Excerpt from the second conversation between M S Gorbachev and G Bush Washington White House May 31 1990 Present from the Soviet side S F Akhromeev A F Dobrynin V M Falin A S Chernyaev E A Shevardnadze from U S side--J Baker B Scowcroft and other officials GORBACHEV If we did not establish personal contact earlier if our ministers had no experience of cooperation and most importantly if Malta summit did not take place then I am convinced that our countries would not have been prepared for the events in Eastern Europe and especially in Germany And that means that we could have made big mistakes Because during periods of high tension one match could spark a bonfire Now we can register the fact that the acute period of cardinal changes proceeded quite calmly in principle even though the changes themselves sometimes assumed some quite sharp shapes both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union In this connection I would like to propose to you right away to focus on the picture of the changing Europe and the processes launched by the German unification as one single phenomenon Because all this is so interconnected that you cannot separate one from another I think there is a real possibility to find such a model of solution for the external aspects of German unification that would not only not undermine but to the contrary would strengthen positive tendencies in the Soviet-American dialog in Europe and in the entire world as well A model that would include some length of time and that would be synchronized with the European processes Then after going through some transition period we would arrive at some new structures of relations in Europe including the relations in the sphere of security During such period it would be necessary to change quickly the nature of the opposing blocs to transform them from military blocs into primarily political organizations In our view such positive intentionality would be solidified by some kind of agreement between the Warsaw Treaty Organization WTO and NATO Parallel to that you could come up with an initiative directed toward reform of the NATO doctrine and the Soviet Union would bring its concrete military structures in accordance with its new defensive doctrine We could develop exchanges between headquarters and we could jointly discuss the levels of armed forces of the future united Germany Simultaneously we could raise the more general questions related to interaction of security structures of the USSR and the USA Finally such a creative approach could also inspire some new options for ensuring security of the united Germany--let us say stand on two pillars--not only in the West but also in the East As a hypothesis I would suggest that it could be some form of associated membership 1 I have to admit that the thoughts that Secretary of State shared with us in Moscow also gave a push to our creativity which is characterized by search of mutually beneficial continuous steps I hope that you also will not let down our hopes and would offer something new Because if we come to an agreement then I am confident the Germans will agree with us BUSH Thank you for your explanations As I understand it we have some fundamental differences in the German issue Possibly the roots of it are in the different historical heritage of the USSR and the USA Your concern your mistrust toward the united Germany are too deep they ignore the 50-year old democratic experience of Germany At the same time one can understand your fears We also fought Hitler but our losses do not stand any comparison with the 27 million Soviet lives sacrificed in the armed struggle with Nazi Germany And yet as it seems to me our approach to Germany is more realistic and has better timing Because the processes of German unification are unfolding faster than any of us could have imagined and there is no force that can put a brake on them That is why the mistrust oriented toward the past is an especially bad adviser here It seems to me that our approach to Germany as to a close friend is more pragmatic and constructive although I have to tell you honestly it is not shared by everybody in the West Some West Europeans just like you do not trust either Germany or Germans as a whole However we all in the West are united in one concern the main danger lies in separating Germany from the community of democratic states in trying to impose some special status and humiliating conditions on her It is precisely this kind of development of events that could lead to a revival of German militarism and revanchism--which is exactly the concern you have It seems to me that without forgetting about those violations of human rights that took place in Nazi Germany we have to at the same time take into consideration her recent democratic experience and start from the notion that Germans deserve their respected and equal place in the family of democratic nations Thus to sum it up I wanted to say that we approach Germany from different positions although the recent transformations as you pointed out correctly are now changing the faces of both the Soviet Union and the United States being in direct contradictions with the established stereotypes Of course we do not possess a crystal ball and we cannot predict the future however as far as we can see the nearest future here the biggest evil would be to try to separate united Germany into a special category Not only West Europeans but also most of the countries of Eastern Europe agree with us on this At the same time united Germany should not be anybody's enemy and the process of inserting it into the new Europe 2 would stipulate deep involvement of the USSR and a fair consideration of your country's interests And one more question I think you would after all agree that some U S presence in Europe is necessary even though some people even in the United States itself are inclined to a different point of view they complain about the disproportionally big burden in defense and economic maintenance of Europe which Americans had to take upon themselves However if we start from the position that prevails in our country then the U S political economic and military involvement in the life of Europe is indispensable for the security and stability of the entire Old World Sometimes people ask me--with tongue in cheek--so who is the U S enemy in the new transformed beyond recognition Europe And I respond with conviction--confusion instability unpredictability As difficult as it could be I want to assure you that the American presence in Europe does not threaten interests of the Soviet Union in any sense whatsoever More than that right now our presence there is a guarantee of stability Of course we are acting in the conditions of democracy and if the new generation of Germans decides so we will pull out of Germany However today I reiterate the mood is completely different These moods are strengthened by the NATO traditions by many of the chapters of the North Atlantic Treaty Taking into account everything I said I am asking you again to overcome your fear of united Germany and to leave the past behind On this road you will find in us reliable partners and we would be able to show together to the rest of the world that we were able to rise above the selfish interests that we are working for the common good I understand that you will probably find nothing new in my words But believe me that this is my sincere conviction and if I am not right then I am asking you not to hesitate to point out my mistakes to me I will only add that I am trying not to rush to conclusions and moreover not to make any sudden or politically extravagant steps I remember when the Berlin Wall fell my political opponent accused me of cowardice of not being sufficiently energetic in welcoming that development However I took into account your appeal to show caution to act in a sensitive manner bearing in mind the fragility of new processes in Europe and in the Soviet Union As far as my response to my critic I said then that I did not intend to dance on the ruins of the Berlin Wall like a little boy Believe me we are not pushing Germany toward unification and it is not us who determines the pace of this process And of course we have no intention even in our thoughts to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration Such a model in our view corresponds to the Soviet interests as well Therefore I am asking you to point to me where do you think I am mistaken 3 GORBACHEV First of all I think I understood the main source of your concern You see the U S presence in Europe as a factor of stability and you are worried about the prospects of its preservation Well I already said that now the U S presence in Europe is even necessary what will happen in the future life will show I am talking precisely about the military presence because the U S economic and political participation in European affairs--is an uncontestable constant Europe is the natural center of global politics and if we allow diversions here then consequences will be felt throughout the entire world Soviet-American cooperation represents one of the pillars on which the European political space is resting That is why we are in favor of taking your interests into account which means--in favor of U S presence in Europe However you are making a methodological miscalculation when you are connecting your presence with NATO only and when you worry that if the FRG pulls out from the North Atlantic Treaty it would mean the beginning of its end and therefore--the beginning of the end of your military presence on the continent I do not agree with this conclusion but I understand your concern Especially as far as today's reality is concerned--when one probably could not do without NATO anyway I also see your efforts to change NATO functions to try to invite new members into this organization If the course aimed at the transformation of the union at its political diffusion into the all-European process is serious then naturally it is a completely different business But then the question arises about transforming NATO into a genuinely open organization the door to which could not be closed to any state whatsoever Then probably we could also think about becoming a member of NATO However today honestly speaking there are very few facts for such a radical conclusion Now about another topic You are extremely concerned about the health of united Germany from which you calculate the health of NATO You are so concerned about it that you forget about the health and interests of the Soviet Union And this in its turn does not help either stability or predictability at all Instead of fixating on the membership of the future united Germany in NATO let us better think about how we could bring the military-political blocs that still divide Europe closer together Let us say why would one reject from the get-go FRG's membership simultaneously in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact Such a double membership could become a binding element some sort of a forerunner of the new European structures and at the same time it would anchor NATO In the practical sense united Germany could make a statement that it would abide by all the obligations inherited from both the FRG and the GDR That the Bundeswehr would still be under the orders of NATO and the troops in the GDR--to the government of the new Germany Simultaneously the Soviet troops would still remain in the territory of the present GDR during the transition period and all this could be supplemented by some kind of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact This way we would alleviate 4 concern of other countries and speed up the construction of the future structures of the European security system We don't have to accomplish everything at once A step-by-step approach is possible For example we would welcome the change in the NATO doctrine already at the next meeting of this bloc A natural question arises if NATO does not plan to fight with us then with whom Not with Germany BUSH I already said -with instability GORBACHEV Do you really think that the more weapons you have the more robust stability would be It seems to me that the past decades should have convinced you that confrontation and arms race puts heavy burden on the shoulders of peoples All right we tossed this thought there and back as they say now let our ministers search for concrete solutions to external aspects of the German unification Let them search taking into account the progress in the 2 4 negotiations making sure that they preserve our rights as based on the results of World War II I would not recommend anybody to treat them jokingly--they will end only at the final stage of the overall settlement One of the spheres that might be fruitful for such searching for solutions could be a discussion of the content of the transition period what do we fill it with which kind of structures how do you change alliances and what kind of common documents do you prepare In this connection I am ready to publicly sign the following commitment if at any time during the transition period the Unites States has a feeling that the Soviet Union is trying to infringe on their interests then Washington has an unquestionable right to break out of the agreement and to undertake corresponding unilateral measures But we will never allow that to happen Because that would contradict our own interests BUSH This is very good I take this statement of yours into consideration However I would like to correct one wrong impression I don't think at all that the more weapons there are the more stability there is To the contrary the Unites States is striving toward the fastest agreement in Vienna and to an immediate move to even deeper reduction in the framework of Vienna-2 In all this naturally we are ready to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union Maybe I should not be saying it but it seems to me that it would be incorrect to draw parallels between the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the countries who do not need them any longer and the prospect of reducing the U S presence which is welcomed by practically all Europeans and which represents a stabilizing factor 5 GORBACHEV I think we can agree on this But one has to have a clear understanding that if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question then all the positive processes in Europe including the negotiations in Vienna would be in serious danger This is not just bluffing It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around And I would really prefer not to do it I would like to move the Soviet-American dialog ahead and to strive for fastest achievement of agreements in Vienna and in other forums In this connection it is really important that we achieve a very clear understanding here in Washington Otherwise everything will become more complicated and there are no objective reasons for that Moreover additional flexibility is in order of course if it comes from both sides Let us say I remember how the Secretary of State hinted to me in Moscow that he was not against going back to our old proposal--to limit the number of Soviet and American troops not at 195 thousand but by 225 thousand Well we can think about that BAKER I would like to use the opportunity to emphasize the main thought--we are trying to take the interests of the Soviet Union into account to the fullest extent and the nine points that I presented in Moscow speak to that effect quite clearly Let me recount them briefly We agreed to support creation of pan-European structures which we avoided earlier We announced adaptation of NATO to new situation by strengthening of its political component We are trying to move in the direction of limiting armed forces as fast as possible including the Bundeswehr Obviously it would require a very close contact and trust on the part of the Germans We assured the Soviet Union that during a defined period there would be no NATO troops in the GDR We are willing to allow the Soviet troops to stay in the GDR for a short period of time The President intends to discuss this issue with you in more detail later We gave new impetus to the discussion of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Already today we are trying to ensure a final and satisfactory for everybody solution on the issue of the borders We and the Germans reached an understanding regarding the obligations of future Germany to renounce possession of nuclear chemical and bacteriological weapons 6 The United States is trying to create favorable political conditions for further development of Soviet-German economic relations All this is clearly aimed at ensuring legitimate interests of the Soviet Union SHEVARDNADZE We are prepared to work on all these issues with the Secretary of State However the central issue of the military-political status of future Germany requires a decision at the presidential level We also have to determine the content of the transition period during which united Germany would continue to have obligations both before NATO and the Warsaw Pact And this is not just a chimera because parallel to that the two blocs will be moving closer together the military confrontation will be taken down and the basis for collective security in Europe will be established BUSH NATO is the anchor of stability GORBACHEV But two anchors are better As a seaman you should be able to understand it BUSH And where will we find the second anchor GORBACHEV In the East What it would be concretely--let our Ministers think about it BUSH Yes let them think about it But we have to take into account the exceptional pace of German unification After the successful conclusion of the consultations in the framework of 2 4 a new Germany is right around the corner And at that moment we could only rely on NATO Of course we should discuss expanding of the role of the CSCE process but I will tell you honestly that it is simply too ponderous to expect any fast and concrete result from it GORBACHEV We do not exclude any options It is possible that NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to exist in some form during a longer period of time than we can imagine it now Then they as I already said could conclude some kind of agreement accounting for the creation of united Germany and the metamorphoses of their own organizations as well At the same time there would be an option of an associated simultaneous membership in the WTO and NATO Because if we want to put an end to the split of the continent once and forever then the military-political structures too should be synchronized in accordance with the unifying tendencies of the all-European process Today it might sound as a surprise but we are entering an absolutely new period of European politics Besides World War Two had already witnessed the birth of a very 7 unusual coalition united by a common noble goal Is it that we are more stupid than Stalin and Roosevelt BUSH We need to learn from their mistakes too GORBACHEV So let us create a new free coalition change doctrines and institutes establish the primacy of politics over military structures BAKER How do you see the coexistence of the new NATO and the new Warsaw Pact in practical terms GORBACHEV First of all--a concrete agreement between the blocs which would give rise to multiple exchanges creation of joint organs for strengthening trust preventing crisis situations These processes would provide a good encouragement for the Vienna agreements as well serve as political insurance for them However if we do it differently if we include powerful united Germany in one alliance then it would immediately create an unbalanced situation and issues would arise to which nobody would be able to find an answer BUSH Do you agree with our starting thesis that we should not create a special status for united Germany GORBACHEV I would agree with it if you accept an associated membership the principle of blocs moving closer together with united Germany acting as a mediator of the process i e a situation which does not change the present obligations of either the FRG or the GDR and that it would be followed naturally by the reform of the blocs themselves in an organic linkage with the Vienna and the all-European process The terrible losses that we suffered in World War Two--this is also the political reality of today And no one should be able to forget about it BUSH Still it is hard for me to understand you Maybe it is because I do not feel threatened by the FRG I do not see an aggressive power in this democratic state If you don't break your psychological stereotype it would be difficult for us to come to an agreement And an agreement is possible because both Kohl and we want to cooperate with you in every sphere GORBACHEV There should no lack of clarity here We do not have fear of anybody-- not the U S not Germany We just see the necessity of changing our relations the need to break the negative and to create a constructive model This is our free choice I hope nobody here believes in the nonsense that one of the sides won the victory in the Cold War Thoughts like these just glide on the surface grasping only the tip of the 8 iceberg The conclusion must be completely different 50 years of confrontation have proven its absurdity and that it only leads to self-destruction Now about trust You assert that we do not trust the Germans But then why would we give the green light to their aspiration to unification We could have given them the red light we had appropriate mechanisms However we gave them the opportunity to make their choice by democratic means You on the other hand are saying that you trust the FRG but you are pulling her into NATO not allowing her to determine her future on her own after the final settlement Let her decide on her own what alliance she wants to belong to BUSH I fully agree with that But the Germans have already made their choice quite clearly GORBACHEV No you are just trying to put them under your control BUSH If Germany does not want to stay in NATO it has a right to choose a different path This is what the Helsinki Final Act says too GORBACHEV Then let us make a public statement on the results of our negotiations where we will say that the U S President agreed that sovereign Germany would decide on its own which military-political status it would choose--membership in NATO neutrality or something else BUSH It is a right of any sovereign country to choose alliances If the government of the FRG--I am talking purely hypothetically--would not want to stay in NATO would even tell our troops to get out we would accept that choice GORBACHEV That's how we will formulate it then the United States and the Soviet Union agree that united Germany upon reaching the final settlement taking into account the results of World War Two would decide on its own which alliance she would be a member of BUSH I would propose a somewhat different formulation the United States is unequivocally in favor of united Germany's membership in NATO however if it makes a different choice we would not contest it we will respect it GORBACHEV I agree I accept your formulation BUSH Maybe our Ministers should discuss this issue in more detail GORBACHEV I am only for it but let them discuss inclusion of this formulation in some kind of a summary document along with our ideas about the transition period BAKER Whatever you say but the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia 9 GORBACHEV It is only for a financier who puts cents together into dollars Politics however is sometimes a search for possible in the sphere of unfamiliar BAKER But obligations to the WTO and NATO are adversarial obligations GORBACHEV Here here you are closer now You started to talk about rivalry and that would lead to confrontation It means nothing is changing Therefore by pulling united Germany into one bloc you would be breaking the balance radically And then we will have to decide what to do in that new situation--whether to continue to sit in Vienna and so on Let us after all reject the logic of confrontation and search for a constructive outcome FALIN I would like to clarify one moment We are talking about replacing temporary structures even though they did exist almost 50 year with permanent structures in which the Soviet Union and the U S could unite for the entire foreseeable future You said yourself that in the future the FRG could raise the issue of withdrawing from NATO That is why it would be good for us to think about the future too to make calculations about the future security structure Here only a pan-European system into which united Germany would be integrated on equal conditions with everybody else can give us guarantees If we are united by our understanding of our common ultimate goal then we can agree on the transition period The main thing is to reject military confrontation to come to an understanding that security in Europe is indivisible In this sense unification of Germany should become the end of the division of Europe and not the event that solidified the division of Europe for the future BUSH So what should we do about the public statement SHEVARDNADZE I would not do it in a rush I would proceed cautiously taking into account the fragility of the current progress both in the 2 4 framework and in terms of preparations for the pan-European summit and in terms of the Vienna agreements BUSH And still what are we going to say if we are asked about the results of this discussion GORBACHEV We will respond that we devoted this entire plenary session to the consideration of the situation in Europe including the settlement of the external aspects of German unification On the basis of this exchange of opinions we agreed that the foreign ministers and experts would continue their work on the issues that were raised here And if we are asked if our positions moved closer we could say that we had a serious and useful exchange of opinions and that now we understand each other's approaches and 10 positions better Beside that we could add that during the discussion we proposed ideas which require additional consideration Let them be intrigued by what kind of ideas those were BUSH I agree That's what we will do Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive Source Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation Fond 1 Opis 1 published in Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros Gorbachev and the German Issue ed by Alexander Galkin and Anatoly Chernyaev Moscow Ves' Mir 2006 11 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu