-CONFf DENTIAL' THE WHITE HOUSE oEURQNf'IDEH'PIAE WASHINGTON 4432 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION SUBJECT Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany U PARTICIPANTS The President Helmut Kohl Chancellor Robert Hutchings NSC Staff Notetaker Gisela Marcuse Interpreter DATE TIME AND PLACE June 1 1990 4 03 - 4 23 p m The Oval Office U The President Chancellor Kohl Helmut How are you doing Fine thanks How are you U U The President I am calling to give you a play-by-play an up to date report I thought you'd be interested in where we stand We talked about German unification for about two hours yesterday afternoon In the first place Gorbachev seemed very personable He was animated but not confrontational I made the point very clearly that a united Germany is no threat to anyone including the Soviet Union and I told him that Germany in our view has earned its place in the new Europe that it will work for the collective good and that Germany wanted good relations with the Soviet Union I told him that right from my heart knowing that you believe that I of course supported YQYGBP position very steadily that a united Germany should remain a full member of NATO and that was our strongly held position I did tell him that Germany is a democracy and it will be up to them to choose its alliance arrangements but that our position is the same as yours -- that a united 'Germany should be a full member of NATO I told him the German sovereignty must be complete at the time of unification and I stressed that Germany should be singled out for special status after unification We used the word singularization He came back with the screwy idea that Germany should belong to both alliances -- have two anchors as he put it He returned to this several times referring to a long transition period He started off this discussion Helmut by saying that a united Germany in NATO would upset the balance But actually his comments seemed directed at NATO itself as much as Germany's cONFHrg JTlhL ' Declassify on OADR -88NFIOENT1Al DECLASSIFIED PER E O 12958 AS AMENDED D - IJ'12Cf-F 'c C i o I EURQHFIDgHTIA t t JU 2 membership in NATO So he came back to the idea of a transition period as new European security structures are developed He wasn't clear on what these structures might look like -- he was much more focused on getting through the transition I had the sense that he was still feeling his way and that his position is not totally fixed And he seemed to accept my argument that Germany should not be singled out although he didn't specifically agree to that Near the end of the thing I thought he kind of agreed with my position that I support Germany's full membership in NATO but that it was up to Germany to decide But then he returned to the idea of a transition period He also took a strong interest in how NATO might change its doctrine and I read him Article 2 of the NATO Charter which Brian Mulroney had called to my attention just to show him NATO's political character And he took an interest in how NATO might evolve to become more a political alliance and how NATO and the Warsaw Pact might cooperate In my view it will be vitally important that we take steps at the NATO Summit to convince him that NATO changing in ways that do threaten Soviet security 1 We had no agreement at all but then there was no hostility And I had an opportunity to say Germany had earned its place and must not be singled out So let me call you on Sunday or maybe Monday to let you know what else comes up today and at Camp David on Saturday But I'm not even sure we will get back to that One final point Helmut de Maiziere the new East German Prime Minister will be'coming here on June 11 I'm going to have a meeting and a working lunch with him He will bring his Foreign Minister Meckel with him I think it will be a good opportunity to push our case with them I would welcome a cable from you with any advice you have And I look forward to seeing you on June 8 before that visit so we can talk Chancellor Kohl visit U The President Chancellor Kohl We will be meeting before the de Maiziere Yes on the 8th U Then we can talk about the visit U The President Okay If you have any questions just ask I think we made headway though there was no agreement But when we have a press conference he won't try to make it a big di fference Chancellor Kohl Have you made progress in other areas -eQHFIDg l'i'IAL -GBPONFIDENTIAL U e 'J E 3 IDEN I 11ff The President It has been difficult on Lithuania and thus on a trade treaty On arms control we will sign some agreements on START -- nothing spectacular -- and a good one on chemical weapons The one that's causing him heartburn though is the trade agreement 1 Chancellor Kohl Did he say anything about economic aid The President Not yet I think he'll hit me with that tomorrow at Camp David I told him that would be the time for frank talks There have been some hints but nothing as definite as in your discussions with him or Baker's in Moscow I expect to hear more tomorrow Chancellor Kohl George on the German issue once again I firmly stand by our position and I would like to repeat once again why Isolating Germany would have disastrous consequences for developments in Europe If a united Germany is not in NATO you and I know the U S would not remain in Europe because there would be no more NATO Then we would corne to a point in Europe a situation where the two nuclear countries -- France and Great Britain would move closer together -- and the smaller nations would fallout of the security structure Denmark the Benelux even Spain Portugal and Italy -- where would they go vt There is another problem which people here aren't thinking of Because we will continue to expand the EC destroying NATO would have disastrous consequences for unifying Europe through the EC Therefore we are not willing to discuss Germany's not being in NATO Give some thought to the following I'll probably meet him pretty soon I'll go into details when we talk on Friday in a small group We should tell him that's not the way to go We are quite willing to move to quite close cooperation with the Soviet Union once unification is complete but we are not willing to pay any price for singularization This was disastrous for Weimar Germany and it would be disastrous today Hungary Poland Czechoslovakia -- they don't want it either The President I told him that and I think he understands I also think he understands the singularization point He just didn't agree c Chancellor Kohl We have to change his mind f The President You have no problem saying that Germany under Helsinki has the right to belong to NATO or not belong 1 Chancellor Kohl Precisely We believe that But we still have to change his mind George I do think the economic side is more important I SEUR 1E T DENT T AT -CONFlDENTiAl 4 'EURONFIDEN'fIAl3 The President I thought I had gotten him to agree first that Germany should be in NATO if it wants to be and second if Germany decides not to be in NATO that should be Germany's choice I thought he agreed to that but then be got into the transition stuff 1 Chancellor Kohl I think when he talks about the transition he is talking about the economic side I don't think he can solve his economic problems without help jn The President Yes If you would like I'll call on Sunday I think we've pretty much covered European security The next step will be up to you or whoever sees him next But I'm not worried about this I'm not discouraged Chancellor Kohl I'm not discouraged either George I would be happy for you to call Sunday night the same time as now I will be at home in Ludwigshafen You know the number 1 The President mind U Chancellor Kohl Okay Good luck I know that We'll keep your interests in U -- End of Conversation eON U3EN'f' IAL EONFIDENT1Al This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu