May 17 1973 8 44 a m Richard Nixon and J Fred Buzhardt Oval Office 921-003 Audio http nixontapeaudio org chron5 921-003a mp3 00 00 7 7 Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt How do you like your job It’s a unique job That’s right You like it don’t you Yes sir It’s great to have You’ve got to be willing to fight That’s right That’s right I was thinking a little about our program here and how we get this thing handled I mentioned one thing to unclear He’s in a staff meeting now and he mentioned you and that you might have to have unclear It seems to me that as soon as you get your facts and I trust that you’ll get them early at least — well isn’t it true you’re not going to get everything nailed down but some of it nailed down — that you should alert on a very quiet basis our friends like for example and the people we have to count on By that I mean Petersen and Schlesinger and Ruckelshaus should know— Right —what happened here Now maybe they already know but — can you do that I can do that Yes I can talk to Henry and Bill You can talk to Henry Jim Schlesinger already knows Yeah what does he know that it wasn’t unclear — He knows that it never went forward Yeah I want him to know I want him to have utter confidence You see so that— I have taken time out to talk to him I went to see him Sunday afternoon Yeah But on— He had some misgivings and I had a long talk with him And explained I think the Walters memorandum I explained — sent him on down First I called Henry made the appointment— Reassured him All the way through You called Henry about this No sir Jim was a little worried about the— Walters —Walters thing Yeah And so I— Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Is he worried about presidential involvement Yes Yes So I went over and personally — and had a talk with him Yeah Jim and I are longtime friends I just wanted you to know that my God I am totally unclear to the Walters thing whatever it may unclear Unclear did anybody at the CIA unclear I explained that to him and he said unclear Now on this one unclear where we presently stand after your calls— 00 02 28 7 Portion redacted for national security — surveillance 00 02 39 3 Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt ’68 ’68 they made an effort They had a meeting here about reinstituting This did not involve the Bureau correct Well I guess it could have Yes it did involve the Bureau Yeah And NSA also NSA Clark Clifford presided at the meeting And they decided not to do it He didn’t make a decision Right He held that one — he said he was going to think about it some more— 00 03 08 3 Portion redacted for national security — surveillance 00 03 20 1 Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt —and they raised the question again in 1970 when they could get somebody’s attention again They had discussions with Hoover in the meanwhile Unclear Well the meeting which is — from which the Dean — or the 43-page memorandum emanated — the policy shift emanated as a result of a battle in the various agencies after the Cambodia thing as to what the hell they should do in this area Is that correct or— It wasn’t a battle at that point Mr President It was a — there had been a number of meetings between the agencies there was concern Yeah In the initial instance Hoover did not really express his objections Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Yeah He had a two-and-a-half-hour meeting apparently with Noel Gayler and Lou Tordella— Without the unclear —just the three of him Without the unclear Yes over there And as it was described to me they got a lecture on communism and he got a lecture on why they needed these entries Right He appeared to be convinced Right So they then had the meeting which it was all discussed — here That was— Before— —the meeting here —that they needed additional intelligence coverage That’s right Everybody discussed it They were told “alright go develop a plan Tell me what these limitations are that encumber you Look at them all—” 00 04 49 3 Portion redacted for national security —surveillance 00 04 59 4 Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon At that point no specifics were apparently discussed Mr President Right They just talked about constraints They were then sent back with the results of that meeting to have an interagency group to sit down and thoroughly work this thing out — what it was they were supposed to do Right Right That the result of that was this 43-page plan the Huston Plan — Who is your leader witness that tells you this — this is Sullivan Tordella Tordella Tordella is the best witness He’s still — he’s at the NSA Yes sir He has been Deputy Director out there since the place was formed And an honest man Unclear Very honest Very unclear Ok then what happened Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Then they— They developed the 43-page memorandum— —developed a 43-page plan It was signed by the four of them— Right —Helms Hoover Gayler and Bennett Right The recommendations were— All four of them signed it All the recommendations were unanimous Except— Nope No excepts It was unanimous when it came to you Right And I approved it You approved it The policy paper The policy paper Right Then — and this place is kind of murky You didn’t approve it immediately Oh I didn’t Unclear Not when it was submitted There was a period of two or three months in there about when a decision was discussed Hoover at some point raised the objection Now it’s — this is one we’re getting the notes on — to get pinned down on the dates Because when the approval and the subsequent disapproval came was not immediately following submission of the plan for some later date What I don’t understand unclear if I approved the plan — I was thinking about it last night — one day and then I went to unclear two days later and I— Right We are still looking— Yeah —to get the specifics— No what I’m asking about — this recommendation was made to me I approved the plan Did I sign it or something No sir I am saying you approved the plan I approved the policy One of the—well it was a policy There were no specifics in that Yeah so unclear The Haldeman note back to Huston telling him to go ahead is dated some time— Haldeman wrote a note to Huston He wrote a memo to Huston Saying what Go ahead with the plan Saying the president has approved the plan Now this was the 43-page plan Yes and to go ahead But to do it with the procedures they had discussed or words to that effect Instead of you signing out the plan Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Oh I see unclear — At the end of the plan they an option paper— Right Right Right —for you to sign off on each one Go ahead Now we need to pin down — we still don’t have pinned down the precise dates on — subsequently at some point in the process Hoover had agreed to it and then— Tolson Tolson got to him He changed his mind Now on one copy of this plan somewhere we are going to try and find it Hoover wrote footnotes This is indicated by the memorandum we have We don’t have the actual footnotes — to which he took exceptions to a number things that were in there There are a lot of exceptions Wiretapping and break-ins Yes Those were the two key issues Then at — when that came back he took it to Mitchell or came here to see you Now we don’t know whether he went through Mitchell and Mitchell came— I don’t know —or he came And as a result according to the word that I get or was told the word was passed that the decision had been suspended The go was recalled and the decision was held in abeyance The what The decision was — the go was held in abeyance Oh the go code Oh yeah It did not come out as an absolute no It was just a suspension of your earlier decision to go That things were to go forward as they had been done previously— That’s right That’s right —but nothing new Nothing new Now that was implemented however by Sullivan— Yes —as we know Sullivan specifically remembers that Sullivan was the one that got the word Sullivan — we are going to try to get him down here to get his notes— Right —he’s up in New England And— But he remembers that Yes Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt He told you that on the phone He’s — Sullivan — well we know from Tordella also Sullivan Alright Little leery of Sullivan’s memory Huh I’m a little leery of Sullivan’s memory Unclear But Tordella says — Tordella says — Yeah What does he say Does he unclear — Tordella specifically remembers that Sullivan called him and telling him it was go — calling him back very shortly thereafter and telling him— No go No go And he’s looking for his notes right now Right Now have you not found anybody else of the principals No sir What about CIA They’re checking but they don’t — they don’t think that anybody out there did anything They are checking now to make sure They want to go down into the unclear Unclear I am sure that’s to have come unclear — I am not — I was wondering not simply about whether they did something unclear — Yeah —but whether they ever got the word from Sullivan Besides Tordella do you have anybody that’s got the word from Sullivan That there was a no go— The word came to me independently from DIA that some of the people knew that the plan was no go— Yeah —that it never did go But they have not located who called — who got the call yet Right I suspect it was Bennett Bennett’s in Korea and I have not been able to reach him Right I think it was probably to Bennett directly because he was a participant Right Right So this is unclear — He’s what a general Yes sir He’s a four-star general now He’s commander in Korea Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt I would ask him I would do it on the phone I will call him and ask him Now this morning’s Washington Post — they’re already unclear You know you can see it all that the— Right —two Washington Post reporters have interestingly they say that the series of burglaries — they say that this was the whole pattern There were many of them yet undisclosed — you know— Right —what we anticipated Wide scale wiretappings but they allege that these were not done by the agencies but done by separate front groups and special groups working out of the White House That’s the worst one Mr President Well it’s the worst one if it’s true Well I doubt if it’s true outside of this one group and all the evidence indicated that they really didn’t do any others You know Hunt was telling everything I went back and read his testimony this morning He swore under oath and laid it all out but he said no they did no others They did no wiretapping and no burglaries and no unclear — No wiretaps and no burglaries except the one on the psychiatrist Krogh’s affidavit says he knew of no other— That’s right —of these activities I know of no other group and I— I know of no other group I know of no other group unclear — I have never heard of another group Of course we hadn’t heard of this one either but I— Unclear —somebody would have a rumble of it surely Whether the way these front groups such as the Cubans — our problem is that they use Cubans in this and obviously the Cubans could have done a lot of things on their own You know if they play this story every time we have a Cuban involved in a burglary even to steal money— Well but maybe— —so we are going to — it’s going to — what I’m saying is we’re going to have to work very hard to prove a negative The main point though that I — that Fred to work on today unclear it’s just — knock the Dean papers out of the Goddamn water Because the Dean papers would indicate that it was a government lie — official thing done and it was not Right Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon You have no evidence of any government agency doing anything whatsoever as a result of this unclear None whatever None whatever None whatever No sir Now you have Sullivan on that and you should have Mardian on that Yes sir And you have Tordella Tordella on that DePoix on that — at DIA You got him Yes sir He says absolutely right— Right Right Right —and I know pretty well on DIA because I am running— That was your— —very close to him Yeah Now CIA didn’t do anything They’re so damn terrible— 00 14 34 8 Portion redacted for national security — intelligence 00 14 45 2 Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon On this one though Fred we can blow them out of the water— We can —if we move at our pace But— I want to get Mr President — I want to get affidavits from all these people Um-hmm And get them in concrete That’s right Now I think Tordella will give you an affidavit won’t he I don’t think there is any doubt I can get affidavits across the board If you get Tordella you can get Sullivan — and say that there was nothing done Alright I would hope you get Gayler an affidavit I would hope to get Gayler’s affidavit— And Bennett’s And Bennett’s And their successor people whoever worked in this area I’ll get one from— What about — Bernie Wells who ran the committee Ran the committee — but did — but ran it after all this After all this Yes sir And his committee was what What was his committee Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt That was the coordinating committee Intelligence Evaluation Committee of the intelligence community to try to get them to work together And he puts it just bluntly He said however much we talked about being able to analyze the intelligence the truth of the matter was that Hoover cut off liaisons with all the agencies No agent would meet with the other agencies or Hoover would fire him— Oh I unclear memory —so we had this group— The reason we had this darn meeting in here and as I now remember is that every — agencies were bitching about Hoover and they said we’ve got to get Hoover to cooperate That’s right That’s what it was This was the whole point And Hoover didn’t want to even meet in the same room with Helms That’s true So I think what happened is that he went back and thought about it a bit and a couple of months later maybe he and Tolson decided when they got the go signal — and then they say they got a go signal and then two days later a no signal Is that right Is that what— That’s Tordella’s recollection and he’s looking now for his notes He’ll have notes won’t he I am quite sure he will coming from where he does I don’t know — I wouldn’t be surprised if they taped the conversations going in and out of there I don’t think they would admit it No they shouldn’t They shouldn’t Even to me but I get the definite impression— Unclear I think Hoover tapes all of his conversations I think it is a common practice in town Sure But they never have to admit it — never have to use it No And shouldn’t Unclear I’m sure everything in here is taped I’ve never used it Yes I guess they probably have a way to do it but — you know what I mean Yes Johnson set it up here — no Kennedy did They tell me They tell me I don’t know But I’ll never use it Yes Well anyway if you could get this one nailed today — I mean — We are going to work diligently on getting it unclear out Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Can you get a plane and get Sullivan flown down or— We’ll be on that And get an affidavit from him He is key in the sense that it was turned off I think so I think we need to bring Huston back too Yes He’s in California He is in Minneapolis Minneapolis You bring Huston back and Huston comes back with all those unclear language that he — he — what did he tell you He told me it didn’t go Huh He told me that it didn’t go And that’s why he left— That the decision went against him and was like — he said you know I was really teed up and I left He didn’t say precisely that was the reason— I know —but he said he was really teed off and I left If you know Tom Huston that sounds like him I’ve only met him about three or four times But he’s an explosive right-winger— I think I met him when he was a college freshman Mr President He’s smart as hell — the smartest of the group Well and a decent man But just— Yes —wanted to do something That’s right But you could — Huston could have a memorandum because he was here at the White House and — He looked last night He hasn’t found a memorandum in his files He said he would not have taken anything that was classified— Yeah —with him Yeah But he could come here and find out where his files were from the time Yes This would have been classified top secret Might have been It might have been depending on what he put in it I suspect he didn’t write a memorandum Maybe he called Hoover — I mean called Sullivan Sullivan Hoover would never have been called on this No And Huston said it did not go Alright so independently — I’m just — understand — I’m not — I’m just trying to get the facts Yes Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt No matter how we want the facts to appear if the facts are wrong screw it I mean you can call unclear it’s wrong anyway Goddamn it we want the truth Independently you first heard that Huston — the plan whatever the Goddamn thing was he talked about did not go Independently Sullivan told you that he— Did not go —made calls indicating that it did not go And independently Tordella said he got a call that it did not go Yes unclear Otherwise you have — nobody else really No we have people in the Defense Intelligence Agency who know that it did not go but they don’t know who received the word No but they — they have — they unclear say they know — they heard that it did not go at the time That’s right General Stillwell was there on staff at the time— Yeah —and he said it did not — it never went They got the word He doesn’t remember from precisely where God they must have made notes on that Right They must have made— Whoever did the talking should have made notes Are they scouring their files now They are trying to find out But being what we have up to this point — it seems to me that you are in a position to have — to give Jim the talking points Yes So that he can I mean — incidentally — unclear — Unclear —no link No link My view is don’t — what I meant is simply say that — I mean put in the whole story that in 19 — that very same issue in government going back to 1967 It was discussed in ’67 It was discussed again in 1968 In 1967 it was brought to the president’s attention There was a unanimous recommendation for the policy The president approved the policy for two months — no after two months — after two months— We’ll run down the exact dates After two months the president approved — presidential approval of the policy was conveyed by Huston — I mean by Haldeman In other words put it that way Yes Just say the approval was conveyed by Haldeman to— Huston Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon To Huston And Huston conveyed it to the agencies Two days later as a result of the — I would then say let’s give Hoover some brownie points — as a result of the objections of the FBI That’s really what it was wasn’t it It was As the reconsideration Yeah Because Hoover — because he signed it originally Yeah as the result of the— Change of mind As a result of that Mr Hoover asked for reconsideration and the policy was then— The approval was withdrawn The approval was withdrawn Withdrawn Approval withdrawn And then the bottom line no activities were undertaken under this policy Yes Not in accordance with law Correct Right No activities were undertaken under this policy The point being that it basically Fred turns out to be if you look at it a study paper What I mean is a policy paper that is developed in the government by the unclear where you go through and agonize and you come up with a paper and somebody signs it and then somebody bitches about it and then the Goddamn thing doesn’t go through Yes And nothing ever happens Is that about fair and accurate That’s right I would say almost the majority of papers we generate go that way laughs Right Now as for how to handle that depends on how it is handled— How it develops —by others But if you could get that kind of a paper to for example—a Schlesinger should have that It seems to me I don’t know or do you think the best thing is for you to just tell Schlesinger I think I should talk to Jim I don’t think you should hand your paper around Right Ok —until the time comes to use it Yeah because otherwise it will leak That’s true Fine You just tell Jim “Jim there’s no worry No sweat on this Because the damn — it was a thing where ” and quite honestly I could say it was true — an NSA— Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon Buzhardt Nixon That’s true It was You unclear — No question about it —NSA And that as a result of Hoover’s objections it was approved and then disapproved We want him to know that that’s the situation Is that— Right Alright then the — now moving — if you could follow-up on that moving to the other subject— 00 24 37 0 Conversation turns to other subjects This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu