ti ' 1 LJLVU VVh iL Authority J J P q5c oo I ' By J'Jfi Nf1h i i _f t_ ' ' 1 1 - o f 'l o Ui -E nt p1 1 0 1 o o' o o ' o l o 'o ' AEPAOOUC8 ATTHE NATIOtlAL 1o co 1 lst3 ot l_ _ l_ or _l j_ oor i Seri 1' DEPARTMEN'r OF STATE o AssISTANT SECR TAIIY o o I o oo o TOP SECREr 1o-i o 1 _ J 1ili 11E IDRANDtn1 OFFICE To S P - Mr Smith From EUR - Hr Merchant Subject NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany Thank you for your memorandum of January $ on the timing of our moves with respect to the NATO atomic stockpile in Gemany 1'1 O'Hil f eeling is however that in conjecturing about the possible public reaction in Gemany when the subject becomes known we should rely on the llancellor 1 s estimate of the problem This was also the Secretary 1s view when he authorized the Ambassador's approach to the Chancellor DEPTEL to Bonn- 131h According to Ambassador Bruce ' s r eport Bonn 1 s lh6li the Ambassador stressed the very point you are concerned about t hat there would probably be widespread publicity in Gennany The Chancellor said ho realized this and was prepar ed for the consequences The Chancellor also agreed that necotiations should proceed at once As for dissension in Western Europe when the subject eventually becomes kn m the NATO Foreign Ministers heard Gener 1 Norstad report on December 17 that a stockpile storage site WAOON TRAIN had been developed for a Gennan fighter- b0111ber squadron and as far as Tknow there was no expression of concern or recommendation that this oooration be suspended Similarly in September a SHAPE document 128 58 wa circulated to all NATO countries except Iceland which listed 13 stockpile sites in Gennany planned through mid-1960 including German-user sites for 5 different types of atomic weapons I have not heard that there was any adverse reaction to this plan on the part of European politicians J The timing of the submission of the lli i b agreement to Congress wilJ of course be most carefully weighed in the li11Pt of the situation prevailing at that time with a constant review of the important factors to be considered with respect to this agreement Our present plans are to answer Bonn telegram lh64 in separate messages setting TOP SECREr forth IJN 'iSc70 o_ i - - RJ o t REPlloouc EURO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 5 $ v - 1 U L -i -2- -- forth our vieus on aspects c f the stockpile for the corunents of General orstacl llnci iriiba sador Bl ' 1ce these teler ror 1s a ro to cover a next steps with respect to 1- i GC E 'l'IUlll b the use i'crmula aspects of the ecncral stockpile ncrt eincnt the secur i ty urvey prerequisite to the inception of lhl1 b agraem nt cliscus icns the question of f 11rther notification of the stockpile to JIATO Concurrence i RA - Hr T imi 1ons j 1 _ GER - J-lr Hillenbrand Attachments S P- 596- lA 1 Hcmo to the Sccretn1-y from S P - Gerard iith dated January 9 1959 5910-lP Viem_pJo l 1n7 tlerel ta Jrof _ sLP - Ce Mm Smith ' aat-ed-Janunr io 16 19 9 v 2 1 'felC IaJ I t e 1eftn Pe rie 6 1EJP r- 1 13 59 A r' ' ' 4 5 somo x 11filt 1 8 'P i o- ' J YI - - M l'JT _ JYJ illar o 1' bbf Jt et s t1 u 111 ' 1 26 59 TO ' S1o CiUIT o o L JI' c s' co i r 1 - o ' IC y TOP SECR 'T Jonuory 1 6 1959 l I TO EIJR PRO -' S P - Gerard C Smith 1- r Merchon t SUBJECT NATO ttomic Stockpile in Oerr tony Attached ia a memorandum which I sont tho Secr etary on January 9 and which as you will oee did not reach him in view of Bonn's 1464 reporting the Bruce- Adenauer stoclcp1le talk s s tolls me that following receipt of this memorandum Governor Herter d1 scusaod it with Mr Murphy who drafted o proposed tologram to Bonn Governor Herter sent thot tolcgrol'I tor ether with this memorandum which he had initialled on to the Socretnry 1 s offi ce By the t1me the pockSP O orr1 vod th ore Bonn lb 6 J was at hand fMr Murphy's proposed telegr am is in the attached package J As indicated in para 5 of my l'lemorondum I did not expect this mornorandum to prevont Ambasoador Br uce from reach1n a decision in principle with the Chancellor I wished rathe r to influence the t1minr or our soJbsequent movos This still oeems foesible I bnliove that the best way to flO about it at the present stago would be to rind this viewpoint into the answer to Bonn's 1464 ond I or i therefore sending the e orondum to you I think it would be de si ra bl e for th'3 reasons indicated 1n this memorandum for our militsry people p roceed vory slowly nnd 1n o low key on this matter husy1ng thoo selvos w1 th low level technical details and delaying the conclusj on of sn agreement and thn consequent lubmission or a ll1hB to Conci re11s while tho Berlin crisis is at 1 ts poak TOP SECHI 'T _ l P c s 1coi r 1 _ J j_f _ I 1 o IIEPIIOOUaaO AT THE NATIOHAI ARCHIVES TOP SECRET ATl'Acm-1F NT o1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETIJUAT I SS 188 Januar y 14 1959 S P - Mr Savage EUR - Mr Long NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany The attached staff stud7 prepared in S P dated Januaey 9 1959 vas initialed b - the Under Secretaey but was not sent on to the Secretaey in viev of recent eventa in Bonn sse Bonn's 1464 The Under Secretaey and Mr Mlrpby discussed this matter thoroughly on Januaey l2 and 13 In any event there should now be a prompt follow-up b - EUR on Bonn's 1464 The outgoing telegram should be prepared for signature by the Under Secretaey or if' it is felt necessaey and or appropriate by the Secretaey Att Staff study 188 cc1 G - Mr Donhauser TOP SECRET ATTACR1'1ENT 1 fJI J D 'i-5 7c O IC Pjf o 1y REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIOHAl AACHVE i JJJ t'Al 'CMENT OF l TATE POLICY PLANNING TOP SECRET TO STAFF ' The Secretary ' THROUGH U - The Under Secr etary rard c FROM II Io I 'I' J If nitfJ SUBJECT NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany l I understand that Ambassador Bruce is upon his return from Paris to discuss with Char1cellor Adenauer the possible establishment of a NATO atomi c stockpil e in the Feder al Republic 2 If we should then proceed to negotiate a stockpile agreement there would be the possibility of a l eak In any event publicity would be unavoidabl e as and when a rel ated agreement f or the exchange of technical data was laid before the Congr ess 3 Publicity concerning this proposed move against the background of the Berlin crisis coul d have two harmf ul effects a Free world support for our position in the Berlin crisis might be somewhat weakened by distracting and conflicting concerns over imminent West German nuclear rearm8Jllent The Soviets would be able to stir up fears in Western Europe - including the Federal Republic - over this proposed move thus creating disunity at the very moment when unity is most needed Tab B Tab c b This might make the Soviets more intransigent not only because they would perceive Western disun i ty but also because they would feel that only by bringing the crisis to a head could they prevent arly German nuclear rearmament SNIE 100-13-587indicates that preventing this is a part of one of their major objectives in creating the crisis In a recent telegram for Ambassador Bruce Paris 2363 of December 27 General Norstad states that although it would be desirable to move forward promptly timing is not critical from a purely NATO military standpoint Nor would TOP SECRET 'iS'J O REPIIOOUCED AT THE NATIONAi ARCHVES TOP SECRET - 2 - would prompt initiation of stockpile negotiations be likely to get this issue out of the way before any EastWest d1 scussions over Berlin In view of the duration of these negotiations and the requirel03nt for Congressional action our move would seem more likely to focus attention on the issue mile such discussions were taking place 5 I would hope therefore that whatever decision might be reached in principle with the Chancellor consideration could be given to deferring action involving substantial danger of publicity while the Berlin crisis is at its peak cc G - Mr Murphy EUR - Mr Merchant S AE - Mr Farley TOP SECRET This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu