% 7 os ‘— Aucmiitnithiemnnintizied mmak President‘s Phone Cal with Gorbachev—Fanvary 11 1991 ——Gorbachev initiated the call at 8 00 a n —corbachev spoke generally about domestic events in the Usst including the situation n the Baitics —The President urged against the use of force in the Baitics —The President asked for Gorbachev‘s thoughts on the Gulf ——Gorbachev said saddan Hussein had responded to his letter Gorbachev said it might be worthnile for him to send an envoy to compare notes with Washington Gorbachev did not indicate y specifically the ideas he wanted to convey to the President £ —the President responded he would be willing to discuss the Gulf 7 with the Soviets but didn‘t want to give Saddan a reason to delay £ a final decision past Januazy 15 Me agreed to meet with Bessmertnykh that day to discuss Soviet views $ Prasident‘s Meeting with Resemertnykh—Janiary 11 1991 i —The meeting began at 3 00 p m« and lasted for one half hour ¢ —The President referred to the morning méeting and said how $ important it was that the Soviets had consulted with the U S $ before going forvard vith an initiative —The President said the 0 5 preferred the USSR not go forward with an initiative He said the 0 5 appreciated Gorbachev‘s efforts and the spinit in which they were undertaken —the President explained the need to be fully consistent with and stand by the 12 UiSC resolutions and for the coalition partners to stick together ——The President said the U 5 thought 1t most appropriate for the I SWSYG to undertax® m mission instead — The President said the 0 9 wanted to avoid a war in a manner fully consistent with the UNSC resolutions ——The President explained the best hope for peace lay in convincing Saddam he had nothing to gain fron being obstinate ——Bessmertrykh said he appreciated the Presidents frankness and would report to Gorbachev te said the Soviets had removed most sommenitnna‘sommaitwas i i 1 greco omnes —— of their citizens from Traq He said the Gulf situation had not had a major impact on events inside the USS and that the traqi regime was increasingly unpoputar ——the President said his letter to Saddan Mussein contained no insutts but was meant to tell him what he vas up against — its purpose was to give Saddam a clear view of events that he probaby did not get from his advisors Rresident‘s Phone Call with Gorbachev —Tanuary 18 1991 —Gorbachev initiated the call at 9 23 a m ——Gorbachev said he wanted to engage in a discussion of the Persian Guif situation Me said the USSR‘s public statement had laid the blame squarely on Saddam and that war had been inevitabie He said the Soviets vere calling for an Traqt withdrawal ‘and full compliance with the UW resolutions y —the President congratulated Gorbachev on the Soviet statement ——Both leaders agreed they should strive to contain the waz £ especially to prevent Terael from being dragged in £ ——Gorbachev said two days of war had essentially dealt a severe brow to Saddam and to Traq‘s military and industrial 5 infrastructure He said the 0 5 should consider how much longer § to continue the afr strikes He also said his Ambassador in Baghdad had been in touch with the Iraqis to urge an Iraqi F withdrawal in return for an end to the air war ——the President said much of Saddan‘s military war machine was $ still intact and that there was no sign he was ready to accept peace the President said the U S was being very careful to avoid civilian casualties Me reiterated the conlition would stay the course until Traq was prepared to withdraw from Kuwait To end the fighting now would give Seddam‘a victory ——Gorbachev reaffirmed Soviet support for the coalition and repeated Saddam was to blane for the war He said the Soviets betieved Saddam had lost the military capability to threaten his neighbors and that the time had cone to stop the fighting —sThe President «61d the contitton had to insure full comptance with the UN resolutions and prevent Saddam from achieving a victory He said there was no evidence Saddan would comply with the Uf resolutions if the fighting stopped —Gorbache said he agreed with the President on the need for full compiiance He reiterated 0 5 belief that Saddam still retained a significant military capability —The President raised the Baitic situation and emphasized 0 5 n 2 ez y tu i I remezome — aaps mme concern that it be resolved peacefully He also raised CFE and star Letter from the President to Gorbachev —Fanuary 24 1991 ——The Presidents letter conveyed deep concern about recent events in the Baltics ——It referred to their many discussions on this issue during the past and Soviet assurances on a peaceful resolution of their differences with the Baits ——t also mentioned U 5 attempts to normalize its econonte relations with the USN including stoning of the Trade Agreement at the June sumnit and the President‘s December 12 initiatives —The letter argued that the denocratically—elected Baltic leaders had acted with restraint and did not deserve to have ® their desire to negotiate met by force £ ——t said that should the use of force be continued the 0 5 f would have no choice but to freeze the major elements of the economic relationship f —The letter said the 0 5 remained committed to trying to 5 preserve the new relationship with the USSR and to work to 3 —It indicated 0 5 understanding of the difficulties facing the ¢ uss® and stated we do not wish the disintegration of the Ussr —The letter urged the Soviet government to turn away from force € and back to a policy of negotlations and peaceful dialogue it urged the Soviets to take concrete steps to prevent the fucther use of force and intimidation against the Baltic governents —The President opened by congratulating Bessmeztykh on his new assignment I ——The President reiterated the concern expressed in his letter to Gorbachev and sit the Soviets must understand that while we do 7 not want to intervene in their internal affairs the Baltics are j in a different category —Bessnertaykh said Perestroika and reform would continue in the USSR Me said the Soviets hoped to maintain cooperation with the uus i —#e said the Baltic situation was unfortunate and not created by Moscow — Gorbachev had read the President‘s letter carefully and poses we ——— wanted to preserve the trust in the relationship The situation in the Baltics was difficult and exacerbated by some — — Arresponsible Baltic leaders —pessmertryih said the Gorbachev letter said the Soviets wanted a political solution and would avoid force ——pessmertayth said the Soviets were trying by many ways to resolve the crisis peacefully Sone ary and MYD units would be removed The Federation Council would meet to discuss the Baltics He appealed for U 9 calm during a difficult time te said postponement of the summit would worry sore Soviets but the Joint statement would help ——The President urged progress on negotiations with the Baltic states He said use of force was the critical element and that drawing down on military presence was the right way to go He reiterated the major point of his letter that barring progress on the Baitic question the 0 5 would be forced to take steps z fe said the 0 5 felt strongly about the use of force Ht urged 3 quick action to better the situation e said the Soviets should mot underestimate feeling in the U S on this issue I ——The President mentioned the need to move on START and Cre f Gorbachev‘s Letter to the President —Febmuary 13 1991 ——Gorbachev wrote a brief letter describing Primakor‘s trip to i Baghdaa % ——fe said Prinakoy used his meeting with Saddam to convince him to comply with the UNSC resolutions and to spell out Soviet $ conditions for a withdrawal and cease—tire € ——fhile not making any connitments Saddan told Prinakoy he was Interested in continuing the dialogue # —Gorbachev said Tariq Ariz would visit Mescow to continue _ discussions ——He pronised to inform the President of the results of these taike TO O —The President rbbponded to Gorbachev‘s letter detailing j Primako‘s trip to Baghdad ——The President recalled our close coordination during the Gulf crisis with the Ussr —The President asked that Gorbachev brief hin on Tariq Ariz‘ visit to Hoscow d rz —— i — f_ gr _s o mem —the President said he could make no pronises to pause in the campaign based upon hopes Sadan vould comply with the USC resolutions This might encourage Saddam to avoid a withdravai —the President reiterated that the military canpaign‘vas fully consistent with the UNSC resolutions He reaffizned the coalition goal of liberating Kuxait not destroying traq fle said the coalition had gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid injury to civilians and non—nilitary installations ——the President mentioned need for movement on CBE and STAT Rresident‘s Telephone Conversation with Gorhachov——rebruary 21 — r9en ——Gorbachev initiated the call at 6 45 pun s ——Gorbachev said he had Just finished three hours of talks with E Tariq Aziz and wanted to brief the President He described in 7 some detail Tragi willingness to entertain a withdraval and i cense—fize He said Ariz would be in touch with Baghdad and get an answer to the Soviet proposal £ —The President thanked Gorbachev for the call e said Saddam £ Mussein‘s speech that day contained nothing positive and 5 indicated no interest in accepting withdravai terns s —The President said it is hard to trust what Saddam says It f would be difficult for the coalition to accept the notion of $ stopping and hoping Saddam would then follow through on a cease $ fire He hasn‘t released any POMs or permitted the ICRC to see € then there is evidence of torture There was also the problen of reparations and the necessity to consider an arns enbargo before sanctions courd be 1ifted ——The President said an Iraqi withdraval would have to be svift — not stow He said he would have to consult with his coalition partners 1 ——Gorbachev praised U S —Soviet cooperation on the Gulf sitwation He adaittod it was hard to trust what Saddam said but i argued that Artz‘s willingness to make the Soviet proposal public ————denonstzated a cHange in the Iraqi position ——Gorbachev assured the President the Soviets were insisting on tough conditions for the Traqi withdrawal ——The President thanked Gorbachev for his efforts and said he understood what the UssR was doing While he had problems with some of the proposals he was thankful for 0 5 —Soviet I cooperation since the start of the Gulf crisis he said Gorbachev was playing a very helpful and constructive role I popmmnstenis rome usboners I Ro deena neenniine f tow a —The President asked Gorbachev to be back in touch when the Soviets had heard from Baghdad because time was running out rxesident‘s Telephone Call with Gobachev —Tebruary 22 1991 ——The call was initiated by the U8G at 11 31 aum Secretary Raker began the conversation n place of the President who was at another engagenent ——the Secretary read a message from the President responding to the Soviet initiative He said the Soviet effort was intensive and useful But Saddam Hussein had begun to blow up Kuwaiti ofl production and refining capabilities ——the Secretary described the President‘s public statement of that morning announcing a 24—hour waiting perfod before the # initiation of a ground campaign The Secretary then read to £ Gorbachev the USG statement on what would be required to avert a s ground campaign i ——The President arrived and added hs concern over the Traql £ action against the ofl fields $ ——Gorbachev then described what he understood the Iraqis would be ¢ willing to do based on his conversations with Tariq Ariz i ——He suggested a combined 0 5 —Soviet approach in the UNSC based F on Soviet conversations with Ariz He spoke of the need for a § political solution i % ——Gorbachev said he expected an answer to his proposals to the 6 Iraqis from Saddam ussein soon ——the President thanked Gorbachev for his efforts and for the close coordination between the 0 5 and USSR since the inception — of the ceists He said Gorbachev had brought Saddam further than anyone could have brought hin —the President said the coalition vas unanimous that Seddan Hussein could not be trusted and that his statements of the day i before were incompatible with what was being asked of hin The President rbhinded Gorbachev that Saddam had fired SOD missiles the day before and had launched a scorched earth policy in Kuwait which shoved his true intentions ——The President said the coalition could not allow the Iraqis to stall and play for time The coalition needed an answer to its demand for withdrawal —The President said he would send his statement to Gorbachev and messi nme requested that he support the coalition position Re also said he hoped U 5 —Soviet relations would not be adversely affected by these events L —— ——Gorbachev said he had the sane assessment of Hussein He reiterated that they take advantage of the opportunity to find a poritical solution He advocated again a Joint 0 9 —Soviet approach in the uiSc ——The President said we could not allow the Iraqis to stall and that the Soviet plan had fallen short of an unconditional withdrawal —the President raised the need for action on CEB and START fe said the relationship would not fall apart over Traq Erestdent‘s tetastons c so gotusonet an ise » £ ——Gorbache initiated the call at 11 15 a m and mentioned it was 7 PEE 5 I ——Gorbachev said Saddan Hussein had shown a white flag by P agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait City within four days ——Gorbachev proposed the 0 5 and USSR conbine their approaches § in a Joint effort in the Ui 3 —the President responded that Secretary Baker had explained the £ U S position to Bessmertyny%h the previous evening He added § that the Traais continued to use a scorched earth policy and were stalling and putting forth too many conditions —The President said the 0 5 position was the UW position fe praised Gorbachev for his efforts and appealed to him to support the UW position of unconditional withdraval te said the U 5 could not wait any longer 1 ——Gorbachev again raised the idea of a Joint effort in the UW before the initiation of a ground campaign —The President said he didn‘t vant to mislead the Soviets I Unless the Traqiac changed their position very soon the 0 5 ————coutd—not wait ranger I