our treaty relationship for tieing the hands of Asim countries One editorial even called the 1951 treaty a good for nothjn treaty 3' In part this unusual wave of criticism of the US was probably ended to shift the blame to the US for a turn of fortune which makes itary conquest of the mainland suddenly a much less credible dream part the Generalissimo may be setting up his usual gambit to convince in this case before the 19th UNGA that to diverge too sharply from GRC wishes might lead him to do something desperate pie 12 Bay 1 5 Sat Inga Bond-I Regain y on the Hawaii Saving Flam is DECLASSIFIED Authority fV Vj 'j S'UOo fly 7 REPRODUCED fiT THE NATlmlAL I iICHIV S NARA Dale d Jti l SECREr - 2 - Immediate actions L Several commerrbabcr-s justified their unconcern by strossing the primitive nature of the explosion This serves our purpose as a first reaction However there will probably be an opinion swing on this matter in any case and I think it would be l e1l if our friends were not too heavily stressing this line when the second bomb goes off or a missile is successfully launched In talking with diplomats we have stressed the token nature of the nuclear force which the Chinese COIIIJIlunists are on the way to developing We have suggested that some such force is to be expect-ed in the not too distant future but have argued that as with the recent ex- plosion such a force would have more political and psychological uses than military I suggest that we henceforth shift toward tllis line 2 A recurrent theme is the need for the US to show firmness President Johnson I s statement coupled with the standing instructions to our posts to forewarn us if specific assurances are needed would seem to answer this problem for the mcment However the linkage with South Viet-Nam is obvious If things should start to slide there fears would be generated around Southeast Asia l ch would bring out the latent fears generated by the CCNE I f another nuclear eJq llosion should follow such a slide we might see the panic which has so far been avoided To protect the Thai we should need to make a strong stand in the vicinity of the Hekong 3 o The need for further educational work in Korea and Halaysia has been mentioned Would it bs desirable to ask General Carter to extend his trip to cover those countries The routine intelligence exchanges presumably are providing the Australians and New Zealanders tith adequate information General Carter is going to Manila and presumably 1 be used to brief Macapagal if that proves politically practicable 4 The Thai expect Sino-Soviet relations to improve and think that this may increase pressures on Southeast Asia In fact the Soviet leadership may possibly be considering whether to take a somewhat stronger position on Southeast Asia to reduce their vulnerability to intra-Ccsnmunist ideological attaok If tllis should happen fear might arise that the USSR has checkmated our pressures against the Chinese Coonnunists Should we consider moving to discourage the Soviets from taking such a stand 5 There is considerable interest in moving to bringing the Chicoms into disarmament negotiations Coonnentators generally assume that - once thoy are brought in -- the disarmament talks can proceed in an orderly fashion toward a world without arms With diplcmats we SECRET - 1H5 NA SECRET - 3 i have already begun to play pretty heavily upon the evidence we have of Chinese Communists disinterest in real disarmament Perhaps we should spread the word as to the Chinese Communist position as to the enormous difficulties of disannanent and as to the likeli- hood that bringing the Chinese Communists in would stalemate ne gotiations Long-term problems I l I need not delay'with the Chirep question 2 The polarization question In the Far East the practical choice for most governments is whether to rely upon neutralism to protect themselves from the Chinese Communists or to assure that their connections with the United States remain good enough to have assurance - of the US umbrella The CONE does not change this basic choice but it dramatizes and clarifies it It is to our advantages in most cases that the nations opt for the US umbrella The other course offers the prospect that over thus the ChiComs will use their superior strength to require the neutrals to tolerate domestic Communist parties and thereby create the seeds for progressive subversion of the states In some cases such as Japan where there already is a domestic debate on the subject the lines will be explicitly drawn So far we seem to have played this about right bw'making clear that we are willing to consider giving further protection but not forcing such protection upon others We should perhaps quietly continue to play the dangers of neutralise as above and we should perhaps weigh in this factor when making policy toward Asian states where the choice is in the balance we do not wish to make reliance upon the United States so expensive or embarrassing as to suggest the desirability of opting for the other course 3 In the specific case of Japan we face the likelihood that the CBC will henceforth weigh less heavily in Japanese calculations and the Chinese Communists more heavily Both to assure that the Japanese continue to opt in the right direction and to protect the continuing CBC-Japanese relations we have reason to try to assure that the price for GRC friendship is not so high as to encourage the Japanese to foreswear it Clearance EA Hr Feerey WV RA Hr Manhard SEA as Dexter SPA er Cuthellt cc M u Mr White Hr Corcoran FahCA Lcrant aw 10 23 64 SECRET DECLASSIFIED 3 - - Authority Add anRooLMD un _ira NARA Daze Bl WE SECRET if Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion REPUBLIC OF CHINA my President Chismg told our Ambassador that he thought the reaction of Asian peoples to the CONE would be enormous and far-reaching that henceforth Asia would never be the same and that therefore the United States and the GRC should work jointly for a new solution Chlang's solution was unspecified but our Embassy thinks he has in mind some dro matic action involving radical stiffening of 0 8 policy towsro Communist China Tlis was horns out hy editorials clearly officially inspired which have renewed in unusually forcofsl terms the traditional GRC demand that tho United States cease its of Passing and provide assistance in logistics to a SEQ counterattsok on the mainland For public consumption Premier'fen told UPI Qctoher 1 that the CCEE would have shsolutsly no effect on tho ERG policy to recover the mainland Recommendation for Action 1 we must be patient with the 886's convulsive reaction to the GONE som% and emphasiso to them that their survival continues to depend on the ovor r h whelming nuclear strength of the United States Briefings of GRC leadsrs on relative nuclear capabilities are now taking plans so 2 At a time when the GHQ urgently needs reassurance of our support we must avoid any action that would tend to create a crisis of confidence Specifically we should avoid a significant out in military assistance we conclude as generous PL #80 agreement as possible for the next throe fears Iv 3 we should maintain close and constant consultation with the GEO so during the tense period leading up to the Chirsp vote in Gsnersl Assembly and should a special effort to assure that the GHC retains confidence in the firmness of our support for its position in the UN - Autho 1 '55- 009 AT THE NATIOHM mantras hig'm 3pr JVERNMENT Aomndum I SECRET This document consists of pp ampies Series A FE -- Mr Bandit DATE October 26 1961 a Law AGA- Grant Policy Implications of Far Eastern Reactions to COM ADDENDUM EA has suggested the addition of the following point to Immediate Courses of Action 6 Because of its claim to he the Goverrment of China the CONE has hit the GRC especially hard In the immediate future and until the GRC has adjusted to the thought that Peiping is beginning to emerge as a nuclear pover it 1-13 11 be necessary that we do nothing which could cause the GRC to question the steadfastness of our support of their international position In particular it will be important that we main- tain the closest possible consultation with the G110 on the Chinese representation issue and that we reduce as much as we can the projected cut in our HAP on Taiwan SECRET Buy U5 Saving Bonds Regzdar y on the Payoff Saving Pier 53 53 WM am 5 I So 0067 mspnoouczo ARIEL ray-3mm Anciliavuew II fgyl l mu Date 91 32 g Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion REPUBLIC OF KOREA Initial press comment was sober and restrained While observing that a nuclear test was predicted some this age and will have no military significance for some time to come the Korean press notes that the one plosion will do much for Chinese Communist prestige within the_Communist world and among the neutrals Linking this event with the new British Labor Party Government which they believe will press for the admittance of Communist China to the United Nations Korean press cmmnentators believe that as a nuclear power Communist China's prospects for UN membership are much better A major independent newspaper said this nuclear capability will provide Japan with a pretext for developing its own boob and that it may also precipitate more positive US policies in the Far East particularly regarding ROK Japan relations A dovernment-owned newspaper commented that the explosion will undoubtedly redound to the benefit of the North Korean regime leading to a possible stepmup in its drive for unification Host papers called for a full assessment of the Korean position pointing out that a new phase in the power relations in East Asia had begun Bold realistic and flexible policies were urged A spokesman for the Donocratic Republican Party said the test had been anticipated but observed that as a result of the explosion the Korean nation should be alert to international developments and be prepared to deal with ROKmJapan relations and other problems with a fresh detensination in Opposition Party spokesman commented that by modernizing its weapons Communist China will meance the security of Korea and that there must be an effort to remove the fear of nuclear weapons soon Another spokesman said the major impact of this explosion will be on Communist China's relations with the United Nations Recommendations for Further Action Although the initial reaction in the Republic of Korea to the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion was sober and restrained and we presmne that President Johnson's speech was fully reported in the Korean press further actions are desirable because of the potential sensitivity of the Republic of Korea to the Chinese Communist nuclear threat we suggest that our Ambassador find early occasion to reiterate the assurances in President Johnson's sppech of October l8 fwe understand i CONFIDENTIAL We Rummy 0067 3 nelanoouorm AT meNMIomLmomvce NARA Dan COWIDENTIAL - 2 We understand that Lt Gen Marshall S Carter Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is touring the Far East We recmend that he visit Korea and brief the top Governmental and military leaders on the Chinese Commist nuclear explosion General Carter has had military service in Korea and knows many of the top leaders intimately It should be wected that some elements of the briefing would become lmown publicly It might be useful to have our Ambassador and General Carter issue public statements after their talks with Korean officials CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED if M Authn ty I 5 2000 i REPRODUCED ARCHWES NARA Date 333 is CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion JAPAN The Japanese have strongly protested the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki voiced strong CCJ criticism of the Chicom explosion stating that the Chinese ignored the earnest prayer of all mankind Suzuki reiterated GCJ support for the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Japanese opposition to nuclear testing by any country He referred to the U S -Japan Security Treaty as pro tecting Japan from the danger presented by the CONE The CCJ has declined to reply to Chou En lai s letter proposing a complete ban of nuclear weapons indicating that this Chinese proposal is inconsistent with the Chinese test The GOJ has indicated that before calling for a summit conference the Chicane should first become apparty to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and exert serious efforts to bring about a total ban on nuclear weapons Japanese political parties except the Japan Communist Party have denounced the CCNE in strong terms Liberal Democratic Party LDP Secretary General Miki stressed the tree lag between the first nuclear detonation and the development of a nuclear capability The Japanese Socialist Party JSP reacted with particular outrage because the Chinese test coincided with the arrival in Peiping of a JSP mission headed by Secretary General Marita First privately and later publicly Marita denounced the Chinese action in forthright tense to Chinese Communist leaders A major strand in JSP statements however is their opposition to possible attempts to make the CCNE a pretext for Japan's developing a nuclear arsenal The Japanese press has been even more_strongly critical of the Chinese test than Government and party spokesmen Press reports have dwelt on the amount of radioactivity reaching Japan but editorial comment has one plored the deeper significance of the CONE While accepting the view that a Chinese nuclear delivery capability is several years in the future most papers do not regard Peiping's development of a nuclear device as a paper tiger Some elements in the press guardedly advocate the view that the Chinese test gives justification for an intensified defense effort by Japan and even refer to but do not accept the argument that Japan also should begin to develop a nuclear defense capability U S Actions Japanese reactions to these events have been excellent from our pent of view Japanese assessment of and reactions to the Soviet leadership change are very close to our own The immediate negative reaction in virtually all Japanese circles to the CCHE indicates that the Chinese Communists have seriously undercut their attempts to cultivate Japan CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED WM Authority 00g 5 fpmicgp meg-m5 NARA Daie 13m Mam A CONFIDENTIAL 2 w We have already briefed the Japanese on the CONE We should ensure that the Japanese continue to receive full and accurate infomation on subsequent developments regarding both the CONE and the changes in the Kremlin For the present we do not believe additinnal US steps Ray Cline is already scheduled to visit Tokyo are required to influence Japanese public or official reactions to these events in our favor 5 a CONFIDENTIAL DECUESSIFIED A 5 1 A as I gfgw 13wa NARA - - e mg mw 675- CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion i lasts THAILAND Newspaper editors and government spokesmen in Bangkok have not paniced over the explosion of the Chinese Communist nuclear device They have noted that the Chinese Communists will not possess a delivery system in the near future and that American nuclear power is far superior to that of the Chinese Communists However they have linked the Chinese Communist achievement with the ouster of Khrushchev and are concerned that the new Soviet leaders may attempt to settle the present dispute with the Chinese The consequences of such a settlement they fear might be renewed Chinese aggressiveness in Southeast Asia which would clearly be dangerous for Thailand Prime Minister Thanom has made this point publicly as have SEATO Secretary General Konthi and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Prince wongmehip Forergn Minister Thanat also touched on this point privately with Ambassador Martin but doubted if an attempt to settle the Sino Soviet dispute would succeed He has asked the Ambassador for a broad evaluation of the Soviet change in leadership SUV is preparing a reply for dispatch today In the future Thai ability to resist Chinese Communist pressure is more dependent on developments in nearby Southeast Asian countries and on Thai confidence in our determination to stay in Southeast Asia than on fear of Chinese nuclear rockets The victorious arrival of the Pathet Lao on the banks of the Mekong without any resistance on our part would be more damaging to our relations than the development of a Chinese Communist nuclear force The threat of an overt attack of this sort would be clearly covered by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Subversion and insurgency are not and are the more immediate danger Our policies and programs in Thailand should continue to be aimed at making clear our determination and ability to remain an effective force in that country and in Southeast Asia and to assist our friends in building up their countries to withstand the threat from the north CO AL DECLESSIFIED Autism 035 0W 9 03 THEE mww-g- Ww inf nu AT CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion BURMA RCUB and Official Press Silent The RCUB has told our Embassy that in the absence of Revolutionary Council Chairman General Ne Win who is in England the Burmese government scald say nothing on the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion The government owned press has also remained completely silent Unofficially the Foreign Office Permanent Secretary told our Embassy that he felt the major impact of the explosion would be to focus world attention on the greater necessity to reach international agreement before the Chinese develop a nuclear military capability This attitude probabhy quite accurately represents the major reaction of Burmese officialdom Private Press and Public Reaction Guarded Cautions about the line to take in the absence of official reaction the Burmese private press has concentrated on expressing the hope that the Chinese will live up to their protestations that their bomb is purely defensive The very limited private reaction received to date indicates that non Communist Burmese are being equally cautious in commenting on the effect of the nuclear blast The impact of the explosion was probably significantly reduced by the long preparation both the Chinese and the other powers have made which meant that the Burmese accepted philosophically the inevitability of a Chinese nuclear explosion 2 Secretary of State Rusk's late September announcement that a detonation was imminent and 3 a general belief that it will be several years before the Chinese Communists have the capacity to deliver the bomb in large quantities at significant distances Potential Reaction to Come The Burmese are distressed by proliferation of nuclear weapon capacity and by any nuclear device testing no matter which country is involved They are undoubtedly particularly worried over Chinese Communist achievement of this capacity because of the increase in Chinese power and therefore potentially in pressure by Peiping to involve Burma on its side in the cold war against the United States we expect that the Burmese will continue to press for the entry of Comnunist China into the UN and other international agencies as a means of influencing and modifying China's policies In this regard the HCUB will actively support any action designed to speed up the prospects for general and complete disarmament including the cessation of nuclear testing and destruction of all nuclear weapons and also the inclusion of China in conferences and other discus sions to these ends CONFIDENTIAL DECESSIHED Authority 000 5 NARA Daze ngect on RGUB Foreign Poligg Provided that Communist China does r not develop into a nuclear threat quicker than we now anticipate Burmese foreign policy should not significantly deviate from its present path their striving to maintain a sincere strict neutral and nonaligned stance and reduction of all foreign influences in Burma nevertheless there will be some compulsion for the Ne Win government to be even more zealous in carrying out this policy and avoiding actions which China could interpret as being unneutral Becommended U S Action Burmese insistence that Communist China he admitted to the UN and to other organizations and discussions through which its policies might be moderated limits the efficacy of any diplomatic approaches we could make to the RQUB concerning controlling the Chinese Communist threat and Chinese Communist nuclear testing Through USIA we can emphasize the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear test capabilities and in atmospheric testing itself We can also seek to minimise the importance of the Chinese Communist breakthrough by conu centrating on the primitive stage of Chinese Communist nuclear development -and on their lack of delivery capacity CONFIDENTIAL I ICE-CLASSIFIED amass W 00 3 Local Communist 'under banner headline in Moscow coverage in many cas to the Chinese detonation was pre e It is reasonable to MbNamara's October 22 or October 2l stat Hong Kong English language and Itwis not special local program re local Chinese populace think we want them to think we are CONFIDENTIAL KONG HUNG papers in Hon s while pro - Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion Kong played the news on page one Taiwan newspaper es relegating it to inside pa presume that CONFIDENTIAL 5 gave the story reduced gee Editorial reaction mpted largely by the change of command official reactions to CCNE ement are being carried in ong Kong prouGRC Chinese language pressd DECLASSIFIED 3 Authon'ty WM 5 006 NARA 09 ch If I CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion There has been no formal GVN reaction except General Khanh's rem marks at a press conference along the lines that explosion of such a device did not make Communist China a nuclear power Radio Hanoi expressed the pleasure of the DEV at the great achievem ment of technology in the Chinese People's Repdblic and described the event as a great contribution to protecting world peace 4 A Pathet Lao radio broadcast picked up in Saigon reacted even ahead of Radio Hanoi in commenting on the brilliant success of the Chinese People s Republic 3 So far as I know the South Vietnamese Liberation Front has not yet reacted specifically to the explosion of the nuclear device However on October 17 the Embassy did report various signs of possible growth of Chinese influence within the Front which included very heavy Front radio reporting on the Chicom National Day and on Chinese developments and activities in general Saigon press comment was divided between the line that detonation of the Chicom nuclear device had no great significance and the line that it would tend to increase Chicom bellicoeity CONFIDENTIAL S VN TJCorcoran 37g By p i mm New 00 4 mm CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion NEW ZEALAND In a press statement made October 17 Prime Minister Holyoake said that the Chinese Communist nuclear test must be unreservedly condemned as violating world opinion and greatly increasing the risk of dis- semination of nuclear weapons He added that possession of nuclear weapons by the Chinese Communists would neither affect the world balance of power'nor specifically change the military situation in Southeast Asia Mr Arnold H Nordmeyer leader of the opposition Labour Party said that all lovers of peace would deplore the fact that the Chinese Comma nists exploded a nuclear device He added that it is regrettable that nations like China with so much need for peace and internal progress are devoting their resources and energy to the preparation of weapons of destruction The Chairman of the Wellington branch of the Committee for Nuclear Disannament expressed dismay at the test but urged the necessity of giving Communist China a UN seat and recognition CONFIDENTIAL WCIIECESSIFIED i Won r A DECEATSSIHED Authority 055 000 II 3'1me MGM Remooucso AT THE CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion AUSTRALIA In a statement issued October 18 Australian Minister of External Affairs Hasluck termed the Chicom detonation of a nuclear device a depressing although not unencpected devalopment He said the device was almost certainly not an Operational weapon and he concluded that it would be a long time before ConmmniBt China will be a nuclear power in any significant sense Thus there are no grounds for supposing that Columnist China has achieved any significant change in its power position relative to that of Western countries Other countries may be tanpted to follow Gomonist China's example However Australia was one of the first countries to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and in spite of disappointnents will continue to work for its acceptance by all coun- c tries including Gcamnunist China CONFIDENTIAL - 006 - e-__ww Mfg Maf- - i ek fz NF IDENTIAL REACTIONS TO CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MALAYSIA Malaysian commentors generally consider the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion to be a momentous development that they regard'with varying degrees of apprehension only by their undern standing that Peiping is not yet a nuclear power due to the lack of a delivery system The Chinese of Malaysia appear to be torn between concern over Communist success and pride in the achievement of the Chinese motherland I Some comments from Chinese sources suggest that US attitudes toward this event reflects a prejudice against Asian achieve ments and membership in the nuclear club Thei alaysian Minister of Finance and others take some comfort in US and Soviet nuclear power as a deterrent to the Chinese Communists There is also general concern about the impact of the success of Communist China on Indonesia and confrontation Suggested'Coursee of Action 1 The US should stress its long standing policy of opposing nuclear proliferation from any quarter 2 Reiterate US determination to defend freedom in Southeast Asia while making evident its ability to do so This might include visita by US nuclear nasal vessels to friendly ports in the area 3 Possible visits by US exports to friendly SEA capitals to pro- videinfonnation to important leaders on the significance and potential of the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion CONFIDENTIKL DECLESSIFIED Authority @955 00 N- Fm GNAL 5 REPRBDUCE nite NARA new WW mm - as I CONFIDENTIAL Reactionsto ChiCom Nuclear Explosion PHILIPPINE We have no reports of comment by prominent Filipinos regarding the CPR testing of a nuclear device Press reaction ranges from sardonic to serious and first reports indicated that treatment of the story was relatively restrained The reapected Manila Bulletin commented that if signs are lacking of undue concern over Red China s explosion of an atomic device with a second one expected in the near future the consensus appears to be that confidence in our defense posture has been heightened as a result of American commitments President Macapagal secured during his recent State other newspapers carried stories to the effect that manila would be safe from fallwoutg that Russia is in the best position to restrain the CPR and prevent the spread of nuclear knowehow and that it is under- standable that President Johnson appealed to the USSR for continued ad herence to the test ban treaty Prior to the explosion cur Charge called on Foreign Affairs Secretary Mendez and left'with hie a statement by Secretary'Rusk on the possibility of a Chinese nuclear explosion together with a copy of talking points on the subject prepared by the Political Section Recently3 we have suggested to the Embassy that in View of the test it expedite an earlier proposal to brief Macapagal on the subject of Chinese nuclear capabilities bearing in mind post explosion authoritative comments emanating from washington Widely publicised statements by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk regarding the unequivocal nature of our commitment to defend the Philippines from any quarter coming shortly before the eXplosion were well timed and probably have helped vitiate Philippine apprehensions we believe it would be useful in diminishing Philippine fears of China heightened by the nuclear test to keep our military commitment before them through frequentznention of it on an official level and through USIS out put CONFIDENTIAL Maurie 7 5 000 strangle swat Reactions to ChiCoa Nuclear Explosion INDONESIA Public statements by Indonesian leaders have ranged from highly landitory to relatively noncommittal Abdulgani Coordinator Minister for Public Relations praised the test as proving that Asians have capabilities equal to those of the West asserted that the test would serve to halt western encirclement of the peoples of Asia and Africa and held that a Chicom nuclear weapons could not be considered aggressive because only nuclear weapons in capitalist hands were aggressive Foreign Minister Subandrio on the other hand stated that he believed the Chicom test would expedite the process of disarmament but that Indonesia was in clined to oppose nuclear explosions especially when conducted near Indonesian territory The press has generally taken the lauditory'nbdulgani line welw coming the test as a proud example of Asian capabilities and a setback 'to the reactionary West Subandrio's reserved statement has been played down Subandrio has told ambassador Jones privately that he feels that Chicom test increases the need for Indonesia and other SEA countries to unite against the enhanced Chicom threat He then took the familiar line that Malaysia would inevitably be dominated by the Chinese and asserted that it was now even more necessary for Indonesia to crush Malaysia before this happened Since he could not see the US defending Indonesia against the Chicoms he believed Indonesia must defend itself and build its own alliances Ambassador Jones commented that while Subandrio's comments can be largely discounted as a line for US consumption he did believe the Chicom test might have a sobering effect on the Indonesians Recommendations 'We might take advantage of Sdbandric's privately expressed fears to press the point that Indonesia through such public statements as Abdulgani's has moved far ahead of the rest of the none communist world in glorifying the Chicom achievement thereby publicly encouraging the very development Subandrio professes to fear If as Ambassador Jones surmises the test actually will have a sobering effect on the Indonesians this line might help to inject some moderation into their hitherto chiefly chauranistic anti4Westernreaction wan-Mad gummy M90753 00 989513 55 DECLASSIFIED 923 3 52 3 6 v NARA CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to ChiCom Nuclear Explosion LAOS There has been little reaction so far the news of the ChiCom eXplosion being overshadowed hy Khrushchev's downfall Over the long run however we can expect this development to cause considerable concern to nonuCommunist Lao who will see it as giving Communist China increased ability to intimidate its neighbors The Pathet Lee on the other hand will welcome this develOpment as further strengthening the Asian socialist camp we doubt however that in itself this will necessarily lead to an intensification of PL military activities in the near future Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and most non-Communist Lao see Communist China and North Viet-Nam as the main threats to Laos and Southeast Asia generally at the same time they recognize that only the power of the United States prevents the greater advance of ChiCom influence into the area Aside from US Government statements on the significance of the ChiCom explosion such as-the President's address of October 18 no special action appears necessany in Laos to deal with the situation Present 0 8 poliqy of firm support for Souvanna and his government together with evidence of the U S commitment in Southeast Asia should continue to he our main answer to the threats from Peiping and Hanoi CONFIDENTIAL This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu