A _ DECAPTTONED SECRET EXDIS May 21 l C r- -ti r u 990 P ALT I CS THEME PAPER BACKGROUND The confrontation in the Baltics continues to deepen just Lithuania but Estonia and Lativa are increasingly Not involved Although there are signs of movement on both sides as yet there is no reason for confidence that the sides will move far enough to begin a dialogue -- or fast enough to preempt Moscow from ratcheting up pressure further The crisis began on March 11 when the newly-elected Lithuanian parliament formally declared its independence Moscow denounced that move as illegal but the Lithuanians persevered by enacting a series of subsequent laws_that directly challenged Moscow's authority Probably the most threatening move was to end compulsory Soviet military service for Lithuanians Moscow responded with a series of military i '' I I LU z I0 i 0 J U no R N n W C O W U W au C currency although not officially embargoed other supplies were reduced as well Vilnius has tried to circumvent the blockade but its effects have steadily grown with unemployment in early may exceeding 23 000 and growing according to Embassy Moscow the way at once C Z 0 0 w as E J U J x 7 W X o 1 1J perhaps not coincidentally is one USG criterion for V rantin g diplomatic recognition Finally on April 18 Moscow cut sharply supplies of fuel and other goods tradable for hard Estonia and Latvia proceeded at a slower pace partly chastened by Lithuania's example partly because of a afore complex demographic situation i e a larger presence of Russians and other minorities Newly-elected parliaments in both states have declared the start of a transition process toward full restoration of independence rather than going all U C c J U maneuvers building seizures expulsions of forei gners and border closures Those actions appeared designed to underscore Moscow's de facto control of territories and borders which W 1' W oQ Like Lithuania both Latvia and Estonia have enacted laws at odds with Moscow's authority but they have taken more care to be less confrontational toward Moscow in the way the laws are formulated However the basic direction has been the same and in the last two weeks tensions have risen there as well Moscow is taking the same declaratory approach it took toward Lithuania Russians and other minorities have taken to the streets in protest almost surely with some direction from Moscow further heightening the atmosphere of tension Moscow's line has fluctuated on some points while remaining consistent on the essential issue of sovereignty Moscow has not ruled out full independence for the Baltics but has shown no sympathy for that option It has chosen instead to emphasize the pasmili 1 iZ ps4of a reformed federation and even special staiiuZ ' for Z_-he - 3a tic etaJe s t fi 'thin that federation 4o f Co 09 o oo o6 o Jo o o11 o9 SECRET EXDIS DELL OADR SECRET EXDIS - 2 - Moscow has also shown flexibility on details e g talking of suspension -- rather than revocation -- of the declaration of independence and subsequent unconstitutional laws Nevertheless signs are that Moscow's position has hardened recently There is no ambiguity however on one fundamental point Moscow will not negotiate with the Baltics as independent states In Moscow's view they have to come back one way or another under the Soviet constitution before there can be a dialogue As the confrontation has grown the U S has become increasingly concerned and has sought ways to impress on both sides the need for peaceful settlement through dialogue our position has stressed no wavering in our longstanding bipartisan policy of non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR or in our support for Baltic self-determination But we do understand that 50 years have created ties with the Soviet Union and interests that cannot be cut immediately we recognize that the potential for revolts elsewhere requires Gorbachev to devise a process which he can claim credibly to control and in which ail-union interests are not ignored Thus in a number of communications to Baltic leaders the Secretary and the President have emphasized the need for realism and practical steps-that would lead to talks e -g possibly a referendum and voluntary suspension of offending laws To the Soviets the U S has emphasized the need to reassure the Balts that moves on their part will elicit a due response from Moscow that resort to violence will have a sharply negative impact on our bilateral relations and that in the long run this issue will remain an irritant in U S -Soviet relations so long as the Balts are denied their right to self-determination The Secretary's recent meetings in Moscow provided an opportunity to make these points more explicitly than before -- and directly with people who really count In addition Gorbachev was warned of summit complications including demonstrations and the fact that his Lithuanian policy was beginning to sow doubts about the Soviet leader's commitment to democratization as well as the chances of perestroyka succeeding Gorbachev told the Secretary as he had told Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene that as soon as the independence declaration was suspended a full range of talks could commence including special commissions for militarysecurity and economic issues But Gorbachev remained non-committal as to whether Moscow would accept independence Prunskiene replied that she was willing to support suspension of the offending laws but she resisted the idea of suspending the March 11 declaration itself The Lithuanian parliament refused to do so on May oa caa ao oo o o oe ca o 19ac o o o eo e R O BE9 o c r o e so e a e oo o o o a 00 o- o eo e o o s e o oa e o o oa R e oo o 00o o oQo oo oo oO oO SECRET EXDIS o e o SECRETIEXDIS POINTS TO MAKE o You know that we have struggled to maintain a restrained position on Lithuania even after your economic blockade o You also know that we have gone out of our way to support a dialogue and to get you and the Lithuanians to talk to one another -- We have taken some political risks in urging the Lithuanians privately to take practical steps that could lead to a dialogue -- not just offer to suspend their independence laws but actually to do it o o The criticism and pressure on But I'm running out of room me have been growing especially in Congress Frankly I'm worried We have a lot at stake in our relationship and I've tried hard to convince the American people that we have to maintain our perspective and a balanced view of things o But you're not helping me o You're dug in on the question of law and your constitution -- which I can understand up to a point o Now what we see is not only a crisis in Lithuania but one in Latvia and Estonia too o o o Your policy isn't working I know you see Lithuania Latvia and Estonia in the same way as Georgia Moldavia or the Ukraine We have consistently refused to As you know we don't recognize the legality of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940 and are firm in our support for the Baltic peoples' right to self-determination -- Therefore it is hard for us to recommend to the Lithuanians that they suspend their Declaration of Independence They claim that this would amount to voluntary incorporation into the Soviet Union o Therefore I would hope that some way around the legal dispute could be found that could get a dialogue going o I have to tell you that your policy is beginning to raise doubts here in the United States about you and about perestroyka Ga o o R o a ia o a o o o a o e i a o o o o o D o oa 9 ' a o e o o 0 o R oa o o o o o o e a e o o o s SECRET EXDIS - 4 - -- The longer this crisis has gone on the more Americans have wondered whether you're really serious about democratization -- And the more people have begun-to wonder whether you're going to be able to allow democratic expression of national aspirations or whether this is going to be the Achilles Heel of perestroyka o One thing you must understand is that Americans really love and believe in democracy -- Nothing in your program has had more impact on Americans than glasnost the freedom that more and more independent political groups enjoy and your free elections o Because of this -- and because of the changes they've been able to see with their own eyes -- most Americans have been very understanding oGBP your position of the difficulties you face ---And for the most part they've been willing to give you the benefit of the doubt on Lithuania o But that could change quickly for public opinion here is volatile o If the hardship Lithuanians are feeling grows worse or if you use force-to impose your will on them it will be very hard for most Americans to understand how this can be reconciled with democracy and perestroyka o So I'll say again it's important that a real dialogue with the Lithuanians get started -- and with the Estonians and Latvians too o It's not for me to say how you should do this -- I still believe it's possible that the Kohl-Mitterrand formula could provide a way out o I know you have rejected Prunskiene's approach Frankly I think the Lithuanians have gone about as far as they can o Their offer to suspend legislation of concern to you appears sincere and offers an opening to get a real dialogue going o But unless you find a way to resolve this peacefully and to let the Baltic peoples enjoy their right to selfdetermination this is going to be a continuing source of irritation between us that sooner or later is bound to become odre'r our t Yio ifr alr'adk is o @ o o o e o o o e a o o oa o o e G3 o f 096 9 o po o a O o 9 O ryo o o o o o oJo o @ oOO O SECRET EXDIS o I 'T SECk T EXD I S - 5 - SUMMIT THEMES Baltics S P PHauslohner Drafted 5 21 90 SESOVFO 1303 Cleared EUR SOV ARVershbow BUR SOV SOBI RMStephenson EUR SOV SOBI JCStruble EUR JFDobbins S PoWBurns S P JHolmes C CSchroeder j 1 P Molff I na m a o o o 3 o Aa oo e w s e o o o a no R a y eu This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu