wesnn cio chapeer 11 warsou an maze necistous on weermme me mamas o reau A the Substance of the Amerféan Decisions 1 Seemuication of the Dectwions to the Allies Principles of Proposed PolGctes On July 19 the Mettonal security Goume1 discussce alterative coxemes of action for deating with the Resiin problem on the busin of the reports prepared in sesponse to the assignments given in Nattoeal Security Action Nesorantum Ho 39 of July 14 Following this meeting the President had Spectal Assistant Heoeorge Bunty Insue instructions to the responsible heats of departments mnd agenctes of the Covernmont summaztzing the dectsions reached Scaacies of the dectsions reached were atso communicated in messages sent by the Provident oo duly 20 to Prime intater Hacatiian President de Cautle ans Chancellor Adenaver ond in instructions of duty 21 directing the Ancriem Anpassaiges in all 1470 capitals to inform the respective KAD Povers The mont detailed statement of the Asertcan postion how ever vas contained in a mexoranéun with several attach« benth which the Secretary handed to eprosentativee of the Enbaster of Britain France and the Federal Republic on suy 2s The sesocendum stated at the outset that the Untted States had reached certain conclusions as to the course of action uhtch it belteves ousht to be followed necord of Actions by the ¥ational Security Comeil at its 488th meeting KS Action No 2405 duty 19 1961 secret Maticnat Security Action Memorandum‘ No 62 July 24 top secret 2zo London tel 335 July 20 1961 to Rom cel 134 guly 207 te racle tel éft suty 205 co kara el 79 July 21 sent also to all other Mito ‘capitals al sceret zo tom tel 170 July 22 1961 seceut pps carmen cine ¥szst of all the Unized Stater beteved chat the vost was in eamnest reperding ite stated incencton to sign a separate peace Ereaty with Fast Germiny in the course of the year a tzeaty which in the Sovies view would end Allied Hghle in berlin iikentse the Uniced States fels that a wey factor in this Soviet poldcy was the bette that in the end the test would mot fight to defend tts position in Bertin Ierefore in the view of the United States itestern yottcy should Constst of two principal etomentes 1 a clear deconstention of western determination to defend the Aled sorition tn Berlin 2 an active diplonstie progeae tncluding megottations with the Soviet Union destzned to provide the Sovtet leadership with an altemative course of action which 44d mot endanger Western incereste in Besiin Creation of a Hore Effective Deterzent Mth respect to the firse element of western policy 1 c the establighnent of a more effective deterzont and of capabittty for milizesy action the United States proposed acconting to the aree— Handun to begin tonediately a series of meanures aimed at ncreasing ite aned strength with due regard however to the dangers of an armament race As a first step the United Scates proposed to take seasures that would Initiate a Tongeren bufld—up of military sesensth witch vould not be of so dranacic a nature as to exacerbate the exists Specifically on July 26 the United States Goverment would sond to the Congress a request for a supplementary defense batget of 3 2 bition dotlars to be added to a supplementary request for 3 biliton dolince made eartter This vould give the Unfted States a copability for soviag an ad¢teional atx divistons to Europe at the end of the year or at any tine thereafter depending on Allied decisions me United States vould also have avaitable supplementary unica of tactical and transport atzcrafe as weld as increased maval atrength especially in the Eield of anct—aubmarine warfare Purthemnore the Untced Stater vould ake tmediate action to Increase by fifty percent the munber of its besber atzcraft on ground alert statue inaly the United States also intended to undestaie substantial measures in the Held of civil defense such as constrvction of atelters and recruitzent and Srainiog of the necessary personnel Sumerctsr resecg «ze In addition the United Scates held shat the following precautionary and planaing measures should be undertaken with in the next tew verks a Strenpthn west bertin‘s ability to mustein an daterruption of access by cevieving and improving Miz life procedures en wo l as the attuation vith regard co atocupiles 3 _ Review berlin contingency planing in the Mabe of the current eteation 6 Conplose AMted plane fo use of nonenttizary comtemessares including econonte sanctions upon intersuption of access to Merlin on earitery as a veen ng and detercent Tn view of the great tnportance of maximus support by world public opinion for the stem position and poltcies the United States hat bepin an active vorlé—wide public infor mation program to this end and vas proposing to expand this progtam in cooperation vith the Allies There had atreaty been agreesent on a protininary quadripareite paper based on propaganda then eugpested by the Beitish see ante Chapter 22 19 and fusther steps n the development of such a propran wire dusgestec ‘e Untad States considernd it to be of the utnot Hnportance that the response to the Soviet threat be a joint undertaking by the MRO alliance and tt hoped therefore to be jones iy tts Mlites n all aspects of this endesvor« The Unized States believed in particular that atl MTO mesbors should make an effore couparable to te ow in the military Rield noweithstanding the cose and seexfice involved A clear villinpmess on the past of atl the Alites way essential zo convince the Kxeatin of Allied determination Such a joint endeavor vould require closes consoltation at every step of the way and the Unized States was prepared to work oue jointly with £t6 Atltes a niitzery program to this end Anticipated Etfects of extern Military Butlé—tp An attachnant to the mexoeardun piven to the western Enoasstcn shoved how the strengthening of the Allied military capsbittty to cope with a theese to bertin woold attect 1470‘a gmneral militizy posture with respect to the Soviet Bloc so that Berlin Contingency plans would henceforth become closely Linked to Mizo‘s general strategy» zxme— udaater mas tt was arpued in this paper that the only action possible with cerrencly deployed Altzed atrength in the event of a Mtockage of acers to Sezlin was a gradual series of probes which 1f sepulied would force the West to accept hnniMiation or to initiate nuclear action Heamile the NATO front would be vulnerable to sudden penetration by Soviet forces Tows the proposed Ancrican and Allied military butldup vould open Wider options for NAD atMizary action and help to reverse atsconceptions about AZD®s weakness and it vould nake much noze exedibe the capability of the Hestern Alitance to take actions leading to a attuation which the Soviet Union could mo louger control and which would therefore be dangerous to tts basic interests the coupletion of Anertcan and Allted military proprans vould make possible the deployment along MMO‘ exuctal centent front of about forty allied divietons about 1—V 2 milion men tncluding a substantial strutente reserve price to a probe along the Autobahn Trese divisions wold be aupported by substantial Allied ate power and nuclear poves generally superior to that of the Soviet Union Even under the assueption of a deployment of a maximan force on the side of the Soviet Union the latter vould not have the margin necessary to assure 2t of rapid offensive success with noornicleas meapone Thus the West vould have the option of nistacing a large—scale ground action which the Soviet Unton sould not throw back with conventional neens ‘e sost important results of the westem military boild— up hovever would be felt in the phase that preceded a ground probe This vas particularly inportent since it vas destzabte to delay a ground probe until all other reasonsble altemative courses had failed tn view of the fact that mlizary actions after an intefal pround probe tended to pass beyond the control of either aide It nade therefore a bis differmce with respect so the effectiveness of these altemative courses whether they vere undertaken against a background of proving siitcory streasth or apainst a beckszound of continued non waclear weakness That 4s to say econontc comternnasures an atelife or naval harasenent and blockade would be nore meaningful and hess likely to ead to enesy countermensures and retaliation if undertaken againot a backgrownd of proving wilfeary strength rather then against a background of unchanged strength active Diplomatic Progtan With resard to the second element of ¥estesn policy manely an active diplonatic program veameetss memssm care the United States indicated in its norormndum that t forosnw several passible courses of action which should be the subject of Austhor dtscusstons mong the alles fven at the present stage hovever the United States favored indicating in goneral tema vhat it might wish to propose later in greater detail Ar this point the mesorandue referred to the possibility of early inforeal talks with the Soviet eaderhip through the Wester Anbassadors in Noscos as svsgented tn the Outline on Gemany and Berlin® submitted to the President by the Sec« recary on July 18 see ante Chapter z C Thereafter it might be destzable to explore opportunities for western poltt en initiatives at an appropriate time« The tixtng of such ntetatives vould depend anong other things on the Mkelthood at any particular time that the Soviet leadership migh be sufficiently tnpressed by Vester deterrent efforts to be uili ng to settle for solutions acceptable to the West Alte Coomuitations Finalty the Unized States supponted in ite mesorandum a schedule of allied consultations as set forth in the outline on Cermany and Berita of July 18 This following tnttinl consultations by the Ambassadorial Steering Group allied consultations at a senior officer level voold eave place to Parke for a veek beninaing July 28 Thie sould be followed by a meeting of the four Western Foreign Ministers in Paris sho would subsequenely report to TATD 2 necessary the group of senior officers could remain n Pavia for a fou days longer to carry out the instructions of the Fore Minterers J shen Secretary Rask handed the menozendus to the Ministers of the British and French Zabasstes and to ¥est Corman Ambassador Greve on duly 21 he did mot review ts contents but expressed hope that this mésorsndum and ito annexes would receive care ful atty by the Governments concemes and that they vould provide a basia for a consinuing discussion of the beritn problen The Secretary also confirmed a achedole and propean of the forthcoming Allied consultations which had atzeaty been outlined to the three Bobassies by Assistant Secretary Robler of aety 20 2 A‘menerandun on Nessuzen for Dealing with the Borlin Situation duly 21 1961 accree Iro tom tel 165 duly 21 1961 and tel 170 duty 22 both secret Tramameres remeamer aas» 2 tesidens Kennedu‘s Report to the Matin on the Berlin Exists ouly 25 President ennedy announced the conclusions and decisions reached on the Berlin problem in an adérens to the American people carried over zadto and television on July 25 it beepose uss not only to give the Anerican people a deanacie presentation of the situation confronttng then and of the Sucdens which they vould have to shoulder but also to make cleat to fetends nevtrate and fors in the international aren the portsion andthe oats ‘of the United States in the face of this eetsts over Bertin ‘he President cold bis audience that Kirushche‘a threat to Merlin had procpted a series of dectstons by his adainia— tration as vell as consultations with the Allies as a result of which « had become clear shat needed to be done The President stsessed chat the steps to be taken vould require mscrifice on the part of many cittzens and that even sore mould be required in the future ut he was hopeful that peace and Erendon vould be rustained if the Untted States and te atites acted out of strength and unity of purpose with cals detesminaton and steady nerves using restratnt in our words as velt us in our verpons The President wazned tit it would be a ntstake to Took upon Were Beciin because of its location as a tempting target exphasizing that Nerlin was not Stolated because the United‘staten so thore the United Kington and Peance eze there the plaige of NMD tn there ané the people of Berlin ase there ‘he President dectared that the Ontted States camot and will not pernit the Conmnists to drive us out of Betkin either ataduetly or by force As long as the Con« muntste tnsteted thas they would unilaterally end western tights in Berit and extern commitments tovard ite people the President said the Ment had to be prepared to reset with force Bot it would abrays be wilting to talk if satk witt hetp Announcing the prepezations to be undertaken the Presi dent mentioned that a Toup—temm military betidup of American strength had been under vay stnce January 1962 and that as a reaslt of supplementary defense appropriations requested in March and April the Unizcd Staten bad atzeaty begin moving tevard ite goal in the £ield of defenses Tt was necessary to guzszm Zn site peed up these measures and to take others as vell tut it vas even sore important to have the capability of placing in a critical aren at the appropriate cine a force which tn ecabination with the forces of the Allies was lexge croush to nake clear our determination an ability to defend our rights at all costs and to meet all levels of agsresson pressure with viacever levels of force are requized the Wntzed States the President stressed intended co have a wider choice than humtHiation or all—out nuclear action ‘mhe President announced that he would now cake the follow» ng steps He would requet of the Congress an additional appropriation of 3 247 billion dollars for the anned forces an increase in the Aimy‘s tocel authorized strength from 875 000 to approximately 1 milion men an increase of 29 000 mn‘tn the active—duty strength of the tiny and 63 000 nes in that of the ate rorces to fulli1l these manpover needs draft calls vould be doubted and tzipled in the coning months authority vould be requested of the Congress to call into active duty certain reserve units and individual reservists and vder that suthortty the President would aiso onde to active duty a munber of ate transport squadrons and Air Metlona Cuer Eacticai ate squadrons to provide airlift cupscity and needed air protection me President atso stated that shipe and planes once headed for setizesent would be retained or reactivated thus increasing Anertcan atrpover as well as aizlite sealtht and anti—scbnaztne uazfaze cupactty« Stentepic atrjoves would be further increased by éetaying the deactivation of 3—57 bonbers Finally the President infomed hin audience that some 1 6 biHion doltars about hal of the total amount requested——uould be meeded Lor procurement of nonensclear veapoas armunition and equipment MLL chose requents the President declared would be subsczed to the Congress the next day Subsequent steps ‘on August 1 President Kennedy signed a bI2X passed by both bowes of Congress the previous day which gave him authority to eall up 250 000 reserves On Aupust 10 the Hours and Senate pessed a defense appropriation DL32 of $46 6 biilion signed by the President on Aupsst 27 which included the addizionst funds he had requested cummte r duswer size vould be taken to sute subsequent needs and compatable efforts for the common defense were being discussed with the ¥it0 atites President Kennedy also discussed the sober responsibility ot civil defensc nessures against nuclear waz announcing that the next day he vould mubmie to Congress a request for noe funds for the ollowing tenediate objectives %o tdentity space Hn existing public and private structures to be used for fall out aheizers in case of attack to stock these shelters with food water ‘and other minumum essenttale for survival to incroase thate capscity to inprove ate raid waming and Call out detection aysconss and to sake other measures tha would be effective tn saving niliions of Lives at an early date me President made it clear that the now defense expenditures would mot requice mew taxes at the mement bue that a request for an increase tn tasation would be nade tne following Jamary should the evence of the ext few months make this necessary Aesrersting that the chotce vas not merely between restut« ance and zetzeat atonic holocaust and suzrender‘ the Presi dent dectared that the Anerican response to the Berlin crists vould mot be ouly atlitary os negative The Unized States he eatd had previously indteated tte readiness to renove actual‘ tsvizante in Wont heskin Wut the freedom of thet efty was not nerestable and the United States could not negotiate with those sho said ‘wWhat‘s mine a nine and vhat‘s Joots in negotiable Yer th Unitzed States vas willing to Zonotter my arcongcnent or treaty in Cernary consistent with the matatemance of peace and Ereedan Moreover the Uniced States recopnized the Soviet Union‘s historical concerns about their securtty in centzal and eastern Rurops and 4t believed that arrangements could be worked out sich vould neet these concerns Mhen Prine Minister McniMdan replied on July 23 to President Kemedy‘s message of July 20 which had given hin nd the othee Allied leaders advance notice of the contents of the President‘s address to the American people he maked f the President coutd avoid erphasizing too much the need for Adv—ratd ahaiters Lester Maenilian to Kennedy July 23 1961 secret poaencr cumsrcam case The President eaphastzed that shat var abnornal vas not the fresdon of West Reslin but the situation in divided Gernany« 42 anyone daubed the legatizy of the ighte in Berl the Unised States wae ready to have 45 submitzed to international atjuttcation Likeuise he said the United States vas prepared to subete the question vhethoz its presence was desized by the people of irest Berlin to a free vote in Beciin and szong all the German peoples The President declazed that the vorld was not deceived by the Communist atterpt to Isbet est Berlin as a hothed of waz The source of world trouble and tension he aat was Moscou mot Rerlin and £ war should beat it would have started in Moscou not in Serlin The President pointed out that the Sovict choilenge vas not only to the Unized Scates but to all free nations and pesticuterly co the Atlantic Comunity and that todey the endangered Erentier of freedom mag throuph divided Berlin The Soviet Goverment alone could convert merlin‘s frontier of peace tate a pretext for vars ut the steps which the President had indicated in his address vere aimed at avoiding that wor Eimally the President declared that he would su up the central neaning of this ctiate and of the policy of the Arcrican Goverment with these words ‘Me seek peace bus we shall not sverenten I B AMHied Consultations at Parte July 2f—pumure 8 1 fous fever Working Grewp Reports Political Questions tn accordance with the progran proposed by the United States and accepted by Britain Prancey and the Poderal Republic the first of the achedeled allied neatings took place in Paris July 26—fwpunt 3 This was the neecing of the Four Pover Yotking Group which produced a report that was to be revioved by a subsctuent necting of the fous Wester Foreign Wintetors 1 documeats on Germany 1966—1961 pp 694—701 Zumeroner rnpuescrme cise Sores Motives and Insentsous« the report first analysed Sovi¢s intentions and motives in terms similar to those of the intemal Anertcan documents previously discussed Iactica« The Report then turned to the nutter of Hestorn tactice They should be aimed at bringing about within the next few werka a change ta the postion of the Soviet Union so that it vould accept nepoctations ‘he Working Group held that the question of a Hestern initiative reparding negotiations would depent on the develop— sent of the Soviet position Lt should be avoided tht the Soviet Union interpreted a Hester initiative as a sign of weakness Circumstances hovever might force the Restern Rovers to consider an initiasive at an easly ataze——for instance an tnpending action by sone country to bring the Berlin question tnco the United Nations or a Soviet reply to the Hestesm notes of July 17 tnvicing mepostations on terme which the Hest would Eind dificult to refuse The situation in East Germmmy could 1tkevise prectpitate matters Kt is motevorthy that an annex to the Repost dealing with the implications of the deteriorating econontc atzwation in East Germany ended with the conclusion that the Communists seened to be creating encuth difficulties for themselves without the Allies taking a hand and thas the Allies should do nothing to exacerbate the attuation ‘me Working Group recomended that prior to receiving a Soviet reply to the Hestem notes of July 17 the westem Revers should adhere to the Line set forth in these notes Tre Horking Group also considered the possibility of sore Hntzed Western intetacives much an an early approach through the Anbessadors in Noscow and discussions with the Soviet leaders at the Geneva Conference on Taos or in lew York at the UK Genera mssenbty It waa agreed hovever that any Abas« sadoriat approach in Moscow should not precede the Soviet reply to the Western notes of duly 17 1t uss also stated that t vould be destrable in principle that a negotiation with the Soviet Union take place before the USSR hat acted unilaterally in convening a peace conferences tn any event ft vas fels that the question of the date of a vestern inttlative vas a very delicate one and that the ideal con— dition ueuld be to take advantage of a Soviet overture cuse f mma apo he Working Group prefersed a Hestern initiative to be aimed fizst at‘e confertnce of the Foreign Itinteters of the thaee wentesn Posers and che Soviet unton even though a nient netting might eventually becoue necensary to achieve a nceningfot discussion of basic tosues The German dele intion intieated that Geman public opinton would noe object to a discussion of the German question by the fous tevers without Geman participation ‘me question was hovever whether the soviet Unton vould ageeg to a conference niclout German participation Deapite the diodvantages of the Geneva femal‘ of 1935 the Working Group concluded that it might be necessary to athece to this formate providing for pertici pation of vest and fast German advisers in order to achteve a‘ conference Regarding the agenda of such a staisteriat meeting the Working Group betieved thee tt shoute not focus on Bertin alone But at the least covee Germany ant berita inclusion of other subjects such us ‘Bust—West relations might also Se eonnitated 18 shere stould be a sumit meeting rach hand of Coveriment would obsicusly have ote sight to introduce ang mubgucs he stated substantive Political Questions The working Group Hacked time to elaborate a complete Tescern negotiating posi« thon 3t atterpted hovever to ansers cestain proposals dncliting Hose nérinced by the Wess easites With regard to Germany the Horking Group felt that the Hester Rovers vould have to raise at a Foreign Mintaters donference the issue of German reantfication on the basta of selt—deverntnation tne working Group considered the Peace Flan of 1959 atidi‘a good baste for nesoctations but suggested that the Plan should be sevieved with the object of present dng At in a nore striking manner to public opintony suppross— ng diserziment featorcs to longer corresponding to the sitontion and adding festuses which sould make tt nore diffi— cute fos the Soviet Unten to reJece the Plan After discussing the possibiiity of a special statue for a remnificd Germany the forking Group concluded that the Western Rovers should adhere to the postclon taken in the Peace Plany nanely that a reontfied Germany should be free to opt efther or Jotning a security pact or for staying neutral were ase me orking Group also agreed that the securtey provisions of the Wester Peace Plan cught to be the baste for any further ssudy of the subject 2t was recommended hovever that the provisions of paragcath 16 of the Plan easures against surprize attack might be made the subject of a study by miditazy and poltzical experts Hth respect to Germanys eastern frontiers the Yorking Group concluded that concessions should be offerte only if the west received a suitabte quid azo oss but if hostilities over Beclin seemed temtnent at night become taportant to counter Soviet propaganda concerning the Oder—Hetnse Line ‘me Horking Croup wazned hvever not to have any Mtusions that Kbrushcher would accept a satiefactory Serlin artangenent mevely in exchange for recognition of the oferaietase tine The German delegation observed that any Sinal detinicion of the eastern Srontter should be Linked with a solution of the German problen and there was general agreesene that any proposal regarding the Oder—Hetase Line should not be advanced as a separate inttrative ‘me Working Group also agreed to recommend to the Foreign Mintatere that the possibility of an atl—Geman plebtscite atong the Lines of the Working Group report in preparation for the svamit meetng of 1960 see ance Pazt 137 Chapter 21 1 be reviewed and the language of the recommentation receuaninod As fos Berlin itself the torking Croup agreed that no asesnponent was acceptable that did not secure these three essenttat objectivess 1 Natnzenance of the presence and security of Hesten forces tn Hest Rerling 2 maintenance of the Ercedom and viability of West Berlin 3 maintenance of the Ereedon of physical access to Hist Berlin the Working Gzoup constdered that the defense of these objectives inplied the preservation of the existing status of berlin and thas ali other sotucions vould result in such a profound trensfor— nation of the seatue of the city and of the conditions of sccens that the basis of Allied policy in Europe woute be enéongered ‘he Norkin Group considered two éifferent Iypothesce in exantning the problem of negostations on hestin with the Soviet Union 1 nesotiatton with the U98R before signature of a separate peace treaty 2 a situation resulting Ezen the sig— mature of a separate treaty rmesssar ose Under lypothests 1 the Hestern Rovers could advance an att—beritn proposal shich should be Linked co the reunification of Germany Subsequently the western Rovers as in 2959 sould present proposals alning at a modus wivendt in Serlin on the basts of cho current status — Tne proposal put foward at Geneva on duly 28 1959 as revised in April 1960 in prec pasation for the ewentt conference sti2l represonted a ienerally acceptable solution and ‘therefore could bo re— examined Pinatly the Western Rovers faced with a probable Eatlure of negotiation ant with the prospect of imntnent siznature of a separate peace tzeaty might consider undcr vhat condttons the Soviet Union while sizing the treaty might enter into practical arrangezents safepierting in fact the existing system of access This yas envisaged onder the formula of sctutton 0‘ Under bypothests 2 the working Group considered that ance a sepazete treaty had been signed acceprable modalicics of accers could be catabltahed resulting either frou parallel measures taken by the two pastics or from negortation Te formula of Solution C could also be envisaged in this case Sut this search for practical arrungenents sefoparding access should be subject to one major contition nanely that the vestern Pavers could accept neither direct negorlacions vith the GDR resanding their access rights noe subordination of their traffic to OR control ‘he Working Group also agreed that the possiblity of a plebiscite in West Beritn resending the position of the testo Rovers tn tnat city shoud be exantned tre German detepation inticated that Lt vented to consult Hes Berlin authorities before expressing further views on this aubject 2 tous Rover forking Group Reports Midicery Buihé it and Contingent Fians Acengtiientng she Forces of the Allience The four dele gations fully endotsed the policy aet forte in the American eccorandim of July 21 regarding the progressive baild—up of the strength of the Alitance In view of the face thas the muclear capacity of the wort had already reached a high level te vas agreed that the requized efforte should be made mainly in the Efeld of conventional armaments so that the Alliance in a given sttwation could respond with appropriate means este nescu ans either comventional os nuctea The Horking Group felt that the dangers threatening the west and peace would be con— siderably increased if the Soviet Unton had prounts to beiteve that the eee had no other chotccs thin to react otther with Mieized forces or at the outset with nucleae ams The British representatives stated that thete poverneent was considering the most effective action t cout take and that the Poreign Secretary vould make pertinent statements at the Foreign Mintesers meeting The French declared chu thetx contribution vas Hikevise unics study and that the measures undertaken or anticipated wore closely in Line uith those anticipated in the Acerican memorandum The representatives of the Federal Republic seated that thete goverment would endeavor to fulfi1 the goale foreseen in XMT planning and they expressed the hope that a totel of nine divisions sould be assigned to ATD by the end of 1961 Moreover the Pederal Republie intended to take at necessary measures to assign wo fusther divistons to KMD in the course of 1962 Review of Berlin Contingency Rans tn reviewing Berlin contingency plane the horking Group first considered the implications of the Anertcan menorendom of July 21 with re— gard to ground access procedures The Working Group agreed to recommend that the Foretpn Mintaters instruct the Arbasse derial Group in washington as follows a to undertake a review of existing Altted contingency plans with a view to providing tor Alited acquiescence in execution by East Germans of the current Soviet procedures regarding Allicd ground access to Rertin 3 To redraft the note to be addressed to the Soviet Govemment shen sipnatuse of a peace treaty appeate eminent and to redeatt the public state ment to be nade by the thore esteem Povers as vetl as the instructions to Allied personnel 6 to devetop a rastonate in the pertinent doeu» ments refersed to in b for the scqusescence in the Execution of cursent procedures by Ease Gemma the Western rovers would make clear tn these documents that no document signee by the USSR and the GD could affect thei stants with respect to Beslin and access thereto seach wgzmmsers ose that they would tnstst on undtatuzbed physical access to berlin that an long as this contimued under current procedures It wan‘a matcer of Andifference to then vio Executed there proceduren and shat they vould contine to hold the Seviet Union responsible for maintenance of their right vith respect to feritn including thore of access 4 to stuty the possibility of extenting the scope of atzanstents now governing ctvilian tratftc to Berlin by having Rast and west Germans at the eechnical level agree on procedures governing atl teattic to Seritn including atlted miticasy eratfic« ‘he working Group explained its recomentactons by point ing out thie the concept underlying the Allies contingency plamning by precipicating an famedtate shown alloved little elustttacy for diplomatic ant political mimowering In order to alloy mare tlme for this and also for the necessary depleyment of military forees tt might be destzable in the initiah atages to resort to a gectinon atelife the Working Group furthemere declared that existing contingency plans vould‘ nake dteticolt my appronch to a modus vivent on access Mong the tires of Solution C‘ The Working Group Ainally dxpeéased douse as to the political feasibility of ithering to the present peclooft procedures in view of public opinion especially mong the Atttcn and it pointed to the dangers CP mitied dlawnity over an cssentially procedurel question on the other hand hovevers the Working Group asked the Roreign Mintaters to eonstcer tle disadvantages of the propored change in procedure In vould greatly increase the hold of the GDR over Allied access and enable tt to explay ercsive Eactien that night paralyze any fornfut reaction by the chree Roveret ‘Purtheimore even though the sugested procedure applied only to land access in might encourage the CDR to driend 12 to ate access which vould endanger sivil access to serin Hth regard to the military aspects of contingency plansing the Unters States delegation presenced to the working Croup a papet on ilicary Planing and Preparations tovar a Berlin Cxlgls® which included ateo érafe instructions to the mititary authorities of the three Hestem Pavers The Vorking Croup xerfenir opzmn oss anseed that it vould not be possible to establish governsental Positions regarding the U delegatton‘s paper an the draft Initructions prion to the necting of the Foreign Mntaters and suggested chat Secretary fuck might start a discussion of these lapues by presenting these tuo papers to the other foreign Ministers ‘me Hotking Grogp recommended that the Foreign Mintaters ask the Ansnssadotial Croup tn Nehington to atuty the follon— ing topics 4 ems for eoncerting end coontinating the planning and execution of military measures beyond the Zompecence or tive ont 4 Means of assuring continuity of militazy control during transition tron eripactize Borlin neasores to control by established NAT mechantone 12 and when necessary Means of effecting coordinated political mitdnce and control of stlitary activity vorld—wi¢e daring a Bertin eriaie e orking Group Linally recomended that the Foreign Wintsters consider the need for new directives for 1iVE Of and other military auchoritics» Eqronte Countemncasres The Working Group also sut mitten Secoemendations with regard to econontc counterscasuren he these were mbatantiatly revised as a eoult of the revies by the Foreign Mintacers they with be casen up in the contest of the discussions and decisions at the meeting of the Foreign Mintecers 3 3 Iripereie Foreisn Mintarers Heeting fuput 5 prior to the review of the Working Group Report on a quadcipectite basta the Foreign Minteters of the Unized States Mitntetertat Consultations on Berlin Paris August 49 1961 Report of the feur—Pover orking Group on Gemany and Seckin Eavis July 26—iugont 4 1961 Aug 4 1961 secret A Bok Thi rer assssmam jj i exeamat Sie Britain ant France aet on Aupset 5 to discuss certain topics Before the Gemmans joined the deiperations ‘hexe uss generat agreement with the Anezicm proponet that ihe Germana should be assoctated rove closely sich planning resarding merlin and thot they shold beccue full Fledged Partzers in the hork of the Mbassatortal Steeting Group in Tastington Preach Foreign Mintater Coone de Musvilie streesed that he preferced to diecors in the abrence of the Corman how Aorertant the Seriia question uas to the futore of the Federal fezgsite and tte atsathnent to the went The Yeat Coure te Regvitle said ‘mot avoid mything that could alter this mtachant and loud to Gerzan neotentin At stake was the feture of the Actonete Alliance me discusstons of the three Poretgn Xintaters then turned to the question #2 the taingot ay negutationt pith ths Soviet Shion on Retin and tt becase appesent thee there uns a taste Ainupreoment over this quretton betveen the nited Srates and Britain on one atde and France on the other Secrezary tusk supported by Bettiah Foreign Secretary Hone toon the portion that the Western Povees should cace ln LMitlactse prior to the comening of the h Omeral Assembly Bepteamer 19 to bring about a Foreime Ministers neecing mich the Soviet Dison uithout however reventing the mupstance of the Menten rosttion The Secrncaty euphantzed that it che Hertare Roven did nce proceed in thes namer theis Eriencs wt Allier sould be ooulliing to suppost either a etittary Rildcup or nconsnte and propaganda mensucen Moreover it Heald be avoided thet when the Uf Generai Aesenbly net on Bepteaber 15 other countrins wuld take an initiative for Anintiations which night be dissdvantageoms for the western Roms Gove do iarvilte stated that before offering negotiations die Renton Rovere atould realize that he Soviet Thion would only vane to nepotate about Beckin A mubstancive aprement Reeiptanie to the Soviet Onion vould have to sotioly the Hatzer‘s demand for an end to Wert Gemun political activicies Im Bettin ant for control by the O08 of all Geman trattic Ancloding fist of refugees between the Federal Republic and Serhin wltch van now procetding under the protective emout loge o all Scgvorer «sn of Atlied military sights thus the Atlies should resitee that any astsemice moe beind to things the states aro to— sevdtiy assess to Sesiin ‘me French Foreign Minister dectaze¢ that he did not see the proven of tactics and of public opinion in the ame Hight me‘ secrerary Rusk ‘Tac essencia1 face in the stcuncion was the Mext‘s relationship with the Soutet Union In the Eenter was‘a trtan of seseupth and it van tnporeant not to Mow neatmens fos the Nese to sake an dntolativn tovar Mistinttons an proposed would mesely intiente that fous of war was at the bottom of out hearts Since Khrushchev vas maying all the cine that the ere vould noe fighe ane hold Pvedtuatly acsese the Soviet position it would bo using to give hin the inpression thas he mas right Addressing hinself to Couse de Movilie‘s argueent that a erin of strength was the inane Secretary Rusk ceciased hae atzangth had nany components and that the hese stootd wt Sppeoute the foosbtence ot ore revstione to Rhroaicbes as well an to the Most me Soviet Union tad extensive Adtatizen in new purie of the morte and would have io take it Sato aesoume 18 the West sctseded in shoving op the Soviet gostiton repasting berlin on the other hand If the western Bovers were mable to convince nost of the nesters of the Unized Mattons that theis position vae reasonable a treat dent of pressuze might be Eeouphc to beas on chon witch could ereate mich diiftsedty Pinailys if the demseraste countrins mould ant theis people to mssioe the risk of muclene was hey fust make tt cleat that every effort vas being nade to achiove the objective by othes meas 5 tnstetsesstce fosetsn Mataters Heatings Aust £6 In vien of the divergences of opinion as the cripersite nesting with sesurd is the excsteal apesach to nogostecions Te in‘ Pethope not muspeining thas when the Fosetqn iinisters nes mo‘a smaisipesiee baste Hey desited to take un the nection on tactics of the Working Group Report only at a Iater stage in theie meetings held Aupsst 5 and 6 Apron Paria tel 52070 8 Aug 5 1961 secret messes Tommee ose soviet Hortves and Intentions tn discussing the section on Soviet motives and intentions the foue Foreign Miniscers dealewith the explosive stswation in Rast Comany resulting from the mass exedun of refugees see post p 77 Hest Gersan Foret Mintater Srenteno eephaitaed that the situation could easily become dangerous if the Bertin dos were closed The fous Foreign Mintazers decided to approve the sepoct and also to fastzuct the ashingron Anbassadortal Gmup to keep the situation in East Gormany under constant review Strengthening the Forces of the Alldance« In taking up the strengthening of the forces of the attianee the Foroim Mintators dtecusset at sou length the stlitary bitldcup of thet individual countries Brentano declared that the Federal Republtc vould take the necessery measures to eneure the butlé« up of tes forces as sct forth in the Report bot that no mensures should be taken before the Hest Geman elections of Septemser 17 The Foreign Mintaters unintmusly endorsed the policy of a progressive buildup of the Alltance as proposed in the Anertcan Mesorantum of July 21 asreed that it should be AMMance—wi¢e and have an orpanized followup and also agreed that the problen of mtlizery preparations should be discussed in sato Econosic Gountermessures Accepting with soe anendzents a Morking Group paper on econcnic countermensucen the Foreign Mintaters 1 acknowledged the tmportant nuciiory rote of econate counterssanurens 2 asreed to the deposition of a torwh econonte exbareo apainst the Soviet Boo in the event ailizary and civilian access ate or ground to Hest Seriin is blocked 3 agreed to consider vhother a‘toral exbargo should be taposed if only AlMed traffic to Rerkin uas blocked or substantially interfersed withs 4 directed that stuites of pessible measuzes other than total enbargo be endertaken by the Four over Horking Group under the guidance of the Ambassadorial Steering Group 3 undertook to seek agrecnent of all N79 mesbere to these princtples and to initiating the necessary leptolazive and atsintstrasive actions required to casey out the concerted measures should the contingenctes aise In the course of thet discussion the Foret Mintotors also agreed that an enborgo vas essentially an econcnte measure while a blockade was eesenttally of a milizery nature and that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Group raessiine oss berita Centingonsy Planning In dealing vith the Working Group paper reviewing Berlin conctngency planning the Foreign Mintetors approved without such ¢lscussion the recommendations regarding groun access providing for acquttscmnce in Past German execution of exteting Soviet ground procedures Cowve de Marvilie and Brentano bovever raised questions with respect to paragtaph 4 Of the recomendations which provided for a study of a proposal to have procedures governing Alited traffic to Beclin agreed upon by East and west Commons at a technical level Secretary tusk pointed ou that white the Alites vould not want to taik with the East Germans about Allied miltary traffie to Berlin they would not wish to go to wae to avoid talking to the Ease Gemmane Since it would increase East German prestige tf the Allies entered into éiacunstons with them t would be prefezable in a certain situation to ave the Hest Gemans talk with the East Germans about Allied alt tary teaffic the more so as the two sides alzeaty dealt dizecely with civilien traffic to Berlin which vas 95 percent of the whote trattic Brentano expressed doubt as to the desirability of fetting Gersans handle AtHied sraffic on this baste ite felt thae it would be dangerous to broach the subject uith the East Germans and to tmply that they hat a ight to be consulted about Allied eratftce to the end the Foreign Minteters agreed that the study proposed in peragzaph 4 of the Working Group recomendations on contingency plaming should be undereaien In the discussion of the atlitery aspects of contingency planning Secretary musk specifically endorsed the working Group recomendation that the Apussadorial Croup in Washington be given broad responsibiitty for plaaning for action on a workd—uido basis te also stzeased that the anbassadoriel Group mht have to be strengthened by the addition of sore nilitacy advisers and that there was need for better Liatson between the Group and LIVE OAK the Secretory furthenmore dees attention to the problen raised in the Anrican atlizery posers cixculated in the working Group as to whether oxtscing MHZO machinery uas suitable for control of operations at a time shen events aight move into an actual militazy phase fogsserrt