MORI DociD 13 J st¢1 -ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET Sua JECf Opli-ft U S News WOrld Report Story on Jonathan Pollard _OM James P Lynch • Direc_ tor of SearriTV TO r -J b fldlfttl ON r-' Ir NO IMfE --·- f AYii OFFICU'S INIIIAI S fOIIWAMDfll' lfaMO 1%'1- MAY 1987 COMMENTS N-b t •Mk - - n t 1v attow frOfft w ' Ot- o 1 - GCfOJJ col- oft ch -- '·1 to om I D PAO 2 -- -' Attached is some background information which relates to specific elements of the story On Jonathan Pollard that U S News World Report is_ expected to pr int - I 3 Also attached is a suggested response to press inquiries - 5 cc DDA 6 0 7 b l b 3 8 9 ao I IJ _ - AP RoVED FOR RELEASE DATE MAY 2006 u i J ll_ J - u J-4 1 5 - ' • -'t l y S ews and World Report 1 ected allegation Before Pollard applied to the Navy he sought employment at CIA and as turned down on the grounds of mental instability and drug use at Stanford Fact In December 1977 Jonathan J Pollard did apply for under the Graduate Fellow pr am Ori 24 d i ii- a - iilil_ j employment with the Agene ______ 2 Expected allegation CIA withheld information when De ense Investigative service conducted a security namecheck with CIA Fact On 8 Novellber 1979 in answer to a namecheok submitted by DIS copies of field investigative reports ere made available to thmt organi ation Polygraph derived information was not provided to DIS Expected allegation The Agency denied any knowled9e of Pollard when he was first arrested · Fact Pollard w•s arrested on 21 November 1985 ·on 22 November I'9ii5 a memorandum was sent to the FBI with a copy to the Naval Imrestigative Service detailing pertinent infor mation concerning Pollard held by this Agency 4 Expected alfegation Pollard because of his SCI clearances and courier card had access to intelligence libraries including CIA The implication being that even though CIA knew of his chacaete • ve gave him access to sensitive documents Fact Pollard did make two v i s i E J h e A9ency Headquarters and attended a three day conference in which he would have been exposed to classified informati • could have access to var ious Agency documents through the OIA and Nl SC channels 'rhe visits would have been based on certification of his clearances and access approvals by his arent command --- -- --··· '1'-1 •• t - - ' • · • Su ested res onse to · ress in uiries Jonathan Pollard made appl oat on for the Agency's Grad aate Fel ow Progratn in December 1977· F£ llowin security process7ng he as - plsapproved for employ•ent 1n May 1978 No 1nformat on reg a mental instability was developed d ring the secufz4t processing and_ therefore was not a factor 1n the4 J1sapproval decis1on Approximately 1 1 2 years later the Defense investigative Service conducted a security namecheck at CIA as a part of its investigation of Pollard for employment with the Navy Per established practice amongst Government agencies copies of field investigative reports were made available to DIS The decision to pass additional information such as polygraph derived inform ation regarding lifestyl• issues vice clear national security issues to other Agencies in particular to Agencies which do not utilize the polygraph as a screening tool is always a difficult decision Fairness to tbe individual his right of privacy and the amount of time that has passed since the info mation was developed are key considerations in this process As a result of this process no polygraph derived information on Pollard was passed to DIS at that time Although the same considerations ·for the individual • s rights would apply the formation would be passed under today's operating philosophy Jonathan Pollard was arrested on 21 Novembe r 1985 On 22 November 1985 a memorandum detailing all pertinent security file information on Pollard held by this Agency was forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a copy provided to the Naval Investigative Service Mr Pollard was g ante4 a security clearance and compartmented information access approvals by Department of Defense elements As with other individuals holding similar clearances and approvals he could through approved channels have gained access to certain Agency documents Simply because an individual does not meet the rigid hiring standards of CIA does not mean that he should never· be el gible for employment and clearance by other u s Government genc es his is particularly true where a time delay is 1nvolved Unless a clear threat to national security is known this Agency would honor the certified security clearances granted by another agency