REPR00Ua0 AT TIE NATIOWII ARCHIVES DECI ASSIAED Authori 1 DC 4 1 p7I ay Y NARAOaie l63l '1S SECRET HEADQUARTERS o UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND OFFICIAL INFORM 11 L Office of the Political Adviser Headquarters U S European Command I G Farben Building Frankfurt am Uain Germany March 29 1954 Dear Gordon I attended the Tenth Session of the NATO Senior Officers Course on Special 'leapons Atomic which was conducted at Oberammergau March 9 through 12 This course is conducted by the U S Army in Europe I enclose a list of those attendine with their positions and countries I found the course not only instr uctive but it seems to me that the approach of the Admirals and Generals from our NATO allies to the problem of the atom was most interesting I thought you mi t find it so as well Our class was fortunate in having as students Major General J H Harper who is the Commandi ng Officer of the Fourth Division in Germany and 4ajor General R C Partridge who is Commanding General of the 43rd Infantry Division also in Germany Both of these men have studied and practiced in recent maneuvers the theoretical use of tomic weapons for tactical purposes and were able to contribute a great deal to the course Because of their ranlc and experience they made a strong and favorable impression on the other members of the class I think that perhaps the fact that most impressed our allied friends was the strong and flat conclusion by the class and instructors up- held by the American Gordon Arneson Esqui r e Special Assistant to the Secretary Department of State Washington D C fflCIAl ASSISTOT 1111iGBP SGII I GBP APR 5 1954 OECLASSIAEO I Authori 'iQ 4 G 7 8Y NARA - oatdo 7 1 ors 2 - officers in it that the wide-spread use of atomic weapons both strategically and tactically would definitely not mean that armed forces could be de creased I thinlc this answered one of the main questions in the minds of the foreign students o I believe they well understood of course that U S armed-forces might be reduced in the future for economic or political reasons but they were reassured that U S military strategy at least did not consider that A-bombs could or would replace man-power The war games part of the course assuming that the estimates of the damage a 20 KT bomb will do unde given conditions are correct seemed to me and I thinlc the others to reinforce the conclusion that you would need just as many soldiers as before the atomic era if not more It was interesting to me but not particularly surprising that the European officers tended constantly to think of the atomic weapons as a defensive measure and Vere quite naturally concerned with what they would do to their cities and civilian populations The ability of soldiers in the field to disperse so that they seldom if ever presented a lucrative atonq c target was brough out It was equally clear that while soldiers under discipline and field conditions could be dispersed civilians in cities could not so that concentrations of civilians became relatively a more tempting target for atomic weapons than was the case with conventional weapons Of course the instructors assured the class that there were no _intentions on our side of using the weapons against civilian s but I am quite sure that the basic fact of the high relative vulnerability of civilians compared to troops was not lost on the class It was clearly demonstrated and I think generally agreed that in most cases atomic weapons favo the aggressor Since this is the case there is less likelihood they thought of waiting for the other side to be the GBPirst to use them The students were also greatly interested in the concept as it developed in our war game that you would use the weapons tactically and attack against the strongest point of the enemy rather than the weakest as has heretofore been military practice REMOOUCEOATTl EW TIOIW AACHYES o - - --- DECLASSJAEO AuthorilY- 'u i l 7 I - - o BY NARAO e 6 7 '15 0 _ - Since enemy strong points and targets are constantly shifting and the ability of soldiers to disperse great the need for accurate and fast intelligence was considered to be more vital than for conventional weapons Under pres nt field con tions and as proved by recent maneuvers in Germany it takes between five hours and forty-five minutes and seven hours and a half to get the final O K to expend an A-bomb after a field commander decides to use one All hands agreed that in view of the short time a tactical target would remain a target this time lag would have to be shortened This of course led into a consideration of the non-military political psychological and other factors involved in the use of atomic weapons It was felt however thlt once it was agreed or customary to use the weapons tactically the c OllJll anders v ould have to be and would be given some discretion themselves in their use To be able to decide whether a target was suitable for an A-bomb the commander woul d also have to have some idea of how many the total stockpile was or at least the stock-pi le in the theater I feel sure that-the course was greatly appreciated by the oreign officers attending it o The instructors p1 1rried with finesse questions which for legislative reasons they c9uld not answer Also the students did no persist in questions they could see could not be answered I wonder whether what is being done on the military level could not be done to a limited extent on the political or governmental level Even though many of the officers in the course had probably been engaged at SHAPE in one form or another in military pl3 llllirig based on atomic weapons it was cl ear to me that many of them had many misconceptions of what the v eapons wouid and would not do particul n-ly in_theoradiation field If this is true in Cony of 5 copies Page 3 of _j_ pages - DECLASSIFIED AuthOri 'u to v1 71 B y HARA Datdo '7S I' - _ - - f CR ET _ - 4 - the mil i tary it must be more true in Foreign Offices embers of Parliaments and leading government fi ures The thought occurred to me therefore that the course be expanded to include selected civilians from JATO countries or better that we operate an additional course appropI'iately modified for them What do think you Sincerely _ Livingston Satt rthwaite CC Ben Moore EUR RA Frederick Reinhardt Paris Enclosure One attendance list ' Copy _j_ of _ GBP copies Page 4 of 4 pages This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu