91 Cu MEN c EGHIEN c u '5 30 LJQC MN 1311 Mq aalm TrijLJ tau-4'60 Wm 9E3 WWLQ 3 13 MCI 05 Liars CLO rug Em 1 mg 99 WELL Liqcu 1 5% WW NHAN XET VA DE we was rage- 1 as u 6% KBC 3401 - 1155 non a 9 all In will a CW fies 2 6114 0 71 Lu 4 2 54 71qu 7 1 04 a a pal aim um 050 7 #57 cg CA a @597 Mc ip x2 204% 514 370W 2 bula 715Ltd A 6332mm f- 6 2 22 Translation by Merle Pribbenow Research Report I -Summary -Order from Ngo Dinh Diem to military and governmental cadres issued at the time the revolution broke out Included is a call to Colonel Bui Dzinh and Major General Cao to bring 4 battalions up to liberate the Capital at 4 o’clock on 1 November 1963 II -Assessment and Recommendation Respectfully report to the Major KBC 340I 20 November 63 signature Handwritten note Colonel Bui Dzinh Bui Dzinh Bui Dzinh Have 4 battalions return here at 4 o’clock in the afternoon of 1 November 63 Affectionate greetings two stars I To Citizens and Military and Civilian Governmental Cadres As the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Republic I order the entire army to refuse any orders issued by anyone other than me This is because a number of officers have plotted to deceive our army in an an effort to betray the interests of our nation Commanders at all levels of our armed forces and of our paramilitary units must rise up to join me in fighting off the traitors Anyone who has already been deceived must immediately desert the ranks of the traitors and come over to my side II Order of the President of the Republic of Vietnam and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces To all large units and armed forces units - to all local forces Because of the current critical situation I appeal to all reserve forces to move out using the fastest means available to return here to liberate the Capital To avoid any chance of mistaken identity when you arrive in the Capital send someone in to make contact with the Joint Services Presidential Guard Brigade in order to receive my instructions However fighting the communists is still important so you must also leave sufficient troops behind to defend our territory Commanders at all levels should take action based on an intelligent assessment of the situation This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article New Light in a Dark Corner Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam November 1963 2020-11-01