t ' - · ' r -- BOUT 1$ MEMOllANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SUB1ECT Henry A K1 lt n g r 0 Mi Utary Alerte 0 ACTION October 9 1969 Attac hed 1 a mernoranc1um from Defena which outline a aeriee of concept actio which coul b executed a early aa October 11th in order to convey the Unpre •• ion ollnerea eel U S reacBae •• to the Soviet There are even conceptual operation auggeat ' which ineluclea 1 Implementation of a period of radio an communi cation aUence in •• lected command •• z 41-hour tand down of atratepc and combat aircraft in •• lected commanc le 3 lacre ••• d urveillance of Soviet ship enro ut 'e to North Vietnam 4 Inere •• eel reconnal •• anc e ortie around the periphery of the Soviet Union 5 Increased ground al rt nte of SAC bombe ' ancI teAker •• 6 Dapereal af SAC aircraft with nuclear VI apone and Air Deien •• ail'craft to their military c tiaper al ba •••• 7 Alert or diepatch to •• a of nuclear eubmarine8 currently in port Of the above propoaal I would recommend that we bnplement atarting n est week and pha ed app oprlately through the week the meaaurea listed above a follo V 1 Z 3 5 and 6 SlCClUtT I 1 l I 1 J I t -1 I I j i SECUT COMMENDATION I That yG u approve the implementation of the eacUn ••• m aau ••• 11 ted above taz1blg •• ea rly aa Octo er 13th ami to be eom pleteel on 'October 35 Approve _____ Di a'prov -- g - _ Attachment mePT OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301 8 October 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG SUBJECT Significant Military Actions In response to your request a number of concepts for military actions are outlined below which would in our judgment be con sidered by the Soviets as unusual and significant The following criteria were employed in developing these potential actions a Ease of detection by the Soviet Union b High probability of being consi'dered unusual and sig nificant c Low p blic exposure in the United States d Feasible of execution as early as 13 October or as soon thereafter as possible e Lasting sufficiently long to be convincing Concepts meeting these criteria would include a Implementation of rad io and or other communications silence in selected areas or commands e g in SAC and POLARIS forces b Stand-down of flying of combat air-craft in sel'ected areas or corrinands e g for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM c Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam d Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union e Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers GROUP-3 DOWn raded 'at 12 year intervals not Automat1callV d claasitied 5416 I i · f Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases with or without dispersal of CONAD forces g Al rting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or by tender Modification of the SNOW TIME 70-2-E joint· SAC NORAD exercise has been considered but does not appear to qualify under the given c r i t e ria The significance of the costs and risks entailed by the military actions outlined above m st be related to the over-all effect desired which is not known at this · time In absolute terms neither the costs nor the risks seem to be high tf£ J Robert E Pursley Colonel USAF Military Assistant