UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR CQ'v'M4ND FY 1974 HISTORICAL STUDY NO 142 u VOLUME I Nl1RRATlVE CLASSIFIED BY CINCSAC oo0J9 8 I C -L 1-DO '1 i-2 l 1- 0 D ¥ - 3 £ 005 $-1 1-00'591 1'- 5 ' 1- OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN 5HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR CQMtWID 28 JANUARY 1974 _D- - - fJ 1 t ' r- 11 SW P 03 -1f@ £ 00 U R C J 'f I ' - HA-1794 CY 1 OF 4 CYS -- -- t-' C o 01 j tv OJ UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED GENERAL RUSSELL E DOUGHERTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 1 AUGUST 1974 - PRESENT M cc t a fa @ ii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ------------------- ---- ' - - f UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER I MISSION RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION Introduction -j us While the war was winding down and the end of the conflict was in sight a sizable part of the Strategic Air Command SAC bomber and tanker force was still committed to the U S military effort in Southeast Asia at the beginning of Yi 74 With the conflict's termi nation SAC expected to receive more definite directives from Head quarters USPY regarding the disposition of excess B-52D and B-52F bombers The decision had already been made as to how many of the B-52Ds would be retained and modified to extend their service life but Congress had not yet authorized funds for this program With two bases scheduled to be transferred out of the command and another pro grammed to reach the final closure stage extensive reorganization and realignment of aircraft forces were being planned At the same time SAC's two numbered air forces in the continental United States CONUS were deeply involved in a major program to realign subordinate units d thereby diversify the weapon systems assigned to the Second and Fifteenth Air Forces as well as those assigned to air divisions under their jurisdiction In sharp contrast to the changing situation in the manned aircraft force SAC's intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM force vas programmed to remain stable from an organizational standpoint There was however a significant change being effected within the ICBM force through the continuing Minuteman force moderni zation program in which older missiles were being replaced with newer models -- i '-VD Mission The Strategic Air Command was both a major command of the United States Air Force USAF and a specified command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS In its capacity as a major USAF command SAC performed its mission responsibilities under the supervision of the Chief of Staff USAF while as a specified command it received Jf t · · UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED direction from the JCS In accordance with directives issued by Head quarters USAF and the JCS SAC's overall mission was to organize train equip aili inister and prepare strategic forces for aerospace combat incluninQ offensive strikes_ reconnaissance_ and snecial missions 1 The JCS further specified that SAC be prepared to attack SlOP lSingle Integrated Operational Plan targets as directed and to support the unified commands by conductinQ' C lt t acks with nuclear nonnuclear weapons in contingencipc 2 J Basic Resources M As in FY 73 the Minuteman modernization program and the - outfitting of B-52 and FE-Ill bombers with the Short Range Attack Missile SRAM continued to bring about significant changes in the primary weapon systems assigned to SAC The sharp decrease in per sonnel strer th was primarily attributed to fewer airmen inputs from USAF resources the transfer of two bases and the impending closure of another base The following chart shows the basic resources assigned to SAC at the end of FY 73 and at the end of FY 74 3 Resources Assigned End FY 73 End FY 74 ICBMs 1 025 1 029 Bombers 463 495 Tankers 622 642 Reconnaissance Aircraft 45 55 Command and Control Aircraft 27 29 Hound Dog lissiles 331 328 Quail Missiles 417 417 SRAJ f Missiles 454 889 Personnel 163 385 155 434 Active Bases SAC wned 32 30 u End of FY 73 statistics do not include aircraft involved in special modification and maintenance programs 28 B-52s 5 FE-llls 2 EC-135s 20 KC-135s 2 RC-i35s J j U2s which were assigned to Air Force Logistics Command under USAF policy APR 27-15 U USAF PRPL Aerospace Vehicle Assignment and Distribution 7 Apr 69 In mid-FY 74 this policy was revised AFR 27-l5 U USAF PRPL Aerospace Vehicle Assign ment and Distribution 7 Jan 74 so that aircraft involved in these programs were not reassigned from one command to another Therefore end of FY 74 statistics reflect these aircraft as being assigned to SAC thus accounting for the seeming increase in assigned aircraft w- - 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Cu Major General John Pauly became Commander of the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division on 3 September 1973 7 replacing Major General Salvador E Felices Located at Vandenberg AFB California the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division was concerned primarily with the execution and support evaluations of ICBM operational tests con ducted by SAC's missile units CU Fifteenth Air Force with headquarters at March AFB Cali fornia was commanded by Lieutenant General Ihlli 'TI F Pitts The Fifteenth in addition to a sizable ICBM responsibility had control of all SAC's strategic reconnaissance forces and some of its bomber and tanker units U Second Air Force with headquarters at Barksdale AFB Louisiana was charged with command of most of SAC's bomber and tanker units and three ICBM wings two of which it acquired from the Fifteenth Air Force on 1 July 1973 It was under the command of Lieutenant General Keck until he became the Vice Commander in Chief of SAC on 1 October 1973 Effective 3 October 1973 Lieu tenant General Richard M Hoban became Commander of the Second Air 8 Force U Eighth Air Force headquartered at Andersen AFB Guam had control over all SAC forces in the Western Pacific Lieutenant General McKee replaced Lieutenant General Gerald W Johnson as the Eighth's Commander on 10 October 1973 9 Continuity of Operations Plan V s Headquarters SAC continued to maintain a continuity of op rations plan during FY 74 10 As in the past the plan provided means of directing the combat forces should a sudden attack seriously damage or destroy the headquarters building and its collocated under ground command post at Offutt AYE Nebraska Following a practice r CU For more details on this subject see Numbered Air Force and Air Division Realignments this chapter 4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED set up in early 1961 an EC-135 flying out of Offutt was airborne on a 24-hour-a-day basis A general officer carrying the title of Airborne Emergency Action Officer AEAO aided by a small battle staff and using sophisticated communications equipment manned this airborne command post which was called Looking Glass This air craft would serve as the primary alternate command center should it become impossible for cOIillI' and to e ' lanate from the CINCSAC or VCINCSAC at Headquarters SAC or from aboard an Auxiliary Airborne Command Post AUXCP The period of responsibility was designed to be brief however for after taking the emergency actions necessary to insure survival of the SAC force and if necessary to implement the JCS execution direc tives the AEAO was to locate a successor to command -- either the commander of Fifteenth or Second Air Force with the senior of the two being first in line of succession In the event neither of these two could take cOflffiand the senior surviving SAC line-rated officer would do so The myriad of situations encompassed by the plan insured that SAC's forces would be utilized properly and fully see Table 1 11 U' CS1 During the Middle East Crisis of October 1973 when the JCS placed SAC and other U S milita J forces on a Defense Condition DEFCON rrlREE alert Headquarters SAC encountered problems in operating under its Continuity of Operations Plan In accordance with the plan upon declaration of DEFCON THREE Major General James R Allen Chief of Staff in coordination with Brigadier General Robert R Scott DCS Personnel were required to designate five Headquarters SAC general officers for AEAO duty on alternate airborne command post aircraft stationed at Offutt These officers were to report to the 2d Airborne Command and Control Squadron ACCS for instruc tions 12 Three additional general officers from field units were The Auxiliary Airborne Command Post one of Offutt's fleet of EC-135s would be manned with a small battle staff and put on ground alert upon declaration of a DEFCON THREE Its effectiveness would depend upon whether or not there was enough warning time to allow the aircraft to become airborne prior to a nuclear attack 5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED en CONDITION ALFA CONDITION BRAVO E AVO MODIFIED S1JCCESSION OF cr'tv'iMNmL3 CIRCUMSTANCES Everyday peac etime operation II exists when the A AO is 'in position' and loses specific with CINCSAC This condition requires immediate reaction by the acting as CINCSAC airborne II t1 • exists Vhe l i t has been posi ti vely deter that of SAC and direction of the SAC fm-cE n can 'lot emanFlt e from CINCSAC or Vice CINeSAC anJ initial emergency actions for SUriri val or tl e SA ' forc es have been completed actions i nclude polling of the SAC force and sUbmiss i on of the initial Blue Report conditicn permits effective 1 January 1974 Ilperrnits changed t ' read Ilrequiresll extensive and time ccnsuminp efforts prior to succession of cornman I' 11 exists vhe 'l CONDITION ALFA has not occurred and either ClliCSAC or Vice CINCSAC7 is off station and the one that io performing - DCSAC resl'onsibility at Headquarters SAC becomes incapacita ed to the po int that ccmmand of SAC uni ts capnot elr ana'te him 11 Table 1 RESPONSIBLE FOR LAUNCH AND EXECUTION OF SAC FORCE CI UCSAC CIHCSAC Airborne Action Officpr the general ofricer on Looking Gless Alt erllate I Jrborne Emergency Action Offi cer the general office ' aboara he Auxiliary Air borne mmand Pas aircraft launched from ei tr er Ellsworth AFB S D or Grissom APE IN Commander Force Commander 01' Fiftee lth Air Force SAC l i ne rated off'io eTs in IlCCorrlance with AFR 35 - 5 G VllO art in position to command DCS Opera-iens Hq SAC after taking action to survival of the force determines 'Whel is ranking SAC line rated officer n at Offutt and informs him that is responsible for acting in the arr e of CINCSAC until CINCSAC Vice CINCSAC or successor arrives on duty SUcce ss or as outlined under CONDITION BRAVO U Based upon s eniori ty prir ciple 'pe itions r eversed after October 1973 nt which time Lieut enant Ger eral Hil1i am F Pi t ts Com nander of Fif'teenth Air Force became s enior t Q Lieut enant General Richard Hoban I who succeeded Li eutenant General James M Keck as ccmmanrler of Second Air Force L UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED to be siailarly designated to report im ediately to Ellsworth to assUGe ground alert duty with a battle staff and be ready to serve as alter 14 nate _ AO on the Auxiliary Airborne Co mand Post 'L ' ut These requirements caused problems during the alert because '- - the overall requirement for general officers to serve in various capa cities including AEAO senior staff and other specified jobs exceeded the number of general officers available Sufficient general officers were finally designated to fill these positions but they were allowed to remain at their normal duty stations on telephone alert rather than being required to report to the 2d ACCS and Ellsworth I 1hile this modified procedure worked satisfactorily for the Offutt requirement due to the collocation of Headquarters SAC it was unsatisfactory for the Ellsworth mission According to Major General Ray B Sitton SAC's DCS Operations the lack of general officers at Ellsvorth WOUld have ilL8ibited a Positive Control Launch PACCS launch or PACCS dispersal if these operations had been ordered 15 V Sj Based upon the problems encountered during the crisi s General Sitton concluded that the current procedures require an over co lrnit lent of headquarters generals to fulfill AEAO positions He reconrnended to General _Allen that the procedure be changed so as to commit by specific duty position only six general officers three from Headquarters SAC and three from subordinate units to perform 16 the AEAO functions at Offutt and Ells mrth as follows Duty Position Asst DCS Plans Hq Inspector General DCS Plans Hq SAC Comdr 4th Air Div Chief of Staff Hq Chief of Staff Hq SAC Hq SAC 2AF 15AF Base Offutt Offutt Offutt F E Jarren Barksdale March AEAO Assignment lU3NCP Offutt lU3NCP Offutt ABNep Offutt AUXCP Ellsworth AUXCP Ellsworth AUXCP Ellsworth ' General Sitton also proposed that upon declaration of DEFCO THR2E the airborne cOlTIllaCld post AEAO flying schedule be canceled and the three Headquarters SAC general officers designated above be used to assume the daily flying schedule He further emphasized the need 7 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED for the other three general officers to proceed immediately to Ells'' orth upon declaration of D SFCON THR2E l 7 Gener2 1 A len approved these changes 1 D b 1073 ·18 f 19 on ece J er they became e fective two days later and reJ2Elined so throughout FY 74 20 ICBM Force '1 31 During FY 74 SAC r s ICBM force remained unchanged as to the ' --- overall lJ S of 1 054 missiles but the nlli 'lber assig l1ed rose from 966 at the start of IT 74 to 972 on 26 June 1974 This force was composed of three Titan II wings each consisting of two operational squadrons of nine UE strength and six Minuteman wings of twenty 50 UE squadrons The Minuteman portion of the SAC ICBM force was being modernized by replacing older model missiles with newer ones As FY 74 started the 90th Strategic 1 1issile Wing Francis E Warren AFB Wyoming was in the process of replacing its Minuteman Is yi th Minuteman Ills On 1 July 1973 the 90th SMW had 150 Minutecnan Is and 10 ltinuteman Ills assig l1ed By the end of FY 74 the composition of this force had been reversed sharply with 120 Minuteman IIIs and only 40 r Iinuteman Is being assigned The Francis E Warren conversion effort was scheduled to be -k completed in FebruarJ 1975 The entire force modernization program would be completed in June 1975 when the fourth squadron at Nalrnstrmn converted from Minutema lIs to Ills The SAC Minuteman fcrce ould then reach its prograJ lJ1led goal of 550 Ivlinuteman Ills and 450 Hinute an lIs Tne exact composition and location of the ICm l force at the ends of FY 73 and FY 74 are shmm in Table 2 Bomber and Tanker Forces WJ Af ter having reElained stable for years the SAC bOlT oer aIld talLl er forces undeTITent several changes in FY 74 In lim vi th the Department of Defense's April 1973 decision to tro nsfer Hestover Air Force Base Hassachusetts to the Air Force ReS2l'Ve Headquarters USAF had directed that the 99th Barno I-ling a 25 TJE B-52D lmit be -r U For more details on the l-1inuteman force moderni zation progrJ J see Force Improvements Chapter V this history UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED evol ve expanded operational concepts that required air refueling lJlC experience in the Israelf airlift operation in october 1973 showed that C-5 and C-141 aircraft could have transported an additional 30 percent of cargo if air refueling had been utilized Therefore each of these commands supported the need for an advanced tanker 130 0 Z Consequently on 15 December 1973 Headquarters SAC stated a requirement for an Advanced Multi-Purpose Tanker AMPT The AMPT was envisioned as a derivative of one of the available wide-bodied civilian transport aircraft Candidates included the Boeing 747 and the McDonnell Douglas DC-IO The Lockheed Company was assessing the C-5B as a potential candidate Depending upon the aircraft selected the AMPT could offer an approximate 2 1 to 4 1 improvement in fuel offload delivery over that available with the KC_135 131 On 8 March 1974 Headquarters USAF reviewed and validated the SAC proposal for the AMPT contingent on resubmission of the proposal as a multi-command do ument with further clarification of MAC's air refueling and airlift requirements The nomenclature Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft ATCA was adopted to reflect more accurately the cargo capabilities of the proposed aircraft 132 Con tracts were scheduled to be issued to Boeing McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed in FY 75 for a six month four phase lowing the FY 75 effort one contractor would competitive effort Fol 133 be selected The HoUse approved the full budget request of $20 million for FY 75 but the Senate allowed only $4 5 million The House-Senate Conference Committee 134 then authorized $8 0 million for the ATCA Manned Aircraft Survivability U United States defense policy was based on deterrence A prime factor of deterrence was credibility One of the important features of SAC's bomber force credibility was that it would survive a surprise attack This SAC requirement was a revival of earlier efforts by SAC to develop an advanced tanker Hist of SAC TS FY 72 pp 296- 297 135 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED U JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sheets normally reflected the breakdovm based on type of aircraft and the unit's authorized unit equipage UE as follm s 137 UE Aircraft c CAP Force 15 DE 15 DE 20 DE 25 DE 30 DE 30 DE 43d SW 93d BW FE-lll units B-52G H B-52D B-52D B-52D B-52G B-52D B-52F 5 sorties 4 sorties 5 sorties 6 sorties 10 sorties 8 sorties 16 sorties 10 sorties 6 sorties Giant Lance Selected Employment of Air Ground Alert - SEAGA backup sorties were included in the Category c force 138 ' f FOXTROT aircraft were those identified by the letter Ff on l· the SlOP assignment and timing sheet They consisted of the remaining DE aircraft that had effective SIOP missions assigned other than those designated ALFA or CHARLIE 139 I·' 3'1 Expansion to include the c CM and IIF CAP was based on the Force Generation Levels FGL A generated aircraft was one that was· NJO-configured and the generated force was that portion of the SAC aircraft force E -TO-configured and ready for launch All generated bombers and tankers became part of the expanded alert force and assumed lines of alert as soon as generated Timing for such action was pre determined but it was SAC policy that aircraft generated earlier than planned would be placed on alert as soon as generated The alert force at whatever FGL was the maximum force available for launch depending upon the conditions of warning Longer warning times permitted more preparation time and thus additional SIOP forces The intent was to d f-P t· f the SAC strl' ke 140 lmprove reactlon tlme an e Lee lveness 0 lIJ In almost all circumstances the bomber would launch direct to he target Rather than staging at advanced bases for pre-strike air refueling provided extended range for the bomber allowed it to carry an increased payload and use E O tactics to enhance penetration and survival Tanker alert was maintained along vvith the bomber in the 137 C5 I UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 U UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 JCS b 1 U U jcs b 1 JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED jcs b 1 U U UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED U U U 1 I I I j ' ' r reS each participating unit The wing's location its weapon systems and normal SlOP target commitments were evaluated in assigning orbit com mitments which in turn affected the design of each unit's special sortie The vast majority of Giant Lance targets were urban-industrial 155 area targets but there were a few nuclear force targets There 1-Tere nine Giant Lance bomber orbits Avai lable tanker task force bases and air traffic control requirements contributed to the selection of the orbit locations One or more of seven tanker 156 task forces supported the orbits Distribution was as follows Orbit Arctic Arctic Pacific East I'lest Atlantic -- East Atlantic -- South Atlantic Atlantic Polar Far East North #1 North #2 Tanker Task Force Eielson AFB Eielson AFB Eielson Kadena Torrejon AB Loring AFB Plattsburgh AFB Torrejon AB Loring ftFB Plattsburgh AYE Goose Bay C-oose Bay Thule Eielson Kadena During FY 74 several changes re-oriented the orbit assign ments Two bomb Tlings--the 99th and the 306th-- vere scheduled to in activate and their commitments were excepted This resulted in a reduction in the CONUS commitment from 44 sorties to 0 157 The Far East requirement for the 43d SH had been 16 sorties through FY 73 158 In FY 74 the number was reduced to 12 sorties sortie numbers 01 through 012 159 Toward the end of the year this distribution was shifted to sorties 01 02 07 through 016 160 There were also several changes in bomber unit assignments to Giant Lance orbits In FY 73 the 449th Bl-r was assigned to the Atlantic East orbit and the 97th Bl-l YTas assigned to the Polar orbit 161 Effective with Rev N on 1 July 1973 and remaining throughout the year 142 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Force reconstitution priorities centered on bringing back aircr ft and-1 prpws n rnmh rp inpss Rn n rpinstate srop alert sorties From ' t e time of notirication of redeployment A-hour the aircraf't and crevs vould launch vithin 72 hours Actually the first days I 6 were devoted to physical redeployment From A 6 to A 12 flight trai ning and B10 study and certification would concentrate on the ini tia alert sortie aircrews And the initial alert sortie would be assumed on A 12 The next 33 days were allotted to bringing the alert sorties up to those required After 105 days the unit vould become vulnerable for gn OnerCltinnCll Readiness InsDection iORIL 165' rL Before this plan could take effect the JCS had noted in June 19i3 that it appeared prudent to modify the schedule established earlier Specifically the JCS recoI 1lllended that the first vithdra' ral include 47 B-52Cs and 52 B-52Ds in place of the originally-planned 99 B_52Gs 170 SAC concurred in this suggestion 171 Others did not iu JS The United States Special Activities Group USSAG successor to'V S Military Assistance Command Vietnam CV protested the JCS specific consideration on two points In the first place the B-52G models vere limited in tonnage capacity The B-52Ds in contrast had been modified to increase the total bo b bay tonnage capacity Hence they vere more effective in Southeast Asia In the second place USSAG pointed out that any withdrawal program vould have to be event-phased rather than time-phased because the unknown quantity of cease-fire adherence was more lmpor t t an t' nan a cer t· aln d t a e 172 v On 10 July 1973 the JCS authorized SAC to redeploy the first 15 B-52Gs from Andersen AFB to the home station SAC directed that they be sent to the 68th Bomb Hing at Seymour Johnson AFB North Carolina A hour for the move was 12 0001Z July 1973 The 15 air craft flew in five three-aircraft cells in redeployment The last B-52G landed at Seymour Johnson AFTI at 17 2026z July 1973 173 This redeployment left 86 B-52Gs at Andersen 1 On 1 August 1973 the JCS ordered SAC to stop B-52 opera- 17l tibns--Arc Light--in Cambodi effective 15 August This action 144 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS JCS JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 U JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED second of these high priority sorties was assumed by the 68th Bomb 184 Hing on 3 August 1973 By the end of August 1973 the 68th Bomb ling had five B-52Gs on alert along with five KC_135s 185 Similar reconstitution and reinstatement programs were followed by the other B-52G units I J i AJ 5 The B-52G wings at Loring and Ellsworth had operated as ' - contlngency training Q its CTU When crews for those units returned in late September A - Hour 21 September reconstitution to normal SlOP and training began and phase down of the CTUs was started The 28th Bomb Wing had reinstated one B-52G aircraft on alert by 9 October The 42d Bomb Wing which had maintained two aircraft on alert through FY 73 reinstated a third alert sortie on 14 October 186 The 456th Bomb Wing at Beale AFB California and the 416th Bomb Wing at Griffiss AFB New York continued as CTUs after redeployment of all B-52Gs Headquarters SAC had established an adjusted D-day 1 December 1973 for these two units to permit completion of training of individuals from other units at these bases Nevertheless when the seven remain ing B-52G units returned from Southeast Asia the reinstatement of alert '1 187 sorties was accelerated A-hour was 20 1900Z October 1973 Each of these units 2d 19th 92d 97th 320th 416th and 456th 188 had returned sorties to full alert status by 8 November 1973 Headquarters SAC established A-hour for the 96th and 22d Bofnb I rings B-52D units as 24 0001Z November 1973 Reconstitution and reinstatement proceeded without difficulty Both units placed each on alert by the first veek in December 189 one B-52D I '1 1- s' Reinstatement of the B-52G sorties alert requirement which ha'a-been assumed by the B-52H wings received first priority For those seven units responsible for the 15 high priority sorties resumption vas achieved by the required time--12 days after notification Rein- 11 190 statement overall was as IO ows 146 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 8-52 Hi1h Sortie Rate Table i B-52G Sortie B-52H Rev J Date Rpt B4H2 l irlg Number Hing Sortie Reinstated DTG 63 BI J 01 379 BW 03 21 Jul 73 27 1420Z Jul 73 02 379 BI J 04 3 Aug 73 03 1100Z Aug 73 23 m J 01 319 BW 03 9 Oct 73 12 1353Z Oct 73 02 319 BW 04 1 Nov 73 01 1118z Nov 73 2 PM 01 17 BTlr 05 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov 73 03 379 BW 05 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov 73 04 449 BW 06 22 Nov 73 23 1035Z Nov 73 19 BH 01 17 BW 03 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov '73 02 17 BI-l 04 15 Nov 73 16 1140z Nov 73 97 BI J 01 410 BW 06 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov 73 02 410 BW 05 15 Nov 73 16 1140z Nov 73 416 BW 01 449 BW 04 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov 73 02 449 BW 03 29 Nov 73 30 1111Z Nov 73 456 BW 01 5 BW 05 8 Nov 73 09 1038z Nov 73 02 5 BI J 06 20 Nov 73 30 1111Z Nov 73 High priority sorties of the other B-52G wings--those not assumed by the B-52H units--were placed back on alert as scheduled The 42d Bomb T hng at Loring JUon was back to its full alert requirement of six B-52s and 12 KC-135s by the end of the month The 320th 30mb 'ding at Mather lli D re-established its first alert line on 8 November and its second on 22 November 1973 The 92d Bomb -ling at fairchild ATB re-established its 01 sortie on 8 November and its 02 sortIe on 15 November 19 7 3 191 ' ' C3J ' Then the tva B-52D alert lines ' Jere reinstated by the 22il and 96th Bomb lings in early December 1973 this was the first time B-52Ds had been on alert in the CONUS since April 1972 192 Shortly after the first of the year two B-52Ds from the third B-52D 193 unit the 7th Bomb Wing Cars ell AFB Texas asstL' led alert During the rest of the fiscal year the B-52D alert lines grev slightly By the end of June 1974 the 7th Bonb Wing had two B-52Ds on alert the 22d Bomb -Ting had four and the 96th Bomb Wing had hra on alert at 1 0 4 yess AYE and one on satellite alert at Bergstrom APB B- 52H aircraft from 17 mr assumed 19 Bl-l scte11i te alert require ment at MacDil1 APE Florida 147 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ys Hhen 105 days had passed the units were vulnerable for SNOW TIME AMALGAM l- UTE and Operational Readiness Inspections By that time Headquarters SAC felt that the EHO transition period -Iould be fully completed 195 In the case of the 22d and 96th Bomb Hings D-day -las set at 1 April 1974 Thus these two -lings became vulnerable on 15 July 1974 D-day for the 7th Bomb Wing was set at 1 July 1974 and its vulnerability period began on 14 October 196 The reason for this delay was that the D-series combat crew training squadron was being assigned to the 7th ElL The additional time granted to the 7th BW was to permit resource management flexibility during the organi zation and activation of the B-52D series CCTS 197 ' r M In January 1974 the Secretary of Defense promulgF'-ted the FY 74 80 Planning Guidance for Southeast Asia Force and Activity Levels In the document the guidance reflected the greater potential threat from the North Vietnamese offensives during the November-j' pril dry season On this basis FY 74-75 planning used the intervals beb een d ry seasons f or f orce re ductlon · d perlO s 198 SAC I s - s B 52 -Iere t b 0 e able to fly 1 200 sorties per month through 31 October 1974 drop off to 1 000 sorties per month through 31 March 1975 and then drop to 300 sorties per month through the end of FY 75 199 In addition B-52 surge capability was retained at 1 800 sorties per month -lith no more 200 than a -leek s notlce V' i fi In May 197 4 the Acting Chairnan of the JCS notified SAC th t higher authority had approved further withdrawal of B-52 assets from Thailand This approval released 14 KC-135s and 33 B-52Ds Execution would begin on 15 May and run through August The B-52Ds -Iould be redeployed in four groups three of nine aircraft each and one of six The first increment of nine B-52Ds 1tTould depart during the month of May the second nine during June the third nine during July and the last six during Angust For the nine B-52D aircraft leaving on 15-17 May four 'were ass igned to Carswell AFB two were assigned to v fess AYE one to March AYB one to Barksdale AFB and 148 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 JCS b 1 U UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 JCS b 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DOE b 3 DOE b 3 DOE b 3 U UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED U JCS b 1 JCS b 1