NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR The President The White House Dear Mr President WASHINGTON 25 0 C t1AN 31 l The attached report on possible projects for substantive co operation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space is provided to you in accordance with National Security Action Memorandum 271 dated November 12 1963 and my interim report to you of December 13 1963 It has been coordinated with the Department of State the Department of Defense the Executive Secretary of the Space Council the Central Intelligence Agency the Office of the Science Adviser and White House staff Since space technology is closely related to and in some measure interchangeable with technology of military interest careful examination of the attached report is desirable in connection with further initiative in this field 1 An appendix to the report reviews the status of agreements already reached between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences for cooperation in three areas 1 coordinated meteorological satellite program 2 passive communications satellite experiments with the ECHO II satellite launched this month and 3 geomagnetic satellite data exchange The appendix als¢ reviews Soviet rejection of numerous specific offers of space cooperation made in the past by the US At this writing the Soviet Academy while in communication with NASA in re gard to the agreements between us has failed to meet time limits on most a greed action items but has conducted optical observations of the ECHO II satellite as a greed and apparently intends to proceed with communications experiments between the USSR and the Jodrell Bank Observatory Other tests of Soviet intentions under these a greements will materialize shortly 2 The report focuses upon possible cooperation in manned and related unmanned lunar programs Possibilities for cooperation in other space programs have been and will continue to be advanced in the channel between NASA and the Soviet Academy GROUP 3 Downgr aded at 12 year int ervals not automatically declass ified 3 The report recommends these guidelines to govern foreseeable ne gotiations with the Soviet Union in the space field substantive rather than propaganda objectives alone well-defined and comparable obli gations for both sides freedom to take independent action protection of national 2 and military security interests opportunity for participation by friendly nations and open dissemination of scientific results 4 The report reco gnizes that cooperation with the Soviet Union must ultimately rest on specific projects However the advantages and disadvanta ges of specific proposals are not absolute They may vary si gnificantly depending upon Soviet objectives techniques procedures and schedules relative to ours Lackin g sufficient information of these factors we remain uncertain of the security and tactical aspects of specific proposals which might be advanced to the Soviets 5 Accordingly the report outlines a preferred struc tured approach calculated to determine a level of confidence in any Soviet response to gain information on basic elements of the Soviet program and to merit confidence and support by the public and the Congress Briefly this approach provides for maximum exchang e of past results generally subject to verification from other US sources proceeds then to sufficient disclosure of the future planning of both sides to identify areas favorable for cooperation and concludes with the joint definition of specific projects Examples of specific projects would be put forward in the initial presentation of this approach to lend credibility and substance to it 6 The report recognizes that the Soviet Union is un likely to be amenable to such an approach In that case it would be possible to proceed directly to specific proposals Some 15 examples of possible projects are described in the report and evaluated in such terms as our current knowled ge of the Soviet program permits However limitations described in the report attach to virtually all these proposals These limitations reflect the general climate of US- Soviet relations and are therefore subject to change--which mi ght bring any of the proposals within the range of realistic ne gotiation At present a change in sentiment appears necessary even for small steps in cooperation for example in the exchange of purely scientific data relating to solar r a diation and micrometeorites the Soviet Union has within the past year declined to provide details of instrumentation and c a libra tion required for their understanding Given a change in sentiment however such At- L 3 exchanges would be useful and some cooperation might be pro posed and developed in several areas including those listed below and in addition mutual tracking support and the re covery and return of manned capsules after their return to earth 7 On balance the most realistic and constructive group of proposals which mi ght be advanced to the Soviet Union with due regard for the uncertainties and limitations dis cussed above and detailed in the report relates to a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing These projects should be linked so far as possible to a step-by-step approach ranging from exchan ge of data already obtained to joint planning of future flight missions They include projects for the determination of a Micrometeoroid density in space between earth and moon b The radiation and energetic particle en vironment between earth and moon c The character of the lunar surface d The selection of lunar landing sites 8 I believe this affords flexibility for positive action utilizing either a variant of the structured approach para graph 5 or with necessarily greater caution selected specific proposals without reference to the structured approach para graph 7 9 With regard to the timing and form of further US in itiatives toward the Soviet Union the report recommends the following a Continuing interest should be expressed through the existing NASA-Soviet Academy channel in a positive Soviet response to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by you b No new high-level US initiative is recommended until the Soviet Union has had a further opportunity possibly three months to discharge its current obligations under the existing NASA-USSR Academy agreement or in the alternative until the Soviets respond affirmatively to the proposal you have already made in the UN c If Soviet performance under the existing a gree ment is unsatisfactory a high-level initiative on a non- 4 public basis would seem desirable to prod the Soviet Union to better performance additional public steps mi ght be con sidered if this proves unavailing d If Soviet performance under the existing a gree ment proves satisfactory personal initiative by you would still be required to extend this success to cooperation in manned lunar programs Because the scope of initiative by Soviet Academy representatives seems limited Mr Khrushchev's personal interest and support would also seem to be required for any si gnificant extension of joint activity It is be lieved that your initiative will be more effective if taken privately in the first instance e A US initiative should establish our interest in the preferred structured approach described above If it then becomes feasible to proceed with technical ne gotiations the NASA-Soviet Academy channel should continue to be the vehicle used as in the past technical proposals to be considered in such ne gotiations should be made available for prior inter departmental comment It may become appropriate to consider an effort to induce the Soviet Union to make personnel avail able who are closer to their technical program f Agreements reached in technical ne gotiations should be embodied in memoranda of understanding explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments g To demonstrate the serious intentions of the US with re gard to international cooperation in space and to maintain some pressure upon the Soviet Union to follow suit we should continue to expand our current and successful joint projects with other nations to the de gree possible This report will be kept under continuing review in NASA in concert with other interested offices and a gencies and we shall keep you advised of our progress with the Soviet Academy under the current a greement between us I believe we are well prepared to support whatever initiative you determine to be appropriate in li ght of this report and stand ready to pro vide such additional information and judgment as you may re quire Respectfully yours Enclosure US-USSR COOPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAMS President Kennedy and President Johnson have affirmed and reaffirmed the desirability of exploring further joint efforts with the Soviet Union and other countries in co operative space activities including manned lunar programs See Appendix I In support of these initiatives and in anticipation of possible discussions with the Soviet Union this report examines technical proposals which might be put forward by the United States as well as other considerations appropriate to such discussions For two reasons this report concentrates upon possible cooperation in lunar programs 1 cooperation in lunar programs was the focus of President Kennedy's September 1963 initiative and of President Johnson's confirmation of that initiative and in particular of his State-of-the-Union reference to the subject 2 cooperation in other areas of space research and exploration was covered in the Kennedy Khrushchev correspondence of February-March 1962 in both specific and general terms has progressed to the point of firm agreement on three projects and is the subject of an apparently continuing relationship pursuant to that corres pondence and agreement At issue now is an extension of this relationship to the only major field effectively ex eluded from it i e manned lunar programs and related unmanned efforts A brief review of the current relation DECI ASS mD A tlv fity NASA y A -3 f'f ---f ONFIDENTIAL 2 ship appears in Appendix II This report necessarily assumes that the Soviet Union is engaged to some degree in a program looking toward eventual manned lunar landings Soviet statements on this point have been ambiguous as to timing and status but clearly positive on balance If there is not a Soviet program the Soviet Union will probably confuse the issue for an indefinite period In that case it has been suggested that US pressure for cooperation might even induce the Soviet to undertake manned lunar efforts not now lanned Viewed positively this could divert Soviet resources from less desirable preoccupa tions seen negatively it could lead the Soviet Union into new technolo gy We believe that the safest assumption is that the Soviet Union does not exclude a manned lunar program and that no significant danger to us is involved if this as sumption is incorrect I• Guidelines which have been applied in the preparation of this report follow 1 The central objective is to bring about continuing cooperation with the Soviet Union rather than to achieve propaganda gains as such In his September 20 speech at the UN President Kennedy stated ••• we must not put forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes 2 In order to achieve real gains we should press for flBENflAl --- 3 substantive rather than token cooperation 3 Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of both sides made clear and comparable This will facilitate implementation as well as clarify responsibility in the event of failure and with drawal 4 In the present state of US-Soviet relations we should undertake no project or other arrangement which might make us dependent upon Soviet performance thereby impairing or limiting our independent capability in space 5 National security i terests and military potential must be fully protected No exchanges impinging upon security should be considered in the absence of certain comparable and verifiable information from the Soviet side 6 Opportunity for participation by other countries should be preserved and all results made available to them II Ultimately any program of substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union must rest upon positive proposals of specific character Such specific proposals can be defined almost without limit and numerous examples of different modes of cooperation with the Soviet Union are provided in this report However the advantages and disadvantages of specific proposals are not fixed by the terms of those pro posals in an absolute sense The positive and negative 4 values to us may vary markedly depending upon Soviet objectives techniques procedures and schedules relative to ours It is therefore most desirable that we seek in formation on these aspects of the Soviet program so that we can evaluate and shape our own proposals effectively and prudently Lacking such information we would inevitably remain uncertain in matters of security tactics and bona fides According ly we should define and attempt to hold to an approach to the Soviet Union which is calculated to 1 determine the level of confidence which we can place in the Soviet Union in this subject area 2 provide informa tion of the basic elements of the Soviet program and 3 merit the confidence and support of the public and the Congress An approach structured to achieve these ends is spelled out in the next section of this report If such a structured approach is not acceptable in whole or in part to the Soviet Union the President and the Department of State may never theless depending upon the circumstances and apparent attitude of the Soviet Union determine that technical negotiators should proceed to the direct presentation of specific proposals Such flexibility is desirable--but with clear recognition that different considerations will apply to the same proposals dependin g upon whether they are offered with 5 or without some confidence a nd knowledge of Soviet plans III The preferred approach to ne g otiations with the Soviet Union entails the discharge o f outstanding obli gations followed by an escalating series of exchanges which are in the initial stages subject to verification It is thus calculated to build a level of confidence upon which pro gressively si gnificant cooperative activities may be based Since ne gotiation on ma nned lunar programs necessarily presages si gnificant new relationships with the Soviet Union requiring evidences of good f a ith the first steps should be directed to clearing the slate as much as possible A most desirable first step would be material progress on both sides to implement the existing bilateral Dryden Blagonravov space agreement in which the Soviets remain at this writing delinquent although they have resumed com munication A second step more directly followin g upon the US overtures in the UN would be the detailed exchange of data and information of the two countries' manned space programs to date This should include past fli ght biomedical and training data and could extend to early spacecraft tech nology The virtues of this step would be that it would represent a clean start requiring from us little new information yet obli ging the Soviet Union to present con- 6 siderable information not previously made available publicly Since elements of the USSR contribution at this stag e would be subject to verification through independent sources a practical and useful test of Soviet intentions would be available at the earliest contact and a first confidence level could be established If this step should _ prove a significant obstacle to further progress it might in the interests of flexibility be downgraded as it were and subsumed quite naturally under the third step below It should in any event be tested since other means of determining the de gree of Soviet good faith are not readily apparent Opportunities for establishing a confidence level for dealing further with the Soviets would be diminished in proportion to de-emphasis of this second step The third step would be the exchange of gross descrip tions of our respective manned lunar programs Again this step would not place an undue burden upon us because of the publicity already given to our own intentions but it would for the first time require the Soviet Union to describe its conceptual approach to the lunar landing problem This step appears virtually indispensable for it is hardly possible to proceed intelligently or saf ely to coordinated cooperative or joint effort without some over-view of the proposed Soviet program The fourth step would seek through more precise descriptions of our respective lunar programs to isolate ---- CONFIDOOIAL 7 elements of conflict or duplication and to discover opportu nities for trade-off complementary procedure or joint action Significant security considerations do not arise until this step is reached Examples of cooperative relationshi ps that mi ght develop at various stages of the a bove procedure follow Conflict between the two programs could arise as a crude illustration through plans to use the same window for independent lunar missions on the same radio fre quencies It would be of mutual interest to eliminate any such conflicts -- Unnecessary duplication illustrated by independent but adequate programs for exploration of the lunar surface would offer opportunities for thinning out or otherwise ad justing our respective programs so as to provide together only required information--the exact de gree of thinning out depending upon the confidence level established at the time -- In other cases a desirable redundancy of effort might be reco gnized and specific provisions for data ex change made to increase reliability and confidence -- Discovery that both sides planned to apply limited resources to the same facet of a broader problem e g examination of the lunar surface in a relatively narrow region would permit a reordering of efforts to cover additional facets of the problem on a shared-effort basis with subsequent exchange of the results - CONFIDENTIAL 8 -- Some trade-offs can be visua lized arising from differentials in schedules and capability in the two pro grams e g the possibility that the Soviet Union mi ght acquire a sample of the lunar surface before the United States taken together with our twenty-four hour deep space tracking capability suggests a trade-off between the two medical data obtained in the Vostok fli ghts mi ght be traded for radiation or micrometeorite data obtained in our scientific program If an improved confidence level is achieved throu gh the modest but meanin gful arrange_ments suggested above progress toward more advanced inte grated relationships could be made IV At various steps in the above procedure specific projects should be put forward as appropriate to lend con crete substance to the ne g otiations A relatively detailed description of such projects follows Ne gative or uncertain values reflected in this description follow from our current lack of knowled ge of Soviet plans a more positive evaluation should be possible in each case if serious intentions on the part of the Soviet Union motivate a sufficient exchange of the necessary back ground information A ne gative assessment of Soviet in terest or desire in a given case does not necessarily mean that the proposal should not be put forward it is intended -bONflDENTIAL solely to reflect realistically the present prospects for a substantive advance of our purpose These apparent pros pects may well change in li ght of any information forth coming from the Soviet side relative to their program and interests Close examination of the comments provided in each case will show that the framing of proposals with positive appeal to both sides requires knowledge of the objectives modes of attack and relevant schedules of both sides The same knowledge is necessary to determine what critical tactical or security advanta ges may be conferred 9 or lost in a given project These defects grow in direct proportion to the significance of the proposal contemplated A Data Exchange 1 On Micrometeoroid Flux -- Both the US and the USSR could profit from a full exchange of information on the temporal and spatial distribution mass penetration characteristics and shielding of micrometeorites in earth to-moon space The security a spects are minimal and pre sent indications are that information obtained will not present radical problems of an unexpected nature However as recently as June 1963 Soviet scientists in precisely such an exchange relating to their Mars and our Venus fli ghts declined to give us instrumentation and pro grammin g information necessary for meanin gful interpretation of their data Also the USSR must be expected to be quite -GONFIOENTIAL 10 reluctant to provide data on shielding materials and results 2 On Radiation and Solar Events -- Both sides seek greater knowledge of radiation and particle fluxes in cislunar space particularly that associated with solar proton events Such information is necessary to improve the predictability of proton showers so as to fix manned flight schedules safely and permit the design of optimum shielding This is likely to be a long-range program requiring constant monitoring and predisposes both sides to welcome an exchange of information We could advance a proposal to define a project of investigation and xchange on this subject to be carried forward by a joint working group consisting of designated representatives of both sides There is some question however whether the Soviets are yet on a par with us in this work Also we anticipate that the USSR will continue reluctant to discuss the detailed interrelation ships of data instrumentation and programming in adequate depth Nor could we be sanguine about exchange relating to shielding or other countermeasures 3 Lunar Surface Characteristics Both sides require information on the characteristics of the lunar surf ace for final design of spacecraft to land on the moon Whether there is the basis for an exchange rel a tionship depends in part on the relative schedules of the two programs if the Soviets are ahead of us as is possible at this early stage they will have acquired intelligence CONFIDENTIAL— 1 of the Junar surface before we do and have little interest in any contribution we can make on this point On the other hand 1 we are on sinflan schedules and the lunar surface is discovered to have radical characteristics not anticipated such information could become critical to equipment design and even mission success It could thus becone an important element in the space race itself with onitical tactical and even security value Either side might well wish to with hold knowledge of this kind u Selection of Lunar Landing Sites —— The sare considerations discussed immediately above apply to exchange of information in the survey and selection of lunar landing sites Assuming a Soviet lunan landing program both sides are faced with the sane gross requirement and thus there should be in principle a basis for cooperation However the actual degree of interest and potential for cooperation would depend in good part upon technical requirements and relative time schedules 1f the latter are not close the leading side could be expected to be relatively disinterested whereas if they are close information on a suitable site could become critical in a closely conpetitive situation 5 Astronaut Training and Experfence —— Each side must be assumed in principle to have interest in the other‘s astronaut training techniques flight experience space medicine resulte and spacecraft technology The US has already been quite open in publishing its material along CONFIDENTIAL - CONFIDENTIAL 12 these lines and has not yet had comparable periods in orbit The Soviet Union must therefore be presumed to have less interest than we Indeed a Soviet representative to a very recent International Academy of Astronautics meeting declined to participate in a second conference on manned flight asserting that there was little new to be expected from the American program in the next year or so No additional manned fli ghts can be expected in the US pro gram for upwards of a year In sum it would appear that we cannot offer mutuality for a considerable time in flight results and space medicine Indeed we would appear to be leading from weakness if we pushed for exchanges in these fields Exchanges in the related areas of astronaut train ing and spacecraft technology would if they were to be meaningful impinge upon flight systems security considera tions and simulator techniques and must be re garded as most difficult to approach in the initial instance with the Soviet Union B Operational cooperation 1 Mutual trackin g support -- Several modes of cooperation in tracking and data acquisition have been explored from time to time with the Soviet Union the USSR was offered the support of the Mercury network for any manned flight of their own with no strings attached Glennan it was asked to consider an exchange of tracking stations each side to place a station in the other country each to operate its own station Kennedy and the USSR itself 13 suggested cooperation in the tracking of deep space probes Khrushchev but later retracted this offer privately implying security considerations Despite seeming Soviet disinterest in this area and the fact that lunar missions are conducted at particular times windows when both sides may launch missions of their own it seems probable that both could gain from mutual tracking arrangements Since windows are a function of launch site and tracking station locations mission profile and objectives and payload capabilities the two sides would probably utilize somewhat different windows We might then provide twenty-four hour ground coverage lacked by the USSR in exchange for greater flexibility afforded by use of their land and ship-based nets 2 Capsule Recovery earth Both sides face the possibility of spacecraft returns to earth in areas not planned Accordingly they might both have an interest in exchanging the signals and recovery procedures to be utilized in emergency recoveries Either side could then proceed to the rescue of astronauts in areas under their control The exchange of such signals could in principle also permit either side somewhat more readily than now to interfere with recovery operations by the other How ever this appears a very small risk and one which mi ght very well be taken Such a project would appear to have few ne gative aspects little prospect for wide implementa tion but possibly considerable public value __ CONFID£1'1TIAl - CONFIDENTIAL 14 3 Capsule recovery space -- It is possible to frame a proposal that both sides a gree upon common docking hardware so as to permit either to rescue the spacecraft of the other in distress In fact it is not known whether hardware common to the two competing systems would be feasible but assuming it is rescue operations of this kind given current limits to spacecraft maneuverability would require compatible trajectories and orbits compatible oxygen supply arrangements an a greed communications rendezvous and docking procedure common training and possibly compatible aerodynamic configurations for re-entry purposes At a minimum guidance systems docking hardware and rendezvous and docking techniques capabilities and limitations would all appear at early stages to be of security concern A proposal of this s ort would therefore not be attractive to either side 4 Lunar logistics -- Following the first manned lunar landings it would appear possible to define a pro posal for sharing logistic support for more ambitious lunar exploration Such a proposal could be shaped in terms of a division of the logistic responsibilities or a division of responsibility as between logistics and personnel A proposal of this type would have some appeal if the two sides were on roughly similar schedules and shared ambitious plans for lunar stations or exploration something not known to be planned in either case If one were well ahead --- ONFlB 15 of the other or had no current plans for ambitious follow on lunar projects it would have relatively little appeal A proposal of this type would have the disadva ntage of sub jecting us to reli a nce on the honorable and competent dis charge by the USS R of its responsibilities over a period of years In any case the proposal would not appear to promise early realization and should be deferred for subsequent con sideration in the course of a progressive and satisfactory development of more immediate projects 5 Trade-Offs -- Where mutual benefits cannot be established in symmetrical projects it may be possible to relate dissimilar activities to a sing le balanced coopera tive effort For example we could offer the Soviets the support of our twenty-four hour deep space tracking capability in periods when it is not directed to our own use in exchange for data or samples of the lunar surface which the Soviets mi ght acqui e before the US C Integrated Projects Substantial integration of major elements of flight configurations is circumscribed by two factors 1 virtually all major contracts for accomplishment of project APOLLO have already been placed establishing a heavy and costly commitment in desi gn and development 2 the placement of responsibility in the Soviet Union for integral elements of our own program would enable the Soviet to obstruct our progress while proceeding --· CONFIDENTIAL-- 16 clandestinely on their own Nevertheless certain coopera tive projects requiring close integration are dely entertained and some comment is appropriate More important there may be some integrated effort which is nevertheless possible at a relatively early stage at least one proposal of this type is noted below 1 USSR booster US spacecraft -- It has been widely proposed that we suggest to the Soviet Union a manned lunar effort based upon the use of their greater boosting capability and the most advanced spacecraft of the US The Soviet Union is not now known to possess a booster capable of manned lunar landing and return although they are develop ing engines which if clustered could provide this capability The US is building such a booster It is not consistent with the US objective of achieving a leading space capability to delegate the development of an adequate booster to the Soviet Union A reversal of the proposal would not appear to be in the national interest since it would employ an advanced US capability to place a Soviet spacecraft first on the moon It would also entail Soviet access to US launching sites and techniques without the possibility of access to USSR sites under comparable circumstances The heart of the problem posed by a proposal of this type lies in the very extensive exchange of technology required to inte grate the spacecraft of one side with the booster of the other Such an exchange applies to all CONFIDENTIAL I 17 significant characteristics of the booster system in design and performance including guidance and requires the launch ing authority to have full information of the spacecraft system A continuing and extensive mutual interplay on technical terms is known through experience in domestic as well as international satellite programs with friendly nations to be required for spacecraft-booster integration if success and avoidance of recrimination are to be achieved Extensive access would be required by both sides to the launch site and by reason of the unsymmetrical basis for the pro ject such access would be on -sided No experience with the Soviet Union in areas with or indeed without military implications suggests that even a small fraction of the interchange required would be forthcoming from them 2 Turner proposal -- A Republic Aviation engineer Thomas Turner has proposed in Life October 11 1963 a cooperative effort to circumvent some of the difficulties noted immediately above According to his proposal the US would fore go the development of a large booster and con centrate simply on placing its lunar excursion module LEM in earth orbit The Soviet Union would at the same time place a very large and powerful spacecraft in earth orbit The two would rendezvous then utilize the Soviet's space craft propulsion to transfer to a lunar orbit at which time the LEM would separate and descend to the lunar surface with both a Soviet and an American aboard It would then ---tONFl 18 return to lunar orbit the occupants would transf er to the Soviet s pacecraft abandoning the LEM and return to earth According to Turner the sole req uirements are common docking hardware and a communications a greement The pro posal is an ingenious one but implies that neither side would develop the total resources to condupt a manned lunar program by itself We re gard this at this time and in the present context as an unacceptable interdependence pre judicing seriously our ability to proceed with our own program in the event that the Soviets do not live up to their a greement over the extended period of years required to implement it The US requires a major booster for its own posture and broad national interest Thus no real saving would be effected by the Turner prop osal The notion that the necessary lunar orbit dockin g could be conducted without common training and practice procedures on earth is not tenable In addition this raises most of the questions which are specified in item B 3 above Our conclusion is that the Turner proposal is neither practicable nor desirable at this stage in US USSR relationships It could be held in abeyance until a progressive imp rovement in the discharge of cooperative obli gations by the USSR warrants its con sideration at a later date 3 Interchange of astronauts -- The US could propose a reciprocal arrangement under which astronauts of each side are accepted by the other for extended periods CONFIDENTIAL 7 19 of training leading to participation in flight missions It is apparent that such an exchange would entail long-term and extensive access to training facilities and programs fli ght hardware and systems launching sites and so forth as well as language preparation however reciprocity might be assured through synchronized phasing of the program in both countries The US would have far more to gain than to lose from such reciprocity in view of the relative secrecy of the Soviet program to date The prospect is particularly attractive because of its implications for opening up Soviet operations We are informed however that it may be politically premature As always in dealing with the Soviet Union it may be feared that comparable access information and training will not be afforded the American astronaut s exchanged with the Soviet Union The concept of synchronized phasing of the training of the two would go a long way to correct this since the two astronauts would move from one phase to another of the two countries' programs on a par and we could withdraw our man if we were dissatisfied The pros pects of such dissatisfaction must be regarded as rather hi gh given experience with exchange programs with the Soviets in the past It may be therefore that greater success could be had with this same project if again it were developed in the course of a progressively improving relationship with Soviet space authorities It remains in any case one of the more attractive possibilities ONFlB l f l- 20 In fact early instruction of selected astronauts in the Russian language has been suggested to remove at least one obstacle to its realization v Questions of initiative timing and procedure for nego tiations with the Soviet Union have been considered The pertinent background and status of past negotiations with the USSR is briefly summarized in Appendix II 1 As contacts continue at the agency Dryden-Blagonravov level we should clearly express our continuing interest in a response from the Soviet Union on the question of extending cooperation to lunar programming and other subjects 2 No new top-level action by the President Secretary of State or Ambassador is recommended until-- a the Soviet Union is given a further opportunity to evidence the discharge of its obligations under the existing NASA-USSR Academy space agreement £ b the Soviets respond to US initiatives already taken in the UN 3 After the Soviet Union has had a further opportunity to deliver or default on the existing agreement a further top level initiative would seem appropriate The nature of such a US initiative might be along the following lines a In the event of continued failure of the Soviet Union to discharge existing obligations in the Dryden- G CONFIDENTIAL 21 Blagonravov a greement a top level US USSR initiative would seem desirable privately in the first instance If Soviet intransigence persists it may then become appropriate to tax the Soviet Union publicly with their failure in matters of cooperation b If the prospects for an extension of existing agreements to the manned lunar landing area become promising--either because of performance in the existing agreement or because of a response from the Soviet Union to our UN initiative--a urther top level US action should be taken privately in the first instance For example thB President may wish to inform Khrushchev that we propose an orderly structured approach toward a developing cooperation beginning with the maximum exchan ge of past results proceedin g to sufficient description of future planning to permit identification of possible areas of cooperation and concluding with the definition of specific projects Examples of possible projects would be included in the presentation of this structured approach to lend it credibility Again if the Soviets are intransi gent consideration mi ght be given to stating our position publicly in order to increase pressure on the Soviet Union In such a public statement the US approach could be openly described to domestic and foreign advantage CONFIDENTIAL 22 4 Whether a further US initiative is taken or a specific Soviet response to the President's UN offer received in either case making negotiations possible it is then our considered view that our action should be for the express purpose of pre paring the way for technical discussions The NASA-Soviet Academy channel which has been successfully opened by Dr Dry den should continue to be the vehicle for technical exploration and negotiation of the possibilities for cooperation with the Soviet Union If it should prove technically desirable or necessary consideration should be given to requesting the Soviets to assign to the negotiations personnel closer to the technology of their program As in the past proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available for prior inter-departmental consideration 5 Any agreements reached at this technical level should be embodied in memoranda of understanding explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments 6 As a tactical device calculated to put pressure upon the Soviet Union demonstrate our serious intentions and gain good will from certain nations consideration should be g iven to means by which other countries than the Soviet Union might be further identified with our lunar programs See Appendix III US-USSR COOPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAMS APPENDIX I __ _ - A President Kennedy · made the following statement regarding United States-Soviet cooperation in outer space in his address before the United Nations· General Assembly on September 20 1963 Finally in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity--in the field of space--there is room for new cooperation for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of spaceo I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon Space offers no problems of sovereignty by resolution of this Assembly the members of the United Nations have forsworn any claim to territorial rights in outer space or on · celestial bodies and declared that international law and the - United Nations Charter will apply • Why therefore should man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition Why should the United States and the Soviet Union in pre paring for such expeditions become involved in immense duplications of· research construction and expenditure Surely we should explore whether the scientists and ··astro- ·nauts of our two countries--indeed of all the world-­ cannot work together in the conquest of space sending some day in this decade to the moon not the representatives of a single nation but the representatives of all of our coun triesc B P_resident Johnson · reaffirmed the above statement through Ambassador Adlai E e Stevenson who made the following remarks in Committee I of the · United Nations General Assembly during debate on international cooperation on outer space on December 2 1963 As you also know President Kennedy proposed before the · General Assembly last September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest of space including the sending of men to the moon as repre sentatives of all of our countries o President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today If giant strides cannot be taken at once we hope ·that shorter steps cano We believe there are areas of work-­ short of integrating the two national programs--from which all could · benefito · We should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation beginning with small steps and hope fully leading to larger oneso I G J c J 2 In any event our policy of engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space--with the Soviet Union as with all nations--does not begin or end with a manned moon landing• There is plenty of work yet to come before that--and there will be even more afterward C In his State-of-the-Union address to the Corigress on Janu ary a 1964 President Johnson said Fourth we must assure our preeminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade--in cooperation with other powers if pos sible alone if necessary APPENDIX II The background of experience in negotiations with the USSR is briefly summarized Progress at all levels has almost in variably required US initiative It appears that new initia tives are successful only if the way is paved at the very highest levels Negotiations are seriously hampered by the fact that Soviet representatives are drawn from the Academy complex which seems to be once removed from the actual conduct of the Soviet space program Soviet scientists do not often appear well informed of flight conditions or hardware Soviet reaction time to US initiatives and correspondence has been extremely slow The USSR is currently delinquent on most action items scheduled in the Dryden-Blagonravov agreements however cor respondence has been resumed by Blagonravov after more than three months of silence and agreed optical observations of the ECHO II satellite have now been performed by the Soviet Union The basic Soviet line for the past four years has been that significant cooperation cannot precede major improvements in the poiitical atmosphere including disarmament The US proposals which led to the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement were apparently regarded as sufficiently modest to permit some departure from this line--though at least one of the agreed projects could lead to a joint global meteorological satel lite system At various times the Soviet Union has ejected US offers of tracking support for manned fli ghts an interchange of overseas tracking stations for earth satellites or deep space probes formal participation with NASA and other countries in experimental communication satellite tests exchanges on standards and techniques to preclude contamination of the lunar and Martian environments and repeated open-end offers to explore any items of interest to the Soviet Union With regard to Soviet plans for a manned lunar program Khrushchev has said little more than that the USSR will not proceed until they are ready ·and that they are working on the problem but it is not known whether they are developing a large enough booster although engines suitable for clus tering for that purpose are reportedly under development Khrushchev has spoken only ambi guously about cooperation and has actually seemed to accept competition as desirable On the other hand some softening of the Soviet line may be indicated not only by the Dryden-Blagonravov a greement but also by the recent willingness of the Soviet Union to reach a greement on legal principles to a p ply to space activity and on radio frequencies to be used in space communications and research The requirements for these a greements however are far from comparable to those applicable to cooperation in manned lunar programs A brief summary and evaluation of the status and content of the Dryden-Blagonravov a greement follows _tONFIDENTIAl d 3 A first US-USSR Bilateral Space Agreement was reached on June 8 1962 and was then supplemented by an implementing Memorandum of Understanding which became effective August 1 1963 Together these agreements set forth the technical details and arrangements for cooperation in three areas 1 Coordinated Meteorological Satellite Program Exchange of cloud cover photographs and weather situation analyses gained from each country's experimental meteorological satellites Establishment of a full-time conventional facsimile quality communications link between Washington and Moscow for two-way transmission of these data Coordinated launchings of future experimental weather satellites and ultimately of operational weather satellites 2 Communications Satellite Experiments Experimental transmissions at 162 mc s between the USSR and the Jodrell Bank Observatory in England using the US passive reflector satellite ECHO II USSR to consider experiments at higher fre quencies L USSR to consider radar and optical observation of ECHO II Future negotiations on possible joint experiments with active communications satellites 3 Geomagnetic Satellite Data Launching by each country of a satellite equipped to measure the earth's ma gnetic field as part of research planned for the International Year of the Quiet Sun in 1965 Exchange of results of satellite measurements Exchange of data from mggnetic surveys of other types Dr Dryden wrote Blagonravov in mid-August listing action items requiring early completion if the a greed deadlines for joint action were to be met and conveying the United States position on each This communication went unanswered until December when Blagonravov acknowledged the letter apolog ized for delay indicated substantive replies were being prepared and asked for the launch date for ECHO II Dr • Dryden replied immediately by cable giving the launch window and nominal orbital elements for the ECHO II satellite and reiterating NASA's request for Soviet radar cross-section and optical observation of the satellite during the inflation stage which occurs in part over the USSR on the first orbit This cable was immediately acknowledged by Blagonravov as of this writing he has provided a statement of in tention to discharge at least the minimum requirements upon the Soviet Union for observation of ECHO II and communications tests with that satellite He remains delinquent in other outstanding matters 5 Although all joint action has slipped several months because of Soviet dilatoriness this need not affect any of the proposed cooperative efforts substantively but may only delay their implementation At this time it seems likely that Soviet performance will continue ragged with little regard for deadlines The remoteness of the relationship maintained by the USSR detracts in some degree from the positive value of the cooperative association established nevertheless satisfactory com pletion of any of the steps prescribed in the a greements should provide the best basis for improved relationships and further progress CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX III Besides inviting the Soviet Union to cooperate in the lunar program in his recent UN speech the President expressed a desire to bring other countries in as well The possibi lities include the following 1 Trackin g and data acquisition--We already enjoy the cooperation of a number of countries in the accommodation and operation of manned flight tracking and data acquisition stations and should publicize this fact along with our interest in extending the present level of participation 2 Scientific experiments--We now give forei gn scientists a chance to compete for space for their experiments in our observatory satellites We should consider extending this practice to Gemini and Apollo noting that these opportunities may be very limited even for our own scientists In addition to space and wei ght limitations there could be difficulties growin g out of Air Force participation in Gemini 3 Contracts--If they materialize in sufficient number publicity can be given to certain subcontracts entered into with forei gn contractors e g Canadian com panies are developing and providing extensible antennae for the Gemini and Apollo missions including the antenna to be used for rendezvous missions In addition consideration A M 1 _ r71ft 7 s t t __ _ _ f - U J Uii L-J11 2 could be given to offering forei gn governments the opportunity to take on the development and production of subsystems and parts on a cooperative basis i e at their own expense to meet our design standard and schedule requirements The technical and contracting limitations would however be severe and the takers few 4 Astronaut orientation--A program might be organized under which forei gn high performance pilots mi ght be brought together for observation of and limited partici pation in NASA astronaut training only programs as a familiarization and orientation effort on a continuing basis e g successive three-month classes 5 Astronaut training and fli ght--The numerous and valid objections heretofore raised a gainst including forei gn pilots in our astronaut program are recognized The ne gative aspects are these rivalry among interested forei gn nations further pressure upon our limited fli ght opportunities resentment by current US astronauts difficulties in application of commercial bene fits to astronauts security questions pressures for fli ght priorities feminist and congressional criticism absence of practical application abroad for the training given here The positive aspects are these Few other sing le actions could more dramatically express the President's deep desire for cooperation few other sing le actions could equal tONFlnE tT At - 3 the boost given by this one to US relations with Latin America or Asia if pilots from those re gions many already trained here were chosen few other actions could do more in the next few years to eclipse Soviet propaganda in this area--or protect us more e ff ectively against a similar Soviet move On balance technical and political considerations su ggest a negative conclusion on an offer of this kind and preference for the proposal reflected in item 4 above Perhaps the most acceptable position to meet the issue of third country participation is represented by the recent statement of Senator Clinton P Anderson before the AIAA January 15 1964 •••• we can give validity to this nation's policy to internationalize space by asserting tha t the United States will accept offers of support from any nation which c a n contribute to the space pro gram Such contributions should continue to be organized a nd implemented within the policies already applicable to existing and uniformly successful international progr ams of NASA February 4 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR BUNDY Mac -- 1 The President can get the gist of the entire report by reading Mr Webb's four-page letter 1 2 The attached draft NSAM has been prepared after consultation with NASA State and Ed Welsh The action proposed is the one they would like to have 3 No dramatic move is recommended at this time The action l is now with the Soviet Union and it is generally agreed that some performance on their part is needed before we should make our next moves 4 If the President intends to communicate secretly with K he l might consider including a personal expression of hope that K - would personally oversee and expedite the Soviet response to our offers of cooperation realizing the great difficulty any Chief of State has in getting the bureaucracy moving with alacrity particularly when mistaken notions of military security may be impeding performance 5 The item concerning Ed Welsh' s Space Council is included in Ed's suggestion He has already made his suggestion orally and in writing to the President It certainly would do no harm to the program of cooperation and might be the occasion for the President to impress his personal stamp on this program it would be all to the good a fQ t Lru-l -· kv - _ N J • Charles