DOCdIrTGRADED TO SECRET BY AFHRA RSA BY tXEcuTIVE ORDER REVIEW TEAM IAW EO 12356 A DIFANTE 9 JUN 97 ASS IFIED 1 J ' ' t ' c- 1 • ' ' -' •• 9 ' l I' • t' I After the conclusion of the Second World Etas United States mill q planning continued to rest on the traditional policy that this country W iAhd not initiate an attack against a foreign rower Knowing in the mid•1950 ' Q that the Soviet Union al-ready had sufficient intercontinerite I let kombtiI to C r r ' C launch a successful attack against thLs hotions SAC planners calculated that our adversary Mould possess' enough highly developed Intercontinental $allestic e' Missiles by 1961 to strike targets'Ln•thc -continental United Statet Hcriever c ' It wasesome comfort Vwinv •tlfst by -this date the American Bsilestic Miftlle Early Warning System hesdquaxtered ai Thule Greenland l would be aisle to detect a missile roughly rtiaway in'its•tialectory and furnish a warning time pf approximately fifteen minutes 2 As early as 1956 Headquarters SAC btgpn ' developing a system o 'strstegic detorreme to meet the Russians' 1•onq• nVnge bomber and missile t om the projected period 1956-197063 U A carefully balanced alert program emerged as SAC'S answer to e possible Soviet surprise attack and it hinged upon three defensive concepts These 17he Thule radar monitor attained on initial operational capability on 30 Septawber 1960 and a completely operational status on 1 February 1961 A second site at Clear Alaska became operational in 1961 and a third site i esme into being at Plyingdoles England in 1963 iiPW SAC Historical Study No 79 The SAC Alert Ptogram 1956-19599 Hq SAC HO 23 Jan 61 p 2 Hitt of BAP 64 F54 3Hitt of SAC FY 59 p94 ASSIFIE WWWOMMING PAPERS 2 r were ground alert which calluJ for a fixed percentage of s A' bombers tb re Ift in a constant state of readiness at designated bases airborne alert whereby aircraft actually in the sky would fly daily sortits on fixed routes N441e '- s lawattl -g-asders to diti'3rt to enemy largetsj and missil alert which defined 'CQ the criteria for the immediate haunch of SAC's IC W force after receipt of warning that Soviet mlasile were on their way to the American mainland The e Cf aircraft and missiles in all-thre conditions carried Emergency WaT pion weapons Cz U Ground alert was the first aM Elie most basic tenet of SAC's 'alert strategy Essentially it w'as o defensi've maneuver A certain percentage•of f SAV s 8 47 8-52 bomber fllet •sunport#4 by KC-97AC-135 tinker forces wasl • E 4 loafed with E'r weapor a and pgised beaid toe runway ready to launnh at a • n JX C moment 's not i ce Fil ots acid maintenance crews lived in the closeaiz-2mmame proximity to both the aircraft and runway After rece•lving war J rg of'on ' impending Soviet attack these L tubers would become airborne immediately and proceed to targets in the Soviet Unior On Oe other hand SAC'S ground alert L system contained a built-in offensive f'eiture ' If the command received sufficient warning of a nuclear assault at least a portion of its aircraft J a could become-airborne in time to retpl'istf Prior to 1994 SAV % strategy for war operations ctntered uponlde•oying t a portion of its forces to bases overseas for prestrike staging In tfrfs year however the command began testing 'a• new operational technique whereby bombers stationed in the United •States would fly directly to their targets and use overseas bases for peat-strike purposes In 1955 SAC planners concentrated on creating' a special 'SAC quick strike operations plan j C kit n 7 gym General Mrtis S 1 eMayq WSAC's cow--ander-in-Chief approved the plan later 'that year and hit decision marked the official 4eginniny of the SAC alert program l C The Strategic Air Command first petitioned Headquarters t3 AF to authorize the creation of a ground alert system on 3 October 1955 and General Nathan F Twining the United States Air Force Grief of Staff endorsed the plan in principle on la December The Air Staff-6 20-7 decision confirmed Txinin g 's action in March 1956 but•slert ree ained _ a roved onl in rinciFle r•-ei • t until December 1957 when the Air Staff officiallY sanctit'ned the recoamencfatf on 2 C ' 1 f r The Strategic Air Command canActed throe ii'd ll service tests between November 1956 and ecember-IIW to determine whether the ground alert concept was practicable A four-aionths'•test at hunter ArB Georgia proved the program feasible The test at Hunter also revealed that facilities must be located as near as possible to the erd of the runway to launch aircraft wi thtn 5 minutes which was calculated as the maximum warning tic the MTWS i oyl r r allow and that approximatFly one-fourth of- S v wing aircraft could be maintained on 24-hour alert with the 1 6 to 1 crew-to-aircraft renning ratio ' r then In effect at all SAC bases Two additional tests at little Rock AFN Arkansas and at fountain Home AFB -Idahoa developed the organizational lidebo SAC Historical Study No 79 The SAG Alert•Program 1956-1959 Hq SAO HO 25 Jan 61 p 1 UNCLASStW 1I 4 r' 4 4 I When SAC began ground alert In J957 its primary delivery vehicle was the 8-0 Stratoift bomber bu •this aircraft required at least one air CJ refueling to •strW target when bastd irk the continental United States The to command however lacked sufficient 'tankers t4 refuel the entire 8-47 force c As a result SAC decided to position a portion of its 0-47•eiert aircraft at ' overseas bases From those the--B- 79 -could strike targets in the Soviet U 1 C union and return without refueling Ck 4W • Although SAC's 'overseas nuclear deterrent before 1957 'Ygvolved f the rotation of bomber wings at 90-eay intervals the command plan'red to i rotate units of aircraft and crews 0 foTward bases for shor er periods of time t The Strategic Air Co ra and be lieveo this policy would provide a defen slve posture equaling or surpassing that Areviouslj realized by the deployment' Of ccmplete bomber wings for three month cycles Full field maintenance facilities would no longer be required Command plahnera calculated that a cutback would also ' Inaugurated operation REFLEX ACTION on I July 1957 DOS b 1 ' 1_0 j result in a considerable moneta'y saVings far the Air Force 2• q test- the concept of moving units to over eas bases for -brief periods of time 1Hi st of GAF 64 F121 2 is SAC Historical Study No 79 The SAC Alert Program 1956 1959 t Hq SAC HD 25 Jan 61 p 43 • UNCLASSIFIED i UNCLAS U on I July 1959 exactly one -year after the beginning of the REFL k-_e' i#INfItC1M4 •WiYSn MIG va l'F ' 'ly' r test the coamand extended the prog am 't ei ht_ _ overseas base3 nd to three' rat t bases io the continental United States The Strategic Air Comand now • ' increased its commitments to ground afert at•farward bases by sending detach British #r bases Bridge Norton Fairfoid rments to the United Kingdom I s s r and Greenham Common each received six B-47s DOS b 1 L e The 22nd 43rd and 320th Bimb dings sent 1 detachments to Eietson AF S Alaska Early in 1959 SAC further expandedrits r bases in the United States the operation was concerned priaarily witty the overseas deployment of B-a7 and KC-97 aircraft REFLEX operations in England by sending-one bomb wing to the Royal Air Force's bases at Meiveston 'UpYer 4ey ord and Bruntingthrope while the lttrategicaI Ily placed facility at Greenham Common DOS b 1 accepted - its fps second wing 1 Although REFLEX notated some aircraft from southerna to northern V In the continental United States units of the Fifteenth and Sepond Air forces went on ground alert at northern bases of the Eighth Air Force The 509tH Bomb Wing at Walker AFB sew Mexico sent five aircraft to Pease AFB New Hampshire the 97th Bomb Wing Biggs AFB Texas sent aircraft to Plattsburg 1Hist of SAC FY 59 p 99 UNCLASSIFIED W • lJl QJ_jASSIFI 6 47 s• mot r 4i terminated completely six and a half years later on 31 December 1965 when the last aircraft were withdrawn from Flmendorf AFB Al ska This wk's the same date that the command removed 011 B-47s and KC-97s from its active inventory and - posted its entire 'ground alert force at bases in the continentll- United States except for '0 B-52s'which remained in Guam ' protecting the continental United States and western Europe fropi%missile and long-range bomber attack ah operation known as AIRMAIL' 'based' yt Andersen I1FB 0uam 1provided asimile r 8 441 alert function in the stern Facific Due to 2lbid p 54 H4 SAC HG 95 Jon 61 p 166 SAC Histori'eal• 5tadV N0 •'79„ The SAC Alert Arograth 1956-1959 3Ibid p 57 4Ibid p 54 AFB New York -and the 44th Bomb Wing Pinecastle AFS Florida each maintained % r three aircraft at Loring AFBg kaine l Thus with the expanci'on at REFLEX in July 1958 SAC had 194 B-47 bombers 47 KC-97 tankers and four EMC aircraft • on ground alert in the continental United States and at overseas 'bases 2 Planners at Headquarters SAC'had originally intended for-the DOS b 1 0 s operation to be a six months' operation However due torthe program sS success the trsmand exte'hd#d the new rotation concept for on -ind finite r period 3 Until SAC developed sufficient long-range bombers 'tankler s and ICBMs to negate the importance of overseas bates to its defe'nsive 9osture s ' REFLEX continued to provide the framework for ground alert 4 Cr#Cation RFFLEX C 5Hiat of SAG Jul•-tic 65 p 194 UNCLASSIFIED • ' aj While REFLEX furnished a practical and tccnomical defen 'li ve tactic for T TT T 'yI ASSIFIE • Guam'dietance I 7 x from the ' atniand SAC met the rotational requirement r for bombers end crews by placing 1 t orrber aircraft of the Fifteenth Ajr Force on the island Ten 8-47s were mointal cd in a constant state of reedit ess while the remaining five aircraft conducted normal training ooerations % The major operational difference between RF Fi EX and AIRMAIL involved crew rotations C at Gu maintenance chiefs snd a-portion of the crew rotated every O days 11 r -TT -% C while SAC alternated support pCrsonnel an-1 aircraft every 90 days '' From the standpoint of both economy and feasibility it v4as SAC's goal to place one-third of its bomber and tanker forces on ground July 1960 At this titre the first alrt reft at any a irrt base rouYd take o ff VE -ithin 15 minutest fter recelvt•r a rrfing of a Soviet attack ancf the'last c G A°- would follow within one hour by the and of 1961 the command F lanned for no less ban one-third of each bomber an9 tanker unit on alert to have-6 capability of l etoa iny airbarnthin the 15 niristt titre criteria 2'cc ' ' 4 • j with the advent of ground alert-i'n' October' 19579 Headquarters estavitshed reaction times of two hours for alert bomber tanker units the continental United States and o _n minutes for those at overseas bases In January 1958 the command reduced this•to 30 minutes in all cssFs 3 H6wever the' 15 minute reaction rrquirEment hoped forSAC at the inauguration of gr 1nd alert Ac4lAa lHist of SAC FY 59 p 105 2Hist of OAF Jul-Oec 57 p 246 Si 01 00 SAC Historical Study Ho 79 Ihe SAC Alert Program 1956-19599 Hq SAC HO 25 Jan 61p pp 76-27 UNCLASSIFIED i B t 01 was not specified until pore than two years later when the codmand prga ulgated the princlplt in the 50-61 Fmergency war Order on 31 August 1960 Now SAO established a proceduze known as Minimum Interval Take •Off•' MITO which enabled all a - rit''6 a rcrafV on ground alert to launch it the ' least possible time Prior to Xhe'•creafionsr of MITO SAC flans had simply called for the first bomber to fake aft as soon as possible Generk H Power reviewed the alert system with an eye to launching the last aiicrarty •tn the shortest possible time after fecaipt of tactical warr ing and created the principle of Minimum Interval Take f when he ordered that the last'•t 6ir would laun ono later than fifteen miltutes when notified of attack The Strategic AccllD C Air Command set 1 Seftember 1960 as the date for 811 cosr bat-ready H-47 creV-s and 15 Nov mber 1960 for all S-52 and KO-97 crews to complete NI 0 flight indoctrination However ssteral KC-97 tanker units of the Eighth Air Fgrte failed to Beet tree susFensey amt SW did not require all its combat-re dy•i tanker cress to cnmflete the training until January •1960 1 •K intmum interval Take Offq emphasizing the most rapid possible launch of the last a1rcraft• continues to be a fundamental principle of lie grovttd phase of SAC's alert program However 4-he time allowed •for'take•off• is even gore scecific todayi •e barbers must follow the first B-52 off tit hdldline at 15 second intervals 1Hist of eAF Jvl-Dec 609 pp 74-75 UNCLASSIFIED r • x sr ' UNCLAS J 11i G - P A P ER Although the command had set 49y 1960 as the date for realRing he y t Placement of one-third 'of its•bombers' 'on•ground alert$ an unforeseen international4 event necessitated an earlier impleme ttation lp May 1960$ Nikita Khru whev p the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics abruptly withdrew from the Paris summit conference after reporting to the gathering that Russian fighters had downed an American U•2 photo reconnaissance aircraft over the hi d C' Soviet Union on I May The command at Once put one-t r of its bomber and -tanker forces on ground alert as Past-west tensions continued to mount l One year later SAC intelligence indicated that the Soviet's ICBM•'system C ' had reached a level of sophistication iwhi ch now made the one-third alert posture F C inadequate Planners at Headquarters SAC reckoned that two-thirds of the bomber '• forces were vulnerable to missile attack and might not survive the fifteen' ftcx Vqd minute warning previously considered sufficient General White the•Akf Furce Chief of Staff favorsd placing at least one-half of the command's B-47k and B-52s on ground alert On 1 February 19619 he directed SAC to study the rpr6blem in 4 ' this light At once General Power confidently informed Secretary of Uefense Robert S McNamara that the'-Strategic Air Command could assume a fifty percent ground alert posture with little difficulty ten days later SAC notifi•ej' the Air Staff that it could°implement such a program The command followed this declaration four days later with specific requirements for achieving the goal ' The White House also suoported the Air force position - President ohn F Kennedy in a special message to Congress on defense O nditure on 28 March gave executive IHist of SAC FY 59 R05 UNCLASSIFIED Ml 1 t endorsement to the action called for by Ar and the Air Force chief Wit4 the President the Air Staff and the command in unanimous agreement Headquarieis USAF authorized SAC to expand the ground sleA force to the 50 percent post re w no later than 15 July 1961 The Increase became effective on this date and rem ained the allocated percentage for ground'alert until July 1967 - t- M To make sure that ground alert units could become airborn within minutes after receiving warning of an impending attack from the twEWS-mon•' at Thule and Clear SAC began a system of operational teadiness inspeetio no notice basis late in 1461 2 These tests 'employed exercises nicknamed 'BRAVO and COCO Crews participating in 't-he BRAVO -test -proceeded to tlie alkrt aircraft and automatically started their engines then after contact 1no the• 10 control town they reported rgady-to taxi In the more thorough C0gQ exe-rc1se M t the crew actually taxied their'altreraft to' the runway held the brakes applied take-off power reduced pcr rer and €exied back to the parking area A'CON exercise required physical movement of each aircraft beyond the runway holding • i line and it proved to be a realistic indicator of a unit's ability to respond to a BMEWS warning 3 potentially the most serious problem created by the increased alert e posture was its impact upon crew duty that The command readily xecvgnized this fact 4 When it had promulgated a 60 percent ground alert posture in e 6 st of SAC Jul-Dec 61 p75 2Mist of SAC FY 63 p144 3lid p152 4Hiat of SAC Jan-Jun 62 P77 UNCLASSIFIED f WNW V UNCLAS 11 July 19619 SAC expected to inactivate certsin medium 8-47 8-52 bwber units and KC-97 K6-135 tanker units in order to achieve a 1 8#1 crew to aircraft ratio for those aircraft participating in lert This surf•assed the 1 6ti ratio which Headquarters USAF had approvad in 1936# and which was still-in sffert c' when the President and the W' Staff made their commitments to a 50' percent alert posture Headquarters U15AF reigily sanctioned the 1 8tl cre ko-aircraft O ratio requested by SAC and authorized it'to become ef fictive on 1 Jiilq 19¢1 1 In order to maintain the new alert posture with existing manpvwett Y •r -resources SAC established a 74-hpur 'w0rk week for the aircrews tai ing part in ground alert in October 1961 pvty'time for-the bomber crews amounted to r 60 hours on alerts six hours flying t 'mt • and eight hours of assljT6pnt not comratible with alert An order frM General Power set the maximum duty'Week at 74 hours and the length of assignment•'•et four amonths 2 Although SAC had not intended for the 74-hour week to became an inflexible standard it dial k ' believe the policy would compel individual units to exercise good managemer t and to strive continuously far more efficient manpower utilization lut 56verai units participating in ground alert found it impossible to equalize work loa among all crews within the narrow limits of thejfour month assignment period outlined- by the command Accordingly 41f'1962 'General Power altered his %rtt directive and authorized the computation of crlw duty twice a year By the end of June 1962 the 74-hour maximum duty week for••combat aircrews was firmly estay shed as an inviolate SAC policy 3 and it remained so for the rest of the deb de • 'k 1MSg AFCVC 602629 Hq USAF to SAC and AFLC Increased Alert Posture for B-52 47 and KC-135 97 Force 07 1601Z'Apr 61 Exhibit 10 Chapter•fII Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 61 2Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 62 T103 3 b 104-1M UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASS a t Pla I r 1 W At the advent of ground alerts crews participating in REFLEX served 26 daysr the tour began with 14 days on alert seven days followedF f4r rest and recovery away from the duty stationi and finally 'the crewmen returned to ap the alert base before redeploying Th O 4nd believed this criteria would continue to furnish efficient use•of marw over and aircraft in maiwe4ning the 54 percent posture But as might suapbcted the more demanding schl dole was not popular -ith the crews Morale was greatly affected'when the Department of Defense decided in February 1 2 'to cut por diem payments for Fiscal Year r 1963 Citing the determental effect on the morale•of the RETLFX b46ek crews c General Power always willing to fight doggedly fox the interests of N16 m nt Imediately urged Secretary PcNamdta to reconsider his decision °M 4ftra reaffirmed his position in Apr 11 and'REF'LEY pilots and support erewa•bectme ineligible for per diem p4ments beginning 1 July 1952 if Air Force 4' arters and Air Force mess were provided without charge 0 0 In an effort to mollify the t2EFLf Y crews SAC diretted midwayrin 1962 that crews would seend'ne More than seven consecutive days on alert -'To iRpiement this policy it divided the 26-day tour into three one-wreeV duty periods separated by two rest periods of three and one-Half days each Because the Department of Defense seemed-unlikely to reverse its decision to-cut per dies paymentss SAC decided late in July 1%2 to reduce the 3-47 8-52• cycle from 2A to-21 days at all REFLEX stations except Elmendorf Alaska It ad6ed all units Participating-in RF'FLFX thit the new policy would become iffective on 2 September 2 1 Htst of SAC FY 63 p 133 2Ibid p 34-135 UNCLASS q _19 rr 1 ' r 1 i P Ft e In August 1963 iaprovemerits ko o Ballistic Missile Early Warning l in minutes and seconds for f System enabled SAC to provic#t a sr4cific warning iea i esch base in the United States Called Available Crew Reaction Time Itk a now technique furnished a unit the exact time-flapsing between the launch t a 5 vi t IC8U and f tti detonation'at the selected American taroet Now it 'became Q 1 C• r t crossed the hold line for take-off AF b 7 t possible for SAC plannors to determine precisely the number of aircraft which Could be launched from a particular bate within a specified number of w4nutes Calculated from the moment the klaxon hdrn sounded until the last-aircraft had r force was required to launch •as sd6fi ai pn sibte but within the VOS eactlon time assigned to that A unit 1-s entfrel' ale rt base and eal4varttrs'SAC periodically tested heir capability by ff ans of ground alert eyercises 2 'f'4 Moth varying launch times now sissified ts-minutes and seconds' ' tha r take-off of alert aircraft froffy a base ' nar -optscrvu or alternate runway presented a new problem to SAC's arou'd ' a14et program late In 1963 ' t7nit commanders poised their H-47 8-52 ai' eraft as close as possible••to their primary runway since it was the bombers which actually carried4w wearobs of •nuelear • • -deetruo n Bomber crews'llved in the-billets closest- to thetabeet's main runway Tanker personnel on the yather hooWl lived ih quarters located a further distance from the primary liy tliia did the srt rb who actually manned avc 1Mot of SAC Jan -Jun 67 P 15 - 2Nist of SAC Jul-Drc 67ip103 • UNCLASSIFIED kIt '4 the bombers I 0 C 0 C C CLAS On rare occasions generally during periods Of incltment Breather it became necessary for alert aircraft to use alternate br non-ootimust runways Such a d evlation from the general sit pattern often resulted in a failure to launch the entire unit within the reaction time assigned by HeadQuartars SAC in August 1963 The cammal was anxious to obtain complete information on the launch capability of an alert force taking off from an alternate runway and ordered a careful examinatlvn of the problem Accordingly LieutenantrGeneral Hunter Barris SAC's Vice Commbnderiln-Chief received the results of a non-optimum runway timing e4 flVatipn on 11 December 1963 The stuOy indicated that alert farces at eriaht ba'xei were'unabl to launch within ihei ltrits imposed • 1 t • by the BWWS tinting crite'ria• t 'Poi• the'monent this inadequacy ej' A not particularli disturb SAC planners who noted the was little chance that weat 6sr conditions would necessitate using non-optis um runways at all eight bases at any given time U General Power however saw no logic in this hyp Ovsis and did not consider it unreasonable to expect a unit on ground alert ta•n eet the HbV launch time from the alternate runway 1n Power's opinion sych a deficiency cast doubt on SAC's atility to carry out its primary mission Oich wasp-of-course to launch its entire fleet of alert aircraft within the warning itinne s assigned i f' by SAC Constructien' projects fo t new billets closer to them were simple butt because of their cost impossible IHLst of BAP 6 11P61 2Hist of SAC Jul-Dec 63 p 100 3Hist of SAF 19641' p 64 UNCLASSIFIED f ro UNCLASMfALY fil P-11 f o u Ra S 15 i solutions Rather SAC met the difficulty by defining and publishing EWO instructions for launching both bombers and tankrrs from opposite eiids''of existing runwaya'tbombers downwind and tankars upwind when weather co gditions permitted In addition the relocation of crews and aircraft froaunoithern bases to those in less severe climates improved the situation'somewhat These uncomplicated solutions did not sol yo the difficulty completely rather they defined the problem in clearer terms and focused more attention upon the hardships presented by the use of alternate runways l ' As the American missile cap4bi-lity became more sophistir 4 ted ---'the Department of Defense with Presidential spriroval directed a comvreherifive series of redeployment actions for the FpXodi n RFFLFX program in 1963-1964 'Prior to this period the command had' maintairitd all its 13-52 B-589 ar'l WrM ground alert aircraft only at bases I n the continental United States 'Urtil this time '' approximately one-half ofj all the B-476 o-i alert and even a are Ler'percentage of KC 97s were located in forward areas as particicants in REFLEX and AIRMAIL operations 2 Anticipating Presidential sanction of operation CLFAP FcTAR which called for a comFrehensive reduction of all U S military forces-ovir'seas SAC implemented some alterations in REFLEX Ouring 1964 In official phroseolow CLEARWATER's mission•celled-for the updating of overseas deploym'tnts During 'y July 1963 Headquarters USAF outlined SAC's responsibility for Pitetb I of CLEARwATFR which specified both a reduction of the puropean REFLEX comitmiont 1Hist of SAC Jul-Dec 63 pp 99-100 21bid 101 UNCLASSIFIED aK • ' Lt 1 L t 'r 4j Aur r i 3 i c l UNCLASSI and consolidation of forces DOS b 1 and two British basesby•l July 1964 D 0 5 Fairford and Greenham Common were rAurned to the United Kingdom DOS b 1 reduced the total number of B-47 aircraft participating in European REFLEX 9 0 p u Since the advent of ground alert it had been SAC's policy to 41sperse its B-52 bomber force over as many bases Original spacing no as possible because redaction these bombers greater in sire than the B-47s' and fully jet-powez-ed presented numerous difficulties for survivability completion of enemy tarc etfng and implementation of a quick launch During the second half of 1964 SAC had L The Strategic Asir bommand RFFLRX followed in 1965 r t V p The Strategic Air Cortmand'a alert program faced the w C C maintained 42 B-52 squadronsroi 1 5 bombers each at 38 bases The command's planners programed this force to inhabit 41 bases in 1966 Hoviever on 19 November 1962 the office of the Secretary of Defense announced a plan for i- B-52 dlepev4zl which would eventually consolidste heavy force of 40 squadrons 1Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 64 p 1139• ' 2Hist of SAC Jul-Dec 64 p Nom 103 to S01 M I DOS b 1 ' The termination of DOS r constant threat of being downgraded by Defense Secretary' Robert S McNamara who -III 1964 was expressing increasina cor fi dence in the country's rapidly improving strategic missile ayct tie believed that the Minuteman and Polaris especially -could assure maximum retaliatory destruction Late-in 1964 McNamara took his first step$ ' i - to reduce SAC's entire force o aircraft on ground alert 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCL 17 A on only 34 base General Power again found himself in opposition to Department of Defense-policy and his earlier testimony to Headquarters L'SAfl which predicted that consolidation would decrease SAC's capability to protect its bomber tanker force and to react to SMEWS tactical warning came readily to min4 1 0 The composition of SAC'S manned bomber fleet and its air refue lA q squadrons changed significantly during the last six months of 1965 due to the phase out of the $-47 KC 97 medium bomber force These two aircraft had been stalwarts of the subsonic medium fleet 116ce the early 1954s and they had rendered long years of ser•itce to the gmand ' Yet as they became ob$olete SAC did not object to their retirement The B-47 bomber contingency Wh iek Nag the largest ever assembled-in the world left the active inventory litt in 1965 for retirement to ravis-Monthan AF$ near Tucson Arizona ' By 31 December there were no B-47 bombers on alert- srd only 114 of these historic Boeing Stsa#o # ts remained in the SAG tnventorys 56 at the 9th SO Mountain Home AFB Idaho 56 at the 140th BW Pease AFB • New- Hampshire and two as co rn arw support aircraft with the ThLrd'Air rAvisiont' Wei-son AFB Guam In addition to the 114 bombers IS F R B-47s wergFr tai'ne'd'in the 59th SRWy Forbbs AFB i Kansas Thest raised the total for all modals of the B-e47 still Operational at SAC bases to 132 but the caamaind progr4cied their retirement for the'earls weeks of 1966 2 ' 2Ibid pp 108 109 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSI R' phase out of the KD-97 tanker was even more abrupt Tkie total number in active service was'only 127 on 30 June 1965 and by 21 December of the same year all'-of them had been retired The KC - 97 was the last of the piston-engined aircraft in'SAC's ' nventory acid now' the command's entire strike • force includinq both bombers add tankers became completely jet-powered l The retirement of the oldest series of the 8-52 heavy bomber 8 models took place currently with the B-47 KC-97 phase out A lack if fuiW for r modifications relegated this oldest series of the eight-engined jet bombers to the Arizona boneyare Although only those which ''gad exceeded tike maximum 4 number of flying hours entered retirement in October•1965 finul'v-1thdrawal c 1- J ' C fci-n 23 eirce was scheduled for January-Februiry 1966 Of the remaining 19 grlginally sranufactured eight were previously- lost to attrition and the reaaindfr had already gone into extended storage 'to museums and to the Air Training Gommar4' 2 t - X1 0 The decision o' the beFartment• of Defense 'to reduce the nur ber of bases hosting alert aircraft nrecededd an even more drastic measure in the next year k which restricted the percentagi-of aircraft actually on alert Latf in 1%6 1lbid 2Ibd pp 112-113 b UNCLASSIFIED 19 UNCLASSIV 1 SAW B-52 surrort tonf -et in Southeast Asia began to have an appreciable effect u cn he •cormland's 'Oround alert program for the first times t„ The Asian commitment was still a small one but the number of B-52 aircraft p involved in air sr i-operations there -had increased from 30 to 1 0 by the r end of the year While only a relatively small percentage of the--strategic bombardment forte vs 4 dlrectlY'involved -In contingency operationsl the war h 1 1 t n ro ram It was iarpossible j f r or t e ent ze a el g in Vietnam had repercussions I for SAC to support ncreased conventional contingency commmitm nts in Southeast Asia without degrading its nuclear deterrent forces in•tho continental United 'vtates These troublesome circumstances appeared Late in JgbtS a t the same tin C Secretary 110a rara Od expressed increastng confldence in the ability of strategic nissiles to provide a sufficient retaliatory capahilitY l e V 0 The Strategic Air Command sincerely believed that those ho oggedly dwelt upon the economics of reducing ground alert - the ability of the-tw-EWS alone to yvarantpe- alert aircraft adequate warning tick and the i pr 6bility of a general war were placing the FdtvrP'of the strategic forces In 'er jus Jeopardy 2 on 5 Decenber 1 066 ' a program change declsion frgrh Secretary Mc4amars reduced the crew-to-aircraft ratio and the percentage of bombers and tankers on alert and further increased UC's anxieties l Hi st of SAC Jul -Dec fib pl l 1 2lbid p 127 UNCLASSIFIED 20 ' UNCLAS SI IOr I N 1 Cr - P PP E R Calling for a seduction in ' the alert rate from RC to 40 perc etot for 411 SAC bombers and tankers participating in ground alert and an aasotiatsd reduction in the crew ratio fr6m 1 e11 to 1 5s1# the new'policy drastically 0 altered the command's-deterrent capability l The decision h 4 r was irrever Ible•and machinery was created immediately to carry it out In the same -month that McNa nara announced his program chance decision 11ea iquarters USAF provided the command with appropriate guilelines for achieV16-the reduced posture and set 1 July 1967 as the date for its full implementation Although directed to assume a 40 percent alert posture on this dat SAC C obtained permission from Headquarters USAF to begin the reduced 1 311 ratio r during the July-September quarter B-52-units were hardest hit '•but X-135 i squadrons also suffered 'from the e ew cutbacks However 11 -52• 1 'and D z units responsible for supporting contingancy operations to the Vietnam conflicts were exempted from the crew-ratiw reduction as the result of a joint appeal by SAC and'Headquartexs L'SAF 2 Although lie adquarters• USAF- had assuied SAC late in 1966 th9t the projected alterations in manpower and aircraft would not begin until mid-1967 the Air Staff notified SAC-in Mar- h that General McConnell had decl i •d to implement the 1 511 ratio on 1 May 1967 In the opinion of the Air Staff this policy would furnish better overall- utilization of pilots eligible for' assignment in Southeast As'iaI 44-x L4_4K minimize personnel relocation IIbid pp 136-37 2Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 67 p 104 T UNCLASSIFIED r 0 UNCLASSIf ' Ch ' difficulties in the majox conx incis l W O Early in 1967 circumstances- 49a6 forced SAC to review its ground alert program By this date the S Ffret Union's arsenal of Sea Launched 1 Ballistic Missiles had reached an advanced stage of develocment Intelligence indicated that 60 percent of the Soviet submarines equinped to carry SLLI• s could be maintained within firlp-4 ranga of the U S for as long ai'45 days C t SLW s presented a greater da w# ierally cited the 5LHbi's rapid ObLi'ity as 60th Its greatest str th end C lel rd anger ' • Wf or General Alvan Gillem II SAC's Director of -Operations C # Mes Lieutenant General Keith K r vrrpzon -Aft- 1415 F 0 Inspector Geneiai contended that more emnhasis shovld be given to interior basing t6 enhance the survivability of aircraft on'ground alert They even went so'•far as to suggest that the SLAT with its associated reduction in tactical iarniing tunes could Completely negate the validity of maintaining's high-eontinvQue t evel of aircraft on ground ale 1 rt 3 4 6 The tre o- Oss saed no system for detecting miistles r 'launched from submarines - iherefor4 it worked closely with the United States t fe-Kf Navy to develop a reliable method fcr•detecting vlssiles launched from Soviet submarines The slew procedure devised by SAC •snd the Navy provided for tht 1 Ibid s p 105 2liist of SAC Jul-Dec b j p 109 3lbid - PP 126-27 at a time Several prominent spokesmen within the -cortmard belipvtd' he new _• UNCLASSIFIED - UNCLAS FIT spa letter to notify the command whenever it observed either an SLBM missile launch or an enemy submarine negotiating a surfacing maneuver Headquarters SAC believed that Navy ships on patrol were capable of monitoring submarine movements before any significant number of enemy craft could maneuver'into their launch positions 'this type of Naval observation would provide G7 r sufficient time for the generation and dispersal of the ground alert forces on the American mainland and in SAC's opinion it would actually constituxe _ Aw 11 a form of strategic warning Alihbug 4the BYEWS furnished a 15-minute warning I 1 time for ground-to-air missiles launchedlfrbm Soviet territory M M hc P p nl YQ 0 Revision A of SA C's Si nole lntegzatrd Operations Plan-4 SIQP d anticloated having 348 strategic bombers 06 B-52s and 40 B-58s on ground ti alert by the end of 1966 However early in 1967 the conflict in Southeast Asia had promoted the command to inactiviate three B-52 squadrons two of the 6th Wing at Walker and one of the 484th Wing at Turner l his action when coupled with an earlier decision to deploy a third cadre unit at Andersen AFB in January 1967 reduced the Revision A commitment by 32 B-52s Therefore 'in mid-1967 4 SAC's bombers on ground alert totaled 316--276 B-52s and 40 B-58x 2 Oh1y two years after SAC's initial participation in the Vietnam conflict the total 1 Ibid p 109 2Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 67 pp 98-99 - UNCLASSIFIED i UNCLASSIFIE W Fill kUk i 14V71 G P3 number of strategic bombers guarding the American homeland stood at approximately 300 1 As previously indicated SAC calculated that by 1967 only six minutes mould elapse betoten the firing of a hostile SLEM and weapon detonatlop at a ' 1 z base hosting strategic farces The question r ow racing SAC planners was how to develop a tactical launch posture which would ona Me tF e alert fords to launch within the more limited SLSM warning time However the tormiand Y realized that its forces on ground alert coyi d not become airborne 01 hln the J 11 six minute criteria since its existing alert posture was designed only f f responding to AhETIS warning Alert tests had pra after the sounding of tI e klexon 2 The Strategic Air Command developed a new defense posture known as DEFC01 1S to c ountar the six minui a danger TMs was a n ndified form of I I DEFCOK 1 which was the command's maximu m configuration for ground alert shorts of actual launch AF b 1 l'1he numbest of SAC aircraft directly supporting c nventinPal operations n Southeast Asia Increased sharply in 1968 2Hist of SAC aul-Dec 67 pp loe-109 UNCLASSIFIED t x i a 24 ess severe an t ose o - r• i• rr• The Strategic Air Command instructed all its alert units except r The revisvd pcstisre perml t ed a wing i DEFCON IS posture on 1 January 1967 2 The -procedures used in T-EFCON IS were AF b 1 3 1 th h f CEFC1 N 1_'• reconnaissance units and elements under the Third Air Division to adopt a C UNCLASSIF to cor••loct additional boerati60 such as airborne alert and tactical dispersal At SAC's directiag each wi 19 developed a DEFCON IS plan during the -first three months of 1967 The parent aiir diV1sion the numbered air foxces •and Headquarters SAC revised these when necessary In addition each wino on alert checked their rgPCORIS configuration in actual tests and SAC evaluated these during the second half of the y per 4 q A In a DFFCON -l AF b 1 IHist of EAF FY 1969 p 84 2Mist of SAC Jul -Jec 67 pp 108-109 3Hist of BAF Jar -Jun 68 p e2 4Ibid 0 po 82-83 • L CA UNCLASSIFIED V 25 I AF b 1 A portion of the alert force positiawdd f GG o instances weather conditions could shorten the shift close proximity to the aircraft SAC secured large numbers of house tr'ailors After-the first blast of the klaxon horn 7o maintain these craws'in fuch to billet the crews participating in DEFCON 1S 1 4i - In January 1968 SAG improved the pEfiCON 15 posture to make ii le Ss r-• strenuous for the crews but the co6mand still Ins l ted that the strategic SUJt I D forces at h ome and at overbe$S bases be launched Hr Known as ORP the new tactic or rated on a orlnciple similar lo a SRP configuration aircraft with engines sbut down positioned'as close as possible to the runway for immediate takeoff At least the first 'cCw 'c alert 'aircraft or Alfa force configured with powcer on two oilots and one o6er control creman lived in the coekrit of 4jg-Alitraft while additional crewmen generally rotating on 12-hour shifts remained sufficiently close to the aircraft alert continued in a cower off confiquration 'As with GEFCON 1S# crews quartered as close as pcssiblo to the primary erunrwy and within the sound of the klaxon 2 IIbid r pp 8344 2Nist of W Jan-Jun 6$ p M UNCLASSIFIED I I time was no longer valid due to the development and testing of new turveillance t c From January 1967 until the spring of 1%9 Sustained React on Posture ' and the six minute warning governFd SAC's ground alert program Thin in ' April 19699 the command inforvned its alert bases that the six minute warning sensors which in the not too distant future could detect and rer ort SLSM I I I survival The Strategic'Air Command had always favored the first' ncept and had shoran little enthasioum for the Ietter' 4rinotl4e T M4 position rested upon the knowledge that Permanently dispersed aircraft could remain reponsive to 1Hist of BAF FY Ao p E5 28-52 dispersal had reached its high point in late 1963 when SAC's 42 B•52 squadrons 15 UE were located on 38 bases Almost siovI taneoutly McNamara began consolidating the hravy force to save money O l E0 June 1967 SAC had 37 B-52 squadrons located on 33 bases UNCLASSIFIED • x•'11 launches in a lesser number of minutei' ' When the sensors become f4 y operational AA the cowand would again assign soecifie reaction times to each base but until V k i 4 L then the six minute warning couid no loriger be accepted as valid l Accordingl-V SAC devised yet another concept to guarantee the survivability bf th-e strateglct ground forces By mid-1967 SAC concluded t' at the dangers presented try the improved Soviet ICBMs and SLEW %s -had made it Peceasa y to exfand the policy of dispr-sing ' strategic aircraft The policy was not a new one for SAC wfik had scattered its aircraft at various bases since 1954 2 Two kinds of dispersal had existed since the comet ndls earliest days One was a permanent basing 'prc%am vyhlch placed a fixed number of aircraft an a spe-cified base the othef'was an emergency operational procedure which 'in timas'of crisis -quickly put tne strategtc forces at an extensive number of bases in order to improve tho 1'r chances for 27 ' UN'CLASSIFI M G - F Pt P EX R S tactical warning whertaP emergency dispersal depended largely upon strategic nln time for impiementation l a r I I i I U General 'McConnell j'h'o A'-r Force Ch1ef of Staffaoproved Option l of the satellite basing program fn Jura 1966 „ Option I arig ffalty snvisioned lHist of SAC Jan-Jun 67 p 113 2Hist of 8AF FY 69 pp 21-22 24 3Hist of SAC FY 69 p 122 UNCLASSIFIED 6 1J Late in 1968 SAC _ de sioned a new program tar imp1 -vir1'9 the i lux-Vivatl itv r of the bomber fleets by more extensive dispersal of its alert forcer Known CO as satellite basing this technique simply placed bomber and'tanker ur Ts of C not more than four aircraft each on'permanent ground alert at Pon-SAC bases The coma and planned to complete its full satellite basing prbglam in three phases or options arK it was a major objective of SAC to realize the third and final option by the end of fiscal year 1972 If the goal were achieved ' 70 bases would host alert aircraft while 30 additional bases'Avould maintaifi'k supporting personnel and rateriel Letachments of pe-rmanently'-lassigned'SAC personnel augumentod by crews and maintenance personnel on-temporary ail furnished the ma6power for thole bases where aircraft wer't a'ctpally statloned r ormal host-tenant support agreftents defined general operatlorai FroCedti ts while the satellite bases co nf erred only with logistics recei-fed manpower increases Airectly from SAC wren the program was fully impl ement ed each base would host a total of four slert aircraft--ideally i o botqbers and t4No KC-735 tankers 3 ' - _ __ __ - 1 14 • I IiL2 e lV I1a ' UhTCL - ASS a j V ri pr D r r i • O C' the creation of 26 satellite bases during FY 1969 and another 42 r A#s i Lt -kno two years later Even though the Secretary of Defense hod ivt approved SAC's proposal the Air Staff authorized the coamand'to take preliminary action short of actually Cxp-ridLag fweds l' W V Once again the tartnent of Defense refused to approve SACls p 1 ans The gormand had submitted a program chongo request for satel 1te taasin'g to the t Office of th• Secretary of Defense In August 1968 but the latter 'di d not act upon the natter until 10 December 1968 when Deputy Secretary of befertbei Paul H Nitt told the Air Staff that-satellite basing should not he undertaken in either FY 1969 or 1970 That the Russians possessed only a few missile- Y Carrying subaarines that the t1 S• lacked ari effective SLBN wirel n$ 'system and that the nation's missile capability alone provided a sufficient nuclaar deterrent were the reasons for Nitzi0s decisions is s' U A few days later„however the Department authorized arfroxif atoly S12 million to ginra limited satellite basing program After careful coordination with the Air Staff SAC'submitted a revised program to the Defense Secretary in January 1969 The command's recommeneation called for the operation of a satellite base at Homestead AF8 TAW as soon as possiblc 3 ar4- the activation 21bid 3Homestead AFB officially became I 'SAC satellite base on 20 February 1969 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFI i of eight additional satellite bales at SheppaxV ATC Bergetrom V-AC j Whiteman SAC Cri ws aus ATC Otis J DC i Albany NAVY MacDi11' TAC acid Mt Home TAC on 1 July 1969 1 By I July 1970 SAC had addict three- more satellite bases at McGuire MAC s Uttle X65k TAC and Mslstrom SAC Pending the allocation of sufficient funds by the Department of'ofense 5 SAC's current plans project•a total 0 35 satellite bases to host 140 bombers O • and tankers by I January 1973 2 llbid P 123 s 2 SAC Programming Plan •70s HQ SAC AMP Phase-In Of S 4 1111e Bases c U 1 July 19709 A-1-3 GP-q Secret AWORN • 5 S a % UNCLASSIFIED In 1958 only one year after the implementation of ground alert thi Strategic Air Cofmand created an airborne ilert system which was a giant step forward in its plans for insuring the maximum survivability of wr retaliatory 'forces While ground alert called foT the deployment of bomber aircraft at 'SAC bases ready to launch on a moment's notice airborne alert would maintain a specified number of B-52s flying a fixed number of sorties on specified routes-- 24 hours a day seven days a VM AI 165 days a year when fully developed the bombers'flying this configuration would remain ready to divert from'their standard flying pattern and attack enetxy targets with nuclear weapons As seen by 'SPC the essential rurpose of an airborne alert system was to provide a secure airborne deterrent during a period of no guaranteed warning »l N Inauouratel by SAC in January 1959 and nicknamed WRTAIN RAISER the first 1 airborne alert test was a small one B-36 aircraft carrying only conven tional weapons flew daily routes from Ramey AFB Puerto Ritb to Nouasseur Ow 1 rocio Ate proved capable of diverting to an-enemy target during a portion of their flight ' DOS b 1 CURTAIN RAISER extended for •1 a9 FhnsecutivO - days from 13 January to I June 195 B and 8-16s from the 72nd Bomb Wing at Rainey AFS made 218 sorties 2 Because the Brlllsttc Mesita Early W'arni ng System' 'was not completely operative in 195 9 General Thomas Se Power SAC's Commander-in-Chief hay asked that Headquarters USAF' take at eandij view toward co T a irrplent-Wng 4irborne alert That such a policv v uld mal ta n a cbti iactcry deterrent in spite cf Rusrlan rr tssile wprv -cy from 1961-1964 was 'the 'tasis of ti UNCLASAW KING PAPERS Powers strong endorsement of an alrbc•rna aleit rogram • r ovemb'e T the CItESAC reaffirmed h15-conv1ctlr- that if the J S w $ to maintain a position r• of strangth at least equal to haj of tha $c Lets' SAC had nc alitc ative but to at hi-ve a maxiurum state of airborne alert by July 1Q61 1 o ' he command's tare tar' tar in le-pnting on airbc-ne alert roararc was • r a three phaste ones an tnitlal prograir by 1 January 1964 'etc nut rfactical r -•1r 3 capabi lty f 1 Ju y 1951 and a further increase through the 1962-f-4 c r alert r ouln be necessary until the day whtrn the r 8 could guarOtee specific t t Howevtrs V -ti the rate and dcyrep of lrvlf- entatl -n derende f u or 3A'-'5 ability to cclWincp t eadquibrters VSAF tM t th z z war i pres ing nee' for alert and then to receive suf iclent furor frcn it to imp irent the progxa mv 12 r-241 CU Maj r C er raI C Vifrotav r Director of P1 ans header the' 3X team vl tch pros cited t%e cowrrnd's j cog am to r Staff on lE eerr' r he' St rc t• 1 Air Co wm nd judge that airbsrrc alert v c sld have r aximum 'ef eC 1 only • Wien flovn ontir-suovEly roc 24 hours i - ay hasiz' '9 the '•'' ' 8 position publicizes' just a few weeks before ••the team contended the 7 3• c ate r be Tally vratlanal b nE2 'O ere oxr z believed a maximum system of airborne- r U ftawever Grrneril rVrti's LeMay the Air Force 'Ice Cillef -of $ta i ind f imself a forr rr C1 1 SACx considered flexibility the st r ttractive feature of airbirrne alert it should be n ez rgency posture abs uned gnly at times f inteoaticnal srlsis In Le gay's pinion SAC u4wld suntl'nue Its ulrboYnt alert tests uting two wings nd are p-52 squadron during the period Marcl t rf -igh Jvnf 1959t and then submit a It ltei rn vats«tle ai hc a alf pri pram to Air Staft Declaring that the cjuzand would lave t% fnrget abnN 4ginnirg the psogram on 1 July 1460 Le Nay advised xAC to strip bfeating°the drur zc lour ly for airborne alert GFOSrbi Thorras L White - he Air 'rarer C of • c Staff agrw 1 r t General Rawer proY ed to •o an extretitly atticu ate spdkesman for atr ne alert 71a rt ed for this kind of deterrence as I-t fuld as ha aw it Alth ugh the command's arsenal teprespnted the world's Ftrongest -aolear strike rcc °In 1958 thr absense a• 5 11tstic Wiisr Ie Early War'tfr c Ststem inJ sort jwy ado VBrr ng vi t missile strenotn trade the Unt' ed S ates's positl Iess' tF ure vaCh yt r In ight c ° fttse aoms'_tlons at -borne Oert mler-rvsen' ed the •oftl y Icient $ofrguard against sc rpriw attack r rLmt a pWtlcal sip xlpoir Poti m believes airborne alert 1vas the only strategic posture then ival 1 avle whl t permit he Unites States to face the SovietL t nt rn3tional c r Feser r a frc'a a poslt on of streng h and thus avoid ruclear blac'tmrnil• Anyt'tsng less i jr the CVCZAC was a-practical arod unsound To vasln Lain ort fourth o'f V E H•52 C-t UNCLASSI WRk E E C To est the relis bility of airborne alert SAC conducted %-v tsts knoon 'as MAD START I and it wring fiscal year L 59 the - owm Wls hlstcry 'or FY 1959 ass reported 'gat no test pr4rrc-m in SAC's brief exlseepce NO received as much attention at these two operations ' With Its purt-nse bvftq solely to determine the extent to %hich alrLjrne alert was possible SAC #'ihedgled BUD SIAPI I to begin 15 September 195E and omter s through 15 December Althaugh SAC had plannid to tegin '' e test n mid-SeptP r it id t re Five pies Itntial i r execut I S i TAPT i-aan flying the first airborne alert rxertlse Divided approval fc % arrj ng nuclrar P% apons on oaiticl ating aircraft t y'0115 date Authcri ati •- %as fnrthccT ing on 1 uc' ober nd on the f i - Ahq jay • 42nd B-52 8osr 6 n g sl ationed at Loring A 3 I alre and singularly rescon4lb1E fc into three stayts the first 'phase of IrCEAOTART roquired the 42nd 6o b 'X nq to y• launch a r bat ready B-5 at six hour Intervals at -W the 120 phase two constitut •1 a stand down period which enabled SAC to evaluate the results of se ' initial test ' hil the last O%ase sit• ly began the six hcur daily sortie cyc11 YI 2 all over ac ln L 'hroughavt its three m6r ths' lift manpower and nater Tel shortages plagued •' li-ta TAH1 I Loring AFS however r ade the p cr of -x4ting resources Ak crews and maintenance n orked seven 3ays4week and legged approximatC y 3 8Op Y flying hours c ur ng each month of the test in an effort to detvm Lie Lhe practicality if airborne alert every other consideratiors vas sacrifIcr• to this goal in dequa a At' hRC•65 radio equipnents 3nt nna rv-spltr rr9blems 5hw Historical Stu 4 y No 79 The SA Alert Fscugran 1956-1939 Hq SA aU 75 Jan 61 Co 41 V UNCLA of W-ml STAPI T 1 R G S MV NU V 11 PAPERS 34 bombing-navi _tirn system bulky gear pr d a lack cf eter rral' _ ftr r is the 8-52 cockpit were the major difficulties associated with the initi l phase K V Althavgh HEA rAi I was a test of M nrt duratl4n which ieft F any questions uranz%-ered SAG considered tit exercise a success It Froved cone a ' •elY t t irbar e alert was a practical stzat yic maneuver tt at a Kr-135 tanker st aAon could fly nrarly tae sorties a mor t% that existing sc •rrunic tioa y r ere sufwicient r to control the aircr4ft p rticipating ' r the test that current rainnino resWirce6 were adequate to support the sorties re4wlred curing the test W thft-i'ri around the clock pr gram %- as p3vible t ith ugt- then rFractlcal Z ' r i arch Five daily in Arri1 and s''• gaily urirg ' ay vrd June F e r r t yc u raI statistics for 'iQSTArT readily inlicated %he enlarged scoce of V v second r test ThF two r irgi of 3 525 fler a total of 3E4 sorties while ztic -cating KC-1356 tcm letera 2 133 efuelim miss'ons ht -52s Pct slly spent 2 1 74 The Strati is Air C mmard judged the hours flyin•7 the airb •re overt exercise 3jerfurraance of t -esa t its t t r di g U Mary cf the r•rcble rs assvc tee with the first iFt r _ '-r RT £KPrcise Ieca -e even more d• i er t in '• D- IARI 11 %hWk sheG c rsrideralvle light uLnn-iAssiin schedull• y the montal and itysicQ eondktion of flight crews ranking eg1Apm r t ratios and the cast f lc gistic supF•ort'for air alert Even tl -rt gh tie schect l i 1g 210th bomb Ono llswcrth 11F8 South Dakota rach fler• f -r rally 8-52 orties fn I - to I EoLSIART 11 FRC s tecpnd alert test began 2 March 1959 and 4 through 30 Ju-c TSQ 52rra Lorib v r 9 alt' is rcH 111 AtBt lash rgtu° an the 11bid f 105 2IbId pp ' -1 •1 3Ut Q• i 10 t J WK UNCLASStU 'I I N PAPERS of rrassions v as again rigid iuty'-asttrr were irr-mrsible 5n te gsslyr ed ifIs - 1 _ _ _ • - -n •nevP t T rv aU -- iA L_ei-- Althnvgh P ACSTAR7 II ze tiirme the feasibility 1 alr crn8 alert frr the fO tecofvi time its grritest significance vac a negative are he Stmt y c 'A r C Cor raand '-9ij N ped to ac%isvt i 5AC- ride tirborno iert by 1 Jai v' ry 19t 0 ' t r V 7hs 31 rat-7'c Mr orr i ' cont tnueu to•stuly ir-'r Te alert-by ur ertakinr four i ct tl-atrrr trpir ir g4 - grad s •'knov n 9s S'45 3L T iv-i I auc II • n t ' r ' i C' • T s d T1 ctw en 6 Octnfter 19h9 and la Ju1v 1960 In t ese to tz trait ing materiel svnfort for an airborne alert-piograrr was doubtful before 1 ' tl e intricate c91stie r qu r4-acnts wk long lead tirm raedec or t 4ocL-re-E-ntb • 0 indicated iy II crnvineeO the •come and that implemontation of adeouate cp rations fivf -Itrattaic ei os fo boat wings jand eiah'refu- Vna y runs flew fr%r • tv o to rigl f l ally sor ies 2 'Ile obj-'Ctivp- of all foul YWO nlthfug 02 Ai staff end SAC b t h aarood ov ib-i nEec frr airhormQ ' • a1Frt cplr lon illfored iihin their narks over the xt •r t thf nos take At • he er 3 f I y 0a-14 rters MiAf -offIcially suf•ported a' r•rora nt nor the cY-bl 'nuac et V•at v•o-ld fable 14 irgs 45 LE '••ith utfielent su rting ta' Ears to evnt uct six sorties per lay for one year beginning 1 arch 14•x•1 an airborne aver t' system ' lowrt 14 a Analysi of exirOng n%rming ratios a ds' erx ne- if tlNy were sufSi 'e t tc suhl Girt i were the sames trai3 rg 'olti ris units to °lyycontinuuui airf•orre alert sorilvv- ' the ar uisititn or ti or as expanded alrforaa °alert• rrcyram arw t - ci reful IIbio E R 113-117 2HI sL at A Jan-Jun tC I 14-1113 3 4ist of t'AF Jvl-Dec 60 r 17 3 1_ Thls air-ountod r ughiV to a ene-eighth rirborne alert posture The S41 ategic A r Command Lt 11 relie eJ that ar-yLhing short of continuous rirtorne avert wag imprdatiedl and unsou W General f•ov er was an xl us to place no less Ulan • Jone fcurti o K s B- 2 bor-ber fleet on airborne avert as loan as ossible and he urges the Air Staff to procure ands for ach4ving thl capaLUIty by 1 Judy 1960 1 c operation In January 1950 i P ncwly apir Inted Secretary cf Defenw orac Grteov candidly cld the'Hoyse 3Lbcpvrittee on DQ appropriations that' r r strdteglc barbers on eirbnrne alert in FY-61 In'the revacus year the Loepartrae 1t of Jcir -rc t ad est 'ate f -X's one-furrch piisn ould add $571 riillion to the FY-61 budy•i r i rproxP ra•ely 1f'CC million each year there fter 2 Such a cost was much too great Ao crdVngly the J r $ on r Arch 1960 officially rxtantive air alert rruVrirr than ex 'sted because tLe Daparto ent did not bzp e- continuous oir rn alert r as rr zesa r C ly 3cneral Pov i among tS -• t't r 'i leading ethc 'es on a r pvwt r saw a aced for placing ono fourth of Sac's for implcmentin3 a cna- L' z h v1rb1rne alert posturer Informed veneral Power to make ro declsion-on the actual'-date an regpire-tents l 'ist of SAC ran-Jun 60 p 137 2 Ibid 14C 3Ibid p 13F differed with $AC aver ti e d1tr°nSS0n3 and the data or Implementing u h r V Although the r efer sa Departmont favored a 11'- ° ted airb3zne alert it I Gaa s IZ J 'eiertheless throayhout 1960 arKf until November 1961 5A 3-52s lew daily airborne Iert Indaettinwtion %ightsi' along ladder-tyFe routes which resembled giant north• outh loops stretching from the United btat s urth Into the Canadian Artic Aircraft from SAC flew six deily oortles aloe these 7twtes until January 1901 Nshen Hiidgcrarto-s USAF sJoUbled the nvuber c t clve 7r cte r tna rite of Ailch l c jrcxirity of supporting KC-155 tankers largely 444trolr ed t• T 1e lsrd r r r ulred extenslve traffl wordin Alun Fre W anticipated were seven i ioer-type Mtes anti ill but two required ShC airs _ft' o l y f t• over Canadian terrltory Each route %as almost a re arete reograp6itvl entity difficulties with the system in tale event of an expended eirtorne a ett A b 7 irtiir „Z Aoug' his r ' Vould not he difficult to obtain for flying only 12 do y 4orties t e nren reared 't that It would greatly i-pitr the efficiency of airborne alert at -he ore- - Pth or tha one-s xteeot t revel 2 a tvar a in he young airbarns a sr•t X gr' caire n 6 November 931 r e Nil artery USAF approved SoC's first rey l r -rogram of airborne ater' r -Joctrinaft r Kr own as Chrome Go this operation -adr• it pcssihle ter a n-het-reac'y n-5'• s carrying nuclear wr nons to f y i'rAeS wr tvo fixod -autes cr 21 h9urs each day • t y emj 1oying a borbf r-stieom • at• ng technique 3 1These amour'- f to six 'ai iy A- s2 ar'ies on 31 ecembcr 1964 and ' ii sort lrs on 31 Uecw nbl'r 1961 FACty Vita Fmm i94i5 8 Soft 772' r 15 2list of JAC Jul-Flee 61 rr '79 3The bo ti t-stream routing technique eir pleyed a move T nt f Cu-A er virr af' one directly bef li J s-iother r r y 1 tho Atlantic Ocean ASpain and finally the western Mediterreon before returning 11 northern route completely cirmmvented Canada while a southern route traversed to the United States iSupporting KC-135 tanker forces at Grifflty Loring and Westover Air Force bases in the northeastern United States at Eielson AFB Alaska and at Torrejon AB Spain serviced the aircraft Six so#tei daily t would fly tht northern route and••fbur the isouthern routeawhile twcoinonitored fir ere J the BME1tS site at Thule Greenland lj The command forwarded its plans for the new o raticn to Headquarters USAF at the end of June 1961 and Air Staff approved Chrome Dome on 15 August r' t The Strategic Air Conmand received instructions to fly tie Chrome Dome routes beginning 6 November trom this date until 0 Ycvember 1967 many changes • occurred in routes flown and the number and tyves of aircraft participating but during the period all airborne alert indoctrination W flights continued to 'be named Chrome Dane During a normal peacFtime posture only a limited number t of SAC wings participated in scheduled airborne alert indoctrination flights but all wings were vulnerable for such flights on a cyclical basis T Each wing 38 launched one bomber daily whvn'on atert r QQN In July 1961 SAC lnformd Headquarters USAF that within a Anth it would bi prepared to launch in tie 'ef 'crisis 60 sorties daily on the Chr'nm' ' ale routes ' 30 on the northern and 10 vn the southern assuming it mere provideX with a T' a P 72-hour lead time to configure its 0-5 s and deploy addittonal•tankeT Fersonnel•at Its Alaskan and Soanish bases Even on 48 hours' notice SAC could still complete 60 sorties daily even though target coverage would be 1PSS complete % In 1961 the implementation of 60 B-'S2dptihes amounted to a one-eighth ai•r orne alert LASSIFIEWORKING'PAPER S posture or AL's D-52 force C1 15 August the sire iay It apFrlvea Chrc-one Zooane lrr dquarttrs USAr 115trUCt d the corm-all to cTV ts an 9 n the iN k 1 copaaility su fitlert to xpand air alert to clO -r one sixteenth or rt elglth of AV s $-52 force °jA a 72 hv6 notice In time of natignai errtrgenty AccordIngly the so-rwrd% dSir tive for the Implemen' atian r f Chrome Soma ir luded' prjvisivn r such a proyrt ss l on• 1 The 5 rat 9ic Air 10 -aks added st l with 's•dec 'ofr tfa orltor cvntinuo s ly d nension 4 airbor t e radar 0% ' hole Grc r v-d Needing to kn- K 1- edtstely if any interrui-C n in cr nr u Icat' -'-s with the radar or enemy attack th -4- om rand had 1 p to coritor Thule wLth rirbo ne 6-32 bc-nters frm f YestSver ATB' j s I bl r tree best survellience SAG could•nrovi•aa am64nted to ar-prc 4-AtOy 21 of every 24 hours Ethowh the Inittai Thule mor toring rt•ute avoidgd Can6 ian o-rerflight Lnoreesed the dit t r e fre- the bxu ei 'Dune is„e-at rsto sr AFB to the 3ret„1 nd War 0-135 t i ker aircr 't trom W'oStx 'Flew to AFJ Laborador to ie•P or fueL before encovhterinq thu d-52 rronitort evan titen 'tie tacker c - j not rrfue ih bmber sufficieitl r to - j ntaln cc -LOUOus su ve111 '11ce VJ ht tr e advent Chrome irsm-- the 99th - b wing at nrstover v ds esFr icle for supporting he muie monitoring progrem Wt it has unable to F-mvide cort nuous s tv O B-52 sorties s hich rI a tats c' qultous CoLr r a I c° tiil i tL 1 AF b 1 - CG V U The need foi a E9tivs 3rd continuous monitor 'uecvv clearto the • ' tom wnd on 24 cve-c • - 1f'61 t har the Thule site lost csntaet sir'ultanteusly with bath s cartors SA d the forth M t 'can neftn»e Carr and s esiiat K put it alert forces in a rinimvrr r'eart n p4stures il sircri t 5r ol#it taxied to t-rally s 'tttE'I usitiors fz'rj- v-Mth ati aarld bv 61-t•ocr r fr ' late trrct« using 111M Frocf dures Foax davs of r the incident SAC aFpealed to VAF b 1 the 1it Chiefs of Steff Li eitai- 1115r r Y r l crizq rfut- t R CC Plo'J i 7 t le cite LL-t o W eye this tnr a•ir taft ti v d ave 'u cass Avgz Ue enrrrand h ri' to rec iv Ferr is Vr -r srrcl an action by 13 LccR ber r'LttiFV i ti n2'v a EedPCS for coordi 3t1•rr brtNeen V e Arwrican and Canadiau govrrm nts 'rens lthe 1 did not arprovo the modified r' ute until 13 January 1962 2 The commao next negotiated v16 the Canadian oove rr 'rent for the right to fly six basic nonitor routes oecause it onticir ted the need to assig s tn Thule roite c B-52 units stationed at bases otner than Westoc Strrtegic Air 'c x and had TOcc3var' iu horizatirn fry Ottav o °- r iti ix 3f t o routes by l Aezil Givpn' t ic sr Grate nickname i FARD IUD bv BU4e tree ttciYYY Canadian 9 serrr-ant had asked Vit the monitor be di5astcciatcd frog CIrMe 7or e the monitoring r ute u _c at any giver i e dei er ded the 3 52 org r zation then re crslble for yurveillino t' radar at Greenland Thi did not -•r rade the ror vaand's ability to unch an cxparviec' airborne alert fore- 1n tie „f - Isis shoe the r umbr- r n -parties flying the itnitar eld rot lvrcreaia 3 r--- u OPW 'o achlevc offectIve 24-hour survellience of t'L iIXWS-ln i erilarcr SAC revised ils hir -refueling' program on 'thy gI RB 11-EAD routo S rce August 1961 the Ky-135 force based at Festover flea a Westove r- -o ac-7 cst 5ver patr err • r but this had provei Extremely ' t 6nuna on both sire art arri craws 5trste91w M Air Co ra ond calculated that if tankers from Eie sor- r%F A1ask4 ve e also % ej C the refu-ling mission could bk j duCed 'rye 11 to sev- n -%46 tYhile also ircreasin the offload As a result i •C'• ''frw A January 1952 the E elsor ton er farce © irrga uF r i• y relieved the 40 e -00t 4 Air Refu a i t rg Ar g and ' he E 5 onitur flying from Westwer AFB 71 6 C Vrand t-hCii i ' re 4ed iNl cr 's 4CR i -lent y C A is f-ur KC-135 sortlas daliyo since Bich- noritor ietstred o aeriiol xef4 -• y % C_ way tr 4c t a f i a site r E rly '- 'A 2 secretary of reftnse O rnara -4 Cq- 'zei tui retd fox reducing the 72• hrur' IrR1 then zequired by SAC f r es t t c _ air -akert loree to a one-elghth o a • re- xteenth -stu re i cj he it trudteG uerera' i 'Vor t 'rvesttgat_ utter Li'r8vor any seduct tn in Tha lean tV e reau•zcc t e ilvv-diat Inc rf-7ratl- of a rorcior cs tha ground slat ' feet r ta 't a aii alert eontirto ncy U the one-nighth or ore-sixteirth cowiltrcn se e _ -hk Ved• 70 impler-ent suCCc iully either of tnese levels SAC Fte 1Lred ice -h e rr encv eselst on by e-ti na ing one FI J c ortie in each B-52 15 JE squidren cqu ve tnt to the ore-sixtesu - th level a•i a secani sortie equ levt to the Sre-eigrth posture ---ither of r-hich coul i be'mounted In tr•a event a rut-leer at ock E• earesi r proa t le„2 7o expedite further the implemention of air alert at these levels SAC assigned a specific launch time to each partictrating unit he corginand•staa Ft these over a 74 hour pprioa to it-sure a cntlnuous covFra P and an even f low of 'VMKIN ' PAPERS W r t i• 51 61 In N ri h M 2 SA sari to Ew ' 4 pre ' atives frxm 1 5 C • 15 4 tj aircraft cn the Chrome Dome routes A unit on the northern lf uld be '•he time I hour 1lus 15 a•int tes ' first in the air durl ig a crisis a nd it•s launch time woulo equal the 42 1 I F lenentativn The units t3• r ian area se cuirv moire• tin 1 0 build up heir tas1 forces$ •n he first would not 'ski-off until four ord re-half hairs atter I h 3ur SSe FA_ flevertheless# the trr rend colould' 0 Lr t'b full po ture could be achieved with r 24 hour • niti•'IIy SAC's proSram f r tva B-52 sorties daily for very 15 •Y 1 a onc-aig th ir t pE alar t j csture equ area U6 syuairon parUci f ating O airbor s nlert This -atiu amour ea to an capaUlity -of 60 3-52 sorties ea ay with Os calling for 76 ar ties to fly p r e i• rn rou' c r1d „4 't t southcr ro ute' by 1' 9t- Z ad3l tional bcn r% sere bec r n - b6' ready and i i _ 'ne the lest rc hc i of inrct ' ta' r i into the air T pile L progxas' Accc Ingly the ccrvmane dre ded tc astign ddltional t 's t •ra•iy LA _ zf'i trews tc the tf-thern r ute since VIM placed the B-52 ' - ir alert er to prime to-gets in adci i-%n the xefu6ing squadrons at nelson AFd ' Ith servieec i• - r sircr4 °t on the -ere aItoady exLonded to number of B-52s had becore o o i «aTe for airborne alert SAC ilo ers c -ulat e t j t nE• nU' CCI ' I air afE rl'rys rro r the Spanish bests would i rcr- ast '•oip Y 44 R teri l L re ' •iota to c • aIn-approval from Vie SpanL h gor- rnx r At ft ° c n the cc a -Wq reduced notVicdtton timesr o r an expander air alert progein n ch necessitated aA fltlonal traffic cn t1' 1 scutheri xo4 v i 3 ca4 a an ir' reased u l lip i ts 2 4e ° r 24 rtortius to Fb for 44 sorties at a one-eighth o ture ry 1--1963 Strategic Air Cor r' drd v anted to create a setond base rt VC -C At ar den c i Jibe thr tanker f r e x ally bet oen rreJon AB and Morcn T' c-s taek farces woula suprort d ll airborne sorties flying the srutt r ri ite btgln%' '-9 A ' y• the Srcnisn yo Irznr ant approved the regl est and he °• aamc c tc •tive o the date ' AC ha Tht ne w pstulf required tt C Se ord Ai 1• n inta n t1r- KC-135s at each of the 5 anl h bases 7 total ai 'x aircraft r ae one pce a ta previously opt -Mil from lorrpjon lone will be reta ied at the r rth rn Ch e Done r utf' 3VUlged ±ravot' ir y tia ar • ian err' cy o• zpr r ing tar l rr units were sr t or c irtr aeterr AC • •iu t E s ir isi nce th ati future Chro-re home nvratl I0-I• Cenar a be conf r 4J tc n• f1i9tt levtl becirme a m Jor prObler• to t e St Vtegi'- r aomma r a • vflch ha•i 1 •vred t fly ttu 11 formations at tvo r'if erent r lt ' 4•ie i-en C I I several logistic problems Tne Inauouratice of 'hrorre Dorn a %itnesved ka e vcrstl naataon vt'the 12-'daily airtlorim in January Strategic Air Command's o prrt rr 1'461 sorties crigfr ally- authorized standard rolicy war to rerlace aFfroxi-rately one half of the narticinatinarach cuarter at the advent of Chrcr e Dome Gen-rally a unit's aircraft served in the program for tro cyclfs• each 3f three 011- months' duration 3y 31 becember 1961 seven of the original ii hroms Doe e bomber units had been vithdrawn from the oreration rhile the remaii In' four- whose particiration accounted for five daily sorties terminated their service at the en-4 of the lanuery-Parch 1962 cycle 2 UNCLASSIFIF d ifGRF6lNG PAPERd em rloying the -m rg ncy iY-rturE After ewtensive conssderatiri SAC•agrred to fly its aircraft at only one flight level horever this led aniy to a vvv lELie sec%ton of AF b 1 developed a flat cell structure which ras contrary to the comran4'a'accorted tactical ac'ctri nt A unit's secoM aircraft woula fly one nLle't- 0 the'r aut V o ants tro miles bthlrrd the lead bomber The eo_mtra ri c evLW this ta'ctk fur use AF b 1 In AFrit k9t2 Shy issued nstrvct ons farl im f lementing Do V ti tree nepri fur mounL%ng a wit-ei9lit alert inrbT• U 1 As witu ground alert the airoiresv alert Program rresf„W •Sk Gt-w ' e t units nGw flying Chrome Dome employed 20 bomber alr4Craft 4aviro both a It r-as of considrrablp irrrortance to the program that the- ma'Jqrity of c beginning 1 January 1962 But its first GAM-77 sortie did not occur 'until CD initially commissioned it to carry the mat powerful gulled air'mif i les V 0fis v greater range than the original B-62 end a capacity to carry guided air missiles GAM the G model significantly increased SAC's air alert detfrrRat ¢ By the end of the April-July quarter 19621 B-52 aircraft were flying 6ine-ai the 12 daily airborne alert indoctrination sortles l K 0 The 40 Et9trategic Wirg stationed at Dow AFB Maine xis the first unit to fly airborne alert with GAM-77 4ound Dog rrissilFs 7hp conmand had c 17 January because the missiles were tate in arrivino from the Okl'aho ra city to carry GAM• 779 on % hTGT ie pore during the first half of 1962 F3've'iiAits -• the 42th 97th W ' 403eth SW 4039th S and the 413th SIN began 'f l yi69 air alert rith the lRst rowerful GAM-72 Green Quail on 1 January By the Air Malarial Area and adlitional time rah necdFd to iomrlete a fl gilt ccortrol r 1 1 11 modification nce they reached Dow The 4038th Strategic King Wh rtie only unit the riuban rrissile crisis late -in 1962 To aepraise the accuracy of alr orne alert at this critical junctuie of $AC's history it must be rererrbered•that end of June 19F 2 eight units r•hich collectively fIew n•ine sorties dally carried GAY-72s on airborne alert 2 0 Both air and missile alert received their baptisirr of fire during the air alert forces then arFrated under stringent peacetime cone itions and still at the indoctrination level In october 1962 SAC' phato-reconnaissance aircraft detected large numbers of Soviet mi silea in Cuba and on the evening IIbid 2Ibid pp 9 -94 UNCLASSIFIE- -a U11-w-' 46 W R Ift I R G P A P E R-u of 22 October President Kennedy reported the tense situation to the'4'American peorle Only hours before the historic address the Joint Chipf f-af'Staff • C' ordered SPC to assume immediately a one-eighth airborne alert posture f General Power the CI AC designated i7Doz as r hour for the cororand to begin this ' level of alert Thus only 29 hours after General Power had received the or• er from Washington AC had one eighth of its forces flying atrborpe al trt The © 4 command continue to maintain this nosture for 30 days l r The deQree of readiness achieved turlna the Cuban crisis xas 4 unprecedented Five years of carefully planned airborne alert'fM -ckr natlon y % - sorties now yielded significant results With each 2-52 unit •ful'•lv'aY are r its' y Ct r_ ute assignroent the oreration Frogressed smoothly and efficiently • At the •' beginntnq of the one-eighth alert resture SAC launched 66 3-52s tail and p by 5 November a total of 75 B-52 aircraft 31 on the northern rou e A2 on the southern anI 2 on the Thute -r oottor route Strategic Pir C orrr-en achieved its highest state of alert during the first week of November On' 19 October the command operated i% ith a 50 percent alert posture less -adjusted' and degraders sorties and deviati ns and had 652 strike aircraft and 35e surrortingy -T tankers on alert but on 4 Novembers which eras the tray of greatest dswalation 9AC r V deployed 1 479 B-52 bombers and 1 003 KC-135 tankers on airborne alerta3 When the one-eighth p sture ended on 21 November and SAC returned to its normal ISA C Historical Study No 90 Strategic Air Command OFeratinns it the Cuban crisis of 1952 Top Secret HA-1162 p 36 - UNCI ASSIFI 6 M sV NMG PAPERS indoctrination program the cimmand had launched OCF B-52s durina the l ovr veeka' oeer tioh and hours actually in the air totaled x7 150 ' The Fsaergency con4ition also nloced additional recuiremrnts upon SAC's tanker force s Because the rrfuelino cafabl lity of the task force at'Fl elson ro AFB Alaska was a limiters one# the greatest increase in B-52 traffic took 'place base increased as follor•st SFanish task force equally divided bethi h V 4on C • and Torrejon from 5 to $i Alaskan to k force Fielson from 7 to 10 ' arid northeastern ilnitee States 'r'estover Griffiss and Loring from 6 k'o i3 2f 'M 7 rv 41a on Chrome rome's southern route The number of KC-135s recuirer' at eaFh tanker r 1 51 0 uring the one month oreratinr mzinten ncF sur'fort vas over 97 rtrcent effective ronsiderino airborne B-52s carried over 7 500 nuclear %Paron s vithout • an incident the safety rec7rd maintained by the command dur no the criaWas s outstanding Of even area' rr ssgr i ' °aree SAC rod Proven the secure c6i4inuovs9 and imrreaizte strike capability of airb rne alert Men aporatina- at teak strength 4uring the crisis aprroximately 55 airborne 9-52s and 24 0 nuciezr weapons vere target effective at any given time 3 y O U Gn 2F Crtl'ter President Kennedy and FYerrier Khruschev agreer on - formula ' 1 for ending the crisis Then on 2 November the President informed the hi - -on that' the denafr of nuclear war had subsided But the possibility of'an atvm j war had not totally Fassea and the J°S decided to meintain one eighth of the strategis forces on alert fpr 19 gore days At the direction of the joint Chiefs 3 1Ibid p 4E 2lbi p 37 bid p AE r• 4j - i • ' or ''f'' r 01% MOM I 1 1 UUNCLASSIFIED'404M TA ' 4t ' WORKING PAPERS General Pover terminated the one-eighth earbora e alert posture effectcve 060OZ 21 liavem er and the command resumed its normal indoctrination program -Although tr to SAC had instructed its numbered air f rces to assu no othor force degrOation ep it permitted them to retail sucfort aireraft ' rersonnel and equipmeA at their attention to creating an alert cycle wh c i h 3 n a JAI4i on ta ar n er 40V 0 f C Since the beginning of the airborne alert program SAC hat devotes srecial C discretion l retaliation to surrrise attack mould also provide maximum convenience j r its crews Before the Uban missile crisis the co and normally assigp ed 52 units to airborne alert indoctrination for six months' reriods ai6 uah3Aorre c changes in unit comritments appearest quarterly In scheduling unit3 '•ar airborne' alert sorties the Strategic Coamand•gave particular attention to both jrunit's role in t• a 5inple Tntegratea Optzati 3nai Plan and to a fair balancing of alert commitments asrono the numbered air t'oxees The coavand's use of port h m based B-52 G and H units On the Thule route the desire to trein ner units s soon as Tpssible and the cor clicattons'always presented by runway construction were criteria r•hich influenced SAC's selection of units to fly airborne alert sorties on the Cfiryme 'on e routes A Y6 t V Farly to 196 the numbered air forces began to question the-length arr frequency of SAC ' s inroctrination schedules for the first time This „ r S' dlesat sfacti n surfaced at the -hrare Dome operations review confereqe meeting • r' at Headquarters SA in January 1963 The numbered air forces objected ito the partial changeover of participating units every quarter gather than to the actual 11bid p 47 2Htst of SAC FY 63 PP 119 1740 si x months' alert cycle Tbo mayor recommendation of the confere fte was that a complete rotation of psrticipating units should occur only tr1ce each year 0 1 January and on 1 July l The command never acted uron this recommvn ation A rrocosal from Colonel F B clliott commander of the 423tth Strategic vying at Barksdale Y Aft Louisiana rendered the sugoestion of the Cffutt meeting obsolete Procosing a three months' cycle for a unit on airborne alert be created as an official SAC Folicyl Colonel Elliott objected to the chrome D- ne cycles as then constituted Althtugh this prorrrted considerable discussion within the' Air force °AC was elready studying the advantages of reduced cycles for airborne alert A shorter cycle would obviously increase the number of-units-participating annuallyi for eyar tle a 90 day AAl woult' nakc - rrces• lry for alt g-52 organizations to take part in Chrome Dome at least once a yrar The enthusiasm and sunrort of SFf''s three numbered air forces for the change %as unequivocal They favored three Toctha 'tyGles an -11-eved these vroul9 11stribute the f AI corimitments more evenly among the forces and furnish a smoother y -ariyj raining • r rrogram for all B-52 crews 'thus in mil-April 1963 SAC offtc -a11y announced that three months' cycles fvr AAI training would take effect in fY 1Af-2 PJ U Strategic Air Omnand'soon reducer the indoctrination cycle skill furthrr The second reductlon rpstalted from the Iscussions at a tactical aircraft squa ron com Aanr ers' conference nicknamed United Effort vhich met at SAC Headquarters on 21-22 Nay 196- The commanders recommended flyinq airborne alert Indoctrination flights with two B-52s in cell formation tnst ad of a single B-52 sortie from each participating unit 15 UE equivalent The cell formation was an accepted tactic for the one-eighth level air alert but LO Headquarters SAC ryas reluctant to approve cell tactics for the mort'routine • t- indoctrination program Also included in the cortmanders' rpcnnner4itions wa's' 4 I I a Fropasal to shorten the training cycles fro three months to 45 days General Power tentatively arfroved the reeomTenAetion during the se's°ion and instructed SAC planners to evaluate its feasibility The con-alnQ officially approved the recommendation in mid-June and iml•lementea cell•taect cs and the 1 • 45-day cycle beginning I Oct 7ber 1963 This pilicy remained fn force until SAr ceased flying airborne alert sorties in 1968 1 S 10 The alert syetem change radically in 1964 when SAC' i IlaH rrogram r st assumed new importance as the second gpneratioh Titan I arr1't'1nt 4man mlviles became more sophisticated and available in greater numbers '46 additional bomber aircraft had Soloed the command's inventory since 19628 The 3-1•12 and 8-15P forces remained static with SAC having received the Ia•st• 6f these'airc aft in 1962 The B-47 fleet was steadily reOuced Manned brmbers- cbyld still-- V carry wearons of generally higher yirlds and SAC aircraft•were'able to provide a greater target coverage and a more Powerful nuclear eeliv ry 2v ell b- 90 4 - J CSsI J «w%-r the number of bomber aircraft in the SAr' f6rcey hfd Increased f considerably since the advent of airborne alert The number of 3-5-5 varticipating in a one-eighth or a one-sixteenth Posture had increased proportionally The one-eighth posture Khich%equaled 60 9-52 sorties a day in 1962 now consisted ''PW IHist of SA- Jul-Dec 63 pp x'647 2Hist of SAC Jan-Jun 64 P 93 o eo such sortleai 44 on the southern route 34 an the northern route G two on tt e Thule monitor route In addition Emergency War Orerationt Planning ' revealed distinct flaws in the 'brome Dane o rattcn •nd Soviet missile lp hardware had reached sew levels of sonhistication l CD 'E'L A new Chrome Dome triple-routing system nicknames TRIDENT was $AC's C AF b 7 ansver to these circumstances at tht beginning of 1964Acs r t w 6A a The Strttegit air COT aand's 'ro3ectesi TrPent routes Cne Eighth -One Sixteenth Northern Rout - 2e la r Increased flexibility afforded by the triple-routing procedures 1 r C C • In the ic'S's opinion these negotiations could take another five xonths Accordinoly thF cmmmand estimates thati Trident could not be ini iatf- 4fgre 1 June 1965 Canadian aprroval caa e 'in April 1965 and SAC began the rrocram in 4 UNCLASSIFIEr V6 'NI G P PEns allowed the command t AF b 1 r route assignments Although there were 7 vt ronsiderablp delays preceded the implementation of the rident pattPrns - General Power Officially prooosed the elan to the Joint hIefs of Staff'•ind Air Staff late in February 1964 But the State Upartment w Ich would coorl'inate the rrogram with the Canadian government did ngt receive it until aunt ' August 2 j8y to Although CAC continued to favor lying airborne lndoctrinatign•iortiQs 24 hours a 0ay the program suffered a major setback late in 1965 Secretary of Defense Robert S Ycllamara's confiuenct in the singular ability of'thv Minuteman and Polaris missiles to guarantee adequate retaliation was rell known ' tr• Still it vas a surprise to SAC when Headquarters USAF received the Setrktary's Subject Issue Number 406 discontinuing airborne alert indoctrination s •ties S effective 1 July 1966 and reducing the support manning crews by 1 ECQ spaces IIbia p 98 2 Ibid p 101 Y 0 Ifting ice '01 ii -Warm iYr 11 UNCLASSIFIED WO OW RM-40 WW Ow x a RKING P APER S Air Staff sent a reclame to the Secretary on 3 Decembers requesting tnp' retextion of six of the 12 B-52 sorties then flying Chrome Dome It also protestjo the manvower cut on the grounds that no resuctton in the overall number of •sc Iles tr' hae been made Not unexpectedly McNamara rejected the reclame on I1• Denim-ber 1 r to eonten-ling that the basis for his eeision r•as the need to provide furtgr C resources to surcbrt B-52 training Since airborne alert was destineO to f ' terminate MCNarr aT4 anniunced that special funds rould no long°r be rromlled to stockpile spare materiel for airborne elect-oreratlons l However of greater significance r•as a condition in McNamara's reply that SAC could en ntiriuf 't to fly any number of air alert indoctrination flight -which the joint CbW s of ' T-1 Staff consiuvred optimvm'so long as they rare financed by the -funds r rovided r for the normal flying' P rogram Y F fatal crash of tVo aircraft narticipatirg In airborne alert oceurree almost simultaneously with the McNamara order ana further hindered SAC's efforts to retain air alert as one of the triple rillars of this nation's strategic forces On 17 January 1966 a B-5201 which was the second of a two-shlly cell from the 60th 8imbardrent Wing Seymour Juhnson AFS North Carolig r a flying the eastern Trident route or the original southern route of Chrome Pore -iij le rran and collides rith a tanrer from the 97th Bombardment U ng Blytheville AFS Arkansas during a refueling mission over the southeastern coast'of- Spain Not only were seven crp%ren killed mien the two aircraft collided t '•ut four uiv usefi hydrogen bombs landed near PalomAres on Spain's Medtterre-An•Goast 1 UnOer this condition Air Staff estimated a one-olglith posture could Orly V be maintained for 3o days after l July 1966 - 2Hist of sAr Jan Jiro' 66 pa 90-91 UNCLASSIFIEI V 54 J ORKING'PAPER- S The command quickly located three of the wearons but did not reco rr the fourth from the ocean until 7 April following an intensive search of land and sea u Saaln's Justifable concern over radiatirn exposure in the Palomares area promoted a thorough review of the existing airborne alert i-4octrLnaU on flights and put a serious strain upon our relatkis nlth friendly foreign t nations Cn 22 January the Spanish government lnforwd the'• MM '7A J-1'j i•n P dr d that flights carrying nvOtar wtapults uver sranisij territory would no longer be cermitted At 1145Z that same day Sh susnenf±ed airborne alert p fndoctrinatinn flights on the eastern route fer an indefidi p P% riod The tow-and hoped this condition r•ould be only a te-rrorary ono aryl that the Franca•• government could soon rearproye•the Spanish ovFrflicht Even tNbugh the Spanish Minister of Touri5m end Information ha Stated Tuhlicly on 29 January that the ban on averfilgbA-•s ith nuclear wrear ons was permanent he qualified the pronouncement by suggesting the prohibition might be lifted In tote went of an International crisis Strategic FIr Command briefly considpre flying the eastern route rithout nuclear vt apons however vhen Ce Teral J hn 0 f Ryan the Cr wSAC since December 1964 objected to such an arrangement the cor' rand's original Aecl sion to cancel the eastern Trident route remaine 'fn effect Indefinitely The susrenston reduced the nusrber of daily W -sorties from y 12 to eIght 3 f8' CV In April 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a revi's-ed program for air alert drafted by Headquarters USAF and endorsed by SAC '47hia program l C1ER210 UNCLASSIFIEl7r ' ' V1 WORKING PAIPERS was in accord with McNamara's authorization permitting the JCS to rrainta n air alert indoctrination within the limits of SAC's regular flying r rogram The Strategic Air Command received the Air Staff's proposals for futwoo lent n 17 February 1966 The draft's major Provisions suggested four da il-q ir r'octrina to tion sorties through fiscal year 19671 a N fenst Cepartmrnt allocaWon of 10350 manpower spaces if the rtductlen of 11KO spaces actually oe c rree ad maintalning 'a capability•of sustaining a one-eighth rrogram after 'the rrfense Venartment had trade a definite decision on the manc over issue The comrrand endorsed this Alen on l Parch By the end of hpril the Joint rbilfs of Staff had arF•-oved this Air Staff-SAC program for cne year and it becamq effyctive Y C r on 1 July 1966 1 # • C 1 40 x To insure that it could immediately escalade to a one-eighth airborne • alert rosture SfC deckled to maintain 38 of its e0 B-52 squa-cons 15 LT in an on-the-sl elf carability for fiscal year 1967 The coT-land 'Grafted a year's schedule based uron the 45 eay cycle then operating for ell vnits•Farti irating ' In AAI exercises In mast cases these sorties would negotiate the routek where thoy had previously'florr 4 ndoctrinatl7n sorties The •-ost feasible'prcgram for the four daily indoctrination exercises consisted of tHO on the eastern route q and one each on the ves' vrn and northern routes 14owever SAC had not 'yet resolved the question of the Spanish overflight which was an absolute corollary Rather than transfer the two sorties regularly flying this pattern to the northern and SAC suspenders the sorties on the eastern one altogether until to implementing AAI flights op the eastern route lIbid V 99 re stern zavtes some aarerment 0 •t 41 T kr i fl I could be reached with Spain on the overflight question l k The cgmr and decided jDO s to begin a continuous monitor of the Thule site vith KC-135 tanker units stationed at Elelson AFB except during July when runway repairs at the C name for airborne alert indoctrination from Chrome Dome to Gierit- Wheel and created the separate aprellatlon of Butter Knife to denote fhe ccrtinuous AT__ q Alaskan Lase shifted this responsibility to the Goose task force -2' ow U The reduced program took effect on 1 July 1966 at the level of four T daily 9-9i sortiest 1one each on the northern and western rovtes a%rJ two l y z flying the Thule monitor The level of Chrome tome operati - ns in FY 1%7 remained the sage as in FY 1966 But effective 1 July 1966 SAC'ghanged the t monitor of the 5SF'hS- cite at Thule Greenland S U he terTinati n a f the Spanish overflight and the terRinat-ton of AAI p $ sorties on Chrome Dome's eastern Trident route greatly imraired' A-'s airborne alert Grogram By late 1966 the comrand vfelt certain that the SGrhlsh government µ a s would not lift thF restrictions'on the overflight and itjbe4a6 to evelop a program vhich nlacee rereVell em rhasis uron ground alert Eat'ly inr 'arch 1967 SAC arpointed a study group to investigate the merits of steprinordp the air ' ' dispersal rrogram Shortly thereafter its recomn endat'_ons rare Im lementi'' and the new program became knoMnn as Selective Employment of AUr Sild• 3rnund Alert SEAGA A IIbid pp 101-102 2However SAC was reluctant to fly tankers on the Thu mnlittor ng route Beginning in 0 Ober 1966 the t opunarvj reassigned 8-52s t vey c r tihuouely Y th Q 1kS TAjOand allotteR tvvo'daily AAI sorties to that route ° ul s't°ofStiC' Jul-rec 66 F 19 4 Hist of rA- Jan-Jun 67 p 112 CLASSIN WORKING PAPERS P1 sortie for each of SAC's 17 B-32 G and H units en this was done SAC planners A creator dispersion of SAC's alert forces was the basic tenet of tho SEACA frograr Tha-st%Wy group further rotomoonded in7 lementino'a universal who had succeeded General Ryan as rl1 CSAC on 1 February 19671'favored the rlant expand the numbev- of sorties °cr the G and H units Although Cenera l J J Naxarro hoped to incorporate Hrund Del missiles into the air d spersal program and to the command had long c•ntended that the air disrersal flan could not be incorrorated into the STOP by the beginning of FY 1966 Thrref orp the Strateaic Air Cortir and requested the Joint Chiefs of staff to approve the continuation of air alert•for another year beginring 1 July at the existing level of four daily sorties Arfrovol for this liniteO alert program came from the JCS in Arril 1967 1 'iair alert frfS1 he SEAM concert ec nbired the best features of ground •a d instant response to tactical warning and comratabi ity-with the SItP were he'- corcept's strongest features V'hpn the flan vient into effect n 1'July 196F the imary aEAGA force consisted afx41 4 _1-620 and H sorties floss 16 B-52 J rr sorties at AnAersen AFB Cuao Nicknamed Giant Laree SFACA enarl ed' the CUrSAC to envloy a portion of the alert forces in three 41ffesejit• options eltl er r • 'P1 separately ox simultaneously Any one of the three conditions made continuous of the 51nale Integrated Cperations Plan Under the second action SAC would escalade to zIrbornp alert and laurch the SEAGA sorties limediat•ely Flush the rescorst ility of coverinq prelletermitted targets according to the requirements loxpst level of SEAGA onerations ' the forces committed to o round alert possessed to the SEASA force corstantly remained in a full combat configvration At the coverage of carefully determine' SOP targets possibles all B-I 2 'sorties assigned Lau ich a or in a less critical cor 'ition in accordance vlth a'v %ecisely timed schedule of winimum irrtervol take-off This maneuver co istituted a 2Ni st of SAC FY 69 p 117 •al visual deterrent of CAC's retaliatory Fosture and this the crfidnd' belijt i t wpuld demonstrate to an enemy launching an attack against the Unite' States the national determination to resist filth very available rasource The ending survival option was the final alert pasture and it provided continuous airborne survellience by the SFAGA forces of targets sufflcient to destroy a vital AF b 7 portion take-ofLLfreeriodicaliy and approximately 20 • 1 sorties its demise Cn 21 January 196 'a B-52 flying the Greenland BWWS route ' full operation at th - advenl of SEAUA urforetean circijr stances scat deterrtined ' FCa k l th ovg h 5 AC' s - h our Pion i for n0 of t e u ra 8r s t Tema ne n i h -h l d i t i d '-3 Immediately General A G Gillen fl 5A CCS CKrratLoris suggested the continuatibtv -•- Jgllowing day the JCS airerted FAC to-cease carrving nuclear weapons at ona parrying four urermed YK-2e nuclear kedoons crashed near Thule AFB The of air alert indoctrinatiin by flyino the foar daily sorties without reaFbrfs but General Nazarro on 24 January took the'rosition that there was llttie• merit' '3 in flylnq unarmed sorties As a result SAC terminated all its sorties on the northern arc western routes 8-52s from Westover AFB flew the last AAI flights on 25 January The B-52 monitor of the BhfEl'YS site at Thule Greenland continued until tray 1968 7 While preparation of the SFAGA study was in progress SAC questioned the practicality lcontlnva ly monitoring the Greenland facility U to changes 141st of SAC FY 69 pp 116-117 Hist of 8AF% FY 69 PF 101-103 With the third posture bcmbers would hours would lapse between unit t in Soviet ICBM deployment With thejtwo other M'F'NS sites now as•'reliable as '• the original one at Thule the command reckoned that continuous- sgrvellience Of the site at dear Alaskag would be an equally effective alternative to the - P- Greenland monitor and less coetly 'than the original operation t ra Selective Employment of Air and Ground Aler V 'AC 1Hist of SAC Jan--Jun 68 pp 79-P0 The F-WS monitor site at a f o-_c o ffi ve KC-135s flying from Eielson Three aircraft -rh c f the pule B EW5 site'Vith tankers based at-Goose Ad and Eielstan AFB however 0 C It rill be recalled that during the July-September 1966 quarter SA mont-toyed r '77' 1 the excessive distance from these to the Greenland station has rendered this x r a experiment unsatisfactory The command now considered monitoringthe Tear Q BtiEWS site° with KC-135 tankers This -technique was quite feas'ilje f these ' aircraft operated from a base reasonably close to the radar site J series -t t of tests ronducted by the command in February 1968 caivinceq SAC juat tan'Ker surveilience of the Alaskan outpost would provide an e46oriotr ical and' efti ule it •r monitor of the Clear radar Accordingly General Nazarro arpxov d the change in monitoring procedure and in early Anril M notified'all affected Air Ford' agencies that on 1 May the Thule monitor -would terminate and surve1Hence of the Alaskan radar by the tanker force bayed at Eielson would begiAle 1 eignt-hour Ghift completed the monitor eacn day 11 _ AI- n RF b 1 WORKING PAP r ' posture Four bases hosted the KC-135 tankers supporting SEAGA bombers but the r for SBMtA I r TO u Selective Fmcloymrnt 'of Air anO' ground Alert charecterlied by alp t r use of these involved no significant negotiations with foreign governmentsb to Fielson AFB was on 'Jnited States soil while there'rere no restrictigns on the c numbef of KC-135s stationed at Goose AB Labrador and existing agreements © justified the operation of the SAC tanker force at Torrejon A3 Spain Ut State Department's notification to the C nadian and Spanish governments - regarding the new alert system was sufficient to insure adequate tanker sQrjort aircraft remaining in full combat cinficuTation and ready to resrond lnstantiy to one of three tactical options replaced the four daily 3-52 indoctrinat on sorties tiewn by 5AC on 1 July 1968 After this date the command no 166gr flew rt9ularlY scheduled AA1 sorties on any of the three airborne 3 ' r outC4f S 1 I As far as bombe ind tanker aircraft are concerned the Strategic Air Command's alert proqrsm currently rests upon the S£AGA technique j Hi st of SAG PY 69€ p 119 ' ' F ujlr7j 1 i K- 4 76 Y4 i ' ' f it • f •q 4•r j J Chapter III N MISSILE ALERT r z C Five years later General Bruce K Holloway CINCSAC since 29 July L S 8 confidentl y CLASSIFIED r program since its inception confidently•asssrted that the ICBM forte had already 1 lp i' fa''4Vq 2 In 1964 General Bernard A Schriever then•Commanerr of the Alt•Force SystemlComand aryl the officer who had directed-the nation'b ballistic-missile established for the United Stated 'a pos3tton of strategic superiority y C summed up the command's confidence in its missile capability whett•be Fpoke of missiles on alert S id the Generals I consider the Minuteman the matt imfortant Minuteman the solid-fueled ICBM which then comrrised over 90 percent' of SAc's r element of the strategic-forces We have 11000 of there they are In thplr silos they work and an average of 9e percent of tho ere on alert 24 hours a day jo As technnlooical eAvenees continually sorhisticeted SK s' ml s ie force during the 196Cs the ICBM emerged as the backb ne of the comranP s alert • • 4 grogram 'Theoretically 100 aercent of the ICBM force was reeui'6d for alert Alth3ugh the SEAGA posture in 1969 called for only 40 percent of SAC s '8-52 8'-5k8' sed on ground alert practiclly all the' r• 0 a command's intere ntinen al ballisticmissiles rew 'ned on eanttr uqus sine' at y r SAC's nine missile basest3 housed in'eoncrete •silos and hardened4 to r rvive• anything but a direct nuclear hit i 3Ernest G 9chwiebtrt A HistorLr of ire U F Air rc 11 stir Missi esrr- tlew York 1965 p 21 r C 'li st of SAC FY 69 p 2470 4 3These bases are Davis-uohthan Ellsworth Grand Forks Littl -A Rock McConnell MalTsirom Minot Warren and Whiteman Vandenberg AFRa$nly supports ICBM testing 4To harden a missile site or installati-in is to reinforce it with concrete or earth to withstand the cverf'zessures of excessive teat or of a nuclear blast '1 T p • The Increasing role played by the Mtgf in SAC's aleit program is directly associated with the additlonal technological sophistication of thl missiles available to the command o aprreciate fully the role of the fr1ssll't IC3l 's in SAC's alert system there follows a brief description of the three tJ0 ' which the tWMand has used on alerts the Atlas the Titan and the Mt•gutemith i i f eled• b a highl volatile and exrlosive cryogenic propellant t required an immaculate propellant-loading system the Atlas %as the United States's initial ICBM Although the first test of the Atlas took pla se in June 1951 it C ryas not until 17 D cember the same year that the nissila hit oargglr the r the designated impact area with all systems performing satlsfsetorily Between 1951 and late 19A2 both the Air Force Systems Convi4rri end SAG tested slx madels of the Atlas designated surly as Atlas' A A C D E F then operatiorfal each rhibited a significant advance over 'the previous model The series initial tYrr 't ' model the Atlas A employed a booster and vernier enoines but rot the sus'ia• lner engine v-blle the guidance system's autopilot was nonfuncticnsl even th' ugh it r was aboard the vehicle Sy the time tests for Atlas C began in December MB Air Force engineers had achieved further imrrovements in the systef hltlS iSugh the propulston system of Atlas B also cowered Atlas C the lstter's•rrorerlant vi1-1- itatlin sydtem now operated as a complete flight unit This missile carried An operatianal re-entry vahlele and an improved and refined guidance sys'•em vhich made possible increased altitule and range l U The series E and F missiles tested fron October 1960 until late'•in 19 62 continued the Atlas' evolution toYgT'Htsr sophistication The E and'r were the CLASSIPjWJJ j p4 PAPER's 63 the last Atlas models The perfection of the Atlas E carried 1CW dev 1or u t to the point Wherr the vehicle could be installed in stmi-hardened sites thsr# mrry t • to hastening the day rhen the missile force could be housed in vrOerground l y to installations A acre Fowerful prorulslon system an all inertial guidance Ft c' system and an operational re-entry ve hicle further characterized these last two eodelt of the Atlas rrogram Atlas F was greater in length than the previous models ani could be fired from an underground silo with liguid fuel t stored aboard the missile l U By the en3 of 1962 AFSC had completed all its scheduled Atlas tesii k n Iles it began s second rrogrom r•hieh developed anti made availatle for aloft- two r new models of intercontinental ballistic missile 'gamed the ParkA Titan and r the Mark II Titan ryese vehicles offered several technical and operational improvements over the At As series For examr1e the Titans deployid in a tandem configuration v hich vas irore compatible vfith hardened crerational 'sites f vfiith and the installation of trisstle silos than the Atlas the most ro histicated mode could only be installed in sari-ihardened sites 'the use of'an'•imvroved all-inertial guidance system made diupersal less difficult and irieaceaaed the chances for survivability from surprise attack Furthermore thet vse of• an ablation-tyre nose cone reduced overall missile weight and rr aee ti1 14stallat•ion of a larger warhead possible A stronger single-boaster first stane permitted cam olete separation of the first s1tage as a comrlete ursil '• he develorrent of non-cryogenic rropellants for the Titan 11 xhith could be stored aboard the srlssilP simplified maintenance of this vehicle when on alert and 0 IIbid• pp 111-112 i 4 k L I reduced critical reaction tlme l U The Titan I which rids this country's first two-stage ballistic sri%sile I regeived its initial flight test on b February 1959 anci because fully oprr tional in late 1461 Uth a length of dC feet and a speed aprroaching l6 00a mgb the range of the first Titan was nearly 6 300 An advanced version of Titan I Titan 11 was ready to join the missile force in the closing works of 146 'hen fully orerctf- nal this vehicle made it possible for SAC to syitch frow aircraft ' ct coverage of priority targets to ICSIh coverage The second model of Ot Titan series carried either a P 000 pound -nine megaton NT warhead or s 4 500 warhead t- with a four and a half megaton payload Its range was-E 500 W Btcajir It C ' could be fired directly from Its underground ni1a the Titan Il v- ca Fa bit of instant launch only five feet lonner than-Titan I its fuel of nitrogen tetroxide and WMH could be stored in the missile when housed in the silo This further reduced launch time and brought an attendar' gain in 'reapon system from its underground silo at Eewards Ay California By May 196Qr tt e Air a Force Flight Test Center at Fdwards had gathered sufficient rata to warrant CL V IS September 1959 rids a historic day -for the United States's mtsille program tr as the first olid•-prorellskt mfs ile of intercontinental range 1 qD Q'Wstrywsrd reliahilLty • terminating the captive tests of the solid-propellant missiles or t e Fivuteman which vies the name the AFSC assigned to its third ICBM series By the end of 1959 the perfection of the Minuteman became the toll priority in the United States's missile progra%t Minuteman testing received an iven grafter impetus on 1 February 1961 with the first succes-ful firing of Minuteman I • ' c y4 40000 miles south of Cape Canaveral on the Atlantic Missile Test Range For the first time the Air Force Systems Command tested a complete weapon system rather than simrly the ICBM booster alone Three stages the guidance system and the nose cane vere all studied in this initial exercise launched from the Tlorlda I coast D U Fulfilling 5AC's requirement for s cuick reaction solid-propellant IOM r_ systemo Minuteman I the first model of the three model•series became' operational in February 1962 It tvas designed to eeploy either the ViA 5 'or the Marc 11111A Reentry System l and its warhead carried a yield of arrrgklma tely r r° an's e -1 im ioye It's accurSry '- one megaton To extend Minutem rpng pa yload F y allow multlrle target sel ectiop and provide a greater Fenetrrtlin caFatlll ' » iTT the AF5C authorizo-l levelopment of a seccnd more sophisticated model b'f t3e' • r series to begin in 1961 Minuteman II was the result of'this program and it became operational late in 1955 It emFloyed a larger seccnd stage engine conttclled by liquid injection into a single nozzle and i as carable of aarryitlg warheads of a hiotw r yield than its predecessor T e advantages rresented by these two Minutemen over the most advanced ICW% to date Atlas F and Titan II mere numerous Not only was the -Minuteman less extensive to produce and operate than the earlier mtssiles but tests •• Indicated that it could be easier to disrrrs end harden in undergrouid sklbs 2 k-' Currently -United States nlssile development nos reached its highest • degree o soahis' 1catton with Kinuteman III Oich has been operational since 1 Tt•e Mark neentsy System is no longer gyrational 2HLr t of 15AF Jan-Jun W p 226 early in 1967 It carries multirle indertndert targetaoie re-entry ver icles that is to say a system of multiple warheads -hich can be woneuvered pn independent courses to separate targets Minuteman III is presently the last modej t•of the in 1998 Employing a third-stage booster mot• ne •erful than these of th quick-reaction soli•l-rropellant IC86' system which the Air Force b 9s ft to develop AF WW1 for exa'mrle with Titan I's range of 6 300 miles and 5 500 miles for-kinuteman 1 earlier ICBMs the range of Minuteman III i s comra red9 • ti 'The third-stage booster enabled Minuteman III to carry General Edttric's 12 i IIAY with three nuclear warheads Although only one percent of the ctmmand's I 11000 mi s siles on alert in FY 197 0 were rinuteman IIIsy SAC has programed this I ICSI I to b -core the nucleus of the ontire nissile alert force tyji'b97 'rss With plans callire for approximately 1 000 missiles to be on alert thiougtuut the 1970s the connand projects 580 Minutemen Ills to achle ve alert 5tatus by the middle of the decade l r' j I i i U The Strategic Air Command presently deploys all three seriev of the Mlnuten'-an on alert in its unmanned hardened and dispersed ur rgrowia launch facilities at the nine bases which host the strategic missile force a hardenO ung'nrgrounO launch control facility dirrcts launch control and contfnuously monitors the missiles 90 nercant of chich are on alert 24 hours ' O'dy This hardened and dispersed Av arvn system is organized into squadrons of 0 missiles each with two or more squadrons constituting a mitslle rang Therel are now s ix missile rings in the Strategic rA r Command All launch control and m oaitorirg activities are limited to the squadron level 2 1SACM M-2 Minutemar• SecrFt 1 July 1970 p 13-10 1-4 12-4 Currently 29000 missiles the command's 1CRId force of arFroximately is'aprortioned amen six missile wings UOM FUN PAPERS 1 The unprecedented ability of the Soviet Union to launch ICBMs with -' startling accuracy in the period 1957-1959 caused the com-and serious anxiety at the end of the decade Planners at Headquarters SAC knew the Soviets had launched several missiles down range in the Pacific at a distance of over -- 4s7D0 NM and intelligence indicated they were on the average 80 percent r f successful It was not surcrisin9 therefore that General Power tomentod O that the f•roaress made by the United States in missile develnoment W Xx tea C little orwi too lots 1 a sidered the ' fired an operational launch of an atlas D on 1 Septombwr SAC con C7 lnitlilly • time rifle to begin a missile alert program even though it would be on an c x '110 When a BIC operational squadron 57hth SNSZ at Yandetiber3 successful Y extremely swell scale 't'he first IC9M now Joined the toamand's'stiategte forces The Vandenberg launch was the first ICBM to be fired by an all-CAC crew It signaled the integration of the 576th SKS at the California base into SAC's emergency war order thus signifying a larrImark in the ev7Xutf of the - strategic missile forces Nevertheless the missile alert forvo in 1 959 was hardly discerniblejand only one Atlas missile was actually on alert at the end yof they' The comand assigned this lone ICBM to the 57hth SO at Vendenbprg 2 rl v No sooner had SAC placed its first missile on alert than reveated malfunctions in the Atlas tests suggested a general lack of reiabi t '' y in the liquid-fuel missiles In early mctober 1960 General Power candi4l expressed his opinion to Headquarters T 61F that the Atlas had 'demonstrated'-slvatt a zero--' probability of being successfully launched in an operational countOMM and arriving at the target area The evidence clearly suprorted the CINCW's 1Mist of SAC Jul-Dee 59 PP 261-263 ' bid P 286 VNC LASSIPIED of the Atlas D from Vandenberg seven were fired and three lmp 6ted'w i thin the position During 1960 the Air Force Systems Command had attempteJt16 launches -' in flight and fell 500 to 19004 miles short of the target area Syitiia target areal two were destroyed' shortly after liftoff two more bad w lfuneL on malfunctions privented the nine remaining missil'rs from-ever gelttng otf the - launch cad l 13 - 3' • • cD yCL1 These circumstances significantly affected the comr'and's planR for C' future operations planners at Headquarters SAC had hoped the SM-65 r or AtIb s Frogr but realistically they knew the Atlas high cost and Intricate na lntalnence would form an essential part of the missile inventory in the peri'd 1 961-1963 problems prevented including this WOM in SAC 's long-range war plons at that thee By the end of 19599' it was SAC's position that the solid-fuet Itinuteewn' ' ± I was the ICBM most suitable for alert because It had demonstrated the g eatest i efficieneyy reliability and quickest reaction tt'w-2 with Justifigati h the Strategic Air uommano in the early l9bus looKeo to the MInutaman to 'close cne • r of these were assigned to the 564th SMS at Francis E Warren AFB Wyoming and missile gap rtth the Soviet Union U In 1960 SAC's alert missile force continued to be a smail' one• on ' • 31 December 1960 five Atlas D missiles were the only ICBMs oh alert Three the remainder to the 576th SMS at Vandenberg AFBO California 3 Nawl to counter ' the Soviet Union's rapid advances in missile technol y SAC pla W r's talled for J I 1 Hist of SAC JUI-Dec 60t p•175 glbid p 174 3Ibid p 175 E ' UN LASSIFI r R a rarid increase in the number of-missiles on alert In 1960 planners at Headquarters SAC now advocated malntalnina a missile alert sufficient to implement the strategy of counterforee This doctrine called for the 'Strategic Air Command to eossess a second strike Capability which court totally I I alert during this critical Juncture of the cold war was extrenety nCputaging to SAC During the four reek period the largest number of rris•iles t'okdate appeared on alert Total ICBMs on alert had alrpacy increased subptmtidlly from'' the suamer of 1962 to October of the sim year 8y 19 October SA 'Ohai%1112 ICBMs' x capable of launching at a s oment•s notice with this inventory inolugloq 74 Atlas D 8 and F and 35 Titan I missiles A mininn of 85 percent of 'these missiles w 0 destroy the enemy's nuclear offensive force l 410P N fhe command's missile alert force continued to increase steadily As of 31 Dtcember 1961 thp missile alert force consisted entirely of Atlas ICBMs v but it had increased considerably over the Frevious year Now 26 miVS1lrs _ out of the 62 assigned to-SAC were on alert 2 The circumstances surrounding the Nban missile crisis have b 0 c previously discussed However the events of 22 October to 27 Novembfk ifforded t f t SAC an unprecedented opportunity to test its command and control appairatvs as well as the force generation ability of its missile fleet under stresA 'Strategic Air Comiond was able to see for the first time how far it had rrogress towar3 realizing an adequate missile deterrent capability The perfo °rance ofh ssile were usually maintained on a lert 3 That the command could quickly'reactivate l Ibid 2Hist of SAC Jul-Dee 61 p 168 3Nist of BAF Jan-Jun 629 p 173 n rat 0 a r• missiles off alert for mechanical malfunctions could be readily toon On 27 October the day of President Kennedy•s historic broadcast on 'the Qabon situation 20 more missiles were on alert than there had been two days beforew The total was now 132 so compared with 112 on 19 October 91 atlas and 41 CO Titan i missiles l e V Even though the overall missile capability wes impres ivt and unprecedented the performance of the Titan I was espectally'signtficant As the crisis began SAC had 56 two-stage Titan I ballistic missiles in its inwntory and all 56 of these were actually on alert by 29 • October It was a landmark in missile alert when SAC maintained its Titan forte 100 Oercene an alert during the critical days of Octobsr-November 1968 2 ' -to Strategic Air Command spared no effort in placing Its entire missile for on alert during the Cuban missile crisis Minuteman the completely new generation of solid fuel misfile came on alert for'the Obit time as a result of the command's commitment to a maximum alert posture • xwo Vinutemen assigned to the 341st SYS at Malmstrom AFB Montana assumed alert 441us oy 27 October r Tyro hours later the 994th SYS at Vandbnberg AFB put anotherEMinuteman on blerta Nine was the largest numbor of Minutemen on alert during the Uban crisis and# SAC realized this total on 0 October 8y 21 November trim day before this c'onsnx returned to Its normal airborne indoctrination orogssm 531C was maintaining pia' Crisis of 1%2 Top Secret 1%-1162 p 62 • ZIbid p 78 1SAC Hist Study No 909 Strategic Air Command Operat'bons in the Following the events of October-November 1962 technology combined Kith a greater awareness of the missile's plats in the strategic forces The total number of ICBMs on alert continued to rise steadily for the remainder of the decade A total of 143 missiles were an alert as of 31 December 1962 and at the end of FY 1%2 0 June 1961 the aggregate number of ICBMs on alert had increased to 208 22 more than at the maximum O This figure included 22 Atlas D 21 C ' and 68 Minuteman missiles l The Strategic Air Command's the 1960s with the addlt•ion of more Defetise45i rotary 5 McNamara's desire to achieve economies in defense spgridl h9-W became greatly manifested in his department's decision to cuf ai'ls It t missile -program at vrrious'times'during the decade Although SAr 's vlsign of missile had consistently a4vocated a more rapid production of this mild-silo Its goal state of alert during the rXiban-crisis Atlas E 42 Atlas F 43 Titan I 12 Titan I1'0 ehissilt force upgradtd e ttan vy -luring sophisticated ICSM$ to its -a ae'al and by the retirement of eaTl er vehicles from the alert had always been an expansive onev pressure from the Army 4i-Navy forced liglts upon its Minuteman program from the latter's earliest days Since 19W i „ SAC recognized that the 's• nhlstication and reliability of the sglid-fuel Minuteman hae determined that this booster could become the p in stay of missile alert Since the first successful launch of the Minuteman in1061e the command was an 800 onerational Minuteman force by the end of FY 1964 and 000 of them Defense opposed creating so large a strategic missile force on the grounds by 1967-1968 However the Army Navy and factions within the Department of UNCLASSIFIED WORKING PAPERS ' I to that such a doctrine of covnterforce always subject technologlcal advance and further sophistication committed too with money to a Finale type of 4etorrent Mindful of this opposition Air Staff forwarded a memorandvm -t6 the Secretary of defense on 16 December 1960 consenting to a reduction in'the projected force structure of the Minuteman At the end of December 1960 SACs projection for its Minuteman force was 5 40 missiles by the end of FY 1964 This was 265 less than the coaaasnd's original goal first defined in 1959 1 Y U Confidence in the Minuteman warranted by the succeks of numerous operational tests prompted- both SAC and Air Staff to encoursge •tht phase out of the Atlas ICBM series and the Titan I missile General Power' xpressod R concisely the reason for retiring the entire Atlas system at•tW earliest' opportunity Although he recognized the Atlas was essentisIA 'for an initial ' •i' missile capability the COCSAC believed that because of its complexity tgh cost and unreliability the coaw4 nd could not rely upon -thisimtssile for the long term In April 1963 Headquarters USAF gave strious tons ration t ' the early terminstion'of Atlas D E and Titan I contending that money saved from the retirement of the earlier missiles could be used to build s larger Minutemap ' force 2 These initial-speculations by Air Staff took more •5Ubstance in Pay' lyhon an Ad Hoe Group appointed by Headquarters USAF suggested teim4nating t W - - - Atlas E by-''the end of F14967 a The retirement of Titan I from the inventory at the close of FY 1968 104ld depend upon the strategic situation at that time Air Force Chief W Staff General Curtis LeMay approved the Ad Hoc Group's recommendation on 24 May but with the proviso that the Atlas D be retired by the end of FY 1965 gather than at an unspecified tine in the-future The Joint tiiefs receivad-'lies recomwndations in June and for a brief time they became the qurdal'ifte for p 'upgrading the strategic missile force l The Department of Defense issued definite time tables-to SAC for deactivating Atlas D E and Titan I missiles No sooner had the •initi ial S McNamara ordered the complete phase out of-Atlas E and Titan I unlts by the Phase out of the Atlas D begun in Way 1964 than Secretary s S of De• en Robert C deactivating these missiles in 1968 the phase out of the Atlas E would take 1964 the Secretary's program change proposals 64-60 and 64 61 of 20'May 1964 called for accelerating the Atlas E and Titan Is retirement Instead •of end of FY 1965 While the Atlas D would bo retired during the fl'rst fia'lf of place at the end of FY 196% and the Atlas F would leave the Inventorq by the Y ' J Only six months later 'in November 1964 OSD announced an v n more rapid deactivation schedule for the three missiles already slated for retirdment In close of FY 1965 July 1964 Readquarters USAF had suggested to the Secretary of Defense that plans be made for missile chase out during the third and fosrth quarter of FY 196 McNamara was already committed to this course of action Since rifs would result from such an action the issue wos an extremely sensitive one and the Air Staff ' CLASS I PAVERS notified the commands that no announcement would be made until after the yovember Fre4idential election Rumors however were rife and thsir effect upon the morale of officers and airman was especially noticeable at 19th Air Force which - V speculation continued until McNamara made the reduction offit Lai aril public on 14 November At a news conference in Washington on this date ths p Defense Secretary announced the closing_of-95 military facilities and the atteMant phase out during the last half of FY 1965 of all Atlas E F and commanded a prsponderance of SAC's ICBM fleet l I Titan I units AlthougR76d cited obsolescence as the reason for deactivating the three ICBMs economy was the read motive for this action The savin i resulting from deactivation was projected to be $116 400 000 annually 'Agting in accord with the McNamara guideline Headquarters USAF issued a nevc tysttm program to modernize the entire Titan system began in 19644 Titan 1 uaaP U Although DOT had announced an early phase out of Titan I an extgnsive program directive for both the Atlas and the Titan programs on 21 November'1964 2 By 29 June 1965 SAC had Inactivated all its Atlas and Titan units and vrith the exception of 'Titan ii SAC's missile alert force was made up anti-rely of Minuteman modi•flcattons were in progress during the first half of the year w 1e3•-71tan II modernization began in early 'July Air Force Systems Cownand engineers'hsstened fp to improve the 'titan I's guidance system since it had been responsible fir • i - ref J ia '' •CLASSI IED approximately 20 peroont of the Titan I countdova failures Because''fitan i would completely leave SAC's missile arsenal by the end of FY 1965 tbe significance of its modernization program on missile alert was only rginal I 00 The Strategic Air command had no Titan Is on alert In December -jV5_5 r r was of greater significance to riissile start Scheduled to beginax y in July 0'' '-1964 and destined for completion in August 19659 the Titan II modefi4x tion c # program included 65 modification changes at a cost of $20 million ' 'Of these r4f 26 were scheduled to be flight test modifications nine in the 4pl dante systoms c four in aerospace ground equipment while db involved basic cqu ipaignt than 9e s Stills the sophisticated Titan rI occupied a numerically static position in 'SAC's operational missile inventory between December 1965 and 1une l 99 ' t while the number of Atlas E and F and Minutemen on alert grew substontially 2 t - The number of Titan 11 missiles which SAC deployed on alert varied'from a low • n• of 47 in December 1965 to a high of 56 on 30 June 1969 This was during a period vehen the size of the command's total ICBM alert force fluctuated between 629 and 975 for the respective years 3 In terms of the number of vehicles on alert th- - - t '--'- -- Owl of manned aircraft in the Strategic Air Comriand case to half of IWA and gave way to the missile forces The 8-52 and 2Hist of SAC Jul-Dec 64 p 183 3Hist of SACS Jan-Jun Us p T93 4 €2ta 16f SAC Jul-Dec 69 p 329 Hist of SAG Jul-Doe 66 p 3731 Hist of SAC lul-Get 67 p 269 and Hilt of SAC FY 69 p 247a 1 i tv static by this date and the 9-47 inventory was diminishing The command hail 1WLASSIFIE% 0R - 1 H6 'ERS ' ° received no additional bombardment aircraft since 1962 On 31 December 1964 the number of ICSMs on alert exceeded for the first time but only by one the number of alert aircraft committed to the SIOP--864 to 86% TK9 cdmmand's • o airborne alert force How consisted entirely of B-52 FB-58 bomberi KC 1315 tankers and miscellaneous FMC aircraft l The Strategic Air Command's ICBM inventory continued to expand in 1966 as the total number of missiles on alert increased by 16 during the seccnd half of that calender year On 31 December the total reached 887 which wys the largest number to date Of even more significance to the command's overalt alert posture Ives the addition of seven flights of Minuteman F to it's ICBM arsenal As the most sophisticated prototype of the Minuteman II seriars the lHist of SAC Jan-Jun 64 p 93 AF b 1 Miputeman F was also larger in sizes- 11600 pounds as compared with 1 366 pod Ws for the F model possessed greater range and accuracy than the earlier mod €l s of the Minuteman 2 The command placed these on alert at Grand Forks AF8 4 p4 VI Thaws %or 171 of that nn m1art nn 11 hr -mhow 1934A tF a C t' • t 3 number of Minuteman Fs on alert now reaching 70 at the end of Fy 1965 -% the J 6 build-up of the most sophisticated ICBM in SAC's missile force wati substantial i 321st Strategic Missile Ming Montana early in the suanFer of 1966' h the of spare guidance - systems enabled more of them to f oin the inventory ' --As of °C Junin age in 1967 when increased production and the availability of s suf iti ent nurniier B model of Minuteman 1 'SACM M-2 Minuteman SECRET 1 July 1970 pp 1-4 2-3 L UNCLASSIFIED WORKING PAPER y 1 7 SAC planners called for 245 of 310 cMaetior-al Minuteman Fs to pose for V Although maintaining as many missiles ss possible on alert has always were committ-e to the M plan and 320 actually enjoyed alert status l time However on thr last day of the year 336 of 60 upPrational Mi'rute mn-f s alert but because of minor mslfunctions o ily 181 were aetvally on alerS at this been the first responsibility of 5AC's ICBM program the command also Conducts operational flight tests Mhich insure that the highest possible rercrf tage of the alert force could launch if called upon to face the ultimate test only a little over two years after the first ICBM joined SAC% arsenal' the a90 tt Strategic Missile Evaluation Squadron SWM located at Vandenberg AF$ began to evaluate and standardize the subordinate units of the tammand's ICW iaree 4 Today the sm adron's n eatest sesponsibility involves s I annual evaiMlons of SAC's three Titan I2 and six kiWeman wings stationed at nine 'oase's' in the western United States The evaluation covers every aspect of a wing s operatlans„• ' including its combat crows misfiles re-entry vehiclesl coRAvrlcat'i nv and civil engineering nrograms as %v11 as the stitus of personnel traiinlrg and 1 r 3 proficiency in each Activiated as the 3901st Strategic Stander lisati¢n Squadren Missiles on 1 July 14 61 2 tAo and one-half years after the first missile launch from Vandenberg its work has constituted an independent audit o f SAC's missile squadrons The 3901st currently deterojoes each unit's state of combat'readiness and is the sole judge of whether ' unit's missiles and crews can per 014 their mission as well as their counterparts who participate in airborne alert In 1970 2In September 1962 this squadron received its present designation the 3901st Strategic Missile evaluation Squadron the 3901st consisted of 233 assigned personnel V In 19671 at a time whon the ICBM force committed to the SLOP was larger than the force of bombardment aircraft on alert combat crew performakes v ere extremely high td'hen the 2901st squadron evaluated 2 932 Individual Titan and Minuteman crew members during the first half of 1967 only 174 scored less than 93 8 percente which was the x1ninoA performance necessary for successful completion of their operational readiness inspection tests 2 j 0 The total number of all missiles on alert rose gradually 1»•1967 and during the first half of 1968 In October 1968 SAC's alert r fremiht reached 1 COO sorties for the first time Substantial improvements in 69 Mi'natrRsn E • ' • ' r made this condition possiblev but 'the figure fell slightly during the jost on alert nn two th of th eas as 06S ICBma were actuall • 314becgm5er • jR f'ti r mon s t y y 4 r kr Twenty additional sorties here available on two•hiurs' nottice Minuteman I models A and 8 and Mifteman 11 model p now ecmprised over tt 'r f ray • 44- 90 percent of the missile force The phase cut of Minuteman A the first prototype of the 10inuteman I series was proceeding rapidly andp of 89 Minutemen on alert on 31 December 1967 only 66 were A models o 4thq f1rst Minuteman series Five hundred three Minuteman I 08 models eompriaed the greatest percentage of the alert force whIle the more sophisticated Minuteman I -- model F••-now totaled 730 ICBMs ' Fifty-six Titan Iis rounded out the force of 955 missiles on alert at the end of 1967 3 Abbreviated History of the 1902rit St rategic Missile Evaluation Igpadron 1961-1970 Vandenberg Air Force Baseli'Vinclassified$ 1470 Although the number of ICBM$ on alert increased only slightly du Wq 303 actually on alert to 491 Conversely the Minuteman F force continufd to rise increasing from 330 on alert at the end of 1957 to 362 ready for iiraarediate tY launch at the end of June 1968 The Titan II force remained constant 'at 6 the first half of 1966 975 vehicles actually on alert on 30 June'1968 the composition of SAC'S missile force continued to beneftt from force modernization The size of the Minuteman A contingency again fell sharply and now totared a arere 50 missiles at the end of this prriod The Minuteman H force decreased from C missiles l J77 o Currently the number slightly over 1 000 vehicleso of ICBM$ employed by SAC on alert re•Oins ek The coemand built no new launch facilitiee'Ln W Fy 197o and„ as the decade began it had a total of 4071 Minuttmsh•and T tan • t remained almost constant with an overage-of g95 missile's required for art end t with 975 actually ready to launch at a moment's notice Ninety-eight p4pent launch facilities at its nine missile bases ten bases if the Vandenber g• test range is included From August 1968 through February 1%9 SAV S ICBNJ once of SAC's total misstle'contingency is always deployed on alert 2 • ti The command's future plans for missile alert project a total of'7 000 fit r Is focused upon Minuteman l1rAmodel Having first becowie operational in ICBMs to remain in its arsenal through the mid-1970s However current emphasis 1967 ten of them went on alert in 1970 Employing a more powerful thj-id•stage booster which has enabled it to carry the General Electric Mark 12 MIRV' Multiple• Independently Targeted Reentry Vehiele with three nuclear warheads tke'range the growth of the command's missile force has caused the size of the bomber fleet•on around alert to decrease during the 1960s 62 9-52s and IF B-5es ' armed with nuclear weapons and seattored at bases in the United States Iwere on -J alert at the end of PY 1969 'today the command's alert system rests upan Co balanced contingent of ICW s•and strategic bomber forces of B-52s and B-M supported by KC-I % •-nua- krmed with nuclear weapons all SAC's bombarchrent AF 1 4 A % A I p 'aircraft on aler t 3 Ind proceeding to predetermined targets in the Sovi at•ilnion of aircraft to remain in full combat ccnfiguration and ready to respond inetantly to one of three tactical options depending upon the sev¢rity of the drea t confronting the nation 'jS4 Between 1961 and 1967 before the command considered its missile f•r ce t• Once the crews are in the cockpits aircraft can take off at 15 wend Xntr rvais Curiently an operation known as Selective Emplo nt of Air a•M Ground-Ale r ' governs alert so far as aircraft are concerned It requires a srecifhp numl er to be of adequate strength to assume its full place in the strategle•arse6al SAC flew daily airborne alert indoctrination flights along three clearly defined routes jone which monitored the DYMS facility-at Thule Greenland ' At the ' height of this operation between November 1961 and January 19660 airborne alert indoctrination sorties amounted to only twelve flights daily but these aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were in the sky 24 hours a day These indoctri-ix-tion flights insured that the command could escalade within 72 hours to a posture-In Vhtch either one-sixteenth or one-eighth of its entire bomber f grce could become airborne and capable of flying sorties 24 hours a day An Improved ICBM caTebility 82 -and the difficulty of negotiating overflight rights to traverse farel9n ' 'territories with nuclear weapons resulted in the termination of ail airborne alert indoctrination sorties in May 1968 uJCnly once has SAC's alert force been put to the test bux the Cuban a issile crisis was•truly a baptis•im of fire At the height of the crisis on K ' 4 November 1962 the command operated in a Defcon-2 posture Ninety-two and one-half percent of its weapons system wax ready to launch within 064 1tsours c-' •Itd79 strike aircraft And 1 003 supporting KC-139 tankers were can aleft The Cuban crisis validated the colmrnand's efforts over the years to maintfin its I 'bnits in a high state of rtsdineas and vindicated the Importance 011he aisrt program lbroughout the 1968s the ICBM assumed increasing importance MP the •r command's alert force Thus is 1%9 General 401Ioway stated 't arnficlontly that he considered the ICBM to b the'Imost important element in the 'strjtegic forces Today there ere approiiimstety I o00 missiles in SAC's arsenal' ti l 1441 1 but 56 AF bill 7 of them are Minutemen with ranges varying from They ere regular systems ssalfunctltnsr 98 percent of these are combat 4eaal all times all capable-of striking a target halfway aroun-t the world in ess toon 10 minutes Theoretically the missile fora is always 100 percent on alei t e'pdue to The command's ICB contingent is today the stro Pst arm of the'strategic forces r and its irTortance will continue to increase in the•turrent decade ay the end of FY 19Tks the missile force k ill consist entirety of ltinutimen ills and 1116 while during 1SAC Historical Study No 90 Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962 Top Secret KA-1162 pp 5859 c r U Throughout the brief 13 year life of SAC'S alert sy tem the cqM aind to' has successfully maintained a mixed weapons forces always ready to respond to UNCLASSIFIE FY 1975 the sophisticated Minuteman III with its AF b 1 f the command's alert missile- - a variety of options Although having at its disposal the world's largest nuclear strike force SAC has always been mindful that its first responsibility ©gt i1 o prevent war hereforei %e Strategic Air Comand ' continue to maintain an alert system sufficient to-insure any would-be enemy that an at ack against this nation would bring massive ietaliation of s degree which would' render such a venture suicidal ' I tt e