age Thomas L Hughes notes of conversations with Mike Forrestal and Roger llilsman during August 24-28 l963 coup planning week The following notes are exact copies of my originals except where later comments are indicated in brackets 1 Long lunch with Forrestal previously scheduled for Saturday noon Aug 24 at the White House 12 noon to 2 pm He began by saying that JFK was delighted with the IN paper on the Buddhists and Diem written Wednesday morning August The IA has nally produced its counterpart paper three days late This is impressive We are very grateful Timing is everything MF said We began by talking about non-Vietnam issues which included ClA s Special interest in Formosa MeCone and Cline Chiang Kai-Shek Korea Gen Pat Carter and Kim Chung l il Ball s trip to Pakistan Bill Brubeek s absence he ran away from Washington just after taking liisjob on Africa Mike complained about getting all his African questions Also handling Sine-Soviet ail airs Mike wanted a quick paper on what the Malaysian elections were really like in Sarawak and north Borneo Mike also wanted a paper on the current Indonesian economic situation before mid September when All bills come up again ironically Mike was tormented with signing off on African questions because of Brubeck s absence As if he were asking a history-laden question he worried out loud have to ask myself Who is away from town Is it safe to sign cables today 2 Vietnam took up most of the conversation Mike stressed that there was not much value in MR doing speculative pieces on SVN on who is doing what to whom since it is a disintegrating situation and speculation may not make any difference was in direct touch JFK could reach him at any timegfgre gr 4 1m use eff Frequent references to 1 17K his current thinking and action Mike clearly implied he i and ot JFK s political requirements Mike suggested that INR should maintain liaison with outside civilian experts on SVN including American Friends of Vietnam TLH said he would call them in for discussion Note I did so the following weekend in Wesley Fishel and Gil Jonas melt with Lou Sarris and Allen Whiting the following Saturday August 3 1 Perhaps should also be a kind of high level refugee debriefing center for the gradual gathering in Washington of newly exiled ambassadors from Vietnam The SVN amb to Japan may resign and come here from Paris where he is They come and see the press Mans eld others in Congress This creates more headaches for the Administration on the Hill has effects on AID etc These gentlemen may not be important at all to the successor government They may create new anti-policy pressures for JFK and even get in the way ofthe formation of a new SVN government We don't want them to divert our attention from the real task if debriefed them JFK could say we had talked to them when the inevitable Congressional inquiries come 1 But MF quickly said had a more important role to play than this The question ofan alternative government is now on the table should work on this and put together a new civilian government or a military-civilian government Need assessments of potential leaders should backstop Roger l-Iilsman ofcourse but you are not the tail to his kite there anyway Mike was critical in FE Hilsman s bureau He spoke highly of Bell and Bob Barnett- but deprecated others Mike hoped Roger would shake up the bureau soon Mike was also critical of Roger s draft instructions to Lodge They were terrible Imagine sitting out in Saigon with Buddhists in your garden refugees and demonstrators outside your house and you get an instruction from us saying press Diem for liberal reforms Mike was also critical of CAS reporting on Nhu s conversation of'l'hursday Mike couldn t see why anyone took it as anything more than Nhu s description of what he wanted us to hear for the rst 24 hours Buddhist crisis It served its purpose well complete with the utterly erroneous CAS comment which has now been retracted and changed overnight from do not have the impression Nhu was a central or important participant to the impression was given that he was not a central or important participant Mike also mentioned the dangerous unreliability of CIA in Colby's message containing CAS views 22 August Gyro airy to prior AS assessments they now said Hope fora civilian government to replace Diem is possibly unrealistic The The solution is improbable It would appear that it will be either Diem_9_r_a_t_n__ileary_jgnta The CA8 view continues to be that we should seek some improved continuation ol'Dicm s adm for at least more months to allow for the consolidation of military campaigns against the Viet Cong Mike and Hilsman agree that another 12 months of Diem is absurd Mike said it was clear that the Ngo family must go that even if they stahiliae' fora few weeks it can't last that this stability itself would be more and more anti American that we were worse off with them staying than with them going no matter what that we can t separate the Nhus from Diem unless the Nhus could be translated somehow liven if left alone and untranslated Diem would not be up to the task translated presumably means exiled On l-larriman Mike who is Harriman s foster son said somewhat astonishingly that Harriman had accused Forrestal of conducting warfare against the Diem regime but he has come around this morning Harriman signed off on Hilsman s long draft instruction for Lodge which included a reference to eliminating the Nhus Ball cut the Hilsman telegram down to U3 its original size and solicited Lodgc s suggestions no instructions But by far the most interesting were Mike s remarks about JFK a things to think of on vacation in New York Maybe the crisis will be over before he gets All this is part ot'JFK s game with Lodge It is implicit in the blame-sharing ploy involved in ll K s appointment ol Lodge to begin with Mike said explicitly that Lodge was hoping for instructions which he could use refuse or complain about later JFK has been determined to wait for Lodge s suggestions Hence the Ball revisions long draft although Ball is not necessarily privy to the latest Lodgedli K private communications The implication is that Mike is I then said i was a bit perplexed about where 1Vietnam policy was being made at the moment I asked about the respective roles of himself 1 lilsman llarriman Ball Rusk and JFK I mentioned that Rusk had called me from New York this morning to inquire what we knew about the French role in the Vietnam crisis De Gaulle whom Mac Bondy gills nosey Charlie was on his mind Mike said that the Buddhist uprising was not really the long arm ot De Gaulle whose historical reputation was surely going to be enhanced by the attention his enemies like Rusk pay to him Mike then added on Rusk Ofall the back Can t it work out that way Having criticized everybody else -- l-lilsman l-larriman Ball Rusk tor one thing or another Mike seemed to want me to conclude that he and JFK were the two who were making policy This may in fact be the case note later this may have added to the bitterness 1 1-K expressed to MF a few days later when he furiously refused MF 1 resignation You better stick around You owe me one Within days Bobby Kennedy was blaming Mike as the chief coup- plotter Query what do we know about the recent private Lodge-J 19K exchanges Who else is in the loop Sunday Aug 25 1963 rode in to work with Roger I'Iilsman at 10 00 am He briefed me on eyes only instruction to Lodge cleared with Ball Harriman Forrestal Rusk Taylor and Helms Helms is 1000% enthusiastic High time we hit the bullet RH Lodge came back this morning 12 hours in advance of his scheduled appt with Diem saying he Felt our objectives could not be carried out via Diem Chances of Diem s agreement were nil Therefore he asked modi cations permitting him to go directly to generals with the main message remaining the same Roger drafted outgoing message approving the modi cations Taylor furious that Adm Felt phoned Roger directly Netting in a state of shock and opposing policy Roger keeps saying told Eleanor that this week would separate the men from the boys Secretary Rusk is a man Rusk asks Roger Is there any wavering in our instructions No sir Very well ljust wanted to be sure there was no wavering Monday August 26 Colby is flying out to briechCone in California and get him aboard the telegram Helms who cleared it is supportive But Gen Carter is wringing his hands and telis I--li sman this doesn t come off I suppose everyone will blame the Roger replies Ofcourse the policy is perfect but the implementation is in your hands Roger is upset about the army his father s profession Taylor is fretting Harkins revising his views JCS claims subterfuge As Forrestal puts it What is it about that place on the Hudson that trains men not to act' Nolting is lecturing at the War College and lobbying for Diem all over town Wednesday August 28 Altercation at meeting with JFK Harkins telegram prompted by Taylor JFK took Taylor into Oval of ce and read the riot act to him Forcing him to send out another telegram saying the Administration was united Taylor chastised and left the meeting Consternation Sunday people thought a great decision had been made more speedily than ever before in Washington But are they kidding themselves Much unrest From JFK on down keeps saying that he hopes that I-lalberstam and the NY Times have not taken us in Halberstam s just a 28 year old kid - The devil is in the details ofcoursc Lodge is now in a strong position 1 VOA broadcast his protest Rusk's abject apology 2 the Washington retraction of the broadcast rather than any statement that it was unauthorised the State Dept brie ngs pointing the nger at Nhu and the police and exculpating the army the GVN reply taking speci c issue with the Dept briefings and denouncing them as inaccurate Lodge can claim credit if the coup succeeds he has more than enough room to blame Washington if it Fails This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article New Light in a Dark Corner Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam November 1963 2020-11-01