'b - 19 September 15 1963 T0 The Secretary - - 1 r - - 5'31 Arm 1 FROM INR - Thomas L Hughes 50- 3 - - - if Alfie 2 - SUBJECT The Problem of Nhu 777744 HALLS DALE 7 7 273 Since May 8 however Nhu has become the primary factor exacerbating the I Buddhist controversy and is the cause of a potentially explosive governmental crisis For the reasons listed below he is the major Obstacle to any genuine I resolution of this crisis His Hold on Diem most reliable authority on the inner workings of the Presidency agrees with Thuan that Nhu speaks for Diem at meetings writes Diem's responses to press i queries and has reduced Diem to echoing his own views As a result Diem believes Nhu's charge that the Buddhist problem is basically Viet Cong created This has degraded Diem in the eyes of his loyal supporters Vu Van Man former Foreign Minister and General Le Van Kim deputy acting chief of the armed forces claim Nhu is non the dominant power in South Vietnam Our Country Team assessment concludes that at top echelons of government as well as at among provincial and district officials the'con sensus is that actual power rests with Nhu rather than Diem moreover the Nhu also has independent sources of power He directs the secret police and the Can Lao the semicovert political control organization This apparatus of informants permeates bureaucratic military and key non governmental groups Nhu's surveillance system generates fear and hatred throughout these groups GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification magma coma 6m 47 11 we 311173-14 - 3 ONLY Nhu controls the army's Special Forces which together with the secret police act as his agents in raids on pagodas arrests_of monks students and oppositionists and the manufacture of evidence to prove the Communist conspiracy behind these disaffected groups It is such actions which have exacerbated eXisting tensions to the point of near revolt His Hatred of the United States Nhu'has conducted a virulent public and private anti Anerican campaign He has accused the United States of plotting with colonialists and feudalists to turn South Vietnam ihto a satellite He has Spread reports that'specific United States officials are marked for assassination He has frequently claimed that the American presence must be reduced because it threatens South Vietnam's independence He has repeatedly lied to our ambassador and the CA3 station chief cohcerning his role in developments since This has impaired our position in South Vietnam Colonel Lac responsible for implementing the strategic hamlet program claims that progress has slowed in the laSt three months because of the anti American attitude of certain elements in Saigon At the same time Nhu's boast that he commands the basic support of the United States both inhibits his opponents and expands his prestige by humiliating our high officials His Relations With North Vietnam seek help elsewhere Should that fail Nhu asserts he would negotiate a settle- ment with Hanoi Nhu has convinced both Vietnamese and foreign Observers that such a prospect is likely Reports that Nhu is already in contact with Hanoi are so credible and widespread as eventually to undermine morale in the army and the bureaucracy regardless of their current acouracy Nhu is capable of believing he could manipulate the situation to his ad vantage whether through fighting or negotiating pith the communists His The Vietnamese Want Nhu Out According to General Barkins both sentiment and reality in South Vietnam have polarized strongly and properly against the Nhus He believes that the country would burvive and flourish w1th them gone and Diem still President We concur fully in General Harkins' View of the Nhus General Krulali reports that Nhu's departure would be hailed by military officers He was told 53 Nun's mail-n rig 3'1 2 ms ONLY - e mr h - 3 dissatisfaction with Nhu Colonel Lac indicated that Nhu last 2 hours if the United States made clear it would not tolerate this situation Tran Quoc Buu head of the largest labor organization in Vietnam claims that his followers believe Nhu must go He fears that should Nhu emerge victorious from the present crisis worse blunders will ensue permitting an eventual Communist takeover V0 Van Hai believes that Diem cannot regain the confidence of his people so long as Nhu remains 1' we agree with the Country Team assessment that Nhu is disliked hated feared or distrusted at all levels in the bureaucracy the military establishment and urban elite circles and 2 longstanding and widespread antiuNhu feelings have now intensified and into blame for the regime 's repressive measures We also agree with the MACV assessment that many top level military officers seem convinced that he could deal with Hanoi and othe great bulk of the military cannot accept Nhu as leader of South Vietnam under any conditions This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article New Light in a Dark Corner Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam November 1963 2020-11-01