oo o o o o o ' ' ' r UHtlLASSIEIED I C g oo 4m@ 01 AN PAGE 01 ACTION NODS-00 INFO 07015 SECTO 01 OF 03 N900003-0390 190830Z 0 mt LOG-00 ADS-00 000 W - ------ ----106256 190835Z U 10 0 1908002 MAY 90 ZFFH USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9939 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE FM 03 SECTION 01 OF FOR S AND E O S S - EYES 12356 SUBJECT MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM Ol SECTO 8 U C III JAMES A FOR THE PRESIDENT 0 O gg8 g N I m III m m 0 0 MEETING WITH m GORBACHEV 1 I HAD A LONG AND 4T TIMES DIFFICULT DAY THE HIGHLIGHT WAS A FIVE HOUR MEETING WITH GORBACHEV' S THREE AND ONE-HALF OF WHICH I DID ONLY WITH GORBACHEV SHEVARDNADZE AND WITHOUT OUR RESPECTIVE GORBACHEV TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE WITH USi HIS FINANCING GAP PROBLEMS' GERMANY' AND LITHUANIAN AND HIS MEETING WITH AND DELEGATIONS RELATIONSHIP PRUNSKIENE 2 FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR SOME QUESTIONS 4BOUT OUR REAL SOVIET UNION WHILE c o o IL4SSIFlED 07015 SECTO MEETINGS' HE RAISED ATTITUDE TOW4RD THE 01 OF 03 ACKNOWLEDG ING o o o THAT o o o 190830Z HE HAD ID o 0 C 0 BAKER IQ Bo o mo JAMES A P4GE 02 a 0 C MY m g Z m FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT mu tO 07015 18 FROM Xl mx TAGS MAY m 0 0 Z ONLY DECL OADR OVIP BAKERi MOSCOW' j 0m D DF CAP G ' NODIS g BEEN n O O O 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 IJNCLASSIEIEIj %5 ASTONISHED AT YOUR ABILITY AND MINE TO WITHSTAND PRESSURE TO CHANGE COURSE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS' HE NONETHELESSi SAID WE WERE TAKING SOME STEPS THAT INDICATED WE HADN' T FULLY MADE UP OUR ---- INDEEDY WE MIGHT STILL WANT TO TAKE OF SOVIET TROUBLES HE CITED SOME INDICATIONS THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO WEAN THE EAST EUROPEANS AWAY THEY WANT TO MOVE AWAY ON THEIR OK'AYi BUT YOU SHOULDN'T BE PROMOTING THIS OWNS HE ALSO CITED THE CONDITIONS WE IMPOSED ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AS AN INDICATION TH4T WE WERE TRYING TO BLOCK OTHERS FROM HELPING THE SOVIET UNION IN ADDITIONi HE CITED OUR POSITION ON LITHUANIA AND GERMANY MINDS ADVANTAGE IF 3 SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT IN HIS HOUR OF DIDN' T NEED US TO COMPLICATE HIS LIFE I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WERE NEITHER SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THEIR TROUBLES NOR WEAN THE EAST EUROPEANS AWAY I ALMOST HE NEED HE THE BANK IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO US TAXPAYER MONEY TO HELP FINANCE SOVIET LOANS WHEN THE SOVIETS WERE AT LL SUBSIDIZING COUNTRIES LIKE CUBAi VIETNAM' CAMBODIAi ETC TO THE TUNE OF 10-15 BILLION DOLLARS 4 YEAR THAT NOTED ON JUSTIFY USING THE ISSUE OF LOANS AND CREDITS IS AN IMPORTANT ONE 4ND HE ASKED ME TO TELL YOU TH4T HE WANTS TO TALK ABOU IT WITH YOU PICKING UP ON WHAT THE FINANCE MINISTER HAD TOLD ME WHEN HE CAME TO GORBACHEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION IS FACING WASHINGTON' 4 SIGNIFICANT FUNDING GAP OVER THE NEXT FEW YE4RS AND WILL NEED %20 BILLION IN LOANS AND CREDITS HE WANTS N P4GE 03 SECTO 07015 01 OF 03 190830Z SYMBOL OF OUR INVO VENENT IN THE LOAN EFFORT SAYING THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO SEE SUSPECT SO HE CAN DEMONSTRATE HOW HIS POLICIES ARE SUCCEEDING IN GETTING US TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOVIET NEEDS GORBACHEV SAID THE NEXT FEW YEARS ARE CRITICAL BECAUSE THEY' RE GOING TO MOVE TO 4 MARKET-BASED ECONOMY AND TO CUSHION THE IMPACT AND EXPEDITE THE TRANSITIONs HE NEEDS RESOURCES TO BUY CONSUMER GOODS AND TO INVEST IN THE CONVERSION OF DEFENSE PLANTS TO CIVILIAN OUTPUT THE I UNCI IISSIEIED '- -- o oo 4 o o ' UNGLASSSED o oo o o o o os o 5 I TOLD HIM I WOULD CONVEY ALL THIS TO YOUI BUT AGAIN CAUTIONED ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF JUSTIFYING US TAXPAYER MONIES IF THE SOVIETS WERE SUBSIDIZING THE CUBANS AND IF THE SOVIETS WERE SQUEEZING THE LITHUANIANS ECONOMICALLY 6 GORBACHEV TOLD ME WAS UNDER A LOT OF PRESSURE TO DO MOREi TO INVOKE DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL RULE OVER THE REPUBLIC HE TOLD NE HE' D BRING YOU ALL THE TELEGRAMS HE WAS RECEIVING ASKING HIM TO PROTECT THE RUSSIANS IN LITHUANIAJ THE TELEGRAMS PROTECT RUSSIANS IMPLORED HIM TO IN THE SAME WAY A US PRESIDENT WOULD ACT IF THERE WERE A THREAT AGAINST ON LITHUANIA 0 0 PAGE 01 ACTION NODS-00 0 190800Z 1 0 0 0 07015 SECTO I 02 j000 ADS-00 LOG-00 INfO 1 1 1 03 OF 190831Z W 106310 190835Z i10 MAY 90 ZFF't USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE t935 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE FM SECTION 02 OF 03 07015 SECTO NODIS FOR S AND E O S 'S -- EYES ONLY 12356 TAGS DECL OADR OVIP BAKERi SUBJECT MEMORANDUI1 MOSCOW' AMERICAN 7 HE 8 HE MAY JANES A III FOR THE PRESIDENT 18 CITIZENS SAID HE WAS DETERttINED TO FIND A PEACEFUL WAY TO UNTIE THE KNOT THE LITHUANIANS HAD NADE Tt IS VERY DIFFICULTi BUT IF THEY WOULD SUSPEND THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCEi HE WOULD BEGIN THE DIALOGUE AND LIFT THE SANCTIONS IttMEDIATELY THEN -- ALL THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FUTURE ECONOMIC TIESi MILITARY INSTALLATIONS' TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF THE BYELORUSSIANS -- COULD BE UNRAVELLED AND RESOLVED IF THE LITHUANIANS WANTED INDEPENDENCEi HE'D ACCEPT THAT AS LONG AS IT EttERGED FROM A PROCESS SAID PRUNSKIENE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO SUSPEND IMPLENENTATION OF THE LAWSi NOT THE DECLARATION WASN'T THIS SUFFICIENT HE WOULD NOT FORCE THE LITHUANIANS TO NULLIFY THE DECLARATION ---- THAT WOULD THE PAGE 02 SECTO 4NNSIRE0 THE 02 OF 03 190831Z FOR THEM ---- BUT HE DID REQUIRE DECLARATION BE FROZEN IN ANSWER TO MY BE TOO HUMILIATING THAT 07015 0 ' ' oem 0 I oo 0 0 0 1 llKLktSIHEO I 0 HE SAID HE THOUGHT PRUNSKIENE UNDERSTOOD REQUIRED AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO VILNIUS SUPREME SOVIET TO ACT TO PERSUADE THE LITHU4NIAN ACCORDINGLY NJ WAS WHAT 9 I SAW PRUNSKIENE RIGHT AFTER GORBACHEV AND SHE UNFORTUNATELY' TAKING A HARD LINE ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE DECLARATION WHILE TELLING HER WE WERE COMMITTED TO LITHUANIAN SELF --DETERMINATIONS I ALSO SAID THE CHALLENGE FOR THE LITHUANIANS WAS HOW TO TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD TRANSLATE THEIR ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE INTO REALITY WITHOUT OFFERING ADVICE' I REPEATED WHAT GORBACHEV' S POSITION WAS AND WHAT WOULD PRODUCE AN IMMEDIATE DIALOGUE I ALSO ASKED WHAT THE' LITHUANIANS LOST BY OFFERING A TEMPORARY FREEZE OF THEIR DECLARATION 4 FREEZE THAT COULD ALWAYS BE REVOKED IF THE SOVIETS EXHIBITED BAD FAITH WAS -- 10 PRUNSKIENE AND HER COLLE4GUES SAID FREEZING THE DECLAR4TION WOULD MEAN HAVING TO ACT ACCORDING TO WHILE IN PRACTICAL TERMS I'M NOT SURE SOVIET LAWS THERE'S MUCH OF A GAP BETWEEN WHAT GORBACHEV WANTS ARE PREPARED TO DOi THERE IS AND WHAT THE LITHUANIANS THE SYMBOLISM OF THE A REAL GAP IN SYMBOLS DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS THE STICKING POINT FOR THUS s NOTWITHSTANDING THE GORBACHEV- PRUNSK IENE BOTH MEETINGS WE' RE NOT OUT OF THE WOODS ON THIS ONE 11 HOW I ON GERMANY SOUGHT TO DEMONSTRATE TO GORBACHEV 4ND SUBSTANTIVELY BEGUN TO WE HAD PROCEDURALLY TRY TO RESPOND 03 PAGE TO SOVIET CONCERNS SECTO 07015 02 OF THE 03 TWO-PLUS-FOUR 190831Z THE SOVIETS 4 PROCESS THAT GAVE THEM A THE TABLE AND ALLOWED THEM TO SHOW THEY WERE HELPING TO MANAGE THE ISSUE WE WERE USING THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TO STEER ISSUES TO OTHER FORA AND I OUTLINED NINE STEPS OR PROPOSALS WE HAD MADE 4ND THF GERMANS SUPPORTED THAT RESPONDED TO SPECIFIC CONCERNS THE SOVIETS HAD G i ON GERMAN BORDERS OF NUCLEARY BIOLOGICAL AND ON GERMAN RENUNCIATION CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON NO NATO FORCES FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE GDR ON HANDLING BUNDESWEHR LIMITS VERY HAD PROVIDED PL4CE AT E QUICKLY IN CFE I Is ETC a 40 0 0 i ' 0 4 0 1 F0 4 1 12 GORBACHEV TOOK COPIOUS NOTES ON WHAT WE'D DONE AND WERE DOING AND MADE CLEAR HE APPROVED VERY MUCH AT THE SAME TIMEi HE SAID A UNIFIED OF ALL THIS GERMANY IN WOULD LOOK NATO IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM HE SAID IT FUNDAMENTAL LIKE SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF FORCES HAD TAKEN PLACE --- JEOPARDIZING PERESTROIKA BECAUSE IT WOULD LOOK LIKE GORBACHEV HAD MADE THE SOVIET UNION THE BIG LOSER IN THE PROCESS HE SAID' IT WILL BE THE END OF PERESTROIKA A 13 I HIM THROUGH THE LOGIC OF GERMANY THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLE THAT GIVES EACH STATE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS ALLIANCES HE HAD NO GOOD ANSWERS INDEEDY HE SAID OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT WE NAMELY THAT BANKED EVERYTHING ON ONE PREMISE WHAT IF AFTER A GERMANY WOULD WANT TO STAY IN NATO SHORT TIMEi IT CHOSE TO GET OUT --- SOMETHING THAT WHAT THENi HE ASKED AT THAT POINTi COULD HAPPEN WHEN IN NATO WALKED AND SAID IT WILL BE TOO LATE TO BUILD A CREDIBLE THE IMPLICATION WAS WE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE WOULD HAVE LOST OUR LEVERAGE AND GERMANY WOULD BE A HE BIGs DANGEROUS POWER owe lPKLiSSIPIEI3 ' PAGE 01 ACTION NO'DS-00 ADS-00 03 03 OF yy 190832Z 000 190835Z 10 W 106332 0 190800Z 07015 SECTO LOG-00 INFO MAY 90 ZFFH USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMNEDIATE 9936 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE FM 03 SECTION 03 OF 07015 SECTO IS NOD FOR S AND E O S S -- EYES ONLY 12356 TAGS DECL OADR OVIP BAKER JAMES SUBJECT MENORANDUM MOSCOW MAY FOR 18 A III THE PRESIDENT 19 WHEN I SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ANCHORING GERMANY IN WESTERN INSTITUTIONS KNOW HE SAID THAT GERMANY WILL BE CLOSER TO YOU BUT IT JUST I BE IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IF WE COULDN' T ACCEPT THIS SOVIET POSITION HE MIGHT SEEK SOVIET ADMISSION TO NATO HE SAID RESOLVING THE GERMAN ISSUE WAS A REAL TEST FOR OUR ABILITY TO FIND APPROACH THAT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT A A COMPATIBLE BALANCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN US HE ADDED WE NEEDED TO FIND A SOLUTION WE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THE ISSUE AND HE WANTED TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT IT WHEN SHOULDN'T HE TO WASHINGTON CAME 15 THIS POINT INVITED IN TO A LARGER GROUP CONTROL WE CLOSED ---- OR SO I THOUGHT ---- ON ALCMS AGREEING TO TO COUNT AS ACTUALLY EQUIPPED HEAY BOMBERS OVER OUR PREFERRED AT JOIN US PAGE AND TURNED 02 NUMBER SECTO OF RAINBOW 150 WE l 'gag 07015 03 OF 03 190832Z GRANDFATHERING OF TACIT AGREED ON 880 FOR THE SLCM NUMERICAL 0 Ijl'Pl WE TO ARMS AND A i 4 4 1 1 0 so eo ' i UNllLASSIEIED LIMITr AND GOT TO THEM DROP THEIR DISTINGUISHABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR SLCM IN RETURN FOR OUR REAFFIRMING THE LANGUAGE OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT OF DECEMBER 1987 ON BEING WILLING TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF VERIFICATION THE ONLY RE'MAINING SLCM ISSUE IS RANGEr WHERE THERE IS A BUILT-IN TRADEOFF IN THE WORKS 16 FOLLOWING THE GORBACHEV MEETINGr IT LOOKED LIKE WERE ON THE VERGE OF CLOSING OUT ALCMS AND SLCMS AND THE REMAINING START ISSUES UNFORTUNATELYr IN ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF WALKING BACK AFTER THE FACT IN THIS CASE AFTER GORBACHEV HAD EXPLICITLY AGREED ---- WE WERE TOLD THAT THE GRANDFATHERING OF TACIT RAINBOW WAS AGREEDr PROVIDED WE ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF CONSTRAINTS ON THE MISSILE I TOLD SHEVARDNADZE WE HAD AGREED TO THE ALCM RANGE ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT TACIT RAINBOW WAS EXEMPTED GORBACHEV HAD MENTIONED NO CONDITIONS HE HAD SIMPLY AGREED TO EXEMPT THE MISSILE I SAID NOW THE SOVIETS WERE JEOP4RDIZING THE WHOLE PACKAGE IF THEY LET THE MILITARY IMPOSE CERTAIN TECHNICAL CONDITIONS AFTER WHILE I THE AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED THINK WE MAY STILL COME TO CLOSUREr WE GOT ANOTHER REMINDER OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE PROCESS AND WE -- WHAT IT' S 17 MY LIKE TO CONCLUDING DO BUSINESS NOW IMPRESSIONS FIRSTs GORBACHEV CLEARLY FEELING SQUEEZED AND IS GOING TO REACT STRONGLY TO ANY STEP THAT CAUSES HIM POTENTIAL PROBLEMS PAGE 03 SECONDs GERMANY SECTO 07015 IS DEFINITELY OVERLOADS HIS 03 OF 03 190832Z CIRCUITS RIGHT NOW WE OUGHT TO LET THE PROCESS GO BUT FORWARD CONTINUE TO TRY TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS BEST TO NOT PRESS THEM TO 4CCEPT OUR OBJECTIVE LET IT HAPPEN THIRDr I SUSPECT THAT GIVEN THE PREOCCUPATION WITH GERMANY AND HIS NEED TO POINT TO HOW THE GERMAN THREAT BEING CONTAINEDr WE PROBABLY WILL H4VE TO GET MORE SPECIFIC ON HOW AND WHEN BUNDESWEHR LIMITS ARE GOING TO BE ACHIEVED IF WE W4NT A CFE AGREEMENT IT'5 IS BAKER UNllLASSIEIEII This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu