MORI Key to Exem 1 Executive Order 1 section b 1 2 Executive Order 13 526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section b 3 the Freedom oflnformation Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL E O 13526 SECTION 5 3 b 3 IS CAP 2 0 01- 0 ' document - 1 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Foreign Denial and Deception Analyaia Committee Washington o c 30 October 1987 f m J THE JONATHAN JAY POLLARD ESPIONAGE CASE A DAMAGE ASSESSMENT Study Director I I -------------------------- WARNIN OTICE INTELLIG E SOURCES AND METHODS INV VED S 3 r ID 46933 Preface This study undertaken byjthe Foreign Denial and Deception lysis Committee DDAC t J the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence is one of two assessments of a Q a result of Jonathan Pollard's espionage on behalf of 1984-BS which are being issued almost simultaneously The other is an assessment prepared for the Department of Defense by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Investigative Service Naval Security and Investigative Command where Pollard was employed during his espionage career The principal drafters consulted closely during preparation of the two studies Although they differ somewhat in detail and emphasis there is mutual agreement concerning their findings yt The Study Director gratefully acknowledges the valuaple assistance of contributors from throughout the Intelligence Community to the project J 1 77 4 J7 L - p··· DIRECTOR OF CENTRAl INTELLIGENCE Foreign Dental and Deception Analyala Committee L-- Washington D C 20505 The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case A Damage Assessment Executive Summary 1 Jonathan Pollard's short but intensive espionage career on behalf of Israel lasted from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985 He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage on 5 June 1986 and was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 Mar ch 1997 Following his guilty plea which arose from a plea bargain Pollard cooperated with US Government investigators including officials of the Intelligence Community debriefings of Pollard aided Extensive post-plea by -------------j1___1____________ la review of document-receipt records yielded an extensive account of Pollard's espionage objectives activities and compromised documents A series of polygraph interviews tended to confirm that his cooperation with US authorities was bona fide lyg ---- 3-- -- Personal History and Espionage Career 2 Although Pollard was regarded by his former college professors and colleagues in naval intelligence as a capable--if eccentric--scholar and intelligence analyst his personal and employment history is replete with incidents of irresponsib le behavior that point to significant emotional instability For r l 4 example although Pollard earned a 3 5 grade point average as a Stanford undergraduate from 1972-76 former student acquaintances told investigators that he bragged about his role as a Mossad agent and on one occasion waved a pistol in the air and screamed that everyone was out to get him Pollard's fantasies regarding involvement with clandestine US and Israeli intelligence operations continued during his emp1oyment with US naval intelligencejfrom 1979 to 1985 3 iii 1 - ----J 13 1 1 Another factor in Po ard's background was his persistent and growing determination to assist Israel either by emigrating to that country or by other means which eventually meant espionage In his first Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing following his arrest and guilty plea Pollard claimed that he had begun dreaming about future emigration to Israel at age 12 when that country won a dramatic victory in the six-day war of June 1967 According to Pollard another influence was his attendance in the summer of 1971 at a three-month science camp in Israel which featured strong encouragement to emigrate During the pre-espionage period of Pollard's employment with naval intelligence he claimed he developed a strong perception of anti-Israeli attitudes among his colleagues and of inadequate US intelligence support for Israel $0 3 1 4 Despite his emotional and behavioral difficulties Pollard managed to gain the respect of most of his superiors as evidenced by his achievement of promotions from GS-07 to GS-12 over a sixyear period Pollard's success rested upon an academic background that included graduate study at the Fletcher School of Law and ET I iv 27 4 Diplomacy Tufts University upon his considerable skills as an analyst and upon deficiencies in administrative procedures and record-keeping--since rectified-jthat allowed Pollard to change jobs without adverse aspects of his past performance coming to the r----------- attention of his new 5 According to Pollard' he eagerly seized an opportunity to volunteer his services to Israeli intelligence in late June 1984 At that time Pollard met his initial Israeli handler Col Aviem Sella--a noted fighter pilot on study leave in the United States-through a pro-Israeli activist who was an old friend of the Pollard family Pollard passed classified material to Sella concerning military developments in several Arab countries during at least three meetings June-August 1984 sessions in Paris in November 1984 Here Pollard met Rafael Eitan advisor on counterterrorism to Prime Minister Shamir and the senior Israeli in charge of the case as well as Joseph Yagur Counselor for Scientific Affairs at the Israeli Consulate in New York who immediately replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler Pollard's initial monthly salary of $1 500 was agreed upon in l£J I -- -- -- Pollard in 1978 had been rejected for a CIA Graduate Fellowship owing to his admission I -------------------- and recent use of marijuana I I Vfl J3 l 1-----rl I MORI DociD 1 46 3 Paris as was the main objective of the operation as outlined by Yaqur--to provide Israel with the best available US intelligence on Israel's Arab adversaries and the military support they receive from the Soviet Union Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from naval intelligence rather than undergo a polygraph examination we assume that Pollard at some point told the Israelis that his application for a graduate fellowship had been rejected by CIA I 7 After returning from Paris Pollard shifted his espionage into high gear Beginning in late January 1995 he made large ' biweekly deliveries of classified material on every other Friday to the apartment of Irit Erb a secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington Pollard recalled that his first and possibly largest delivery occurred on 23 January and consisted of five suitcasesfull of classified material and that he maintained the biweekly schedule--interrupted only bY a second operational trip abroad-- until his arrest in November 1995 Pollard also met Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month to discuss additional taskings and the value of the intelligence he delivered Pollard recalled that Yagur on at least two occasions indicated that selected items of his intelligence were known and appreciated by the highest levels of the Israeli Government salary was raised to $2 500 n Pollard's monthly February 1995 in appreciation for his productivity and he made a second operational trip to meet his Israeli handlers in Tel Aviv in July-August 1995 a d D J By the fall of 1995 Pollard's Navy supervisor had become suspicious of his activities because Pollard seemed to be handling _ p U1 l l' ORI 134 3 3 large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East and unrelated to Pollard's legitimate duties which concerned North An investigation ensued that America and the Eastern Caribbean led to Pollard being questioned by FBI and NIS officials beginning on 18 November andJarrested on 21 November after an unsuccessful -----------' effort to gain asylum at the Israeli Embassy 9 j ShJ J During post-arrest debriefings Pollard said that if his espionage had remained undetected he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research because he would not have been required to undergo a polygraph and major intelligence products were readily available there He also indicated he could have assumed a less risky role as an agent of influence at State Ic J1 3 Israeli Espionage Motives and Classified Materials Received 10 Given Israel's challenging security problems over the past 40 years Israeli intelligence officials have put into I vigorous practice their belief that 1 j1 I In the aftermath of Israel's pyrrhic military victory in Lebanon in 1982 representatives of the Israeli Government defense forces j1 l expressed concern about a potential erosion 1 owing to Israeli economic difficulties and a robust Soviet-sponsored Syrian military- 1 @J t ------------------------ 11 According to Pollard the Israelis submitted the following collection requirements in descending order of priority to Pollard --Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence --Arab exotic weaponry including chemical and weapons --soviet aircraft --Soviet air defenses --Soviet air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles and --Arab order-of-battle deployments readiness LJ l Eitan provided additional tasking for -- -----LCJ ---------------- material reporting dirt on Israeli political fiqures any ·information that would identify Israeli o ficials who were providing information to the United States 12 We believe that Pollardlresponded effectively to the general Israeli taskings but that he himself exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access interests and collection initiatives US investigators with DociD 1 4 Pollard's assistance identified the following categories and approximate numbers of compromised published documents plus an estimated 1 500 current intelligence summary messages Special compartmented information SCI Top Secret non-codeword Secret non-codeword Confidential Unclassified and unknown classification 800 vr I 3 I 1 Jsraeli Intelligence Gains 13 1 933 ID 14 ' In our view Pollard's stolen material Losses and vulnerabilities 15 1 Security The unauthorized disclosure to the sraelis of such a large and varied body of classified material poses risks of several kinds to US intelligence sources and methods analytical capabilities and intelligence exchanges and foreign-policy interests including the possibility of extended compromise of some of Pollard's material to third countries --Sources and Methods Analysis of the information received from Pollard would be a routine counterintelligence function performed by the rsraeli intelligence and security services We believe the MGR 1345333 mu-Analytical Cagabilities and Eachanges l 693 --Foreign Policy Interests Pollard's role in providing Israel with intelligence that assisted its planning for the 1985 raid on PLO headquarters near Tunis --Extended Compromise of Pollard's material to third countries I I ---------------------------------------------- -- 71 MGR 1346 3933 3 16 Pollard's espionage has put at risk important US intelligence and £oreiqn-policy interests J l 3 II 17 'still without discounting th s eotential £or serious --------l long-term damage £rom Pollard's espionage I I 4 933 Lessons Learned 18 The DCI's Foreign Denial and Deception·Analysis Committee has commissioned a separate paper to be published in the spring of 1988 on the counterintelligence and security lessons learned from the Pollard and four other recent espionage cases--those of Larry Wu-tai Chin Pelton WalkerjWhitworth and Howard Among the most important lessons unique to the Pollard case is that vigilance must be maintained j 19 7 Lessons from previous damage assessments and security ---------' studies that were reinforced by our findings in the Pollard case include Tab III pp S-9 --Utility of the polygraph as a deterrent to espionage I l 10R TD 3 -Need to complete background investigations before granting access to sensitive intelligence -Need for management awareness of employee behavior and for completeness and availability of employees' personnel records and -Need to devote additional resources to computer security Key to Exemptions 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b l 2 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 b 3 the Freedom ofinformation Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E 3 The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espio A Damage Assessment te Table of Contents Page Preface ii Executive Summary iii Table of Contents xvii I Introduction 1 II Background 3 A B C D E F Personal History and Espionage Career Personal Hi story Navy Employment and Descent toward Espionage Contact Assessment and Recruitment 1984 Espionage in High Gear January-November 1985 Detection and Apprehension • Debriefinqs Legal Disposition and Publicity III Inventory Profile--Classified Material Sought and Stolen • • A Israeli Intelligence Motives Priorities and B Regue sts • TJ c Overview of Compromised Materia 1 4 7 14 21 25 27 31 31 I 43 44 46 47 47 48 48 49 49 49 2 3 4 50 50 Current Intelligence etc 51 51 52 A 53 B 58 ------------T-Q_p §_E_C_I 3m ----- ------------------------ __ MORI DociD 13 933 Table of Contents cont v Losses and Vulnerabilities Damage to US National Security A Intelligence Sources and Methods • 6 2 6 2 6 2 65 66 67 69 B c 70 72 73 D E F 74 74 79 80 eo VI Conclusions A The Bottom Line B Damage Limitation 82 82 c '-------------------- '1 ------ Selected Bibliography 83 94 87 Boxes Pollard's Assignments and Security-Clearance Actions wtih Naval Intelligence 1979-85 Israel's Intelligence and Security Services 1 2 8 34 3 54 1 1 I 1 QJ 2 3 I 146a 46b 46c Tabs Tab I Tab II Tab III Tab IV Tab V Jonathan Pollard A Chronology of Events I-1 II-1 Annotated Examples of Compromised Documents Security and Counterintelligence Lessons Learned III-1 Terms of Reference IV-1 Contributors V-1 · -r T_O_P_S_b_C_AF-' -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case A Damage Assessment 1 Intro uction 1 In March 1986 the National Security Council Staff asked the Director of Central Intelligence to commiaion comprehensive damage assessments of espionage cases that have occurred since 1980 NSC lCS 40102 dated 19 March 1986 Among the cases to be addressed was that of Jonathan Jay Pollard an employee of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office NFOIO and other components of naval intelligence from September 1979 until November 1985 The DCI directed that this effort be undertaken by the Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee DDAC This study results from the collection of all available information on the Pollard case and represents an assessment of the overall damage to national interests and to the Intelligence Sj Community 2 j3 I Jonathan Pollard's short but intensive espionage career on behalf of Israel lasted from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985 He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage on 5 June 1986 and was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March 1987 Following his guilty plea which arose from a plea bargain Pollard cooperated with US Government investigators including officials of the Intelligence Community who were examining the extent of his damage to the national security of the United States of Pollard aided by Extensive post-plea debriefings _I------ll JJ-------'1 and 1 TOP SECRK I review of ------------------------------ document-receipt records yielded an extensive account of Pollard's espionage objectives activities and compromised documents A series of polygraph interviews conducted to monitor the veracity of Pollard's debriefing statements tended to confirm that his cooperation with US authorities was bona fide 2_ ----- _______ II Backqround 4 Personal History and Espionage Career Jonathan Jay Pollard's intensive 17-month espiona ge campaign on behalf of Israel resulted in the loss of more th an US classified documents and messages Pollard concent rated on providing Israel with US intelligence on the militar y forces and equipment of Arab and Islamic states and on Soviet military forces equipment and technology Judging from Pollard's post-arrest statements and writing s 2 he has tried to justify or rationalize his espionage as an e ffort to help a beleaguered Israel so that it would win the nex t war against the Arabs The Intelligence Community believe s the Israelis readily would accomplish that objective without Pollard's stolen intelligence 2 In addition to the extensm· oat-arrest debriefings he gave to and Naval Investigative Service inveeti gators from the FBI 1 -t e-record interview to journalist Pollard granted a detailed Wolf Bli tzer and submitted two Memoranda In Aid of Sentencing totaling 107 pages to presiding Ch Aubrey E Robinson Jr of the US District Court 3 -- r--3 ------------------------------- --------------T-o_P___s_t_e T -------------------------- A Personal History 5 Jonathan Jay Pollard's childhood and adolescence were marked by material sufficiency strong intellectual stimulation within a closely knit family and some bruising experiences as a member of the Jewish-American minority growing up in Middle America Born as the youngest of three children to Morris and Mildred Klein Pollard on 7 Auqust 1954 Jonathan Pollard spent his early childhood in Galveston Texas and his adolescence in South Bend India a where his father is a prominent virologist at the University of Notre Dame The family has been strongly pro-American3 and also active in support of the State of Israel 4 Jonathan Pollard indicated that he felt ethnically isolated in South Bend and was uncomfortable in an environment he perceived to be strongly anti-Semitic 5 ff tl E 4 In a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing Pollard wrote that the first flag I could recognize in my early youth was that of Israel and for years our family took quiet pride in my late uncle's decision to provide the fledgling Israeli Army in 1948 with military boots and medical supplies liberated from the American Hospital in Paris which he commanded at the time Pollard also states in the memorandum my parents never ceased in their efEltt Jrtray this _land fUSA as a Godsend for Jews 3 5 In the same memorandum Pollard related that the first indication I had that life would be an agonizing struggle between competing values rather than one of coherent academic absolutes occurred when my family moved to Indiana where I suddenly found myself confronting a community in which racism and bigotry were acceptable social practices was never able to establish friendships in my neighborhoods and was compelled to spend most of my time around the city's Hebrew Day School where I felt at least physically safe and emotionally prot·ected rr y5 j Q3 4 _c ___EJ _ _ _ _ TOP SECRB'r I MORI 6 Pollard indicated that he already had begun fantasizing about future emigratipn to Israel when that state won a dramatic victory in the six-day war of June 1967 This event evidently made a lasting impression upon him from then on he increasingly considered emigrat'ion to or other means to assist Israel Another influence was Pollardrs attendance in the summer of 1971 at a three-month science camp in Israel sponsored by the Weizman Institute which featured patriotic field trips and stronq encouragement for young Jewish-Americans to emigrate to Israel csl l3 I 7 Pollard's attendance at Stanford University from 1972-76 was marked both by significant academic achievement and signs of emotional instability On the one and he graduated with a B A in political science emphasizing national-security studies with a grade point average of 3 5 On the other hand after Pollard's arrest former Stanford acquaintances alleged that he was involved in several bizarre incidents They for example claim that he told them he worked for the Israeli intelligence service Mossad and was being groomed to work for it within the United States Government On another occasion Pollard waved a pistol in the air and screamed that everyone was out to get him 8 Throughout his time at Stanford Pollard apparently retained a fixation on emigrating to Israel or providing other direct assistance to Tel Aviv work on a kibbutz du ing He claims to have volunteered to the Yom Kippur War in 1973 as part of a program to permit Israeli men to be transferred from the kibbutzim to the war fronts 6 Pollard indicates he decided at that time that the intelligence field would provide him with a skill 9 Pollard followed a circuitous path from stanford to the US Intelligence Community He attended Notre Dame Law School from September to November 1976 and Indiana University from January to May 1977 He then was enrolled in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University from September 1977 until August 1979 While at Fletcher in early 1978 Pollard applied unsuccessfully for CIA's Graduate Fellow program Although his academic credentials were impressive and most of the references interviewed for his background investigation commented favorably upon his character and qualifications Pollard admitted extensive and recent use of marijuana ---------- 1-- '------------ jthereby disqualifying himself for CIA employment In the spring of 1979 while still at Fletcher Pollard successfully applied for employment with the Department of the Navy 1 ---------------- Although Pollard did not receive the Master's degree he began work as an Intelligence Research Specialist assigned to the Naval Ocean 6 Pollard claims in his first Memorandum in Aid 'of Sentencing that his volunteer group spent five frustrating days waiting for an El Al flight in Los Angeles before being told the need for ad passed with Sharon's crossing of the Suez Canal V 7 I classified him as a temperamental geniuslind a gifted person who worked at his own pace and would on d to people he felt were of equal intelligence 8' 3 6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Surveillance Information Center NOSIC of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office in September 1979 B YY Em loyment 10 and Desc nt Toward Es iona Pollard's job performance and personal behavior varied markedly in the course of working for several components of naval intelligence from 1979-95 Most of his performance evaluations were very positive and he was promoted from GS-7 to GS-12 during the period Still especially in retrospect Pollard showed additional evidence of emotional instability and ah obsess on with helping Israel 8 · The following factors that have come to light about hia employment with the Navy indicate that Pollard was unsuited for access to sensitive national security information --False cl ims concerning professional qualifications Pollard falsely stated on his naval employment application that he had a provisional M A degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Moreover in February 1980 during an interview with Task Force 168 the intelligence element charged with HUMINT collection Pollard falsely claimed to have an M A degree to be proficient in Afrikaans and to have applied for a commission in the naval fJ fJ 8 After Pollard' a arrest I observed that Pollard's sometimes strange behavior-including inter alia the telling of bizarre stories about his adventures as a CIA agent in Syria and being captured and tortured by Syrian authorities--had taken on new importance after his discovery and arrest but noted further that the most important thing known about Pollard before his arrest was that he was an intelligent energetic and often productive analyst whose faults could be overlooked in light of his obvious value to the components to which he was assigned S · reserve Pollard made another more farfetched statement to his immediate supervisor in NOSIC he said he had key South African contacts who could provide him with valuable information and that he had known South African citizens for many years because his father bad been the CIA Station Chtef in South Africa 9 ys BOX Pollard's Assignments and Security-Clearance Actions With Naval Intelligence 1979-85 September 1979 Research analyst Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center Suitland Maryland merchant shipping analyst and watch officer November 1979 Interim Top Secret clearance granted February 1980 Volunteer to Task Force 168 TF-168 the naval intelligence element responsible for HUMINT collection Pollard was assigned to collect information from a South African defense attache April 1980 Pollard temporarily reassigned to position in Naval Intelligence Support Center NISC -34 that did not require access to SCI material 9 Pollard admitted I 16f lin July 1980 that he had lied about his South Afrib-mli contacts in order to impress others and enhance his professional status 'I_8_EJ_3------- -____ r -------------------------- owing to reservations concerning his emotional stability May 1980 Assigned as Middle Eastern warship analyst Free World Branch NISC-33 SCI access reinstated Auqust 1980 Association with TF-168 terminated owing to evidence of gross unreliability and recommendation by clinical psychologist that Pollard be assiqned to non-sensitive duties Top Secret clearance and SCI access suspended Pollard reassigned as research ship analyst NISC-34 pending fitness for duty evaluation by one of four cleared psychiatrists identified to Pollard by Commanding Officer NISC April 1981 Psychiatrist diagnosed Pollard as having a _____ l_s_ l_________ l but also deemed him thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk The psychiatrist recommended further treatment but Pollard did not seek or receive any January 1982 Reinstatement of Pollard's Top Secret clearance and SCI access ordered by Commander Naval Intelligence Command NIC February 1982 Pollard returned from NISC-34 to assignment as Middle East warship analyst in NISC-33 33 June 1984 Began temporary duty with Anti-Terrorist Alert Center ATAC Naval Investigative Service NIS worked rotating shift as watchstander October 1984 Permanently assigned to ATAC NIS as analyst responsible for assessing terrorist activities narcotics traffic and instability in North America and Eastern Caribbean Remained in this assignment until arrest END BOX -----------------------------------------------------------------•Adverse record with Task Force-168 Pollard repeatedly violated his instructions--for example by attending meetings against orders and disclosing classified information without authorization--during his assignment to collect intelligence on Soviet naval activities in the South Atlantic from a South African defense attache Pollard's superiors quickly deveioped misgivings concerning his erratic behavior and then learned he had lied about his qualifications and disclosed classified information to the South African attache without authorization 10 11 As a 10 Although we are not certain of the extent of unauthorized disclosures durin the TF-168 assi 11 The TF-168 collection operation was converted to counterintelligence case Operation swan Song under the auspices of 10 3 result of his unacceptable behavior Pollard was examined by a clinical psychologist who described Pollard as grandiose and manipulative The psychologist felt that the risk of unintentional compromise of information but not espionage by Pollard was high He recommended therapy and assignment Dr to nonsensitive duties --Lifestyle Problems Pollard experienced intermittent financial difficulties and behavioral problems and the post-arrest investigation turned up allegations of drug abuse Pollard's rent check was returned owing to insufficient funds in March 1993 and he was late paying rent due in December 1993 and March and April 1994 In May 1994 he borrowed money from a co-worker and over the next few months bounced several checks attempting to repay it In July 1994 a letter of indebtedness from the Navy Federal Credit Union reported that Pollard was delinquent in repaying a $4 175 00 loan Meanwhile Pollard and his fiancee Anne Henderson allegedly used marijuana and cocaine occasionally at parties in the Washington area from 1982-84 In late 1993 an anonymous telephone caller informed a NISC official that Pollard had been observed i n an altercation in a bar in Georgetown and had identified himself as an intelligence analyst during the incident 11 ft $' In post-arrest debriefings Pollard claimed that what he perceived to be anti-Israeli attitudes among his NIS in July 1980 for the purpose of clarifying Pollard's activities Operation Swan Song was terminated in early August following Pollard's admissions noted above and a determination that further investigation would be unproductive '-r -- ---T-O_P_S_E_C_ _ffi_T 11 7 j_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ colleagues in naval intelligence contributed to his decision to commit espionage for Israel For example Pollard claimed that the US delegation to a US-Israeli scientific and technological intelligence-exchange conference which he attended in 1982 failed to follow established disclosure guidance by withholding information releasable to Israe1 12 Pollard also claimed he overheard comments from US delegates that he viewed as either anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic 12 $' L1iP Pollard claimed that another key contributing factor was his concern and frustration over the inadequate US reaction following the bombing of the US Marine headquarters in Beirut in october 1983 Pollard rationalized that if the us Government were unwilling to take effective countermeasures to protect its own interests in Lebanon then it might be unwilling or unable to provide Israel with adequate assistance· in the event of critical need Pollard stated he walked out of the memorial service for the marines committed to doing something that would guarantee Israel's security even though it might involve a degree of potential risk and personal sacrifice 13 $ Lifestyle problems notwithstanding Pollard on the job had rebounded fr9m his failure with Task Force 168 he received outstanding performance-appraisal reports covering the period February 1982 through January 1984 His supervisor 12 In his Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing Pollard claimed that the principal instruction I received from my supervisor was that we should only be prepared to give the Israelis enough to get them paranoid but not enough say to let them figure out a countermeasure to a newly identified Soviet weapon system $ 12 2 commented that Pollard was an outstanding analyst who made many valuable contributions to intelligence production his final promotion to GS-12 in September 1983 14 He received In contrast Pollard exhibited significant performance problems during iebruary-Auguat 1964--the period immediately preceding and just after initiation of his espionage in June of that year He had to be counseled several times about completing his work on time and he had several heated arguments with his supervisors questioned their professional competence and expressed discontent with them to his co-workers Pollard often was late for work and fellow employees observed that he often worked late and alone Despite these problems Pollard's supervisor indicated that Pollard's analytical ability and his retention of facts enabled him to make up for other shortcomings and earn a highly satisfactory performance rating 15 j @ Pollard stated that in the fall of 1983 he made a final decision to assist Israel through espionage and he soon sought means to initiate the activity l3 He thought initially that he would need an associate to act as an intermediary with the Israelis Accordingly Pollard--accompanied by Anne Henderson--in the spring of 1984 approached I f6J I I friend who worked with a proposal for an -------- -- -- 13 Pollard claimed in a post-arrest debriefing that he had come very close to volunteering to commit espionage while holding a conversation in Hebrew with the Israeli Naval Attache during a US-Israeli intelligence exchange in 1983 Although it is not clear exactly when Pollard first began to consider espionage we believe it was at least as early as 1980-81 $ 13 'f6P SiUiMi' 1 - --------- EJ ______ ' ill-defined effort to aid Israel Being aware of the nature of Pollard's employment he was proposing the delivery of classified material and firmly rejected the suggestion l4 c Contactc Assessment and Recruitment 1984 16 The contact assessment and recruitment phase of the Pollard operation appears to have lasted from June to November 1984 15 ring this time Pollard met with Israeli intelligence officials on at least four occasions in the Washington area and on three successive days during an operational trip to Paris He also established a pattern of providing more and better intelligence than his handlers expected vfiTLJ 17 According to Pollard his initial contact with Israeli intelligence for the purpose of espionage was arranged by '----- @ j an old friend of Pollard 16 LJ£D was aware of 14 When making the proposal I Pollard and Henderso stressed that he could earn rough this enterprise upgrade substa r current lifestyle which they ridiculed $ 15 Pollard could have come to the attention of Israeli intelligence as early as 1971 when he attended the Weizman Science Camp in Israel In any case we believe Pollard's dissatisfaction with the Navy's intelligence-disclosure policy and his eagerness to help Israel probably became known to Israeli intelligence operatives as a result of Pollard's dialogue with 16 1 1 dating from 1981 -s U3 L-J F ------------------ 14 2 Pollard's access to classified informat ion and according to Pollard would have known intuitively that Pollard would welcome an opportunity to provide classified material to the Israeli Government In late June 1984 1 shortly after Pollard was detailed to the Naval Investigative Service's newly-created AntiTerrorist Alert Center ATAC Pollard received a phone call from who wanted Pollard to meet a high-ranking Israeli Air Force officer stated this officer had been involved in the raid on the reactor which Pollard understood to be the October 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq Pollard claims he immediately viewed this proposal as an opportunity for him to volunteer his services to Israel A few days later Pollard was telephoned at his residence by Avi who introduced himself as a friend of Pollard in W uhington 18 @ and arranged to meet with $ Pollard said his initial meeting with Col Aviem Sella17 occurred a week to 10 days after Sella's nitia phone call They met at a bar in the Washington Hilton Hotel and Pollard immediately informed Sella of his desire to provide US qu J 17 Sella is not an intelligence careerist but a highly successful fighter pilot who was being groomed for senior rank with the expectation that he eventually might become Chief of staff of the Israeli Air Force Sella's official reason for residency in the United States in 1984 was his pursuit of a doctorate in computer sciences at New York Un while on study leave from the Israeli Air Force 3 _ JS ----------------------------- _TOPS£8 r ---------- -------------- intelligence information to Israel Speaking in Hebrew Pollard described his job at the ATAC and his extensive access to classified material both in the center and elsewhere in the US Intelligence Community While Sella seemed skeptical that security could be as lax as Pollard described he identified the general targets of his collection efforts--the Soviet Union and Arab States Sella emphasized that Israel would not request information on US military capabilities then to ld Pollard that he wanted to see an example of the material he could provide Sella suggested that Pollard obtain classified documents on Saudi Arabia and Soviet air-defense systems as well as photographs of the bomb-damaged Iraqi nuclear facility 19 Sella established a secure procedure for setting up future clandestine meetings He directed that Pollard obtain a listing of several pay telephones within a few blocks of his residence also located near the Hilton Hotel Once this was accomplished Sella assigned a Hebrew letter to each number and explained that he would call Pollard at his residence mention a Hebrew letter and thereby direct Pollard to a particular pay telephone to await an operational telephone call 20 fir Using this procedure Sella contacted Pollard within a few days to arrange a second meeting for the purpose of viewing and evaluating the information requested at the first After again making contact at the Hilton Sella drove Pollard to a secluded outdoor location near Dumbarton Oaks Pollard had brought a briefcase full of classified documents for Sella's review including a three-volume LJjJ study of Saudi Arabian military forces a study of Saudi ground forces' logistics and j Iraqi nuclear facility Sella commented that the material was satellite imagery of the bomb-damaged much better than what was currently available in Israel and would be of great assistance to his country 21 yt A third meeting with Sella was scheduled for the purpose of copying all material collected to date In the week or so between the second and third meetings Pollard assembled information from the National Security Agency including daily Middle East and North African Summaries and a study on Egyptian air defenses He also screened and obtained numerous us·defense attache reports from embassies in various Arab countries 22 The meeting began at a Holiday Inn in Bethesda Maryland and proceeded by car via a circuitous route to a residence on Deborah Street in Potomac Maryland Subsequent investigation identified the Deborah Street residence as the house of Ilan Ravid Attache for Scientific Affairs of the Israeli Embassy in Washington Pollard saw a man in the house whom he identified during subsequent investigation as similar in appearance to Ravid 23 ---- During the third meeting Sella informed Pollard that he would have to travel to Europe--Paris was agreed upon--to meet the Israeli intelligence official in charge of the operation Pollard was told to make his own travel arrangements and charge the expense to a credit card as he would be reimbursed after arriving in Paris Anne Henderson to whom Pollard had become engaged in July 1994 was to accompany Pollard but the Israelis did not want her to know the true purpose of the trip To assist Pollard in explaining how he could afford such a vacation Pollard and Sella created a fictitious Uncle Joe Fisher who was paying for the trip as an engagement present Sella also told Pollard to arrange for him to meet Henderson socially so that she could see a familiar face in Paris Pollard Henderson Sella and his wife met subsequently for dinner at the Four Ways Restaurant in Washington D c 18 Finally Sella told Pollard to bring his latest Navy leave-and-earnings statement to Paris for examination by Israeli Intelligence officers so that they might use it as a basis for establishing payment for his espionage 24 · Meetings between Pollard andhis Israeli handlers on 8 9 and 10 November in Paris essentially completed Pollard's lB Pollard was instructed to tell Henderson that Sella was an old school chum who would coincidentally be in Paris with his wife at the same time Although Sella also had instructed Pollard to conceal his espionage activity from Henderson Pollard informed her immediately after his initial contact with Sella L@C J eJ p SESPfT I 18 I 3 assessment and recruitment and prepared him to undertake the most productive period of his espionage career Several important developments occurred during the meetings --Pollard met Rafael Rafi Eitan a senior career official in Israeli intelligence former adviser on counterterrorism to the Israeli Prime Minister and the person in charge of the operation --Direct handling of Pollard in the United States was transferred from Sella to Joseph Yossi Yagur Counselor for Scientific Affairs Israeli Consulate New York Eitan and Yaqur warned Pollard against further operational contact with Sella --Yaqur and Eitan provided initial detailed taskings on the intelligence Pollard was to obtain Yagur emphasized that Pollard should seek military and scientific intelligence on Arab States Pakistan and the Soviet Union in its role a 's military patron of the Arabs Eitan requested the only specific document mentioned at the Paris meetings the RASIN Manual which he could only describe as a document concerning signals intelligence Eitan also requested information on PLO Force 17 material reporting dirt on Israeli political figures any information that would identify Israeli officials who were providing information to the United States and any information on US intelligence operations targeted against Israel 19 -------- ---- --Eitan emphasized that Pollard should resign from his --Pollard's compensation was set at $1 500 per month roughly equivalent to his Navy salary after deductions The Israelis--using Uncle Joe Fisher as cover--also purchased a diamond sapphire ring for Ms Henderson Pollard was instructed to avoid ostentatious use of his new-found wealth and to stay away from investments or expenditures that later could be documented such as purchases of securities --The next operational meeting was scheduled to occur in the Washington area in late January 1985 25 j 13 I In addition to conveying operational instructions and taskings Eitan used the Paris meetings to test and strengthen Pollard's motivation Eitan presented a formal highly alarmist briefing to Pollard on the Middle East situation which described how Israel could be quickly overrun by a Syrian attack He emphasized that Israel £aced a technological Pearl Harbor and badly needed access to the material Pollard could provide In his debriefings Pollard commented that the presentation was calculated to strengthen his commitment to the espionage operation and it was accompanied by a ceremony wherein he was sworn in as an Israeli citizen 20 $' 26 According to Pollard security and cover matters were addressed only perfunctorily Pollard was assured that US authorities would be unlikely to take any action against him if he were detected and any action that was initiated could be contained by Israel The Uncle Joe Fisher cover story originally created to explain the financing of the Paris trip to Henderson was extended to cover the purchase of the diamondsapphire ring as a gift for her Eitan commented that he could backstop the Joe Fisher identity in New York Pollard then composed a letter from Fisher to Pollard referring to the gift and indicating that Fisher was sorry to have missed seeing Pollard and Henderson in Paris D Espionage in High Gear January-November 1985 27 Upon his return from Paris Pollard initiated intensive espionage activity in response to the Israeli taskings By the time of his scheduled meeting in late January 1985 19 he had accumulated a large volume of documents During the afternoon and evening of 22 January Pollard went to his work space in ATAC to collect the material he had accumulated He estimated that four to five hours were required to move the material to his automobile in five suitcases Owing to his repeated trips in and out of the building Pollard informed the 19 During the post-arrest interviews Pollard recalled an additional meeting at the Deborah Street residence in Potomac sometime between his return to the United States and the January 1985 meeting--probably in December 1984 Pollard recalled that the purpose of that meeting was to pick up the ring for Henderson and the Uncle Joe Fisher letter Yagur also told Pollard that this meeting and all future meetings would be in an apartment on Van Ness Street N W in Washington D C Pollard received a key to the apartment at that time C-8' 21 security guard that he was removing the material to another building for an ongoing project 20 He took this material to his residence retained i t overnight and delivered it to Yagur at the Van Ness Street apartment on 23 January the date government records indicate Pollard was on sick leave 28 0t Pollard was met by Yaqur and a woman later identified as Irit Erb who lived in the apartment secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington D Erb was a c Yagur expressed amazement at the volume of Pollard's material The accountable documents that Pollard needed to return to a government repository were removed to another room for copying then returned to Pollard 29 At this meeting Pollard and Yaqur established a schedule for future meetings and deliveries of classified material Pollard would deliver material to Erb's apartment every other Friday In addition Pollard would come to Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month for tasking discussions with Yagur which usually lasted several hours Erb would notify Pollard when to return to pick up documents after they had been copied--usually the following Saturday or Sunday This schedule was kept until the Israelis obtained a second apartment in Erb's building several months later The use of the second apartment which contained only copying equipment 20 To avoid the inconvenience of readmitting Pollard to the building after each trip to his vehicle the guard allowed Pollard t oor open so that he could enter and leave freely 3 · 22 ---------1 1-----------J' £6 ' 8J il8iRiiiil'- occasionally allowed the material to be photographed or duplicated while Pollard waited 30 The biweekly drop schedule and monthly face-to- face meetings with Yagur at Erb's apartment continued up to the time of Pollard's initial questioning by NIS and FB personnel in November 1985 He made his last drop on Friday 15 November The only interruption in the routine occurred during Pollard's second and last operational trip overseas in July and August 1985 21 During this trip Pollard met with Eitan and Yagur in Tel Aviv and married Anne Henderson in Venice Italy j D 31 The Israelis warmly praised Pollard's productivity during his first operational meeting in Tel Aviv Pollard and Yaqur met with Eitan in a secure area of the Beilinson Hospital in Tel Aviv where Eitan was recuperating from eye surgery Eitan reviewed a computerized listing that Pollard believed contained all the material provided to date 22 Eitan complimented him on the material stating that it had been crucial to the security of Israel and had far exceeded expectations $ 21 Pollard advised NIS FBI investigators that his monthly salary was raised fr to $2 500 per month shortly after his large delivery of stolen documents on 23 January 1985 According to Pollard the raise was based upon the Israelis' appreciation of bo ntity and quality of the material he was providing 22 Pollard noticed that one significant item was missing from the list the photograph of the bomb-damaged Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq that Sella had requested during his initial meeting with Pollard Pollard told investigators that he belie kept this photograph for his personal memorabilia 3 23 tif ORI Doc 32 A second meeting in the afternoon covered security and future operational plans and compensation Eitan repeated the reassurances he had offered in November 1984 to the effect that Pollard should not worry OJ_ __ Pollard claimed to investigators that he again expressed concern about what would happen to his wife and himself if his espionage was detected Eitan again assured him that no drastic action would be taken by the United States He also repeated his pledge that Israel would take care of Pollard and informed Pollard that in addition to his salary Israel was setting up a Swiss bank account for him into which Israel would deposit $30 000 per year 23 Pollard was to continue his espionage for Israel for 10 years after which Pollard and his immediate family would emigrate to Israel He could then use the projected $300 000 to establish himself in his new homeland The Swiss account would be in the name of Danny Cohen which would be Pollard's Israeli identity Eitan commented further that Israeli passports would be prepared for the Pollards 1 D 33 Eitan's plans Pollard claimed that he was deeply troubled by This was the first time he had heard of an 23 Although Yaqur subsequently set up a Swiss bank account in the name of Danny Cohen from which funds could only be withdrawn with Yaqur's countersignature Pollard's arrest occurred before any money was deposited in the account 24 anticipated 10-year timeframe for the espionage operation According to Pollard he was becoming increasingly concerned about being detected and wanted to terminate his espionage activity in the near future however he had not yet informed the Israelis of this intention 34 Pollard claimed that he unburdened himself during a final confrontational meeting with Ei tan which lasted only 15 to 20 minutes Pollard told Eitan of his concern about detection and his belief that a 10-year commitment was unreasonable Eitan who appeared very angry once again told Pollard that he had nothing to worry about insofar as security was concerned and the Swiss bank account in any case should allay any concerns Additionally Eitan directed Yaqur to give Pollard a couple of thousand more for the expense of his trip Yaqur subsequently gave Pollard approximately $12 000 for expenses which Pollard assumed included the extra $2 000 mentioned by Eitan ir E Detection and Apprehension 35 Upon returning to Washington in late August following his marriage and honeymoon in Europe Pollard resumed his espionage activities amid heightened security awareness The revelation in May 1985 of the WalkerjWhitworth espionage conspiracy had led to a general government-wide increase in security consciousness particularlywithin naval in telligence 24 24 We speculate that the publicity concerning WalkerjWhitworth contributed to Pollard's increased concern--almost alarm--over the possibility of detection as expressed to Eitan during the lOP SEClU Ifo I 25 36 By the fall of 1985 the ATAC officer-in-charge OIC had become auspicious of Pollard's activities because he seemed to be handling large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East that was unrelated to his legitimate area of concern North America and the Caribbean to monitor more closely Pollard's activities The ore began on 25 October 1985 one of Pollard's co-workers notified the ore that he had seen Pollard apparently removing classified material from the center without authorization The ore verified that Pollard had removed the material and informed the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Naval Investigative Service investigation of Pollard and notified the FBI N S opened an Pollard was observed removing additional classified material during the NIS FBI investigation 37 On 18 November 1985 FBI and NIS agents confronted and questioned Pollard for the first time as he left the ATAC building in Suitland Maryland They found classified material in Pollard's possession for which he had no authorization to remove from the building Pollard at first claimed to be delivering the material to another US intelligence organization Once this story broke down he alleged that the information was destined for a journalist contact Kurt Lohbeck who was interested in helping the Afghan Mujahidin 25 J ly 1985 meetings in Tel Aviv QJ Early in I r' -- ---------------- I ___ ___ I LZ L J J 25 Pollard and Lohbeck had met on a number of occasions to discuss Middle Eastern Soviet-Afghan and arms-transfer issues Lohbeck was a pro-Mujahidin lobbyist who maintained contacts 'T 5p $i t SST I 26 the three-day period of questioning by NIS and FBI investigators Pollard alerted Yagur by telephone and volunteered false information to investigators thereby giving Yagur Erh and Sella time to flee the country Pollard was placed under 24-hour FBI NIS surveillance on 19 November with the two-fold objectives of identifying his real contacts and preventing his escape from the United States Pollard and his wife were arrested by the FBI on the morning of 21 November after a security officer at the Israeli Embassy refused to allow them entry into the building Probably Yaqur Sella and Erb already had left the United States F $ Debriefings Legal Disposition and Publicity 38 The 15-month period between the Pollards' arrest on 21 November 1985 and sentencing on 4 March 1987 was marked by the Pollards' quilty pleas extensive polygraph-supported debriefings of Jonathan Pollard by NIS FBI and CIA officers repeated sentencing delays and violations of the plea-bargain arrangements by both Jonathan and Anne Henderson-Pollard After defense counsel realized that the government had developed enough evidence to indict the Pollards and probably to convict them Jonathan Pollard pleaded guilty on 5 June 1986 to conspiracy to commit espionage His wife pleaded guilty at the same hearing to conspiracy to receive embezzled government property and to being an accessory after the fact to possession of national-security with Afghan guerrilla leaders as well as US and Pakistani government officials As far as can be determined from investigation Lohbeck had no role in Pollard's espionage CEP 27 documents 2 6 Accompanying the quilty pleas was a plea bargain which stipulated in effect that in return for the Pollards' full cooperation with government authorities the prosecution would not request the maximum sentences of life imprisonment for Jonathan Pollard or 10 years or Anne Henderson-Pollard QDJ 39 Jonathan Pollard cooperated with government authorities to the extent of responding in apparent good faith to debriefers' questions--including those of the study director of this assessment--regarding his own operating objectives and methods and those of his Israeli handlers 26 In addition to being witting of her husband's espionage activities Anne Henderson-Pollard assisted him at the time of his initial interrogation on 18 and 19 November by removing and attempting to conceal classifie erial that Jonathan Pollard had stored in their apartment Ms Henderson-Pollard however apparently did not steal documents assist her husband in delivering them to the Israelis or otherlije jctilely participate in the espionage conspiracy 3 l'er sBse e r 28 41 During his dabriefinqs Pollard discussed what he might have done for Israel in the future if his espionage had remained undetected He commented repeatedly that he had intended soon to resign his position with Naval Intelligence He said that he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and ReaearchJ L----------------- He believed that once he was at INR he could have assumed a less risky role as an agent of influence within State while also being in a position to steal key intelligence documents when necessary It is unclear whether Pollard discussed this idea with the Israelis 42 While his cooperation in debriefings was most helpful to government investigators Pollard's willingness to grant an interview to journalist Wolf Blitzer for The Jerusalem Post without obtaining advance approval of the resulting text from the Justice Department violated the terms of his plea bargain In the Blitzer interview which was held on 20 November 1986 at Petersburg Federal Penitentiary Pollard provided 27 It should be assumed of course that given Pollard's record of exaggerating the importance of his qualifications and activities his claims regarding his e to the Israelis probably are somewhat distorted 29 extensive information on his motives and objectives in conducting espionage for Israel He also provided Blitzer a general account with some important examples28 of intelligence he passed to the Israelis and emphasized that the Israeli Government must have been aware of and have approved of his activities The interview first published in excerpted segments in The Jerusalem Post over several months was replayed in The New York Times and The Washington Post Anne Henderson-Pollard followed up with her own commentary on the case in an unauthorized interview on 60 Minutes on 1 March 1987 just three days before the Pollards were sentenced 43 $' This publicity which the Pollards apparently hoped would mobilize sympathy and support from the Israeli Government as well as from within the American Jewish community backfired on both them and on the Israelis Following a series of delays in sentencinq from 10 September 1986 until 4 March 1987 Judge Aubrey Robinson pronounced sentences of life imprisonment for Jonathan Pollard and two concurrent five-year terms for Anne Henderson-Pollard Although his perception of the severity of the espionage offense probably was the chief factor in Judge Robinson's sentencing decision he likely also took into account the Pollarde' plea-bargain violations 28 The examples included intelligence on Tunis Iraqi and Syrian chemical warfare Soviet arms shipments to Syria and other nuclear proqram and the US Intelligence of a new Soviet fighter 30 10# SftiliL PLO headquarters in production facilities Arab states Pakistan's Community's assessment · 3 44 Additionally the publicity not only failed to engender widespread sympathy for the Pollards within the United States it resulted in severe criticism and political pressure on the Israeli Government by American Jewish leaders to conduct an investigation to determine Which if any senior Israeli Government officials had approved or knew of the Pollard operation Israeli discomfiture had been heightened by the US indictment in February 1987 of Pollard-recruiter Col Aviem Sella and then by the sharp US reaction to Sella's appointment as Commander of Israel's Tel Nof airbase Although the official Israeli Government investigation announced on 11 March and completed in late May was legally toothless and did not yield findings of complicity on the part of Israeli cabinet officials in the affair adverse publicity and political pressure forced Sella's resignation from the Tel No£ post 45 Nonetheless Israeli media commentaries and public opinion polls also suggest that many Israeli citizens regard Pollard as an Israeli patriot and believe that their government should have assisted him once he was caught _r Moreover Sella retains his status as an Israeli national hero and his colonelcy in the Israeli Air Force III Inventory Profile--Classified Material Sought and Stolen A Israeli Intelligence Motives Prioritiesl and R eguests 46 Israel's intelligence services aggress ively seek information concerning threats to the security of the State and 31 _·o_P__s_ __s_n_ _ __' _______l3___l__________________ -- L_____________ toqether with Israeli military and political leaders search with equal diliqence for means to counter such threats j l TOP sf CRM I 32 j2 I 49 Consistent with Israeli intelligence objectives and Pollard's access Pollard's handlers included intelligence and military and technical specialists Rafael Eitan Pollard's chief handler and longtime intelligence and security expert was a personal advisor on terrorism to Prime Minister Shamir and was recognized by Sella Yagur and Pollard as the senior Israeli in charge of the case Joseph Yagur Counselor for Scientific Affairs in the Science Liaison Office Lekem at the Israeli Consulate in New York accepted general guidance from Eitan but 33 demonstrated considerable initiative and independence in tasking matters as Pollard's primary direct handler Pollard's recruiter Col Aviem Sella initial handler and career fighter pilot was at New York University at the time of the Pollard affair We speculate that Sella was chosen to make the initial approach to Pollard because of his reputation as a leading Israeli war hero 50 Pollard claimed that he assumed initially that Mossad Israel's external intelligence service was responsible for his case I I I --------------------------------------------------------- ------- BOX Israel's Intelligence and Security Services Israel's intelligence and security services comprise Mossad Merkazi le-Modi' in u-le-Tafqidim Meyuhadim I 1 1 I L----------------3-401 ---- ---------- 1· TeP i'KCBil L_j She rut Bitahon Kelali Counterespionaqe and Internal Security Service or Shin Bet L------------------- --L--------------------------- and Agof Modi'in Military Intelligence-MI L----- ---------- In addition to running operations against the Arabs the Israeli services have high interest in collecting political economic and scientific intelligence about the Soviet bloc the United States and the United Nations whose policy decisions could have repercussions on Israel Tel Aviv's program for accelerating its technological scientific and military development has included attempts to penetrate classified defense 35 3 --_ _ ____ 11 1_ _ _ _- 1 YCJ3TJ ----------------------------------------------------------------51 We believe most of the tasking levied on Pollard by his handlers was intended to advance Israel's objectives Two of Pollard's three handlers Col Aviem Sella and Joseph Yagur emphasized that Pollard should obtain military and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union Arab states and Pakistan The Israelis wanted to be informed of technological advances in Arab military inventories for example they wanted Pollard to provide them with information on Soviet reactive-armor technology and on 36 I advanced Soviet SAM systems so they could prepare for their appearance in Arab inventories At the first formal tasking meeting in Paris in November 1994 Yaqur used one tasking list 52 At the Paris meeting Yaqur told Pollard that he should obtain the following categories of information in descending order of priority --Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence --Arab exotic weaponry including chemical and biological weapons --Soviet air defenses --Soviet aircraft air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles --Arab order-of-battle deployments readiness I LCJ services Political and economic intelligence was deemed less valuable than military and technical material Yagur expressed interest in intelligence regarding all Middle Eastern countries which he defined as ranging from Morocco to Pakistan and from Lebanon to the Yemens Iraq Syria Saudi Arabia Egypt Algeria and Pakistan Pollard also was to provide indications-and-warning support for the Israelis by contacting them via an emergency telephone number and using a code word later designated as 20 percent if he learned that war in the Middle East was imminent TOP 37 SEI IRU ygc J fD 53 Eitan supplemented Yaqur's briefing with requests for information that appear to stem from ---------------- -- ---------------- intelligence and security specialist -------- ------------ his background as a career Be asked for information on the PLO's Force 17 CIA psychological studies or other intelliqence containing dirt on senior Israeli officials information identifying the rats in Israel by which Eitan apparently meant Israelis who provided information to the United States In his polygraphcorroborated debriefings Pollard claimed that Yaqur standing behind lU tan violently shook his head no to these requests and later away from Eitan's presen e told Pollard that procuring such information would be grounds for immediate termination of the operation 54 As the espionage operation accelerated following the Paris meetinq Yaqur extended and refined the Israeli requirements at meetings held monthly with Pollard During a discussion which accompanied Pollard's first large delivery of classified material on 23 January 1985 Yagur repeated a request that Eitan had made in Paris for the RASIN Radio Siqnal Notation manual Yagur showed Pollard the first chapter of the manual which identified it as an NSA document Yagur told Pollard that Israel had gained access to the communications of the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus and needed the TOP SECMM ' I 38 3 RASIN manual to determine if it were technically feasible to decrypt the siqnals 55 u ffOJ Many Israeli taskings involved Syria ----L-J------- Examples included requests for information on CERES which Yagur thought was a Syrian research and development facility data on Syrian remotely piloted vehicles information on the Ramona ELINT system in Syria the numbers and locations of all Soviet advisors in Syria information on the national-level command control and communications center in Damascus the identities of Syrian units with attached Soviet advisors and all training programs for Syrian personnel in the USSR Yagur also requested medical intelligence on the health of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad 56 Pollard also received specific requests for intelligence on Egypt and on the Egyptian connection with an Argentinian missile program Yagur asked for a specific Egyptian study on the Israeli Air Force and a Westinghouse Corporation study on Egyptian air defenses neither of which Pollard was able to obtain Yagur also made a high-priority request for information on the Argentine-Egyptian Condor missile program DIA documents on the Condor which Pollard obtained and provided filled an important gap in Israeli strategic intelligence according to Yagur Pollard claimed he later saw an Israeli intelligence report based on his information cEO 39 I yg e Jl 57 In June or July 1995 Yaqur asked Pollard for all available information on PLO headquarters outside Tunis and on Libyan and Tunisian air defenses Following the Israeli air attack on the headquarters on 1 October 1985--according to Pollard--Yaqur said a contingency plan had been developed and executed based upon Pollard's information Pollard claimed that Yaqur passed thanks from the highest levels of the Israeli I Government for his intelligence support for the raid 58 3' In the absence of an Israeli request Pollard initiated the delivery of three daily intelligence summaries prepared by the National Security Agency and by Naval Intelligence and issued by the originators in message format which the Israelis found useful and asked to receive routinely These were the Middle East and North Africa Summary MENAS the Mediterranean Littoral Intelligence Summary MELOS and the Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary I O Littoral Intsum Pollard claims to have Provided E copies of each summary from mid-July 1994 until a few days before his arrest on 21 November 1985 which would yield a total of roughly 1 500 messages As an example of their importance to the Israelis Pollard recalled that Yaqur once chided him for missing one· day out of a month's collection of MELOS messages Pollard claims the Israelis used the MENAS to identify new units in Arab ordersof-battle S'j 13 59 I Pollard recalled that on two occasions--dates not remembered--he delivered information on an emergency basis for 101 lii'CR t I 40 -------------------- L----------------------- dirt on Israeli officials which Eitan had requested at the Paris meeting --The State Department's position on Taba a small disputed area on the Egyptian-Israeli border dP SSGPlii t I 41 I 11 I I Granite ------ -- -------- and Have programs which involve US exploitation of foreign materiel r1 l Pollard said he provided at his own initiative a DIA study that concluded Syria had a less-than-even chance of retakinq the Israeli-occupied Golan Heiqhts in a surprise attack This contrasted sharply withL ---- L1 1-- -- ' which according to Pollard concluded that Syria could recapture the Golan Heiqhts and reach Haifa in 72 hours 'rt5P S83Ri T I 42 J 11 I ------------ -- -------------- Yagur questioned Pollard about the Middle East Arms Transfer MEAT Working Group a State Department-chaired interagency committee that coordinates military-hardware sales to that region and asked if Pollard could join it B What the Israelis Did Not Ask For 63 According to Pollard the Israelis did not request or receive from Pollard intelligence concerning some of the most sensitive US national-security resources The Israelis never expressed interest in US military activities plans capabilities or equipment Likewise they did not ask for intelligence onUS communications per ae although the RASIN manual f 5p 43 OJ_--L_1_· J ----- SSCR fr--------------------------- EJ fvJORI communications-security deficiencies or cryptologic systems or keying material Pollard was not tasked to describe the pro- or anti-Israeli biases of individual intelligence analysts nor was he asked to slant his own anafyses for Israel's benefit The Israelis expressed no serious interest in other US espionage cases although Yagur did ask about damage from the Morison and WalkerjWhitworth disclosures during casual conversation c Overview of Compromised Material 64 Although Pollard's Israeli handlers aggressively requested intelligence on a number of specific topics and asked for some particular documents by name Pollard himself apparently exerted the strongest influence on what was compromised by virtue of his own access interests and collection initiatives Judging from the Israeli-volunteered raise in Pollard's monthly salary from $1 500 to $2 500 in early 1985 the quantity and quality of Pollard's deliveries considerably surpassed the Israelis' initial expectations After the Paris meeting in November 1984 Pollard appears to have operated to a great extent independently of major coaching by his handlers 44 According to Pollard who may well have been exaggerating his degree of independence and self-control within the operation his sessions with Yagur focused more on the substantive content and usefulness of his recent deliveries than on instructions for additional $ ' - - ' - - - ' - - - - - ' collection 65 In terms of the sheer quantity of identified intelligence stolen over a limited period 17 months--with the vast majority being passed from January-November 1985--Pollard's operation has few parallels among known US espionage cases Government investigators who were assisted by Pollard in reconstructing the inventory of compromised material identified the following categories and approximate numbers of compromised published documents 29 Special Compartmented Information SCI Top Secret and Secret Top Secret non-codeword Secret non-codeword Confidential Unclassified and unknown Classification 800 29 In addition Pollard stole an estimated 1 500 current i n t e l l i 9 z e n c e s umm a r _ jyL m e -s -· s a2q e sJ _ I-r --_ _ _ _ _ _- _ _ _ __- _ _ rl2J - - r-r-_ _ _ _ -_ -_ _ _- _' _-_-_-_-_-_-_-__ ' I tJ 45 66 Most of the documents address--at least tangentially--issues of major concern to Israeli security Many of the documents focus on Iran Iraq and the Iran-Iraq War Pakistan and Afghanistan and on military developments in Israel itself 46 I 111 ID 3 I Key to Exemptions 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b l 2 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 b 3 the Freedom ofinformation Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E SECREt I---------- tJr---------- 1 I MGRI BQCEB 13%6933 46b 303$ DGCIE 13%6933 46c L - QJ r c EIJ QJ QJ 47 j TOP Sll eRl l' ' --'------------ ____ _ _ _ eJ_ _ ____JI MORE Daai WEE c% II 48 TOP I MGR EEGCVED 13 6933 49 J1 I J J c1 EJ_j QJ QJ QJ I fl 3 1 I I QJ L TOP-sEem EJ - - - 5 - 0_ _ _ 2 I f U3 I 2 I 2 QJ 4 j i f1Ttl current Intelligence Foreign Intelliqence Services CounterintelligenceL SIGINT Operations and Multidisciplinary Items 78 These important categories of compromised material contain messaqes and documents of widely varying subject format purpose and complexity 51 0 8iliaii 3 1 --l_ _ _______ l cj LEO ____ _ _ _ _--l l_ IV Implications of Compromises--What Israel Gained from Pollard's Espionage 79 While the loss of such a large volume of highly classified material clearly is serious per se our conclusions concerning specific damage center on an analysis of Israeli gains and on the harm and risk of these compromises to US interests TOP SECRE'f I 52 l 134655333 mm 53 'Wf M f DQCEE It 3 54 - MGQE Dac 33%6933 755' m NOR DQCIE 56' MGRI 134 933 57 Amw 4 ------------ ---------------------------------------------------- 82 Pollard's stolen material from the Israeli perspective provided significant benefits ---- r---------- 58 TOP S ECR£ 1 I I -------- ---------- Pollard' a deliveries co cerninq PLO headquarters near Tunis Tunisian and Libyan air defenses and Pakistan's plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad I 11 I I 59 TO ' 5ECRE'fl EJ j L----------J Pollard told investigators that Joseph Yaqur informed him that the RASIN manual permitted Israel to begin the process of attempting to monitor a communications link between the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus Syria 60 TOP 5ECRE f I DQCID 23463-333 61 MGR 1346933 V ggsaga and Vulnerabilities Eamaqe to Us National Security w w A Intelligence Sourcgg and Methada _62 fwme Mij E 1345933 63 MQRI 1346933 My 64- ID TGP SECRE'I' l 'S J3 r l 65 ------ TO P 5 E CR E -------------- '------ --_ _ _ _ _ -JI 3 M9322 13%65333 - 66 m4 303T 13 5933 S 67 WW MGR again 1346 2333 68' WW MGRI 13%6933 - 69 1346593 3 34 5 70 MGR BQCIE 23 1693 3 1 1 1 2 5 3 71 D 99 US Relations with Pro-Western Arab States Apart from supporting Israeli actionsor positions that could harm US relations with friendly Arab states Pollard's activities have caused some Arab countries to raise unwelcome questions or make critical observations about US in its Mideast policies ev nhandedness 1 1 EJ I I'JYI EJ I EJ Ipressure tJ led to the resignation of Pollard-handler Col Aviem Sella from his prestigious position as commander of Israel's Tel Nof airbase The findinqs of the Israeli investiqations announced in late May I 73 19871 _____ _ The investigators however did criticize some current and former cabinet ministers--including the Prime and Defense Ministers and a former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces--for failing to discover and put an end to the espionage operation Even so some Israeli press articles and Israeli public opinion polls indicated support for Pollard anger at the Israeli Government for failing to help him once he was caught and a perception that the United States had failed to provide adequate intelligence and military assistance to Israel CS' EJ 74 J Emslm 1346933 1 5 at 75 My L -_ __ j Seere LJ£0 ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ISecre LI£LJriTJ l 76 TOP SECRE-T I l MORE Daai 1346933 mm w gLRadia Siqn l Natation Rasin ManualL ApgendicaaL a Cataie a 1983 I MGR Us 78 1345 33 WI 79 933 1 ·· Sf J3 1J r I p l2J 1 J I csl f3l J l2J - ---__ ----JI L __ __ _'_8_0 M012 23 35 11 13ii 933 81 MERLE BGCID 134 5333 33 VI A Tha gatm Line E 1 I 92 Daei z 13436933 Mem B Damage Li titation' 83 QQCID 134359335 84 MOEI EGCID 1346933 MORE 1346 33 86 oociD 3 The Jonathan Jay Follard Espionage Case A Damaqe Assessment Selected Bibliography 1 2 Declaration of the Secretary of Defense in the United States District Court for rict of Columbia January 1987 op Secret 3 Def$ndant Jonathan J Pollard's First Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing 20 August 1986 Secret 4 Defendant Jonathan J Follard's Second Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing 27 February 1987 aearet 5 6 7 8 9 10 87 TOP SECRET '_________@Cj 3 ---------------- 3 Bibliography cont't 11 12 13 14 Numerous press articles concerning the Pollard case by Jerusalem Post correspondent Wolf Blitzer and others appearing in The Jerusalem Post London Sunda Times The New York Times and The Washington Post during 1986-87 Key to Exemptions 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b l 2 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 b 3 the Freedom of Information Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E 933 TAB I Jonathan Jay Pollard A Chronology o£ Events Date Event 7 August 1954 Born in Galveston Texas 1961 Family moved to South Bend Indiana father employed as virologist at Notre Dame University Pollard complained in pre-sentencing affidavit that the community generally was unfriendly to Jews June 1967 Pollard indicated in pre-sentencing affidavit that Israel's dramatic victory in the six-day war made a profound and lasting impression upon him Summer 1971 Pollard attended Weizman Institute Science Camp in Israel which extolled Zionism and encouraged emigration to Israel 1972-1976 ' Attended Stanford University graduated with BA in Political Science GPA 3 5 Displayed first known signs of emotional instability I-1 Sl CrtET I £ ---------- ----------- 3 September 1977- Attended Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at August 1979 Tufts University No degree received owinq to failure to submit required term papers for eiqht courses but Pollard falsely claimed achievement of provisional M A deqree early evidence of tendency to exaggerate personal and professional qualifications Pollard's application for CIA Graduate Fellowship May 1979 denied owing to extensive and recent use of marijuana April 1979 ------------ ---------------------- Applied for Navy Mid-Septemb er 1979 e ployment with Department of the I Began work as GS-07 l for Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center NOSIC a component of the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office NFOIO Suitland Maryland background investigation requested for Top Secret clearance 29 November 1979 Interim Top Secret clearance granted based-upon favorable results of NAC but prior to completion of background investigation I-2 SECRE -------- @ ----__j' December 1979 Indoctrinated into several SCI accesses eight days before successful completion of background investigation Pollard began standing watches in NOSIC's current Operations Center while working as merchant-shipping analyst for Naval Surface Forces desk February 1990 Detailed part-time to Task Force-168 TF-168 the naval-inte ligence collection efforts element responsible for EUMINT Made several false statements to TF-169 supervisor about alleged personal and family connections with South Africa the intelligence target of Pollard's association with TF-168 March 1980 Applied for analytical position with the Surface Ship Systems Division of the Naval Intelligence Support Center NISC-33 April 1980 Removed from access to SCI clearances based upon Director of Naval Intelligence re servations concerning Pollard's stability as a result of bizarre behavior during the TF-168 assignment May 1990 Regained SCI access when assigned to NISC-33 position applied for in March NISC not I-3 sEcRET _ --- l£ 3 -------' SECRET immediately informed of Pollard's unfavorable record with TF-168 Assigned as Middle Eastern Warship Analyst in Free World Branch June 1980 Director of Naval Intelligence requested that Naval Investiga ive'service NIS help to clarify Pollard's TF-168 activities NIS initiated counterintelligence Operation Swan Song to investigate Pollard's relationship with a south African attache Jul 1980 Pollard admitted during pre-polygraph interview conducted pursuant to Operation Swan Song that he had lied concerning his alleged personal and professional conn ctions with South Africa in order to impress others and enhance his professional status He further admitted that he had attended a clandestine meeting with the South African Defense Attache in September 1979 I-4 SECRE I ------ -------- L r J J Pollard was referred to and examined by an Air Force clinical psychologist who described him as qrandiose manipulative and at times uncertain of what was real exa gerated imaqined or false recommended therapr and assignment to nonsensitive duties Auqust 1990 Operation Swan Song terminated Pollard's Top Secret and SCI clearances suspended Pollard reassigned from NISC-33 to NISC-34 position as research ship analyst with access to Secret noncompartmented information pending Pollard's receipt of a satisfactory fitness-for-duty evaluation from one of four cleared psychiatrists identified to Pollard by the Commanding Officer NISC September 1990 Performing duties proficiently in NJSC-34 successfully completed one-year probationary period received within-grade increase to GS-7 2 November 1990 Pollard sent memorandum to Commanding Officer NISC advising him that he had seen a psychiatrist of his choice and requesting that NISC contact the psychiatrist for·a report on Pollard's emotional fitness I-5 SECREIJ ' MOR December 1980 Pollard promoted to GS-9 1 January 1981 Commanding Officer NISC ordered Pollard to consult one of the four cleared psychiatrists referred to Pollard in August 1980 February 1981 Pollard submitted grievance letter against Commanding Officer NISC denying he originally' had been ordered to consult a cleared psychiatrist and intimating that he was a victim of persecution hy NISC March 1981 Pollard examined by a cleared psychiatrist He diagnosed Pollard as having a borderlinepersonality disorder with a good prognosis for improvement if he sought further psychiatric treatment The clinical judgment deemed Pollard thoroughly capable of handling the duties of his job and not a security risk '' but also advised that Pollard be closely supervised in his work because he had a tendency to become expansive under stress Pollard did not receive further psychiatric couselinq July-Auqust 1981 Pollard's request for reinstatement of SCI access was endorsed by Commanding Officer NISC based upon cleared psychiatrist's findings Navy Senior I-6 SECRR'P _ I_ _ _ _ _ 3 _ -_ _ _ _- MORI DociD 1 6933 SIGINT Officer SSO recommended against granting Pollard such access because of his history of problems November 1981 NISC request f r a status report regarding the reinstatement of Pollard's Top Secret and SCI access again resulted in rejection by Navy SSO and Commander Naval Intelligence Command December 1981 Pollard promoted to GS-11 1 January 1982 Received highly satis factory 11 overall rating on annual basic performance appraisal Commander Naval Intelligence Command ordered reinstatement of Pollard's SCI clearances Director of Naval Intelligence ordered that Pollard be monitored closely on a continuing basis and that quarterly reports be provided on his progress and stability Pollard worked with SCI access and with an interim Top Secret clearance from 19 January 1982 until 3 _January 1985 when he was granted a permanent Top Secret clearance February 1982 Pollard returned to workas Middle East Warship Analyst at NISC-33 CO NISC provided very complimentary quarterly reports on Pollard to Commander Naval Intelliqence Command in May I-7 SE CRE'i'l __ _ __ _ 3 __ __ _ _____ MORI DociD 346933 July and October 1982 quarterly reports ended thereafter February 1982August 1984 Pollard's performance was rated 11 outstandinq in the first two of three annual performance appraisal reports The third report coverinq 1 February - 24 Auqust 1984 which included the time of Pollard's initial espionaqe activities rated his·overall performance as hiqhly_ satisfactory but cited some siqnificant problems The problems included failure to meet some assiqnment deadlines disaqreement with assigned work priorities Pollard wanted to· concentrate on research related to the Middle East to the exclusion of littoral Africa an lateness for work Following Pollard's arrest his supervisor indicated that Pollard's superior analytical ability and command o£ facts enabled him to dazzle his supervisors and consumers of information and make up for shortcomings in performance 1982-1984 Post-arrest investiqation showed that Pollard and Anne Henderson occasionally used marijuana and cocaine at parties in the Washinqton area Pollard showed increasinq signs of financial difficulty or irresponsibility indicated I-8 MORI 6933 initially by occasional failure to pay rent on time and later by failure to repay credit union loan October 1983 US Marine Barracks in Beirut bombed In post- arrest debriefings Pollard identified this incident and subsequent US inaction as major factors precipitating his decision to commit espionage for Israel Late Fall 1983 Anonymous telephone call informed Commanding Officer NISC that Pollard had been observed in an altercation in a bar in Georgetown and had identified himself as an intelligence analyst during the incident Pollard received counseling from NISC-30 department head Spring 1984 Pollard and Anne Henderson approached 6 I @fJ -- Ia friend of Pollard's who workedLI-- @f -- ---- --- -- in an unsuccessful attempt to recruit him to aid in Pollard's thus far ill-defined objective to commit espionage f r Israel May-June 1984 Anti-terrorist Alert Center ATAC established within NIS Pollard selected for temporary detail to ATAC in light of staffing needs and Pollard's areas of stated interest and expertise Middle I-9 SECRE '----- @ 3 __ _ __ f-10RI DociD East terrorism 134 Pollard's personnel file as provided to NIS for inspection was incomplete omitting information concerning Pollard's grievance aqainst Commandinq Officer NISC in February 1981 and omittinq his involvement with TF-168 and its consequences 20 June 1984 Pollard beqan temporary detail to ATAC workinq a rotatinq shift as a watchstander Late June 1984 Pollard received phone call from l ___ l_s_j__ J an old family friend and active member of the Israel ' Lobby with whom Pollard'had conducted a dialogue ·on I rael since 1981 J6 I Iwanted Pollard to meet a hiqh-rankinq Israeli Air Force officer who had been· involved in the nraid on the reactor which Pollard understood to be the 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq Pollard claims he immediately viewed this proposal as an opportunity for him to volunteer his services to Israel A few days after call Pollard received a phone call at his residence from Avi Col Aviem Sella who introduced himself as a friend ofj j6 and arranqed for initial meetinq with Pollard at the Washinqton Hilton Hotel I-10 SEGRE'I' 1 _ _ _ 3 _3 __ _ _ ___ II Early J'uly 1984 Pollard made initial disclosure of classified material to Sella at second meeting that began at Washington Bilton and continued at a secluded outdoor location near Dumbarton Oaks included a three-volume Arabian military a of Saudi Arab a Q1 I I study I j1 I andj 11 Material of the Saudi j ground logistics study I Isatellite imagery of the bomb-damaged Iraqi nuclear facility Sella emphasized that scientific and technical intelligence particularly Top Secret documents would be of greatest value and commented that US intelligence information on terrorism was not very important to Israel Navy Federal Credit Union letter concerning Pollard's non-repayment of two loans forwarded to NISC Pollard owed approximately $4 000 and was three month s in arrears on payments record of any action taken by NISC There is no Neither NIS nor the Navy SSO were informed of the delinquent repayments Pollard claims that his NISC-33 supervisor spoke to him about the matter but that i t was a non-issue because he had the money to repay his debts but had simply neglected to do so I-ll ---- lU ---- 1 SEGRE'PII - July 1984 Pollard's third meeting with Sella occurred approximately one week after the second They made contact at a Holiday Inn in Chevy Chase and proceeded in Sella's car via a circuitous route to a residence on Deborah Street in Potomac Maryland subsequently identified durinq investiqation as the residence of I1an Ravid Attache for Scientific Affairs of the Israeli Embassy in Washington At the meeting Pollard provided for the Israelis to copy the same material he had shown Selia at the second meeting plus additional classified mate ia1 including the daily Middle East and North Africa Summary and some additional NSA-originated documents such as a study on Egyptian air defenses He also passed a number of US defense attache reports from embassies in various Arab countries Pollard's debriefings indicate that he delivered no additional classified documents to the Israelis until December 1984 Pollard and Anne Henderson became engaged I-12 SECRET ------ ---------- 16 August 1984 Pollard submitted Personal Qualifications Statement and application for an Intelligence Research Specialist position with NIS This statement omitted employment information prior to October 1981 which resulted in a failure to consider derogatory information concerning Pollard's detail to TF-168 in 1980 14 october 1984 Pollard left NISC and became a full-time employee of NIS remained in the ATAC and retained his SCI access Clearances were certified from NISC again without an extensive file check Pollard's past investigation by NIS was not in the open files and no NIS personnel familiar with Operation Swan ·song were aware of Pollard's employment with NIS NISC did not notify NIS of any of Pollard's past problems In his new permanent position in ATAC Pollard left the Watch Office and became a Foreign Counterintelligence Analyst with responsibility for analyzing information and producing assessments pertaining to terrorist activities narcotics traffic and factors affecting the stability of North America and the Eastern Caribbean I-13 SEORE' i' __I---- lD r ________ I MORI Pollard also was responsible £or conducting liaison with other elements of the Intelligence Community For that purpose he was issued a courier card on 22 October 1984 which permitted him to carry classified material out of any DOD building without being questioned Officer-in Charge October 1984- The ATAC told investigators that November 1985 Pollard did not do well in the analyst position in contrast to his excellent performance as a watchstander because his interest in Middle Eastern affairs and retrospectively because his espionage activities for the Israelis took precedence over his assigned duties Nonetheless Pollard's performance was rated as satisfactory· and he was judged to have great potential Pollard's coworkers noted at he kept unusual hours permitted by the flextime policy then in force He often came to work late spent long periods away from his ATAC spaces and frequently worked on weekends November · 1984 Pollard and Anne Henderson traveled to Eur·ope He met Rafael Eitan the senior Israeli official in charge of the case Aviem Sella Pollard's first handler and Joseph Yaqur Counselor for Scientific Affairs Israeli Consulate New York and I-14 SECRE E ''---- @ ------- l Sella's replacement as handler in Paris where formal tasking priorities and operational procedures were established Pollard received his initial payment from the Israelis of $10 000$11 000 in cash and his salary was set at $1 500 per month Anne Henderson selected a diamond- sapphire ring from a jewelry store which the Israelis purchased fo her Eitan conducted a ceremony during which Pollard was sworn in as an Israeli citizen Yagur replaced Sella as Pollard's direct handler Eitan downplayed security concerns and pledged that in any case Israel would take care of Pollard if he were caught Eitan instructed Pollard to resign if called upon to submit to a polygraph December 1984 Pollard made his first delivery of classified material since July by bringing stolen documents ' to the Israeli residence on Deborah Street in Potomac 3 January 1985 Pollard's final Top Secret and SCI clearances were certified by NIS Headquarters and Pollard signed an NIS Security Agreement Information regarding his prior limitation of access to the Secret level from 1980-82 was not brought to the attention of NIS I-15 R P W ---------- @C -------- MORT DociD 23 January 1985 1 4 933 Pollard made his first large delivery of about five suitcases full of classified material From then until his arrest the following November he made larqe biweekly deliveries every other Friday to the same apartment on Van Ness Street in Washington D C where Erit Erb a secretary in Israel's Embassy resided Erb would advise Pollard when to return to pick up the documents after they had been copied The Israelis eventually obtained a second apartment in Erb's buildinq which they furnished only with copyinq equipment which occasionally permitted the material to be copied while Pollard waited · Pollard's schedule also called for a face-to-face meeting with Yagur at Erb's apartment on the last Saturday of each month for the purpose of obtaining additional tasking and feedback The schedule of drops and meetings was followed consistently except during Pollard's trip to rsrael and Europe the ·following summer February 1985 Pollard's monthly salary raised to $2 500 July-August 1985 Pollard and Anne Henderson traveled to Israel where Pollard met Eitan and Yagur I-16 Eitan reviewed fORI a computerized listing that Pollard believed contained all but one document provided to date Pollard said he believed Sella kept one photoqraph of damage to Iraq's nuclear reactor for his personal memorabilia Eitan complimented him on the material stating that it had been crucial to the security of Israel and had far exceeded their expectations OVer a three-day period two additional operational meetings occurred concerning future operational plans and security concerns At the first meeting Eitan again assured Pollard that Israel would take care of him and that no drastic action would be taken by the United States based upon experience with similar situations in the past Eitan also told Pollard that Israel was settinq up a Swiss bank account for him into which $30 000 per year over 10 years would be deposited in return for Pollard's continued services At the end of 10 ·years Pollard and his immediate family would emigrate to Israel where he could use the money to establish himself The account would be in the name of Danny Cohen · which also would be Pollard's Israeli identity I-17 r OR r Doc ro 134 6 93 3 Pollard initiated a second confrontational meeting with Eitan wherein Pollard informed Eitan o£ his concerns about detection and his belief that a 10-year commitment was unreasonable Eitan angrily told Pollard that he had nothing to worry about insofar as securrty was concerned and that the Swiss bank account should allay whatever concerns he did have Eitan directed Yagur to give Pollard a couple of thousand more for the expense of his trip Pollard received $12 000 for the trip which included the Pollards' marriage and honeymoon in Europe following the meetings in Israel 9 August 1985 Pollard and Anne Henderson were married in Venice Italy Early Fall 1985 Pollard surprisingly once again sought to be assigned or detailed to TF-168 despite his previous problems with that component He arrived late and disheveled for an applicant interview and offered a preposterous explanation to the effect that the Irish Republican Army had kidnapped his wife and he had spent the weekend getting her released j I-18 t10RI 3 SESRBT Pollard was rejected for the TF-168 job Fall 1985 Security awareness and vigilance had increased within naval intelligence as a result of revelations about the Walker-Whitworth espionage case Officer-in•charqe OIC ATAC had begun focusing on and became suspicious of Pollard's activities because Pollard seemed to be handling large amounts of classified material concerning the Middle East and unrelated to Pollard's legitimate area of responsibility North America and the eastern Caribbean The OIC began low-key monitoring of Pollard's activities 25 October 1985 A coworker notified the OIC that he had seen Pollard apparently removi ng classified material from the ATAC without authorization The OIC verified that Pollard had removed the material and informed the Counterintelligence Directorate of NIS NIS opened an investigation and subsequently notified the FBI Pollard was observed removing more classified material during the joint FBI NIS investigation I-19 MORI DociD 134 933 18 November 1985 FBI a nd NIS agents confronted and questioned Pollard as he left the building housing the ATAC The agents found classified material in Pollard's briefcase which he had no authorization to remove from the building Pollard at first'claimed he was delivering material to another US intelligence organization and later claimed the information was destined for a contact journalist Kurt Lohbeck who was an active supporter of Afghan freedom fighters He retracted the Lohbeck story only after his arrest 21 November 1985 Pollard and his wife were arrested outside the Israeli Embassy following the Embassy's refusal to accept them for asylum 5 June 1986 Under terms of a plea bargain Pollard pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage and his wife to conspiracy to receive embezzled government property and to being an accessory after the fact to possession of national-security documents 4 March 1987 Following successive delays to the original ' sentencing date of 10 September 198'6 Pollard was I-20 SBCRB'i' sentenced to life imprisonment and his wife to two concurrent five-year prison terms Key to Exemptions 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b l 2 Executive Order l3526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central ntelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 b 3 the Freedom ofinformation Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E I-21 MOR TAB II Annotated Examples of Compromised Documents 1 Military Intelligence 2J 11 J I J3l I 2J II-1 13 5933_ 1 a 13 3 1142 V Mm MGEI EQQID 1346 33 DJ f3 7 S 3 IIHS MGR DOCID 134 933 1144 MGRI DOCIQ 13453333 3 75 MORI BOGID 13%5933 Ml MQRI DGCID 1346933 MGRE acl t 1345933 1 gum w 3 I MORE DGCID 1346933 s 3 3636113 13%6 933 1 2 mp IleO MGR I Basin 1345 33 -MHWW 2 Politica AIntelligence 11 11 v 1345333 13 m Wm MSW 3 3 321-13 MQRI DQCID 13 6933 DociD 4 1 46 33 Current Intelligence Foreign Intelligence Services Counterintelligence SIGINT Operations and Multidisciplinary Items --NSA Radio Signal Notation RASIN j II-15 3 3 ys --Middle East and North Africa Summary MENAS I I ---------------- ------------ II-16 3 I 3 Tab III Security and Counterintelligence Lessons A number of counterintelligence and security issues raised by the Jonathan Jay Pollard case have been discussed previously as in the Report of Task Group Six of the Integrated Damage Assessment in the 1985 publication Keeping the Nation's Secrets A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices the Stilwell Co ission in National Security Decision Directives NSDDs 196 and 197 of 1 November 1985 and in Congressional committee reports on counterintelligence also - re relevant to other Some aspects of the Pollacrd case espi nage damage assessments recently completed or under preparation by DDAC specifically the Larry Wu-tai Chin Ronald Pelton and WalkerjWhitworth cases as well as the Edward Howard case k8 -- '3 '-- All five cases have significance for counterintelligence and security issues that have become all too familiar in the last few years the efficacy of polygraph and repolygraph tests physical security of classified facilities from inside theft by trusted personnel computer security violations of the need-to-know principle the relationship among personality lifestyle including management of personal finances and espionage the vulnerability posed by ties of affection to other countries III-1 I l and the need for more management awareness of security issues It is our view that these issues merit discussion in a broader context I There are however some unique aspects to the Pollard affair that raise specific concerns not discussed in other recent damaqe assessments or counterintelligence studies rr_I_-_2 TOP ______________________ MQRI $306113 13%632333 I Israel's abaenca from the Attorney General's list of critaria countrieg -meaning that the US counterintelligence poature against Israel is not aspaciaily high points to a need for remedial actien Israel's 3p united states appears to preclude criteria cauptry list ecial relationship with the that country s placement 6n the My DQCID 13 6 33 3 -- ------ ' · I f3J _ _l2J_1 Security Counterintelligence and Pollard Several security and counterintelligence considerations came to light during the government's investigation of the Pollard case that deserve highlighting mostly as old lessons reinforced --Usefulness of the polygraph as a deterrent to espionage As noted p 20 Pollard's chief Israeli handler Rafael Eitan instructed him to resign from naval intelligence rather than III-5 TOP B lOrui X l submit to a polygraph interview We assume Pollard told the Israelis that he had been rejected by Moreover Pollard himself stated that had hie espionage remained undetected · he would have been inclined to seek a job with the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research because he could have gained necessary access there without having to undergo a polygraph --Need for thorough personnel background investiaationsl j4 and 7 I 1 14 and 71 I III-6 l 3 --Completion of background nvestigation before qrantinq access to sensitive intelligence There was no legitimate requirement for Pollard to have been granted an interim Top Secret clearance or access to SCI based upon a waiver o£ DCID 1 14 before completion of his background investigation --Management awareness of employee behavior and completeness and availability of personnel records Pollard's adverse 'performance record with TF-168 and other manifestations of irresponsibility during his employment with naval intelligence should have been highlighted in his personnel file and been readily available to naval intelligence components as well as any other intelligence ' agencies considering him for reassignment or interagency transfer Pollard's £requent removal of large numbers of documents from his workspace should have aroused the suspicion of his supervisor and colleagues much sooner despite complicating factors such III-7 I as flextime permission for employees to work odd hours and Pollard's possession of a courier card that afforded him unrestricted permission to transport classified material among DoD facilities A related factor was that most of the documents Pollard stole were unrelated to his job as a terroriam analyst for North America and the Caribbean Pollard's acquisition of such documents 1 therefore constituted a gross violation of the need-to-know principle 14 and 7 T0P- I III-8 I 14 and 7 I Key to Exemptions 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b l 2 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 6 3 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 4 5 6 7 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 b 3 the Freedom ofinformation Act section 522 b 6 section 522 b 7 C section 522 b 7 E III-9 ------- Tab IV AL INTELLIGENCE Foreign Denial end Deception Anelyaie Committee Washington D C 20505 cf3J I 28 October 1986 Terms of Reference The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case Intelltsence Damage Assessment PURPOSE 1 This study undertaken on behalf of the Oirector of Central Intelligence will 1 e t1fy and review the full range of US classified information and materials compromised to the Israelis between June 1984 and November 1985 by Jonathan Jay Pollard aka Danny Cohen in order to determine the damage to US intelligence sources methods and capabilities of the study include · IV-1 SECRET Objectives Evaluation of the damage to US intelligence capabilities and regional interests Review of security considerations arising from the Pollard case such as the possibi11ty that Pol1ard may have encouraged or facilitated other Israeli attempts to penetrate US intelligence agencies BACKGROUND Pollard using his access to Top Secret sensitive compartmented 2 information and other classified documents while employed in the antiterrorist Alert Center of the Naval Investigative Service passed a large volume of classified information to Israel's Directorate of Military Intelligence from June 1984 unt11 his arrest in November 1985 Extensive post-arrest debriefings of Pollard--corroborated by polygraph interviews-indic ate that he provided the Israelis with more than 800 documents Most of c3 the compromised materials comprise intelligence on Soviet weaponry and systems and on the military forces programs capabilities I DCJ ---- rtJ-JNsA's RASIN radio signal notation catalog on the Soviet Union D 1 j1 I Additiona11y Pollard's case officers told him that his intelligence provided critical support for the planning of Israel's air attack against PLO hea quarters near Tunis on 1 October 1985 ·IV-2 SECRET 4 A major difference between the Pollard espionage case and others exposed within the past several years -e g Walker-Whitworth Boyce-Lee r Kampiles Pelton Prime and Chin- IV-3 MQRI EGCEB 1346933 E 13 33 134 33 MGRI Qaclmz 'iv 5 M anr - MQRI 3 36 33 13 933 WM m EEQJCID 1346 33 TAB V Contributors to the Pollard Damaqe Assessment Key to Exemptions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 1 Executive Order 13526 section 3 3 b 6 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 50 U S C section 403g 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C 5 U S C section 522 section 522 section 522 section 522 b 3 the Freedom ofinformation Acf b 6 b 7 C b 7 E V-1 ' _____PJ 3 ------