EYE-WED PM 3 mm 1w ATION JCS M- 10 1 3 -64 EXEMFHON- E0 1 6 3- DATE- 0 DEC 1954 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRE ARY OF DEFENSE Subject A Military Appraisal of Chinese Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons U l The Joint Chiefs of Staif have prepared a military- appraisal of the implications of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense ISA 1-28605 64 dated 1 October 1964 subject as above A copy of the appraisal is attached 2 The possibility of a Sine-Soviet rapprochement leading to a resumption of Soviet military aid to the Chinese communists CHICOMs would inject new dimensions into the problem Should such a situation develop consideration of adjustments to the US posture would be required prior to the time the CHICOMs could attain I significant operational nuclear weapons delivery capability 3 The US military posture in the Pacific provided for in plans which are etiectire through 1970 is considered generally adequate to meet US security requirements assuming the CHICOMs continue to develop their own independent weapons I delivery capability without external aid or assistance US military planning has anticipated that Communist China would progress toward achieving a nuclear capability The threat of an evolving CHICOM nuclear capability will continue to be re ected in US military posture planning for subsequent years based on estimates of the progress the CHICOMs achieve 4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that a The implications of CHICOM acquisition of nuclear 1alreapuns on their strategy in conducting wars of national libera a i ag The CHICOMs will attempt to exploit their nuclear capability- gtend their influence over their Asian neighbors thereby attempting to attenuate us influence Infiltration and insurgency probably would constitute Peiping's chief instruments of aggression If the CHICOMs attain an intercontinental nuclear delivery capability their confidence in their ability to extend their influence by political and economic means short of overt military action will increase b The effects of a limited use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against US forces and bases The probability of a direct confrontation with the United States or the presumptive use of nuclear weapons against US forces and bases will not significantly ' increase If the CHICOMII attain an operational intercontinental delivery system there is danger that they might misjudge US will and determination to stand by its commitments in Asia CHICOM employment of nuclear weapons against US forces and bases should provoke immediate US nuclear retaliation c The possibility and danger of a CHICOM transfer of nuclear weapons to other nations A CHICOM transfer of nuclear weapons to the custody of other nations appears unlikely although deploy- ment under CHICOM control is possible d The effect on US defense arrangeiments especially in Asia more specifically in India and Japan The United States must demonstrate firm support of our Asian allies against CHICOM aggression and nuclear blackmail if it is to maintain a position of leadership and influence in the Far East 1 The United States should increase its effort to attain objective level forces and force improvements through MAP for Korea the Republic of China the Philippines and Thailand 2 As a corollary to the Presidential address to the nation made on 18 October 1964 which offered nations support against CHICOM nuclear threats and blackmail 3 The United States should explore the possibility of broadening and strengthening to build a stronger alliance or alliances or study the feasibility of developing an effective multilateral regional alliance that would provide greater unity for common defense and cause a greater contribution of standing forces and resources by our allies II US military planning and assistance for India should continue to reflect collective action by Us and other Free World forces of the magnitude required to stop a maximum supportable communist attack and to restore the status quo as outlined in dated 26 December 1963 subject Contingency Planning - India 5 Japan should be persuaded to increase her defense efforts including enlarged conventional forces to be used in the common defense of Asia and should provide military assistance to other nations e The military Esture the United States must adopt to cope with the CHICOM nuclear capability A credible US military posture is required to deter GHIGGM aggression and prevent the CHICOMs from effectively using their nuclear capability to threaten and blackmail Asian nations Implications of CHICOM nuclear capability on us posture include 1 Throughout the three stages of CHICOM nuclear develop- ment listed in the referenced memorandum US forces must have the capability to deter the the CHICOM nuclear capability should deterrence fall 5 2 Highly mobile ground air and naval forces capable of rapid deployment and supported by modern airlift sealift forces will continue to be required 3 Stt i i 3 Although US military poeture in the Paci c does not appeat to require adjustment at certain man each at defeau thou be tun-examined in light 0 the evolving cmcou nuclear threat At you meant the Joint Chiefs of Bta are presently reviewing a BB Raw study of US military millennium in the man Ocean area t The Eat-moo h Communist China oi nuclear mug will not to the indefinite intern-alter the real relations of me ml the gig states orthe halanceofmileerlnA-ia A cmcou nuclear capability need not impoee new restrictions on the HE spouse to aggression in Asia that impinge- on US eecurity intereete B The Joint Chiet'e of Staff recommend that the attached appraisal be considered in future national policy planning aotlone with the under etaading that thin is only an initial appraiul based on the evidence available at this time For the Joint Chiefs of Staff SIGNED EARLE G WHEELER Chairman Jnirzt Chi ft of Staff Attachment APPENDIX A MILITARY APPRAISAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACQUISITION s1 vitreous U GENERAL 1 Pu ose a The purpsse bf this appraisal is to analyse the 2 implications of the emergence of Cnmmunis China as a 3 nuclear power based on the following stages of weaponry development 5 A limited capability based on possession of 6 20 - 30 weapons using current delivery systems 7 2 An effective mid-range delivery system based on possession of Jet bombers or ballistic missiles which could feliver a significant over 50 number of war heads on targets within 800 200 SE auu of ll 3 An intercontinental delivery system based on 12 a finite but limited capability no less than ten 13 nor more than 100 ICENS to attack targets in 1he 1H United States and Europe 15 b The appraisal addresses the following 16 1 CHICOM strategy in conducting wars of 17 national liberation 18 2 The estimated effugtsof a limited use or 19 threatened use of nuclear weapons against US forces 20 and bases El 3 The possibility and danger of a CHICOM transfer 22 of nuclear weapons to other nations to include 23 North Vietnam North Korea and Indonesia 2h H Implications for US defense commitments par icu- 25 'r'13 in Isis or sp-cifically in Indir ard Japan 25 5 The nature of the military posture which 27 the United States must adopt to cope with the 28 CHICOM threat 29 1 5'13 Graft-Es 3 LE ll dai i 1 233389 ET 2 General Considerations a This appraisal is based on the assumption that the USSR will not resume extensive military aid to Communist China although a degree of political accom- modation between the two may be reached A Sino-Soviet rapprochement leading to the resumption of extensive military aid to the CHICOMs would inject new dimensions into the problem Should such a situation develop consideration of adjustments to US posture would be required prior to the time the CHICOMs could attain a significant operational nuclear weapons delivery capability b Communist China exploded its first nuclear device on 16 October 196h US strategic planning has been pre- dicated on this eventuality and its timing was predicted with some accuracy c As time goes by the importance of the evolution of Communist China as a nuclear power will weigh ever more heavily on the entire spectrum of US diplomatic and military actions ESTIMATE OF CHICOM NUCLEAR THREAT 3 CHICOM Capability to Become a Nuclear Power a A preliminary analysis of the 16 October detonation reveals that the CHICOM nuclear program is somewhat more advanced than pro-explosion estimates indicated Egg 2 Append ix bull-J 12 we of b The CHICOMs are expected to place a high priority on continued development and refinement of weapons and compatible delivery systems c The CHICOMs may be able to produce twenty or thirty fission weapons by the end of 1965 deliverable by their 13 I'U-ll BULL aircraft and two BADGER aircraft It is believed that the CHICOMs are now capable of producing a less sophisticated gun type fission weapon for delivery by the IL-28 CBEAGLE and TU-16 a smaller implosion weapon for these air- craft probably could not be produced before 1967 d It is believed that the CHICOMs could have a limited operational capability with a Soviet type MREM and nuclear warhead by 1967-1968 and an effective mid- range ballistic missile weapons system based on deployment of over fifty warheads after 1970 e There is no evidence that the CHIGOMs have decided to pursue an ICBM program It is believed that ten or more years from inception would be required for the CHICOMs to achieve an initial operational capability with an ICBM system of native design v Implications on CHECOM Strategy_in Conducting Wars National Liberation a From a limited to mid-range capabili_y The acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and an effective mid-range delivery system may result in a more assertive and militant anti-US foreign policy The CHICOMs probably would not adopt a general policy of open military aggression or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks Infiltration and insurgency would continue to constitute Peiping's chief instruments of aggression The CHICOM primary 3 Appendix mm qmmp-wmw obJective would continue to be the domination of Asia by political means attempting to deny IS access to the area by nuclear blackmail b Intercontinental nuclear capability Once the CHICOMs attain an intercontinental nuclear delivery capability their relations with the Soviet Union will become an almost overriding factor in any speculations concerning their strategy A detente with the Soviets could provide the CchoMs greater freedom of maneuver CHICOM acquisition of an intercontinental nuclear capability would as a minimum increase the difficulty and danger for the united States the USS sand Communist China in any maJor crisis Peiping would recognize that any CHICOM provocation could invite US pre-emption as a prelude to other military action The Chinese there- fore might realize that their own actions would have to be kept at a low key well below the level threatening vital US interests Nevertheless the possession of an intercontinental nuclear capability would increase its confidence in its ability to extend its influence in neighboring areas at the expense of the United States and the USSR by political and economic means short of overt military action 5 Threat vs US forces and bases a The CHICOMs can be expected to target US bases and forces as their nuclear delivery capability increases It is unlikely however that these bases would be attacked by the CHICIMs so long as they are convinced that such action would result in destruction of their military and industrial base by US retaliatory nuclear power w 4 4 Appendix b The CHICOMs probably would not risk a direct con- frontation bug through nibbling actions they could test the level of US intentions and determination These aggressive actions would become more probable should the CHICOMs feel that their nuclear capability would deter US counteraction c Availability of Korean and Philippine bases does not seem likely to be affected nor does access to Thai bases provided US words and actions provide evidence of a con tinuing strong commitment to Thai defense Dramatic effects on access to Japanese bases are not likely though there may be some tendency toward restriction In the near future increased restrictions in Japan seem less likely since the strongly pro-US Said recently became Prime Minister US operations from Taiwan bases of the Republic of China will probably not be adversely affected US territories in the Pacific such as Guam can be expected to become of more strategic importance to Us operations d h_ 1 5 Transfer Weapons to Other Nations to Include North'Vietngm North Korea and Indonesia Communist China probably would be willing to exchange scirntific data and possibly provide aspiring nuclear powers with technological assistance Political and military considerations almost certainly would preclude China's transferring nuclear weapons to other nations The Chinese could however deploy to North Korea and North Vietnam while retaining operational control of accompanying nuclear warheads IMPACT ON FRIENDLY NATIONS 7 The long term attitudes and reactions of Communist China's Asian neighbors will have a very important bearing 8% 5 Appendix EL on US security and military posture A drift towards neutral- ism or accommodation with the CHICOMs would complicate US security considerations ASIA 8 The CHICOM nuclear detonation in general has had a sobering effect on some US allies in Asia There are indica- tions that these countries are reassessing their defense postures The attitudes of our Asian allies must be the sub Ject of watchful and continuous analysis The United States must take every action to convince them of US determination to defend their freedom against communist aggression Otherwise these countries will be under greater pressure to disassociate themselves from US influence and seek an accommodation with Communist China Preliminary analysis indicates a The GRC will become increasingly restive as the reality of the implications of the CHICOM nuclear capa- bility undermines their belief in eventual return to the mainland and as international support for the representative position of the GRC continues to erode b Within the Government of Japan there seems to be emerging an internal agreement that the country's defense posture must be re-examined Japanese attitudes will con- tinue to be ambivalent towards this posture Any reduction in the level of Us military forces or expenditures in Japan may be interpreted with concern c India is in the process of re evaluating her defense position Although India has announced its intention to confine nuclear activities to peaceful uses it is recog- nized that India has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons if it desires Despite announced intentions various pressures could lead to a decision to develop her own nuclear weapons capability 5 Append EUROPE 9 Although the principal impact of CHICOM acquisition of nuclear weapons will be on China's Asian neighbors it will also tend to sharpen the proliferation problem world- wide This influence will be felt particularly in Europe as possession of nuclear weapons becomes the symbol of power status for the 19703 Thus the United States can be expected to come under increased pressure from some NATE Allies to make nuclear weapons available to them through a unilateral multilateral or some other nuclear sharing formula CONSIDERATION OF US DEFENSE COMMITMENTS 10 A major task facing the United States in the immediate future and as Communist China attains an operational nuclear weapons capability is to establish credibility of US determination to Communist China the our allies that the United States will live up to its commitment to protect Asian nations against CHICOM encroachment and nuclear blackmail 11 The United States may be called upon for greater commitments including more definitive guarantees and military support as a consequence of the Presidential statement made on 18 October which offered US support against CHICOM nuclear threats a On 18 October 196h in a public address the President offered United States' support to other nations against CHICOM nuclear threats and blackmail As an extension of this protection t 3 Appendix '0 tom-down a b A strong multilateral alliance in Asia would strengthen resistance to CHICOM infiltration and sub- version and provide regional deterrent against overt military aggression The United States should explore the possibility of broadening and strengthening using these as vehicles upon which to build stronger alliance or alliances composed of as many of the free nations in Asia as possible 2 Should the foregoing not be fruitful the United States should study the feasibility of the development of an effective multilateral regional alliance in Asia that would provide greater unity for common defense and cause a greater contribution of standing forces and resources by our allies All the free nations in Asia along Communist China's periphery plus Australia and New Zealand should be considered Such an alliance would require maJor US policy changes to include the degree of integration of US forces into the alliance and the organization and direction of a military struc- ture to support the alliance 3 The political climate in Asia is such that a strong effective alliance seems unlikely in the immediate future However the United States should examine methods for strengthening the Pacific area through alliance c 1 3 5 Appendix 3 -1 12 The United States should make a concerted effort to convince Japan that it is in Japan's long-term interest to assume a greater role in the leadership of Asia Japan should be persuaded to provide increased defense efforts including enlarged conventional forces to be used in the common defense and provide military assistance to other nations If Japan were to assume a larger military role in Asia and commit its forces outside of Japan for the common defense of Asia revision of the Japanese Constitution would i be required I 13 Although limited in country resources and current projected US MAP dollar reductions prevent the attainment of objective level forces and force improvements for Korea Republic of China the Philippines and Thailand positive future US actions to contribute toward achieving these force levels would serve to demonstrate US interests and intentions Build-up of modernized indigenous conventional 9 Appendix I LJ '11 03 forces committed to the common defense against Communist China would hel to relieve the requirement for US forces 1h US military planning and assistance programs for India should continue to be based on collective action by the united States and other Free World forces of the magnitude required to stop a maximum supportable Chinese Communist attack and to restore the status 333 that existed prior to initiation of aggression as stated in JCSM41006-63 dated 26 December 1963 subject Contingency Planning India 15 A successful solution in South Vietnam is essential to the retention of US influence in Asia US MILITARY POSTURE 16 Current US_posture in the Pacific US forces in the Pacific are positioned to support US forward strategy - a posture designed to demonstrate US physical presence to our Asian allies to provide a flexible force to counter a local contingencies il forces have faced the Soviet nuclear threat for many years and to provide air defense These PACOM forces are limited to meet certain contingencies forces must be shifted within the theater until augmentation forces arrive from CONUS 17 US posture vs a CHICOM limited nuclear capability a Until the CHICOMs attain a significant mid-range nuclear weapons operational capability military force levels in the JSOP are generally adequate to cope with the CHICOM threat Initially the limited numbers of delivery vehicles available to the CHICOMs will limit this capability however the possibility of the CHICOMs mating a nuclear weapon to the IL-28 in the near term and the consequent increased threat must be considered 10 Appendix raga Targets in close proximity to mainland China especially Taiwan Japan Southeast Asia and South Korea will be more vulnerable to nuclear attack It may be no longer prudent to leave generation of active air defense until after a contingency situation begins Consequently a re-evaluation should be made of the air defense capability in the PACOM area b During this time period maintaining and using as appropriate flexible forces with both a conventional and nuclear capability in forward areas becomes most important to provide visible evidence to our allies as well as to the CHICOMs that the US defense commitment is firm This is especially pertinent in Southeast Asia where CHICOM expansionist efforts are most active c At the request of the Secretary of Defense the JOint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing a Us Navy study of US military requirements in the Indian Ocean area 18 US_p9sture vs a CHICOM mid range capability a Uhited States military power will exceed that of the CHICOMs even if they attain a significant mid-range nuclear delivery capability However several factors may tend to degrade the credibility of the US deterrent to the Asians US forces in the Far East will be more vulnerable and the CHICOM nuclear threat may inhibit some host countries' acceptance of US bases although this does not seem likely The United States would have to increase alert measures dispersal and adopt other tactics to improve security of its forces and may be required to commit additional forces to meet contingency situations b Adjustments to US posture that may be required to meet the CHICOM MRBM threat will be assessed in the appropriate JSOP planning cycle as the threat is more definitively identified 11 Appendix m 19 E _posture vs a CHICOM limited intercontinental delivery capability The implications of a limited intercontinental ballistic missile capability pose several major problems Modern nuclear weapons delivery capabilities continental air defense detection and warning systems and a mix of modern conventional forces will be required a In view of the options that would be available to the CHICOMs for employing this nuclear capability US forces must have the ability to deter the employment of the CHICOM nuclear capability should deterrence fa11 Appendix c If the CHICOMs attain sufficient intercontinental 1 delivery capability to pose a significant threat to the a United States the US deterrent vis-a-vis Communist China 3 could attenuate somewhat unless the Chinese are convinced that the United States maintains the will and capability to 5 destroy or neutralize the CHICUM nuclear threat If the 6 deterrent fails the CHICOM land farces would become a more 7 significant factor to the US strategy in Asia The 8 CHICOMs might commit forces to test the level of US and 9 allied intentions Highly mobile ground air and naval 10 forces capable of rapid deployment supported by modern ll airlift sealift forces will continue to be required to deter12 the CHICOMs from exercising their ground capability 13 d Modern nuclear weapons delivery capabilities l continental air defense detection and warning systems 15 and a mix of modern conventional dual purpose forces will 16 be required 17 a 13 Appendix This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu