lJ U IU I U C I I I'li L PAGE 61 Dr 6J 110SCOII ACTION EUR-SS IS714 6S Dr SS 1117B lZ 1743 EURI363 ACT ON OFFICE INFO PI1P-BI EUR-O PI1A-61 PI10-BI E V-OJ SOEC-BI SOV SI PA-61 PlIS-SI PI1-SI SCC SI FILE 61 IS22 AI GF SOI1L-SI LOG-SII ADS-SO INR-B5 SS SO CIAE-SS EB OS 01C S2 OOOE SS H-OI NSCE SS NSAE-SO SSO-66 HA 69 10-19 TRSE-SO o PI1-00 INRE-BO L S3 PA SI OI1B SI NRRC S8 E-SI USIE-SS SP-SO SNP OO C 61 PRS'SI P S2 T-BI DPR OI 1 ISSc II oo - -- -- -- 32440f 1117S3Z 148 46 o I l1S4U I1AY 90 FI1 AI1EI1SASSY liDSCOli TO SECSTATE IIASHDC II1I1EDIATE 799S INFO AI1CONSUL LEHIHGRAD i10SCOII POLITICAL COllECTIVE INFO I I k 1 S --o t 5 0 I oJ en l- 0 I i I L ''C' 0 c e 0 N F IDE N T I A L 110SCOII IS714 SUBJECT 1 SUI1I1ARY UJ I tll Q 1 -- I 1' 0 2 THE U S -SQVIET IIINISTERIAL IIIL FIIIO THE SOVIET j I f UNIOII III A CRISIS Dr POLITICAL POIlER AND FACING I 3 FUNDAI1ENTAL CHOICES - OF GORPCHEV'S I1AKING IF NOT Dr 18'HIS DESIGN HIS 01111 POPULARITY IS IH SHARP DECLINE I 0 ITHOUGH HE REllA INS THE 110ST POPUL AR SOV IET POL IT ICAL LEADERI AND HE HII1SELF APPEARS 011 TNE DEFENSIVE HIS POSITION IS II1PERILEO NOT BY CONSERVATIVE APPARATCHIKI - DR liEN ON I H ITE HORSES aUT RATHER Y THE pOIIERFUL SOCIAL FORCES HIS REFOI I1S HAVE UNLEASHED THE RECENT I ro ' HESITANCY ON PARTY AND ECONOl1lC I EFORI1 AND TOUGHIIESS iJ l OVER LITHUANIA ARE 110RE LIKELY THE RESULT OF GORB ACHEV S ' o u 1 OlIN DESIRE TO KEEP SOCIETY FROII UNRAVELING AIIO REFORI1 ON - Co TRACK THAN CONCESS IONS FORCED BY CONSERVATI VES Icl__g- g I I 5 f - - '7 3 GORBACHE V HAS YET TO FASH ION A COHERENT SYSTEI1 So o THE SIGNS OF CRISIS ARE LEGION SHARPLY RISIIlG CR II1E RATES PROLIFERAT ING ANTI REG II1E DEI10NSTRAT lOllS BURGEONING SEPARATIST 110VEIIENTS OETERIORATItIG ECOIIDI1IC PERFORIIAIICE A'IO sTALLED ECOIIOIIIC REFORII COt FUSING SIGN lLS 011 PARTY REFORII AND A SLOII UI CERTAIII TRAIISFER OF POIlER FROI1 PARTY TO STATE AND FROI1 THE CErlTER TO THE PERIPHERY THESE OOI1ESTlC SHOCKS TO THE SYSTEn ARE COIlPOUliDED BY THE PEll I1Ell UNRAVELIIIG OF THE SOV IET SECURITY SYSTEII IN EASTERN EUROPE AlSO UNACCOI1PAIIIED AS YET BY THE ESTABlISHI1ENT OF INY CREDIBLE ALTERNATE o EUROPEAN-Ill DE INSTITUTIONSo Dr c en en LEGIT IIIATE POIIER AROUND NEil STATE INST ITUT IONS TO g IlEPLACE THE OLD PARTY-OOIlINATED STAL INIST ONE HE HAS m UJ g EXTENSIVElY DISI1AIlTLED IN THt ABSENCE OF A STRONG iii - ttl E ECENTER OF PDIlER OVIET SOCIETY HI S FRAGIlENTEO ALONG iil 0 @Ji THNIC LINES AD PDLARIHD ON THE POLITICAL SPECTRun iti CO THE PARTY ITSELF AS YET STILL THE OOI1II1ANT POLITICAL l - - -3 - 110SCOII muss OF OS 11I7110Z 1743 L AST f ORAR Y o TO I1AIIlTAIN THE UNIOH OR RISK HIS o'm PDLlT'CAL POS'TlON HE HAS HOIIEVER ALREADY IlEGUIl TO PREPARE THE PUBL IC FOR THE PART IAL 0 ISSOLUT 1011 OF THE UNIDN THROUGH THE LAII 01 SECESSION AIlO THE IIILLINGI ESS TO COIISIDER COllrEOERAL RELATIOIlS BETIlEEN 110 COII AIID THE UNION REPUBLICS HE COULD EVENTUAllY PUT TOGETHER A COALITION FOR CONTINUING IIITN REFORI1 EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF ACCEPTING A TRUIICATEO UNION THE I1ID-nAY U S SDVIET I1INISTERIAL IIILL FIIlD THE SOVIET UN10N AND GORBACHEV IN THE I1IDST OF A DEEP CRISIS OF POLITICAL POIIER STANDING AT THE CEIITER OF A CRUI1BLlNG POLITICAL ORDER GORBACHEV LOOKS LESS A l1AII III CONTROL AND IIDRE All EIIBAtTLED LEADER POllS SUGGEST THAT HIS POPULAR ITY HAS DROPPED SHARPL Y OVER THE PAST SEVERAL nDNTHS EVEN IF HE REI1AINS THE COUllTRY'S 110ST POPUL AR POLl TICAL FIGURE CR 'T ICISII OF H111 AND HIS POLICIES HAS GROIIII SHARPER AIIO 110R DPEN 1I1T1lESS THE JEERING I1ARCHERS ON RED SQUARE THIS IIAY DAY PlIO PUBLIC ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION GORBACHEV' S OlIN REPEATED PROTESTATIONS TO THE COrlTRARY nANY SOVIETS II CLUDING EnBASSY CDIITACTS ACROSS THE POll TICAL SPECTRUI1 1I01l0ER HETHER 'HE HAS A CLEAR SENSE OF HERE HE IIAIITS TO TAKE THE COUIITRY AND HOII TO GET THERE IIANY ALREADY REGARD HI n AS A SPENT POLITI CAL FORCE GORBACHEV CONFRONTS CR ISIS OF POIIER CONFIDENTIl L ENTIRE TEXT I TELEGRAM 1 - - - - ---- 0 i INCOMING 6 DESPITE THE PROBLEns GORBACHEV HAS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF REnAlIlING AT THE HEln FDR SOliE TIllE TO COilE HIS POSITION IS UNDER PRESSURE NOT LOST BOLD EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS POIIERS AS PRESIDENT COULD REvERSE THE CURRENT DEClIllE III HIS POPULARITY AIID AUTHORITY NO nATTER HAT GORBACHEV FATE CHANGE IIlll CDIITINUE IN THE SOVIET UNIOI FOR OBJECT IVE REASONS THOUGH ITS COURSE IIILL BE UNEVEtI AT BEST AI D COULD EVEII BE INTERRUPTED BY AN AUTHOR ITAR IAll INTERREGIlUIl END SUI1I1ARY CRISIS OF POLITICAL POIlER - E TAGS O 123S6 OECL OAOR PGOV PINR us I I1- It I ' '- Department of State 'f J6rJ I INSTITUTION IS BESET BY FACTIOIIAL STRUGGLE AND PRO ABLY lGBP D DOOIIED TO SPLI T AT THE 28TH PARTY COIIGRE SS TH IS JUL Y DR I IT IS A CRISIS OF GDRBACHEV'S HAKING IF NOT OF HIS DESIGN FIVE YEARS or GORBACHEV'S PERESTROYHA HAVE UNDERI1I1IED THE KEY IIISTITUTlON Dr POLITICAL POIIER IN THE SOVIET UNIOH THE COI1I1UIIIST PARTYoo GORBACHEV HAS SHORlL Y THEREAFTER 4 THE SUCCESS OF GORBACHEV'S EHORT TO nODE NlZE SOViEt SOCIETY AND AT THE SAHE TillE KEEP THE FEDERATION TOGETHER APPEARS IIICREASINGL Y PROBL EI1AT ItAL DEI10CRAT IIAT ION AND Il RKET RErORnS ARE HEQE EXACERBAT ING REGIONAL ETHIIlC AHD CLASS TEH ION AND THUS COI1PlICATlH THE FORGIN OF THE NAT 10llAL CONSENSUS NEEDED FOR FURTHER EFORI1 TRUE TO HIS PAST GORBACHEV IS PROBABLY IIfCLII EO TO 110VE BOLDLY TO RE OLVE THE CURRENT CRtSI H ' HA AIO THAT TilE flUT YUR DR YEAR AND A HALF I ILL nAHE OR BREAK JHE PErORIl PROCES HEVERTHELESS HE IIAY FIIID JHE E IS NO BOLD DEPARTIIRE THAT IIILL ALLCII I 10 H P 80lH RHOPII Ofl TRnCK AND JHE FEOERATIOH TObEIHER o S IF GOQ8ACIIEV Ii FOPCED ID ICT IN THE SHORT RIIH HE I1AY HAVE TO iACRIFlCE rll HIHG A r AO l J R r OR A o 0 oo oooooo o COI1PROI1ISED THE PAIITY' S IlIGHT TO RULE BY GUTTING IIARXlsn-LElliNISI1 LEG lIZING A IIULTIPAR'TY SystEn 110 PERI1ITTIIIG REVtLATlOII Of THE PARTY'S PA T CRII1ES PRESEIIT CORRUPT 1011 AIID HISTORICAllY INEPT ECOIIOI1IC I1II1AGEnEHT - ijNDERCUT THE PARTY' ABILITY TO RULE BY REI1DVINb IT FROII THE DAY IO OAY l1AIIAGEnHIl Of THr ECOIIOIIY 110 IN ISTING DN IIiE rPARATIDU Of PARTY AND iTAlE AIID --SERIOUSLY STR IIIEO THE pnRTY' IIILL TO RULE BY BAHDDNIIIG REGIOIIAL PAIlJY LEADER fACED BY I1nllllll ' PUBLIC DI COllTGBPtIl RFfIl ING TO PROVIDE DGBPTAIIEO POlICY GUIDANCE AND TRllmlflG THGBP PRIVilEGE Of POIIFF o 'IIQ o D oo a oo e ' 00 oo o If' t' o oo ao o o lIZ- 0 GONF fDENlIAL QI oo oo EURI363 R lIUIH I Ur I I I HL DejJartnlcnt 'of Stu te 'PAGE 112 OF 113 MOSCOII 'I iu 110 OF II 1117BOl 1743 MOREOVER GORBACHEV HAS FURTHER UNOLRCJT THE AUTHO iITY AND POIIER OF THE PARTY BY PERSONAL XA IPlE tY PRE ERINC THE ROLE OF PIl SIOENT TO THAT OF GEHERAL SECRETARY AT THE SAME TIllE THE FLIGHT FROM COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MOHTHS HAS ONLY FURTHER SHAHEN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MAKING COMMUNISM APPEAR THE SIIAMp or THE PAST INSTEAD OF THE IIAVE OF THE FUTURE EURI363 Ill AS GORBACH V HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED HE HAS YET TO CREATE A NEil $YSlEl1 TO REPLACE THE OLD p ARTY -DDMI NATED STALINIST OIlE HE HAS THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED AND EXTENSI VEl Y DISMAlllLEO TD BE SURE THE ELEMENTS OF A NEil SYSTEM loRE pRESEIIT THE NEil EXECUTIVE pRESIDErICY THE REFORMED MORE DEI10CRATIC SYSTEM OF SOVIETS GREATER RESPECT FOR THE R'ULE OF LAII THEY HAVE NOT YET MATURED INTO A COHERENT I HOLE HOIIEVER 14 PARTY FACTlOIlS NOli EXIST III ALL BUT liAr-E THE LEFTIIING CENTERED 011 THE DEMDCRATIC PLATFORII IS IIAGING AN INSURGENCY - APPARENTLY IIIlH SDME SUCCESS - FOR COIITROL OF PARTY ORGAIIIZATlOIlS THE RIGHTIIIIIG HAS ApPARENTL Y FOCUSED ITS HOPES 011 THE CREATI 011 OF A RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AS A COUIITERIlEIGHT TO HAT IT SEES AS A TOO LIBEPAl ALL-UNIor PARTY BOVIIlG TO THE INEVITABLE THE PARty LEADERSHIP HAS JUST IIDORSED SUCH A PART AND MOVED TO COOPT Il AFTER HAVING RAILED AGAINST IT FOR tHE PAST- YEAR NON-RUSSIAN REpUBL IC PART IES HERE TH Y HAVE NOT ALREADY COLLAPSED BEFORE MAlIOllAL 1l0VEI1WT lAS IN THE BALTICS ArID TRANSCAUCASIA' ARE II1CREASIIIGL1 INFECTED By NATIOflAlISII AND ARE PUSHING FOR A FEDERAL PARTY STRUCTURE FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST THE CENTER LED BY GORBACHEV IS TRYING TO KEEP THE DISPARATE FACTIONS UNITED IN A SINGLE PARTY MOST OBSERVERS HOIlEVER EXPECT THE PARTY TO SPLIT AT THE 28TH PARTY COIIGRESS TH IS JULY DR SHORTLY THEREAFTER --THE PRESIDENCY IIITH ITS TIIO ADVISORY 80DIES THE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE FEOERATlOll IS STILL IN THE FORMATIVE STAGES THESE BDDIES ARE NOT rLAYING THE KEY DECISIOHMAKING RIlLE THE POLITBURO ONCE DID RESIDENTIAL --THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET REMAINS TOO UNDERSTAFFED UNDERINFORMED lWD INEXPERIENCED TD BE All EFFECTIVE LEGISLATUP Eoo THE EMERGENCE OF IlAIIY REPUBLIC AND LOIIER-LEVEl SOVIETS IIITH A GRE TER CLAIM TO LEGlTlnACY COUlIl IlARGIfIALIIE THE ALL-UNloOlI SUPREME SOVIET HILE GIVING RIORlTY TO REGIDNAL INTERESTS OVER ALL UNION CONCERNS 1I0REOVER NONE OF THE SOVIETS HAVE ADEQUATE COIlTROL OVER BUDGETS DR RE30URCES HICH IS NECESSARY fOR TRUE POll TICAL CL OUT --THE BUILDING OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY THE KEY INST ITUT 10NAL GUARAIITEE OF THE -RULE OF LAII REIlAINS 'LARGEl Y A PROMISE GORBACHEV DN THE DEFENSIVE ----------------_ _-_ _- 1 GORBACHEv'S POLITICAL POSITION IS JNDEEO IlIpERILED BUT NOT BY CDIISERVATIVE APPARATCHIKS O MEII ON HITE HORSES THE NEil POLITICAL S13TEIl HOIIEVER TENTATIVE ITS BEGINNINGS HAS PROVIDED HIM DEFEIISES AGAIIIST A PALACE COUP LIKE THE ONE THAT DEPOSED KHRUSHCHEV EVEN 'IF THE DtHER PARTY LEADERS IIERE UNITED ENOUGH TO ATTEMPT ONE 1III11CH THEY ARE NOlI THE THREAT OF A MILITARY COUP IS LIMITED NOT ONLY BY THE MILITARY'S TRADITION OF 'ROFESSIONAL ISII 8UT ALSO BY tHE fiSSURES IN THE I1ILlTARY ITSELF ESPECIALLY BETIlEEN SENIOR AND JUIIIOR OFFICERS MOREOVER PUBLIC SENSITIVITY TO THE POSSIBILITY or A MILITARY CDUp HAS COMPLICATED THE TASK OF ANY PLOTTERS 'WO MIGHT BE TElIpTEO BY THE SREAKOQIIII OF THE COUNTRY'S OTHER POVERFUL INST ITUTIONS AND ORGAN IIAT IONS 11 1I0RE IMPORTANT THE NEV SYSTEM ITSELf LACKS FULL LEGITlllACY THOUGH IN H1S REGARD IT IS AT LEAST BETTER OFF THAN THE PARTY RHETORICALLY GDRBACHEV AIIO HIS ALLIES HAVE SOUGHT LEGITIIIACY IN DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES PRACTICALLY HOIlEVER GORBACHEV SACRIFICED HIS LEGITIMACY AS PRESIDENT BY INSISTING THAT NE BE ELECTED NOT BY POPULAR VOTE BUT BY THE CONGRESS OF pEOPLE'S DEPUTIES THE CONGRESS ITSELF IS FAR nOM A DEMOCRAT ICALL Y ELECTED BODY o AND POLARIZED _SoclsTY _ FRAGIIEIITEO _ _ _ _-- - 12 IH THE ABSENCE O ORDER IlIPOSEO FROIl THE CENTER AN INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED SOVIET SOCIETY NAS CONTINUED TO FRAGIIENT ALONG NATIONAL LINES AND POLARllE 011 TNE POL IT ICAL SPECTR M 16 RATHER GORBACHEV IS THREATENED BY THE POIlER uL SOCIAL FORCES HIS REFORIIS HAVE UNLEASHED RECENT 1I0VES By GORBACHEV o THE CENTRAL COIlIlITlEE DPEN LETTER BLASTING PARTY RADICALS THE TOUGH TAIID 011 l IlHUANIA AND THE HESITAIICY orl ECOIIOIIIC REFORII o ARE 1I0RE LJIIH Y THE RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S OliN DESIRE TO KEEP SOCIETY FROIl UtlRAVH IIiG AND REFORII 011 TRACK THAll COllCE IOIIS fORCED BY COII ERVATIVES - IN TNE PAST TIIO 1I0NTHS THE THREE iALTIC ST4lES HAVE DECLARED THEIR INDEl'EIIOENCE AND UKRAINIAN SEPARATISTS VOII BII IN SOVIEt ELECTIOII IN VE iTERN UKRA GBP MOSCOII'S GRIP OVER EVUITS III TRAII CAUCASIA IS TENUOUS SENTI liE NT FOR 11i0EPEIIOElICE III 110LDAVIA IS GROVING EI1ERGIIIG I LAIlIC FUIIOAIIGBPN1ALISlI HAS GIVEN NEil EDGE TO ANTI'RU S IAll AIIO Arlll-SOVI T ATH1UOES IN CENTRAL ASIA --ACR OSS THr COIINIRY GORBACHEV AND HIS REFORII PROGRAII ARE COI1IN UIIOER III REA IIIG PRESSIJRE Ai LEFT AD RIGHT-VIIIG POPUL ISI1 GAIN TRrJl TN l Jl iAt llE l aNO o o eo o o ee o ' '1 o C1e MOSCOII 15714 SO OF as 111700Z IH3 ATTACKS GORBtCH V AND HIS BRAND DF REFORI1 1I0RKERS ARE ORGArlZ NG o LArGELY BY 'DUSTRY AliD REGION - TO SECURE THEIR SHARE OF A DltllNISN ING ECONOIIIC PIE I ITH LITTLt REGARD FOR THE GREATER INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AS A HOLE PARTY SpL ITTI G 13 AT THE SAllE TIME A BITTER STRUGGLE IS UIIOERVAY IN THE PARTY IH ICH DESP ITE GORBACHEV'S REFORIIS REIIAI NS THE DOMINANT POLITICAL INSTITUTION NOT SO IlUCH FOR ITS SOUL AS FOR ITS PROPERTY AIID RESOURCES DEEP SpL ITS III THE LEADERSHIP ARE NOV PUBL IC KllOVLEOGE AS GORBACHEV CHAllENGES RYZHKDV'S ECOIIOIlIC REFDRM PROGRAM ArlO SHEVARDNAOZE AIID L1GACHEV TRADE CHARGES OVER tHE TB IllS I TRAGEDY OF APRIL 1989 -_ -- _-- _--- _- _ -- - oo 1 o o oC o TELEGRAM --_ _--_ _---- NEil SYSTEIl HAS HOT COALESCED INCOMING o o ftQ ' 17 AGAINST THE BACKGROUND O GROIIING SOCIAL UJlRr T PERESTROYHA AN EFFORT to 1I00ERHIZE OVIGBPT OCIETY ECONOIIICALLY AND POLITICALlY HILE HOLDING THE FEDERATION TOGETHER LOOH IIICREA INGLY PROBLGBPI1ATICAL THE EHORT IS BECOMIIIG IIORE DHPLY IIIREO IfI IIIHRIIAL COG7r 'AOtUllOIIS oo 1' o 8 o o CONFlnENTI L EURl3 LUlit I Ut NI I AL l epa t1nel1t AGE 93 OF l 3 liDS COli ISTI4 Ill OF 9S 111700Z 17U -GORBACHEV HAS HOT BEEN ABLt TO FOJi iE A GBP11 hATIO AL CONSENSUS AROUND OEIlOCRATIZATION TO JErLA E T E OLt ONE BASED ON IlARXIST LEIIINISr IDEOLOGY BUTTREssED BY THE LIBERAL USE OF COERCION THAT liAS INCAPABLE OF FO TERIN_G THE 1I00ERN HIGH-TECH SOCIETY GORBACHEV IIANTS INDEED OEIlOCRAT IZATI ON AHD GLASNOST' HAVE ONL Y EXACERBATED REGIONAL 'ETHNIC AND CLASS DIFFERENCES AND UNDERIlINED EHORTS AT CONSENSUS BUILDI G EUR1363 THE LACK OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS IIIPEDES RAPID IIDI EIIENT ON ECOliOlllC REFORII 'SHOCK THERAPY' ALONG POL ISH LiliES STRAINS THE FABRIC OF EVEN A UNITED SOCIETY IT IIDULD LIKELY TEAR THE SOVIET UNION APART 'ECEIlEAl REFOR HOI EVER LEAVES REFORII AT THE IlERCY OF CONSERI AT IVE OPPONENTS ST ILL ENTRENCHED IN THE ECONOIlIe IIINISTRIES o U FOR FIVE YEARS GO BACHEV HAS COIIFOUHDEO THE DoOIlSAYERS lHEN HCEO SV GRAVE CHALLElIGES HE HAS IlDVED BOLDL Y NO DUTIl IlEUVERED HIS OPPOIIEHTS I HI LE RAD ICALI ZIIIG AND ACCEL ER T ING RErORIl ACROSS THE BOARD HE IS PROBABL Y INClI NED TO DO THE SAllE AT TH IS CR III CAL JUHCTURE HE-HAS NDTED SEVERAL TIllES THAT THE HEAT YEAR DR YEAR AND A HALF IIILL IlAKE DR BRE K THE REFORII ROCESS SO HE REALIZES HE CAmlOT DELAY BOLD DEPARTURES INDEFINITELY BUT THERE ARE lIlllTS TO THE BOLD DEPARTURES SOVIET SOCIETY lILL TOLERATE ESPECIALLY IF THEY DO NOT PRODUCE THE PROIlISED ECOIIOIlIC IIELL-BEING EVENTS ARE PUSH ING GORBACHEV TD lARD A CHOI CE HE HAS TRIED HARD TO AVOID SIIICE THERE DOES HOT APPEAR TO BE ANDTHER BDLD DEPARTURE CAPABLE DF KEEPING BOTH REFORIl DN TRACK AND THE FEOF-RAT Oil TOGETHER - - - 23 LENINGRAD IIIHIIIIZE CONSIDERED REPARING TO SACRIFICE THE UHION' - _- _ 15 IF GORBACHEV I FO RCED TO ACT IN THE SHORT RUH HE llAY HAVE TO SACRIFICE PUSHING AHEAD IIITN REfORIl o AT LEAST TElIPORARILY ' TO IlAINTAIN THE UNION DR RISK HIS OliN POLITICAL O ITION A POLICY THAT lOULO PERlllT THE DISSOLUTION or THE UNIOII STILL FACES SUBSTANTIAL RESISTANCE IlITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE lHERE THE Ili1iTARY IN PARTICULAR WOULD SACRIFICE REFORII FDR THE TERRITORAL INTEGRITY OF THE SOVIET 1l0THERLAIIO BUT HE HAS ALSO ALREADY BEGUN TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR AT LEAST PARTIAL DISSOLUTlorl THE LAII ON SECESSION SETS HIGH HURDLES BUT THEY ARE HOT TOO HIGH FOR SOIlE OF TNE REPUBLICS PARTICULARLY LITHUANIA 1l0REOVER A AN ALTERNATIVE TO SECES IOII HE HAS RECENTlY ABANDONED HIS FIRII OPPOSI TION TD BOTH COl FEDERAL RqAT IONS BETIlEEN 1l0SCOW AND THE UN ION REPUBLI C AHD THE CREAT ION OF A RUSSIAn COIlIlUNI T PARTY THE LATTER HOULO PUSH THE PARTY FURTHER TOIIARD AN GBPTHIIIC BASED FEDERAL STRUCTURE A COIIFEDERAL TATE TRUCTURE AIIO A HftERAL PARTY ONE lIoULO PELL THE END OF THE OVIET UHIO'I AS A UNITARY SUTE AND IlIGHT IlA E IT A UNI IED OllE IN NAIlE ONLY THU DOlIN THE ROAD A BIT GORBACHEV lAY BE ABLE TO PULL TOGETHER UPPORT FOR STICKl IG IIITH THE RHOR l PROCES EVEN IF DOIHG 3D REOIIIRE ACCEPTING A TRIJI CATED UNloII IIILL GORBACHEV HANG OH' 1------_ _-----_ _--- o o 0 0 eo _ 9 f Cl _ it to o 0 ' o o ' ' eo '0' o o ClI O o G o o _ _ __ 22 NO IIATTER lIHAT HAPPENS TO GoRBACHEV PEIlSONALL Y THE PRESSURE FOR CHAIIGE FRoll All INCREASIIIGLY REST IVE AND IIELL INFORIlED POPULACE IIILL CONTlllUE OVER THE LONGER TERti THE COURSE OF CHANGE III LL AT BEST BE UIl VEil IH COiliNG YEARS HOI EVER AIID lIE DO HOT EZCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT All AUTNORITARIAN INTERREGIIUIlIlIGHT INTERRUPT IT AN AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR REGIIIE ROIlEVER IF ONE SHOULD OCCUR 1I0ULD BE INCAPABLE OVER ANY EXTENDED PERIOD or DEALING 11TH THE UNDERL YING ROBLE liS OF SOVIET SDCIETY IT DR ITS SUCCESSOR 1l0ULD BE PUSHED FOR DBJECTIVE REASONS TO CHOICES SIIlILAR TO THOSE GORBACHEV NEllE FACES _- liDS COli IS714 ee OF as 11l7DllZ 17C3 U lH ITE RCJIHG PRDBLEIl GORBACHEV HAS A 1EASO'IAGBP E CH IIC OF REIlAIIIIIIG AT THE SOVIET HELtI FOR SOliE 111lE TO COilE HIS POSITION IS UNDER PRESSURE NOT LDST SHOULD HE DEIlDI STRATE AN AB ILITY TO USE HIS NEil POIlER AS PRESIDEIlT BOLDLY AND EFFECTIVELY 011 THE NATIONAL ITY AND ECONDIlIC CRISES HE FACES HE COULD REVERSE THE CURRENT DECL IHE IN HIS POPULARITY AND AUTHDRITY IF HE VACILLATES THE PRDBABIL ITY OF HIS REIIDVAL lILL iIlCREASE CHANGE IlILL COIIT INUE SUT SETBACKS ARE ALSO POSSIBLE ANOTHEIl BOL D DEPARTURE _ TELEGRAM Of State IN SHORT THE TIIO GOALS OF PEllESTRoYKA o 1l0DERNIZATION AND A STRENGTHENED SOVIET FEDERATION INCREASINGLY APPEAR TO BE IlUTUALLY UCLUSIVE INCOMING '0 o 0 o oooo o o o o o e ' o o o o o 0 ef'e o eo o 0 0 o 0 o 0 o00 ' CONFIDENTIAL IIATLOCK EURIl This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu