EYES ONLY Drafting O re and O irer Memorandum of Conversation SUBJECT Viet-Nam The White House The President The Vice President Mr Bundy Mr Forrestal PARTICIPANTS DATE October 29 1963 4 00 p m Defense Department Secretary McNamara General Taylor Mr William Bundy General Krulak State Department CIA Secretary of State Mr McCone 70 Governor arriman Mr Helms Ambassador Johnson Mr Colby Mr Hilsman in final stages Mr Mendenhall The Attorney General 1 Mr Colby Opened with an intelligence assessment of the lineup of He indicated this assessment was not based on the information from General Don just received by cable but forces pro-Diem and pro-coup rather on an overall CAS assessment of available information He said that the pro and anti GVN forces in Saigon number about the same on each side 9 800 which can be classified as non tral There are also about 18 000 forces in the Saigon area 0f the key elements he listed the Presidential guard the special forces and the armor unit in the Saigon area as pro-GVN except for one element of the Presidential guard He listed airborne air force and some parts of the Marine forces as anti- palace In response to the President's question he stated that the only change since August is that two Marine units have moved over to the palace side Mr Colby said that there are two main categories of coup groups 1 Can Lao dissidents and 2 the Generals There is some contact between these two main categories but not very much In a discussion of the balance of forces the President referred to the South Korean coup and indicated that there were relatively few pro-coup forces at first but that the bulk of the forces were attracted He suggested however that the draft telegram to Lodge which Mr McGeorge Bundy had circulated at the to the coup as it progressed L 05-1254 roe seem EYES ONLY DECLASSIFIED E O 13526 SEC 3 5 - 7 3 By my NARA nateqm TOP SECRET -2- beginning of the meeting be expanded to ask for a detailed assessment of the balance of forces from Lodge Harkins and CAS Secretary Rusk outlined various issues which require consideration He said we should consider having Lodge pass the word to General Dontm our concern over the possibility of prolonged fighting if the forces are relatively evenly balanced He suggested Don be cautioned that if the Generals move they should have the situation sufficiently in hand that their move will cause little less of life He also suggested that Harkins be briefed on the situation by Lodge He further raised the issue that both sides may ask for our help during a coup He commented that if we help the coup group we shall commit ourselves by this action to guaranteeing its success because we shall have burned our bridges with Diem If we help Diem we shall fundamentally handicap the execution of the war because of the resulting adverse effect on the morale of the armed forces The President stated that if Ambassador Lodge delays his departure from Saigon this will be a tip off to our foreknowledge of a coup He added that if Lodge leaves Harkins should be in charge if there is any coup activity Secretary Manamara suggested that Trueheart be in charge until a coup starts and the responsibility then switch to Harkins Prior to a coup he suggested that a group of three -- Trueheart Harkins and Smith -- serve to direct Conein and if there is any disagreement between them the divergencies be referred back to Washington Mr McCone suggested that Smith be kept out of the triumvirate and Secretary McNamara acceded to that point of view The Attorney General stated that this proposed coup makes no sense on the face of it from the 8 8 standpoint It would mean placing the whole future of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia in the hands of an official whom we do not know well we do know that Diem is a fighter who will go down fighting Secretary McNamara reported on the basis of his visit that the war was going reasonably well and the coup raises a serious risk of a reversal of that trend The Attorney General concluded that he believed we should play a major role in finding out what the coup plans are and in influencing whether or not a coup should take place He pointed out that whatever we do or do not do the U S will be blamed anyway for the results Secretary Rusk agreed that the cable to go to Lodge should call for a more active role by the U S in assessing the proposed coup and in trying to influence whether it should come off but Secretary Rusk added that if a major part of the Vietnamese military leadership feels that the war against the Viet Cong could not be won with the Diem Government then it is a major risk for the U S in continuing with this government TOP SECRET EYES ONEY EYES ONLY -3- The Attorney General remarked that he was aware of no support for the view of certain Vietnamese military leaders that the war could not be won with the Diem Government General Taylor expressed agreement with the Attorney General's point of view He added that even if the coup is successful prosecution of the war will be hampered For example the new government would change all of the province chiefs Mr McCone also expressed agreement with the foregoing point of view The President said that he could not see why it would be necessary for the new government to change province chiefs Secretary Rusk re- iterated his concern about the possibility of prolonged fighting during a coup but declared'that if the coup succeeds he felt no concern about the ability of the new government to win the war Governor Harriman expressed agreement that if the coup comes off successfully we need feel no concern about the progress of the war He stated that the military situation is now gradually going downhill and military difficulties will increase since Diem does not exercise the leadership necessary for victory The President stated that the coup group should have the balance of forces in its favor Mr McGeorge Bundy interjected that as an alter- native it might have tactical surprise in its favor The President suggested again that Lodge's assessment be sought as to where the key military units stand with respect to a coup Ambassador Lodge's departure on his visit to the U S then became the topic of discussion Secretary McNamara suggested that Lodge be left to judge whether he should delay his departure and that a military plane be made available to increase his flexibility in this regard He indicated Lodge may wish to delay his departure because we have led him to believe in past messages that we support a coup and now we may appear to be drawing back Secretary McNamara also commented that it seems hard for Lodge to talk to Harkins and that they are evidently not talking to each other at present It was agreed a military plane would be despatched for Lodge's use EYES ONLY This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article New Light in a Dark Corner Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam November 1963 2020-11-01