DECUSSIRED • J - • • • • • • • 1 I • • • • - - • • • • • • • ' • • · ·• ·•··-• ·•· ·····••- - --- ·•·--·• -····' - - -- _ -···-·· ··•··-···• -- _ · - - - - ·· • SECURI1'Y 1 Tliis· document i classi°ficd rop ·sici ET ·1n acc9rd 1 C -wi t·h ·pa'ragtll Ph 9 AF R· _20 -r- 'r_t - ifil' be ·tr qnapa r ted · stQi cd -_sa _fegua r d eid- 'and·iac counted fo r 11s· cqii ct_ed ' Y 'AJ · 2o·s-i _ A 3'§o'' ' nd 'Oi' AV Instr' ie_tJ_on_ 5510--lI · - · · -2 This-ao·cll llent-·is clii ssi i' d TOP -S-EC RET be cause it ' co nta ris 'det' '--i led 1 _1' a ··· 1 1n' ·rp ' Sl¢ RET plnn n ing cuments ·• ll f 1 ··di t_' ' on_U - i ·operat i ns · c11pabillt1·01 i -and ·rcq p -rements 1-n onne cj ion the·rewHh which a ficcts ' tne·· naU ona1 ··defens ci-f tJ 'e un· ted Sta_t·es • thj n · tlie irie' 'n ng ·of 't_1 ·e Es_pio nage· Laws Tit-J e 1_8-US_G - Section 79 3_ a nu· 79 4 ·The transmission ·or t e· r eV'elation ·of i-tE C _911 tents_ -in any l lanner to an uriauth·orized 'person •ir j rohi ' j _ted by 1aw · · · · · -· 3 Recj pi 'nts c f · ti is dc cumen t 11 -i lf a_f qrcl it and its· v a i•iaus _parts ·a -d 'g1'cc• · 0£·· §·l t s s if ca tl on and' prp e ctio·o equ_ival_e t to or g1 ·eate'fi than ' ' that r quine by the origina or 1 R·cproduct_ion of th is _document in wl ol·e or in port is prohibitc d except by the aL1Lhority of CINCONAD 5 The title of this document is unclassified 6· Dest ruction of this document-will be ac co1nplished n acco1•datten wit h pertinent service egulations and instr ctions This doctiment onsists of 41 pages plus co •ers - ' p ' ' • - f ' ' - - • ' - • I • ' ' - _ ' - I - • - - • - - I OLD RI C NYM IIK IRIS WORKSHEET OIi CALL NUN CR U IAHI tn1• f'tVM • J k llDAHI O 1 U • in i OLD ACCC 'litlON NIJMar Jl UA NJ oa5xiil 3ctao 1Y 11 SECURITY WAIUilNG AOMIN MARKINGS 0 AL t'HSTDRT CAVE4'1' RD CH •v rQ ocow NACT -ROPR IC AR'I' INf O TMll 0DCU •N'1' CDNTAUU' 1 ATO INFO D OOCUMENT SE CURITY DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS lL ________ D CL 11 al Y ON I ••v••w CI ASSIFICP TION AND OOWNGRACING INSTR lCTIDNS FOR -------t-----1-------- TITL E AGITRAC''I' L Jl TlnG5 NUM11t A IN t uo o n£tll SLJltl J'I « r DEST' PVf' Q CNil ' T yo 01 1•0•· CATALOGING RECORD MAIN l ' N1 'RY- UJC Olt I ru ' IDQ • l IU ONA l t i A WIII tD • 1•'1'-'IKC 1 Gt N Y a Tl'TLC A S MA a CHTftV Tr'fLE liJ£ UMI IJO tOT Ii £ IF TITLE If MAI I ' ENTR J I IOAl'f no OR Cltt C I 0 121 0 ORAL HISTOIIV • JI tt ENO o TOVA R£PORT 0 J2ltl HISTOfl' NO Vfl' op tlNC OOCUMtNT5J • 22-'C CHtCO M ICKOFILM 0 125Q COAneSPOHDENCt • 1-117 PAPERS 0 i127P C A ENO A L4£DTj 1LJ j i ba v u u u AAT re IUMO ·1 •• _ J J- I -- - t e d J y fl hoJ f z S15 C I - ' - - 1- ·l· o Te 5 OtlLV u 1 OR H l YU l oMn l TCl II U PL'I' •OTH ' MOWN INCLUSIVE OA'1E -J__ 1 - TO ---1--• -- II' cu I C liTIMAT o C ttf 'CK H nt D 00 YY 00 OATEOFPlll K 'TION _g_ CJJ 1'01 AL PAGES----- DD HQ USArHRC ' 7 P-Al'VIOUS O TIONI _ltE 08IC l -r1C • f • • b • • • • _ - 1 JllAD CONAD PARTlc J PAT ION J N THE CUBAN CRrnIS TJ11 ocumept inf0r1l afH n ill r 1 contai h d GH rl l d u1 1 h1 - -tn forei ii i lt 1 •t c1 H I I i' l p1 • - f l Jlt0 I i •pr liistortca1 Rrfere11ce P per Nr 8 f F1An· ll-J 1·• t 1 9rl3 · ·- ·- _ · ' rt-•· r J1 -A• 1 r - r _ · e - FJW l •m D 1q ir J1 Ml QM I-1-IG- t'f'F-- · 1- Vtt h- -1-t ---OOES----Nfl l'--A-PPhY- t• - - ·· • -· ·rate of rin- r1a1id f - Lr 1·y t -f i - e f lnJQ1- ' icn 1 f Al QIJ 1Jl 1·U ' 'N I RfY f RSE BLANK •·· ' J' • • • • • • ' • • ti · - I • CONTEJiTS - BACKGROUND CIIICI ANT AND CJNCONAll OPLlNS SEJI QUARANTlNf AIR QUAllANTINE PLANNING J l - AUGMENTATION OP THE FLORIDA FORCES l 3 4 6 1'UE PRE-CRISIS FORCE ·6 HISTORY OF TIIE BUILD-UP OF l'OIICES 6 SOIU ARY 11 IIULE 9 OF F NGAGEMENT 11 FAA AIR TIUFFIC RESTRICTlON 14 TASK FORCE 33 15 Jll · ALERT AND DISPERSAL 16 SYSTEJ 1-WlDE 16 MONTGOMERY SECTOR 18 OAIIGOR SF CTOR 21 J FFEC'J' OF A 1 1rn·r AND DIS PERS L 23 IV - RJSIS TERMJNAT10N 26 RETURJllNG TO HORM i COt1D1'r101 s 16 l'ROPQSALS FOR PERMANJ NT SO JT IERII FLOR Dt FORCES 30 s011nc1- s 33 LU REVERSE BLANK • ' • •• ii • • • • ' · ' · ' ' ' ' llACKGROUND CIHCLANT AND CINCONAD OPLANS The possibility o f thore becoming a much greater threat from Cuba was long recognized in the United States and planning_and preparation for such an eventuality had long been underway How ever ot interest to this study is the crystalli zation of this threat and CONAD's participation in meeting it Of immediate interest therefore 1s CINCUNT Operations Plan 312-62 dated 4 September 1962 TS This plan provided for quick retaliation or pre-emptive air strikes against Cuba Operations were to beg in 6 12 or 24 hours subsequent to the receipt of orders to execute In October COHAD was advised that Commander Tactical Air CoJ11JT1and had I Jeen designated ConunRnrl i•-in-Chief Air Forces Atlantic CINC FLANT with tJ1e 1·csponsibi1ity for developing th detailed plans for this operation CINCAFLANT Operations Plan 313 was prepared pri marily to lnitia tc p1·e-empti ve air strikes The AFLANT concept was la launch air strikes to elim inate all missile sites 111i$sile ships and the Cuban Air Force Ir tho massive air strikes failed to eliminate all resistence and bring about the cornpl ete surrender of Cuba then CINCAFLANT Operations Plan 315E Employment was to be imple mented TS This consisted of ai r dropping two n i rborne divisions into six d p zones near Havana The troop carrier forces were to be pre-positioned nt seven bns S in Florida Naval Marine forces would be conductinis amphibious landings at other sections of Cuba si iultaneous y wit h the ai1·borne operations TS - ' _ ' ' - •·· ' 2 The CONAD mission throughout tlu se operations was Ln TS l Defend tile continental U S 2 uefend al I AFLANT 5lagin bases J Defend troop carrier routes from slagin bases to the Ory Tortugas marshalling area On l Octobe1• CINCLANT reqllesLcd all coam1a11de1·s responsible for execution of these plans to take all measures nc cessa1·y to assure maximum readiness to execute by 20 October CO HAD prepared Operations Plan 1-62 dated 18 October 1962 to carry out its respollS1bilities An intellii e11cc annex was pub 1 ishcd on 25 Octobe1• and a re ision lo the basi1 plan was issucd un 7 November· The intelligence annex listed thrc e InBM lnunch sites and ix IRBM s1tes It also stated thi re were 22 IL-28 Beagle bombers in Cuba It was late • determined tl1at there -ere at lc i t 4 2 lL-28 1 s in C11ba IS COllAD OPJ A I -u2 as revised provided respon- si j lities for the task oq aniz ntioni USAF ADC ARADCU•t 32d CONAD Region nnd t h lontgomcry CONAO Se ctor the concept of opera lions iden t 1- f ication proccdu •c s and rules of cnga1remE·nt CONAD slated its mission as fol low yt's a Conduct incrensed air defense operations in the southern Florida area with priority oi defense to Hoines tc ad Arn McCoy AFB MncDi 11 U'B 111d Key Wc st l- AS b Conduct air aL Iensc op n·ations of Dry TortugAs ia u-stu1lli1 arcn and air co1 ridor s fro• ttr- ip can·icr stngl ng bast's if and when directed c Provide two additional AEW C stations for 1·he ope1· tio11nl control of CINCLANT during dayUi ht hours C tnmr ncing D-Day the day on ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - -····-'·· _ _ • - - · · - • ·• - · • _ • - - - - - · T - 3 which the plan s were to be executed u_ntil D 2 days Under the concept or operations CONAD st ted that jt would assui e a n increased air defen e pos- tm·e in Flo rtda on 20 October This improved capa bility would· be ntai 1tai11cd until completion of CINCLANT opei·at1ons unless reduced by CINCON D CONAD would provi le air defense protection of CINCLANT deployed forces and ·e 1pl oyrne1t1 bases If airburne amphil ious opel'n tions were conducted after the air strikes air defense protection of troop carrier aircraft would be ·provided CON 'Ul would be responsible ior CONUS air defense within the limits of the surveillance system'unt11 s-HQur the actual hour the fir it ordnance was ch·opped on Cuba At that tillle FLANT would assume responsi bility for Joint Zone Cuba TS Because of the vast amount of air traffic nfter D-Day i L was pla11ned t o suppress all non- essential flights in the Florida area A military emergency zone MEZ and a security control of air traffic SCAT program was to be implei ented To control and identify friendly forces troop car- riers air resupply support aircraft air strike forces and reconnRissance aircraft a system of corridors and con1 rol points was to be t up and specia 1 identification proce dures established CONAD's plan also included a special set of rules of engagement· which were to supplement t he i nstruc tions in NORAD R gulatiDll 55-6 Eng i gement was authorized with nr n--nur lear weapo11s only 1S SEA QUARANTINE CJNCI AN1' was dinicted by ltttl JCS on 22 October to prepare immadiatt ll' fo • blockade of Cuba The oojectiv was to prevent entry into Cuba of ofien si •c wenpons and ultir ate y to bring about the ithdrawal of sue weapons from the island CINC LANTFt T stabliSlied a sea quarantine P ffective -•· ' • ' • • ' ' - ' l400Z 10 A M BDr 24 October An interception area w S established composed of two 5-00 nautical mile area one centered on Havana and the other centered on Cape Maysi at tbe eastern tip of Cuba The first interception was of an oil tanker the Bucharest the first boarding of a shjp was of a Lebanese freighter under Sovi t i harter the Marucla at 120oz 26 October It h11d nr prohibited material S AIR QUARANTINE PLANNING An air quarantine was planned but never es- tablished On 22 October in the same directive pertaining to a sea blockade the JCS directed ClNCLANT to prepare plans to prevent aircraft enroute to Cuba believed to be cnrrying prohibited material from reaching their destination In re- sponse ClNCLAJIT prepared Ope 11 tions Plan 308-62 24 October which provided for a limited air quar antine o Cuba 1 This plan assigned to GONAD re- sponsibility to assist ClMCLANT by intercepting diverting and if required destroying suspected aircraft that f 1 ew within the coRsta l AD1Z or range oft he CONAD system and to pa ss to CINCLANT information on the move ent of suspected aircraft CUJCUNT's plan provided that the northwestern flltnk of the quarant 1ne woul cl i Je secured by CONAD forces operating from COtruS bases TS CONAD responded with Qp rations Plan 2-62 26 October 2 Thjs cove •ud CONAD's planned p irt cipa tion and provided j nstruct ions to re gion and secto1• commands and USAF ADC for carrying out the quaran tine Dctniled pians were then prepared by the region and sectors S Bul on 29 October the JCS issuea a new d1rec t1ve which ill effect cancelled CINCLAlf'l e and CONAD' l plans for a 1imitcd quarantioe The JCS now directed CINCLA NT CINCONAD and CINCSAC to pl'epare upporti11g plans to implement an air quar antine when directed by the JCI ClNCLA llT and ' ' ' · · ' ' ' ' • • ' I • ' ' - - ··- ·••···• f · _· 5 CINCOl-lAD l sted by CI NC SAC wei·e to establish an air quar rntinc of Cuba CONAIJ was assigned_ responsil d l ty for enf01 c1ng the quai'11ntiJl8 along the rout Northern Europe to Gaudqr to Cuba CINCLA11'1' u i · 1 o enforc tl•c qwu•antinc along the sm1t 1 ern 1·r 111satl1u1t ic and Canbbcan routei TS Yc 1 lts part CONAD ·prepared Oporations PJpo 3-62 l'fovr mher CONAD rescinded its 2-6 shortly after 3-62 was issued 3-62 provided instructions 1 o lhc 26th and 32d Regions end Goos and Bangor oc cf or for l mplementing the quarantine 'hen directed It also provider p -ocedures fo - COHAD SAC cooperation and ru1es of engagement SAC was to provide long-range pacer survnillance aircraft at East Coast 3AC bases on 30 minute call ·to flight- Coll ow suspect n1rcrnft report poi it ions and assist 1n interception TS CONAJJ's plan also epel led out the posJ tion of C 1 n ad t O 'I overIJights or Jan dings by Sov iet bloc d ·c ·ai n 111 Canad No furtltP T landings in Canada or ov r l1 1 t of Ca nad1'r 11 ton itory would be rnnti a I Jovicl urcra t r nrour ' tq Cuba For f li l1ts b twccn Soviet bloc ountrics and Cuba s t l' had t e en takcrn to ensure that lnspec tion and o f hr 1• p1--occtlurec 111 accordance with Canadian laws ot1d 1·l provislons o-f tho CAO C 1nve11tion were J11J ly r ornpli •d wlth to ensm·e that - ' warlike ma Ll t' i 1 l wr- re he ing carried lhl'nr i h Can-aria to Cnba _J t 1 trr ih nud inspection provisions were set up f0r li 1rcraft regardless of ownership on fltgJ1ts ta C uba tr m ovjct bloc c-ountries on lanrlln1 tn CDnadR TS t • • ' • ' ' t ' •• • ' • • I • r J1 AUGMENTATlON OF TIIE FLORIDA FORCES THE PRE-CRIS1S FORCE On 20 October CONAD bei an a build-up of its force in the southern Florida area The day before CONAD had 24 ighter-intcrc -eptoT aircraft consisting of 12 F4B's of VF-41 at Key West NAS 8 F6A's of VF AW -3 at Key West NAS and 4 F-102's of the 482d FIS at Homestead AFB There was one picket ship and one AEW c station being manned off the coast There were prime land-based rada2·s at Key West AS and Richmond AFS and gap- 11lers at Naples Long Key and Jupitnr Further north at about central Florida there were prime radars at Patrick AFB and MacOi 11 Arn - ii tlt a gap-fill er between the two CONAD control centc 1•s at Key West NAS Jacksonville NAS and Ty11ctr l 1 AFB 1·eporlS'd to the SAGE Direction Cente · nt Guntu · AFB Alaban1 i Montgomery Sector S HJS' O Y OF THE BUILD-UP OF FORCES 011 17 Oc -1 obor the JCS directed that action be lak 11 without delay to augment the air defenses of tile southeast U S CONAD replied with recom mended a tions that could be co apleted by ZO October These included deployment of IS '-102's to Homestead Arn 12 F-106 1 s to Pntr1ck AFB 18 F-l02's to Tynelall AFB and G AEli i aircraft ro McCoy AFB retaining VF-41 and VF AW -3's detach ment and aug1•enting tl e latter with additio11al crews assuming op rn tionnl control of 8 F8U 1 s at Key 'lest HAS ha ing T •ndall AFB be prepared to augment the defenses with assigned F-lOl's F-102's and F-JOG's s required and plRcint a Hawk bat talion it Ki y West CTS G • - f • ' • • • • • • • ' • ·_ ' ' ' · - ' ' · '' ' ' ' ' • • C • • I - _ • I • •- -- - • • - 1 • • - •• ' ···r _ _ - - • • - · - · 7 The JCS apJH OVC d the above I on the same date e ccept moving aircraft to Tyndall AFB which was saturated op rational control of the F8U's and the Hawk battalion The JCS asked CINCl ANT s com menls on operational control of the l'SU' CIN - LANT 1·ep1ied that these airc1·aft were required for escort of reconnaissance flights cover for surface u11its and sin1ilar mjssions How ver by local agreen1ent they could be made available to COHi D when required in an air defense emergency TS The authorized forces were in place by 20 0ctohe1· see tnbJ e on page IO for uni ts and pl tc S Included wer eight additional crews for the VF AW -3 detachm nt And som 60 interceptors at Tyndall AFB we1·e placed on alert Aircraft in the Florida area under CONAD operational £ontrol were to be armed 1 -ith conventional weapons only S On 19 October the JCS authorized th move ment of a Hawk battalion from Ft Meade Maryiand to Key l 'est CONAD then requested ARJ DCOM to -I'- ran1Ie wj th CONARC 1or 11ove1nen t of this unit This was thu Gth Missile Battalion 65th Artillery Hawk with fou1· batt n-ies S COJUO sul mi t ted addi tiona 1 reco11u11endations on 21 October -- one on aircraft and another on mis sile units CONAD asked to move 18 more F-102's to Hoo es tead AFB and 12 more F-106 1 s to Patrick AIB and fo • ·lederaUzation of certain Air National Gnard units 2 The JCS approved the aircraft de ployment tu ncd down the Guard federalization TS ln the seco11d ubmission CONi D stated its rcquit·e111ents for ttawk -- eight battalions for ade4uate defe11se 3 battalions to meet only its first priority plus minimal protecLlon for itg second and third priorities The priorities were flrst I Homestead Pat1·ick and Ma cOill i second 1 populntion conlic -11ous to these l ases _ and tltird populatio11 at Houston New Orleans Mobile and - · · - ' ' __ ' ' - • •• • - • ' • • ••• I • 1 • _ _ • • 8 Jacknonville The JCS on 23 October directed the Army to provide a l awk battalion the second approved for COlfAD and CINCSTRIKE t o provide a Herculus battalion for t porary a slgruoent to southeast U S defense CONAD 'l'as directed to 11ak ' the best possjble deplo rment in the M1am1- 11o 'est e11d ai·ca TS Cot• AD 1·equcsted deployment the next day of the Bl h Missile B ttalion 15th Arti le1·y Hawk Jrom Pt Lewis Washington to Florida Two o its-batteries were to a to Homestead and one each to Patrick and MacDill Also CO AD re- quesc d moVt 11 Cn't of the 2d Missile B J ttal ion 52d Artillery Nike Hercules from Ft Bliss Te as to Uomeste11d The latter was missing one battery B which was at Johnston Island on a special mis sion S CONAD nJso got another ADA unit unexpectedly This was a 40mm batte1·y irom rt Bliss On the 21st of October ARADCOM asked about 40nun units because of qu ry it h id i ot ten rom Cot ARC C1NCOJ _o said he anted anythin ivailablc that would improve nis capabiiity CGSID t en told the JCS it wanted 12 battalions oi 40 nm 5 The JCS concuri·ed 1n CO IAD's desu·e to pro 'idc 4 0mm for low al itudc defense but said that 12 battalions were more th in could be r de wai table Prio1· it ' onsiderations were to be si cn to Key West Uia 1 and llomcstc-acl COXAD again submitted its recom- endations and apajn the JCS asked for a re-evnlu ntion Dy this t i11ie h ' ver u c oa1e 40oun battery had been moved to Hoaestead by CONARC COKAD had been una are of its ioovemcnt nd 11·as surprised by its arri ' 1 but took immediate steps LD integrnt it G CO UD replied lo the JCS l hat it recagn tzed 40mm 11uns hll only limHed cap 1 b1lit but felt they could maKe some cont ribytion nnd would employ whataver was made available ' CONAD also e sked for morn Un ·k ur its which were not approved TS On 28 October COt AD replaced th f-102'5 o one unit at llomestend AFB th 33lst rlS from Webb • - '• ··- - · · ·· · _ _ ' ' _·- •· - -• · - 9 AFB Texas with the F-102 1 s of another unit the 325th FIS £ram Truax AFB Wisconsin to get air craft carrying 2 75 rockets Those of the 331st were equipped with missiles only The purpose was to improve· low-altitude inter·cept capability APC was also directed to deploy all available TF-102 rocket aircraft to Homestead TF-102's were also placed at McCoy AFB· l lacDill AFB and Pat rick AFB S In the meantime late on 23 October communt cations were established from the Key West control center to four Navy DDR's in the Florida Straits a Thei pr i ary _mission·was navigational reference for CINCAFLANT strike aircraft but they were in position ti provide low-alti'tude early warning· coverage as a seccndary mission They were some 30 miles apart a proximately 011 Latitude 24 north centered d1rectly south of the ·Key West center Navy WF-2 aircraft began 1nanni11g a third IEW station parttime on 24 October This had been ar- ranged by CONAD with CINCLAIIT The unit VAW-12 Detachment 14 began operations at Jacksonville NAS but moved to Key West on 26 October SJ A final action •as the establishment by the Air Force of an improvised missile early warning system 1'his system which w_as given the project n uae of Falling Leaves by the 9th AerosPf8e De fense Division consisted of three radars These wer l an AN FPS-49 at Moorestown New Je1·sey which was reoriented south and operated for missile coverage of CUba on 24 October 2 an A N FPS- -78 at Laredo Texas which began missile detection operation on 26 October· and 3 aa AN FPS-35 at 'fhomasville Alabama which began mis sile detection c-peration on 30 October A commun- ications net was establ1shed connecting the three radars with the NORAD CDC the USAF and SAC com mand posts and each other S The Moorestown tracker which was RCA-owned and operated under contract to the Air Force was the only site of the three 1dth a computer Missile • r - • • • • ' • • • • • • • C t ' • • 'II • • • • ' ili@MitT' 10 Al t l' 11 OR F MPWYMENT f Ftll C F Ill 5Cl ITll IU-I l'Wf ll A ' -_ £ _ _____ - Dc A S £ __ ____ _Ul-lIT ________ C OccM-'-'l'-' tE ·14'-7'------ 2t l Oc1 18 F·lO'l s 12 F· 1116 12 f46's 8 Fu l'a 1 NC-121' l Jl UliJP GO Ad •PJ'IOX f·lDl f-102 f-Hl J I Pickel Ship 101 l based prime a 14 c•p- rtller rad an Oct STAT S RAISEll ·re l6 r--1D'Z1 s l-1 r--1 · 14 F4P' 2 AE --1 ' Hol i om - oc •• iii-- ' •H'mm till f H f1rr ienihl Ha1neucad Pa Irie I K 'y West Key Wc sc McCoy Ho mc sl•t td P i1rJck Kry Wcu Jil C k -lQ'l'illc rTu 'K - W ft 1he t tht lh llDCSlcacl krUK·- t - bu- - A P 11rk r t r- · E 1r t idl1II l hu - n 482d fJS Sc 'OXlUl·Johmon ltf added 10 • 1l1erf 481h 1'15 Langley W-41 ' F CAW -3 Dct £1 c1e'W3 add c d US f omu l s ilh h1 cbt Ill FLr g SclfriJge Je h f-4 f idde d 10 l'i rhL rc k8 Jddl d ro111 t3hl t2 a dded from ln F I 2 added hy CINCL1 NT -- ----------------------- AW·l lc'r l J IHI 1st Gan Tin 1 Jh A1i i C lt nun t'1 11Ui' t 11t f-bl lln t J1h Art · p t iw k Ft l fo adt ucg n providin radar 1urvtdU an e a1 second- · ml J slon Mil Med chbd A W 13 Unn ran tune Ru npnl 2G Oct tin partly or n L 2 Oct --------------·--· - J Mid lh -2 l nr tJih Beret r1 n1i s - th Lh Jl1• t lii t ri la lcl t 1 1 t wi l omple1cd CO D UcplO 'mcnu O buy or n - ' t-lav ad er - l 1 t IQ • • Ji 1 id ·11- · -'- 1 i t rt ·- l T arn z -· · i •--·mi_ i n M lf' · i fl Oil -i r · IL ld 11 itit t M · u u·xi f 111 - - ' ' ' ' ' J ' • •• ll deLection was handled there by a delachmcnt from the 9U Aerosp11ce Defense Division A USAF mes sage directing action on all three radars on 26 Octobe1· stated that lfOR Ul would have operational control of these facilities for Spacctz -ack but the prim 1ry function and responsibility was to provide 21-hour surveillayre 0 ICl' Cuba for bal listic missile detection · Later ADC investi- ated the use of FPS-16's in Florida but use was held up pendin tests and t_hey were never employed for Lhis purpose S SUM1'lARY By 32 October when the President announced l1is intcnllon to quarantine Cuba CON D t ad built up he interceptor force in Florida under its operationnl control to about 150 1rcntft This remained the npproxi111atc nuntlicr under CONAD con trol thl·tnq hollt the cJ isis period By 24 October aff-ahor• radar coverage had been jn1pruved by the m Lnning of two additional AEYI stations and commun i al i Jns tie to iour DDR's The first J DA unit arrived 24 October the last one on 2 Novembet· which ornpleted all CONAD d •ployment _ At that time lh re were three Hercules hatterics iu11t Hawk ba1 cries and one gun bnttery for a tat L of 12 batteries Also by t at lime a threc-3tntian missilP tlrtcc ti0n system was op rntin CS On 20 October Ute JCS approved ·u cs fol' rn a a e111cnl of C fba n Sino-Soviet taccical aircraft • The rr po ·tcd tc tals vAricd considerably from time ln time throu hout the pDrjod but generally the fig111·e was around l O From around '15 to 60 of t 10 se airc ·aft were tl10 se a I reac l • at Tyndall FB which ·ere plact'd on alert Twenty-fou · other aircraft were in place previously in Florida the hnlnnce were moved in ' - ' ' i • ' • • • • •• • • It• • I • I r • ' 12 1£C END -- 1 --'Pf 1 - ' C Pl I E• qp 001 • HOl 1ESTEAD __ - c • Jl Al l Afo F-106 20 F-101 11 F-102 r J KEY oP WE ST c lf E 50l' Jt 1· jO · li E J' r - -cco r _i f • Tf-102 f-102 15 Tf- lO'i p TIii 1 MS l 'ACDlll t FA F-106 2 rr--102 J TF-102 2 tlJ V '1 I i · -IAV r 1 anr- 'rill S P GE l S SECRET 0 0 STF AD r-r F-102 24 TF-102 8 Nll E 1-ifRC 3 SlRYS HA ' 1' 2 81RY5 40 t I aTRY 1·fY WEST NI- F6t 8 F48 14 HAVIJ 4 8TRYS ' • • • 1 • ' • • ti • ' ' ' • • • I 13 which had been submitted in Beptember by CONAO These rules were issued as CONAD Supplement 1 to NORAD Regulation 55-6 9 oecembe 1959 Rules of Engagement with a date of 22 October It applied to all U S military forces assigned attached or otherwise mRde nvailable to ClNCONAD except those operating in Canada and Greenland The rules pro vided that if a CONAD t egion sector commander posi tively identified an aircraft as a Cuban Sino Soviet tactical aircraft in flight toward·CoNUS airspace he wou id first attenipt d lversion and then if unauccosaful would engage and destroy tbe aircraft upon penetration of CONUS airspace Engagement was authorized with non-nuclear weapons only T3 A second sat of rules of engagement was in cluded in CONAD Operations Plan 1-62 Annex D which was in support of CINCLAJ IT Operations Plan 312 Since th la tt lr wo s not implemented ·these rules wel' nevi put into fore The JC J stl essed that their approval of the Supplement l above did nof 2 constitute approval of tbe 1-62 Annex D rules The latter rules they stat·ed were authorized only upon eatabllshmcnt of the Military Elllergency Zone nd implementation of SCAT These provisions were to be implemented only when ClNC LANT's OPLIN 312-62 or any of its options were ordered executed 13 TS · As with the approved Supplement l the OPLAH 1-62 rules·were intended to supplement NOR AD Regu iation 55-6 The latte was to apply prior to implementation of these rules After implementa tion these rules were ta remain in effect until S-Hour the actual hour the first ordnance was dropped on Cuban soi After this ti-mis' the pro cedures in NOJtAD Regulation 55-G were to be ap plicable fS Initially thia was d signated Supplement 2 Another p oposed supplement l bad been sent to the JCS in September 1961 nnd wa never acted upon Th11s thl s supplement the first publisned became number l - ·• •- •· 'these rules w n·e to 11 pply ta CONAD forces and forces corunitled to the suppo1·t of CON ID in the CONAD areas of responsibility •r110se rules when 111ple11ented would have delegated authority to de clare airborne obj octs hostile to the llontgome ·y CONAD Sector Cornn111nder and the senior CONAD officer at the Key West CONAD control Center This autl1- ority wa to remain ln effect until tl1fi objoctjve area was secured at which time ClHCOttAD was to •escind this autllori ty ts As in the Supplement l rules these rules provided tllat nuclear we tpons would not be used On 26 October CONAD told th0 JCS that in the event of an I -28 Paid it was consl derey impera t i •e to use weapons with a 111nx11oum kill 4 There fore CONAD asked for clarificntion of authority and use of nuclear weapons both before n nd after CINC 1 NT OPLAN 312-62 was iinplcM1cnted sho 11 1 a raid fro1n Cuba penetrate the ADIZ or boundaries of the U S The JCS explained iu reply that CONAD I Uthority in NORAD Regulation 55-6 wai not d arlged by the con tingency plans for Cub 5 A threat presP nt ed by hostile nircraft from the Cuban nrea should be evnluatcd with the pattern of hostile actions ap pnre11t elsewhere in the NORAD COlfAD system lf the pattern provC d that a C1 1l a1l 01· Sino-Soviet attack wHS in r rogrt ss nuclt n 1• weapons could be uDed lo dest •oy hostile aircrnft Jlowevcr the JCS con tinued the rules of • n nJ Da11 nt in CINCLANT contin gency plans for Cubn we •i not chn1J1ted by th is mcs snge Non-nuclenr wcnponJ w rnJd IH• usr d TS PAA AIR TltAFFlC RESTRJCTfON As poi ti d Ollt lll 1'11c first· cl Dpter the Mil Jt l'Y Emergency Zone a11d Sec n·il • Control of Air ' 'n1ffl c w rc p1•11vidl'O fo1· in CONAD's Opc rations P1nn 1-62 'Nwsn nl' 'YCt' implemented however a sm·t of mr diJierl SCAT proicr11in was ei tabl ish cd on 21 octolJer IJccnus the problem of 1dcntifying and controllini I'll lltr•f C numbers of nh·craft in southr rn Florida reai lled such pi·uportions 5 • • • ' I •' • • • • • • • ' • • • • • ' • • • I' • • • I I b • • ' ' - • 4 • ' ' # • • • • • ' • 15 Effective at 1800 hours EST 24 October the FAA implemented a special civil air r l'gulatlon which p1·ohibited operation of any civil aircraft in sout hel·n Florida u 1lcss it was operating under an approv d fliffht plnn ond had navigational equipmt nl nncl lwo-wn y com111unic ations equipment_ lh S TASK fOllCE 32 To provide seniu · Cot AD 1·epresentaU011 or dischai•gin CONAO responsibilities in support of ClNCLANT ope rat ions Task Force 32 was est ab I ishcd at the Key IYL st COMAD Conlrol Center by 32d Region g ner·nl order ll 1 21 Octubcr The co1nma 1H11J1 was Colrrn I Theo Jl J i lz who nrd •ed 20 Oct lbt'r Jjjs staff was o lieutenant colone J uperatiuns off cnr F r Ki ·sr hbaum anrl the cnntrol centl•r staff -1ieutcnHnt Colonel E r- ltlc'l'a - art was assigned a s t ·rnum 1nrJc1· 1 f th L ontr -JJ Gi ntcr just pt·ior lo the• t ri5iS nln11r with fnu1· additional mtl Jors l'1c Jat lL•1· wcJ·1 • r provid1 - nn t · - prn·ic-nceci nr i J H i senior t 1111 nJl l r on dut · nt the· r·nnlroL cr -nt i- around t hc •loc·k S fi0 i0Rii 'J'llIS PAGE IS SECRET • • l • • • - ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' - · · • • · ·- · · I - --T ·· · · · 1 · ___ ------ I I I AU ll'r ANIJ DJSPEHSAL SY STr 11-li'JlJF Early at 17457 - 1045 hours MST un 22 October COHAD raiae I t s r- 11pons readiness from Alpha DEFCON 5 thf norinal peacetime condition to Delta DEFCON 5 COHAD except for the Mont gomery Sector re na1ned on alert status for tile oext 36 days 6 hours and 10 minutes until 2355Z 27 November This was the longe3t period of in creased readiness in the history of post-war air defense S Delta which required all aircraft and mis siles to be un fiv -m inute status 'l as achle •cd by 19157 on tlrn 2 d At 1 hal time there were 140 interceptors on five-minute stntus in Florida and 715 in the rest of th systc m Modified Charlie statu wns dc lared fnr all r gion except the 32d at 21 noz Sl 1'hc iCS dlrr c cd lhlll OF 'CON 3 be esLabli hed i r IJ lort i•s w11rld-w1 • c•ffl ctiv 7 rnqz 22- 0t tober also cc n llllH d 1 37 Novemller •• All CONJlD rcginn s lrnd nLt11111o d D FCO i 3 by 2 11 iz COi AD di r •d ' ' 11 I l reg j '' c pt thP 3 2d to llCJ lo Normal Chnr1Ju at 2 35Z an the l3d see section hel W an th h1011t somriry i • TS On 2•1 Ot- toh• r Cunuda d -• -lnred DF FCO 3 FC llowinl 111 s dt t lari t I -·· • 1 inn l Cl t•lared Dt- n oN J _ lfln J ji · fr 1 U l-'-ui1• 1t i' 1 J1 l - cxcarJt fnr rn - J t '1 n 1 1 • ••• • - - J-- w • 1 J _ nr •vo · n 3 Novt innr 1· wl11C h w • 111 11 1 r1l i1 2 Novernb t· l8 In LIit' n• · tnt 1m - - 1 HJOO ' 011 22 October CONAD urde •c l J J CON 13 n unu to disperse one-th1i-d of tl jr r r s1 s cd Kln raft to the interim disper al haS ' JlsLetl ill Anrwx O nf AOC's OPI JtN ll0-·62 16 - · - • ' ' ' ' _· ' ·•· · · ' - ' r • - 17 COi AD dh·cct •ct that dispersal be nccoi pl ishcd in a quiet low-key fashion This nc nrded with JCS instructions on tl1e 22 which nuthorized CONAD lo dispe1•se its ajrcrafl Tlw JCS rt dYised earlier that the Secretary of Oefc11se had autltnrizc-cl thi flying of nuc lea2· weapons when dispersal ' -' directed CONAD thcre l'orc ordered all ai -r i-nft to be loaded with pi·im ucy a1·mainent TS No d l spcrsa l was D1ad c to anatlian base rhe latter could not be used because of restrictions on ovei•flyini Canada with nuclear wcapolls until decl aratlon of DEFCOM I or Ji igher Tho Bangor Sector presented a special problem i-esuittng from dispers il and nthe1· CON ID crisi 'i ncti Jns S ' section below 1'ho Alaskan COliAD logion ilso dispersrd irc1·aft to its llt'rt basc s SJ Dispersal in the contin 't ltal U S was olTI plr lcd by Oll-10Z 2 1 Oc tnbc1· fh• hou •s alld 40 m11u1tc a Ill•r it• wa s ordcred 6 AJ proxi1»alt- y 155 i ircrait we1· cU - 1 pc1·sc-d ti11cludi111 tho c iu Alaslt -i bul no includlni ait•t i•nft 111 wr d lo ·1oridn ln 20 b l S - f S ADC rc qu ·sl 'd l U'l hoi·ll y l'u rol i 'r - ni1·ci•aft a nd H 2 1 0 1totHit· 1 CONAD author1z r J rc-g·i1H1 c-0111- ntundcrs b1 appl'OVC rotational f j hls tn r xchnna -C' ai1'Cf'af 'llld l'f WS ThP f1·e•1w i1c • •as r bt left lo t 1r 1·c- jrai co11um1ndor P1·ima1·y eapons l1nd to hr tl wn-J ond •d tncl p teed un ihi 110111 a j n ra ft un less I ha weap rns h d le b 1• -1112·nc d lnr inspect inn cH' 11l l illt nnnc1 lri thjs cnsi - prot r h ircs estab l l sh rl hy CONAD fo · r •rryinii n11 l on · wt apons had lnhc-Joltow 'd c'S A f w dnys l ter 111 1·t·spon c to COliAD · •- in s • the JCS uuLhL1rl ' C tl i 1·l3ducc cl incl raodom clispcrs il cm1s1s1 cnt -Hh n comuat-1·oady post lr · nnd iJ1speclio11 and maint 11anco 1·eqi1it·ernents B CON i D thc11 asked for rc c ommnndations from each 1·egjn11 1 except tt1e 32d on nccessarJ reductions Three re inns the 26th 28th •nd 30th reported no prnbl m utd no 1 cct-uctions nece sar at that v• ' • - • • • ' 9' • • • • •• ' • • • • • • I • ' ·18 time TJ e 28th had w11 hd1·aw11 tlw aircraft fro111 one of its dlspHrsal bases on 26 October 7 F-102's of the 82d FIS Travis from Siskiyou Three other regions asked hw slight reductions The 25th iskod that six uf 12 aircraft sont to Paine be recalled lrncausce J crowded facilitl s and other proble -s al Pulrn Tlic 29th wanted to pull back four of 12 F-l ll's l Billings because this was too many to uard and m intain The Alaskan Re gion also wantod to return a few aircraft from it al rt hascs All of these changes were approved lncluding the ear ij er withdrawal by the 28th so e 20 aircraft werP returnad Mo t rnoved back during the first t wo wee ks of November TS 1fh1le lhE problm11s wer-e few llt this thie the regions forec a Lr d difficulties when very cold weather set in DJspersal bases for the most part lacked hoatod Ia cilities The 29th Region for mrampla r •r r mmcnded that all of its aircraft be •eturn 'tl wl1rr 5 tead • sub-zero weather set in 111 ·epo1·liL1J hark to th• J S liORAD said that it cnuld ke 'P its 111 pnsturP wifhuut loss uf combat cupnbiJ tty nti l lh1 nsc t _ J cxtrr ll1cly cold · w ather in the 11orth 1r11 U S e S 'fh rur e In the Mo tgoD1e1·y S0clor bctuii dircutly n imrnedintoly invulvnd ln protecting ag inst the Cuban th1· at 111 dntalne d he higher l alert posture anrl stay •d o a alert lon cr from 22 octobcr to 3 Dl' C llllll 'r - 12 days than for ' es in other ar-c as i' • • ' pt f - • th • f i n 1 day of I his t1i--rJc_ d ii r- · - 1 n 1- i1 11 - _ J Jrla area was r adt 1 1 i i -J __ • _n i 1 01 rJinrt tc1 lh t iJD e of da • •r1 I' h1gtu ' 1 i 1- 1 l' c • ' jlahl sh cJ for the dawn period 1 he mo 5t Ja nr 1 Ljn · fa1 at tack it was sl 1ckc lH d sumo wl1-11 du2•inJ the day and night p J iods Ar air r a1rnf was rnaintnlncd all during rhe l' i-lo i J cr rnl • 1·C'rp 1ir - l the air patrol or stl'ale1 lc nrh11 llflllll'-' mnnrwd WC't·e increased 01· rr duccd injt' ' n' 1 ovf'd JrL ln Cha1·lie to Delta - - ' ' ' • l · _- T status n d ai1·c aft engines 1 1nnin in lll' 11 bat t lo Lations'' rendy to t e i•·lJornc thnn Iivo ntin11trs WLirc pJ 1 s c d OIL • 1sli1 - s1tot 1 ' 1 1 ' C ll l'l ' slagL'S of t ht crlsis cJ·e ·s i11 aircraft n ar runway ln a mifiimum of time- hul less fs Th air alrn lor southeru Flu1·Ida was din cteLI by CONAD OPl IN J- i'l This plau providc·d or the 1•anninll' of St rau ic o ·l il Points STOPS nt points aver key areas Rnd off the coast of Flnrlda Th plan s t tcll 1 hal this wn rPquin d bcc usf c f the • On 26 octnb I' NORAU cstnbl isl cd alert J ' j lire 1n nts or Hawk and 4f mmt s follows A Uawk pl atoon u1 as 1 J br t nn8idcr d ns a fir11 unil ftH purpose of aluJ ·t For' tlnwk dcfensr •s with murc th 11 two fj I • trti l i J'P IU1rcmc mts undc r Alphn 1 a1·a 1t - -tn l Drl 1 t nrr t lH s am i Lhn -H• 'H L s J· ilJed rnr ikc• U1 J'r-1d1 l f •n P8 with mnr thi 1' two fjn • unUft lind ·t· Ci1 u li 1 - Lat us 1lil following appl h • · · in I 111ii1t11 t s s·r Dtl 1 lllil l ll 51 n1hi i 0'1-- 11 JO 111i1 1111 •s Fnr tlilwl d1 fcn e wi t h lln ly t •r J 11· units r q111n m ··nts undr 1' Alpha Bril Vu and 1 nl La n the s tmt· as tha 1 1 Dl·Asc1 illt·d fur ikc· fi1 r1 11lr-s d1 Jr11sL 'ith 11ly f ln li••e unll s Unch 1r Char i ' r 1 ttu -s lhl - f illowinv np pl ir s 51 v c1n i- ·r - iin11LPs 1 u on so 1111nuL s i•u1 •lt m111 u 11 -r il i aLP j ol alrl'C 11 0 of th fi1·-i ' units n ant1cd with sl elclLH c ·ews I ·cwi onr l1nnr h • ut'r da tl r hf 11111 i l one- houl 1fter nrHH•I nnr1n1 ' lll r pi •r·io l -i 1 r l r H nnim is 1·L1 - qoirc -d oth r 111an norinal sc 1 11·ily J U trd S Tht ab n• w 1 s l Od i 1 led nu N1 n•1 mh1 1· t•1 hr•n J1 1wl uuil - into l1n ·lLh tJti1er Aili' 1111t s A H rn•I hatte1·r was t-o IH• crn «idcred 11 fin unH for purpOSP S nf ni nimum a er·t rC quit•t•nwnts J -1'1 ·k dr·fnrH P wllh only ori f11°l-' unit we-re ti maiolaln tllf' u1111 nn 1 15 1dnutc t Lus under Alpha Br 1vo 1 and Cl rlJPf and n n 5 Jninute stolius under DP 11a Th-e 1om1u 1·equtrcment u ns 1lsfl ch in cd rn mannlnt- from 15 minutes bc oJ·e daylh l1t 1 15 m1nutns al ler sunsr- t S - ' ' • - ' ' f' • • ' • • · b • ' • ' • • • 20 massing of large forces into a relat ivtely smal I area STOPS w re to inannc cl 24 hours per day 'our points were listed with the noJ·mnl manning being one ail'craft each In a change to the plan issued on 7 Novcmbel' s«vcn 111orc STOPS were added and th normal 1•anni111 raJs d tn two aircrnft each TS STOP manninr be1 an the morning or 22 October and from tl1e start 111ore STOPS than 1 isted in the 18 October plan were manned Tcm aircraft were manning S'l'OPS -- two on eacli of the original fgur plus one each at Patrick and Homestead Miami In addition two aircrnft were kept on sling-shot and t-wo 011 battle stat ions at Key West Homestead and Patrick This was in addition to the Delta stHtus On 2 J October COXAD advised that the ai rl orne alert manning could be reduced from ti n to four interceptors bcginnjng at 15457 and that special STOPS at Patrick and HonH stead r uld be covered by alr r aft on battle stations CONAD noted that at lhe ti c designated tour DDR's wouJd be in positi n tn pa$S lrnr ll ' 'C' t irget inforMatlon to fh• 1' 'Y W st Cl'C S t fl t' thir lh 32d plac 1d Lil e h ct a dawn day rnd nigl t typ nlcrt nn inning Lhe 24th lrum one ho 11· b f lr'-' 111til one hour aftc·r the first li hl cvr 11 STOPS w rc ir anned with two air crc ft '3 h And twn fighters 1v re put Oil sling shot and cw 011 battle stations at K Y •ost Home st e ad and P 11 r1 ck un Ii I a It er n covery of the STOP aircraft A Jso tlw 32-d pul 11s inL ··rn·ptor a11d A0 11 unils on 1Jr1l I a status duri 111 Lhe dn -11 period rts Jo 1he d J J i 1ul l ' v dnt 1 IUt-' a 1crl schente was n odlfied n11111be1· I times 'ilh some sl11 cki ni111 For exa plc on rn Oct h l' NORAD advised thaL sling-shot was no Lon er nec ssarJ but could be reswned if requi1•ed 1 and l11at stnlight Clt u·li1 status was appropriate except when necessary 2 On the 27th Lhe al rt was changed tn the follow ing early omrnJnt lw111·s - se 'en o1 eleven 51'0PS ' • ' • f' • • - ' • ' 'y ' ' ' • · _· · ' 21 n1aaned wtth two ni rr raJ1 1 i1ch al rilJHhnn plus Deltn st 11tu 111J fn11r nlrc-rnfl on h1tl l le slati rn at llomest cad u1d Kc • wost dayllJJltt - random 1•a 11- njni of fi •e 81'ilP 'l pills Charli status and t O·o tlrt J·afL Hl hi1 l ln tat jcm at Hn nt s teHd nnd Key West itnrl tli1z·ttn - LIH a1ncr as 1Jc 1 ylight except STOPS manne rl r ut to tw 3 On 11 is sn111 dntr' 1 lhl i Zd r nm1 141tder stated that his nJm•t pl•Js scrnnilJI• for idcntiflcaUon reCJu1r d 120 n ·l lf'S la l ly '·1 1 hr r nmmannc · sa d he c- nllld SIJJ JlOJ'l this if hls prr s1ml S lpply pr lor- 11 y wn 13 mtdn1 tjnPd 111d aJ l pl ·rludic 1 nspnclions il - r 1c r - mpll Sh d i - 1 h11nu slaiinns arid replac puJnt ail cr i ft rn-r •iih d GONAD c a cked with ADC and found that lhtJ Rfl 1·C illirr -menr--s wr r· - hr in fl f ti that no ho n f• l i-as nrc•ilt rl 1 - ncl 1 h 1 I l hr' J rl h t d the not as E1r i · h lppcn· Inf l t pl 111 1•1 8 1 11 1· 1 4t111fli 1· 1i IJIJ1 - · r11 - r t Cl r1·1 'rl •I 1 11· lj 1J1 C fi - · - ·••• t 1·• -- HI _f ilH U 'i urcl-- i$Lt1··J- ll i H'1 J n t lJ11 t·•u aPf 1 lfrc crisis and t 11_ - 11nu 11-a1 ilu•t 1na i11 h1s ••r t 11r t A rr 1 q nn17 a ttnn un 1 1 ·ii 3plt'llliH' 'l lfi2 fi l11f 1 d lh hrn1ndnries or tlln Bangor NOHAH Sc -t 11· lo pl u -r it alrno t en lir·Ply J 'lthirt 1 -- -anntlLu 1 '- nrth •rn U01l i O R1 J ion tt---rTifq t· Ah' oj Uu· • • 1 Jl' 01 • ·a c Xtl nded intt 1 hP u s n l i rrilit 'J·r' h1 tnc Tlli• sr ctoi- nan Pl'C viouslv l ic · 11 wi hln 1n i unth·-r I h Ii-th Rr gioll lt Joni j th the h• 1 UH1il 1· 1·h u1r -r• l hr-- ' nmmn nd assii n ment was chant 1· 1 fr-iur lht iith th 1 rt T - f Jt'Lh lf comp lcal - lllaflc•r _ 1·h1•f 1 • 'il t tlf-11 n 1ri1 f'l1' t 'ONAD • Thf' Gnnsr· S P_AD _ rl - - C1 u n 1 1dr·r -w 1 ' lsn G r' ost- C HtAn ec 1 01· C f IRnlii ndc r an•I i such t Sp ll S i VI tn CINCON d h11l nr_ parlll- ul n1· pr11hlent i iros Tbe lL H rl' • q1-p1 ic t f u·ces llS1th Cana ti a at· Jhulc•t u rl n11 di f 1 rsal 1- • 5 ma de- nl iooae HORAD f t ll - ' ' • I • • ' • - • ' ' • V - ' • • • 22 Sector but its territory included only thal por tion of the Ba nl or llORAD Sector that lay within U S territory Its command assignment wa - changed on I 5 September fro l he 26th CON AD Reg ion to Head quarters COHAD S The situation thnt 1vas common to CONUS air de fense forces of tlwr being two different channels of control NORAD und CONAD became a problem with the 02·ces in Maine Fi1•st CONAD ordered alert of ils units ineludin those In the Bangor COHAD Secto1• on 22 Octobrir The rest of the Bangor NORAD Soctor did not go on the sa lle alert until some 48 hours later when NOR AD oi-dc1·ed increased nlert Secondly CONAD ordered dispersal of its interceptors in the CONlJS including the Bango1· CONAO Sector ai 1·crafL l'he 26th as told to aovu airc •af1 from tlds sectn · tu U S bases Tern interceptors wcre 1110 r d out six to Olmstead AFB and our to Njai al'a Thus interceptors which were undr r the npPr21l i l11al onlrol of Nt 1rthe1·n NORAD R ig-irn1 wen ri ru Wl•cl f1•0111 tha L reg i n hy GONAD orctN· IS The rC sult inl disc·r-cp tnc ics an l conlusion 'A'er' • pointed out b y A 1 AI J B Harvey NNR Couuuando · in n lette · to th NORAD Oraputy Cominander-in-ChioJ A If C R SJ 111011 o 15 fovr iob r As A V M Harvey st tod two ct1nn11 ls of control were opernting in his rc ion and b in xercis d unilat 1·nlly which I imilod the • 11r 1·nl ional cuntr I n the re ion and secloc· crnnmnndr·rs rnd r •ated confusio11 He said that dispersal f1·otn I h n rn1 or Sei toi· af fr cted hi i·egional dcft·ns11 pusl'ure lie said hL· felt that these ain ra t were s11ll assi11ned Lo him however and conlinnr d t·n ari·y lhem lJn his Lote 1 on rd as di the BanJlCll' NORAD Seelo1• Rs part of th« NNil co11t1·ibutian ta IIORAfl DEFCON 3 Bn1 ·o He alsc• poi-nted Dul lhal the CON AU suppl 1m •11L to NORAD Regulatiun 55-6 un ru 1f 'S oJ c 11g-ag m nt wort ' bind in on the- Dani or COh'AD Secto1• on I ' S At ut • rate A · I M 11 i rvc y c1nphasized thnt the· altnim u nt f ·hr- hc st pr s tl lt · cl dens e pustur1 ifiOMieRl'f Tll lS PAGE IS SECUET ' ' ' ' · ' ' ' • • • • • • l • r • ' ' ' ' ' ' h-ad nc1t been lJjnd r rl 1 ' i 11 -P1HlcavrJr Ln HO by tJi 1 ho k or u split lt irs 10 lh hatJ f l'H u1•1 d he sairl that the c 1n RICJU ai1n was kl fll In vlcw 111 ill J f imcs nowuvHrJ he f dt J and he Hit h l egJn11 1 unu1rn ndcr lgToed Lhat thcr r11 111 ' r sluity i1f tlii ttial ter to makr 11 t·l 11n lh 11 tfrtJ 1·l1r 11nt•IR fhrnu h ·hi 11 l xccutivf n ulhtu·ily ftH' lhf' x rt 1sr nf •·n11trl l 1 V1 -1• opnrali•1n • 1 r r'f' -i t 'l'I• 1' l 11•I 11nd •n i•nHl Ly a l r ol Ct cnbJ IIJ - 1· cr11111 U HJal itHI w 1 11ml 9 TIit ' ut1 1'··•·•·la1 i1Hl -il1iJ l11 lwt- un h'UHAI 1 0NAll clH•I l 1SAI- o J•r 1•· c • tli •1 •utthci1itir •s iLS it 1 I 1 c• I - No t J1cru liOH D R • J u tnd in JlnTl j1•1 tar l'i o n nr • OUI I 91• ' 1'H lll- Xi-llld n ·Ll 1i•i nil ab 1 1 i 1·1 l i r n 1 i- 'l'Jl to 1 vn1rl nve·rl tjJ IUlf 111• ll'inJI i l iJ 1 di1 Pf·ti f n l sc 1 111c ua1 unJt 11'1 nn1H·i Ctl111ma1h 1·r I I he P I vl•la ·rtn 11 'l il 1 f fc • 'rl 111 l ' trr ' tl 11 tla ·•i1· rc• Y fl'1Hsihi1ili•• CS i l 1 1 Al 1'1 • A il1 11 ' 1' llSAI 1f 1 - T_ u 1 1•· • hl J ' l r1 -• 1 t·a c•1 -i1 I ii •·1 11·1il h l l•· lit 1•1 11 I illl - 1NAD - • l •1tt or ·nu1·i1HHl1 l• ll 111 Jh1 1·111·1·•· 1 a1 rl p lu1· irl 'l•f nr•l tr df r ci••·· I i •U 1 I ·r- plilt•· - ·• 11 1i 11 tf' l hlp - nn p1 n nn1h'f ' r c1H l 111 -r cp11 1 l•• 1 I l1l' 1•·1 l• U - • R'•plJ•- S 1nd11· 1lr·d rh 11 th• ·Ld 11 1 L•II i11 l t' ll11 ug ·nul t r• T••nru all -· j 'j J I 1 1n 1 h 11· 1•1· st i•·l Ill J fPCI J J •11c·ss Anntlh'J' 1 t Jn1' prc· 1 11•tii 1• a '-i l tlrt hlllr rr •q11irPd p •1· ••·11111 •1 h 11F 1i 1 r h1· a lvt l inti d1 p - r - 1 l tH h aid JIJ I lh•· rn·I ·-•1 I ' H un lhr- Pl 0 h 1' ·Tl 1 nu ' Tll•· 81•- 111 11 ur· • l r1 • ii 1d I · •w r•1•rq 111l KU h1u 1 per w • - flu• 1· · Hrtl I • 11 thil I 1 tu· uns hnur i wunld l • 111· 1 1 I ' •• rr 1 ' I Is i- n ·y Pru1Jlem5 1111-n 1 i• 1111•tl JJj tlir· t'l i ' 1 1• 11 l 1111i 1 Print or 1·ny r1-nd rr11wdt tl ·1 11 t i • lh · - t JIJ 11d 2' riJ 1 1 ioas w1·1•1 'i pt I i 1 ly ·•- 1 11 1 c ' ··l 1l11· f 0 lii1in qf •pJ -11ld · 1 •c-ath• r 1li -ip- l·- · illli 1J ·11t1ld I P11nH•fl ci Vt·i· and lh·al 1·1 _ • nl t• l1j1•11·w - TS d· Jd '- 111 1·• • u11t t•·· - · 1 r 1 l iat l 11• 1·- ·1 •·h1 fll' 11 'll si n1 u i 1 lt - J J 1 1·1 s s · w1• •1 -io ii 1 r s • · ' ' t 14 • · ' b • • - • • 24 without diU1culty 16 Beyond that aircrew fatigue and loss of skill fr9m reduced training would become serious ADC felt that continuous di$persa l would further degrade training and per sonnel f tiguo until there was adequate support As for the Florida deployment ADC said that the current postura cuuld be maintained indefinitely · but if the curron1 soi-tie rate was continued a spares and engine shortage would result ADC stated that TDY wits tne fficient and costly and that establJshlllent of a perm'1 lle11t squadron was a solution 1SJ In tte reply to the JCS CONAD co ·ered all or the above 17 Maintaining the present alert pos tui·e indefinitely wi 11 cause some degrad ation of our geoernl wnr capability pr1- madly been use of the following a lndiv idunl nirc1'cW ground environ11011t ind battlu stn f £ pe · rnnncl will gradually lose proficiency due to reduced training b Currently approved manpower alloca tions in both aircrew and support person nel require long worl1 weel1s which will eventually affect morale and efficiency c Conti nLl JHS d ispen al of interceptor ai craft adversely affrc ts training quality of maintenance 111cl induces per sonnel fati ue and hardship because of lack of adequate faciljtics at dispersal locations ·rhis is particulnrly true at our northern base9 S COll D · c on aHrndnrl that l he disper - ed forces be rocalleil 1111 th il e-t liir-d nf th 1ntercepto1· forl e br kPpt on L I ·-1tli iH• e i e1r1 n t ho nit bases J which 'lo uld pruv cJ-e fnr q tlCtl J lil h t11g or d1 s persn l CONAO p ·oposed kcepinis the forces in the 32d Region as urrunlly deployed If the activity 1·ates were adjusted ns 1•equircd by the tactical situatioJJ CONAD snid the current posture could be maintajn d see page 27 Finally CONAD • • ' • • • • ' ' I ' ' f • • • • •• ' · • • ' • ' • ' ' - ' - W3hl d l11 •f _ t 11 i11 l1-1l11 J il p1uJJr'J 'fH Y tr iini u c nnr1nnl 1HJ 1 • -- 11m1 11uj1 1r if11in1 on 1 -itdc r tj •t ha 1· JtiAJ'J 11 J11 J d iJa d ii r ln d r 1 1inlr1in the r Su 11 f p•1 - 1_1n Jn J fJ ifl1 ly v -rll••H1L fh J ira da tJnn f iljtUbJIJ J ·•I CiluJu - Ji l -ll l l·f l1 1n hifJ c s • j • • • • • • • • r • • ' I • C ' • - ' - ' lV CRISIS TEnMJNATIOH 111 TURNING 'NJ NORMAL CONDlTlOIIS By 10 Novo111ber aerJ l surveill in c 11nd checks at S£•a lu1d f ' t tbli hcd thPt Sov i et nhlp i had removed 42 offensive missiles from Cuba I ter Russia ave nssurnnces that tho IL-28 bombers would be re11 oved also The U S theru- ore liftud its c1uar11ntine on 21 Novr ber Be tween the 5th and 7th of Docmnber 42 1L-28's were shipped out S I11 a1 r- d1-tftH1s the major actions in rctul n ing to a u ore normnl condition yerc th-esc l 17 N0 veml cr dispersed aircraft l llthorizod to re turn to l101 e stat i 011 s 2 27 November NORAD aod CONAD c cr cpt thu Muntgmaery Sector resumed DEFCO f A I Jlh • J l 1 Do•ccmhar Mot1tgo1na1•y Sal - tor re1 rnmcci Dt r-CON 5 Alpha und a large pa •t of the aircraft jncluding AF W relea ed from Florida The dnt'li lc l pha r - lo •n Is c v rcd chronologically b luw S As sh 1wn p1- Yiou2 1 I y J CON AD recomme-udcd rct urn inc the disprrs d nirrralt in response to a JCS 11uc ·y on tllr inipnct or alert and disperanl On 17 l ovembc1· the JCS npprovtid this request and HORA£ 1smrnd insL1·11cl1e ns to it s rngionll tha sa mc day The forces in Pl11ridn were not affected B td weathr 1· held up the return of the dispersed air crl ft in A1 ost ra scs ho'fii•nver Rnd the mol'ement was a low Oy 22 t1ovcrn1hoi· most aircraft had buen retu1·ned S In j LB tn - tt·u I 1011 In rc c all aircraft NORAD l1r -ct11d lhal 1J1·nvc tal 111 be u1 1ln1 1jnad at home bases NOH AO also d1re tr d thaL a Phaso JI capa bility b ' raaJntili ned 111 tit djsp n•snl bases in ac cordanco w ith Af C' 0pc1·'1 ti0t S Plan 20-G2 USAF 26 • ' • ij - if - ' - ' - ·_ ··- T 27 ADC Lltell sent l115truct ions to 1 2s divisions on es tablishment of thls capability These included making traini ng flights into dispersll 1 bases After DEFCON 5 Alpha was resumed on·3o November NORAD c1tneelled tts re uirernent for maintenance of a Vhase JI capability fs · In t hc mean ti the flying rate was reduced in the Jo'lorida aroit The Air Yorce F-102's and F- 06's and Navy F-iB's had Ileen flying some thr·ee to fou · times t he p1·ogramn1ed rate F-J02's and F-10 ' s had been averagi11g 75 hours per ·mn11th and the F4B's 89 botH'S per montli ac ordiug to the lfQRJ D Djrect or ate of Operations This al · · ' X- ·· ceedud normal suppl Y and ••aintenance ca pabil i ty CINCLANT r o npl alncd a bout the high sot·tie ate for F4B 1 s tn ClNCOlfAD 011 14 Nove10ber and aslted that the rate be cut tu about 27 hours per 111onth per aircrn ft Ln pc rnd t ·adequ te inatei-J el support AOC Jrn i irnJjcal cd that 35 hours could he supported fo1· ilS alrr ri ft NOR AP dii· •r 1 P d thr 32d Regiort to fl lid rn npti iuu d1111y acti lty r 1te tha t could b ustained tnr w in11eJ inile pe1·iorl staying within n 27 35 hmlJ rwr aircraft per montlt cnte ro - nor1nal condJLlons J'h i-c gion was also o provide a pubi Ji Ly t J j 11 reast the defensive posture as ro lll i p tl S ln rcsp rn -H t hc 1 d Re tioLi prr pnred a µJan ft f s• 1sLajned l p ir it lons 'l'Llis W llS hrau ht tci NORAD 011 l J Nov JGr Vcrl1 1l ppraval wns giv n and th - plnn was mpleu11 nt_cct the n xt mornini 1 The 32d's pl n e 'tn inP d flvc opt ions or plans 1 1· opnr 1ti ns under all conditions Plan A or ex an ple was or 011e-l hil'd of tho intnrccptoi· force on 15 Minutes c i· 1 es and no STOP manning Plan f r quircd n na lllll5 and six- s·roP 111'0115 mann ad Th pl lll sc Je led was to be based on the threat nnd lhr rc·g ir n romra t1 dcr•s e ttimnt of the situa tion and lurin1 nurmal condi11ona was Lo be within th c npa ui l i Ly of th roeces lo s lst nin ror an iudd initc· pt r-ind SJ •· ·•t · · ' '- 11 ' ' '- - - ' 28 At this time also CONAD agreed to release from operational control all the F-101 and F-106 aircraft of the 73d Air Division at Tyndall AF'8 7 ADC asked for this release by 1200Z 18 Nove11br r so that weapons training and test progra RIB cotild be reswned at Tyndall 8 ADC said that the 73d would continue to provide five F-102 1 s arid three 'rF-102' s in support of the 32d Region strip alert and five F-102's as a maintenance back-up pool for all TF-102's in southern Florida S Following this in response to a JCS query on phase-down of the sou the as t forces - CONAlJ recom- mended 011 21 November that fo ' ces cu1•rently de ployed be maintained except the 40mm battery 9 DEFCON 3 should be continued for the Montgomery Sector COJl'AD said and the balance f _NQRAD COHAD returned to DEFCON 5 The sa11e day CONAD also recoDU11ended lhat the FAA suspend the provisions of its special civil air regulation over FloJ·ida in1- mediatcly with the provision that the 32d could ·einstitute it if a inilitarY necessity arose The JCS passed this Oil to t hc Air F ll CC TS On 27 Nnve11ber lhe JCS advised that DE FCOR 5 could be resumed world-wide except as otherwise speci led at the discretion of the col1Ullantler-in cl1ief1 At 2355Z 27 Hovember NORAD rnd CONAD declared DEFCON 5 Alpha with tile exce -tion or the Mo11tgo11tery Sector which was to renulin ou DEFCON 3 Charlie Modified lo TS A start although small on the dismantling of the Cullau c1· i is temporary 01·ce was made the ne t day CONAD advised Vl' AW -3 that th eight c1•ews brought in to ruginent its Flo1•ida detachment could be sent homc 1 A d tlte Moorestown and Laredo t•o dars were returned i their pri11al'y SPADATS mission at 1700 MST The JCS had agi·eed to a HORAD request to return the Moorestown rndar on this date with a 15-minute recall capability utd lhe Laredo radar without a specifi recall capability NORAD asked that the Thomasville radar be kept on ts Falling Leaves mission for a 30-dar pcriod 1 TS ·' - ' ' • • • • ' _ • • ' ' - --- • • ' • i' • ' • ' •• ' ' · ' - ' Tha JCS di1•i cted 1 t1at 20 F-l02 1s r 11 ain at Jlnmest rnd A Fil pending dcterminaUon of tho permHn onl air dc fcnst requirements in the 32d R ion So m 2 l llov rnbcr CONAD directed ADC t l rr cteploy to home base s all di-craft except 20 F-102's nt loinesti ad and the 18th and 71st Squadrons at Pntrir k AFB All other forces jncluding Al 7Y were to re111ain in plar e unLI ful'ther 11oticc 14 J JJC' s Op H'n ti '' ' Pl an 26-62 21 llovcmber cs lab 1 tshcd I 6 -day rotation plan for the 20 F-102's 1 o _be kupt ill Florida TS On 3 December t he Inst of lh J increased alert was termjnatod and the temporary force re leas d lnsofar as possible pending a decision on Vhat the pc rmannni southc- lst foree wa s tc1 he At 22UllZ CONAD •s t h I i bt•d OF 1-'C ON 5 A I phn l he Mo tgorncry Seclnr CONAD dir ctcd Lhc d8lh anJ 7lsi SqtJa lJ•ra1s l J he rchu·nL tl hnull' ar1J rr- J t Hc d AOC's at1l led HC••lit's nncl th ' Havy' q WF-2's orrl r- ing •c5 UU ltj1 n 11r rtPnnill r n -sln linu Ar w mn nJ 1illK•l i NORAD harl sajd na ·J ic•r that il Ilic not neecl th •l01mn un 1 a t tt l'Y wh i h 11 1 d he All 1nnverl rrnui Ft Hlis l11 Jlc an sto acl AH l 111 4 k l i- follow n JCS app ·n 'il I NORAD asked AIU DC m to have the unit n•1 11rn I o This lcfl thu lf re - -llatlcry IICl'CU S hatlalinn 1 1wn four-b lllL't'Y Hawk hattn Iions 20 F-102 's i-s f-1 lA· i a11d 1·1 F1U 1 s In s ' 11-fhc-1·11 Fl 1rid L TS A i-1 •· Sil J- 1 11111u 1u l j 'h t 1H NOil AH fcJrr Uf wa sent hy I lie c 111 tl Ol l • i11-C 1ief 0 11 s n icr 11111rn· 11 S niClH ttJ h 1hu Cuban cl·isis is 110 a 1 lu f' -d iss11t• I v -•lf h lo pass tu al 1 L'Hl•'l'rlP tl 10 • c 011g ratu latJnn nu lhn of•- 1 ·1 n-r- an lhcu·nqJ hly 1a· ft i011 1I a 111- rwr· JI wht fl N'ORJ 0 forr s l' e lc d to I he 1·1·1st Thi l l hJs w Ls 'Cl dnne lfi t i J'i• ·s - lilt l 'ldl1n dd 1 l JlC1·gy t n l lnl 1- ll ir · dLsptay _•d al nl J 1c •v1 J parlif u l 1r i11 ic n the specin n tture 11J 1h · ulhlll sitd uv111 S ' ' ' • 0 • • 0 ' a ·- • ' j' ' ' ' ' 30 To insure that this command returns as soon as possible to the highest state of readiness for its primary mission l desil·e that commanders take action to eliminate any degradation resulting from the recent extended period of increased readiness Deferred training and main- umance suspended evaluations and mod ification prograMs will be made good as a matte1· oi priority With recognition to the special nature of tbe Cuban crisis and within your capabllities weaknesses and deficiencies which cane to light dur itlg its courso will be corrected Call on this headquarters for assistance in matter beyond your c pabilities S PROPOSALS FOR PERMANENT OUTHERN FLORIDA FORCES CONAD responded to a JCS request for re-ex i 111- 111 ition of air dcfensfi forces 111 the southeastern U s with a rapm·t on 30 November containing rec onnended horl and lon l range proposals For the short rang·e tJrnt wbic h could be implemented up to 1965 CONAD prnposed lhcr be four batteries of Ni kc JI£u•c1 i C in tha MiaW1l-Jlomestead area a n un - dt tu1• 1ncd numh n' c f Hawk in southern Flor1da one 18-21 1•l1· 1•a IL Jntr rrcptor squadJ·on of the F4 type al l MesLaad-KcJ Wes one flight of P-102 1 s at 18 Home imuJ lna FST-2 St GE e q 11pmen1 for Key West wng-rani l pl' Jl 1Sals bad bec11 submitted earlier in NADOP G•l-73 1 J o ai-rh Ull 1 and a •nport to the Secret i1 t• lr lh rr-11· c Th 1 _ ' t· iocluded one IMI nqund 1 'tu- -• f• 1' 1 • t 1 -- q _ 11 I ' a r ti nn in the 19fj'7 1· i •• 1 · 1 Jt• •· us locations 11t th - 01 ' J ii '' t· p1 l l i'O pcn •1odt the short - 11 • 1 c111 1 r •r ien Ls l st ed nbove less Hawll nnd in1 • P r 11 r n r Key West in th TRACE Trans portnbl e AutomalGd Control Environment syst m SJ o dcdl • i·ing 1hese proposals it wa learned that t o fol lo'll'-Ull aciions were 1·equi red 19 This wns b1 •r a11• I' I hc ne was not only a requirement to liD O T THIS PAGE IS SECRE'r r - ' • I • • • t • • • - _· -· •· __ - • - ••• • •• '• '• • • - ' • 31 retai1t units in Florida for ail' defcmse on a per manent basis- but also the JCS had stated a require ment for a continuing capnbility to execute CINC LANT OPLAN 312-62 in a relatively short time There fore tbe JCS- l' quirNl CONAD's proposals fox cur 1·e11tly or soon available equipment in specific detail Le sliort range t·equir ments Also an immediate reco11 ln tldation for the interi111 retention of ADA units was t•equ11•ed These units had to be in place if tl ey were to be able to react to OPLAN 312 in a short tjme S On 7 Dccen1b_er thus CONAD asked for retention o the cuyrent Hawk nnd liercules lnits unti 1 the details of pe1•1na ncmt reqtlirements were submit tcd The JCS concu1·red ancl skc d for the permnneni re qtlirc1•ents by 2 Jnnuary 1963 S CONAD' s 2 January proposals wer near ' the s une as those in lhc 30 Novcmbe1· lett er but pro vided specifiG number a nd method o f me ting the requirerncntsJ in ludiu various optic ms The re quire enls were O S n One Nike 1ferc 1lcs L attalion deployed 1bonl tlle r1omcs1 e1ul-Minmi area h Two l nwk battalions nne nt Key l 'csl and one nt llomeutc ad ' One FIS stationed at Jlomeslead and m dnta tlng nn alert rletar lunent nt Key W sl an ADC f'4 H squact ·on nf J 8 aircraft w a s the fil'st option d lni t• p·ation of the Key West C0NA • Conlrol Centc r into the SAG£ env1roriment by p1•ovicllng FST-2 equipment e Construction of adequate maintenanc and supporl fncili ties at Home-stead AFB if an FIS was tn b• st tionnd th re ' ' ' · • I • • 4 • • - ' ' '· 32 Final JCS approval had not been rGceivud by the time this paper was euo pl tcd Many chanr cH ere to be made in thn interceptor force in Februa1·y however NORAD agreuct to release of the VF AW -3 detach1nent nt Key West NAS on 1 February 1963 VF-41 was to be replaced an the same date with a Marine squadron of I 2 F4B's VMF AW -SJll And NORAD advis•ld the JCS that the F-102 force was to be cut to six airc1•aft at ltomt stead because of the impending JOove c f an ADC squadron This squadron the 319th 11 -as to p1uve from Bunl C'r Hill AFB to 1- omestead in l farch without i ircraft or crews and start equipping with F-I04's It was to have six nircrn l nnd be able to assume a minimum alert by mid-April nnd be operationally ready nnd le to nssumc t ha full ale1·t commih1ent on 15 JUII 1963 Becnusc llomest ad's facilities could not support the F-102's and the F-104 build-up rhe F- 02 lorcc was LO he reduced Lu six aircraft on 15 Februar ' F-102 st renH Lh wtls lo re1ria l11 at this fii lurl' until 15 J1111c S ·- - • f • ' ' I • ' · -- · - •• · · r ·-- • • - • • 33 SOURCES HF VERSE Ell ANK I ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 35 SOURCES CHAPTER l J Msi ClNCl Al T to JCS 24 21' I0-2l47Z Oct 1962 2 Msi CONAD to R ns COOJ -P X-•188 26 Ocl 1962 2 3 4 AJs1 i1s1 Ms J ls 1 CONAD to CONAD to CONAD Lo • JCS 6913 CH APTEH l l JCS COOP-P-1'S-459 18 Oct 1962 JCS COOP-P-TS-1022 21 Ocl 1962 JCS COOP-O-TS-'170 21 Oct 1962 2 ' l Oct 1962 5 f 1 l COh'All l JCS COOP-0-TS-478 22 Or L l9G2 1 _ COOll COC Op I'alj1111 Lo 7 1lsn CllNJ l to JCS COOP-O NCRC-C-60 26 Oct 9fi2 8 ISi 32d Hgn tu CONAD CCRC-C-45 25 Oct 1962 TACAFLAN'f CP to AFCP DOCP-CU-87 2 J Oct 1962 9 1Js1 CONAD to 3''d CH CCHC-C-11 23 Qc t 1962 JU 9th le1·ospace Def Div OPS PLAN 62-68 30 Oc-t 1962 Wkly Acl Rc pt NOCC to NOPS 26 Ot t 19u2 Ms17 us u· tu ADC AFORQ 93033 24 Oct 1962 l I Msg l SAF' to ADC A 'OOP 93232 26 Oct 1962 ' • f ' • • • 4 • • • • b • • • • • • • - • • ' J6 12 Msg JCS 6860 22 Oct 1962 13 lsg J JCS 6887 23 Oct 1962 14 Msg CONAD to JCS X-076 26 Oct 1962 15 Msg JCS 7057 28 Oct 1962 IG Jle1ou prepared by COOP-P Ci 27 Nov 962 JCS 6968 25 Oct 19G2 CHAPTER Ill I COC COOP Operations Log 2 l l g JCS 6864 1 22 18097 Oct 1962 CONAD lo Rgns Co1oponents COOP-P-TS 1027 22 19 57 Oct 1962 3 COC COOP Loi COCConti·oller Loi • 4 CO COOP l og hlsg COi' AD to Rgns CONAD 22-Hl-120 1 22 Oct 1962 5 Msi JCS to COKAD JCS 6858 22 0 I 1962 6 coc coOPj LOil' enc no port tt4 23 Oct Msg 29th R1 n to CONAO 29 CRC MLP 68-62 23 Oct 1962 7 CRC Report b·1 21 Oct 962 Msgs fro n Rgns on Dispersal 23 Oct A Nov aod 17 Nov l9G2 fl Ms JCS to CONAD JCS 7091 29 Oct l962 9 COC COOP Log Msg C'NAD lo 25lh CR 31 Oct 1962 Msi NOR AD t o 29th NR 31 Oct 962 Msg GONAD to ACR 31 Oct 1962 10 COC COOP 1 og II Msg CONAD to 32d CR CCRC-C-11 23 Oct 1962 ·_• ·- · _ • - 37 12 JSg NORAD to 32d NR NCRC-C-65 26 Oct 1962 13 MS l CONAD to JCS CCRC-C-81 27 Oct 1962 11 M R lo above 1n ssage dated 28 Oct 1962 15 l lsg JCS 7 Jfi9 J 2 Hnv J962 l 6 Ms AOC to CONAD ADOOP-CP-381 13 Nov 1962 17 Msg CONAD u JCS CCRC-C-TS 176 13 Nov 1962 CH APTER IV I Ms1 JCS HO 17 Nov 1963 COC COOP Log J lsg NOl1AD to Rgns NCRC-C-181 17 N ' 1962 2 Ms11 ADC tu Divs ADODC 62-400 18 Nov lfl62 3 Mst- 1 NOIUI D lo ADC NOOP-0 X-552 30 Jfov 962 •I DF NOOP-0 to J OOP-T Com1nu11ic11ticm Ln the cosc • 21 Nov 1062 At NORAD l'1t 32d Nil NOOP-O 1 -526 lli lfov Ul62 6 DF NOPS to Nl CS Propos d Air Deleuse Plan lor Sustilined Operations 20 Nov 1952 7 Ms COll'AD to ADC COOP-0-•l 81 20 Nov 1 162 8 Ms1 ADC to CONAD ADODC 314·1 1·1 Nov l JGZ 1l lls CONAD 1'• fCt COOP-A TS 535 21 Nov L l62 10 COC ConLrolle ·s l h II us CONAD to VF All' -3 COOP-X-54U 28 Nov 962 · _ __ · · · - - • · _ _ · i -r · · ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' j ' ' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' · j · _-'•• • • ' • • • •' • ' ' ' • • _'' • l ' ' ' • • •• ' • • • ' • • • • • • ' • • • • • 6 • 1' - • ' • • ti • • • • • • • • • • - ' 1 • ' - 4 I M 38 12 Wkl Act Rept NOCC to NOPS 26-30 Nov 1962 13 Ms g MORAD to JCS I IWOP-E- 512 TS 23 Nov Hl62 Msg res 7468 27 Nov 1962 11 • A g CONAD to ADC A RA DCOM 3 2d CR COOP-P TS-5541 29 Nov 1962 15 ls f CO fAD to ADC Cih'CLAN'l' 32d CR COOP-P TS-559 3 Dec 1962 16 Msg- NORAD to ARADCOhl NOOP-O-X-561 4 Dec 1962 17 Ms CINCN•llAD ta AlG 949 Componc-nt Commar ds et nJ NOOP-E-X-531 3 Dec 1962 18 cmtAn to 7CS ·• Ali- Dc-iense of Southeastern United States 30 Nov 1962 I'l DF COPS to CIICS Air Defense or Sm1thenster11 U S 6 Dec 1962 20 CONAn lo JCS Air n rm s of tile Soutl1eastern Un iti •ri Siates 11 2 Jnn 1963 AP · ·· f· · • · _ - ' ' • r' • t - ' • - - - ' JCS IIQ COIIAD TOTAL 12 1 1 215 DISTRIBUTION ----------- REDJSTRlOUTED BY HQ CONAD C ICR COPS COOP CNCH 1 I I 5 • # • • • ' • - - ' ' • • • 'I ' ' V • ' FROM TJ--fE OF FICE OF fHE DIRECTOR PLANS AND SUPPORT OP ff TIONS lo r C -· · - 19 JUri m B L ParaRraphs originally classified by ClNCOf AD could l e rlm-mgraded to no less than SECRET The concepts of force employment ules of engagement and baaic strategies within this document are similar to p_resent methods incorporated in curn n t ADCO - OPLAN COHPLANs and OPORDs of which the hir hest classification is SECRET 2 However those par i1 raphs hich cite por tions of JCS and CINCLANT documents cannot be dmmgrnded until they are reviewed by the appropriate organiz ation •rherefore r cormnend subject document be forwarded ta those agencies mentioned i n the source list al the end of the -el TE HAG SAV Director Pl -· ' ' ' ' ' ti • • • f r o m T h e O ffi c e· 0 f Th e Deputy Cl1ief Of Staff INTELLIGENCE a · • •' • ' l -· • r • • - • ' • • ' ' 1 • • • • ' • ' - ' NORIIO XP I OCOM XI' ASST DCS A ASST I EXBC 1 SECY SECY XP ·I XPX --------- -- ------1----l---l-- J XPY HPlt 10 4111J yT UIUICI •o DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE H OOUAATEAS • no SPACE Dt' FE NSE i oMMj HQ P lERSON MR fOACf BASL COLOKAOO 8891• lf l ' llll J 9 I ·Rci rading of lS IJocw ent · Ollc ll C O 1'11rticip ttion jn thc Cub 111 Crisis Historical Rcfcnrnc - l' pcr So -1 r 1i · '- J-J ' DO l Re uest the ntt chcc docu1 ent suhjt ct n 'IP l he 1·t vie1 cil for possih t Tl'j l n1lin1 and ret11ri ccl to thi office for fi l ' Whc11 at t ac u11eut is h'ithd1·crw11 or not nttachad this letter is unclassified ·1f 1Lo l t ch fl is tori cal fl eH•11cc Paper o 11 IQR 11 CO -i ll rnnicipa tion in the CQhnn CriGil T5 'iOF01lt CY •1 1 1
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