siseRBIP-- ENVELOPE CDSN CFS142 MCN 96342 19362 TOR 963421045 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7681 3420918-9fl 9---RUEALGX ZNY SSSSS HEADER R 0709182 DEC 96 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEADWD OCSA WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA CNO WASHINGTON DC RUEACMC CMC WASHINGTON DC b 2 b 3 10 USC 424 RUEAIIA CIA WASHINGTON DC RUDMONI ONI WASHINGTON DC RUDHNIS DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC NAVATAC 22 RUEALGX SAFE R 0620102 DEC 96 TO RUEKJCS DIA WASHDC RUSKGRD COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC RUEHC SECSTATE WASHDC ARA INL IT RUDGUSC US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC INTEL RUANJTF DIRJIATF EAST J2 BT CONTROLS -6 _ _ _ SECTION 01 OF 03 _ -RBeREIIISERIAL U IIR _- -OEWFAW page 28 sir THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE BODY COUNTRY SUBJ U COLOMBIA I IR PARAMILITARIES IN URABA WARNING U PANAMA_ PM COLOMBIAN PROSECUTOR COMMENTS ON CO b 2 b 3 _ 10 USC 424 ''% U THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED ---------------------------------------------------_-_----DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE D fb U SUMMARY F a - e AGREE THAT ILLEGAL PARA14ILITARIES IN THE URABA REGION OF ANTIOQUTA HAVE BECOME A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES AND b 1 1 4 c CONSTITUTE A POTENTIALLY GREATER THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT THAN DO THE GUERRILLAS f Th AT I - i 1'rir 1LlihUAL NAKAMIL TAKY URUUYS IN THE URABA REGION OF ANTIOQUTA HAVE BECOME A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES -THE PHENOMENON OF PARAMILITARY 11-1 page 29 GROUPS IN COLOMBIA IS NOT A RECENT DEVELOPMENT BACK TO THE EARLIEST DAYS OF COLOMBIAN HISTORY IT GOES BECAUSE OF THE IMMENSE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY COMPARTMENTALIZATION DENSITY ITS GEOGRAPHIC AND THE RELATIVELY LOW POPULATION IT HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY NATURALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS TO ENFORCE THE LAW AND PROVIDE SECURITY CITIZENS HAVE TENDED TO BAND TOGETHER TO PROTECT THEIR COMMON INTERESTS OFTEN BY ESTABLISHING THEIR OWN LOCAL GROUPS TO COMBAT BANDITRY AND LAWLESSNESS NOT ENTIRELY UNLIKE HOME--GROWN VIGILANTE GROUPS ESTABLISHED IN THE U S IN THE 19TH CENTURY THIS HAS OCCURRED ON A GRAVE DOUBTS THAT GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAVE THE MEANS TO CONTROL EITHER THE GUERRILLAS OR THE PARAMILITARIES INDICATED SEVERAL AREAS AROUND CAREPA WHERE THE LOCAL INHABITANTS OPENLY SUPPORT THE PARAMILITARIES REFUSING TO COOPERATE WITH GOC SECURITY FORCES IN ANY 7_1 F SEVERAL AREAS IN THE SERRANIA WAY MOUNTAINS PURE GUERRILLA b 1 1 4 c DESCRIBED AS PURA GUERRILLA COUNTRY IN THE MIDST OF THESE SEAS OF GUERRILLA AND PARAMILITARY CONTROL THERE ARE A FEW SMALL ISLANDS MORE OR LESS CONTROLLED BY THE COLOMBIAN ARMY COLAR AND NATIONAL POLICE 'THE PARAMILITARIES' 3• f' CONFRONTATION WITH THE FARC IN URABA IS BASICALLY A TURF 3 u WAR TO DETERMINE WHICH GROUP WILL CONTROL THE RICH BANANA-GROWING REGION AND THE LUCRATIVE ILLICIT NARCOTICS OPERATIONS WITHIN IT CARLOS AND FIDEL CASTANO WHO CONTROL THE ACLU AUTODEFENSAS OF CORDOBA AND URABA ARE INDEED INVOLVED HEAVILY IN NARCOTRAFFICKING AND OTHER ILLICIT ENTERPRISES ALEJO BG RITO THE 17TH COLAR BRIGADE WAS NOT HIGHLY REGARDED BY THE PARAMILITARIES DEL RIO COMMANDER ROJAS AND THAT THE GENERAL HAD INDEED MADE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE PARAMILITARIES WERE A GREATER THREAT TO THE NATION THAN WERE THE GUERRILLAS page 30 b 1 1 4 c 4 U THE PARAMILITARY PHENOMENON HAS DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS IN COLOMBIA STARTING OUT AS LOCAL VIGILANTE GROUPS ORGANIZED TO COMBAT LAWLESSNESS AND BANDITRY IN THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT CONTROL THESE ARMED GROUPS TOO OFTEN CAME TO BE CONTROLLED BY CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS WHO PUT THEIR OWN PRIVATE INTERESTS AHEAD OF THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY AND USED THESE PARAMILITARIES TO LIQUIDATE THEIR POLITICAL RIVALS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITORS IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE FORCE OF ARMS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE RULE OF LAW THE LEADERS OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS BECAME LOCAL CAUDILLOS OR DICTATORS THE ONLY WAY TO EFFECTIVELY OPPOSE THE EXCESSES OF SUCH CAUDILLOS WAS TO FORM A RIVAL PARAMILITARY GROUP AND BREAK THE CAUDILLO'S MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE AND COERCION BY THE LATE 19TH CENTURY MOST OF THE REGIONS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL CITY HAD COME TO BE DOMINATED BY RIVAL PARAMILITARY GROUPS WHOSE SHIFTING ALLEGIANCES SOMETIMES SUPPORTED AND MORE OFTEN RESISTED THE ATTEMPTS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN BOGOTA TO IMPOSE ITS AUTHORITY IN OUTLYING DEPARTMENTS 5 U WHILE THE PARAMILITARY -RIVALRIES MOST OFTEN MANIFESTED THEMSELVES IN THE FORM OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE LIBERALS MOST OF THE RIVALRIES HAD MORE TO DO WITH THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF COMPETITION FOR LOCAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOMINATION THAN WITH THE ABSTRACT POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM VERSUS CENTRALISM THUS IF ONE LOCAL CAUDILLO DECLARED HIMSELF TO BE A CONSERVATIVE HIS RIVAL WOULD NATURALLY DECLARE HIS HEARTFELT COMMITMENT TO THE LIBERAL CAUSE 6 U IN 1899 THESE RIVALRIES WERE SET LOOSE IN THE page 31 -b QPRr% COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE WAR OF A THOUSAND DAYS IN WHICH TO PUT THE AN ESTIMATED 100 000 COLOMBIANS WERE KILLED LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE COLOMBIA'S TOTAL POPULATION AT THE TIME WAS ESTIMATED TO BE LESS MOST OF THE BUTCHERY OCCURRED THAN THREE MILLION PEOPLE CAUDILLOS USUALLY LANDRIVAL IN THE RURAL AREAS WHERE OWNING ELITES MAINTAINED THEIR OWN PRIVATE ARMIES DEDICATED TO THE DUAL TASKS OF KEEPING THE LOCAL PEASANTRY IN LINE WHILE OPPOSING THE DEPRADATIONS OF RIVAL CAUDILLOS UNDER THE HIGH-SOUNDING BANNERS OF POLITICAL CAUSES THE LOCAL CAUDILLOS LIQUIDATED THEIR RIVALS SETTLED OLD SCORES WITH THEIR PERSONAL ENEMIES AND GENERALLY INSTITUTED A REIGN OF TERROR AT THE SAME TIME THE LIBERAL PARTY FACTION 7 U WITH ITS ORGANIZED ARMY HAVING BEEN DEFEATED AT THUS NEW PALONEGRO RESORTED TO GUERRILLA WARFARE GROUPS OF ARMED MEN EMERGED TO COMPETE WITH THE EXISTING PRIVATE ARMIES AND PARAMILITARIES AND WREAK HAVOC IN THE COLOMBIAN COUNTRYSIDE THE SAME TYPE'OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT ERUPTED IN 8 U COLOMBIA DURING LA VIOLENCIA THE VIOLENCE WHICH MOST SOURCES DATE FROM 1948-57 SOME SOURCES INCLUDE A SECOND LESS VIRULENT PHASE OF LA VIOLENCIA FROM 1958-65 DURING THE NINE-YEAR PERIOD OF LA VIOLENCIA POLITICAL VIOLENCE CLAIMED THE LIVES OF AN ESTIMATED 200 000 MANY AT THE HANDS OF PRIVATE ARMIES AND PARAMILITARY OR GUERRILLA GROUPS OF BOTH PRINCIPAL COLOMBIANS FACTIONS WHILE MILITARY CONNECTIONS TO THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS HAVE LONG BEEN SUSPECTED AND WOULD BE LOGICAL TO IN PLACES ASSUME HARD EVIDENCE IS DIFFICULT TO PRODUCE 9 - S WHERE PARAMILITARIES ARE FIGHTING THE GUERRILLAS FOR CONTROL OF LUCRATIVE NARCOTICS-PRODUCING OR CROSS-BORDER SMUGGLING AREAS THE PARAMILITARIES MAY LIKE URABA INDEED REJECT THE MILITARY'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM THE MILITARY'S INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER PARAMILITARIES THAT WE SO OFTEN LOGICALLY ASSUME TO EXIST MAY IN FACT BE TENUOUS AT BEST AND NON-EXISTENT IN SOME CASES b 1 1 4 c page 32 b 1 1 4 c WARNING U REPORT CLASSIFIED- -E- DRV FROM DIA DHD MSG 29133OZ JAN 96 ET 47683 NNNN firoFkf_ page 33 This document is from the holdings of The National Security 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