i sie isrontomt stur no 61 mie omussore am comsm A cimotorcarcat imuromy 2946—2956 4 Uniates ntsroricat prvzston ceice or rreonumzon regimes emizore am comm Dectassstied 1A 19 S1C 0 Letter dated 11 Oct 91 21 March Headquarters Continental Air Forces CAF Redesignated Headquarters Strategic Air Command GAG Location Bolling Field Washington D C Gommant ‘The first commanding general of the Strategic Air Command was General George G Kenney former air commander in the Pacific during World War 11 his deputy commander was Major General St Clair Streett who had occupied the same position with the Gontinen— tal Air Forces Background Army Air Porees AAF Reorganization The redesignation of Headquarters Continental Air Forces as Headquarters Steategic Ale Command was only part of an ex— tensive reorganization of the Army Air Forces in the Zone of the Interior which laid the groundwork for a potent post—World War If air force To fulfill the unprecedented requirement of $ the United States for the maintenance of a combat—ready force in peacetime the maturing Army Air Forces relied on specializa s tion replacing the Continental Air Forces with three new com— m mands which were each charged with a specific role in the air % defense of the nation Strategic Air Command GAG Air De— g fense Command ADC and Tactical Air Command TAC 5 Headquarters First Air Force GAF and Headquarters Fourth Air Force GAF were assigned to the Air Defense Command i which was activated at Mitchel Field New York and Headquar— $8 ters Third Air Force GAF and Headquarters IX Troop Carrier ¥ Command GAF were assigned to the Tactical Air Command i whose headquarters was established at Tampa Florida Head— 1 masters Second Air Force CAF was assigned to th esic 44 Ait Command can wee to thp Stier oy an Downgraded at 12 you itterals hcaly declssiied The Tactical Air Command and the Ate‘WeZPCaminana — wore insetivated on 1 December 1988 b v Zand reacti— vated respectively on 1 December 1950 qo v and 1 January 1951 q v 1916 sTRATEGIC AIR COMMAND ESTABLISHED Continued The Gontinental Air Forces ‘The Continental Air Forces had had a relatively short ex— istence having been activated on 15 December 1994 prio to the surrender of Germany to relieve the Air Staff of the bar den of operations in the Continental United States so that it might devote more of its time to matters of policy No units had heen assigned to the Continental Air Forces until 16 April 1955 and it had not assumed operational control of them until 10 May 1945 Through its four numbered air forces and the IX Troop Cartier — J Command the Continental Air Forces had executed a hetero« geneous mission bearing all Army Air Forces responsibilities in the Zone of the Interior including the redeployment of air power from the European to the Pacific Theater the air de fense of the United States joint air ground training and the formation and command of a Continental Strategic Reserve on completion of redeployment During the last four months of 1945 the Continental Air Forces had also been responsible for the demobilization of Army Air Forces personel stationed in the Zone of the Interior Significance The creation of the Stzategic Air Command represented a re— cognition of the efficacy of strategic bombing in World War t In Germany the Nazi war potential had been destroyed and the country decimated The dropping of an atomic bomb by a B—29 on Hiroshima had offered dramatic and undebatable proof of the v capabilities of a strategic air arm This one devastating eurike brought about for the first time in the history of warfare the capitu Hation of a major enemy homeland without full—seale invasion by ground troops It also augured a new era of warfare the atomic in which the Strategic Air Command was to figure prominently« Because of the tremendous destructive power provided the pos— sessor of an atomic bomb in foture ware great advantage would acerue to the country striking first The only way to preserve the peace would be to deter such an attack by the threat of mas sive retaliation The Strategic Air Command was created as wom M ist STRATEGIC AlR COMMAND ESTABLISHED Contineed STRATEGIC AiR COMMAND ESTABLISHED Continued such a deterrent force During the first decade of its ex— istence it developed the capability to deliver more destruction in the first weeks of any future war than all the combined American military forces were able to accomplish through— out World Wae it Interim Mission An Interim Mission was assigned to the Strategie Air Command even before its official existence on 12 March 1946 At that time General Carl Spaate commanding general of the Army Air Forces in a letter to the commanding general of the Strategic Air Command defined the Strategic Air Command s mission as follows ‘The Strategic Atr Command will be prepared to conduct long range offensive operations in any part of the world either independently or in cooperation with land and Naval forces to conduct maximum range reconnaissance over land or sea either independently or in cooperation with Naval forces to provide com— bat units capable of intense and sustained combat opera— tions employing the latest and most advanced weapons to train unite and personnel for the maintenance of the Strategic Forces in all parts of the world to perform such special missions as the Commanding General Army Air Forces may direct Though lesser responsibilities were subsequently added and s the mission redefined from time to time the Strategic Air Command s mission throughout the first decade of its ex— istence remained essentially as it had been originally defined by General Spaate On 10 October 1946 q v the first regulation governing the Strategic Air Command mission was published Major Subordinate Commands Assigned Headquarters Second Air Force Colorado Springs Colorado and all assigned units and stations were reassigned from the Continental Air Forces to the Strategic Air Command — 3 1 wee——__— 1986 2 STRATEGIC AiR COMMAND ESTABLISHED Continued However inactivation of the Headquarters was disected to be effective 30 March 1986 Headquarters Fifteenth Ais Force was assigned to the Strategic Air Command with activation to be effected 21 March 1946 at Colorado Springs Colorado utilizing personnel and equipment of the inctivated Head» quarters Second Air Force Unite Assigned The Strategic Aiz Command assumed jurisdiction of atl Continental Air Forces unite except the Headquarters of the First Third and Fourth Air Forces and Headquarters IX Troop Gazrier Command which were assigned to the Air _ Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command see above 7 These units had made up approximately one—half the strength of the Continental Air Forces Most important of the units assigned to the Strategic lz Command were the Headquarters 3tith Reconnaissance Wing tenant at Buckley Field Gotorado and assigned squadrons Task Group 1 5 Provisional Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Headquazters VII Bomber Gom— mand VH Colorado Springs Colorado Headquarters 56th and 734 Very Heavy Bombardment Wings March Field California temant and MacDill Army Air Field Florida respectively the 509th Composite Group Roswell Army Als Base New Mexico twelve Very Heavy bombardment groups 10m sech 930 death aeth 449th 4624 46700 468th ‘ 485th 497th and 496th at various locations and three __ single—engine fighter groups 36th 86th and 354th at Bolling Field — Most of these unite were inadequately manned and the only unit capable of sustained combat operations and possoss— — ing an atomic capability was the 509th Composite Group of the 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Except for the 3lith Re— connaissance Wing Task Group 1 5 and the three fighter groups all these units were reassigned from Headquarters Strategic Alz Command to the Fifteenth Air Poree on 31 March 1916 q v 7 Sanes Auteces The Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of 55 air— fields and installations and reassigned 43 of them to the _ Fifteenth Afr Rorce on 31 March 1986 § v 7 Many of L 1 a — u_ STRaTEGiC am CoMMaND EsraBLisuED Gontinued these stations had been World War I bases and were on an inactive status or were slated for early abandonment Of the 55 bases assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 21 June and between that time and 31 December another eight ing are the bases assigned on 21 March Andrews Field Camp Springs Maryland under command — jurisdiction of Bolling Field Arlington Auxiliary #4 satellite of La Junta Army Air Field Colorado Gaddo Mills Aueiliary #1 satellite of Majors Field Texas Gash Texas Ausitiary f2 eatellite of Majors Field Texas Genter Auxiliary #2 Parma New Mexico satellite of Deming Army Air Field New Mexico Chico Army Air Field California sub—base of Gastle Field Davis—Monthan Field Tucson Arizona Deming Army Mir Field New Mexico sub—base of Alamogordo £ Fairmont Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Fort Sumner Army Alr Field New Mexico satellite of Deming Army Air Field New Mexico technical ex post factopos— to the Corps of Engineers 5 Mazch 1986 Geiger Field Washington and Seven Mile Gunnery Range Gowen Army Air Field Idaho sub—base of Walla Walla Army Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska — s I t —— __ T 1988 srRatEGG am COMMAND ESTABLISHED Continued Great Bend Army Air Field Kansas eub—base of Smoky Hill Army Aur Field Kansas Greensboro—Highpoint Army Air Field Greensboro Noxth Carolina under command jurisdiction of Greensboro Overses Replacement Depot ORD Greensboro Oversea Replacement Depot ORD Greensboro North Gazolina under command jurisdiction of Headquaz ters Strategic Air Command Grenier Army Air Field Manchester New Hampshire Harvard Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Headquarters Area Colorado Springs Colorado Keazney Army Air Field Nebraska Kearas Oversea Replacement Depot ORD Salt Lake City Uish under command jurisdiction of Headquarters Strategic Air Comment Kirtland Army Air Field Albuquerque New Mexico La Junta Army Air Field Colorado sub—base of Clovis Army Air Field New Mexico Las Animas Aueiliary #2 Colorado satellite of La Junta Army Air Field Colorado MacDill Army Air Field Tampa Florida Majors Field Texas satellite of Abilene Army Air Field Texas MeCook Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Iland Army Ais Field Nebraska Mountain Home Army Air Field Idaho sub—base of Walls Walla Army Air Field Washington Oscoda Army Air Field Michigan sub—base range of Selfridge Army Aiz Field Michigan Peterson Field Colorado Springs Coloredo Pratt Army Air Field Kansas sub—baze of Smoky Hill Army w Air Field Kansas Pusblo Army Air Base Colorado sub—base of Clovis Army Air Field New Mexico Rapid City Army Air Field Ellsworth South Dakota Richmond Army Air Base Virginia under command jurisdiction of Bolling Field D C Rocky Ford Ausiliary #1 Golorado satellite of Lo Junta Army Air Field Golorade Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Roswell Ausiliary #2 New Mexico sub—base of Roswell Army Alr Base New Mexico o J ——i¥y 1946 STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND ESTABLISHED Continued Salt Lake City Army Air Field Salt Lake City Utah finder command jurlediction of Kearns ORD Selfridge Army Air Field Mount Clemens Michigan Seymour —Johnon ield Goldsboro North Carolina Sioux City Army Air Field Towa sub—base of Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Sioux Falls Army Air Field South Dakota Smoky Hill Army Air Field Salina Kansas South Ausitiary fl Deming New Mexico satellite of Deming Army Afr Field New Mexico South Sulphur Ausitiary #3 Texas satellite of Majors Field Texas Tonopah Army Air Field Tonopah Nevada sub—base range of ©‘ Castle Field California Walla Walla Army Air Field Washington 25 Mareh Majors Field Texas satellite of Abilene Army Air Field Texas Second Air Force and ite three auxiliaries Caddo Mills Ausiliary #1 Cash Texas Ausiliary #2 and South Sulphur Auxiliary #3 transferred to the Corps of Engineers 30 March Headquarters Second Air Force Inactivated Headquarters Second Air Force inactivated at Colorado Springs Golorado and assigned in an insctive status to the Ar Defense Command and its personel and equipment used to man Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force which was activated the following day Headquarters Second Air Force was reactivated by the Strategic Air Command on 1 November 1949 g v 7 31 March Fifteenth Air Force Activated Location and Command Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 21 March 1946 q v was reactivated from World jj 7 _ p __ Re 1916 FIFTEENTH Al FORGE ACTIVATED Gontinued Wes i stame a Hesdapsetere Arce Gctsrege Sorings Iutsents Mo meh inteiidine pe coat ondas wah ace wwe ang ta hobs present Buse ersingd comment of the Pidieanth Alr Fives unit 18 April 1987 qo v 7 Seen Ale Pores aesiutiiss Gonitoueds Personnel and equipment of Headquarters Second Air Force Tice maire Proiiner te motic int Shoe soca te aan and equip Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force Practically all stations and units of the Second Air Force plus some additional foe meam aos sgoeest more dneondi ee aoa noodl Pree migh epee mn wig the soimnine m Sitch die domme pivgaciesepetnedvainrs Bening the assignment of a new eotenton by Hepdquagters Sir stegte Afr Command which occurred on 1 May 1946 1g v J the Piitcnts Air Poree begun eperations with tie Sime Tory davy infieifen mie ariis Aiea s a s Semys eeste eptrtte apd Seale tpose gesupe to be dugioped ist rerofedt Remtoren® hee tared if i am md toot fhared detie ma ver eae To supply replacement personnel for oversea replacement depot ORD shipments to various occupational zones — The Fifteenth Air Force was also responsible though not as part dis mhisine masice inn mevepoin n ue mand me Facing Recruiting Program an activity which had been begun by the Second Air Force and which was continued by the Fifteenth Air Force until 30 November 1946 q v 7 Ente Ausigneds As the nly major Strategic Air Command operational command the Tifenits Ais Fores tn» arsigren the Simien ms Command bembiee ieee aioe sad oon nieces onnnt _ p ¢ i 2s 2 dj L1 _ is B § — I ee __ e rirresnrh am FORGE AGTVATED Gontinued assigned to the Strategis Air Command on 21 March including a total of 43 bases and 162 units of a wide variety of sizes and types Most of the units were of detachment size many of them were not on Fifteenth Air Force bases and some had missions foreign to that of the Fifteenth Air Force and hence were slated for early inactivation The three most important newly—assigned units were the Headquar« ters VIH Bomber Command VH Peterson Field Colorado Springs Colorado the 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing a tenant at March Field California which was charged with Steateglc Air h ©‘ Command responsibilities pertaining to the atomic bomb and the 738 Yery Heavy Bombardment Wing MacDill Army Air Field Florida Below wing level the most important units were the 509th Composite Group Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico of the 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing and the twelve Very Heavy bombardment groups originally assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 21 March Bomb Group Location Assignment 40th — Mazeh—Field California 58th Bomb Wing teman Ath — Smoky Hill Army Air Vilt Bomber Command Ficld Kansas 938 Clovis Army Air Vilt Bomber Command Field New Mexico 444th — Castle Field California 58th Bomb Wing 448th — Port Worth Army Air Vill Bomber Command Field Texas 449th — Grand Island Army Air Vill Bomber Command ° Ficld Nebraska 4624 — MreDill Army Air Field — Inactivated same date Florida 467th — Clovis Army Air Field Vilt Bomber Command New Mexico 466th — Roswell Army Air Base Inactivated same date New Mexico 485th — Smoky Hill Army Air Vilt Bomber Command Field Kansas c 497th — MacDill Army Air Field Insctivated same date © Florida 498th — MreDill Army Air Field — 738 Bomb Wing Florida ai it ___ sate ripreswth am FORGE ACTIVATED Continaed Gombat Capability Limited Strategic Air Command combat capabilities at the time of its establish ment as vested in the Fifteenth Air Force were extremely limited and remained so throughout 1946 and 1947 The 509th Composite Group the only combat—ready unit was preparing for participation in the atomic test CROSSROADS _ see 1 July 1946 7 as part of Task Group 1 5 The only sther unit that Tes adequately manned and possessed any combat capability was the 498th Very Heavy Bombardment Group of the 738 Bombardment Wing The six Very Heavy bombardment groups assigned to Headquarters Vilt Bomber Command were not only weakly manned but were slated for special overseas assignment under Project Wonderful see below Because the Strategic Air Command was faced with manning requireinents that it could not fulfill on 29 March 1946 two days prior to their assignment to the Fifteenth Air Forse manning re quirements were reduced to 1 1 for the 4628 468th and 497th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups and they were later inactivated of— fective the same date they were assigned The two groups assigned to the 56th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing the 40th and Addth were only partially manned and neither group occupied an important role in the training program nor had a cominitment schedule prior to their inactivation on 1 October 1946 3 v 7 The VIH Bomber Command Project Wonderful Headquasters Vilt Bomber Command was unmanned when it was as— signed to the Fifteenth from the Second Air Force and remained so « until 14 May when personnel from the Headquazters 738 Bombard— ‘ment Wing which was inactivated on 31 May q v _ were trans— ferred to it Headquarters VIII Bomber Command was charged with executing Project Wonderful which had gone into effect on V—3 Day The project called for the manning training and permanent—change—of—station overseas deployment of all Very 5 Heavy bombardment tactical and service units of the Second 4 Air Fores 4th 938 446th 449th 467th and 485th Groups id that had originally been scheduled for overseas deployment through February 1946 The original target date for completion of the deployment was 1 September 1945 but delays and extensions of qverseas commitment dates followed io ® mvspnnmsncian ly noe Sagigl e fsl 2 rirrEENTH A FORGE AGTIVATED Gontinued When the Fifteenth Air Force assumed the Second Air Force mission on 31 March 1986 not one Wonderful unit had left the United States and overseas deployment dates ranged from 1 August to 1 October 1946 In June for all practical purposes Project Wonderful came to an end as it was de—emphasized as a Fifteenth Air Force mission and soon thereafter abandoned The 48th Very Heavy Bombardment Group was insetivated 12 July 1946 q v Zand four of the other five groups 448th 449th 467k and 485 ware inactivated 4 August 1946 q v The 934 Very Heavy Bombardment Group was placed on minimum manning status in July On 16 August 1946 q v Headquarters Vilt Bomber Command was reduced to l manning and continued _ in that status until it was insetivated on 10 November 1946 q v 7 Apparently the main reason for the abandonment of Project Wonderfal was the objection of overseas commanders to having such permanent—change—of—station personnel charged to their total manpower allotment Bases Assigned The Fifteenth Air Force assumed jurisdiction of 43 of the 55 fields and installations assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 21 March 1946 Major Active Stations 7 Davis—Monthan Field Arizona Very Heavy bombardment taining Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas Very Heavy bombardment training Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Very Heavy bombardment and reconnaissance training MacDill Army Air Field Florida Very Heavy bombardment and reconnaissance training Roswell Army Ar Base New Mexico Very Heavy bombardment training Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan Very Long Range fighter training Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Very Heavy bombardment and reconnaissance training Active Stations 7 reduced manning Castle Field California Clovis Army Air Field New Mexico Lid gwt Mal 98 _ ___ 196 — Firreenth am FORGE AGTIVATED Continued Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire Kearney Army Air Field Nebraska Rapid Gity Army Air Field South Dakota Seymour —Johnson Field North Carolina Walla Walla Army Air Field Washington Inactive @3 Abilene Army Air Field Texas sub—base of Port Worth Army Ate Field Texas Arlington Ausiliazy #4 Colorado ratellite of La Junta Army Alr Field Colorade Center Auxiliary #2 New Mexico satellite of Deming Army Air Field New Mexico Chico Army Air Field California sub—base of Castle Field California Deming Army Air Field New Mexico sub—base of Alamogordo Army Air Field New Mexico Dow Field Bangor Maine Fairmont Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Island Army Air Field Nebsaska Geiger Field Waehington and Seven Mile Gommery Range Auxiliary Gowen Army Air Field Idaho sub—base of Walla Walla Army Alr Field Washington Great Bend Army Air Field Kansas sub—base of Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Harvard Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Ls Junia Army Air Field Colorado sub—base of Clovis Army Alr Field New Mexico Y Las Animas Auxilary f2 Colorado satellite of La Junta Army Ale Field Colorado McCook Army Air Field Nebraska sub—base of Grand Island Army Ale Field Nebraska 1% Mountain Home Army Air Field Idaho sub—base of Walla Walla % Amy Ale Field Washington Oscoda Army Air Field Michigan oub—base range of Selfridge 5 Army Air Ficld Michigan Pratt Army Alr Field Kansas sub—base of Smoky Fill Army Air Field Kansas Pucblo Army Air Base Colorado sub—base of Clovis Army Air Field New Mexies — 0 © Lar — ———aazlt n isee rIPTEENTH AIR FORCE ACTIVATED Continued Rocky Pord Auxiliary f Colorado satellite of La Junta Army Air Field Colorado Roswell Ausiliary #3 New Mexico sub—base of Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Stous City Army Alr Field towa sub—base of Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Stow Falls Army Air Field South Dakotn South Auxiliary A Deming New Mexico satellite of Deming Army Air Field New Mexico Special 6 — Alamogordo Army Air Field New Mexico bombing and gunnery moe Avon Park Army Air Field Florida inactive bombing and gunnery rasps Headquasters Area Colorado Springs Colorado Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force Kirtland Army Air Field New Mexico Flight Test Section for atomic bomb Peterson Field Colorado Springs Colorado Might facilities for Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force Tonopah Army Alr Field Tonopah Nevada inactive sub—base range of Castle Field California 31 March 36th 86th and 354th Fighter Groups Single Engine eadquasters Strategic Air Command Bolling Field D C inactivated a apein Signe bases and seven gib —bases transferred to the Air Defense Gornmanty 42 bases ans 36 sob htees Iranalersed to fos Tesllist Ar Command ane one base transferred to the Air Materiel Command These bases had never officially been assigned to the Strategic Air Gompant Hevers spesrenly bcvuase Pesipstinss Ardent Air Command was the successor of Headquarters Continental Air Forces Headquarters Strategic Air Command handled the assign— ment of these Continental Alr Porces bases to the two other — ARE CAIT _____ i_ __ eu 1916 repium—Rangs rEconNatssANGE ACTIVITIES 1986—1989 Continued the East Reconnaissance Group Provisional of the 31th Wing In 1948 shortly after the initiation of the Berlin Blockade by the Russians see 27 June — 17 July 1968 reconnaissance forces in Europe were augmented by the dispatch of five RB—29s of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Group to the United Kingdom From then on until 1950 when there was an even greater expansion of reconnais« sance activities in Europe small detachments were continoally ro— tated to Europe But it was not until late in 1949 that the first recon naissance squadton was rotated to Europe a# part of the rotation program see 1 December 1949 — 6 March 19507 in 1948 the 31 th Wing participated in the atomic energy test Operation SANDSTONE © see 9 Jansary 1948 — 7 June 19487 In 1949 and 1950 two 311th Atr Division RB—LTs accomplished a geological survey of Brazil by means of aerial photography in Ecoperation with the government of Brasil The specific purpose of the project was to survey and locate deposits of highly strategic minerals and sight possible transjortation routes in the summer of 1949 a detachment of the 55th Strategic Wing 31th Air Division was assigned to Alaska where it accomplished two TOP SECRET mapping projects and 9 000 miles of acceptable Shoran photography of the Fairbanks area Two RB—29s and six G—B2% were utilized in the latter project Four RB—29s were also committed to various projects calling for visual and radar photography of the Alaskan mainland and two RB—29s were assigned to Electronic Counter Measures EGM operations designed to determine the nature of foreign electronic emissions in the area 30 April Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Gasper Army Air Field Casper Wyoming and Pocatello Army Air Field Pocatello Idaho from the Air Materiel Command and assigned them on an inactive status to the Fifteenth Air Force ‘The two fields were satellited respectively on Rapid City Army Air Field South Dakota and Walla Walla Army Air Field Washington They were trapsferzed out of the command respectively c 1 August 1950 q v _ and 19 September 1988 q w 7 On 4 August 1946 Casper Army Air Field was placed on active — status for use as a fighter base However it was not used in this capacity during 1946 though it had been expected that the 4th 2 —— A — m 1986 Fighter Group see 9 September 1916 7 would be moved from Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan to Gasper Army Air Field by 10 October Instead the 4th Fighter Group moved to Andrews Field Maryland gee 1 April 1947 Gasper Army Air Field re— mained a satellite of Rapid City Army Air Field until 24 September On 4 November 1946 it was again eatellited this time on the 200th Army Air Forces Base Unit AAFBU Colorado Springs Colorado 30 April Greensboro Oversea Replacement Depot ORD North Carolina Greens— boro—Highpoint Army Air Field North Carolina Kearns Oversea Re— I placement Depot ORD Utah and Salt Lake Army Air Field Utah transferred from Headquarters Strategic Air Command to the Army Air Forces Training Command AAFTC L May First Operational Fighter Unit Activated 56th Fighter Group Single Engine Very Long Rangel activated at Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan and assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force The 56th Group had 21 Republic P—47 Thunderbolts assigned to it when it was activated In June replacement of the P—47s began in that month six North American P—S1 Mustangs were assigned and by 31 December 1946 the total reached 82 ‘The last P 47 was phased out by 1 April 1947 The first jet P—80 aircraft were not assigned to the 56th Group until early in 1947 zee 23—24 April 19477 The 56th Group was reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquarters Strategic Alr Command on 1 October 1947 9 v 7 redesignated as a Fighter Wing on 1 August 1948 q v _ and transferred to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 ac v Responsibility for long—range fighter escort training and operations was not officially assigned to the Strategic Air _ Command as part of its mission until 10 October 1946 g vc — 19 ——— a € #5 rue riouren program 1916 — 1952 Two Distinct Eras 1916—1952 and 1953—1956 Fighter activities and capabilities in the first decade of the Strategic Air Command fall into two distinct eras 1946—1952 and 1953—1956 for fighter activities 1953—1956 gee 20 Janvary 1953 J During the first period all fighter units had a primary mission of bomber—escort t was also a period of great instability and Auctuation both in units and individual personnel which seriously hampered training Units were gained and lost regularly and the transfer of large numbers of pilots to the Far Bast following _ the outbreak of the Korean conflict see 25 June 1950 — 27 July 19537 made a very serious incoud into the fignter program A shortage of suitable up—to—date aircraft was a constant problem The 1946—1952 period was also characterized by a rather weak fighter capability especially in the first half of the period as compared to the 1953—1956 ora By 1952 the fighter program began to reach maturity In that year with the Korean conflict almost ended a greater stability developed More important Gighter capability was immeasurably enhanced by the addition of an air refueling capacity tee 19 July 1948 7 An increased integral range plus an in—flight refueling capability gave the fighters the mobility they needed to cross oceans in hours rather than days and to deploy from one side of the globe to the other just as the bombardment wings deployed The general maturity attained by the fighter program by 1952 and especially the addition of the air refueling capability culminated in 1953 in the Fighter—Eecort wings being redesignated Strategie Fighter Wings and undertaking the development of a capability to deliver nuclear weapons gee 20 January 19537 At the same time their primary mission was changed from bomber—escort to atomic—weapons delivery Fighter wings equipped with nuclear weapons became in themaeives powerful strategie striking forces And in the years 1953—1956 in contrast to the earlier period the fighter program was very stable Two new wings were activated in 1953 but the wing strength then remained at six throughout 1954 and 1955 and no further changes were anticipated in 1956 § 14 Development of the Fighter Force 1% — Until 1952 the number of fighter units assigned to the Strategic Alr B Command Auctuated to a considerable degree Following the active ® ton of the 56th Fighter Group on I May 1986 see above the gars c 4 __ Mig ha id ThE FIGHTER PROGRAM 1946 — 1952 Continued i second fighter group the ith was activated on 9 September 8 1916 v However manning of this unit was not begun $ until March of 1947 see 1 April 1947 in 1947 three new fighter groups were activated the 27h 338 and 824 ace 8s respectively 25 June 1947 25 August 1947 and 12 April i947 # their manning being initiated shortly after their activation In ma 1947 Hesdquatiers Strategie Als Domessnd apsomed jerlediiion C of three of the fighter groups the 4th 56th and 82d see respectively 1 April 1987 10 October 1947 and 1 August 19017 When activated the 27th and 238 Fighter Groups were assigned H to Headquarters Strategic Air Command but about a month after H their activation they were assigned respeqtively to the Bighth Ase H Force on 16 July and 16 September 1947 q v J F On I August 1948 ‘q v 7 the five fighter groups 6th 27th 33¢ ta 56th and 82d were redesignated fighter wings To conform to its authorization of two fighter wings under the 70—group program F late in 1948 tee 1 December 1948 the Strategic Ale Command re— sa assigned three of its fighter wing 4th 338 and 5610 to the Gon— R tinental Air Command and in mid—1949 see 22 August 194977 it d lost still another wing the 82d to the same command This left f assigned to the Strategic Air Command only the 27th Fighter Wing j which was redesignated a Fighter—Escort Wing on 1 February 1950 a v _J A second wing the Ist Fighter Wing was assigned to the command for a comparatively short time It was assigned on I May 1949 q v J but was redesignated a fighter—interceptor wing on 16 April 1950 q v 7 preliminary to its transfer to the M Continental Air Command on 1 July 1950 v Thus at the end of 1949 Strategic Air Command had only two fighter wings neither of which was equipped for long—range missions The loss of the Ist Fighter—Interceptor Wing on 1 July 1950 was offset by the gain of the 3ist Fighter—Bomber Wing on the same date see 1 July 1950 7 The 3ist Fighter—Bomber Wing was re— designated as a Fighter—Escort Wing on 16 July 1950 3 v 7 Under the 95—group program the number of fighter winge in— exeased from two in mid—1950 to seven by the end of April 1951 only to drop to three by the end of the year The third fighter _ escort wing the 12th was activated on 1 November 1950 q v J— Four more fighter wings were added to the fighter force early in 1951 when four Air National Guard Unite the 108th 3ist 1324 and the 146th were called to active duty and assigned to the § Strategic Atr Command see 10 March 1951 16 March 1951 — —— Pp ___ ram en ue rrowrem PROGRAM 1916—1952 Continued 16 April 1951 and 17 April 195 7 These four wings however were assigned for only a short time being redesignated _ fighter—bomber wings a short time after their assignment see 9 April 1951 and 1 June 1957 and reassigned to the Tactical Air Command o 16 November 1951 q v 7— The 508th Fighter—Escort Wing was activated on L July 1982 ‘a v 7 bringing the number of wings to fours the 12th 27th Blat and __ 508th ‘Two new wings were activated in 1953 see 20 January 1953 7 and the number of fighter wings remained at six throughout 1954 and 1955 and no further activations or inactivations were anticipated in 19se Fighter Aircraft The lack of fighter aireraft with an adequate Tong—range capability was a very serious problem until 1952 hindering the development of an effective bomber escort program In 1952 fighter wings de— veloped an air refueling capability andimproved models of the F—84 Gs and Fs were assigned to the command However in 1946 the Strategic Air Commands fighter aircraft consisted of a few obsolete World War I1 propelior—driven atreraft World War II tactics would have been necessary f fighter units had been required to support bomber cperations In 1947 the first jots P605 were received aee 23—24 April 19477 The P—80s which were assigned to the 4th and 56th Fighter Groups and which replaced propellor—driven Republic P 47 Thunderbolts were considered tactically reliable but their range was limited In 1948 a jet with a greater range the Republic P—84E ThonderJet w was introduced into the command along with some propellor—driven — North American F—62 Twin Mustangs The three fighter wings activated in 1947 the 27th 330 and 62d were originally equipped with propelior—dviven North American P—S1 Mustangs see 12 April 1947 25 June 1947 16 July 1947 and 25 August 1947 The 27th Wing equipped with P—B2s in 1948 and in 1950 it converted to P—B4Es In 1948 the 338 Wing converted to F—MEs prior to its transfer to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 g v The 628 Wing retained its F—Sle until it was transferred to the Continental Air Command on 22 August 1949 q v _7— Though‘a great improvement over propellor driven aircraft the F—84s presented many maintenance difficulties because of short engine life and the need for excessive engine changes However Q 4 i L —— it § ______S® Jo —— I mh 1946 accesses Hi — rue riowrem PROGRAM 1916 — 1952 Continued on I December 1918 ‘g v _ the Strategic Air Command momentarily lost all its jet aircraft when the 4th P—B0s 338 P—B4Rs and the 56th F—B0s Fighter Wings were reassigned to the Continental Atr Command ‘The Ist Fighter Wing assigned to the Strategic Air Com— mand for a few months in 1949—1950 see 1 May 1989 and 1 July 1950 was equipped with North American F0 Sabres which had little long—range potential and were used primarily as an interceptor All F—51s were phased out of the command by the end of 1949 but three of the four Ar National Guard Units assigned to the command for a short time in 1951 were equipped with F—S1z one of them being equipped with F—t7s The 3ist Wing assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 1 July 1950 q v 7 was equipped with P—A4e _The 12th Fighter—BEscort Wing activated on 1 November 1950 q v7 equipped with P—64Rs in 1951 Late in 1951 P—84Gs possessing an air refueling capability were introduced _into the command and the conversion program continued into 1953 see 19 July 1968 and 20 January 1953 7 _The 508th Fighter «Escort Wing activated on 1 Tuly 1982 qc v began equipping with F—B4Gs in 1953 Fighter Activities Fighterescort strength of the Strategic Air Command in the first _ few years of its existence as in the bombardment see 31 March 19467 and recommatssance see 22 April 1946 programs was extremely limited Fighter capabilities were restricted by obsolete World War It aircraft and by extreme Auctuations in units and personnel Bot like the bombardment and reconnaissance programs the fighter program gradually developed into a strong strategic force During the 1946—1952 period several distinct trends are evident — In 1966 and 19¢7 fighter units were beginning their conversion from I2 Gonventional World Waz Ii—type aireraft to jets The units were also hampered by nmerous supply organizational and manning problems During these early years their most important operational training like that of bombardment and reconnaissance unite was in the Arctic see 29 October 1946 In the winter of 1946—1947 one squadron of the 56th Fighter Group trained in Alaska gee 18 December 1946 and the entive 824 Fighter Group deployed to Alaska in 1948 see 1 April — 30 June 1948 By the end of 1949 Strategic Air Command fighter strength was re— duced to two wings the 27th Fighter—Escort Wing and the Ist Fighter 2s wam 1 Ip 1 __im see rus riouren PROGRAM 1916 — 1952 Continued Wing neither of which was prepared for long—range missions As a result fighter aircraft had to be excluded from war plans calling for long—range missions Strategic Air Command fighter resources were further depleted following the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 when the 27th Fighter—Escort Wing was assigned to the _ Far East to support United States Air Force operations there see 25 June 1950 — 27 July 1953 The transfer of 90 fighter pilots to the Far East at the same time further decimated fighter personnel ranks The loss of these experienced pilots was keenly felt especially because of the activation of a new wing the 12th on 1 November 1950 g v At the same time there was an input of inexperienced Reserve personnel into the command and discharges and transfer quotas further reduced the fighter personnel ranks On A the positive side the Korean confict brought about a renewed re— cognition of the place of fighter—escort operations in modern aerial warfare Therefore in late 1950 and 1951 the proportional increase in fighter units far exceeded that in bombardment unit From 1948 through 1952 the Strategic Air Command pioneered the trans—oceanic mass jet Mights that later came to be accepted as routine by other United States Air Force commands It was with good reason that the Strategie Air Command emphasized this acti— vity Before jet fighters could effectively support bombers in their global missions a way had to be found to make them more mobile and to deploy them rapidly from the Zone of the Interior to either Europe or the Far East Otherwise the advantage of speed would be sacti— ficed because of overnight stops From 1948 through 1951 the trans —oceanic mass fights were ac— complished without the advantage of air refueling Therefore the jets had to make numerous stops enroute The first of the pioneer ing flights was known as FOX ABLE ONE and consisted of the ight ot 16 P—60s of the 56th Fighter Group to the United Kingdom on 16 ——_ July 1948 w _ Late in 1950 eee 15 September — 28 October 1950 in FOX ABLE THREE the 27th Pighier—Becort Wing ferried 180 F—64z8 from Bergstrom Air Force Base Texas to Germany A emaller—scale mase flight of 55 P—62s to the Caribbean was made by the 27th Fighter Wing during the period 1—10 February 1949 q v FOX ABLE TEN accomplished by the 3ist Fighter—Escort Wing late in 1950 see 14 December 1950 — 6 January 1931 consisted of the deployment of the entire wing to England The unit returned less aircraft to the United States in July 1951 being replaced by the 12th Fighter—Escort Wing which deployed to England less aircraft see 16 July — 22 — 2 __24 m __ _ Coo THE FIGHTER PROGRAM 1966 — 1952 Continued TME FIGHTER PROGRAM 1946 — 1952 Continued December 19517 In mid—1950 FOX ABLE S1X was accomplished by the 20th Pighter Bomber Group Continental Air Command uaees the gretational control of the Steategte Air Gommund see 18 July — 12 August 1950 7 the group deploying to the United Ringdom 1ts return flight to the United States was known as FOX ABLE ric In 1952 two epochal transpacific mass air refueling flights were made The first of these POX PETER ONE was performed during the pertod 4—17 July 1952 ‘q v 7 by the 3ist Fighter—Eecort Wing when it deployed from Tuznér Als Force Base Georgia to Japan lr re fueling was accomplished on the Travis—Hickam leg of the flight ac complished on very short notice and at a time when fighter units had c Uttle ate refueling experience the Sight brought out several defici— Envir and problems in the air tefueling of fighter atzcraft that needed corvecting Late in July 1952 see c 26 July 1952 46 aircraft of the 27th Fighter—Escort Wing tested the basic tactics for mare ais refueling that had been developed during FOX PETER ONE in Opera— tion CHECKOUT during which they provided fighter escort for bombere Matriking® at Chicago Capitalizing on the lessons learned diring FOX PETER ONE and Operation CHECKOUT in October the 27th Fighter—Eacort Wing made the second record—breaking transpcitic lE of the year POX PETER TWO Even though mass refueling was decomplithed on two legs of the Night Pravie—Hickam and itavay Misawa instead of only on the Teavis—Hickam leg as in FOX PFTER ONE and was therefore much more difficult the flight was conducted with ex— ceptional success This was in marked contrast to the first mase re— feeling Right of 1952 which the 27th Wing had made in June of 1952 Le 17—20 June 1952 from Bergstrom Air Force Base Texas to Ramey Air Force Bage Puerto Rico and during which scores of €iL— ficulties were encountered By the time of FOX PETER TWO mass tle refueling Sights had come of age and a new dimension had been Aa —— added to fighter strength 1 May Fifteenth Air Force Misston Revised Atomic Mission Assigned COCO M2L SCEE oren Revised Moric Mesion Assigned Poul s May the Fifteenth Air Force was charged with the same mizsion an Bhat ofits predecessor the Second Air Porce see p on that Gate the Fifteenth Air Porce was assigned a new strategic bombardment mission by Headquarters Strategic Air Command The Fifteenth air Force was charged with manning training and equipping the 58th — as c tue aie 1 ___ Yury Hity for the manning training and equipping of the 2lith Reconnaissance missions in the Zone of the Interior as required see following entry io further change was made in the Fifteenth Air Force mission until 1 November 1946 Low I ines Air Command to the Fifteenth Air Force for administration and lopistical tro of the unit though the Fifteenth Air Force was charged with this responsibility by its mission tee above entry On 1 April 1947 ‘q v X7 Headquarters Strategie Air Command took over complete control of the unit inet YRocky Ford Ausiliazy #1 and Las Animas Auxiliary 12 Colorado Fifteenth Air Force both satellites of La Junta Army Alr Field 838 and its assigned 40th Bombardment Group were on tenant status at March Field California a base not destined for Fifteenth Air Force use the two organizations were relocated The Wing Headquarters 1 26 2 __ on completed its move to Port Worth Army Air Field Texas on 6 May and the 40th Group began operations at Davis—Monthan Field Arizona on 4 May To make Castle Field California available for use by the 934 Bombardment Group VHHl Bomber Command see 29 May 1916 and to provide for better geographical control of 56% Wing units the 444th Bombardment Group was moved from Castle Field California to Davis—Monthan Field Arizona beginning operations there on 9 May The other tactical unit of the 56th Wing the 509th Composite Group re— mained in place at Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico 6 May Headquarters VIL Bomber Command VH Fifteenth Aiz Force began j operations at MacDill Army Air Field Florida following its move from Peterson Field Colorado For activities of the VIII Bomber Command see pp 10—11 9 May Geiger Field Washington and Seven Mile Gurmery Range Auxiliary Fiftee nth Air Force transferred to the Army Air Forces Technical Training Command AAPT TG 19 May 498th Very Heavy Bombardment Group the only group assigned to the 734 Bombardment Wing reassigned to Headquarters Fifteenth Alr Force The 734 Wing was inactivated on 31 May 1946 ‘9 v 7 29 May 934 Very Heavy Bombardment Group began operations at Castle Field California following its move from Glovis Army Air Field New Mexico 31 May Headquarters 730 Vory Heavy Bombardment Wing Fifteenth Air Force inactivated at MacDill Army Air Field Florida On M4 May it had been reduced to 1 1 strength and its personnel trans— ferved to the unmanned Headquarters Vil Bomber Command which SB 1916 had recently completed its move to MacDill Army Air Field from Peterson Field Colorado see 6 May 1986 7 # The inactivation of the 734 Wing left the Strategic Air Command with only one wing the 56th L June Chico Army Air Field California Fifteenth Air Force sub—base of Castle Field California transferred to the Corps of Engineers 1 Sure Headquarters Eighth Air Force Assigned Headquarters Eighth Air Force relieved from assignment to the United States Army Forces Pacific transferred less personnel and equipment to MacDill Army Air Field Florida and assigned to the Strategic Air Command Manning of the Headquarters did not begin until 20 July 1946 q v It was attached to the Fifteenth Air Force for administration from 1 August to 1 November 1946 moved to Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas on 1 November 1946 ‘g v 7 and became operational there on 19 November 1966 v 7 issues is 1 Support of Air Defense Command Reserve Training Program _ An Air Reserve Training Program was established in June 1946 by the Air Defense Command ADG The Alr Defense Command was authorized by the Army Air Forces to activate Army Air Force Base Units AAFBUs at eight bases all of which were Strategie Air Command bases or were satellites of Strategic Air Command bases Romulus Michigan parent base Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan Andrews Field Maryland Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire Hensley Field Texas parent base Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas Richmond Army Air Base Virginia parent base Bolling Field D C Wold—Chamberlain Field Minnesota parent base Rapid Gity Army Air c Field South Dakota Dow Field Maine 2 Offutt Field Nebraska parent base Kearney Army Air Fleld Nebraska © _ J I nase fat The Base Unit at Romulus was ectivated on 15 June and the other seven on 1 July T—6 and Toll aircraft were to be used for Reserve training Strategic Air Command base commanders were directed to render assistance within the limitations of facilities to Reserve detachment commanders including messing facilities transportation tools and equipment and other similar support Though the Strategic Air Command was not officially assigned responsibility for supporting the Reserve or Air National Guard Programs as part of its mission until 19 December 1987 q v such responsibility was assigned to the Eighth and Fifteenth AIF __ Forces on 1 November 1986 q v J and 4 November 1986 q v support or reserve prooRam 1916—1956 SupPort or reserve prooRam 1916—1956 From 1946 to 1956 the Strategic Air Gommand continued to support the United States Air Force Reserve Program and Ate National Guard Program in every way possible Training was given to all Reserve or Air National Guard personnel that could be absorbed by stations and units Usually the personnel trained resided within a 50—mile radius of Strategic Air Command bases Flying and ground training was given to Reservists or Guardsmen during the normal work week when possible and on weekends to the maximum extent Flying train— ing was accomplished by the utilization of Reserve personnel as ad— ditional crew members on tactical aircraft The Strategic Air Com— mand also furnished demonstration units for active duty training periods of Reserve personnel Beginning in 1952 Strategic Air Com— mand also conducted annual summer encampments for the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps see 23 June — 23 July 1956 15 June Sioux Falls Army Air Field South Dakota Fifteenth Ar Force trans— « ferred to the Corps of Engineers 30 June Richmond Army Air Base Virginia which had been under the command jurisdiction of Bolling Field D C transferred to the Air Defense Command 30 June _ Headquarters Strategie Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Bownan — Field Louisville Kentucky and Headquarters Army Alr Forces Person» nt Distribution Command from t in For tsam«l Distribation — Command AAF PDG E i Uso ae 20 43 196 —_—— s Headquarters Army Air Forces Personnel Distribution Command was immediately placed on temporary insctive status and was later insetivated effective the same date asite assignment Bowman Field was transferred to the Corps of Engineers on 15 October 1916 q v L July A Strategic Air Command B—29 Dave‘s Dream under the control of Task Group 1 5 Provisional Strategic Air Command the Army Air Forces component of Task Force One dropped a Nagasaki—type atomic bomb from 30 000 feet on 73 former Japanese naval vessels bf Bikini Atoll on Able Day of Operation CROSSROADS Five ships were sunk and nine heavily damaged On 25 July a second atomic bomb was exploded undervater resulting in tremendous damage to the test vessels These were the fourth and fith atoinic explosions by the United States The first had occurred on 16 July 1915 at Alamogordo New Mexico and the second and third on 6 August 1965 and 9 August 1945 respectively at Hiroshima and Nagasaki For Strategic Air Command participation in other nuclear— energy exercises see 15 April 1948 Operation SANDSTONE 27 Jansary 1951 Operation RANGER 1 April 1952 Operation TUMBLE—SNAPPER 16 November 1952 Operation IV¥ 17 March 1953 Operation UPSHOT—KNOTHOLE and 1 March 1954 Operation CastL® articteation in open azion crossnoans Eartfcst Strategic Air Command Activity in Atomic Program Participation in Operation CROSSROADS was one of the most important activities of the newly—activated Steateplc Alr Command the other most important activity being Arctic training see 29 October 1916 7 Task Force One was under the command ofVice Admiral Blandy United States Navy and the operational control of the Joint Chiets of Staff The Task Group 1 5 force consisted of B—29 aircraft and crews competing for the privilege of dropping the bomb the B—208 _ so 1___ _—— ___ OPERATION CROSSROADS Cominued and crews earmarked for dropping blast—gauge instruments the G—548 and crews who provided the airlift from the United States photo ships and technicians supply aircraft and engineering person nel aircraft and crews for weather reconnaissance and public relations personnel and official observers Task Group 1 5 which was responsible for all Army Air Forces participation in CROSSROADS was staffed by some 2 200 Strategic Air Gommand personnel and operated under the command during its organization and training period at Roswell Army Air Pase New Mexico The Group was originally activated on 13 February 1946 under the Continental Air Forces and was assigned to the Strategic Air Command at the time of its activation see 21 March 1946 Shortly after President Truman‘s approval of the CROSSROADS project on 10 January Brigadier General Roger M Ramey com— manding general of the Strategic Air Command‘s 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing was appointed as commander of Task Group 1—5 On 7 May 1946 Strategic Air Command responsibility ended when overseas deployment of the Group was completed The 320th Troop Carrier Squadron of the 509th Group used 26 G—Sts to airlift personnel and equipment to and from the tests On com— pletion of its part in the exercise the aircraft and personnel of the 3201 Squadron were absorbed by the newly—activated ist Air Trans— port Unit see 10 July 1946 The flygway kit concept was fostered during CROSSROADS and problems encountered in mobility during the exercise focussed on the need for a more effective Strategic Air Command mobility plan which was finally established in 1948 see 1 March 1948 Assigned to Task Group 1 5 which consisted essentially of the 509th ha Composite Group with aug mentation were an Air Attack Unit 1 51 Air Photographic Unit 1 52 Air Instrumentation and Test Require— ment Unit 1 53 Air Transport Unit 1 54 Air Service Unit 1 55 Air Orientation Unit 1 56 and Air Weather Reconnaiseance Unit 1 57 The 509th Composite Group and all Strategic Air Command per somnel who participated in the test were attached to Task Group 1 Sufor the duration of the exercise but remained assigned to the Strategie Air Commans The 509th Composite Group originally activated and manned in December 1944 was the Army Air Forces unit which employed the — first atomic bombs to be used in warfare at Hiroshima and Nagasaii Eo OPERATION CROSSROADS Continued in August of 1945 The group brought to Operation CROSSROADS all the experience they had gained during the training period for and the actual dropping of these first two bombs The original group consisted of approximately 1 500 officers and included one bomb squadron a special ordnance squadron a troop carrier squadron and a service group which were augmented in Jnuary and February 1946 for the CROSSROADS project During a training period of five months involving the dropping of more than 70 facsimiles of the atomic bomb a great many new lessons were learned that made an atomic bomb group unique among —29 groups ©‘ Task Group 1 5 was inactivated on 15 November 1966 10 July ist Ate Transport Unit activated at Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico and assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force The unit absorbed the personnel and aircraft of the 320th Troop Carrier Squadron 509th Composite Group which was finishing its activities in Operation CROSSROADS see 1 July 1946 J On 1 November 1946 q v the Ist Air Transport Unit was re— assigned from the Fifteenth to the Eighth Air Force On 23 September 1947 q v _ it moved to Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas on 1 June 1948 q v _ was redesignated the Int Strategic Support Unit on 14 December 1948 q v _ moved to Biggs Air Force Base Texas and on 14 January 1949 q % _ was redesignated the w — 1st Strategic Support Squadron For history of Strategic Air Command air transport program see 14 January 1949 12 July 44th Very Heavy Bombardment Group 6moky Hill Army Air Field Kansas a Fifteenth Air Force Project Wonderful unit see pp 10—17 that had never had more than three people assigned to it L was insctivated a 15 duly — 28 August Planned Relocation of Headquarters Strategic Air Command and Headquarters Fiteenth Air Force On 15 July the Army Air Porces advised Headquarters Strategie Air Command that it would be moved to the Midwest By the end of the month the decision was made to move the Headquarters to Headquar ters Area Colorado Springs Colorado and to move Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force from that location to Fort George Wright Spokane Washington A liaison officer was sent to Golorado Springs in early August to secure quarters for Headquarters Strategic Air Command personnel Orders were issued and some personnel had shipped their household goods and were enroute to the new location when suddenty ‘ the movement orders were rescinded on 28 August 1986 The same situation existed at Colorado Springs where the exodus to Fort George Wright had begun When the move of Headquarters Strategic Air Gommand to Golorado Springs was cancelled two other locations were considered as a site for the Headquarters Port George Weight and Port Worth Texas However Headquarters Strategic Air Command remained at Bolling Field D C until 21 October 1986 19 v when it moved to Andrews Field Maryland Andrews Field had originally been rehabilitated for use by Headquarters Continental Air Forces and it was logical that its successor Headquarters Strategie Alr Command should move there 20 July Manning of Headquarters Eighth Air Poree Initiated Manning of Headquarters Eighth Air Force which had been assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 7 June 1946 q v at MacDill Army Air Field Florida was initiated by the activation of the 39h Army Air Forces Base Unit AAFBU at a strength of I1 From I August to 1 November Headquarters Eighth Air Force was attached to the Fifteenth Air Force for administration and manning On 16 August Headquarters Eighth Air Force received its first substantial assignment of manpower when personnel from Head« quarters ViHt Bomber Command which was reduced to 1 1 manning were assigned to it 3s — @» doe weume« 85 Headquarters Eighth Air Poree moved to Port Worth Army Air Field Texas on 1 November 1986 q v bu did not become operational there until 19 November 1916 Lac vcl as suiy Army Air Forces Staging Areas established at four Fifteenth Air Force bases MacDill Army Air Field Florida Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Fort Worth Army Alr Field Texas and Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska 30 July 509th Composite Group of the 56th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Fifteenth Air Force redesignated the 50%h Very Heavy Bombardment Group 2 Augest Project No 5 Operations FLOODLIGHT and POLARIS Initiated Before being transferred to the Alaskan Air Command on 19 August 1966 Tq _v the 46th Reconnaissance Squadron Very Long Range Photo— Westher later redesignated 726 Reconnaissance Squadron had begun Project No 5 This project consisted of aerial recomnaissance of the North Polar Area for significance of Arctic operations during 1966— 1948 see 29 October 1946 Special attention vas given to undiscovered land masses the accumulation of meteorological data and the possibility of a polar air route from Alaska to Iceland The project was divided into viwo phases Operation FLOODLIGHT Search for Land Masses Operation FLOODLIGHT was begun in August 1946 and was completed long after the unit had passed out of Strategic Air Command control in September 1948 Seventeen flights were made over the North Pole ° and 228 000 nautical miles of flying were accomplished During the course of 103 missions and 1 500 fying hours it was determined that there was no land in the polar area covered but a large ice field was discovered on which aircraft could be landed or a weather station established Target No 1 as this phenomenon cametobeknoun a J ——— ls 1 __—_—_——oommmmadl j S944 was discovered in August 1946 soon after the FLOODLIGHT flights began The area was roughly 16 x 18 nautical miles and was originally discovered about 310 nautical miles north of Point Barrow Alaska Operation POLARIS Study of Trans—Polar Air Route Operation POLARIS was accomplished to determine the feasibility of regularly —scheduled Air Transport Command fights between Iceland and Alaska The 46th Reconnaissance Squadron investigated navigational and communication difficulties involved and suggested procedures for overcoming them The unit also studied the cireula— tion of the Polar Air Mass and completed photographic and visual reconnaissance of landmarks along the proposed route in order to ‘ ald any future operations By July 1947 after the unit had been transferred from the command it had gone beyond the original directive by investigating magnetic variation and the true location of the Magnetic Pole constructing a radar mosaic of the area determining possible sites for emergency landing strips and weather stations and recording weather data Sixty—four missions had been credited to POLARIS by the end of 1947 and when FLOODLIGHT was completed in September 1948 the POLARIS project had only proceeded as far as the northern tip of Greenland By the end of 1947 no deicision had been reached concerning the feasibility of an Iceland—Alaska route 3 August Sioux City Army Air Field Towa Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Corps of Engineers m 4 August 448th 449th 467th 486th all Project Wonderful units see pp 10—117 and the 498th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups were inactivated and in their places were activated respectively five Very Heavy bombardment groups bearing historically famous numerical designations 924 28th 30ist 97th and 307th Personnel and equipment of the inactivated units were utilized in manning and equipping the new groups ‘The new units which were all assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force were located respectively at Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Glovis Army Air Field New Mexico Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas and MacDill Army Ar Field Florida Suibewany — ag 1986 The 92d 97 and 307th Greups were on training status throughout the remainder of 1946 but the 301st Group was on minimum manning status Chroughost the year The 26th Bombardment Group uas _ assigned to Alaska for Arctic training on 29 October 1916 q v 7 15 August Strategic Air Command assumed juriadiction of Fort George Wright Spokane Washington from the Air Materiel Command and assigned it to the Fifteenth Ar Force The base vas apparently acquired as a site for Headquarters Fifteenth Ar Force which was expected to move to Fort George Wright see 15 duly — 28 August 1946 When this action was cancelled the base was transferred out of the commant on 14 December 1986 3 v 7 16 August Headquarters Vit Bomber Command VH MacDill Army Air Field Fiorida Fifteenth Alr Foree reduced to 11 manning because of cancellation of Project Wonderful see pp 10 L1 — Personnel of the Headquarters were reassigned to Headquarters © Eighth Air Force see 20 July 1946 7 19 August 46th Reconnatesance Squadron Very Long Range Photo—Weather transferred to the Alaskan Air Command The Strategic Air Command however continued to receive technical and scientific data from the unit The 46th Reconnatssance Squadron had originally been assigned to the Steatepie Als Command on 21 March 1986 and at that time had been attached to the 449th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska Shortly before its transfer to the Alaskan Ar Command the squadron had initiated Project No 5 see 2 August 1946 7 21 August Eighth Air Force Mission Assigned PERONOSMELASALLAEIEIEA Though the Eighth Alr Force did not become operational until 19 November t 1948 Tq t 27 on 21 Rugoat i aiggaeasinet to Headquarters ___ Eighth Air Force It was given responsibility for manning training gic Air Command units deployed to the North Atlantic and North Pacific No further change was made in the Eighth Air Force mission until 4 November 1946 ‘9 v Army Air Forces Staging Areas established by the Fifteenth Air Force ‘ September Beginning of Fiying Safety Program At Army Air Forces direction fying safety schools were established in studied accidents so that pilots would learn from past mistakes FuyiNc sarETy ProGRAM 1966—1959 The Strategic Ar Command Flying Safety Program in the period 1986—1949 developed very stouly paralleling other command activity hos 1950—1956 Flying Safety activities see June 1950 As a matter of fact it was not until 1950 when the command underwent ws a tremendous expansion program that the program reached full A maturity In the early years of the command Flying Safety was a relatively minor relegated duty being mostly concerned with re— viewing and evaluating accident and trend factors that would similar—type accidents This emphasis on the investigative phase of aireraft accidents produced results Towering the accident rate approximately 50 percent in the period 1946—1950 but as far less effective than the new more comprehensive program that went into Early in 1947 all levels of command down to base level were re« quired to appoint part—time flying safety officers These positions 4 __ —eommeme 4 L____ if 0 a 194 FLYING SAFETY PROGRAM 1946—1989 Gontinued but in March 1947 were transferzed from the Air Inspector to A—3 Operations Strategic Air Gommand Regulation 62—3 bomber and reconnaissance group in the command These boards conducted emergency procedure checks to insure standardization of emergency procedures and to evaluate the proficiency of all In 1949 more personnel were added to the Flying Safety Program provide formal standardized transition for atrolane commanders pilots and engineers see—— March 1949 7 New and refined procedures developed By ihe schout were Insorpremted in Bisategis Procedures to make all landings Ground Controlled Approach a September Dow Field Maine Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Air Defense Command uy — 1986 g v had on 7 May 1946 been eatellited on Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshize Strategic Air Command reassumed jurisdiction of Dow Air Force Base on 1 April 191 Lo v 1 transferred it to Tactical Air Command on 15 November 1951 q v and reassumed jurisdiction of the base on 1 July 1952 Tq ¥ As of 21 Mazch 1956 the base was still assigned to the Intl 9 September — Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan and assigned to the Fifteenth Air os y to Lg s 0 The unit was on minimum manning status throughout 1946 and through February of 1947 Originally stated for transfer to Gasper Army Air Field Wyoming late in 1946 or early in 1947 see 30 April 1946 the unit was instead moved to Andrews Field Maryland on 1 April 1947 q v where it was manned and eatipped with P—60 jet aircraft see 23—24 April 1947 1 October 10th and 444th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups both located at Davis—Monthan Field Arizona and assigned to the 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing atomic were inactivated In their place were Activated two new groups bearing historically—famous numerical designations the 7th Very Heavy Bombardment Group and the 434 Yery Heavy Bombardment Group The 7th was activated at Fort Worth Army Ale Field Texas and the 43d at Davis—Monthan Field Person— nel of the Insetivated 40th and 444th Groups were absorbed by the newly— activated 430 Group and 25 days later on 25 October q v person nel of the 924 Bombardment Group located at Fort Worth were trans— ferred to the nevly—activated 7th Group and the 924 Group transferred less personnel and equipment to Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Strategic Air Command bombardment groups as of 1 October 1916 fotaled nines the 7th 28th 434 92d 930 9rth 30lst 307th and 50%h Three of these the 928 938 and 30ist were on minimam manning status and only three of the other six groups were active 1 October j Cloris Army Air Field New Mexico and ite sub—bases Pueblo Army Alt Base Colorado Castle Field California and Tonopah Army Air Fisld Nevada were satellited on the 200th Army Air Forces Base Unit AATBU Colorado Springs Colorado Mountain Home Army Air Field % — Maho and Pocatello Army Air Field Idaho which had been sateitited ou Walla Walla Army Air Field Washington were also sateilited on the zoom aarBo 3—4 October 10 000 Mile Nonstop Flight of a B—29 In a Might significant in aeronautical history a speciallyimodified 3—29 fhe MPacusan Dreambeat made a 10 000 mile nonstop Right from — — RHenololu Hawaii to Cairo Egypt via the near—Great—Circle route over Sitka Alaska and the Magnetic Sic The fight also passed over ___azam 1 jue mup 1916 Iceland London Paris and Foggia Italy It was accomplished in 39 hours and 36 minutes passing through two of the worst weather areas in the world The plane with a crew of nine commanded by Gotonel Glazence 5 Levine carried 13 000 gallons of gasoline and took off with a gross weight of 147 000 pounds 27 000 pounds 0 the maximum allowable weight of a standard B—29 Conducted for the purpose of testing equipment over the pola regions the fight climaxed the work of the first Operational Engineering Program It brought new vistas to the use of strategic air power and demonstrated the effectiveness of cruise control for the range extension of all types of aircraft a program that was established by the Strategic Air Command in the spring of 1947 see 9 July 1947 7 For other record fights of the Pacusan Dreamboat see 1—3 August 1947 and 31 August — 1 September 1950 10 October strategic Air Command Mission Redefined and New Responsibilities Assigned 7 Strategie Ar Commands Interim Mission of 12 March 1946 zee p 3 was redefined by Army Air Forces Regulation 20—20 10 October 1946 which also assigned to the Strategic Air Command some new responsi— bilities The new mission obligated Strategic Air Command to have a global striking force in readiness rather than preparing to furnish it at some fature time Instead of the words will be prepared to conduct long ange offensive operations the new mission stated that the Strategic Air Command % will provide and operate that portion of the Army Air Forces for employment against ‘‘abjectives of air attack in any location of the globe « As in the Interim Mission Strategic Air Command continued to be charged with global strategic recomaissance New responsibilities included those concerning sea search and anti—submazine operations see 14 January 1947 7 the training of long—range fighter crews and unite for the performance of fighter escort and joint Army—Navy operations and the conduct of Universal Military Training as directed No further change was made in the Strategic Air Command mission until 19 December 1947 q v 7 R «o Io 15 October Rowman Field Kentucky Headquarters Strategic Air Command transferred to the Corps of Engineers The base had been assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 30 June 1986 g v 7 1s October Army Air Forces Separation Points established by the Fifteenth Air Force at MacDill Army Air Field Florida Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska and Fort George Wright Spokane Washington The Fifteenth Air Force thereby resumed an activity that the Army Air Forces had been able to discontinue in February 1946 21 October Relocation of Headquarters Strategic Air Command Headquazters Strategic Air Command began operations at Andrews Field Maryland following its move from Bolling Field Washington D C Earlier in the year Headquarters Strategie Air Command had been slated for relocation at Golorado Springs Colorado gee 15 July — 28 August 19467 The move to Andrews Field was the first of two moves made by Headquarters Strategic Air Command during the first decade of its existence It remained at Andrews Field until 9 November 1948 q v _ when it moved to Offutt Ar Force Base Nebraska 23 October Army Air Forces Separation Points established by the Fifteenth Air Force at Davis—Monthan Field Arizona Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas Port Worth Army Air Field Texas and Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan 25 October 924 Very Heavy Bombardment Group transferred less personnel and equipment from Port Worth Army Air Field Texas to Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas ¥ — in bnomnteninted — 1916 22 Aprit Headquarters 311th Reconnaissance Wing Headquarters Strategic Air Command began operations at MacDill Army Air Field Florida fol lowing its move from Buckley Field Colorado The unit had been on a tenant status at Buckley Field 1946—1909 From 1946 through 1949 Strategic Air Command reconnaissance I capabilities were limited to medium range In 1950 with the introduction of RB—36 aizeraft a long—range reconnaissance pro— gram was established see1 April 1950 along side the medium« range program for medium—range reconnaissance activities 1950—1956 see 6 July 1950 However because of the addition of an in—flight refueling capability to RB—47 aircraft See 19 July 1948 7 they wers able to perform long—range missions For this reason the long—range reconnaissance program utiliz— ing heavy «type aireratt RB—36s came to an end in 1954 for all practical purposes when the heavy reconnaissance wings were given a primary mission of bombardment see 1 June 1954 The Nature of Strategic Reconnaissance The dropping of the first atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of World War If revolutionized all concepts of military warfare see p 27 The Strategic Air Command itselt had been established to defend the United States in any new total global waz It was charged with developing a strategic striking force Y capable of instant retaliation anywhere on the globe World Wa 11 bombardment tactics were no longer applicable in the Atomic Age The same was true in reconnaissance an age—old military science In World War I1 bombing missions often had to be made without adequate target information and even without the navigational aids necessary for crews to find their way in and out of hostile territory Such a lack of essential information would be suicide in the Atornic Era At the beginning of World War II the need for more strategie information was highly apparent for at that time dess than one—tenth of the earth‘s surface had been charted Dur— — ing World War ame progress was made in securing more am» MEDIUM—RANGE RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES 1916—1919 Continued reconnaissance information Nevertheless Strategic Air Command at the time of its establishment was—faced with a staggering recon— naissance requirement To destroy an enemy in a nuclear war it would be necessary to know what his vital targets were and where they were located As a result the responsibility for world—wide strategic reconnais— sance was assigned to the Strategie Air Command as past of its very earliest mission see p 37 Strategic reconnaissance con— this of he exmminniior SB purity stn etrvers os a bered seste to gain an advantage in war Unlike tactical reconnaissance which deals with the support of front—line armies strategic reconnaissance is concerned with missions beyond the front lines in seeking informa« tion that will make possible a long—range plan of attack that will in— fliet the greatest amount of damage on the enemy in places where it will hurt him the most The primary task of strategic reconnaissance is estfecting torget information but resoneatssance watts also coltest D3 information on Bomb Damage Assessment BDA which is reporting 6 an the degree of suecess schteved by a bombing sstesion 6 Development of the Reconnaissance Force #3 In the years 1946 — 1949 the reconnaissance force was slowly built up C Units of the 31lth Reconnaissance Wing assigned to the Strategic Air Command at the time of its activation gee 21 March 1946 were of o squadron size only until the first half of 1947 when two groups the 55th To and Sist were activated and assigned to the 3lith Wing see 24 Sh February 1947 1 July 1947 1 October 1947 and 29 June 16487 Man Hom ring ofthe 55th Group was begun in July of 1947 but manning of the Ro 2 91st Group did not begin until the middle of 1968 s On 1 June 1947 v 7 Headquarters 31th Reconnaissance Wing H moved from MacDill Army Air Field Florida to Andrews Field Maryland where early in 1948 _see 16 April 1948 it was redesigna— d ted the 3lith Air Division Reconnaissance Shorily thereafter on s 20 July 1948 ‘9 v Fit moved from Andrews to Topeka Air Force a Base Kansas In the last half of 1948 the 55th and ist Groups were redesignated Strates c Reconnaissance Wings see 19 July 1918 and d 10 November 1948 J On 5 January 1949 g v_7 the 3lith Air Division Reconnaissance was redesignated the 3lith Air Division Shortly thereafter the Sth Strategic Reconnaissance Wing was acti—_ vated see 1 May 1949 7 and assigned to the 3lith Air Division is a % c ——_—SB mEpiUh—RaNos RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES 1916—1919 Continued bringing the number of wings to three A fourth wing the 5th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing was activated on 16 July 1969 L9 v _ but only a few months later _ see 14 October 1949 wing strength was reduced to three when the 55th Strategic Re— connaissance Wing was inactivated The 55th Wing was later reactivated on 1 November 1950 q See also 6 July 1950 7 On 1 November 1949 g v _ the 3llih Air Division was inactivated being replaced by the Second Air Force which for a short period of time after 1 November 1949 q v 7took over the mission bases and units 5th 9th and Sist Wingo of the 21lth Air Division Just prior to its inactivation on 1 November 1945 q v 7 the 3lith Air Division moved from Topeka Air Force Base Ransasy to Barksdale Air Force Base Louisiana see 28 October 1949 7 In the Command l reorganization of 1 April 1950 g w _ the reconnaissance mizsion was disseminated among the three Zone of the Interior numbered air forces who were also each assigned reconnaissance unite This masked the end of Headquarters Strategic Air Commend con— trol of the specialized reconnaissance function and a recognition of the integral role of reconnaissance in the Strategic Air Command mission Headquarters Strategic Air Command had controlled operations of the 3lith Wing and 3llth Division from the time the unit was assigned on 21 March 1946 until it was insetivated on 1 November 1949 though the 3lith had been assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force for administration and logistical support between 1 May 1946 q v_ and 1 April 1947 q v _A Early Reconnaissance Activities Reconnaissance activities in the 1986—1949 period like those in the —— _ bombardment and fighter programs see 31 Mazch 1946 and 1 May 1946 7 were limited in comparison to those from 1950 on when all command u activities matured and expanded However in the early years the groundwork was laid for an effective recomnaissance program It was a period of unit buildup and training and the development of tactics and procedures Activities were limited and litle true strategic re— connaissance was accomplished The year 1950 was a transition and maturation period for the recomaissance program A long—range program was established along side the medium—range program and the recomaissance function was disseminated among the three numbered air forces te 1 April 1950 — RB—508 the first air— craft suitable for high—allitude long—range reconnatssance missions were introduced into the command as were RB—45s the first jet 1s — 196 mEDIUM—RANGE RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES 1986—1949 Gontinued afseral tobe used foo sic omnsiontucs pueprses Howees wotit ip rsinmistons imle nore ennippco wile mesists Narle Yas ASAT mp Apis wire m Pede ageein ned anesist soos Fromm Sas $4 pg bile Spempnisnmen none like other units suffered from serious shortages in equipment Soe beipeg erie Phe proprion in ine cathy venes aas Pepiniornig hy s Trg sencenaion ot seisgion ahanges ima ihe SAH mi ietbe sedinmem ain mere engetighh ano scobtems Wire Tolece in fimling recomnatssance activins Most of the reconnaissance activities from 1946 through 1949 were specialized projects a good share of them being accomplished for other agencies of the government Reconnaissance units served Ii thax te mories in Maske the Castobean Horih and Such eer irige Ino purees Icon rig Seng senigren ne the destadie tion and operational control of theater commanders Many recon Infroime Eriecty were 206 SECRET and ase mecatone bnpont the scope of this study The general tendency in the early period fies oom e spetisieed or cfg die nnieh Sese pavslly see oorplisent by small numbers of aircraft or even individual aircraft whereas tha Par Tie arteney wee severe perience af iorges seige Also after 1950 reconnaissance activities were more closely allied to Rep st tos simaingts fonbscamen mlssion and the Serocgines War Plan EWP The 31ith Reconnaissance Wing assigned to the Strategic Air Com mand on 21 March 1946 g v _ was the Army Air Forces‘ world—wide photographic and mapping unit All mapping and chart« ing agencies of the United States government were dependent on it — for their area photography From 1946 through 1949 the 3lith was engaged in hundreds of separate projects for Arctic reconnaissance activities of the 46th Reconnaissance Squadron a separate squad— ron not assigned tothe 3lith Wing see 2 August 1947 J It was oma I He Acioong a A boomesn onine bad was engaged in Shoran Short Range Navigational Control tests dois oo merpraininy ot wie Snorer resiecege ts map—making _ for Shoran program see June 1952 One of the most important projects of the 311th Wing in 1966 and Par Tas bprrovne ARCS Spder emmnicted af we sein spring of parts of Greenland Project EARDRUM and the establishment R of weather stations in the Greenland area see c 15 May — 4 — September 1947 ‘The NANOOK Operation wa accomplished by ___ ins ie performer wo edoiimin wive revetennie seite 1b Rembng— ment Group which had been activated on 1 October 1966 9 v mess areas enien ead been aetivated on 1 October lae Fhe Aeopieet a Soo S eemgneicinnt wa So ra eon ommmaa nery Rou ray gee Lomimaune seca cs wlll BS Rigs HAtguge Rict of colored troops at MacDill Army Air Field Floride Suge Colonsl Luther J Fairbanks replaced Colonel Nell B Harding as © omnia w a ao Take SelSt Geerst Baul # MWaviemith has been anslgred he commend general of the Righth Alr Force on 13 September 1946 but he was Sop Ty mpi tiihe secisem t the same tay on t Mevooger 1986 q vc General Roger M Ramey was assigned as first v einig amend mike high mr Sarie 29 October Beginning of Aretic Training of Tactical Unite First Overseas Deployment Beusing o rstc Training of Tactical Units Tirst Overseas Deployment First increment of the 28th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force departed Grand Island Army Als Field Nebraska via trap take Savage Ties a iil pariah in na nmoith ar Arctic training at Elmendort Field Alaska The 28th Group was not only v the first Strategic Air Command group deployed overseas bat it was also ‘the first bombardment group equipped with B—29# to be assigned to Alaska Approvimately 33 atreraft and some 2 000 personnel participated in the Arctic training The unit was under the operational control of the Strate Pe o Sommine shorn in an hgimiin moose Sep prend by the Alaskan Air Command until 4 Pebruary 1947 q v 7 when mav ramen shores epresiy rine alsine to gon mand The unit returned to the United States on 19 April 1947 q v 7 EMPHASIS oN ARCTIC OPERATIONS 1916—1948 During the period 1946—1948 the Army Air Forces and the Strategie _ — inpa semsmomate hea al demonios t ott y woontbtiiew 2 H — © — TP ARCTIC OPERATIONS 1946—1948 Gontinued training This came about because of the concerted military opinion that the Great Circle air route across the Polar Basin from Evrope and Asia would be the likely avene of approach by any future aggressor General Spatz in listing the main objectives of the Army Air Forces in October of 1916 declared Development of the defense of the Arctic frontier is our primary operational objective It was planned that ultimately most Army Air Forces personnel and units would be trained in Arctic operations Strategic Air Command was to initiate the program by the assign ment to Alaska of the 28th Group see above and one squadron of the 56th Fighter Group see 16 December 1946 These units were to establish training periods standards and doctrines for the units that were to follow under the Army Air Forces rotational plan for Arctic training Even prior to the issuance of General Spaate‘s directive Strategic Air Command had started to give attention to Arctic training Shortly after the Fifteenth Air Force was activated on 31 March 1946 and the Strategic Air Command began operations several units were slated for manning and training for ultimate assignment to the Arctic area In mid—July a Polar Training Program was initiated On 21 August 1946 q v _ the Eighth Air Force though it did not become operational until 19 November 1946 was assigned responsi— bility for the administration training and logistical support of all Strategic Air Command units deployed to the North Atlantic and North Pacific It was also charged with assuming command Jurisdic— tion over air bases and other War Department installations located in thore areas if such action was deemed necessary Another illustration of the emphasis placed on Arctic activities was the ight of a B—29 on 3—4 October 1946 v _ from Honolulu Hawaii to Catro Egypt via the Great Girele route to test equipment under Arctic conditions Throughout the winter of 1946—1947 the 46th Reconnaissance Squadron was engaged in a special Arctic reconnaissance project Project No 5 see 2 August 1946 The squadron which was assigned to Ladd Field Alaska during a winter that broke all existing records for low temperatures performed more Arctic fying than any other unit In 1947 12 of the 18 formal reports issued by the Operations Analysis Offce Headquarters Strategic Air Command concerned c— B % n 1946 ARGTIC OPERATIONS 1946—1948 Continued Arctic activities and problems In the same year during the period 17—19 March a Polar Navigation Conference was conducted by the Fifteenth Air Force Operations Analysis office for Strategic Alr Command group navigators Approximately ten navigators from the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Pores participated Both the Army Air Fores and The Aeronautical Chart Service were also represented In July and August 1947 two Polar Mobile Teaining Unite were formed to facilitate the indoctrination of personnel in Arctic conditions During the winter of 1947—1948 the 96th Bombard« ment Group served a training tour in Alaska see 2 December 1947 — 21 March 1908 7 Arctic Emphasis Diminished Trend Toward Global Mobility In 1948 there was a shift in emphasis from the Polar regions to Europe and later to overall global mobility rather than emphasiz« ing any particular region for development of Strategic Air Com— mand Mobility Plan see I March 1948 The shift occurred abruptly in June 1948 when three foll bombardment groups were assigned to Europe during the emergency alert occasioned by the Russian blockade of Berlin see 27 June — 17 July 1948 Rota— tion of Strategic Air Command units to Alaska was continued but that region lost some of its importance as a key area in the world—wide plan for retaliatory steategic bombing 30 October Army Als Forces Staging Area established by the Fifteenth Air Force i at Selfridge Army Ate Field Michigan 1 November Army Air Forces Assembly Station established by the Fifteenth At Force at Smoky Hill Army Alz Field Kansas I November Eighth Ar Fore Became Autonomous Headquarters Eighth Air Force began operations at Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas following its move from MacDill Army Air Field wo j Florida Fifteenth Air Force At the same time the Eighth Air Force achieved autonomy as a Strategic Air Command numbered air force when Headquarters Eighth Air Force was released from the Fifteenth Air Force for administration and Brigadier General Roger M Ramey assumed command General Ramey retained command of the Eighth Air Force until 12 November 1946 q v _ Units and Bases Assigned Five major bases and their sub—bases and auxiliaries and the units located thereat were reassigned from the Fifteenth to the Eighth Air Force but the Fifteenth Air Force retained administrative control of them until 19 November 1946 q v _ at which time the Eighth Air Force became folly operational ‘The units assigned to the Eighth Alr Force consisted essentially of the 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing atomic and its three assigned bombardment groups tase Unie Alamogordo Army Air Field New 23ist Army Air Forces Base Mexico bombing and gunnery Unit AAPBU Special range Deming Army Air Field New Mexico South Auxiliary A New Mexico Center Ausiliazy A2 New Mexico Davis—Monthan Field Arizona 438 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas Headquarters 56th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing 7th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Abilene Army Air Field Texas Kirtland Army Air Field New Mexico Ist Ordnance Squadron Flight Test Section for atomic Aviation bomb 428th Army Air Forces Base Unit aareu Alf ___ e L_ t —or P joi tis al asimelt Armp Ais Base Sew $098 Very Seaue Bumbeds hks eiss 16 Ate Tersopost Unt Sopp Auntiisey £3 SSME $300 and EAesuth Ae Farge Misclons Resined A sesiston in the seledions t the Sighth and Fie inth Als Seece was s poy rononind olo neeed neben se may eoneoien ano Sn a a it mart r reprmaidlt re Sn ege A Aepmnent reranta nile tiie program On 1 November 1946 19 v following the Fifteenth Air Votan onllerories Sole Like t bellowing the Eiiteenth a pomp nobel py heman oagin aatanet November 1986 a v 7 Final Manning of Headquarters Eighth Air Force Manting of fressquariens Sighth Ate Epote fad been Statied us £5 July 1946 q v On 16 August 1946 a substantial number of person— mep me neer Haie Feger f foie aeoniines Cin doves dicaiics which was reduced to 1 1 manning — But as of 1 November 1966 Head» fomnseoit ares oined duane timate tte tant prions o nner ame nmiemietmins s pmaiie caa nod Pinmnvp ane e meriond anoe mae Pniiidnin t Ep a oases meenop rein frameet erat io man tteatqperters Ahi After the reorganization the Fifteenth Air Force had three active w Very Heavy bombardment groupe assigned the 28th 97th and x — 307th Three other groups were assigned but these were unmanned throughout 1946 the 92d 934 and 30lst The Fifteenth Ar Force lost the only wing that had been under its control the 58th to the eoharan dat 1 Seventies Fifteenth Ar Force Mission Revised Avorate Mission Deletes Fifteenth Air Force Mission Revised Atomic Mission Deleted In a revision of the mission assigned to t on 1 May 1916 g J in eased ob he mieten atrlamed to fron t May tost Patch _ sit sl rommsagee ___ ras in the atomic bomb program because of the reassignment of the Sth Bombardment Wing to the Eighth Air Force see preceding entry J This responsibility was assigned to the Eighth Air Force on 4 November 1946 q v _ « No change was made in the strategic bombardment or reconnaissance mission of the Fifteenth Air Force As part of its re— vised mission however new responsibilities were assigned including those concerning sea search and anti—submarine patrol see 14 January 19477 long range fighter and fighterescort operations In any past of the world see 1 May 19467 participation in Universal Military Teaining UMT as directed and support of Reserve and Air National Guard activities see 15 June 1986 7 Strategic Air Command was not officially assigned responsibility for the support of Reserve and Air National Guard activities as part of its mission until 19 December 1947 q v © Mo further change was made in the Fifteenth Air Force mission untis 16 September 1949 19 v 7 4 November Eighth Atr Force Mission Revised Atomic Mission Assigned The mission assigned to the Eighth Air Force on 4 November which replaced the interim mission that had been assigned to it on 21 August 1946 q v _ was exactly the same as that assigned to the Fifteenth Ai Force on I November 1916 q v but in addition to the responsi— bilities assigned to the Fifteenth Alr Force the Eighth Air Force was charged with responsibility for the atomic bombing force and was to assist the Manhattan District in aerial experimentation in connection with the development of the atomic bomb and act as a lintson agency between the Strategic Air Command and the Manhattan District Mo further change was made in the Eighth Air Porce mission unl 15 September 1949 q v though the above mission was restated by Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 10 January 1947 The only change in the restated mission was that no reference was made to the Eighth Air Force acting as a lintson agency between Strategic Air Command and the Manhattan District 4 November Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire satellited on Selfridge _ Army Air Field Michigan Keaney Army Air Field Nebraska and Walla Walla Army Air Field Waahiagton satellited on the 200th anole adi ‘4 i 1 196 Army Air Forces Base Unit AAFRU Colorado Springs Colorado Also satellited on the 200th AAFBU was La Junta Army Air Field Colorado which had been satellited on Clovis Army Air Field New Mexico All these bases remained assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force 6 November — Great Bend Army Air Field Kansas Fifteenth Air Force trans— ferred to the Corps of Engineers 10 November Headquarters VII Bomber Command which had been responsible for the execution of Project Wonderful see pp 10—11 7 inactivated c It had been reduced to 1 1 manning on 16 August 1946 g v 7 10—19 November ° Participation in Operation NULLUS Six B—29 aircraft of the 509th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Eighth Air Force participated as Task Unit 05 4 3 of Task Force 05 in Operation NULLUS This operation a joint Army—Navy exercise off the west coust of South America con— sisted of a simulated attack on the Panama Canal by United States Navy Task Force 66 which was returning from Chile On 14 and 15 November the fleet was intercepted and bombed by 509th aircraft Leaving their home station on 10 November 509th atreraft s staged from Rio Hato Panama and returned to Roswell Army — Air Base on 19 November They were supported by two G—54z of the Ist Air Transport Unit Eighth Air Force 12 November Major General Glements McMullen replaced Brigadier General Roger M Ramey as commanding general of the Bighth Air Force On 16 December 1946 Brigadier General Ramey assuried temporary command of the Eighth Air Force during the — ___ _is_ — mmm — U 1946 — absence of Major General MeMutien and on 10 January 1947 General Ramey again permanently assumed command af ino Eigith Air Force 13 November —4 December First Flight of B—29s to Europe and First Post—World War I1 Use of Aircraft as Instrument of International Diploma ©O20 C 22 Melt Ement of International Diplomacy A ight of six B—29 aireraft and two spares from the 434 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Righth Air Force left Davis—Monthan Field Arizona on 13 November for Rhein—Main Airfield Frankfurt Germany via Morrison Field West Paim Beach Florida Bermuda and Lagens Field Asores The two spare B—298 remained at Morrison Field until the other six atreratt had arrived in Germany The military diptomate Might under the command of Golons James C Selves In provconca a display of United States air power in Germany England Frence ins Maly and returned to the United States on 4 December The B—29s crossed the Atlantic in groups of twos The first two aircraft arrived at Rhein—Main Afrfield on 17 November being delayed for a day in the Arore because of weather condi— Hionn The ather two groups were also somewhat delayed be— cause of inadequate weather reposts ant poor communications aver the Atlantic The B—29s were accompanied by two G—54# from the let Alr Transport Unit Eighth Alr Force Roswell Army Ar Base New Mexico which carcied spare engines and Supplies On the return trip two aircraft departed 29 November via Rome Orly Field Paris Azores and Bermuda Poo sie Craft departed 2 December and two departed 4 December via Paris the Azores and Bermuda n Significance of the Flight Though only a small number of aircraft were involved this Might of B—295 to Europe was a highly significant one not only to the Steatepte Air Command but to the people of the United States as well It symbolized growing sentiment in the United States for the thwarting of the aggressive actions of tie Soviet Union in Europe by a show of force For the first time in their history the American people vere to support a large military force in peacetime The Strategie Air Command was to be one of the main components of this force L — a 1 — H «il ___ ¢ I 4 snail ay 1916 A New Era in Diplomacy Giving as it did a special potency to aircraft the atomic age ushered in a new era of international diplomacy The Strategic Air Command‘s ability to deliver atomic bombs placed it in a position to take over the Navy‘s traditional role as the strong arm of the State Department Although the flight of the six B—29s to Europe could not have been interpreted as a direct threat to Russia the implications were obvious The B29 was widely recognized as the aircraft capable of dropping an atomic bomb and the appearance of B—29s in Europe would cause speculation that they might be stationed there permanently The flight was made at a time when the international situation — — was particularly tense Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers already strained became especially critical in August 1946 when two United States Air Transport Command C—A7s were shot down over Yugosiavia resulting in the death of five Americans An Army Air Forces request for a round—the—world flight of B—29s as a demonstration of American air power was denied by the State Department but the Might of six B—29s to Germany was approved For the first round—the—world flight of B—295 gee 22 July — 6 August 1948 7 Groundwork Laid for Strategic Air Command Rotation Program Though the flight was made primazily for diplomatic purposes some important military objectives were attained Personnel in the American Zone of Occupied Germany were indoctrinated in the peculiarities of the B—29 which had been committed ex« clusively to the Pacific Theater during World War‘Tt A survey 4s was made of European airdromes to determine their suitability w for B—29 operations and other data was compiled that might be useful to Strategic Air Command units later assigned to Europe The feasibility was established of deploying Strategie Air Gom— mand unite periodically to European bases for tactical training a program flat went into effect on a limited seale in 1247 see 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 and which became an integral part of the Strategie Air Command training program 15 November Task Group 1 5 Provisional inactivated — It had been activated on 13 February 1946 by the Continental Ar Forces GAF as the Army Alt Forces component of Task Group 2 Ous fon participation in SBip — crossroaps Tee I sty 19167 —— 19 November Eighth Air Force Became Operational The Eighth Air Force became operational as it assumed full control over the units and installations it had acquired on 1 November 1916 q v from the Fifteenth Air Force 20 November Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed direct jurisdiction of Andrews Field Maryland from Bolling Field D C This action was preliminary to the transfer of Bolling Field to Headquarters Army Air Forces on 16 December 1946 see 15 — 16 December 1946 7 30 November Fifteenth Air Poree Recruiting Program Ended The Fifteenth Air Force was relieved of responsibility for particips— ton in the Army Air Forces recruiting program This program had been begun by the Second Air Force on 16 August 1945 and continued by the Fifteenth Air Force after it assumed the Second Air Force mission on 31 March 1946 see p 8 Between 16 August 1945 and 30 November 1946 14 192 Regular Army Air Gosps enlistments were obtained w — A December Kirtland Army Air Field New Mexico Eighth Air Force trans— ferved to the Air Materiel Command 4 December Arlington Ausiliary #4 Golorado Fifteenth Air Force satellite of Ln Junta Army Air Field Colorado transferzed to the Gorps of Engineers ‘ si ___oom i hy 1916 i December Harvard Army Air Field Nebraska Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Gorps of Engineers 14 December Fort George Wright Washington Fifteenth Air Force transfersed to the Air ‘Training Command Strategie Atr Command re—assumed jurisdiction of Fort George Weight on 16 July 1947 q v _ 15 December Exirmont Army Air Field Nebraska Fifteenth Air Pored transferred ‘ to the Gorps of Engineers 15—16 December Bolling Field Transferred to Army Air Forces On 15 December Bolling Field Command was established as a separate command under the Army Air Forces and on 16 December Strategic Air Command transferred Bolling Field D G and its off—base fact— Hities to the Bolling Field Command Headquarters Strategie Air Command had assumed direct Jurtadiction of Bolling s sub—base Andrews Field on 20 November 1946 q v _ « As of 31 December 1946 Andrews Field was the s only base remaining under Headquarters Strategic Air Command jurisdiction 18 December 624 Fighter Squadron to Alaska for Arctic Training The Slight echelon of the 628 Fighter Squadron of the 56th Fighter Group Single Engine Very Long Range Fifteenth Air Force consisting of 28 P—S1Hf aircraft left Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan for Ladd Field Alaska arriving there on 28 Decersber The flight under the command of Colonel David G Schilling was touted via Rapid City Army Air Field South Dakota Great Falle Montana Edmonton Alberta and White Horse Yukon so —or EBRD __sme— te — ime 0 0C The P—S1s were accompanied by three B—29s of the 97th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas which carried spare parts and maintenance personnel The ground echelon of 10 officers and 217 enlisted men had preceded the ight echelon by rail and water leaving Selfridge Army Alr Field on 20 November and arriving at Ladd Field 5 December 1946 Training commenced on 2 January 1947 and ended 31 March 1947 The unit was under the operational control of the Strategic Air Command administration and logistical support being provided by the Alaskan Air Command until 4 Pebruary 1947 q v _ when complete control of the unit temporarily passed to the Alaskan Air Command Alaskan Air Command retained control of the unit until it returned to its home station in April or 1947 24 December Consolidated Gunnery Training School for Aexible acrial gunnery established at Alamogordo Army Air Field New Mexico cummery tramic 1966—1956 First Schools Established The Army Air Forces Central School for Flexible Gunnery was discontinued shortly after World War 11 Therefore when the Strategic Air Command was activated plans had to be made to establish a gunnery training program In November of 1946 the Eighth Air Force began operating a fexible gunnery school and laid plans for a central school for the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces which was officially established at Alamogordo Army Ar Field on 24 December 1946 The gunnery training at Alamogordo was brought to an end when that base was trans— _ ferred to the Air Materiel Command on 16 March 1947 a v— In May 1947 however the program was resumed at Smoky Fill Army Aix Field Kansas when the First Gunnery Training Squadron was activated The first class commenced training on 8 July 1947 and in the following seven months a total of 44 officers and 97 airmen were trained The school had to be closed on 16 February 1948 because of a lack of funds and all formal gunnery training ceased s J__cond 1 a L_ wooesmmugh e GUNNERY TRAINING 1946—1956 Continued Emergency Training Program 1950—198 Nothing further was accomplished until the Air Training Com— mand resumed a gunnery training program late in 1950 How» ever personnel from these schools did not begin Aowing into the Strategic Air Command until late in 1951 In the meantime because of requirements associated with the Korean War the Strategic Air Command was forced to initiate an emergency training program for large numbers of combat crew gunners This program was conducted at five bases Biggs Air Force Base Texas Walker Air Force Base New Mexico Caravell Air Force Base Texas Hunter Air Force Base Georgia and Davis—Monthan Air Porce Base Arizona Upon completion of this training gunners were assigned to Air Training Command Gombat Grew Training Schools GCTS or to Strategic Air Com— mand bombardment wings A lack of gunnery rangess trainers and gumery officers were serious problems in the gunnery training program until late 1950 when additional ranges and instructor personnel became available Between July 1950 and June 1981 6 000 gunners were trained Evaluation Program Another step taken by the Strategic Air Command to improve the proficiency of aerial gunners pending the fruition of the Air Training Command program was an evaluation program that was established in December 1950 see Strategic Air Com— mand Regulation 50—24 1 February 19517 Under this program individual gunners were evaluated to determine the amount of — training necessary to bring them to the desired level of proficiency and they were given aid in selecting a course of training to overcome their deficiencies A point system was utilized 85 points being necessary for assignment to a Lead Grew and 78 points for assignment to a combat—ready crew Sub—marginal gunners were removed from crew duty The program was begun at Davis—Monthan Air Force Base Arizona in February 1951 Walker Air Force Base New Mexico and Matagorda Island Texas in March and at Hunter Air Force Base Georgia in April This program was carried on even after the Air Training Command began to meet Strategic Air Command requirements for gunners late sa 9 bnness mosses GUNNERY TRAINING 1946—1956 Gontinued in 1981 By June 1952 some 8 000 gunners had been evaluated and recevaluated in Strategic Air Gommant medium and heavy bombardment unite the evaluation of heavy bombard ment gunners having been begun in October 1951 Grew Specialization Greates Excess Gunners By late 1951 the Air Training Command was able to meet three— fourths of the Strategic Air Command requirements for gunners In the period 1951—1956 no other emergencies arose such as that in Korea to tax the command resources and the gunnery teain— ing program leveled off As a matter of fact instead of there being a shortage of gunners as in the earlier period frequently ° there were surpluses For example in 1954 the B RB—36 Featherweight Program see 23 June 1948 and the conversion of medium units to B RB—ATs see 23 October 1951 created an excess of about 2 000 gunners who were retrained in allied career fields With the introduction of B—47 aircraft large numbers of gunners became excess because the gunnery function was incorporated into the duties of the observer in the highly—specialized three—man B—47 crew The days of a foll—time gunnery officer had ended B36 Deficiencies Remedied When B RB—36s were introduced into the command in 1968 Tase 23 June 19487 some serious deficiencies were discovered in their gunnery systems However through improvement in Standard Operating Procedures and the functional reliability of the gunnery systems a significant improvement was made in fire—out rates The fire—out rate for modified systems rose s from 36 percent in July 1952 to 80 percent by the end of 1953 The average percentage of fire—out on routine B—36 missions rose from 60 8 percent on Featherweighted B 36s at the end of 1954 to 65 7 percent at the end of 1955 On non—Featherweighted B—36s the figure increased from 62 4 percent at the end of 1954 to 66 1 percent at the close of 1955 B—47 Fire—Out Rate Increased B—47s introduced into the command late in 1951 see 23 October 19517 also presented some serious defensive arma— ment problems Their gunnery capability was exceptionally _ C_ _ me © i 1916 ——— mme GUNNERY TRAINING 1946—1956 Gontinued low because of equipment deficiencies It was decided in February 1951 to abandon the A—2 defensive armament system which had originally been chosen for the B—47 Therefore the first B—47% off the production line had no defensive armament system whatsoever The B—4 system was installed during the modification of 244 B—47Bs that was completed in October 1953 The first aircraft equipped with the A—5 system was delivered in June 1953 to the 3034 Medium Bombardment Wing This system was superior to earlier systems but was still not entirely acceptable In 1955 a modification was in the process of development that provided projection hoppers for the A—5 system — Fire—out in A—5 equipped aircraft increased from 69 percent in 1953 to 82 1 percent at the end of 1954 and to 88 5 percent by the close of 1955 On the other hand percentage of fire—out in B—4 equipped B RB 47s which was 74 percent at the end of 1954 rose to 77 3 percent by the end of 1955 E—26 Trainers and Radar Gunlaying Trainers By the end of 1953 practically all wings were equipped with E—26 gunnery trainers By 1955 AN APG—TIA radar gunlaying trainers for the radar control of the tail gun were in place at all operating bases having the configuration necessary for use in all types of assigned aireraft In cooperation with the Air Force Personnel Training and Research Center at Lackland Air Force Base Texas the Strategic Air Command established a standard scoring procedure incorporating five basic skills required of radar gunlaying operators m Developments in 1955 A B—S2 G gunner course was established in 1955 by the Air Training Command at Lowry Air Force Base and the output of this course met Strategic Air Command schedules for B—52 conversion ree 29 June 1955 By 1955 most of the gunnery officers assigned to the Strategic Air Command had attended or were training at the Primary Basic Observer Upgrading schools at Ellington Air Force Base Texas and Mather Air Force Base California It was anticipated that by the end of 1957 all gunnery Tables of Organization R O vacancies would be filled by qualified observers 56 J — ammesnnacorems C 1047 oon 9 January — 4 June Provisional Wing Plan Established at Fifteenth Air Force Bases and Andrews Ficld Maryland Headquarters Strategic Air Command Ascendancy of Tactical Group Gommander over Station Commander Until the Wing—Base Plan of station organization was made mandatory at all Strategic Air Command bases in the last half of 1947 see 15 August — 1 December 19477 the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces were free to establish any form of station organization that was approved by Headquarters Strategic Air Command Eighth Air Force bases were organized under an integrated base system command of a base being exercised by the bombardment group commander However because of General Spaate‘s dissatisfaction with any system where a tactical group commander was subordinated to a station commanter all Fifteenth Air Force bases had to be reorganized The form of station organization chosen by the Fifteenth Air Force was the Provisional Wing Plan which was also established at Andrews Field Maryland Headquarters Strategic Air Command Between 9 January and 4 June 1947 eight Provisional Wings were activated Base Wing and Assigned Group Effective Dates 947 Andrews Field — 34 Combat Fighter Wing VLR 1 april — Maryland Head Provisional 15 August quarters Strategic Air Command ith Fighter Group 27th Fighter Group an unmonned organization moved to Kearney Army Air Rield Nebraska on 16 July 1947 x Smoky Hill Army — 49th Combat Bomb Wing VR 9 January — u — Air Field Kansas Provisional 7 November 97th Very Heavy Bombardment Group $24 Very Heavy Bombardment Group an unmanned organization moved to Spokane Army Air Field _ Washington on 20 June 1947 9 v — Rapid City Army 50th Combat Bomb Wing Vi 21 March — Air Field South Provisional 15 August wera 28th Bombardment Group which returned from Alaska on 19 April 1907 Co vl wes 1947 PROVISIONAL WING PLAN Gontinued Base Wing and Assigned Group Effective Dates 947 Castle Field — Sist Combat Bomb Wing VH 20 May — Gatifornia Provisional 15 August 934 ¥ery Heavy Bombardment Group Spokane Army $24 Combat Bomb Wing VH 4 June — Alr Field Wash— Provisional 5 December ington f 324 very Heavy Bombardment Group moved to Spokane Army Air Field on 20 June 1947 a v and manning of the unit was initiated 98th very Heavy Bombardment Group an unmanned organization moved to Spokane Army Air Field on 24 September 1947 ® v Selfridge Army 65th Combat Fighter Wing VLR 9 January — Air Fiel Provisional 15 August Michigan 56th Fighter Group Grenier Field _ 66th Combat Fighter Wing VLR 10 aprit — New Hampshire Provisional 15 August 824 Fighter Group Los Grenier Field and all assigned units were transferred to the com— mand jurisdiction of MacDill Army Air Field Florida Headquarters Strategie Air Command on 1 August 1947 g v _ MacDill Army — 94th Combat Bomb Wing VB 9 January — Alr Field Provisional 15 August Florida 3070 Very Heavy Bombardment Group MacDill Army Air Field and all — assigned units were transferred to p Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 1 April 1947 om PROVISIONAL WING PLAN Continued The inactivation of the Provisional Wings coincided quite closely with the establishment of Wing—Base organizations _ at Fifteenth Air Force bases see 15 August December 1947 Background The recommendations of Major General Born Commanding General of the Fifteenth Air Force for the establishment of the Provisional Wing Plan of station organization had been ap proved in October 1946 Though original plans called for the reorganization to be effected on 1 November 1916 the task was more difficult than anticipated and the first unit of this type was not activated until 9 January 1947 Another plan of station organization considered by the Fifteenth Air Force at the time was the Hobson Plan which was adopted by the Air Force as the Wing—Base Plan in the last half of 1947 and established Air Force—wide see I5 August — 1 December 1947 However the Provisional Wing Plan had been chosen by the Fifteenth Air Force in 1946 in preference to the Hobson Plan Ascendancy of Tactical Commander The World War If type of station organization in effect at Fifteenth Air Force bases prior to the initiation of the Pro— vistonal Wing Plan had subordinated the commander of the tactical group to the station commander and had required the complete integration of personnel of all Tables of Organiza— ton and Equipment T O E Unite with station complement personnel who were assigned in bulk to the Army Air Forces Base Units AAFBUs In September of 1946 Carl Spaate Commanding General of the Army Air Forces had exprensed dissatisfaction with any system where the tactical group com mander was subordinated to the station commander and had dizected that the situation be remedied Objectives of Provisional Wing Plan The reasons for the establishment of the Provisional Wing Plan were 1 to comply with the Spaats directive 2 to create an organization that would permit the appointment of officers to administer and operate combat stations who were so ¢ ag —__—_— 1 ——— —— MG iet PROVISIONAL WING PLAN Gontinued more experienced in station and rsonnel administration than the younger tactical group commanders and 3 to create a station organization more economical of personnel and which would also eliminate problems concerning the jurisdiction of personnel that had existed because of the in— tegration of all T E personnel Heterogeneity the Keynote The Provisional Wing Plan never attained a standard form and almost as many different types of organization existed as there were bases At least seven different plans all incorporat— ing specific modifications of the basic plan were in effect at various times Plan Able Plan Baker Plan Charlie Plan Charlie — Revised Plan Dick Plan Dog and Plan Busy Under all the plans however the station organizations were con— sidered as wing commands They were however administra— tive in nature only the tactical unit continuing to be the bombard ment or fighter group The major basic units of the provisional station organization were the bombardment or fighter groups the ar service group and the Army Air Forces Base Unit AAFBU or Combat Atrdrome Group Personnel of these three major unite who were performing the same or related functions were grouped together and assigned in various combinations of organization to the three major unite or to the Provisional Wing Headquarters Years of Reorganization 1947 and 1948 The heterogeneity of the Provisional Wing Plan forms of organi L sation demonstrate the emphasis that was placed on wing organi— sation in the early years of the command 1947 and 1948 es— pecially were years of organization and reorganization of trial and experimentation Dissatisfied with the World Wa II type of organization which was clearly incompatible with its needs the Strategic Air Command in 1946 and early 1947 gave consider able attention to evalving an improved wing organization The Provisional Wing Plan was the first probing step In mid—1947 however the Army Air Forces directed that the Wing—Base Plan which had been devised by the Strategic Ar Command ‘as the Hobson Plan be established Air Force—wide see 15 August — 1 December 1947 7 The Wing—Base Plan proved highly successful so 4 ——— 4 Th 197 ® PROVISIONAL WING PLAN Continued but as time went on and as the Strategie Air Command ex« panded some amendments were necessary in the original Wing—Base Plan Under both the Provisional Wing Plan and the original Wing—Base Plan the wings were administrative only in nature the tactical unit being the bombardment or fighter group In mid—1948 combat wings were organized to replace the existing administrative wings see 12 July — 1 August 19487 The existing Very Heavy bombardment groups were redesignated medium or heavy bombardment groups and assigned to the combat wings The fourth major reorganization occurred early in 1951 when air base group commanders were designated as installations commanders to free the wing com mnders from the administrative management of their bases so that they could devote more of their time to the command of their tactical units gee 19 January 1997 As part of the same reorganiza— tion the Yerew chief maintenance system was discontinued and a Maintenance Control organization was established in the wing staffs In 1951 aie divisions were also activated to direct the activities at two—wing bases see 10 February 1981 10 January Brigadier General Roger M Ramey replaced Major General Clements McMullen as commanding general of the Bighth Ar Force General Ramey had taken over temporary command of the Eighth Air Force from General McMullen on 16 December 1946 General Ramey retained his command until 15 June 1950 3 v 7— % 10 danoary Major General Clements McMullen replaced Major General St Claiz Streett as deputy commander of the Strategic Air Command — a — — ——— 17 14 Jansary j Headquarters Strategic Air Command Assumed Operational Control of the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Begining of Sea Search and Antisubmarine Program rus antisusmanin® prooRamM 1916—1956 Army Air Forces Background Recognizing that Russia was programming and bailding a formi— dable submarine fleet that could do irreparable damage to United States shipping and coastal installations the Joint Chiefo of Staff shortly after World War 1t programmed an antisubmarine cam— paign to be carried out in the event of war by surface forces and the air force working together Barly in the post—World War II period a Navy request that it be given some B—20s that it could modify for antisubmarine warfare was denied The Army Air Forces was authorized to retain control of all B—29s because of their scarcity the uncertainty of pasts production and availa— bility and the importance of its strategic bombardment mission Antisubmarine Mission Assigned to the Strategie Air Command Controlling as it did all B—29s the Army Air Forces vas as— signed responsibility for sea search and antisubmarine training and operations on a global scale This responsibility was in wen passed on to the Strategic Air Command as part of its mmission on 10 October 1946 q v On 11 Februazy 1947 the Strategic Air Command was directed by the Army Air Forces to designate a heavy bombardment unit to receive specialized train ing in the air phases of naval reconnaissance antisubmarine — warfare and the protection of shipping This unit would also be charged with establishing and executing a plan that would provide antisubmarine warfare training for all heavy bombard ment units Mission Delegated to 307th Bombardment Group Strategic Air Command however had anticipated this require ment having delegated it in December of 1946 to the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force located at MacDill Army Air Field Florida To monitor the activity i — ——— ¢ 5 JP 1 D 107 — THE ANTISUBMARINE PROGRAM 1986—1956 Continued closely on 14 January 1947 Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed operational control of the 307th Group the Fifteenth Air Force retaining administrative control of the unit unti 1 April 1947 q v_ when Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed full control The 307th Group began a 90—day training program on 1 February 1947 devoting all ite resources to the antisubmazine project All fying crews were qualified in the tactics of antisubmarine search and attack Also a planning section was organized within the group for the purpose of develop— ing tactics and doctrine applicable to all Strategic Air Command units An informal liaison was established with personnel at the submarine base at Key West Florida and at the Naval Air L Station at Boca Chica Strategic Air Gommand Unite Trained During the period September 1967 — May 1948 eight Strategic Air Command squadrons were given an intensive 30—day train— ing course by the 307th Group each squadron reporting to MacDill Army Ar Field with ten aircraft and their assigned crews Four squadrons of the Eighth Air Force were trained in 1947 beginning in September with one from the 509th Bombardment Group The Tith Tiith and 717th Squadrons of the 28th Bombardment Group and the 327th Squadron of the 324 Bombardment Group all Fifteenth Air Force unite completed theix training before the end of May 1948 Early in that year avare of the shortcomings in the training of the Steategic Air Gommand unite the 307th Group received permission from the Navy to send three officers at a time to a two—week introductory course at its antisubmarine instructor school at Norfolk Virginia and a four—week advanced course at Key West Florida Unfortunately personnel who at hast tended these schools had not returned to the 307th Group by the time the unit training program was halted in June 1948 Actial Mine—Laying Responsibility Added On 28 November 1947 Army Air Forces directed the Strategic Air Command to begin an aerial mine—laying program This responsibility was not formally assigned to Strategic Aiz Command as part of its mission until 6 September 195 q v _ After all Strategic Air Command units were trained Strategie Alr Com— mand was to be prepared to train light bombardment units of the _—— ——— mmmmmmali 1947 THE ANTISUBMARINE PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued Tactical Air Command Aerial mine—laying was immediately incorporated in the antisubmarine training program of the 307th Group and the four Fifteenth Air Force squadrons trained in 1948 each received nine days of training in aerial mining as part of their thirty—day course Aerial mine—laying was a logical adjunct of the Strategic Air Command primazy strategic bombardment mission Aerial mining—could be carried on by unmodified bombardment aircraft and the techniques of employ— ing aerial mines was similar to that of strategic bombing A mining program would be conducted against enemy targets for the same reasons as would strategic bombing the destruction of an enemy‘s asility to wage was Though Strategic Air Command responsibilities were later re— stricted in sea search and antisubmarine warfare its responsi— bilities concerning aerial mine—laying remained in force By the end of June 1952 a coordinated aerial mining program for Strategic Air Command had been developed and a training pro— gram undertaken A selected group of officers and airmen were indoctrinated at the Norfolk Naval School so that they could train other unit personnel in the tactics of aerial—mining warfare In June a training manual Tactical Doctrine Aerial Mining Strategic Air Gommand Manual 55—7 was published which established training criteria in this field On 1 August 1952 training requirements for aerial mining were established Strategic Air Command Regulation 50—41 for all medium and heavy bombardment units Formal Unit Training Program Ended L In June 1948 because of exigencies associated with the Russian tx blockade of Berlin the 307th Bombardment Group was alerted — for assignment to Europe see 27 June — 17 July 1948 7 and the antisubmarine training for all Steategle Air Command units was temporarily suspended The 307th Group returned from England in October 1988 but in February — May 1949 it was again rotated there see 11 February — 3 May 1949 Because of the nature of these movements all antisubmarine training of Strategic Air Command units was suspended during the period June 1948 — May 1949 From June — December 1949 the 307th Group continued limited antisubmarine training but the train— ing of Strategic Atr Command units by the group was not — — J LC 0 L THE ANTISUBMARINE PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued AREANTISUBMARINE PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued Tompitted Also antisubmarine directives to the 207th Group vere held in abeyance pending a clarification of the Strategie Air Command antisubmarine warfare mission On 16 December 1948 q v _ the 307th was returned to the control of the Filteenth Air Force by Headquarters Strategic Air Command and the mission of the unit was revised to place antisubmarine vas fare in a secondary position Problem of Unmodified Atreratt Eroblem of Unmodified Atreratt The most persistent problem faced by the Strategic Air Command in rotting its sea search and antisubmarine warfare responsibl— Hitler was that Strategie Atr Command could not oltain permission from higher headquarters to modify any B—29 aircraft for this biahly specialized function With the limited forces at ite disposal to meet it strategic bombardment mission Army Air Forces and United States Air Pore would not authorize the modification of bombardment aircraft to enhance its effectiveness in meeting a fecondary mission such as antisubmarine warfare if in so doing atratenis bombardment capabilities—were hindered Because of the restrictions on the modification of aircraft Strategic air Command sea search and antisubmarine warfare capabilities were always seriously retarded Since no Strategic Air Command ais — eraft were equipped with APS—20 radax training had to be limited to the tactics and techniques of visual and APO—13 radar sea bearh and the tactics of depth charge attack against submarines using visual and low altitude radar sighting with the APG 5 bomb» ing attachment Othe Problems mu The restriction on the modification of atreraft was not the ouly beriowe problem The responsibility for antisubmarine wartire Wat a formidable one and in the event of war could be accomplished only at the expense of the Strategic Alr Gommand‘s planned de— ployment index the Emergency War Plan EWP Also emphasis on apeed and altitude in new aircraft such as the B—36 and B 47 aes 23 June 1948 and 23 October 1981 was not compatible vith the aircraft capabilities required by the antisubmarine mission Besides there was no way by which the Strategic Air Commun could keep informed of the latest thinking in naval antisubmarine ss C_______ homas ___ wit que AnTisuBmaniN® PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued circles Recognizing that under extsting circumstances its sea search and antisubmarine capabilities especially as far as hunter—killer® tactics were concerned would always be very limited Headquarters Strategic Air Command late in 1948 and throughout 1949 recommended to higher headquarters that its antisubmarine mission be modified but that it continue to develop an aerial—mining program an area in which it could develop great proficiency Mission Modified On 12 May 1950 United States Air Force redefined Strategic Air Gommand‘s antisubmarine mission Instead of being responsible j for sea search and antisubmarine training and operations on a global scale Strategic Air Command was henceforth to be responsible for 1 Interdiction of enemy sea power through air operations 2 Conduct of antisubmarine warfare and the pro— tection of shipping and 3 Conduct of aerial mine—laying opera— tions These responsibilities were incorporated in Strategic Air Gommand mission regulations of 6 September 1951 a_ v and 25 Mareh 1954 g v On the same date the United States Air Force granted the Strategic Air Command permission to relieve the 207th Bombard ment Group of ts antisubmarine warfare mission and to assign it to a small unit that would be authorized within the 306th Bombardment Group MacDill Air Force Base Florida How» aver because Strategic Air Command‘s request for Table of Distribution D authorization was denied antisubmarine warfare responsibilities became an additional duty for the 306th w — Group The 306th became a mere planning agency that could — initiate a training program and a limited offensive if called on to do so The 306th was not allowed to modify any of ite aireraft to flAH its new mission In early 1951 the antisubmarine mission was reassigned from the 306th Group to the 305th Group also located at MacDill Ate Force Base but only temporarily since the 305th Group was programmed to receive new aireratt At no time during 1951 was adequate equipment on hand with which to conduct a training program nor was the mission fixed long enough with one unit to organize and begin an effective training program On 4 April 1951 the United States Air Force recopniz 200 Ing Rteategte Ate Command Limitations in the antisubmarine wan renew ow 1947 THE AnTiSUBMARINE PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued THE AnrisupmARINE PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued warfare program notified the Strategic Ate Command that responsibilities for the program were also being assigned as a secondary mission to the Tactical Air Command Ate Defense Command Air Proving Ground Command and Air Training Command Strategic Air Command as a compromise mensure was directed to designate bases near the sea perimeter and make the unite assigned to thore bases responsible for at« tacks against submarines when directed to do so by the United States Alr Force In May commanders of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Porces were directed to build the forces with which to launch a limited attack on submarines from the following bases Second Air Force Fifteenth Air Pore Hunter Air Force Base March Air Force Base Savannah Georgia Riverside California MacDilt Air Force Base Castle Air Force Base Tampa Florida Merced California Ramey Air Force Base Travis Air Force Base f Puerto Rico California Fairchild Air Force Base Spokane Washington Late in July 1951 the Continental Atr Command was appointed 4 as the United States Air Force agency for coordination with the g Navy concerning antisubmarine warfare and for the promulgation ce of all policies pertaining to United States Air Force participation of in the antisubmarine program Continental Afr Command also 8 relieved the Strategie Air Command of participation in the antl— x4 submarine program in the coastal waters of the United States Es In June 1952 the Continental Air Gommand and the Chict of the hs m Eastern Sea Frontier made an agreement concerning the Atlantic 9g area As a result the Strategic Air Command relieved the 305th H Group of its antisubmarine mission At the end of 1952 an agree— m ment between the Continental Air Command and the Chief of the o Western Sea Prontier was pending x 2 February o Pratt Army Air Field Kansas Fifteenth Air Force sub—base of Smoky Hill Army Att Field Kansas transferred to the Corps of j Engineers — « lj —— 1 yup 1947 4 February Control of Units in Alaska Transferred to Alaskan Air Command 28th Very Heavy Bombardment Group and the 624 Righter Squadron stationed at ElmendorE and Ladd Fields Alaska respectively re Hteved from the command jurisdiction of the Strategic Atr Command and attached to the Alaskan Air Command for the duration of their tours of temporary duty for Arctic activities of these units see 29 October 1946 and 18 December 1946 The two units however te— mained assigned to the Strategic Air Command for transfer of dith Reconnaissance Squadron to the Alaskan Atr Command ee 19 August 1967 Though relieved of direct responsibility for the training and activities of the two units the Strategie Air Command was not retieved of responsibility for support of the Alaskan Air Com— mand incident to the accomplishment of their missions Re— ports of the units continued to pass through Strategic Alr Com— mand channels The Strategic Atr Command lost control of its units in Alaska as a result of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy of establishing unified command over component forces in overseas commands ‘Mt the same time some confusion that had existed concerning Strategic Air Commant‘s jurisdiction of these unite was al— Heviated Until 4 February the Strategic Alr Commands ree— ponsibilities had not been clearly defined the unite being under the operational control of the Strategie Alr Command with ad ministration and logistical support being provided by the Alaskan Air Command __ 14 February emy Air Forces Assembly Stations established at three Fifteenth Air Force bases MacDill Army Air Field Florida Selfridge Army ‘Air Field Michigan and Rapld City Army Ate Field South Dakota 18 Febroary Roswell Auxiliary #3 New Mexico Eighth Afr Poree sub—base of Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico transfered to the Corps of Engineers es 20 ‘8 a is J I Thad _ ewccsupmmmmegr 19e7 19 February Thisty—six aircraft 18 each from the 434 and 509th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups Eighth Air Force participated in an aerial review over Roswell New Mexico 20 Pebroary Oscoda Army Air Field Michigan Fifteenth Air Force sub—base range of Selfridge Amy Alr Field Michigan placed on active status 22 Pebrsary — 10 March — Goodall Flight to South America A flight of six B—29s from the 97th Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force led by Major General Charles F Born commanding general of the Fifteenth Air Force participated in the inauguration ceremonies of the new Uruguayan president Tomas Berreta on 1 March 1947 The flight which was known officially as United States Task Force No 1 also took part in the dedication of Uruguayts new international airport Carrasco Airport The aircraft departed Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas on 22 February stopping enroute to Montivideo at MacDill Army Air Field Florida Boringuen Field Puerto Rico and Natal Brasil They arrived at Montevideo Uruguay 26 Februazy and left Urupuay for the United States on 6 March 1947 returning via the same route The planes arrived at their home base on 10 March United States Task Force No 1 consisted of hand—picked personnel 56 officers 70 enlisted men and 11 corres— pondents s One spare B—29 accompanied the ight as fa as Natal Brazil and then returned to Smoky Hill Three G—54 aircraft of the Ist Air Teansport Unit Righth Air Force which carried spare parts and supplies followed the same route to Montivideo ex— cept for refueling stops at Georgetown British Guines and Rio de Janeizo Brasil 24 February 55th Reconnaissance Group Very Long Range Mapping activated i at MacDill Army Air Pleld Florida and assigned to the 3lith Recon— 1 — naissance Wing Fifteenth Air Force 14 AL £09 tae Lad — 1947 Manning of the unit began in my 22 time 31ith Wing units had been of squadron size For activation of the second reconnaissance group the Sist see 1 July 1947 The 31 Ith Wing had been assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force for administration and logistical support on 1 May 1946 q v On 1 April 1947 g v however Headquarters Strategic Alr Command took over complete control of the unit «March Army Ate Forces Retrenched to 55 Group Phase of 10 Group Program Because of fund limitations the Army Air Forces reduced the number c of programmed groups from 70 to 55 The 55 Group Phase as this program was known was not intended to replace the 70 Group Program Rather the attainment of 55 group strength was to be a step toward the re—establishment of a 70 Group Program at a later date In July 1947 the Air Staff directed that the 55 Group Phase Program be operationally efficient by 1 January 1948 The goat was to man 55 groups by 31 December 1947 and to meet formal training requirements by 31 December 1948 retasnomasnt rao to to 18 oxours 1947—1950 Background The dismantling of the Army Air Forces at the end of World War 1t had reduced the number of combat groups to approxi— mately 50 by mid—1946 from a World War II peak of 273 com— w bat air groups Fund limitations in the 1946—1950 period ¥ forther reduced the number of groups first from 70 to 55 groups and later to a mere 48 groups The 70 Group Program had been instituted shortly after V—3 Day and plans called for all 70 groups to be activated by August 1947 However even though by March of 1947 shortages that had been acute when the 10 Group Program was instituted were somewhat alleviated T0 groups were still faz from being a reality The retrenchment to the 55 Group Phase actually had litle direct effect on the Strategic Air Command only emphasizing to r —— — n—— WR ___ e® RETRENCHMENT FROM 70 TO 48 GROUPS 1947—1950 Continued RETRENCHMENT ERoM 70 To 48 GROUPS 1947—1950 Continued the austerity that all the United States Armed Forces were fxcing As a matter of fact Strategic Air Command capa« bilities were so weak especially in 1946 and 1947 that the command deagged far behind the number of groups authorized to it by the Army Air Forces 70 Group Program The original 70 Group Program called for 419 355 officers and enlisted men organized broadly into 70 groups and 22 separate squadrons 25 Very Heavy Bombardment Groupe 25 Fighter Groups 5 Light Bombardment Groups 10 Transport Groups 5 Tactical Recomaissance Groups 7G plus 22 separate squadrons The number of groups or wings authorized the Strategie Air Command under the various programs was always subject to fluctuation By September of 1946 the Strategie Air Command had been authorized 16 Very Heavy bombardment groups under the 70 Group Program but it vas apparent that the activation and manning of even this relatively small number of unite vas impossible Therefore and also because of heavy losses of civilian personnel Strategic Air Command requested Headquar ters Army Air Forces to reduce the interim tactical structure to aix Very Heavy bombardment groups This request how» ever was ignored Under the 70 Group Program the Strategic hast Air Command was authorized in addition to the 16 Very Heavy bombardment groups one Very Long Range reconnatesance group three fighter groups two separate squadrons and one separate transport fight 55 Group Phase i Under the 55 Group Program the total Army Air Forces authori— zation in the Zone of the Interior consisted of 32 groups plus 13% ight separate squadrons ‘The balance of the unite were al— Re located to aix overseas areas The Zone of the Interior 1 51 — Fig C_ —Bm a B 1947 AETRENcHMENT FROM 70 10 7—1950 Continued — authorization was as follows 11 Very Heavy Bombardment Groups 4 1 Light Bombardment Group 12 Fighter Groups 5 Reconnaissance and troop carrier groups 32 plus cight separate squadrons The 55 Group Program went into effect in March 1947 During Fiscal Year 1948 the Strategie Air Gommand was authorized as its share of the 55 Groups 1 bombardment groups and five fighter groups Later two additional bombarément and two ad— ditional fighter groups were added Because of personnel © fhortages a policy was established of manning all tactical unite 100 percent before Maintenance and Supply Groups were mamed above 50 percent 48 Group Program Throughout 1948—1949 the United States Air Force was operat« ing on a sliding 48 Group Program but during the Inst kaif of 1950 it began planning an expansion program first aimed azo pooess ao Iofet 35 wings by the end of Fiscal Year 1952 Hor T2 Top ‘dO and 143 Wing Programs see 29 August 1949 for 127—137 Wing Programs see 27 October 1953 The United States Air Force 48 Group Program was broken down as follows 4 Heavy Bombardment Groups 11 Medium Bombardment Groups 1 Light Bombardment Group 17 Day Fighter Groups 3 All—Weather Fighter Groups 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Group 5 Strategic Reconnaissance Groups 6 Troop Carrie Groups as The otal number of groups authorized the Strategie Air Command Far 19 Of the four heavy bombardment groups only two were to be equipped with B—360 72 L 1 ___ € Jup Seer 15 Mareh Gowen Army Air Field Idaho Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Corps of Engineers — 16 Mareh In an exchange of bases Strategic Air Command assumed juriedic— ton of Wendover Field Utah from the Air Materiel Command and transferred Alamogordo Army Afr Field New Mexico Eighth Ate Forse and its three sub—bases Deming Army Air Field South Aneiliazy #1 and Center Ausiliary #2 to the Air Materiel Command Wendover Field was assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force on inactive status but the bombing and gunnery range was opened for use Fo the training of Strategic Air Gommand unite at Wendover in 1947 see 14—24 November 1947 1 Apeit Headquarters Strategie Air Command Assumed Jurisdiction of MacDill Army Air Field — Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed jurlediction from the Fifteenth Air Force of MacDill Army Air Field Florida its range Avon Park Army Air Field Florida and all units located at MacDill These included the Headquarters 9th Combat Bomb Wing VH Provisional the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group and Head— quarters 311th Reconnaissance Wing and its assigned 55th Reconnate— sance Group Also included in the transfer were the Army Air Forces Staging Area Separation Point and Assembly Station that were located L at MacDill Army Ate Field This action involving the reconnaissance and antisubmarine unite at MacDill created for all practical purposes a new com mand directly under the control of Headquarters Strategic Air Command ‘The Fifteenth Air Force maintained court—martial jurisdiction of the base until the middle of May when this Jurisdiction was transferzed to the commanding general of MacDill Army Air Field Operational control of the 3070 Very Heavy Bombardment Group which had a specialized sea search and antisubmarine mission had been assumed by 13 __——_ lls c—_—_R®M Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 14 January 1947 g v _ Since 1 May 1946 g v the Fifteenth Air Force had been responsible for the administration and logistical support of the 311th Wing The Fifteenth Air Force on I April 1947 was freed from all responsibilities toward the two units On 1 June 1947 q v _ Headquarters 31th Reconnaissance Wing moved from MacDill Army Air Field to Andrews Field Maryland MacDill Army Afr Field and the units located there were returned to the jurisdiction of the Fifteenth Air Force on 16 December 1988 q v — — EMERGENCE or mEapovantsas stRaTEGIC AR COMMAND as AceNcY or pict command During 1947 Headquazters Strategic Air Command emerged as an agency of direct command and at the same time there was a reduction in the command responsibilities of the Fifteenth Air Force At the beginning of the year all combat unite were ad— ministered by the Bighth and Fifteenth Air Porces the lion‘s — share being assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force The Eighth Air Force controlled three bombardment groups the Tth 430 « and 509th which were assigned to Headquarters 58th Bombard— ment Wing The Fifteenth Air Force controlled six bombard ment groups the 26th serving in Alaska see 29 October 1986 92d 934 97th 30ist and the 307th antisubmarine varfare mission It also controlled the 4th and 56th Fighter Groups and the 311th Reconnaissance Wing administration and logis— tical support only see 1 May 1946 By the end of 1947 Headquarters Strategic Alr Command had assumed control of the 307th Bombardment Group see above this entry and 14 January 1947 the 311th Reconnaissance Wing see above this entey and ite two groups activated in 1967 the 55th see 24 February 1947 and the lst see 1 July 1947 and 1 October 19477 the dth Fighter Group see 1 April 1947 the 56th Fighter Group see 10 October 1947 fand through MacDill Army Air Field the 824 Fighter Group which was stationed at Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire see 1 August 1967 7 Also assigned to Headquarters Strategie Air Command at the end of 1947 were five inactive and unmanned _ bombardment groups the 44th 90th 3030 305th and 306th 1 a — — Rem mvmomemae — _—— L——Rpp lat Zee 1 July 1947 Thus by the end of the year the spravling Fifteenth Air Force had been condensed and it had become ex— clusively a bomber command It then controlled the opera— Honally active 28th 938 and 97th Bombardment Groups and was faged with the problem of organizing and manning the 92d 98th see 24 September 1947 and 301st Groups The Eighth Air Force at the close of 1947 had assigned the same three bom— bardment groups as at the beginning of the year the 7th 434 and 509th still assigned to the 58th Bombardment Wing Also assigned to the Bighth Air Force was the inactive and unmanned 24 Bombardment Group see 24 September 1947 7 and it had also been given the assignment of organizing and training the newly activated 27th and 334 Fighter Groups see 16 July 1947 and 16 September 19477 1 apear 4th Fighter Group Single Engine Very Long Range reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquarters Strategie Air Command and its station assignment changed from Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan to Andrews Field Maryland In March just prior to the change in its station reassigament manning of the unit was begun and in April it began to receive P—80 jet aircraft see 23 — 24 April 1947 The 56th and 824 Fighter Groups were also reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquarters Strategic Air Command later in the year see respectively 10 October 1947 and 1 August 1947 Abilene Army Air Field Texas Eighth Air Force sub—base of Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas transferred to the Corps of Engineers f Wagen Eighth Afr Force Actial Review Over Western United States Biggest Flight of B—29s Since World War it During an Army Week celebration a flight of seven squadrons from the three Bighth Air Force Very Heavy Bombardment Groups 7th om 1947 meme — 434 and 509th consisting of 64 B—295 provided an aerial review over Fort Worth Dallas Carlsbad B1 Paso Tucson Phoenix and Riverside enroute to a simulated bombing run on Los Angeles The flight was made up of 21 aircraft from each group plus General Ramey‘s lead plane 12 Apeit 820 Fighter Group Two Engine Very Long Range activated at Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire and assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force Shortly after it was activated the unit began equipping with P—Siz and on 15 August 1947 q v it was redesignated as a Single Engine unit — By the end of 1947 it had a full complement of 72 _ P—Sis The 82d retained its P—Sls until 22 August 1949 q v when it was transferred to the Continental Air Command The 824 Group was reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquarters Strategic Air Command on I © August 1947 ‘g w 7 The 4th and 56th Fighter Groups were also reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 1 April 1947 q v _ and 10 October 1947 q v J respectively 15 Aprit Army Air Forces Staging Area at Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska discontinued by the Fifteenth Air Porce 15 April v Golone Charles Sommers temporarily replaced Major General Charles F Born as commander of the Fifteenth Ar Force Golone Sommers retained command of the Fifteenth Air Force untit 24 April 1947 g v 7 76 L_—_liiy we c 19 Aprit 2th Bombardment Group Returned From Alaska Thirty B—298 of the 28th Very Heavy Bombardment Group which had been assigned to Alaska for training since 29 October 1946 Lq v landed at their new home station Rapid Gity Army Air Field South Dakota The Fifteenth Air Force reassumed command jurlediction of the unit which it had lost on 1 January 1947 and which had passed from Headquarters Strategic Air Command to the Alaskan Air Command on 4 February 1947 q v _ Before being assigned to Alaska the 28th Group had been stationed at Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska but on ‘ 10 Mazch 1947 the home station of the unit was changed to Rapid City Army Air Field South Dakota and Grand Island Army Air Field was transferred to the Corps of Engineers on 8 June 1947 Lec wJ 22 April Eighth Ar Force Maximum Effort Mission In their second mass flight in the month of April tee also 11 April 1947 the three Eighth Air Force groups the 7th 43d and 509th made a maximum effort strike at Kansas City Seventy B—29s from a potential of 90 participated in the mission 23 — 24 Aprt 4th and 56th Fighter Groups Redesignated Jet Unite First Jets Assigned to the Comment On 23 April the 336th 335th and 336th Fighter Squadrons Single Engine Very Long Range of the 4th Fighter Group Headquarters Strategic Air Commant Andrews Field Maryland were redesignated Fighter Squadrons Jet—Propelled Very Long Range On 24 April the 61st 62d and 634 Fighter Squadrons Single Engine Very Long Range of the 56th Fighter Group Fifteenth Air Force Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan were redesignated Fighter Squadrons Jet—Propelied Very Long Range r C__IBe pe _ C Shortly prior to its redesignation as a jet unit in early March 1947 the 56th Group received its first jets Lockheed P—80 Shooting Stars These new jet aircraft replaced the P—S1 air _ craft that had been assigned to the unit in 1966 see 1 May 1946 7 The last of the P—Sis were phased out by June of 1987 except for a few which were retained for administrative lights until the unit was transferred to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 q v 7 The dth Fighter Group which had been reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Poree to Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 1 Aprit 1947 q v _ had a handful of P—47e assigned in March It got its first P—80s in April and by the end of the month it pos— sessed 27 P—808 and 12 P47s Throughout 1947 it got an in— © creasing number of P—80# and by the end of the year all P—47e were phased out The unit had a full complement of 84 jets by the end of February 1948 Both the 4th and 56th Groups retained thei P—80# until they were transferred to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 q v along with the 330 Fighter Group 2s April Brigadier General Leon W Johnson replaced Golonel Chasies Sommers as commander of the Fifteenth Air Force General Johnson retained command of the Fifteenth Air Force until 3 August 1988 g v 7 29 Aprit Iwelve B—29s from the 7th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Eighth Air Force Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas escorted President Aleman of Mexico in President Truman‘s private plane to Washington D C for an official state visit — Near Washington the B—208 were joined by 24 P—80s of the Fourth Fighter Group Headquarters Strate— gic Air Command Andrews Field Maryland ‘The B—20s landed at Andrews Field and returned to their home base on 30 April 1947 7s I © __ — Rp R —— C_ —lap o May — October Operation FINBACK Squadron Rotation Program to Par East First Formal Rotation Program for Strategic Air Command Units Six Very Heavy bombardment squadrons served monthly tours in the Far East Month Voit Assignment May 436th Squadron Eighth Air Force 7th Group June 65th Squadron Eighth Air Force 434 Group July 4920 Squadron Eighth Air Force th Group August 3428 Squadron Fifteenth Air Porce 97th Group September 634 Squadron Eighth Air Force 434 Group October Composite Squadron Fifteenth Air Force 28th Group Background Though the Strategic Az Command did not achieve the capa— bility to maintain an overseas rotation program for groups for 90—day periods until 1948 see 18 February — 20 April hast 1948 and 27 June 17 July 19487 in 1947 the command did succeed in rotating some groups and squadrons to Europe for short periods see 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 and in establishing a monthly rotation program for squadrons to the Far East No groups were rotated to the Far East until 1948 gee 10 May — 27 August 1948 and 20 August — 20 December 1948 J In May of 1947 the Strategic Air Command received permis— sion from the Army Air Forces to initiate the Far East f 79 — pase —— m Poa wee Bst rotation program The plan had originally been recommended by Liestenant General Ennis G Whitehead the commanding general of the Far East Air Force and had envisioned the use of the visiting squadron as a fourth squadron with one of the groups assigned to the Par East Air Force To conform with Far East Air Force practice the rotating squadrons consisted of eight aircraft instead of the ten comprising Zone of the Interior—based units Program Temporarily Halted Original plans called for squadrons to be rotated to the Far East for the last eight months in 1947 but the program came to a halt — in November when the 9th Squadron of the 7th Group Eighth Air Force reached Hawaii and discovered that 100 130 octane gasoline was not available Since Strategic Air Command aircraft were not modified to use 115 145 gasoline the squadron returned to the United States and the scheduled rotation of a squadron of the 307th Group in December was cancelled However the shortage of gasoline was alleviated in a couple of months and the squadron ratation program to the Far East was resumed in February 1948‘ ee February — April 1948 Hawaitan Flights Also Temporarily Discontinued The gasoline shortage in the Far East also prevented continuation of a program for small—sized training flights not more than four aireraft of bombardment aircraft to Hawai which had first been carried out during the period 27 July — 20 September 1947 The distance from the mainland made fights to Hawaii ideal for train— ng in long—range navigation and cruise control see 9 July 19477 A similar program set up for the period 16 November 1947 — 10 hy January 1948 could not be carried out because of the shortage of 100 130 gasoline in the Far East The lights to Hawaii however Hike the squadron rotation program to the Far East were resumed early in 1988 Another series of flights to Havail was authorized during the period 25 January — 20 March 1948 Under a program that was established beginning 31 March 1948 flights were made for only a short time because of the buildup of forces in Europe beginning late in June see 27 June — 17 July 1948 Plight exews accomplished so mach overwater Ning that the importance of the fights to Hawaii diminished but they were still made oc— __ castonally as were also similar training flights to‘the Caribbean See 1 duned9e7 so — —_tmie _ L May Strategie Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Fort Dix Army Air Base Wrightstown New Jersey and its off—base facility Port Dix Army Air Base Radio Range from the Air Transport Command and assigned them on an inactive status to the Fifteenth Air Force They were satellited on Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan until 1 August 1947 9 v when they were reassigned to Andrews Field Maryland Subsequent to this action the base was renamed McGuire Air Force Base and on 16 August 1948 Tq v _ it was reassigned to the 31ith Air Division Reconmais— sance On I October 1949 q v the base was transferred to the Continental Air Command c 15 May — 4 September Project EARDRUM Aerial Mapping of Greenland The Tri—Metrogen aerial mapping of extensive areas of Greenland was accomplished in record time by the East Reconnaissance Group Provisional of the 311th Reconnaissance Wing Logistical support of the unit was provided by the Air Transport Command The coast of Greenland not previously mapped in 1946 was photographically mapped as were also central and cross strips across the interior so that some conception of the inland topography could be obtained The urgency of the project had a diplomatic background because the Army Air Forces eared that United States rights in Greenland might be terminated in 1947 The 311th Reconnaissance Wing was assigned the project on 3 a March 1947 The Army Air Forces directed that six fully—equipped — F—9 aircraft and a maximum complement of 200 men including air and ground crews be in place at Blute West—8 not later than 15 May 1947 By the end of May the project was 90 percent com— pleted and it was finally completed on 4 September 1947 well ahead of schedule oreration Nanook Project EARDRUM was part of Operation NANOOK which con— sisted of the Arctic operations of the 311th Wing in the winter of 1946—1947 and in the spring and summer of 1947 Besides ai l_ p o Project EARDRUM the 311th Wing also provided air support ‘ to the United States Weather Bureau which was establishing weather stations in the Greenland and North Polar areas The 311th Wing provided preliminary air recomnaissance and air 1ift support from Blute West—8 for the establishment of a weather station in the vicinity of Burcka Sound Grantland a joint project of the United States and Canadian Weather Bureaus Eureka Sound was several hundred miles north of the Arctic Civcle During April 1947 the 31 ith Wing airlifted 125 tons of equipment and supplies with three G—472 and one G—82 landings being made on the ice at Slidre Fiord By August of 1947 a unit of Army Air Forces engineer troops had constructed a 4 000 foot airstrip four miles north of the weather station A 55—man weather station was to be established at Winter Harbor Melville Island as soon as water transportation was feasible The Strategic Alr Command was to furnish necess ary personnel to construct an airstrip at the location When the airstrip was completed the 311th Wing was to conduct recommaissance of Banks and Borden Islands to determine the location for the establishment of two five—man weather stations in the spring of 1948 15 May Army Air Forces Separation Point established at Rapid City Army Alr Field South Dakota Fifteenth Air Force 15 May MeGook Army Air Field Nebraska Fifteenth Air Force sub—base of Peterson Field Colorado transfered to the Corps of Engineers On 1 December 1946 the field had been reassigned from Grand Island Army Air Field Nebraska as a satellite of the 200th Army Air Forces Base Unit AAFBU Peterson Field Colorado Springs Colorado 16 May Operation PAGIFIC Maximum—Effort Mission over Eastern Seaboard The largest number of Strategic Air Command long—range bombers — that could be mustered 101 B—29 aireraft from the Eighth and Fifteenth _ __ Bm c Air Forces attacked New York Gity and New over other Eastern Seaboard cities General Kenney led the formation as Air Porce Commander and General Ramey of the Eighth Air Force partici— pated as Deputy Air Force Commander Assembling near New York City the planes passed over that city and then flew over Danbury Newark Trenton Philadelphia Wilmington Baltimore and Washington The exercise was under the direction of the Eighth Air Force As an exercise to test the ability of the Headquarters Strategie Air Gommand and the major subordinate command staffs to plan a mission for the entire command and the ability of the tactical echelons to accomplish such a mission the exercise was a sue— cess However much confusion existed and the operation vas — not conducted exactly as planned All six Strategie Air Command bombardment groups that were operational at the time were re— presented the Tth 28th 434 97th 307th and the 509th Non—operational groups at the time all assigned to the Fifteenth Air Foree were the 920 938 and 30ist The 7h 434 and 509th were Eighth Air Force unite the 307th was assigned directly to Headquarters Strategic Air Command and the other two groups were assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force The total potential number of B—20 aircraft that could be mustered from the six groups was 180 but though the field orders called for 131 —290 to participate only 101 aircraft took past in the mase fight 25 May Strategic Air Command assumed juriediction of the Aeronautical Chart Service Washington 25 D C and assigned it to the 311 Recomnaie sance Wing Headquarters Strategic Air Command The Asronsutical Chart Service was transferred to the Air Materiel Command on 1 March 1950 q v 7 30—31 May Ten B—298 from the 97th Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Porce Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas participated in an aerial review over Philadelphia as — savite ___ oy 197 1 June Caribbean Training Flights Authorized Training flights of not more than three aircraft were authorized by the Army Air Forces to the following Caribbean Defense Command bases Rio Hato Panama Vernam Field Jamaica Borinquen Field Puerto Rico and Watler Field Trinidad Flights were also authorl zed to the Air Transport Command base at Kindley Field Bermuda In 1946 Strategic Air Command capabilities had been so limited and so much emphasis placed on organization and manning that almost no overwater Alight training Ind been conducted By 1947 with the achievement of a minimum capability preliminazy plans were made for a world—wide rotation progtam and some units were rotated to Europe and the Far East see May — October 1947 and 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 However a great need existed for the indoctrination of individual crews in over water fying as a preliminary to an effective world—wide rotation program It was for this reason that the Strategic Air Command obtained permission for the Caribbean fights as well as a _ similar series of fights to Hawaii see May — October 19477 1 June 311th Reconnaissance Wing began operations at Andrews Field Mary— Jand following its move from MacDill Army Air Field Florida The 55th Reconnaissance Group the one group assigned to the 31ith Wing remained at MacDill Army Air Field until 19 July 1948 9 v _ when it moved to Topeka Air Force Base Kansas 1 — 26 June Project TRAINING Gooduill Flight to England Nine B—29s of the 340th Squadron of the 97th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force and one G—54 support aircraft departed Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas on 1 June for England via Andrews Field Maryland Lagens Field Asores and Glcbelstadt Germany The purpose of the goodwill—training fight originally planned for a full bombardment group was to repay a similar visit — sa — «——— 1947 by a Royal Air Force bomber squadron of Lancaster aircraft to the United States in 1986 The 340th Squadron arrived at Giebelstadt 5 June and four days later New to Mazham England During the following week the squadron received a red—carpet welcome from the English Sixty Royal Air Force personnel and 30 correspondents were given familiarization fights in the B—298 and on 11 June the 340th Squadron flew over the principal English cities On 16 June the squadron returned to Giebelstadt and the following day performed an aerial review over the major German cities On 24 June the squadron departed Gicbelstadt for the United States via Lagens Field Azores Kindley Field Bermuda and Westover Field Massachusetts The B—29s arrived at their home station on 26 June Project TRAINING was one part of a special two—part European project assigned to the 380th Squadron in March of 1947 by the Army Air Forces The other was Project HARKEN see I2 July — 4 November 1947 8 June Grand Islan Army Air Field Nebraska Fifteenth Air Force trans ferved to the Corps of Engineers 10 June ‘ Mass Demonstration of P—80 Jets in Chicago Gentemnial In the largest mass flight of jets on record 20 P—80 Lockheed Shoot» ing Stare of the 56th Fighter Group Selfridge and Oscoda Army Air Fields Michigan under the command of Golonel David C Schilling provided an aerial review for the Chicago Centennial celebration 20 June 924 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force trans— ferred at 13 strength with organizational equipment only from Smoky Hill Army Air Fleld Kansas to Spokane Army Air Field Washington Spokane Army Afr Field was occupied jointly with the Air Mate— riel Command from 5 June until 1 September 1947 19 v 7 when the Strategic Afr Command assumed Jurisdiction of the installation i K orm ——S isn 3 25 June Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of the 27th Fighter Group Single Engine Very Long Range from the Army Air Porces less personnel and equipment The station of the unit was designated as Androws Field Maryland On 16 July 1947 y v 7 the 27th Group was reassigned from Eva Headquarters Strategic Ar Command to the Eighth Ate Force 3 and transfered less personnel and equipment to Kearney Army Air Field Nebraska where the manning and equipping of the unit was begun 5 1 Puty g 2d d4th 90th 96th 3030 305th and 306th Very Heavy Bombardment PB Groups and the Slst Reconnaissance Group activated on a 1s baste at f Andrews Field Maryland and arsigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Commant cal On 24 September 1947 v2 the 28 Bombardment Group was 9a assigned to the Eighth Air Force less personnel and equipment 0 i and its station assignment changed to Davis—Monthan Army Alr f Field Arizona On the same date 19 v the 96th Bombard— f ment Group was assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force less person— f nel and equipment and ite station assignment changed to Spokane 3 Army Air Field Washington B On 6 September 1948 ‘9 v _ the 44th 90th 3034 and 305th d Bombardment Groups which had never been manned were re— i assigned to the Department of the Air Force Subsequently G however the four groups were reactivated by the Strategic Y — Air Command but as medium rather than Very Heavy groups The Afth 90th and 305th Groups were reactivated 2 January 1951 q w _ and the 3034 Group was reactivated 4 September 1951 Face77 On I August 1948 q w 7 the 306th Very Heavy Bombardment Group was attached to the 307th Medium Bombardment Wing Mac Dill Air Force Base Headquarters Strategic Air Command and its station assignment changed from Andrews Air Force Base Maryland to MacDill Atr Force Base On 16 December 1948 ss @ J se HB loma» ® ae 1947 q v MacDill Air Force Base and all assigned units including the 306th and 307th Groups were reassigned from Headquarters Strategic Air Command to the Fifteenth Air Force The Sist Reconnaissance Group was reassigned from Head« quarters Strategic Air Command to the 311th Reconnaissance Wing on 1 October 1947 g v 7 but the unit was not manned until the middle of 1948 3 July 1967 — 28 January 1918 Operation SUNFAST originally PARKWAY Beginning of Programmed Rotational Flights to Europe First Full Group Deployed to Europe Six units served short periods of tempo ary duty in Germany Dates unie Assignment 3 19 suiye 97th Bombardment Group Fifteenth Air Force Smoky Hil Army Air Field Kansas a gory — Two equadrons from the 307th Headquarters 9 August Bombardment Group and one Strategic Air Gom— from the 26th Bombardment mand and Fifteenth Group MacDill Army Ate Air Force Field Florida and Rapid City — Army Air Field South Dakota — 12 August — 64th and 65th Squadrons of the Eighth Air Force m — 1 September — 430 Bombardment Group Davis—Monthan Field Arizona 2 September —— 7th Bombardment Group Port Eighth Air Force 20 September Worth Army Als Field Texas ¥ All deployment dates are based insofar as possible on the date the first increment of the main body of tactical aireraft left the home station of the unit and the date the last aircraft returned All unite were equipped with B—29 aircraft each squadron being authorized 10 atreratt — a7 we _ c Rater usic Assignment t 15 November — 718th Squadron of the Fifteenth Air Force 15 December 28th Bombardment Group Rapid Gity Army Air Field South Dakota 12 December — 3 ist Squadron of the 307th Headquarters 28 January 1948 — Bombardment Group Strategic Air Gom— MacDill Army Air Field mand Florida All units were based at Giebelstadt Germany except the 37ist Squad rom which was stationed at FOrstenfelwuck They were under the operational control of United States Air Force in Europe USAFE — Secrecy of the rotational fights was stressed because of delicate diplomatic questions involved Nevertheless the training program of all unite was hampered because of diplomatic difficulties The failure of some European nations to grant clearances for operational flights limited the scope of Strategic Air Command operations Changes in route sometimes had to be made and special formations had to be flown through the Berlin Corridor Yet the periods of training away from their home stations were beneficial for the unite They performed familiarisation fights and aerial reviews over Western Europe as well as radar bombing and navigational training lights Some units flew missions to Dhahran Saudi Arabia Background Original plans established by the Army Air Forces in May 1947 called for the assignment of a Very Heavy bombardment group # monthly to Europe beginning on 1 September However late in June the plans were changed considerably The departure date for the first unit was moved up to 1 July and the duration of the temporary duty EDY training periods was cut to ten days Every Strategic Air Command operational group was to take past in the program except the 509th which was exempted because of its specialized status concerning the atomic bomb After the group program got under way plans were amended to rotate squadrons instead of groups to FUrstenfeldbruck rather than Gicbelstadt All but two of the squadrons one from the 43d Group and one from the 28th Group originally scheduled for deployment to _ Europe took part in the program — as 2 Taw ___—— i nad‘ S2 — 1947 rie novation erconan in 1917 Strategic Air Commant‘s operations in Europe in 1947 though limited represented a marked increase over those in 1946 In that year only one flight consisting of a mere six aireraft _ had been made to Europe see 13 November — 4 December 1946 Strategic Ate Command capabilities had been especially weak immediately following its activation and in 1946 priority had been given to Alaskan training of the available forces see 29 October 1946 and 18 December 1946 The assignment to Europe in 1947 of several groups and squadrons as part of Operation SUNFAST while at the same time squadrons were being rotated to the Far Bast under Operation FINBACK see i May October 19477 demonstrated the increasing capability of of the Strategic Als Command to meet its world—wide strategie bombing commitments Yet it was not until 1948 that the rota tion program to Europe got under way on a broad seale ‘see 18 Pebruary — 20 April 1948 and 27 June — 17 July 1948 7 Except for Operation SUNFAST the only other Aights to Europe in 1947 of any special note were Project TRAINING see 1 — 26 June 1947 and Project HARKEN gee 12 July — 4 November 1947 For continuation of the equadron rota tion programs to Europe and the Par East in 1948 see respectively 22 January — 12 August 1948 and Pebruazy — April 1968 For rotation of groups to Far East in 1968 see 10 May — 27 August 1948 and 20 August — 20 December ioe 4 July Sixteen aircraft from the 7th Bombardment Group and eleven airerat from the 434 Bombardment Group Eighth Air Force performed an serial review over Seatile Washington during a Fourth of July celebration j 9 July Cruise Control Program Established Strategic Air Command Regulation 50—16 formally established the Cruise 2 Gontrol Program which was the first of two phases of the Range E tension Program The other phase was the Air Refueling Program ace 19 July 19487 a 1 _____—— emg — l RANGE Extension cauiss controt pase A vital consideration to the Strategic Air Command in meeting its world—wide strategic bombardment commitment has always been the development of the maximum range capabilities of all ite combat bombardment aireraft In the first ten years of its history the Steategic Air Command conducted two programs to extend the range of its aircraft The first of these was the Cruise Control Program which first got under way after advance study in the spring of 1947 Shortly thereafter preliminazy plan ning was begun on the Air Refueling Program and in 1948 this program was pat into effect see 19 July 1948 7 After the Air — — Refueling Program was established the Gruise Control Program was not abandoned but it received less emphasie This vas especially true after the Ar Refueling Program reached maturity in 1952 Nevertheless both programs were maintained side—by—side in the interest of increasing combat capability Nature of the Problem The Cruise Control Program was initiated when a series of supervisory visite to Strategic Air Command operating groups in the spring of 1947 revealed that bombardment aircraft when operated according to the appropriate Technical Orders TO could not attain the speeds shown on the miles—per—gatlon curves provided by Air Materiel Command Fuel flows were less than indicated on the fuel flow curves which were based on manifold pressure and revolutions—per—minute RPM Strategie Air Gom— mand Might engineers discovered that one of the reasons was be— cause the regulations applied to carburetor—type engines and B—29 bombers had been converted to fuel—injection—type‘ engines m Alreraft could attain the speeds given on the curves by increas— ing the revolutions—per—minute specified but only at the cost of excessive fuel consumption In either case however the air— craft could not meet the Technical Order ranges Bither Strate— gic Air Command operating and maintenance procedures or the technical instructions were seriously in error This was quite serious in that the war plane of the Air Staff were based on tactical plans prepared in accordance with Air Materiel Gom— mand technical instructions Flight Test Program © Further investigation by Headquarters Strategic Air Command revealed that all echelons were lacking in knowledge of accurate P Rs so ap Cs q —— P 4 197 ‘h CRUISE CONTROL PROGRAM Continued # aircraft operation or the use of instrument calibration Therefore a series of studies were conducted on both stripped ¢ and combat aircraft The original Technical Order power £ schedules new Strategic Air Command power schedules and 4 several special power schedules were utilized to determine a optimum range performance Specially instrumented aircraft $ were used to prepare proper power schedules for B—29s equipped E with fuel—injection engines to supplement the existing Technical € Order data on carburetor—equipped aircraft G Indoctrination Program E Using the data that had been gathered the next phase of the U program was the indoctrination of fight personnel They were H instructed in the accurate use of existing technical information d and detailed operating instructions were provided them To f increase the proficiency of Might personnel in their flight plan t ning and in—flight planning procedures specially instrumented combat B—29 aircraft were assigned to operating groups and a specially instrumented test and demonstration aircraft was as— d signed to Headquarters Strategic Alr Command The aircraft 4 assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command was used for a Might tests and fight planning demonstrations for each group It was demonstrated conclusively to flight personnel that a B 23 when in proper condition would meet or slightly exceed the performance and range characteristics envisioned by the original B—29 Technical Orders w To train supervisory fight engineers in mid—1949 the Bighth Air Force Operational Engineering Section established a Staff Flight Enginzer‘s School at Walker Air Force Base New Mexico Instruction was given in aircraft weight and balance it factors aircraft instrumentation aerodynamics airspeed calculation and other subjects related to cruise control By the end of 1949 five classes had been conducted approximately 125 officers being qualified for supervision of the engineering phases of long—range tactical missions Maintenance Standards Raised The second phase of the program consisted of improving main— tenance standards and procedures To fullll the requirements of the Strategic Alt Command mission maintenance standards si —_commmue— _ p ——— f _ ame—— l G 0 ul cRuiSE CONTROL PROGRAM Gontinued were raised to a level that would permit the initiation of major global operations on 24—hour notice and the conduct of such operations for 100 hours with a minimum of maintenance New and more stringent maintenance regulations were issued not only to improve the quality of maintenance but also to reduce the number of manhours required for maintenance Range Capability Enhanced Once personnel were indoctrinated and maintenance standards raised to a higher level the next step was the extension of range capability This was accomplished on two levels First a program was developed to obtain maximum possible range and fuel economy by regular aircrews Shortly after Strategic Air Command Regulation 50—16 was published on 9 July 1947 Head— quarters Strategic Air Command dixected that each B—29 bom— bardment crew make a 4 000 statute—mile flight under specified contitions every three months Secondly maximum range was sought through the use of specially trained crews and aircraft operating under optimum performance conditions for examples of these ights see 3— 4 October 1946 1—3 August 1947 22 March 1948 11 June 1948 6 August 1948 7—9 December 1948 and 31 August — 1 September 1950 7 Lessons leazned on these special lights were disseminated to all crews Both regular and special crews made significant progress in range extension in 1947 and 1948 accomplishing many fights of over 4 000 statute miles In 1947 to enhance crew proficiency in cruise control techniques a series of fights were authorized to Hawail and the Caribbean gee May — October 1947 and 1 June 1947 Cruis» sontrol techniques were emphasized in all command activities See for example 10 — 11 July 1947 7 — With 3 800 nautical mile flights being accomplished regularly in April of 1949 Headquarters Strategic Air Command raised the standard to 4 020 nautical miles for B—29 and B—50 aircraft see 20 February 1948 Standards were also es— tablished for B—29 air refueling tankers and B—29 and B—50 receivers At the time standards were not set for B—360 be cause of insufficient information concerning their operation Anyway the Gruise Control Program was less applicable to the B—36 see 23 June 1948 because of its tremendous range _ se 2 Aik Somer —— loa — CRUISE CONTROL PROGRAM Gontinued CRUISE CONTROL PROGRAM Continued The peak achievement in the Gruise Control Program eccurred in 1948 when a picked crew flew a standard B—29 with a 10 300—pound bomb load slightly more than 5 000 nautical miles Lree 1 ane 1948 7 Until 1952 when the Air Refueling Program reached maturity considerable emphasis was given to the Cruise Gontrol Program but from then until 1956 it declined in importance as greater emphasis was given to the range extension of Strategic Air Com— mand s new major bombardment aircraft the jet B—47 see 23 October 19517 by means of air refueling — 10 — 11 Juty Eighth Air Force Group Gompetition Gonducted Three combat crews from each of the three Eighth Alr Force Very Heavy bombardment groups 7th 43d and 509h took part in a bomb— ing and navigation contest at Port Worth Army Air Field Texas The winner of the competition was the 509th Bombardment Group Roswell Army Ar Base New Mexico Long—range navigation cruise control and visual bombing were emphasized at the contest Each crew had to plan its oun flight and choose fight altitudes Penalties were asscased for deviation from scheduled bombs—avay time for not follow ing required track Fort Worth Army Alr Field Chicago Melrose Bombing Range El Paso Fort Worth Army Air Field or for not estimating fuel requirements accurately The crews and aircraft were inspected by the commanding general of the — Bighth Air Force formation flights were flown and radas bomb rune were made on the USCR—584 station at Fort Worth For first command—wide Bombing and Navigation Gon— test gee 21 — 26 June 1948 12 July — 4 November Project HARKCEN Special Bombing Test A detachment of the 340th Squadron of the 97th Bombardment Group — Fifteenth Air Force consisting of three Albert—modified B—29s 93 Rave 4 197 left Smoky Hill Army Afr Field Kansas on 12 July for Gicbelstadt Germany via Bermuda and the Azores The detachment arvived at Gicbelstadt where it was based for the duration of the test on 14 duly The three B—29s departed Giebelstadt for their home station on 4 November The purpose of Project HARKEN was to test the effectiveness of two recently «developed bombs the Amazon and Samson which the Army Air Forces hoped would destroy massive and highly resistant steel and reinforced concrete targets Several other British and American bombs were also tested ‘The HARKEN detachment had cartier accomplished preliminazy teain— ing for the project at Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kaneas Muros Air Field California and Wendover Field Utah The tests were conducted at the Farge Submarine Assembly Plant about ten miles north of Bremen Germany The tar— get area was 318 x 1 400 feet and the thickness of the con crete was 23 feet in one area of the roof and 15 in another Prior to the tests in March 1945 an Eighth Air Force alscraft had dropped a 4 500—pound rocket—assisted RA SP bomb on the target area that barely dented the concrete to a depth of a mere two feet The HARKEN detachment used only inert—loaded bombs containing no explosive charges — ‘The first bombs were dropped about 21 July Thirteen British 1650 —pound bombs were dropped to determine whether or not these bombs would break when dropped from high altitodes Three hite were made from 30 000 feet and two from 35 000 feet the bombs being bent and deformed but unbroken Four good hits were made with 25 00O pound Samsons TZBE® on w — both the 15 and 23 feet sections of the roof a total of 15 _ Samsons being dropped from 17 000 feet ‘Fifteen 25 000—pound Amazons T2BE1 longer and slimmer than the Samsons were also $ropped from the same altitude two good hits being made The 23—feot thick section of the roof safely withstood the dropping of these large bombs Photographic coverage of the test was provided by one P—13 aircraft of the 311th Reconnaissance Wing Project HARKEN was one part of a special two—pat European project assigned to the 340th Squadron in March of 1947 by the Army Air Forces _The other was Project P TRAINING bee 1 — 26 June 194777 aa Pe C_ Nh low 16 Juty Kearney Army Air Field Nebraska transferred from the Fifteenth to the Eighth Air Force 16 paty 21th Fighter Group which had been activated on 25 June 1947 Lac v_ reassigned less personnel and eqsipment from Headquarters Strategie Air Command to the Eighth Air Force and its station assignment changed from Andrews Field Maryland to Kearney Army Air Field Nebraska The 27th was the first fighter unit to be assigned to the Eighth Air Force As of 31 August 25 P—S1s were assigned to the 27th Group By the end of 1947 a full complement of 80 were assigned In 1968 the unit converted to F—625 and it had a full complement of 79 P—82s by the end of the year a handful of P—Sis still being on hand at that time The 27th Group retained its P—82s until 1950 when it converted to F—84Es 16 July Steategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Fort George Wright Washington and Seven Mile Gunnery Range formerly an ausiliary of Geiger Field Washington from the Air Training Command and assigned them to the Fifteenth Air Force % They were satellited on Spokame Army Air Field Washington until they were transferzed out of the command late in 1948 see — December 1948 Fort George Weight had earlier been transfered by the Strategie Air Command to the Air Training Command on 14 December 1946 q v _ and the Seven Mile Gunnery Range to the Army Air Forces Technical Training Command AAFTTC on 9 May 1946 q v 7 1 Fighters Unit Air Force 36 P—60s — 56th Fighter Group Selfridge Fifteenth Air Force Army Air Field Michigan 37 P—S1s — 824 Fighter Group Grenier Army Fifteenth Air Force Air Field New Hampshire is All fighter aircraft staged from Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan Fifteenth Air Force bombardment aircraft staged from Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas and then proceeded — in group formation over Omaha Des Moines and Peoria en— route to prescribed assembly stations 1 August MacDill Army Air Field Assumed Jurisdiction of Grenier Army Air Field and Assigned Units Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire and its off—base facilities relieved from assignment to the Fifteenth Air Force and assigned as a sub—base of MacDill Army Air Field Florida Headquarters Strate— gic Air Command At the same time the 82d Fighter Group and the 66th Combat Fighter Wing VLR Provisional both located at Grenier Army Air Field were assigned to the 94th Combat Bomb Wing VR Provisional MacDill Army Air Field without change of station On 5 May 1947 Grenier Army Air Field a satellite of Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan had been reassigned to the dizect jurlediction of Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force For the emergence of Headquarters Strategic Air Command as an agency of direct command in 1947 see1 April 1947 1 August Glovis Army Air Field New Mexico transferred from the Fifteenth to the Eighth Air Force — ‘The base had been placed on inactive status on 28 May 1947 — —_—_ IP ___ iet 1 Augost Fort Dix Army Air Base New Jersey a satellite of Selfridge Army Mr Field Michigan Fifteenth Air Force reassigned to the jurisdiction of the 30 Combat Fighter Wing VLR Provisional Andrews Field Maryland The base was renamed McGuire Air Force Base prior to its transfer to the 31ith Air Division Reconnaissance on 16 August 1948 g v 7 1 — 2 August ®Pacusan Dreamboat Endurance Flight International Glosed—Gourse Distance Record In a spectacular demonstration of what could be done under optimum operating conditions in the early days of the Cruise Gontrol Program see 9 July 1947 7 the B—29 Pacusan Dreambost in slightly more than 39 hours twice cireled a triangular course—— MacDill Army Alr Field Plorida—Tascon—Andrews Ficld—MacDill Army Alr Field The total distance covered was 9 002 statute miles 400 gatlons of gaso— Hine remaining when the plane landed The Pacusan Dreambost was piloted by Lientenant Colonel Olbert F Lassiter of the 434 Bom— bardment Group Davis—Monthan Field Arizona Eighth Air Force The plane had been stripped and specially prepared for the flight by the installation of four new engines and four new Hight—weight propellors It carried a gasoline load of 12 800 gailons——600 gallons less than twice the amount prescribed for the standard B—29 4 000 statute—mile test 15 August — 1 December Wing—Base Plan Established at All Stations In the second major station reorganization of 1947 all active bom bardment and fighter groups were reorganized under the Wing—Base Plan see Army Air Forces Regulation 20—15 27 June 1947 Army Air Forces Regulation 20—15A 10 November 1947 and Air Force Regulations 20—15 13 December 1948 and 20—15A 9 June 1949 The Wing—Base Plan of station organization replaced the Provisional _ Wing Plan at Fifteenth Air Force bases see 9 January — 4 June 19477 5 waa ——— ® f «re wio—mase pan 2d ontinued The reorganization involved the inactivation of practically all existing units other than the combat groups the activation of new ones and the transfer of personnel from the inactivated to the newly activated unite All Provisional Wings were inactivated at Fifteenth Air Force bases bombardment and fighter groups were reorganized Headquarters and Base Service Squadrons of Air Service Groups and attached Air Materiel and Air Installations Squadrons were inactivated Very Heavy bombardment or fighter wing Headquar ters Maintenance and Supply Groups Airdrome Groupe and Station Hospitals or Medical Groups were activated and the bombardment and fighter groups were assigned to the newly activated wings which like the Provisional Wings were administrative in nature and provided for station command by the tactical commander The new wings and their dates of activation were as follows Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Location and Assignment Effective Date 947 2e Davis—Monthan Field Arizons 5 November at« 1 Eighth Air Force tached to 438 Pimartree a Wing on 17 i Novembed # Tm Fort Worth Army Air Field 17 November % Texas Eighth Air Force 3 zem Rapid City Army Air Field 15 August South Dakota Fifteenth Air s Force % asa Davis—Monthan Field Arizona 17 November £ Eighth Air Force 3 sea Spokane Army Afr Field Wash— 17 November ts inigton Rifteenth Air Force B s3a Castle Field California 15 August I Fifteenth Air Force H The 44th 9oth 303d 305th and 306th Very Heavy Bombard— B ment Groups assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Gommant E were all inactive and unmanned see 1 July 1947 They were § therefore not reorganized under The Wing—Base Plan f 1 i —allmumemum #A R E _d 1947 wino—mass PLAN ESTABLISHED Gominued vere Hews Finhsminks Wing Location and Assignment Effective Date 1947 970 Reorganized at temporary 1 December duty station Mile 26 Alaska Home base — Smaky fil hemy ais Field Kansas Fifteenth Air Force For Alaskan training of this unit see 2 December _ 1947 21 March 1948 7 96th Spokane Army Als Field 10 November Washington Fifteenth Air attached to 92d Force Bombardment Ting m if November sist Smighy Hill Arney Ate $Spretbes Field Kansas Fifteenth Air Force o sor MacDill Army Ate Field 15 August Florida Headquarters Strategic Air Command som Roswell Army Air Base 17 November New Mexico Righth Air Force fg CC B® o winG—BASE PLAN ESTABLISHED Gontinued Effective Date Fighter Wing — Location and Assignment com at Andrews Field Maryland 15 August Headquarters Strategic Air Command arm Kearney Army Air Field 15 August Nebraska Eighth Air Foree 320 Roswell Army Air Buse 5 November — New Mexico Bighth Air attached to Force 509h Bombard« ment Wing on 17 November sem Selfridge Army Air Field 15 August Michigan Fifteenth Air Force sea Grenier Army Air Field 15 August New Hampshire MacDill attached to Army Air Field — Head 307th Bombart— quarters Strategic Air ment Wing on Gommand same date Priority was given in the reorganization to operational and Fifteenth Air Force units Except for the 27th Fighter Group which was reorganized on 15 August no Eighth Air Force units % were reorganized until November Original plans called for — all Fifteenth Alr Force units except those located at Smoky Hill and Spokane Army Air Fields to be reorganized on 15 — August Special factors involved at these two bases resulted in the units there being temporarily excepted from the re— organization The reorganization of the 30ist Bombardment Wing at Smoky Hill Army Ale Field had to be held in abeyance until the 97th Bombardment Group was cleared for departure of that station for Alaska tee 2 December 1947 — 21 March 1988 7 Two wings and combat groups were assigned to Spokane Army Air Field 924 and 98th To effect the re— organization at that base all units were placed under the _ command jurisdiction of the wing commander The two o J wito—BasE PLAN ESTABLISHED Continued wings subordinate units other than the combat groups were manned at an operational minimum authorized by Headquarters Strategie Air Command The target date eS August for the reorganization of Fifteenth Air Force bases could not be met in the case of the 24 Very Heavy Bombardment Group a neviy activated unit see 1 July 1947 and the 97th Very Heavy Bom— bardment Group which was preparing for deployment to Alaska Background The Wing—Base Plan which was established Army Air Porces— wie in 1947 had originally been devised by the Strategie Air Command as the Hobson Plan As early as November 1946 this plan was being discussed in the command At that time the Fifteenth Air Force had considered establishing the Plan at its stations but the Provisional Wing Plan had been selected in preference to it see 9 January — 4 June 1947 7 Development of the Plan O2 1 July 1947 Headquarters Army Air Forces announced that the Wing—Base Plan of station organization would be mandatory at all Army Air Forces stations Sixteen Strategic Air Command bases were directed to effect the new organization on an experi— mental basis After a three—months trial each station vas to submit recommendations concerning possible changes in the organizational structure After this initial test the continental bases of all Army Air Forces commands were ordered to proceed with the reorganization plan After the program went into effect because of a variety of interpretations of the regulations no two wings were operat« ing uniformly So late in 1948 a new regulation was issued embodying some of the changes supgested by various Strategic Air Command units see Ate Force Regulations 20—15 13 December 1948 and 20—15A 9 June 1949 Among there was a provision for two—wing stations that appeared in the plan as a wing—reinforced which was in actuality a wing with an additional combat group J 1 © I Coa» — _ — WING—BASE PLAN ESTABLISHED Continued WNG—BASE PLAN ESTABLISHED Continued Advantages of Wing —Base Plan One of the principal reasons for the establishment of the Wing—Base Plan was to increase the mobility Aexibility and combat effectiveness of Army Air Forces units by bring» ing all elements of a base under a single commander The World War It type of organization that had been in existence was completely incompatible with mobility an urgent require— ment of the post—World War II Army Air Forces see 1 March 1948 For one thing there had been too many commanders with equal authority at Army Air Forces installations As a result there were frequent conflicts concerning the jurladiction of personnel and activities For example a combat group com— mander controlled his tactical unite and the first and second echelon maintenance personnel and equipment Third echelon maintenance on the other hand was out of his hands being controlled by the service group commander Furthermore the tactical group or wing did not controi the base or the equipment on it the landlord being the service group commander it was insvitable that many disagreements arose over the use of equipment or the mission that should be emphasized at a pas Hicular time Before mobility could be realized it was imperative that authority be centralised and operational personnel be given the authority prerequisite to their function The Wing—Baze Plan was an attempt to make wing organization conform to the needs of mobility First of all the wing com— mander was designated as the final authority at every base both the group commander and the air base group commander being subordinate to the wing commander The wing commander vas hat freed of most of the housekeeping functions by the air base group commander who supplied all base services allowing the wing commander to give full attention to his primary tactical duties The Wing—Base Plan was designed to eliminate further organi— zational changes and to establish a standard organizational pattern for all Army Air Forces bases It was hoped that it would allow unite to operate efficiently during periods of peace and yet shift smoothly to wartime operations without the necessity for major organizational changes ‘The organization was designed to encompass the functions previously performed at combat _ £ i 19 1 £ wemon — om $ 22 i wino—Base PLAN ESTABLISHED Continued stations by the combat group the air service group and the permanent party component The Wing—Base Plan was a radical departure from the combat—service group combination employed during and immediately subsequent to World War I1 The four main groups——combat group maintenance and supply group airdrome group and medical group——were mutually dependent and were designed to operate under the direction of a single commander The airdrome group was to be the perma— nent party to remain at a station regardless of the move of the combat or the other two service groups The organization provided centralized control through‘a wing headquarters but yet allowed for decentralized operations through the specific delegation of authority to subordinate elements It also established clear—cut command channels and eliminated split juriediction or responsibility The combat administrative and service elements of a base were organized into self—contained functional groups designed to perform the basic functions of the wing Basic functions were grouped homogeneously each group of functions being identified with a particular squadron Individuals were clothed housed paid promoted assigned jobs and ad— ministered by their own commanders The basic functional unit was limited to a maximum of 250 and provided actual command positions for field grade officers Under both the Provisional Wing Plan see 9 January — 4 June 1947 and the Wing—Base Plan see above the — wings were administrative in nature only the tactical unit continuing to be the group In mid—1948 combat wings were organized to replace the existing administra— s Sige wings see 12 July — 1 August 1948 In mid—1949 Lee 30 August 1949 a Specialized Aircraft Maintenance System was established within the Wing—Base organisation Early in 198 air base group commanders were designated as installations commanders to allow the wing commanders to devote moze of their time to the tactical units see 19 January 195K and air divisions were activated to direct the activities at two—wing bases see 10 February 1951 For an experiment to reduce the number of person— nel assigned to a base organized under the Wing«Base _ Plan to 2 000 gee 10 May — 30 November 1948 2 ——— 15 August Fighter Groups Redesignated 95th 96th and 97th Fighter Squadrons Two Engine Very Long Range of the 824 Fighter Group Grenier Army Air Field New Hampshire MacDill Army Air Field — Headquarters Strategic Air Command redesignated Fighter Squadrons Single Engine Very Long Range 5220 5238 and 524th Fighter Squadrons Single Engine Very Long Range of the 27th Fighter Group Eighth Air Force Kearney Army Air Field Nebraska redesignated Fighter Squadrons Two Engine Very Long Range The 824 Fighter Group had been equipped with single—engine P—S1z since‘its activation on 12 April 1947 g v though apparently it had originally been planned to equip the 628 Group with twin—engine aircraft It retained its P—S1s until it was transferred to the Continental Air Command on 22 August 1949 Laiv 4 Redesignation of the 27th Wing as a Two Engine unit was ap— parently a preliminazy to it# conversion from F—Sls to F—B2s in 1948 see 25 June 1947 21 August 6 Support of Atr Transport Gommand Project SNOWMAN Project SNOWMAN was conducted to test the possibilities of landing wm and taking off at the Greenland Ice Cap Although the project was — basically an Aix Transport Command operation the Strategic Air Command contributed to its completion and benefitted from the lessons Jearned It was found that ice cap landings and takeoffs were entirely feasible Colored films were shot of the landings and takeoffs 23 August Seymour —Johnson Field North Carolina a sub—base of Selfridge Army Az Field Michigan Fifteenth Air Force transferred to _ the Corps of Engineers L war — s 7 RA 1st The base had been placed on inactive status on 3 May 1946 It had been satellite on Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan on 10 June 1946 and declared surplus on 16 May 1947 24 August La Junta Army Afr Field Colorado and Pueblo Army Air Base Golorado Fifteenth Air Force bases transferred to the Gorps of Engineers 25 August Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of the 334 Fighter Group Single Engine less personnel and equipment from the Army Air Forces On 16 September 1947 g v _ the unit was reassigned to the Eighth Air Force at Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico where its manning and equipping vas begun 30 August — 1 September Aerial Review at National Air Races Twelve aircraft from the 438 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Eighth Air Force and 18 aircraft from the 509th Very Heavy Bom— bardment Group Eighth Alz Force performed an aerial review at the National Air Races at Cleveland Ohio Also participating in the review were aircraft from the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command the 4th Fighter Group Head— quarters Strategic Air Command and the 56th Fighter Group Fifteenth Air Foreq 1 September Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Spokane Army Air L Field Washington from the Air Materiel Command and assigned it to the Fifteenth Air Force _ Since 5 June 1947 the base had been occupled under a Joint Use __ Agreement with Air Materiel Command On 20 June 1947 a v _ the $24 Very Heavy Bombardment Group had moved there from Smoky Hill Army Air grim —— ___ Ne 16 September 334 Fighter Group Single Engine which had been assigned to _ Headquazters Strategic Air Command on 25 August 1947 q v _ reassigned to the Eighth Air Force less personnel and equipment at Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico This was the second fighter group to be assigned to the Eighth Ale Force see also 16 July 1947 By the end of September 1947 53 P—Sls were assigned to the unit and by the end of the year it had a full complement of 74 aireraft The 344 Group retained its P—Sle until June of 1948 f when it began equipping with F—04%s By the end of August a full complement of P—84s were assigned and the unit retained these aireraft until it was transferred to the Continental Air Command on 1 December 1948 g v 18 September Air Fore Achieved Autonomy W Stuart Symington was sworn in as the first Secretary of the Air Force first Air Fore Day The transfer of all air activities from the Army to the new Department of the Air Force was effective this date but personnel material and bases were not officially transferred until 26 September 1947 g v %s President Truman had signed the National Security Act creat— ing the Department of the Aiz_Force on 26 July 1947 g v _ On 25 September 1947 q v _ he appointed General Carl Spaate as the first Air Force Chief of Staff All Army Air Fields and ades were redesignated Mr Force bases on 13 January 1948 9 v _ 23 September Ist Air Transport Unit Eighth Air Force began operations at Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas following ites move from Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico — —————Mig 197 — ‘The unit had been activated at Roswell Army Air Baze on 10 July 1946 q v On 14 December 1988 q v I it moved to Biggs Air Force Base Texas 24 September Two Bombardment Groups Reassigned 24 Very Heavy Bombardment Group reassigned from Headquarters Strategic Air Command to the Eighth Air Force less personnel and equipment and its station designation changed from Andrews Field Mayland to Davis—Monthan Field Arizona 98th Very Heavy Bombardment Group reassigned from Headquarters — Strategic Air Command to the Fifteenth Air Force less personnel and equipment and its station designation changed from Andrews Field Mayland to Spokane Army Air Field Washington ‘The two units had been activated on 1 July 1947 9 v — The 24 Group occupied Davis—Monthan Field jointly with the 430 Very _ Heavy Bombardment Group until early in 1949 gee ——April 1949 7 ‘The 98th Group occupied Spokane Army Air Field Jointly with 3 the 924 Group until July of 1950 when the 924 deployed to Korea q J see 25 June 1950 — 27 July 1953 ‘The 96th Group deployed to if Kore in August and stayed on indefinitely in the Far East but 3 the 924 returned to Spokane in October of 1950 25 September President Truman appointed General Carl Spaate as the first United a States Air Force Chief of Staff a General Spaate was succeeded by General Hoyt 5 Vandenberg % on 30 Aprit 1948 s v a 26 September Defense Secretary James W Forrestal ordered the transfer of personnel bases and materiel from the Army to the new Depart— ment of the Air Force For the establishment of the Department of the Air Force hs — see 26 July 1947 and 18 September 1947 — as _is_ ies 1 E3 ak 1947 1 October 91st Reconnaissance Group Andrews Field Maryland reassigned less personnel and equipment from Headquarters Strategic Air Command to the 311th Reconnaissance Wing without change of station Manning of the unit did not begin until mid—1948 1 October Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan its sub—base Oscoda Army Air Field Michigan the Army Air Forces Staging Ares Separation Point and Assembly Point located at Selfridge Army Air Field and the S6th Fighther Group reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to Headquar ters Strategic Air Command This was the third fighter group over which Headquarters Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction in 1947 the other 1 two being the th and 82d see 1 April 1947 and 1 August 1947 The 27h and 334 Fighter Groups were assigned to the Eighth Air Force see 16 July 1947 and 16 September 19477 10 October € Eighth Air Force Group Competition similar to the one staged on 10 — 11 July 1947 1g v _ conducted at Roswell Army Air Base 5 New Mexico The competition was won by the 438 Very Heavy Bom— bardment Group Davis—Monthan Field Arizona 3 5 w 23 October E _ Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Midland Bombing B Ranges 13 14 15 and 21 from the Air Training Command and s assigned them to the Eighth Air Force A Ce Ranges 13 and 15 were located at Fort Worth Texas and U 14 and 21 at Roswell New Mexico t 1 November H 301st Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Fifteenth Air Force began 4 operations at Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kansas following its — F move from Clovis Army Air Field New Mexico a wore 1947 Clovis Army Air Field had been transferred from the _ Fifteenth to the Eighth Air Force on 1 August 1947 g w 7 1—4 November Participation in Operation COMBINE Operation COMBINE tested the Navys capability to intercept bom bardment aircraft Beginning on 1 November the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group MacDill Army Air Field Florida Headquarters Strategic Ar Command was charged with keeping under constant surveillance the enemy Naval task force located in the area south of Bermuda On 3 and 4 November the 307th Group the Eighth Air Force Composite Group consisting of aireraft from the 7th 43d and 509th Groups and the 64th Squadron of the 434 Very Heavy Bombard— ment Group simulated the bombing of the naval force The Bighth Air Force Composite Group was stationed at Langley Field Virginia during the maneuver The 64th Squadron whose home station vas Davis—Monthan Field Arizona was temporarily based at the time at MacDill Army Air Field for antisubmarine warfare training see 14 January 19477 The above exercise is not to be confused with Operation COMBINE It see 1 September 10 November 19487 14 — 24 November Eighth Air Force Manewsers at Wendover Task Force Bight consisting of the Ist Task Group lst Air Transport Unit 38th Task Group 36th Engineer Battalion and the 509th Task Group 509th Very Heavy Bombardment Group conducted manewsers at Wendover Field Utah The bombing and gunnery range at Wendover Field was utilized during the maneavers Bombing Maneuvers at Wendover in 1947 During 1947 every active bombardment group except the 307th conducted bombing practice at the Wendover Range ‘The 307th was charged with antisubmazine warfare training for the command ‘ase 14 January 1947 A shortage of aviation gasoline divided the maneuvers at Wendover into two parts The three Eighth 20 C_——BW _ Air Force groups the 7th 438 and 509th trained at Wendover in the spring By September the gasoline shortage had been remedied and Fifteenth Air Force units began using the range In that month the 26th 934 and 97th Groups each sent a squad ron to Wendover Range for training maneuvers Then in Novem— ber see above the 509th Group charged with developing bomb ing tactics for use with the atomic bomb returned to Wendover Range for further practice 30 November Walla Walla Army Ar Field Washington Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Corps of Engineers 2 December 1947 — 21 March 1948 37th Bombardment Group to Alaska for Arctic Training Some 300 personnel of the 97th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Fifteenth Atr Force including the 30 crews assigned to the group departed Smoky Hill Army Air Field Kensas on 2 December 1947 for Arctic training Fifteen B—Zs were flown to Eielson Field located about 26 miles southwest of Fairbanks Alaska This field I was formerly known as Mile 26 The 97th Group completed 14 of the i 18 missions prescribed by Alaskan Air Gommand training directives fying a total of 4107 hours or an average of 274 hours per plane During the period 25 August — 10 September 1947 personnel of £ the 97th Group had received extensive Arctic indoctrination Personnel of the 28th Bombardmient Group which had served # in Alaska in the winter of 1946 — 1947 see 29 October 1946 4 L were assigned to duty in the various staff sections of the 97th % ou Group 3 On 9 February 1948 Mile 26 was renamed telson Ate Force Base Alaska — Mile 26 had been used during World War II as n a fighter plane alternate landing strip Bielson Air Force Bane was large enough to accommodate B—36s see 23 June 9 1948 and was intended expressly for the Stzategie Air Com— mand It was intended to supplement the very heavy bomber 2 bases being built near Presque Isle Maine and at Rapid City s South Dakota The Maine base was later known as Limestone b Air Force Base Maine and the Strategic Air Command assumed h C_ _ Ma 3 B pm __ Je Jurisdiction of it on 18 February 1953 g v 7 Rapid City Army Air Field South Dakota had been under the jurisdiction of the command since 21 March 1946 q v _ For the significance of Arctic activities to the Strategie Air Command see 29 October 1946 19 December Stratepte Air Command Mission Expanded The Strategic Ar Command mission see 10 October 1946 was — expanded to include two new responsibilities Army Alr Forces Regulation 20—20A 19 December 1947 One of these was partici« pation in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies as requested by the other major air command responsible for conduct« ing such activities Secondly the Strategic Air Command was charged with participating in the Reserve Training Program to the maximum possible extent including the training and administration of individual Reserve personnel and units For Strategic Air Command participation in the Reserve Train— ing Program see 15 June f 1946 For participation in domestic emergency relief activities see —— July 1951 and 9 — 20 Apeit 1952 No further change was made in the Strategic Air Command mission until 6 September 1951 q v 7 ——— ale © t 1918 7 January Command—Wide Maximum —Bffort Mission At the direction of Headquarters United States Air Force the Strategie Air Commands ten bombardment groups and five fighter groups on three weeks notice performed a maximum —effort mission in which 107 P—80s 186 P—S1s and 268 B—29s participated from a potential of 117 224 and 307 respectively Practice missions and rendesvous were accomplished where feasible ‘The following units participated Bombardment Groups uait Location Assignment 2 Davis—Monthan Field Arizons Eighth Air Force Tm Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas Eighth Air Force 2e0 Rapid City Army Air Field South Fifteenth Air Force — Dakota asa Davis—Monthan Field Arizona Eighth Air Force sea Spokane Army Air Field Washington Fifteenth Air Force 9% Castle Field California Fifteenth Air Force sem Spokane Army Air Field Washington Fifteenth Air Force sois Smoky Hill Army Air Pield Kansas Fifteenth Air Force sore MacDill Army Air Field Florida Headquarters Strate— gic Air Command soom Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Eighth Air Force Bombardment groups not participating were the 97th Group Fifteenth Air Force which was serving in Alaska see 2 December 1947 — 21 March 1948 and five inactive and unmanned units assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command the 44th 90th 3030 205th and 306th see 1 July 1947 7 sean‘ igre Fighter Groups Unit hae Assignment ath Andrews Field Maryland Headquarters Strategic Air Com— mand 27m Kearney Army Afr Field Nebraska Eighth Air Force 330 Roswell Army Air Base New Mexico Eighth Air Force s6th Selfridge Army Air Field Michigan Headquarters Strategic Air Com— mand sea Grenier Army Air Field New MacDill Army Air Hampshire Ficld—Headquazters Strategic Air Gom— mand m Four bombardment groups ‘the 434 Eighth Ar Force and the 26th 934 and 301st Fifteenth Afr Force were able to make airborne all their assigned aircraftfor the mission Fifteenth Air Force bombardment aizcraft participating totaled 137 out of a potential of 150 13 January All Army Air Fields and Bases Redesignated Air Force Bases 13 January Bases Renamed m Roswell Air Force Base New Mexico renamed Walker Air Force Base Fort Worth Aix Force Base Texas renamed Griffiss Air Force Base I However shortly thereafter on 29 January 1948 the base was again renamed this time as Carswell Air Force Base On the same date Rapid City Air Force Base South Dakota was renamed Weaver Air Force Base On 20 May 1948 however in an ex post facto action the action was annulled 114 19 Jansary — 19 October © Gross— Training Program in I — Strategic Air Command Regulation 50—23 Gross Training Program for Combat Grew Officer Personnel 19 January 1947 officially established the Cross Training Program This program had been formulated in mid 1947 at the direction of Headquarters United States Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force had initiated it on a test basis on 9 October 1947 However as time went on the Strategic Alr Command found that the dis advantages of the program far exceeded the advantages and on 19 October 1998 it was abandoned Objectives The Cross— Training Program was established to stretch the limited personnel resources available at the time as far as possible and to — man the maximum number of combat unite Serious manning ° problems had plagued the command since its activation in 1946 and it was felt that the Cross—Teaining Program would allow the chanilet —— — ing of personnel from othexlspecialties into critical skill speciatiics ___ The air crew member would become a more rounded specialist in several Gelds and thereby combat effectiveness would be less jeopardized by any personnel stashes Under the Gross—Training Program crew members were cross— trained in allied specialties as navigators bombardiers radar operators Might engineers radio operators and Electronic I Counter Measures EGM operators The cross—training of en Histed personnel was accomplished only on a second priority basis to round out individual atr crew potentialities Specific deadline dates in the first half of 1948 for the completion of cross—training in the various crew specialties were specified in Strategic Alr Gom— © mand Regulation 50—23 19 January 1948 Even more rigid dead Hine dates were later established for the last half of 1948 Strategie % Air Command Regulation 50—23 Change 1 20 May 1948 Demise of Cross— Training and Inauguration of Lead Crew Concept 5 Mo special instructors were authorized for the program which was 36 given special priority Individual units developed their oun Grose $ Training Programs general guidance being provided by Headquarters wh Strategie Air Command Shortly after the program got under way it @@ us Hew t 4 3 Bit © became apparent that the Gross—Training Program was perhaps too ambitious a project Faced with tactical commitments of various types and the need to maintain their combat efficiency field units were unable to meet cross—training deadline dates particularly because of the lack of instructor personnel Any acceleration of the program would limit combat crew training to a minimum and perhaps result in the deterioration of basic crew skills On 21 September 1918 the program came to an end for all practical purposes when field units were directed to concentrate on qualifying and maintaining crew proficiency in primary specialties all cross—training deadlines being rescinded All eross—training was henceforth to be considered a secondary mission Only a few weeks later on 19 October 1948 all eross—training was suspended until all Strategic Air Command _ combat crews attained lead crew proficiency see —— June 19497 Henceforth throughout the first decade of its existence the Strategic Air Command concentrated on the development of com— ___ bat erew efficiency by increasing the capability of the individual in a particular skill or skills rather than in all—around capability Emphasis on the capabilities of the individual crew member in his own specialty or specialties became even more mandatory with the introduction of highly complex aircraft such as the B—47 tee 23 October 1951 and B—52 see 29 June 1955 which were manned with a relatively small crew The interchangeability of personnel envisioned by the Cross—Training Program gave way i to the specialization of personnel for the purpose of achieving i lead crew capability i As an attempt to remedy the serious personnel problems facing the command in its early years the cross—training experiment was worth a tey However it detracted from sus— tained effort at improving bombing proficiency and resulted in in decreased efficiency of the individual combat crew It was 5 therefore abandoned in favor of a program that promised to 4 increase combat crew efficiency 1 116 G € isssf 22 Jansary — 12 August Bombardment Squadrons Rotated to Europe In a continuation of the limited program for the rotation of bombard ment units to Europe that had been initiated in 1947 see 3 July 1967 — 28 January 1946 five squadrons served monthly rotational tours of duty in Rurope at Forstenfeldbruck Germany between 22 January I and 12 August 1968 Dates Voie Assignment 22 January — 2 Mazch® — 717th Squadron of the Fifteenth Air Force 20th Bombardment Group Rapid City Air Force Base South Daketa c g 25 February c — 9th Squadron of the Eighth Air Foree T April 7th Bofsbardment — — Group Garewell Air —— — Force Base Texas 13 April — 27 May 3524 squadron of the Fifteenth Air Force 301st Bombardment Group Smoky Hill Ar Force Base Kansas 6 23 May — c 14 June 32 Squadron of the Fifteenth ‘ir Force 301st Bombardment Group Smoky Hill Atr Force Base Kansas 3 June — 12 August 353 Squadron of the 301st Fifteenth Air Force Bombardment Group Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas T Ril deployment dates in this study are based insofar as possible on the date the first increment of the main body of tactical aireraft 1eft the home station of the unit and the date the last atreraft re— turned to its home station tg 198 The squadrons nurmeny neproyecwmin me—29 aircraft They were each supported by two G—54 aircraft of the Ist Air Transport Unit Eighth Air Force and one F—13 aircraft of the 311th Reconnaissance Wing On the enroute and return fights both the northern and southern routes were utilized Units staging through MacDill Air Force Base Florida flew to or from Europe via Lagens Field Arores Those staging through Westover Air Force Base Massachusetts flew via either Goose Air Base Labrador or Keflavik Air Base Iceland As in 1947 the Strategic Ai Command squadrons were under the operational control of United States Air Force in Europe USAFE and they accomplished the same type of training including familiaz iration flights and aerial reviews over Western Europe and radar bombing and navigational training flights Because of the diplomatic situation at the time and because of negotiations pending between European countries and the United States for the use of air bases f units were directed not to fly over Belgium Holland England or Ireland except in emergencies Flights to Dhahran Saudi Arabia initiated in 1947 were mide until 17 May 1948 when fights B ___ that base were discontinudd because of diplomatic difficulties in _ _ obtaining clearances——a problem that had also been encountered by units training in Europe in 1947 However permission was I obtained to make flights to Khormaksar Field Aden Protectorate in April or 1918 THE roration proGRAM IN 1918 cud Europe limed t The squadron rotation program came to an end in July 1948 when 5 the initiation of the Berlin Blockade by the Russians ree 27 June — 17 July 1948 7 created sufficient impetus for the long—sought es— tablishment of a 90—day group rotation program to Europe At that time plans for the rotation of a equadron of the 924 Group were cancelled and the squadron serving in Europe the 3534 PM Squadron of the 301st Group was joined by the other two squad— ° rons of the group which had also been rotated to Europe earlier in 1948 see 18 February — 20 April 1948 The entire 30ist Group had been deployed to Europe in April as part of a 90—day group rotation program to Europe that had failed to materialize after the deployment of the 301st Group The first attempt to set up a group rotation program to Europe for 30—day periods me 198 had been in mid—1947 see 3 July 1947 — 28 January 19487 Though a few groups hid been rotated to Europe for short periods of time by the end of the year only squadrons were rotated Because of the rotation of groups to Europe at the time of the Berlin Blockade a squadron rotation program to Goose Bay Labrador had to be temporazily discontinued zee 1 June 4 September 1948 7 1 The Far Bast The alleviation of the shortage of 100 130 octane gasoline in the Far East made possible the resumption of the squadron rotation program to the Far East that had been initiated in 1947 see May—October 1947 Three squadrons were rotated to the Far East in 1948 see February — April 1948 Also in 1918 the first full group was rotated to the Par East see 10 May 27 August 1946 and before the year ended a sccond group deployed there see 20 August — 20 December 19487 Small flights of aircraft were also rotated to Shemya Air Force Base in the Alestians see 14 June — 1 November 1948 — sult — 22 to _ sae One Sitmors dent Bombardment Squadrons Rotated to Par Bast In February of 1948 the alleviation of the shortage of 100 130 octane gasoline in the Far Bast allowed resumption of the program for the _ monthly rotation of squadrons to the Par East that had been initiated in 1947 bee May — October 1947 However in 1948 squadrons were rotated to Yokota Alr Base Japan for only three months because of a new group rotation program that went into effect ‘The following squadrons served tours of duty in the Far Bast Month Gai Assignment % February 3934 Composite Squadron Eighth Air Force B05th Group March 3260 Squadron Fifteenth Air Porce 928 Group April 325th Squadron Fifteenth Air Porce 928 Group 12 4 ns d Re ime As in the case o1 ime squagrons rotates to Europe see 22 January 12 August 1948 7 the squadrons assigned to the Far East were each supported by two G—54 aircraft of the Ist Air Transport Unit Righth Air Force and one P—13 air— raft of the 311th Reconnaissance Wing The route utilized was Castle Pleld — Hawaii — Kwajalein — Guam Yokota The squadrons were under the operational control of the Far East Air Force FEAF In May a group rotation program was inaugurated to the Far East The first group to be deployed there was the 934 see 10 May 27 August 1948 7 which was followed by the 96th Group L tee 20 August — 20 December 1946 For a general review of the Sizategic Alr Command rotation program in 1948 see 22 January — 12 August 1948 1 18 February — 20 April @ Plans for Group Rotation to Europe Re—Initiated J __ Jn a second attempt to establiak a prograra ar the rotation of full _ _L __ bombardment groups to Europe Headquarters United States Air Force 7 on 18 February 1948 unveiled a new plan for rotating groups to Europe © for 90—day periods beginning 1 April 1948 and continuing indefinitely £ In 1947 plans for a 30—day rotation program to Europe had not mate— G sialized though two full groups had served short tours of duty there Y L see 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1946 As past of the new 90—day program the Strategic At Command scheduled the 301st Group A Fifteenth Air Force to leave the United States on 5 April the 96th Group Fifteenth Afr Force in July and the 307th Group Headquar— A ters Strategic Air Command in October However because United o States Air Force in Europe USAFE did not have the personnel and U facilities to accommodate a full B—29 group the 30lst Group which 4 initiated the program in the middle of April was able to stay in Germany only a week ‘The program was then abruptly terminated j at Headquarters United States Air Force direction when two squad— f rons of the 301st Group the 324 and 3530 returned to the United States on 20 April One squadron the 3524 remained in Germany as part of the squadron rotation program see 22 January — 12 August 1948 f i It was not until July of 1948 shortly after the beginning of the Berlin Airlift that the program for the rotation of groups to Europe for d 90—day periods was successfully established see 27 June — 17 July 1948 7 t tzo 1948 20 February First Boeing B—50 Superfortress Delivered to the Strategic Air Command A crew of the 434 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Eighth Air Force landed at Davis—Monthan Air Force Base Arizona with the first B—50 to be assigned to the group The crew had procured the B—50 at the Bocing Seattle Plant after having been checked out in B—50s at Eglin Air Force Base Florida Earlier in the same month three Boeing civilian representatives had arrived at Davis—Monthan Air Force Base to conduct training classes in B—50 maintenance and attempts had been made to order special tools and equipment A Mobile Training Unit MTU for B—508 started a training program on 1 March 1948 THE B—505 A LIMITED CONVERSION PROGRAM — B—255 REMAIN MEDIUM MaNSTAY THROUoH 195% In 1948 two new major airéraft were introduced into the command hs One of these was the med him—range R50 Superfortzass a greatly improved version of the World War 11 B—29 Superfort The other was the revolutionazy new heavy bomber the B—36 which was to give the Strategic Air Command its first long—range striking capa— bility gee 23 June 1948 Though the conversion to B—50 air— craft got under way in 1948 the obsolete World War II B—29s continued to be the mainstay of the medium bombardment force through 1952 The capabilities of the B—29s were enhanced by an ontop modification project to allow 180 B—29s to carry atomic weapons that was completed in September 1951 Shortly after the conversion to B—50s was begun the Strategic Air Command learned of the production of the new B—47 medium—range jet bomber the first of which was assigned late in 1951 see 23 October 19517 As the B—47s went into production B—50 production was curtailed As a result with the introduction ® of B—47s imminent only five Strategic Air Command wings com— ha pleted the conversion to B—50s _ Large numbers of B—29s had to be removed from Air Materiel Command storage and assigned to the Strategic Air Command to meet command needs during the tremendous expansion program that ensued after the out break of the Korean conflict in 1951—1952 Because of the slow delivery rate of B—47s B—29s also had to be temporarily assigned to some wings 121 10 ass B—2mAm0 B50 RIRCRAFT Continued Five Wings Converted to B—508 The 434 Medium Bombardment Wing Eighth Air Force was the first unit to complete its conversion to B—50s in December of 1948 for redesignation of Very Heavy bombardment groups as Medium or Heavy bombardment wings see 12 July — 1 August 1948 The 24 Medium Bombardment Wing another Eighth Air Force unit received its first aircraft in December of 1948 and completed its equipping in March of 1949 Receiving its first aircraft in June of 1949 the 934 Medium Bombardment Wing Fifteenth Air Force completed its conversion in January 1950 The 97th Medium Bombardment Wing Eighth Air Force received its first B—50s in February of 1950 completing its conversion in May of 1950 The 509th Medium Bombardment Wing began its conversion in June of 1950 and completed it in November of 1951 Delayed deliveries in the ruralist‘ these aircraft were designated as B—50 MRs nd safety modifications hampered the __ B—50 conversion programl_which was also stowed un because of ___ overseas rotations Nevertheless from 1950 through 1952 the B—50 units continued to constitute the bulwark of the Strategic Air Command‘s medium bombardment Emergency War Plan EWP strength After the first B 47 Wings began achieving combat—ready status it was decided to advance the conversion to B—47s of the 24 and 434 both B—50 Wings because of the limited availability of bases and qualified support personnel Furthermore it was felt that the more experienced B—50 Wings could convert and become combat—ready more quickly than B—29 Wings The 930 Wing converted to B—47s in 1954 and in 1955 the two 1smaining B—50 Winge the 97th and 509th converted to B—47s % The total number of B—50 aircraft assigned to the command being only two in June of 1948 rose to 35 by the end of the year ‘The number assigned then rose to a peak of 239 at the end of 1952 and then fell off to 172 including 31 RB—50s by the close of the _ following year The number dropped further to 86 including tight RB—50s in December of 1954 and then to 12 including seven RB—508 in June 1955 By the end of 1955 no B—508 were assigned the nine RB—50# on hand being assigned to the 97th Medium Bombardment Group which had as a secondary responsi— bility a Electronic Reconnaissance Mission 122 2 2 mst B—29 AND B—50 AIRCRAFT tGuntinued B—29 Force Built Up Following the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in 1951 and 1952 the command undertook an extensive expansion program To meet its needs lage numbers of B—29s had to be obtained from Air Materie Command storage under Project PUSHOFF How— ever the B—29s were not received rapidly enough to keep up with the increase of five units that occurred in 1951 and at the end of the year two of the new units the 3034 and 308th were unequipped The shortage of aircraft was a serious problem during this period in trying to increase combat capability A B—29 Operational Training Unit OTU program trained three of the new wings two being trained by the 90th at Forbes Air Force Baze Kansas the 308th and 376th and one by the 44th at Lake Charles Air Force Base Louisiana the 68th Crews came largely from the Aiz Training Command Combat Crew Training School CCTS at Randolph Air Force Base Texas ___ The B—29 program revieh its peak in 1952 eleven B29 satieeds M wings being assigned and the conversion of B29 units to B—47 aireraft began in 1953 At the end of 1952 the total number of B—295 assigned to the command was 372 This number fell to 111 by the end of 1953 and then to 39 in June of 1954 All of these aircraft had been transferred out of the command by the end of 1954 Some of the B—29s were converted for use in the air refueling program see 19 July 1948 7 From December of 1950 through June of 1952 the total number of B—29s assigned had ranged between 250 and 350 At the end of 1946 the Strategic Air Command had pos— sessed only 145 B—29 aircraft but by the same time the following year the figure had climbed to 319 It then rose to an all—time peak of 486 in December of 1948 and then gradually dropped to 325 in December of 1950 The number of RB—29 reconnaissance aircraft increased from 14 in June of 1948 to 52 in June of 1949 in and then dropped gradually to 13 in June of 1952 From December of 1952 through December of 1953 seven RB—298 were assigned but all of them had been transferred out by June of 1954 123 1908 B—29 AND B—50 AIRCRAFT Gontinues Medium Bombardment Wing Equipment Status f B—29 and B—50 Aircraft 1948—1954 Number of f Equipped I Wings Unc a f equipped in B—29 Equipped B—50 Equipped as or Parenthesis — Wings Wings 20 Rebruary 1918 11‘ ut o 31 December 1948 12 u 1 30 31 December 1969 — 12 s 3 2a asa 930 31 December 1950 12 s 4 20 «30 934 97m 31 December 1951 16@ ° — ut s ea 430 934 97 —— —— soot w— —I 31 December 1952 160 ut 5 same as above 31 December 1953 8 s 3 930 97h 090 31 December 1954 2 o 2 orm sooty Minimum of 15 aircraft assigned Beginning in 1952 B—47 Wings came into the medium force For B—47 equipped wings see 23 October 1951 m 1 In addition to the 11 active groups at this time five inactive and unmanned groups were assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Com— mand the 44th 90th 3030 305th and 306th See 1 July 1947 2 20 Tol 20th 43d 92d 930 97th 96th 30lst 307th and 509th 3 26 ate 26th 92d 934 97th 98th 3olst 306th 307th and 509th The 7th Very Heavy Bombardment Group was redesignated as a Heavy Bombardment Wing on 1 August 1948 9 v Strategie Air Command assumed jurisdiction of the red wise on 18 May 1948 Le v l 124 me B—23 AND B—50 AIRCRAFT Gontinued 4 22d 260 92d 97th 98th 3olst 306th 307th and 509th The 28th Heavy Bombardment Wing was beginning its conversion to B—36 aircraft having seven assigned in November It had been redesignated a Heavy unit on 16 May 1949 9 v but since the bulk of its assigned aircraft 14 were B—298 it is considered as a B—29 equipped wing here i 5 9th 22d 924 98th Far East Air Force 30ist 306th 307th Far Rast Air Force and 509th The 9th had been activated as a Strategic Reconnaissance Wing on 1 May 1949 ‘g v 7 redesignated as a Heavy Bombardment Wing on 1 April 1950 7 q_y—_ and re—_ _ designated as a Medium Bombardment Wing on 2 October 1950 q v — Except for one B—36 aircraft assigned throughout 1950 the unit was equipped with B29 6 6th 9th 220 44th 90th 98th Par East Air Force 1086 solst 305th 307th Far East Ar Force and 376th The 528 Medium Bombardment Wing was redesignated as a Heavy unit on 16 Tune ___ q v and by the end of 1951 had 19 B—368 and only 2 B—20s _ _ __ assigned The 306th Medium Bombardment Wing began its con— version to B—47s in October 1951 see 23 October 1951 and only had B—29s assigned for a few months at the beginning of the year The 4dth 90th and 305th Medium Bombardment Wings were activated on 2 January 1951 and were all fully equipped with B—29s by the end of the year The 106th Light Bombardment Wing was assigned to the Strategic Air Command from the Continental Air Command GonAG on 1 April 1951 q v _ and redesignated a Medium unit on 1 May 1951 q v _ — At the ond of 1951 there were two unequipped wings The 3038 Medium Bombardment Wing activated on 4 September 1951 q v _7 had only five B—296 as signed at the end of the year The 308th Medium Bombardment Wing was activated on 10 October 1951 q v _ but had no air craft assigned at the close of 1951 w 7 The unequipped unit was a newly activated one the 40th which began to receive B—298 in 1953 The 22d Wing as of 31 December 1952 had only a few B—29s on hand and was awaiting its conversion to B—t7s It is therefore not considered here as either an equipped or unequipped B—29 unit The same is true with the 340th Wing also a newly activated unit It had no aireraft assigned and was not equipped until 1954 when it received YRB—47 reconnaissance aircraft though its mission remained bombardment 12s Em B—29 AND B—50 AIRCRAFT Continued 8 9th d4th 68th 98th Par Bast Air Force 3olst 3038 307th Far East Air Porce 308th 310th 320th and 376th 9 sin dork 9th 307th and stoth 10 The 97th Medium Bombardment Group in April 1954 assumed the Electronic Reconnaissance Miasion® of the 55th Strategic Recoonaissance Wing and RB 50# and technically trained crews were transferred to it Two—thirds of its aircraft how» ever were B—50s until 1955 when this portion of its strength was converted to B—tTe It retained its RB—50 aircraft in 1955 In 1955 the 509th converted from B—50s to B—4s 1 March Mobility and Supply Plan Strategic Air Command Manual 67—50—1 Published for n—29 Unite Bepiming of the Sizategic Air Command Mobility Program The Mobility and Supply Plan outlined requirements for the initial air move by tactical and supporting aircraft and established supply procedures for the operation of B—29 units for a minimum of 30 days from a prepared base anywhere in the world It superseded the Mobility Plan that had originally been prepared and utilized by the Eighth Alr Force On 15 December 1948 a Mobility and Supply Plan for P—80 equipped fighter units was published This plan however which had been in use for some time prio to its publication was tormed over to the Continental Air Command which had assumed jurlediction of all Strategic Ale Command P—60 units on 1 December 1948 q v 7 Tis pevetopueENt or worup—wine mosiutzy 1946—1956 Loctstics anp suppiy mm rns aromic aos o The achievement of true world—wide mobility by the Strategie Air Command was its greatest accomplishment during the first decade of its existence As a matter of fact it might be said that as the decade progressed Mobility came to describe the Strategic Air Command better than any other single word Actually the achievement of mobility was not really a singular accomplishment but represented the focal point of a series of accomplishments that were in themselves highly significant — re ms THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1956—1956 Continued These included the origination and development of a comprehensive Mobility Plan with little or no precedent the establishment of a world—wide logistics and supply system in coordination with Head— quarters United States Air Force the Air Materiel Command AMC the administering of a global network of bases and the establish ment of an effective air refueling program see 19 July 1948 From 1946 to 1956 mobility planning and programming were at all times activities of the highest priority being closely allied to all war planning When it had been activated in 1946 the Strategic Air Command had not only possessed an extremely limited combat capability but it had also been virtually immobile Little or no mobility planning that would conform to post—World War 11 requirements had been accomplished by anyone in the Army Air Forces A gigantic task lay ahead But by 1956 the deploy— ment of its wings to all parts of the world was a routine accomplish ment of the Strategic Air Command By that time a full B—47 wing could fly from California to England in 12 hours and land equipped ___ to begin offensive combat air operations In some cases wings _ __ could by means of air refueling deploy directly from their home stations to their assigned Emergency War Plan targets Throughout the first decade of the Strategic Air Commant‘s existence there were three essential ingredients of the Mobility Plan Flyavay Kits Unit Essential Equipment and Base—Type Equipment Flyaway Kits which were the first to evolve and which gave units some self—sufficlency consisted of aircraft spares necessary for immediate combat operations that were carried by Air Echelons when they moved forward Unit Essential Equipment consisted of essential organizational equipment that was air transportable and which like Flyaway Kits deployed units alvays carried with them Base—Type Equipment included heavy non—air—transportable equipment necessary for base support In 1949 an important program Project AFGEN was established for the positioning and pre—positioning of war reserve materiels at forward bases and in Zone of the Interior depots It constituted the Air Force plan for the support of the Emergency War Plan EWP AF—GREN consisted of Projects SEAWEED BIG TOP and NIGHT LIFE SEAWEED covered the pre—positioning of Baze—Type Equipment and supplies at forward operating bases and depots Both BIG TOP and NGHT LIFE concemad the positioning of other war reserve 127 ms rie monmary PROGRAM 26056 Continued mmatericis in the Zone of the Interior and its preparation for overseas shipment In 1952 an aerial resupply program was established for the replenishment of Flyavay Kit spares of deployed wings Mobility planning reached maturity in 1951 with the publication of the Mobility Planners Guide Prior to that time there had been numerous Mobility Plans and Supply Plans in effect and these had not only been subject to considerable amendment but their very diversity had made them somewhat inconvenient to use All existing supply and mobility concepts and practices were consolidated in the Mobility Planners Guide which also served as an aid to unite in the development of their own mobility plans ‘The Guide as amended from time to time remained the one basic mobility planning document for all Strategic Air Command units from 1951 through 1955 One method used to test and improve the Mobility Plan was the program for the rotation of Strategic Air Command units to overseas areas Rotations gave units an excellent opportunity to deploy under simulated combat conditions and to keep their mobility plans up—to—date The rotation program got under way originally on a emall seale in 1947 see 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 tn 1948 after the initiation of the Berlin Blockade by the Russians a 90—day group rotation program was established see 27 June — 17 July 1948 and 22 January — 12 August 19487 There was a progressive development of the rotation program from 1948 through 1952 especially in 1951 and 1952 when the overseas base network was greatly expanded From 1953 through 1955 the rotation program reached a climax as units rotated regularly to overseas bases accompanied by their air refueling squadrons % Mobility A Vital Requirement Charged as it was with global strategic bombardment commitments the Strategic Air Command immediately after its activation took steps to develop a Mobility Plan and put it into effect It was a vital requirement because the Strategic Air Command was required to deploy its bombardment unite anywhere in the world on short notice and to maintain them for at least the initial period of combat during which they had to be self—sufficient and be able to cary on — E3 12s 1948 THE mostity PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued 4HE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued sustained operations until support units could be moved into place Until some time after 1948 when the Strategic Air Com« mand began to develop some long—range capability with B—36 aircraft see 23 June 1948 it vas particularly imperative that medium—range unite be prepared to operate from forward bases where they would be in a better position to attack the homeland of any aggressor This was especially true because the bolk of the Strategic Air Command forces were of the meédiom—range type In other words it might be said that the Mobility Plan came about only because of the lack of a long—range intercontinental bombing force The Mobility Plan was intended to overcome the deterring factors of distance and time that separated the Strategic Mr Command from its potential targets It would allow the Air Echelons of combat units to deploy to forward bases and be prepared to begin combat operations within a matter of hours after the beginning of any hostilities Had not the Strategic Air Command possessed the capability to deploy and support its combat units throughout the world many of its other achievements could not have been effectively ex pleited or would have been of only limited value The air re fueling program for example which greatly facilitated the movement of units to forward areas was a tremendous contribu— tion to the Mobility Program see 19 July 1948 At the same time however it further increased the need for a program to procure maintain and supply forward bases If this had been impossible the efficacy of the air refueling program would have been practically negated The tactical advantages of the B—47 medium—range bomber with its great speed could never have been utilized if it were limited to operation from the United States Even the long—range B—36s and B—52s needed some overseas base a and logistics support especially during prolonged operations Strategie Air Command was never able during the first decade o its existence to execute completely its master Mobility Plan the nearest opportunity to do so being at the outbreak of the Korean conflict when four bombardment wings were deployed to the Far East see 25 June 1950 — 27 July 19537 This was the first eal test of the Strategic Air Command Mobility Plan Generally speaking the deployment was carried out with great 129 — 1948 THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued success but the immediateness of the movement produced un— expected problems especially concerning the unpreparedness of forward bases Some of the lessons learned during the Korean deployment were incorporated in the Mobility Planners Guide published in June of 1951 1 Because of the inadequacy‘of overseas base facilities especially until about 1952 peacetime rotations required modifications in the execution of the Mobility Plan Nevertheless by 1956 Strategic Air Command units were highly mobile Numerous supply problems remained and some refinements in the Mobility Plan were still being made Yet continuous progress would need to be made in improving the world—wide logistics system and in mobility planning to adjust to ever changing operational concepts In the light of its important mission the Strategic Air Command could never be too mobile A Priori and Allied Requirements AO OOC i The achievement of world—wide mobility was especially outstand ing because so many a priori and allied accomplishments in so many varied fields were basic prerequisites The whole problem of establishing and maintaining a MobiJity Plan was intricate em« bracing scores of interrelated factors As a matter of fact all command capabilities were directed toward the goal of mobility an all—embracing subject It included all activities and factors necessary to make and keep the aircraft personnel and equip« ment of Strategic Air Command wings ready at all times not only to deploy to forward bases but also to be prepared to begin combat operations promptly and effectively Aircraft maintenance standards had to be kept at the highest level and personnel innoculated and their records kept up—to—date A network of Zone of the Interior and overseas bases had to be ® procured and readied for operations This proved to be one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the Mobility Program It was a continuing and critical problem one about which General LeMay was greatly concerned and toward which he devoted much of his personal effort Serious problems were also encountered in setting up POL Petroleum—Oi1—Lubricants facilities in overseas areas Strategic Support Squadrons had to be activated and equipped to provide the Strategic Air Command a limited air 130 10 2 — ams THE Mosicany exuunamy 19900950 Continued transport capability to supplement that of the Military Air Trans— port Service MATS which provided the Strategie Air Command with the majority of its airlift support see 14 January 19497 Another command that made a major contribution to Strategic Air Command mobility was the Air Materiel Command which provided all the supplies and logistical assistance needed by the Strategie Ar Command for its world—wide operations Overseas major als commands atso made a significant contribution Tactical units had to be reorganized to render them more mobile see 15 August 1 December 1947 and 12 July — 1 August 1948 7 Mobility had not been a prime consideration in planning the struc— ture of tactical units that had prevailed throughout World War It and in the early post—war years The result was a relatively immobile organization that was incompatible with the needs of the Strategic Air Command and the United States Air Force Another problem was that the World War II organization had never been standardized which meant that more often than not groups and wings were organized differently thereby making U __ planning difficult Mobility required a centralized authority _ under one commander and the separation of operations activities from basic housekeeping functions As a result the Wing—Base Plan of unit organization was adopted Air Force—wide The Mobility Plan had to be constantly developed and modified i to meet new conditions such as conversion to different types ‘ of aircraft see 1 May 1946 20 February 1948 23 June 1948 23 October 1951 and 29 June 1955 7 and changes in Emergency War Plan deployments All these factors altered logistics planning and plans had to be amended constantly Therefore all logistics planning was closely tied in with war planning In many respects the development of the Mobility Plan was as im— portant as the development of the Emergency War Plan In a way the Emergency War Plan would be almost meaningless without the Mobility Plan There was a mutual inter—action between the two the series of war plans forming the basi for the procurement and positioning of materiel reserves Peacetime programs and wartime plans were also naturally closely interdependent Because of this logistics planning for the support of the wartime forces was not confined to war plans alone but was concerned with the peacetime program as well The peace time forces had to be adequately equipped to perform their j in ias THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued — wartime tasks and the logistics system had to be ready at ait times for wartime expansion It was inconceivable that Strite— gic Air Command Emergency War Plan units could operate under peacetime authorizations of personnel and equip nt and expect to fulfill their obligations Therefore the Strat c Air Command went on a readiness footing which provided for wartime alloca— tions of aircraft increased supplies and an augmented personnel quota At first only Emergency War Plan units were allowed to © be so manned and equipped but later on the plan was expanded to include other units The Problem of Forward Bases The inadequacy of the forward base network was a serious impedi— ment to the Mobility Program especially from 1946 through 1950 when Strategic Air Command‘s operations were limited to a hands fol of overseas bases The procurement and retention of forward bases was enmeshed in a labryinth of diplomatic complexities f __ Even after bases were acghized their rellability was frequently __ uncertain because of political unrest in the area such as was the 6 case with North African bases see 14 January 195 or for other reasons After 1948 the Strategic Air Command began to develop E a long—range capability with its B—36 aircraft see 23 June 1948 7 which promised to be even further enhanced by the introduction of the jet B52 in 1995 ‘gee 29 June 1955 Such long—range air craft could operate almost exclusively from the Zone of the Interior requiring only a minitoum of overseas staging support However during the first decade of its existence the majority of the Strategic Air Commands forces were of the medium—range type represented first by B—298 and later by B—50s and B—47s Medium—range aircraft could only strike effectively from forward bases since most of the Strategic Az Command‘s possible targets % lay beyond the radius of medium—range bombers and fighters operating from their Zone of the Interior basec The lack of a long—range intercontinental bombing force created a very serious problem making the Strategic Air Command hopelessly dependent on its overseas bases The absence or loss of overseas bases would cut its striking power almost exactly as much as if the majority of its forces were destroyed on the ground Near the end of the Strategic Air Commands first decade its dependence on overseas bases was rendered ¢‘ 132 — ms THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 196 2956 Continued acutely perilous in two different ways Politically the bases became less and less reliable because of a general weakening I of the Western Alliance and because of political unrest throughout t the world Strategic Air Command was always affected by the caprices of international diplomacy But the political and diplomatic problems associated with overseas bases were not the only ones As time went on the overseas bases became more and more strategically vulnerable a fact that resulted in a complete reorientation of Strategic Air Command operational concepts It was an appalling fact that the Soviet Union could either use its new ballistic missile to intimidate American allies who con trolled Strategic Air Command overseas bases——or worst of all to wipe out the overseas base network if it chose The presence of these new and startling factors put into motion in 1954 and 1955 new operational concepts that promised to alter radically the basic postulates of Strategic Air Command operation in the second decade of its existence On the horizon appeared to be a withdrawal of the __ Strategic Air Command fokces into the Zone of the Interior the __ gradual phase—out of a medium—range force an accelerated de— velopment of its long—range bomber force and a wide dispersal of these forces throughout the United States Nevertheless in line with its operational capabilities during most of its first decade the Strategic Air Command relied heavily on its overseas bases A network of overseas bases had to be acquired and developed before the tremendous task of supplying these bases and making them ready to support combat operations could be initiated Zone of the Interior bazes also had to be developed to support the Mobility Plan Though deployment in the event of war would be mainly from the Zone of the Interior the forward bases were the key to effective deployment The state of readiness of these bases was a factor absolutely essential to the workability # of the Mobility Program Forward bases had to have useable facilities essential equipment and be manned with a base comple— ment to insure useability of facilities and equipment when required In 1951 Air Divisions were activated in the United Kingdom and North Africa to administer the overseas base complexes in these areas and to provide base housekeeping services for Strategic Air Command units rotated to these areas see 14 January 1951 and 20 March 1951 A third Air Division in the Far East was activated in 1954 see 18 June 1954 7 133 iE THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1916—1956 Continued The Strategic Air Command required four types of bases ac— cording to the Mobility Planners Guide June 1951 Enroute Operating Staging and Emergency Enroute bases were needed along deployment routes for refueling and crew rest and in some cases possibly for final pre—strike maintenance and crew briefing Operating bases were those outside of the United States that were to be used for deployment in a war emergency From these bases continued strikes could be launched against an enemy Staging Bases would be used for post—strike crew interrogation and rest refueling and emer— geney maintenance to permit one—time return flight to the Opera— ting Base or home station Emergency Bases were those along the strike route at which aircraft unable to complete planned flights could stop for emergency refueling and service Despite the criteria that were established for the four types of bases however in the event of war the goal would be to convert En route Staging and Emergency Bases into Operating Bases _ During the first decade of ite existence Strategic Air Command efforts at procuring bases were in two major areas North Africa and the United Kingdom However it appeared that during its second decade bases in Spain would also be available for use by the Strategic Air Command The possibilities of base acquisition in the Par East were extremely limited because of Communist control of the mainland As a result Strategic Air Command had to use World War II or post World War If acquired bases the two most important such base areas being in Okinawa and Japan The Third Air Division was activated in the Far Bast on 18 June 1954 ‘q v _ to support Strategic Air Command rotation in that aren When it had been activated in 1946 the Strategic Air Command found itself with few accessible forward bases from which it m could operate and even the use of these was hampered by diploma % tie considerations see for example 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 and 22 January — 12 August 1948 Because of the relaxed world situation immediately following World War 11 military appropriations were niggardly and the Air Force was forced to operate on an austerity basis Also foreign powers did not welcome the use of their bases by the United States It vas not until mid—1948 at the time of the Berlin Blockade that the political climate of the Free World became favorable 131 1918 THE MosiLtTy PROGRAM 1916—1956 Gontinued to the development of the overseas base network see 27 June — 17 duly 19487 Prior to that time the Strategic Air Command could only use a few bases in the Occupied Zone of Germany the United Kingdom Alaska and the Far East These bases moreover were in no way equipped to support the Mobility Plan Of course in these early years Strategic Air Command combat capability was very limited and most of its energies were devoted to building up its forces and training them to an acceptable degree of combat proficiency Nevertheless if a war emergency had broken out at this time the Strategic Air Command weakness in combat capability would have been even further accentuated by the lack of forward bases At the time of the Berlin Blockade the Strategic Air Command arranged for the use of a few British bases However these and all active or potential bases in Europe required extensive renovation and in 1949 and 1950 were in a dubious state of readi— —— — ness bad an emergency—occurred Continuous efforts were made — by the Strategie Air Command in 1949 to arzive at further agree— ments with the British to use additional bases in the event war broke out By mid—1949 agreement had been reached to use eight bases It was not until 1950 that Congress approved an overseas base building program in support of the Air Force expansion program and in 1951 an accelerated construction and renovation program got under way in North Africa and the United Kingdom The Fifth and Seventh Air Divisions were activated in those areas respectively to support units on rotation and to administer the base construction programs see 14 January 1951 and 20 Maxch 1951 In 1951 funds w were allotted for the extension of runvays the construction of ad— i ditional troop housing and the improvement of maintenance facilities at United Kingdom bases Progress in the construction of bases in North Africa was slow because of political unrest diplomatic difficulties and construction problems encountered there see 14 January 19517 By the end of 1952 many bases still had major deficiencies and rights for peacetime utilization had not been obtained for all the required bases In 1952 and 1953 the Strategic Air Gommand determined the priority for each Emergency War Plan base to 13s 198 Tie mostuiry Piuuicrnr #3900 Continced be used as a guide in funding the development of these bases The major factors considered in developing priorities included intercontinental attack capability of existing and programmed airraft planned wartime operations vulnerability of bases to enemy attack and the political reliability of countries in which the bases were located In 1953 and 1954 priorities of bases were revised in line with new operational concepts Zone of the Interior and overseas bases in the northeast were given top priority for relocation of Headquarters Eighth Air Force in the northeastern United States see 1 April — 30 June 1955 7 Development of a successful jot tanker the KG—135 see 19 July 1948 7 gave impetus to those revised concepts and pointed up the need for additional northern bases for tanker operations Unfortunately eleven of twelve Canacian Greenland bases that had been given high priority in Strategic Air Command‘s Fiscal Year 1957 Military Construction Program MGP had to bd deferzed until Fiscal Year 1958 These __ eleven bases were progtamined for anioimum facilities to support _ air refueling operations Sondestrom the twelfth base was scheduled for facilities for one tanker squadron in the Fiscal Year 1957 Military Construction Program and a second squadron in Fiscal Year 1958 Kindley Air Force Base Bermuda vas programmed for facilities as the permanent station for one tanker squadron and for additional wartime tanker operations ° Late in 1953 an agreement was signed by the United States and Spain granting the United States the rights to build and operate a series of bases in Spain see 26 September 19537 These new bases promised to further enhance Strategic Air Command mobility Planning for use of the bases was initiated by the Strategic Air Command in 1954 but construction of the bases — and POL Petroleum—Oil—Lubricants facilities was not begun until 1955 by the United States Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks because of diplomatic and technical difficulties associated with the land acquisition As a result the bases were not expected to be ready for Strategic Air Command use until Fiscal Year 1958 instead of Fiscal Year 1957 as originally planned Mobility in the Atomic Age The first mobility planners in the Strategic Air Command were faced with unprecedented problems The atomic bomb had 136 499 « 2 — ime Tite MoHlItITY PROGRAM 1986—1956 Continued completely changed all major concepts of varfare In particular the need for mobility was enhanced Prepared— ness concepts upon which the nation had relied prior to World Wars I and It were rendered obsolete The prospect of an atomic war so devastating that a power delivering the first blow stood to win the war forced military planners to turn to a philosophy of maximum greparedness and rapid mobility The new philosophy was a considerable departure from that which had prevailed prior to World Ware I and 11 when United States military forces had been on a peacetime or nucleus footing and when the philosophy had been that the United States would have to withstand the shock of initial losses while building up its Intent war strength to the point necessary to win the war The separation of the Air Force from the Army see 18 September 1947 7 was in some ways a recognition of the differing concept I uporr which the tactical deployment of ground and ais forces were based When in early 1986 the Strategic Air Command had beer _ given its— singular strategic bombardment mission Laee p 3 L _ mo formal mobility plan existed in the Strategie Ar Command or any other command upon which to organize aerial forces for future wars It became the primazy task of its planners to devise means to deliver telling atomic blows against any enemy as rapidly as possible To do to a highly mobile striking force would be needed Because almost all previous military planning had beenbased upon slow land and water transport early Strategic Air Command planners could call on few precedents The only precedent was the aerial mobility that had been conducted on a small scale in the Pacific Theater during World War 11 where long distances had created a serious time and logistics problem The experi— ences of the 56th Bombardment Wing in the Pacific Theater dur— pHi Te Ann fonction tismirnadranmige — Air Command planners The 56th Wing which had participated in the Pacific B20 offensive had found it necessary to operate against Japan from bases in China which were unprepared to handle the units and had developed some embryonic mobility concept 137 aes 1918 F THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1986—1956 Continued Mobility Planning 1946—1950 E The development of a Mobility Plan was begun in 1916 follow» T ing a survey of the equipment and aircraft upon which the com— mand would have to rely in the immediate future Problems in k mobility encountered in Operations CROSSROADS see 1 July I 1946 had particularly emphasized the need for a horough study t of the problem Major General Roger M Ramey who had com— manded Task Force 1 5 in the CROSSROADS operation and who t had assumed command of the Eighth Air Force on 10 January 1947 q v was given the task of mobility planning Late in 1946 he was directed to develop mobility to the maximum extent in the Eighth Air Force An Eighth Air Force Mobility Plan was drawn up and after testing by Eighth Air Force units was presented to General Kenney early in the spring of 1947 The plan was approved by the Air Staff but only for the Eighth Air Force at first because of supply stringencies prevailing at the time Development of a Mobility Plan was carried on throughout 1947 Until the Mobility Planners Guide was published in 1951 several Mobil ity — Plans and Supply Plans were in effect The Strate— gic Air Gommand Supply Plan had been formulated in 1946 and published on 2 January 1947 see also Strategic Air Command Technical Pamphlet 67—1 December 1947 Strategic Air GCom— mand Supply Plan‘ It was based on the premise that Strategic Air Command units would be capable within 72 hours of notifica— tion of flying 10 000 miles and remaining at the advanced stations for 30 days during which 100 hours of flying time per aircraft would be accomplished Prior to the publication of the Mobility Planners Guide in 1951 two major mobility plans for medium bombardment units were my in effect the first of which was published for B—29 units on 1 March 1948 ‘ see beginning of this entry Supporting guides to this plan included Strategic Air Command Manual 67—50—2 16 August 1948 which established criteria for the self—support of units at forward bases It considered the requirements of the bases to be utilized once aireraft had departed the Zone of the Interior describing the preparations necessary at advanced operating bases prior to the arrival of tactical wings that were 13s — S66 THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued scheduled for immediate operations _ A second supplementary manual to the 1 March 1948 Mobility Plan was the Unit Equip— ment Readiness Plan for Bombardment Wings Medium Steategic Air Command Manual 67—50—6 published on 1 March 1949 This manual which was a revision of the Eighth Air Force Brown Book was designed to assist bombardment commanders in preparing to execute a complete wing mobility move to an over — seas base It was applicable only to those units designated to operate under the Strategic Air Command Readiness Reserve Plan The second major Mobility Plan for medium bombard ment unite was published in September 1949 Strategic Air Gom— mand Manual 67—50—1 This plan as amended® was in effect until June of 1951 when the Mobility Planners Guide was issued All essential precepts and other major elements of the Strategic Air Command Mobility Program were established as early as 1947 and 1948 and were promulgated in the various mobility documents in effect prior to 1951 when the Mobility Planners __ Guide was published These included the concept of phased deploy» __ ment and the three main phases of the logistics and supply system Flyaway Kits Unit Essential Equipment and Basé—Type Equipment As the first mobility plan developed in 1946 four main factors absolutely essential to its successful operation be— came clear First all Strategic Air Command aircraft and personnel had to be kept in a constant state of readiness so they could move overseas and begin combat operations without delay Second all combat aircraft had to be provided with a reserve of spare parts and engine changes sufficient to sustain them in combat until normal lines of supply could be opened Third forward operating bases to which an orderly movement of combat elements could be made had to be secured and supplied Finally the minimum of personnel equipment and other supplies had to be determined which must be in place at forward operating % bases to support the combat units during the initial phases of a war All these concepts were incorporated in the Mobility Planners Guide Change No 1 28 December 1949 Change No 2 25 Janary 1950 and Change No 3 24 March 1950 139 e mosniry PROGRAM 1986—1956 Continued The Mobility Planners Guide The first deaft of the Mobility Planners Golde was drawn up in August 1950 and it was finally published in June 1981 as Strategie Air Command Manual 400—1 Prior to that time a large variety of publications covering various aspects of mobility planning had governed the Mobility Program All previous directives were consolidated in the Mobility Planners Guide® which was with three exceptions primarily a consolidation of previous directives and concepts in a more expanded form Other than providing for a modification of phased deployment through the use of staging teams it promulgated no new mobility concepts but two existing concepts were revised and the Plan was based on these two re— vised concepts First greater emphasis was placed on the pre—positioning of supplies at forward bases a project that had been established as Project SEAWEED see below 7 The Guide specified that all logistical support other than the initial 30—day supply of aireraft spares included in Flyaway Kits should be provided by the forward bases Secondly the planned amount of time re— quired for the complete deployment of a wing was increased from 30 to 90 days Us shortly after the Korean War the Strategic Air Command Mobility Plan had been based on a 30—day deployment concept for austere operations In roughly 30 days supply lines were expected to have been opened and a large past of the Base—Type Equipment deployed unite would be in place at forward operating bases Lessons learned during the Korean conflict influenced the change to a 90—day concept It was decided that deployment of a wing at full wa strength with complete organizational equipment as required for sustained operations would require from 60—90 days even under the most favorable conditions To solve the problem of supplying units after 30 days when their Flyavay Kite would be exhausted Headquarters United States Air Fore agreed that spares would The Mobility Planners Guide superseded Strategic Air Gom— mand Manual 67—50—1 SAG Mobility Plan Bombardment Wing Medium September 1949 as amended Proposed Requirements tor an Operating Base Bombardment Mediam 1 February 1950 Staging Base Requirements Mediom Bombardment B—29 c and B—50 Proposed 17 May 1950 and Mobility Plan Ecort Fighter Squadron Jet Augmented Proposed 10 May 1950 10 10 J — B 4 1948 Tite MomtTY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued be stockpiled and provision — made to resupply units by air no later than 28 days after D—Day This resupply would continue until regular supply Hines were in operation somewhere in the neighborhood of D 90 The Mobility Planners Guide as amended® remmined the basic mobility planning directive from 1951 through mid—1956 It included mobility planning factors for heavy bombardment and recommaissance units as well as for medium bombardment and fighter unite The various sections of the Guide pertaining to specific types of units were printed in different colors each unit receiving only the applicable section and the general section printed on white paper This system allowed for convenient and efficient amendment of the Guide The Guide was intended as an instructional guide only for unite in their planning and in the preparation of their oun mobility plans The Guide was hot intended as an authorizing document a fact misunderstood by many units When it was new there existed widespread differences of opinion among units as to the effective application of the numerous planning sections ‘The Seventh Air Division therefore requested in 1952 that a test be un based on the Guide to determine whether or not one of its forvard operating bases could support a tactical combat wing over a 30—day c period of operations ‘The Seventh Air Division felt that its supply shortages would prevent effective support of the Emergency War Plan A simulated war—time test of the Mobility Planners Guide was therefore conducted by the 97th Wing when it rotated to England in 1952 see 2 March 1952 — 15 June 1952 7 Some difficulties were encountered but generally it was found that the Mobility Planners Guide was basically sound Change No 1 18 July 1981 Change No 2 25 April 1952 Change No 3 5 August 1952 Change No 4 21 October 1952 Change No 5 5 December 1952 Change No 6 23 January 1953 Change No 7 10 Pebruary 1953 Change No 8 28 February 1953 Change No 9 30 April 1953 and Change No 10 30 June 1953 i J J Hes THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued Goncept of Phased Deployment The Mobility Planners Guide presented a typical plan of phased deployment to serve as a guide for detailed wing mobility plans An understanding of deployment concepts is essential to an understanding of how the Strategic Air Command Mobility Plan operated and the part played in it by Flyaway Kits Unit Essential Equipment and Base—Type Equipment From 1947 through 1950 phased deployment was envisioned in the event of a war emergency but the Mobility Planners Guide presented a plan for the utiliza ton of staging teams to supplement or in some cases to replace the phased deployment of medium bombardment and reconnais— sance wings The deployment of heavy bombardment or reconnata sance units was to be accomplished with staging teams only The advantage of phased deployment was that it would permit the initiation of combat operations from a forward base by the first elements to arzive and the continuation of operations as succeeding elements arrived until the full war—time strength of the wing ar rived to carry on sustained operations for an indefinite period Under the concept of phased deployment it was recognized that a wing must be capable of performing certain functions at its forward base by a given time if it was to meet its operational commitments on schedule It was likewise recognized that all wing functions need not be resumed on a full scale simultaneously and immediately but rather that an orderly phased resumption of wing functions was more desirable Thus the personnel and materiel required to perform a specific function moved in accord— ance with the priority given the resumption of the particular function Those personnel who could be effectively utilized at the forward base prior to the arrival of complete organizational equipment were included in the Afr Echelon the remainder of the personnel being deferred to the last phase the Surface Echelon % The phased deployment concept as developed earlier and as enunciated in the Mobility Planners Guide called for wing deploy ment to forward bases to be accomplished in four phases The First Phase Air Echelon which would move in tactical aircraft and the first increment of transport aircraft during the period E 1 through ® £ 3 would consist of minimam personnel most Unit Essential Equipment see below 7 and 7 12 L E THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued prierity items of Flyaway Kits ‘see below including spare engines required to carry out combat operations for ten hours of combat or 30 days _ It would consist of 1 503 personnel in— cluding the first increment of support personnel from the Maintenance and Supply and Air Base Groups and 418 930 pounds of cargo Included would be the command and opers— tions sections combat crews Might—line maintenance person— nel and any other specialists needed to launch the first strike 2 The Second and Third Phases Air Echelon would move forward over succeeding days as rapidly as support aircraft of the First Phase could effect turnarounds In these phases were included the personnel supplies and equipment necessary for functions that could be postponed for a few days The Second Phase which would normally move in the period E A 5 to E 7 would consist of the first turnabout of support transport aircraft 534 personnel and 170 147 pounds of cargo The Third Phase moving during the period E £ 9 to E 11 would consist of the second turnabout of support aircraft 479 personnel and 146 430 pounds of cargo It was desirable that all three phases of the Air Echelon be in place at a forward base by E 14 If the air— ift was inadequate the arrival of the third phase might be de— layed another 10 to 14 days without halting combat operations but some retardation and reduction in operations would likely occur In any event the most austere deployment that was acceptable was that the Second and Third Phases be in place by E £ 28 in order to begin the essential functions of receiving replenishment items for the Flyaway Kits and to begin the en— gine build—up operations on the replenishment engines received Likewise the augmentation for personnel administration security and field maintenance activities had to be provided at the earliest date that airlift support could bring in the Third Phase m 3 The Fourth Phase Surface Echelon would include all remaining wing personnel and equipment not in the Air Echelon first three phases that made up the full war strength of the wing It would move only when directed after all elements of Air Echelon had departed by either air or surface trans— portation War reserve materiel positioned in the United States Golumn A‘of Mobility Planners Guide under Projects BIG TOP and NIGHT LIFE see below would be shipped 13 — w THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued by the Air Materiel Command to be in place by E 99 to supplement Base—Type Equipment Column B of Mobility Planners Guide see below already pre—positioned at for— ward bases under Project SEAWEED Some 512 Air Base Group personnel would move to forward bases in the Surface Echelon to support Column A requirements and 482 Air Base Group personnel to support Column B requirements Upon ar— rival of the Surface Echelon sustained operation at the scheduled rate should be possible if forward base preparation and the re— supply operations were adequate Under phased deployment the Wing Commander who deployed with the First Phase would assume command of the forward operating base and merge such base complement personnel as were present with the Air Echelon of his wing resulting in a unit that would be organized and operated in such a manner as did his complete wing at the home station The Air Base Group of course would be incompletely manned until the Surface Echelon arrived Pre— and Post—Strike Staging Teams Modification of Phased Deployment The Mobility Planners Guide June 1951 required wings to organize two specialized task force teams Enroute Maintenance Teams and Gontrol and Maintenance Task Forces Enroute Maintenance Teams which were to be organized by all medium bombardment and reconnaissance wings were designed to pro— vide specialized maintenance support to combat aircraft enroute from their home station to a forward operating base or staging between the home station or forward operating base and the tar got The specialized support provided by Enroute Maintenance Teams was to augment the maintenance service that was normally available to transient aircraft Control and Maintenance Task m Forces were special task forces designed to provide specialized i support of post—strike staging including control post—strike interrogation medical service and emergency maintenance on staging aircraft assisted by forward base complement person nel All medium and heavy bombardment and reconnaissance wings were required to establish Control and Maintenance Task Forces ma 49 1948 THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued — In Change No 3 to the Mobility Planners Guide dated 5 August 1952 the concept of staging teams was greatly expanded and clarified Enroute Maintenance Teams were redesignated Gon— trol and Enroute Maintenance Teams CKEMTs and their function changed from enroute support to pre—strike support of deploying wings Also a third type of staging team Advance Echelons ADVONs were established to provide support for furn—around staging No change was made in the role of Control and Maintenance Task Forces CLMTFs ‘The functions of En— route Maintenance Teams had been solely enroute support so as to minimize straggling during deployment The newly designated Control and Enroute Maintenance Teams were on the other hand to provide specialized support of pre—stzike staging That is they serviced units that required staging after departing from the base from which they operated _ This refinement in concept occurred because it was found that an equally flexible and effective enroute support during deployment at less cost in supporting airlift could be provided through pro— perly balanced leading of the First Phase of the Air Echelon In other words it was discovered that special teams as such were not required for enroute support Bach increment of deploying 2 combat aireraft could carry the personnel and items of Unit Es— U sential Equipment and Flyaway Kits required for enroute support flyaway engines preferably being complete power packs In any instance where combat aircraft capacity was inadequate to move all the personnel and materiel items needed for enroute support sufficient supporting transports might be required to make the same enroute stops as the combat aircraft However only after providing the built—in enroute support capability described above could a wing commander use other resources at his disposal for enroute support Such other resources included assigned admini— strative aircraft station supply stocks and personnel not assigned n to the Air Echelon — These could be used to support enroute stops in the Zone of the Interior but no additional airlift other than that provided to the wing to deploy the Air Echelon was to be provided for enroute support The third type staging team that wings were directed to organize in mid—1952 were Advance Echelons ADYONs These were to 145 — J f me Tite MOBIEITY PROGRAM Tys—rse t@ontinued — provide specialized support of turn—around staging in which aircraft were post—strike and pre—strike serviced as a combined operation Advance Echelons would service aircraft that usually make several strike sorties and therefore pre and post—strike several times before returning to the base from which they operate Heavy bombardment and fighter units would normally require this type of staging The plans and arrangements for deploying staging teams formed only a part of the wing mobility plan of medium bombardment or reconnaissance and fighter wings these units relying basically on phased deployment On the other hand plans for the dispatch of staging teams comprised the entire wing mobility plan for heavy bombardment and reconnaissance wings All wings however were required to set up the teams make assignments of personnel and materiel prepare loading plans and make all other necessary arrangements to insure that the teams were ready to be dispatched on short notice All wings were to set up staging teams because all types of combat aircraft might require staging during strike sorties and normally the forward bases that would be used for staging provided only transient service Certainly they would be incapable of supporting staging operations Strategic Air Command wings therefore had to be capable of providing control and i specialized support to augment the services normally furnished to transient aircraft and that which aircrews provided for themselves The deployment of teams or component elements were to be directed in operations orders The teams could be employed as entities or component elements of them could be dispatched to augment teams from other wings Only one control element was to be dispatched with each type team The number and type of other elements in a team were to be based upon the peak load of aircraft to be staged at any one time Staging teams might move to forward bases in % combat aircraft or support aircraft or in both the means of transportation depending on the situation and being specified in operations orders The personnel of the teams which were austerely manned and equipped could be drawn from the full personnel resources of a wing including Tables of Organization T O and Tables of Distribution P D personnel but normally only T O personnel 146 05 J 1 wis THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1966—1956 Continued — were assigned to the teams Materiel for the teams normally was drawn from the Unit Eesential Equipment and Flyaway Kits including engines Those medium bombardment and reconnais sance or fighter teams deployed from the home station concur rently with but to a different forward base than the est of the Air Echelon could draw their initial requirement of supplies from station stocks This exception was made because it would be impracticable to divide Flyaway Kits at the last minute Staging teams were austerely manned and equipped because the priority on support airlift had to be reserved fo the movement of medium bombardment and reconnaissance or fighter wings to for— ward bases from which they must operate Another reason vas that the bases from which wings operate home stations for heavy bombardment and reconnaissance and forward bases for mediom bombardment and reconnaissance or fighters must retain the ‘ capability to perform major inspections and maintenance and other essential wing functions Teame were also austerely manned ale ___ egipped because the interval between strike sortien would provide __ opportunity for staging team personnel to rest between the maxi— mum effort spurts required of them during stagings From 1952 on more and more emphasis was placed in Emergency War Plans on the use of staging teams which introduced a new Aexibility into the plane and allowed a much greater latitude in the deployment of mediam bombardment and reconnaissance units By the use of staging teams these units were made more mobile In 1953 Control and Enroute Maintenance Teams Gontrol and Main— tenance Tak Forces and Advance Echelons were redesignated i respectively Pre—Strike Post—Stzike and Turn—Around Staging Teame By 1955 with the increasing vulnerability of the overseas base network it appeared that the use of staging teams dispatched from the home station in the Zone of the Interior to forvard bases would ultimately supersede to a large extent the Emergency War Im Plan operation of mediam—range units from specific operating bases under the phased deployment concept However the ex» tent of operation from the Zone of the Interior was considered to be fexible and the capability to operate from overseas bases was maintained where appropriate The capability to stage or operate included Project SEAWEED see below station sets 17 P — Bit THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Continued Storage capacity increased considerably in French Morocco during 1954 but fulfillment of the Strategic Air Command mis— sion was dependent on resupply schedules The planned con— struction of a sealine at Casablanca by the French was not be— gun Support of the Strategic Air Command mission at Wheelus Tripoli was contingent upon an almost impossible resupply schedule However stocks were adequate in Saudi Arabia and the construction of facilities in Turkey were almost complete to furnish a 60—day supply In the Northeast Air Command NEAG area considerable storage was available but resupply depended upon a five—month shipping season Storage at Thule Air Base Greenland was adequate to support aviation gasoline require— ments but for only 60 days of jet fuel requirements Harmon Air Force Base Newfoundland had storage for approximately 60 days of aviation gasoline and 30 days of jet fuel Storage in Alaska was adequate for a 45—day supply but support in the Pacific area as a whole was marginal and contingent on resupply schedules In the Atlantic area support of the Strategic Air Command mission by Military Air Transport Service MATS bases was problematical being contingent upon tight resupply schedules In 1955 completion of additional hydrants pipelines and tankage in overseas areas and the Zone of the Interior fur ther increased Strategic Air Command s capability to fullite mission The greatest benefit accrued from the completion of hydrant systems at overseas bases such as Goose Air Base Labrador Nouasseur Air Base North Africa Strangulate a code name Dhahran Saudi Arabia and Wheelus Tripoli Com— pletion of these facilities allowed a faster turn—around of aircraft Imminent completion in 1956 of hydrant systems at Harmon Air Force Base Newfoundland Lages Azores Keflavik Iceland and United Kingdom bases was expected to further enhance opera— tional capabilities w In 1955 aviation fuel storage in the Zone of the Interior increased by 1 013 455 barrels reaching a total of 4 032 015 barrels United States bases also gained 50 hydrants for a new total of 537 At major overseas bases of interest to the Strategic Air Command bull storage increased by 1 740 193 barrels Two cross—country pipelines were placed in operation overseas contributing to re— supply support a 30—mile line connecting the ocean port at Yamaztalik to Strangulate a code name and 2 700—mile line from Haines on the southeast Alaskan coast to Elelson Air Force Base in the interior s 164 _ — f aoe THE MOBILITY PROGRAM 1946—1956 Gontinued Several Zone of the Interior bases during 1955 were connected with commercial cross—country pipelines which resulted in a large savings in fuel transportation For example by this method $330 000 was saved in one year on JP—4 delivery at Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas Other savings accrued because of the decreased manhours and equipment required to receive fuel and less in—transit losses through evaporation At the end of 1955 pipeline connections for Lockbourne Air Force Base Ohio and Barkedale Air Force Base Louisiana were under construc— tion and negotiations were underway for similar facilities at Abilene March Davis—Monthan Mountain Home Lincoln Forbes Lake Charles and Biggs Air Force Bases By the end of 1955 the French Morecean pipeline complex connect ing eperational bases with the port and depot was still not opera— tional However it was expected to become operational early in 1956 Another problem was the manning of oversens bases with native refueling personnellunder contract Keflavik Ar Base ___ esland was considered nlost critical in this respect because of __ the Communist element there Other bases affected were Lages Azores Kindley Be—muda and Dhahran Saudi Arabia Action was being taken by the Military Air Transport Service and the United States Air Force to man a portion of the storage facilities and all hydrants with United States military personnel 1 Mazch Headquarters 58th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing reassigned from the Eighth Air Force to Headquarters Strategic Air Command less personnel and equipment and ite station assignment changed from Caravell Air Force Base Texas to Andrews Air Force Base Maryland The 58th Wing one of the two active winge assigned to the _ % Strategic Air Command at the time of its activation see pp 4 3 was inactive at the time of its transfer from the Righth Air Force _ to Headquazters Strategic Air Command On 16 April 1968 q v Headquarters 56th Wing was redesignated Headquarters 58th Air Division Bombardment and it was inactivated on 16 October 1948 g v 7 16s 1948 I March Midland Bombing Ranges 14 and 21 Roswell New Mexico transferred from the command jurisdiction of Walker Air Force Base New Mexico to that of Carswell Air Force Base Texas Walker and Carswell were both Eighth Air Force bases Midland Ranges 13 14 15 and 21 had been acquired by the Strategic Alr Command on 23 October 1947 Lo w 17 March 9th Yery Heaty Bombardment Wing temporazily attached to the 30lst Bombardment Wing Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas Both wings were assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force The 97th Group returned to Smoky Hill Afr Force Base from Alaskan training on 21 Mazch 1968 see 2 December 1947 — 21 March 1948 7 On 16 Miy 1948 q v 7 the 97th Wing was re Heved from ite attachment to the 30let Wing and moved to Biggs __ Air Force Base Texas being reassigned from the Fifteenth Air Force to the Eighth Air Force 22 March Long Range Gruise Gontrol Flight Two B—29s of the 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command departed Barbers Point Oahu Hawail for MacDill Air Force Base Florida on a eruine control flight but due to high winds nelther aircraft was able to complete the planned flight to MacDill Air Force Base One landed at Eglin Air Force Base Florida fying aitotal of 4 121 nautical air miles consuming 6 485 — gallons of fuel and averaging — 635 miles per gation The other air— w craft was forced to land at Tyndall Afr Force Base Florida This aircraft flew a total of 3 888 miles consumed 6 305 gallons of fuel and averaged 609 miles per gallon For the Cruise Control Program see 9 July 1947 16 h 1948 L April — 30 June 7 82d Fighter Group to Alaska for Arctic Training 824 Fighter Group Grenier Air Force Base New Hampshire Head— quarters Strategic Air Command consisting of 49 P—31H aircraft deployed to Ladd Air Force Base Alaska for Arctic training i The 96th Squadron started the movement on 1 April and two days later was followed by the 95th and 97th Squadrons The fastest time made by any squadron was 11 days because of bad weather that was encountered enroute The 96th Squadron ar rived at Ladd Air Force Base on 12 April bad weather delaying the squadron for 10 days enroute One plane crashed along the way The 95th Squadron did not arrive at Ladd Air Force Base until 14 April two aircraft crashing enroute The 97th Squadron was even further delayed mot arriving until 17 April losing one aircraft enroute Departure dates from Ladd Air Force Base were staggered over the period 27—30 June for the 49 aixcraft Two had to stop enroute for engine changes but 47 completed __ the retuen tzip without difficulty ___ —— __ For significance of Arctic activities during this period see 29 October 1946 12 April — is May First Participation in Air Defense Exercises Strategic Air Command unite participated in cooperation with the Air Defengé Coinniand ADC 4% a fast of the radar defenses of the north western United States Small numbers of planes from the 509th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Walker Alr Force Base New Mexico Eighth Air Force participated on 12 April 15 April and 15 May in bast simulated attacks on the Boeing Aircraft Plant at Seattle Washington and the Hanford Works of the Atomic Energy Commission AEC — Similar missions were flown on 29 April and 3 May by the 96th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Spokane Air Force Base Washington Fifteenth Air Force Barly warning radar proved to be quite ineffective during the tests which indicated that the afr defenses of even this vital area were inadequate Ground—Controlled Interception GC 167 L 00 ane was effective unti the control frequency was jammed by the attacking bombers The Air Defense Command recommended using alternate control frequencies in similar future situations pastictpxtion m Am berense Exercises i918 — 1956 Duzing the period 1948—1956 Strategic Air Command units pasti— elpated on a more or less routine basis in exercises with the Air Defense Gommand ADG The Continental Air Command GonAC and the Continental Air Defense Command GonAD for specific exercises in which the Strategic Air Command participated see Index under Air Defense Exercises for evolution of air defense commands see 1 December 1948 1 January 1951 and 1 September 1954 7 ‘The exercises which were intended as a test of basic defense procedures had a twofold purpose Strategic Air Com— mand aircraft penetrated defended areas to test radar defence nets and interception capability and to accustom Strategie Alz Command crews to fighter interception In these exercises Strategic Air Command fighter aircraft often assisted the de— fense forces while Strategic Air Command bombers assumed ___ — the role ofaftackers To facilitate communicationa in such exa— — excises a direct line was established between Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force and Western Air Defense Force Communica— tons with the Eastern and Central Air Defense Forces were passed through the Strategic Air Command Operations Control System S0GS to Headquarters Air Defense Comment 15 Apeit First explosion of atomic bemb on X—Day in Operation SANDSTONE atomic energy test at Eniwetok Atoll On X—Day 1 May the second bomb was exploded and on Z—Day 15 May the third bomb was exploded ho ‘The SANDS TONE explosions were the sixth seventh and eighth atomic exploions by the United States For earlier explosions and for Strategic Air Command participation in other nuclear —energy exercises see 1 July 1946 1s 2C ms PAmtictpation n opERATION saxibstons Second Major Atomic Energy Test AAs the Air Force agency most likely to make use of the atomic bomb and the one charged with the use of strategic weapons the Strate— gic Air Command was charged with the administration of air activities at the SANDSTONE site as it had also done in Opera— tions CROSSROADS see‘l July 1946 7 _ General Roger M Ramey commanding general of the Bighth Alr Force see 10 January 19477 commanded Task Group 7 4 Rovistonal Strategic Air Command the Ale Force element of Joint Task Force Seven More than 80 percent of the personnel assigned to Task Group 7 4 came from the Strategic Air Commnd principally from the Bighth Air Force other major United States Air Force commands providing speciali— zed personnel The Strategic Air Command s 3lith Reconnaissance Wing was responsible for all photography for other activities of this unit see 22 April 1966 7 Strategie Air Command planning for participation in SANDSTONE was begun even before General Ramey was notified in October ——— — 1947 thathe was to be appointed commander of TexicGroup 747 I Als Task Group 7 4 was activated on 9 January 1948 at Fort Worth Army Air Field Texas by the Eighth Ate Poree Air and set movement of personnel and supplies from the United States began the first week of February 1948 and continued until the test began By the end of February 67 officers and 815 enlisted men were on duty in the test area Pron a scientific point of view the important Air Force operations during the actual tests were the light of the drones through the atomic cloud photography of the cloud and the tracking of the cloud for several days following the explosion All other air activities were of a support nature Task Group 7 4 was inactivated on 7 June 1948 16 Aprit wo Headquarters 311th Recomnaiesance Wing Andrews Field Maryland ieadquarters Strategic Air Command redesignated Headquarters Stith Air Division Reconnaissance retaining control of the 55th and Sist Steategic Recomaissance Groupe For reconnaissance activities see 22 April 1986 169 1948 16 Apeit Headquarters 56th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Andrews Field Maryland Headquarters Strategic Air Command redesignated Headovarters 56th Air Division Bombardment Headquarters 58th Air Division was on inactive status with no unite assigned see 1 March 1948 7 It was inactivated on 16 October 1948 g v 1 22 April Air Force Separation Point at Fort George Wright Spokane Washington inactivated Separation activities in the locality were transferred to Spokane Atr Force Base Washington 26 — 30 Aprit — Fighter Gunnery Meet Conducted at Avon Park Range MacDill Air Force Base Florida All five Strategic Air Command fighter groups participated in the meet two of them the 4th and the 56th flying P 80 jets and the other three the 27th 334 and 824 fying propellor—driven P—Sle The 56th Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command won the P—80 competition over the 4th Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command in all four jet events——serial gunnery ground gunnery dive bombing and alip bombing The 82d Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command dominated the P—51 competition taking three first places The 27th Group Eighth Air Force entry won in dive bombing and the 334 Group Eighth Alr Force entry in skip bombing Five aircraft from each % group participated in the meet 30 April General Hoyt 5 Vandenberg succeeded General Carl Spats as Air Force Chief of Staff — 170 — 1948 General Spaate had been appointed as the first Chief of Staff on 25 September 1947 q v _ General Vandenberg was reappointed on 28 April 1952 for the term euting 30 June 1953 However he retired on 1 May 1953 v being replaced by General Nathan Twining 1 May © Peterson Field Colorado Springs Golorado Fifteenth Air Force transferred to the Gorps of Engineers 10 May — 27 August First Group Rotated to the Far East First 90—Day Group Deployment 934 Very Heavy Bombardment Group Castle Air Force Base Cali fornia Fifteenth Air Porce accompanied by ore P—13 of the 3lith Air Division Reconnaissance rotated on 90—day temporazy duty to Kadena Air Force Base Okinata initiating the group rotation pro— ——gram to the Faz East Under tlis program _one rotating Strategic Ais— — Command group was to be constantly on hand in the Far East under the operational control of the Far East Air Force FEAF to supplement the one bombardment group permanently assigned to the Par Bast Air Force FEAF The 934 Group replaced the 224 Group which was assigned to the Strategic Air Command Fifteenth Air Force from the Far East Air Force on 18 May 1948 qr v 7 and which arrived at Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas on 2 June 1948 The second and last full group to serve in the Par East in 1948 was the 96th Group see 20 August — 20 December 1948 10 May — 30 November Tm Personnel Readjustment Plan 2000 Experiment Conducted at Castle Kir Force Base At Headquarters Strategic Air Command direction the 934 Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Castle Air Force Base California Fifteenth Air Foree conducted an economy experiment to determine whether or not a Wing Base with one combat group could fonction im CC iss efficiently and economically with a reduced strength of 2 000 in— cluding officers atemen and civilian personnel As of 31 January 1948 there were 2 534 military personnel and 264 civilians assigned to the base The reorganization began in February and by 1 May the number of personnel was seduced to 2 000 Final reorganization was effected on 10 May and continued through November 1948 However the 934 Bombardment Group vas serving at Okinawa during the period 10 May — 25 August 1947 q v _ and so ° no valid test could be made until September By November personnel strength was well above the 2 000 ceiling The experiment was terminated on 1 December 1948 because of the negative results it had on the effectiveness of the unit It had saved $71 877 in payroll conte but the reductions in efficiency and ability to carry out the unit‘e mission greatly outweighed the savings achieved in terms of dollars and cents _ On 1 December the 934 Wing was re— instated to the standard Wing—Base organization see 15 August — 1 December 1947 J 16 May _ — L — 91th Bombardment Wing Reassigned and Relocated 97th Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Smoky Hill Air Force Base _ Kansas which had Just returned from Alaskan training in March zee 1 December 1947 — 21 March 1948 relieved from attachment to the ‘ 30lst Very Heavy Bombardment Wing see 17 March 1948 and re— assigned from the Fifteenth to the Eighth Alr Force At the same time the home station of the unit was changed from Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas to Biggs Air Force Base Texas By 21 May the unit completed the move to its new location where it was on a tenant status until 30 November 1948 g v _ when the Strategic Ar Command acquired the base The 37th Group was replaced at Smoky Hill Air Force Base by the 224 Bombard mo ment Group gee 18 May 1948 7 18 May 224 Bombardment Group Assigned u Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction from the Par East Ar Recen FEAF of the 224 Very Heavy Bombardment Group which had ire ms been stationed at Kadena Air Force Base Okinawa The unit was as— signed to the Fifteenth Air Force its permanent station was designated as Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas and it was attached to the 301st Very Heavy Bombardment Wing Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas The unit returned to the Zone of the Interior on 2 June It re— placed the 97th Wing at Smoky Hill Air Force Base see 16 May 19487 25 May Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Guadalupe Bombing and Gunnery Range New Mexico from the Tactical Air Command TAC and assigned it to the Eighth Air Force Tactical Air Command however continued to use the range on a joint—use basis f ___ The base was subsequentlylagsigned by the Eighth Aiz Force to _L _ the 509th Medium Bombardment Wing n 1950 that organization transferred it to the 97th Medium Bombardment Wing see 1 April 19507 c« 1 June — 4 September Squadrons Rotated to Goose Bay Labrador for Arctic Training Between June and September six bombardment squadrons served week» long tours of duty at Goose Ar Base Labrador ‘The 98th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Spokane Air Force Base Washington Fifteenth Air Force began sending its squadrons to Labrador early in June The 345th 3430 and 344th Squadrons respectively completed their tours prior to the June alert occasioned by the Berlin Blockade see » 27 June 17 July 1948 Because Goose Air Base was needed as a staging base for the deployment of units to Europe the equadron rota— tion program was halted between 28 June and 14 August After the tension in Europe subsided the 509th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Walker Air Porce Base New Mexico Eighth Air Force began send— ing ite squadrons to Labrador The first squadron the 2934 arrived at Goose Atr Baze on 14 August It was followed by the 830th Squadron which arrived in Labrador on 25 August _The third squadron the TISth began its rotation on 28 August and returned to the United States on 4 September f urs 1968 1 June # ‘nt Air Transport Unit Carswell Air Force Base Texas Eighth Ar Force redesignated the Ist Strategic Support Unit On M4 January 1949 vX it was again redesignated as the Ist Strategic Support sikis i m us i On 14 December 1948 3 v the unit moved to Biggs Air Force Base Texas 2 June Eighth and Fifteenth Atr Force Maximum—Effort Mission Tn a maximum—effort strike all available bombardment and fighter aircraft in the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces participated ina simula— ied bombing of Selfridge Atr Force Base Michigan No advance notice vos given to any unit prior to thelalert ‘The four Fifteenth Air Force bombardment groups participating successfully joined up on schedule _ over Marshall Radio Kansas and proceeded to Kansas City for Zendervous with bombardment aircraft of the five Bighth Air Force E1oupe Fighter aircraft of the 27th Fighter Group Kearney Alr Force Bare Nebrazka Eighth Afr Force joined the bombers at Kansas Gity and furnished escort to Bloomington Ilinois at which point the 334 Fighter Group Walker Air Force Base New Mexico Bighth Ae Force took over the escort duties to the target Though hase and emoke over the target area required that bomb runs be accomplished by radar with visual assistance when possible by the bombardier excellent photos of the aiming point were obtained and the mission was considered to be successful The main problems wore encountered in fighter escort Because of the length of the bomber Miream fighter escort was considered to be inadequate Rendezvous tus — With the fighters was succersful though some difficulty was experienced af in communicating with them However the ighter attacks were deemed unaggressive and ineffectual The Eighth Air Force furnished a total of 213 aircraft for the mission 191 of these completing the mission Of the effective aireratt 12 were fighters from the 27th and 334 Groups and 79 were bombers from the im — f 1948 24 Davis—Monthan Air Force Base Arizona 7th Carswell Air Force Base Texas 434 Davis—Monthan Air Porce Base Arizona 97th « Biggs Air Force Base Texas and 504th Walker Air Force Base New Mexico Bombardment Groups The Fifteenth Air Force which had no fighter units assigned mee 1 May 1946 7 provided 44 bombers from the 28th Rapid Gity Air Force Base South Dakota 924 Spokane Air Force Base Washington 98th Spokane Air Force Base Washing— ton and 30st Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas Groups Non— participating Fifteenth Air Force unite were the 22d Bomb Group which was just returning from the Far Bast mee 18 May 1948 and the 934 Bombardment Group which was serving in the Far East see 10 May — 27 August 1948 11 June Record Gruise Gontrol Flight A crew of picked Headquarters Strategic Air Command and 509th Bombardment Group personnel under the command of Lieutenant Golond Olbert F Lassiter achieved the 1988 peak in eruise control when they _ _ __ Tew a standard B—29 carrying a 10 300 pound load 5 767 statute miles This record exceeded the standard 3 450 miles by nearly half For the Gruise Control Program see 9 July 1947 14 June — 17 November Small Eighth Air Force Units Rotated to Aleutians ‘The 509th Bombardment Group the unit specializing in the delivery of the atomic bomb was cleared for a series of four—plane flights to Shemya Air Force Base in the Aleutians on 4 June The first four—plane Alight of B—29e left the United States on 14 June These fights involving the Tih and 97th Bombardment Groups as well as the 509% continued through the summer and autumn and would have continued until March 1949 had not the Alaskan Afr Command asked on I7 November that rotation to Shemya be suspended 16 June Tonopih Bombing and Gunnery Range Nevada Fifteenth Air Force transferxed to the Air Training Command Tenopsh Air Force Base was transferred to the Corps of Engineers on 21 August 1948 q v 7 — us —L Bst cl p 21 — 26 June ‘A First Annual Gombat Grew Competition The Strategic Air Command 6 World Series® a The First Annual Combat Grew Competition was conducted at Castle f Air Force Base California utilizing the Wendover Utah bombing a range Each crew dropped three bombs visually and three by the use 5 of radar all from 25 000 feet Three picked aircrews from all active € bombardment groups except the 934 Group Fifteenth Alr Force which L was serving overseas see 10 May 27 August 1948 7 and the 22nd Group a Fifteenth Atz Force which had just returned from he Par East see H 18 May 19487 took part in the competition All bombardment groups‘ % were B—29 equipped though the 434 Group was beginning its conversion hi to B—50s at the time see 20 February 1948 and the 7th Group was lik getting ready to begin converting to B—36s see 23 June 1948 c The first five places were won by the five Eighth Alr Force groups H and the last five places by the four Fifteenth Air Porce groups partici— pating and the 307th Bombardmént Group Headquarters Strategic Air i __Command Unite placed as follows ___ wen —— R Group Home Base Numbered Air Foredh asa Davis—Monthan Afr Force Base Arizona Eighth Air Force fi 509th _ Walker Air Force Base New Mexico Right Atr rorce B 2 Davis—Monthan Air Force Base Arizona Bighth Air Force 97th Biggs Air Force Base Texas Eighth Air Force To Carswell Air Force Base Texas Bighth Air Force R $2nd Spokane Air Force Baze Washington Fifteenth Air Force 30ist Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas Fifteenth Atr Force 28th — Rapid Gity Air Force Base South Fifteenth Atr Dakota Force 307th MacDill Air Force Base Florida Headquarters B Strategic Atr Command 98th Spokane Air Force Base Washington Fifteenth Air Force Insctive and unmanned bombardment groups at the time all assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command included the Adth 90th 3034 305th and 306th Groups See 1 July 1947 ure — — I 1948 The best indivigual crew award went to a crew commanded by First Liestenant M J Jo es of the 509th Group Second and third places for individual crews went to crews from the 438 and 24 Groups respectively For later Bombing and Navigation Competitions see 3 — 8 October 1949 13 — 18 August 1951 13 — 18 October 1952 26 — 31 October 1953 23 — 28 August 1954 and 24 — 29 August 1955 Background Throughout 1946 and 1947 problems of manning organization and supply had been so pressing that bombardment unite had been unable to conduct adequate bombing training As a result by the spring of 1948 the bombing accuracy of Strategic Air Com— mand units had fallen considerably below the standard re— quired by the strategic bombing mlesion In order therefore __ to determine the potential combat effectiveness of unite and tol_ __ promote bombing accuracy Headquarters Strategic Air Command decided to conduct a command—wide bombing competition which was announced on 27 May Unite were also directed to take im— mediate action to reduce their circular errors and to stress radar bombing the interest of an all—weather capability I The Fifteenth Air Force went into the competition under a severe handicap as was reflected in the scores Its bombing training during the first half of 1948 had been comparatively slight — Fifteenth Air Force unite had dropped only 729 high explosive bombs of an authorized total of 4 632 during this period The Fifteenth Air Porce was also in arrears with respect to radar bombing Of 2 287 bomb rune scored by command aircraft during the early part of the year only 310 m had been made by Fifteenth Air Force units The 307th Bombard— ment Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command had made c 410 such runs and the Righth Air Force the remaining 1 567 To correct its deficiencies the Fifteenth Air Pores tet up a weekly squadron training program at Wendover Range Utah for the period 2 May — 4 September for squadrons of the 28th 92d 97% and 30lst Groups but this program was barely under way when the Combat Grew Competition was held in June for bombing maneuvers at Wendover in 1947 by both _ Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force units gee 14 — 24 November 1947 a ane visuar ap rapan BomBinc 1918—1956 Viewed against bombing proficiency standards expected from Strategic Air Command unite the June 1948 competition exposed a large number of weaknesses Therefore even before the final results were tabulated Headquarters Strategic Ar Command directed that the authorized unit allowance of bombs be fully ex— pended whenever possible with special emphasis on radar bombing in order that the highest possible proficiency could be attained Fr om then on throughout the first decade of the Strategic Air Com— mand particular stzess was placed on the development of bombing accuracy In the days of the atomic bomb shot—gun methods of the past were unthinkable True precision single—shot bomb ing was an urgent requirement Through a concerted program excellent results were achieved between 1948 and 1956 Trend From Actual Drops to Radar Scoring and High Altitude Borgbing i By late 1988 emphasis had switched from actual bomb drops to intensified radar bombing and stress was being placed on bomb ing from greater altitudes In December of that year Headquarters Strategic Air Command tightened the rules for radar bomb scoring considerably Only bombing runs made from at least 25 000 feet and scored by a Radar Bomb Scoring RBS unit were to be con— sidered in evaluating unit bombing proficiency Though low» altitude bombing was not ruled out the need was clearly recogni— zed for a high—altitude precision bombing capability By the _ time of the Second Annual Gombat Grew Competition in 1949 ee 3 — 8 October 1949 7 the radar bombing proficiency of Strategic Air Command crews had improved considerably Circular er— rors steadily decreased in 1949 even though bombing altitudes ag increased substantially The number of drops from over 25 000 fect showed a large increase during the year In January of 1949 349 Radar Bomb Scoring runs at 25 000 feet or above were made and during the last three months of the year bombing crews averaged 970 runs per month at 25 000 feet Yet the Circular Etror Probable was reduced substantially during the year Circular Error Probable GEB is the distance from the target within which 50 percent of the bombs fall Thas there is no penalty for an occasional wild bomb On the other hand ure — € — mes % ¥ © ase viSuAt AND RADAR BOMBING T9B—195b 1GBntinued Despite the improvements made in 1949 however the average Circular Error Probable remained unsatisfactory and evalua— tons were made during late 1949 to determine the factors in— volved It was found that poor target identification poor techniques and improper briefing were contributing factors Comprehensive Proficiency Program Inaugurated Beginning in 1948 and 1949 numerous steps were taken by Head— quarters Strategic Air Command to improve bombardment pro— ficiency A comprehensive evaluation program special Radar Bomb Scoring RBS exercises and anneal bombing and naviga ton competitions were the three principal methods used to raise bombing and allied navigation standards However a variety of i other methods also proved to be fruitful Achievement and in— centive awards were offered to outstanding crews a competitive spivit was engendered in every possible way and attempts were made to improve crew morale by such devices as the Spot Promb— ___ ton Program see 20 Dekember 1943 and the designation of _L _ Lead Crews see I June 1949 7 New and improved bombing equipment enhanced bombardment accuracy as did also improved maintenance standards and the better arrangement of bombing equipment Radar scope prediction methods and better target identification through improvbd target analysis and classification also played an important role in raising proficiency Carefl alysis was made of bombing errors and evaluation missions Standard Cperating Procedures were improved and training was made more and more realistic Within the Zone of the Interior target sites were frequently moved a variety of types of targets were utilized and aiming points were frequently changed An increasing number of evaluation mtesions were scheduled for all crews Unite were provided with better planning and briefing materiale ¥WContinoed Circular Erzor Average GEA is the average distance from the target of the number of bombs dropped Under this system of scoring which was less practical and therefore used less frequently than Circular Error Probable a sizeable penalty accrues to the average because of one stray drop In 1954 the reliability factor system replaced the Cireu lar Error Average system for the rating of crews Under this system if crews kept more than 85 percent of their runs within a distance from the target specified by Headquarters Strat egic Air Command they escaped probationary state 17s f « — H4 VISUAL AND RADAR BOMBING 1946—1956 Continued f HE0AL AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued f Grew Evaluation I A formal crew evaluation program was established in mid—1949 ‘ when the Lead Crew School was organized see— June 1919 J f The consept of Lead Crews developed late in 1938 after the I Gross—Training Program ended see 19 January — 19 October 194877 i It evolved because of the recognized need for the most highty com — petent crews to be assigned to lead all bombing missions The Lead Grew School which shortly after its establishment was re— named the Combat Grew Standardization School was established so that the finest Strategic Air Command crews could be evaluated and taught a standardized method of bombing and navigation and their existing skills augmented After attending the achool Lead Grews returned home and assisted other crews in reaching the same standards The Combat Crew Standardization School was superseded in 1951 by the 3906th Strategic Evaluation Squadron L ree 16 May 19517 the mission remaining crew evaluation and training though greater emphasis was on crew evaluation In __ 1954 the 3906th Squadron was redesignated a Group and its de— _ __ tachments at various locations redesignated squadrons Radar Bomb Scoring Sites Radar Bomb Scoring RBS sites were particularly suited to evaluat— ing the accuracy of bombardment crews From a handful of Radar Bomb Scoring sites in 1946 the number increased to 26 by 1956 At the end of 1949 there were five permanent sites and one mobile detachment which were manned by persconel from j the one existing Radar Bomb Scoring Squadron By the end of i 1951 two additional permanent sites had been established In 1951 a Radar Bomb Scoring Group was activated consisting of three equadrons one in the central United States one in the western United States and one in the eastern United States Each of these squadrons was broken down into detachments which manned the various Radar Bomb Scoring sites By the end of 1955 the number of sites had increased to 25 permanent sites plus one mobile detachment and by the end of April 1956 the 28 Radar Bomb Scoring sites programmed for 30 June 1956 had all been activated Twenty—five of the sites were permanent ones in— I cluding five overseas sites and three were mobile detachments The first overseas Radar Bomb Scoring site in L don was set 1s h — me visuat AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Gontinued up in mid—1949 — A second site was established at Marzakech French Morecco in 1952 and a third at Montreal Canada in 1953 Two ates were set up in 1954 one at Paris and the other at San Juan werto Rico The five overseas Radar Bomb Scor ing sites were manned by detachments of the squadron assigned to the eastern United States Radar Bomb Scoring Rune The object of Radar Bomb Scoring sites was to provide a greater variety of training for all bombardment crews and early results warranted a considerable increase in this type of training All bombardment wings were directed to make maximum use of the Radar Bomb Scoring facilities The use made of these facilities after 1946 demonstrate the growing acceptance and value of such units In 1946 there were 880 une scored By 1949 this figure had jumped to 28 049 and to 43 722 in 1950 In 1955 more than 120 000 runs were scored and the figure was expected to total ___ more than 150 000 for theyea 1996 __ __ whe Gommant—Wide Evaluation Missions In 1949 the first command—wide evaluation missions were con— ducted These became a permanent part of the Strategie Air Com— mand bombardment training program and after 1949 at least one and sometimes two or three command—wide evaluation missions were conducted yearly They were used to test specific capabili— ties of bombardment unite and their equipment and they proved to be excellent yardaticks of bombardment capability against un— familiar targets The missions showed unit capabilities in mis sion planning target study and prediction and bombing accuracy All the command—wide evaluation missions were conducted under increasingly rigidly controlled conditions Radar scope photo— graphe of the target areas and approaches could not be used as w briefing material for the evaluation missions as had previously been done The evaluation missions demonstrated the capabili— ties of specific typer of aircraft against certain types of targets under particular weather conditions using either radar or visual bombing techniques All commant—wide evaluation missions between 1949 and 1956 used radar bomb methods except the Omaha mission in 1953 when visual bombing was used and j 1m ye — ases viSAt AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued when radar scope photographs and up—to—date target materials were allowed to be used as briefing materials All command wide evaluation missions were Radar Bomb Scored The first evaluation mission was staged early in 1949 at Dayton Ohie to which location the mobile Radar Bomb Scoring detachment had been sent in the winter of 1948 — 1949 — Both Eighth and Fif— teenth Air Force units made maximum—effort missions In May of 1949 similar missions were Noun using the mobile detachment home site at Birmingham Alabama by the 24 7th 434 and 97th Bombardment Wings n 1950 evaluation missions were conducted at the Radar Bomb Scoring sites at Oklahoma Gity St Louis and Omaha in 1951 at Minneapolis Indianapolis and Binghamton New York in 1952 at St Louis and Bedford Indiana in 1953 at Springfield and Omaha visual in 1954 at San Antonio i and in 1955 at Vincennes Indiana The San Antonio Evalvation Mission 954 The San Antonio Evaluation Mission conducted during the period 26 April — 16 June 1954 demonstrated that Strategic Air Command exews could accurately bomb Designated Ground Zero DGZ‘# in a large industrial complex The results of select crews validated the selection system used for the mission It was found from evaluation results and other activity that altitude alone had no 1 apparent effect on B—47 bombing accuracy However the effect of ground speed approximated 20 feet of error for each 10 knot ins 2 crease However it was felt that B 47a could bomb effectively 1 at any speed or altitude within the normal aircraft performance I range The major source of bombing error in the San Antonio mmission was the common problem of aiming point identification An acceptable Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment IBDA capa« bility was demonstrated by most wings indirect Bomb Damage Assessment IBDA is that accomplished by the bombardment aircraft themselves whereas Bomb Dam— age Assessment BDA is normally accomplished by recon— naissance atrcrat 1se Hs YISUAL AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued CCN AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued The Vincennes Mission 1955 The Vincennes Mission 955 The Vincennes Mission Operation POST HOLE was conducted during the period 18 July — 16 December 1955 Major purposes of m mintion were to determine the current Strategie Ai Com— mand capability on a no show‘ airfield target one with no rader Rignificance using 15 year old photography to determine tre night photolash capability of the RB 47 wings to appraise the Capability of wing staffe and crews in planning and executing this type of mission to appraise the capability of Bhote inter— prorors MIs tn scoring bomb impact points from radar scope photography and in determining yield and height of borst from fimulated AN ASH—4 photography and to provide a diffcult mavigation target location problem that put a premium on Ground Position Indicator GPI backup procedures beceuse of the confusion of radar signals in the target area The Vincennes mission demonstrated that bombardment crews —— — bave hecapability to suedensfully bomb no show airfields near — small complexes although accuracy regressed from results praviously achieved against large complexes Ground Position Indicator GPI methods proved to be the most effective in locat» ing and identifying a email target complex It was further found that recomnalasance crews had a marginally acceptable photoIash CupabNity Precision and securaey were lacking Most wing stalls were found to be highly professional in mission planning The pre—target abort rate and gross bombing error ate were cqual adverse factors in force effectiveness The abort rate and bomb—nay system radar reliability improved over alf previous evaluation missions As in the San Antonto mission of 1954 aiming point or target complex misidentification remained the major source of bombing f srror However the bombing results of select crews validated the selection system The bomb impact plotting Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment IBDA capability of Zone of the Interior Re— connaissance Technical Squadrons and most wings proved satis— factory for the miusion conditions Wing Photo Interpreters PMs were able to compute heights of burst and yield with ac— I ceptable accuracy However it was felt that the validity of the 100 Series Target Complex Chart TGG radar intensity over — print and unit predictions needed to be improved 183 L 1 — ims visuat Ab RADAR BOMBING —1948 1956 Gontinued Project PURPLE Besides the command—wide evaluation missions specific evalua« tion missions or tests were conducted from time to time either to test equipment or procedures Project PURPLE for example tested B—36 bombing equipment The 7th Bombardment Wing conducted a series of special evaluation missions under the code name Project PURPLE during the period 27 October — 23 December 1949 The B—36s of the unit participated in a series of simulated I bombings of Eglin Air Force Base Florida and vicinity Radar 1 Bomb Scoring sites in order to test the effectiveness of the C APO—24 radar bombing system of the B—36# and the method used 4 by the Strategic Air Command to score a simulated bomb release 3 At the same time however the exercise served to point up the a value of the B—36 as a stable bombing platform Results were exceptionally good ‘The aircraft bombed from an altitude of ER 40 000 feet flew 27 missions involving 143 releases of which E 91 were actual drops at Elin Air Force Base and 52 were Radak d ___ Bomb Scoting runs on the Tampa and Birminghamn sites __ _ f Operations FANCY I and 1t 953—1955 Operations FANCY I and It were tests of bombing procedures 4 Both tests concerned Ground Position Indicator GPH or reference % point Sharkey bombing methods Operation FANCY 1 which was B conducted between 1 November 1953 and 15 January 1954 proved E that reference point bombing was more accurate than had been C believed and that it assisted target identification Chief sources ¢ of error were wind shifts and jet streams inability to accurately f set information into the equipment and inaccuracies in geodetic B control data The purposes of Operation FANCY It conducted dring the period 22 November 1954 — 10 Pebruary 1955 were d to determine the current capability in the use of reference point bombing to determine whether capability to deliver weapons by has this method has changed since the first FANCY exercise and to ‘R Getermine the effect of reference point to target distance and re— 4 ference point to target time on bombing accuracy— FANCY It revealed reference point bombing capability to be © marginal Though it was felt that some further improvement was possible with existing equipment the reference point method of bombing was not considered to be a prime one Over« f all Ground Position Indicator bombing capability did not change 184 iit visuat ANB RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued significantly from FANCY 1 to FANCY 11 Reference point to target distance was found to be the greatest factor affecting accuracy It was found that decreased reference point to target time improved accuracy at longer ranges High speed aircraft had the advantage and high mach tailwind conditions within reason were found to 14 be desirable Wind synclironization and gradient change were i found to be the largest component errors at the 100—150 mile range FANCY 11 also demonstrated that units and crews were placing in— a sufficient emphasis on Ground Position Indicator procedures in g the normal training program f Visual Bombing Capability 4 As with radar bombing the Circulaz Ezor Probable for Radar Bomb Scored visual bombing improved substantially between 1948 and 1954 for B—50 and B—36 aircraft being reduced more than one—half However the B 47 # encountered difficulties in bomb—bay turbulence and brroneous static instrument inputs to ___ — the bombing system Thi resulted in a predictable predominately __ over—impact error bomb falls beyond target which varied with the weight of the bomb As a result by the third quarter of 1953 the Strategic Air Command Circular Error Average was about the same as it had been during the first quarter of 1949 During 1954 however scores made in B—47 aircraft showed improvement A major portion of the over impact error was eliminated by moving the system input static parts to a position less affected by slip— stream turbulence caused by the opening of the bomb—bay doors In addition compensation for earth curvature helped reduce visual K—system errors Observers were also learning by experience to procedurally compensate for the over—impact error Anyway because of their high speeds B—47 aircraft were not expected to obtain the accuracy of conventional aircraft % Scores obtained in 1955 during routine training on Radar Bomb Scored visual bombing missions continued to fluctuate Some regression in accuracy occurred with B—36 aircraft but the heavy units continued to demonstrate a high degree of accuracy Also scores made in RB 36 aircraft using Norden equipment were higher than those of the B—50 units before they were phased out Consequently the command—wide Circular Error Probable tor Radar Bomb Scored visual bombing was high compared with scores for earlier years B—47 units improved their accuracy somewhat on scored visual releases iss — ® is VISUAL AND RADAR BOMBING 1948—1956 Continued Radar Bombing Capability As a result of the comprehensive program for the development of bombing accuracy proficiency standards showed a tremendous improvement from 1946 to 1956 especially in radar bombing Abort rates and gross error rates showed a progressive decline By the end of 1954 the Strategic Air Command Circular Error Probable for routine radar bombing was reduced to about one—fourth of what it bad been during the 1946—1948 period By the end of 1954 all APO—13 and APO—23 equipment had been phased out leaving only the more accurate APO—24 RB—36s and K—Syatems B—36s and B—47s in use Heavy reconnaissance units which were given a primary mission of bombardment on 1 June 1954 q v 7 experienced little difficulty in develop— ing bombardment recurach although by the end of 1954 they I —— had not attained the accuracy with the APD—24 equipment that had been attained by the B—50 wings see 20 February 1948 with the same equipment Scores obtained in 1955 during routine training with the different types of equipment remained relatively stable Though some improvements in scores were made with APO 24 RB 36 atr— craft equipment RB—36 units still had not attained the ac— curacy with this equipment that the former B—50 units possessed New equipment was introduced in 1955 the MA 6 in B—52s see 29 June 19587 and the MA—7A in B—47 aircraft see 23 October 19517 By the end of the year only a small amount of training had been accomplished with this new equipment m but bombing accuracy and equipment reliability appeared to be good 186 mo ise 23 June First Convair B—3% Peacemaker Assigned to the Strategic Air Gom« mand Beginning of a Long Range Bombardment Capability The first B—36A was assigned to the Strategic Air Command on 23 June and it was delivered to the 7th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Carswell Air Force Base Texas Eighth Air Force on 26 June Three more B—36As were delivered to the unit a few days later on30 June In July six more aircraft were assigned By the end of the year a total of 38 B—36s including 18 B—36Bs were assigned to the 7th Heavy Bombardment Wing and the lith Heavy Bombardment Group for redesignation of unite from Very Heavy Bombard« ment Groups to Medium or Heavy Bombardment Wings see 12 July 1 August 1948 It had been decided in the summer of 1947 that the 7th Group would be the first to convert The training of personnel vas begun and personnel from the Group were sent to a factory «— transition training school‘at the Contalidated—Voltee_Plant at _ _ Fort Worth Texas A Mobile Training Unit MTO was set up in April of 1948 In May test flights were conducted with a manu— facturer‘s crew and a group of personnel were graduated from the Convair school in B—36 maintenance Significance of the B—36 The introduction of an aireraft with the vast potential capabilities of the B—36 into the Strategc Air Command bombardment force was an epochal event though it was some years before its full capabilities could be realized This aircraft the worlds first true intercontinental bomber provided the Strategie Air Com— mand with its first intercontinental long—range capability which immeasurably enhanced ite ability to fulfil its worldwide strate— gic bombing commitments The B—3% Long—Range Bombardment Force 1988—1956 ‘The Convair B—36 was not only the world s first intercontinental bomber but it was the only true intercontinental bomber assigned to the Strategic Aix Command during its first decade The new all—jet Bosing B—52 that was introduced late in the decade in 1st c 50 f J — s _ — 1948 THE B—36 LONG—RANGE BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1918—1956 Continued ——— mid—1955 see 29 June 1955 7 though classified as a long—range bomber was not a true intercontinental bomber as was the B—36 The eight—jet B—52 would need to rely on air refueling to accomplish long—range missions similar to those that could be accomplished by the B—36 Of course the great advantages of the B—52 were in its speed and altitude capabilities which surpassed those of the B—36 For example the average bombing speed and altitude of the B—36 was 300 knots True Air Speed at 40 000 feet where as for the B—52 with a comparable bomb load it was 460 knots Prue Air Speed at 47 000 feet Another consideration in favor of the B—52 was that jet engines presented far fewer maintenance pro— blems than did conventional engines Eager to develop the potentialities of the revolutionary new B—36 the Strategic Air Command contrary to common practice ac— cepted the aircraft before it was operationally ready and for all practical purposes acted 4s a service—testing agency a function _ that would normally be pekformed by the Air Materiel Command _ As a result it was not until more than two years after the first B—36 was introduced into the command that the aircraft was con— sidered to be operationally ready or that the Strategic Air Com— mand developed any real long—range capability with the aircraft It was not until 1950 when the ten—engine four Jet B—36D and RB—36Ee models were introduced that the B—36 was considered to be operationally ready This occurred because of the numerous problems associated with integrating such a revolutionary air craft as the B—36 into the command and developing it into a truly operational tactical aircraft However the calculated risk of temporarily losing the combat capability of one of its small force of combat—ready groups was taken by the Strategic Air % Command in the interest of an infinitely greater future strength The risk produced a bountiful yield in the form of a greatly en— hanced combat capability From 1946 to 1948 the Stratogic Air Command possessed no long—range capability in any way comparable to that provided by the B—36 and as a matter of fast in those early years its over—all combat potential was very weak Its limited aircraft resources consisted solely of obsolete World War It B—298 and it was therefore dependent on overseas bases for the greater °C 188 j 6 TE ®—3 LonG—raNo® BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1946—IS5® Gontinsed C part of its Emergency War Plan capability As a result great emphasis had to be placed on the development of a Mobility Plan ase 1 March 1948 7 and the establishment of an air refueling pro— gram see 19 July 1948 7 It was not until 1950 or 1981 that the overseas base network was sufficiently developed to provide more than a limited Emergency War Plan strength During this period of time the intercontinental capabilities of the B—36 stood as a i threat to any would—be aggressors who likely did not know how Limited the actual capabilities of the aircraft were at the time It was not surprising that an aircraft as revolutionary as the B—36 created some controversy In mid—1949 the B—36 and especially 4 its procurement was the subject of a Congressional investigation 3 see 25 May — 25 August 1949 — at the close of which the United 3 Siates Air Force was completely vindicated in its choice of the F B36 t The First of Tvio Major Conversion Programs C The introduction of the —36 was also significant because it was A the first of two major bombardment aizeraft conversion programs M accomplished by the Strategic Air Command during the first decade b of its existence for fighter aircraft conversions see 1 May 1946 and 20 January 1953 _ The other major conversion program was e That to medium—range B—47s ee 23 Oct ber 1951 Conversion i to the new all—jet long—range B—52 was barely under way as the first decade of the Strategic Ai Command came to a close see 29 Jre 199 ‘The only other conversion program undertaken between 1946 and 1956 was that to the medium—range B—50 see 20 February 1948 — However this was a limited conversion program only five wings being converted Also since the B—50 was merely an improved version of the B—29 the B—50 program presented few serious problems whereas the revolutionary new B—36 presented a con m siderable number of problems to the command as did also the B—47 the first all—jet bomber to be assigned to the bombardment force Many similar problems were encountered with the B 36 and B—47 conversion programe In both cases integration of the new aircraft was very stow having come adverse effect on command combat capability Specific malfunctioning problems and reductions in the aireraft inventory due to modifications were common problems in both programs However conversion probleme were likely even ines t serious with the B—36 which was n its time probably even more revolutionary than the B—47 I 189 — ma 1918 Gontinued Procurement Design competion for the B—36 had begun on 11 April 1981 even prior to America‘s entry into World War II On 16 October of that year Lieutenant General Henry H Arnold Chief of the Army Ate Forces authorized the Gonsolidated—Vuitee Aircraft Company Gonvaiz to manufacture two experimental models on the basis of their proposal Shortly thereafter on 18 November a formal contract was avarded the company for construction of the B—36 and work was initiated on the experimental models In July of 1943 Gonvaiz was given a contract for 100 B—36s although the experimental models were far from complete Originally planned for use as a long—range bomber in the Pacific Theater the B—36 lost its priority when Allied forces captured large numbers of Pacific islands thereby eliminating the urgent need that had existed for a long—range bomber B—29s were therefore given production priority However at the end of the war engineering ___ manpowee was shifted to the B—36 program and the first experi __ mental models came off the production lines in 1916 and the first production models in 1948 Late in February 1949 General LeMay recommended to Head— quarters United States Alr Force that plans for the procurement of the B—54 the last possible refinement of the B—29 be cancelled and two additional B—36 groups created At first Headquarters United States Air Force rejected this proposal on the ground that it would throw the planned 48—group Air Force out of balance However in March Headquarters United States Air Force agreed to procure 36 additional B—36# and cancel the contract for the B—54s Henceforth complete priority was given to B—36 pro— duction Pollow—on contracts brought the total number of pro— m cured aireraft to 383 including Be and RBs and two YB—60s see % below Practically all these aireraft were assigned to the Strategic Air Command a handful going to Air Training Com— mand Air Materiel Command and Special Weapons Command The Experimental Models The first fight of a B—36 occurced on 8 August 1946 when the XB—36 made its fest test fight over the Texas countryside « — lasting 37 minutes The first formal press showing of the XB—36 $e iso L —‘ is 1 Pete _ Po 7 THE B—36 Lono—naNG® sumpatoment rorce i948—1956 T Contineed — was held at Fort Worth Texas on 7 June 1947 and at the same time its younger sister ship the newest experimental model the YB—36 was unveiled The showing was attended by some 200 aviation writers and broadcasters Texas newspaper reporters and Consolidated—Vultee officials who saw a light demonstration of the XB—36 On 4 December 1947 the YB—36 which was to serve as the production model for the 100 B—36s on order by the Depart— ment of the Air Force made its first flight On 30 August 1947 the first production model of the B—36 the B—36A was flown from Fort Worth to Wright Field Ohio where it was turned over to the Air Materiel Command B—36 Model Characteristics and Atomic Capabilities Because of the various problems encountered with the new and revolutionary B—36s it was not until 1950 when B—36D and RB—36 E models were introduced into the command that the __ Strategic Air Command xeceived a truly operationalatreratt _L The later perfected models possessed an awesome capability These sky mammoths were capable of flying nonstop to any point in the world and dropping an atomic bomb Grossing over 370 000 pounds except for I models which had a gross weight of 410 000 when fully loaded they could cary a 10 000 pound bomb load on a 10 000 mile roundtrip mission With a span of 230 feet and a length of 162 feet the B—366 had a capability speed of 300 knots and an altitude capability of 45 000 feet in non—Feather weighted L kee below models and somewhat higher in Peatherweighted models The B—36s were manned by a crew of 15 except in fully Featherweighted aircraft where the crew was cut to 13 The first 22 production models of the B—36 were B—36As powered with six pusher—type Pratt and Whitney R 4360—25 engines each possessing 3 000 horsepower B—36Bs began with the 23d air— craft off the production line and delivery of these to the Strategic has Air Gommand began in November of 1948 The principal dif— ference between these and the A models was that horsepower was increased to 3 500 in an improved Pratt and Whitney engine the R 4360—41 Neither the A or B models possensed any The first B—36A off the production line was delivered to the Air Materiel Command on 30 August 1947 As a result the grratopts Air Command subsequently received a total of only 28 HAs a wn « 4 Tite B—3% LONG—RANGE BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1948—1956 Gontinaed atomic—weapon carrying capability B—36G models were never produced It had been planned that this model would have tractor propellers rather than pushers which would increase the speed capability over 100 miles per hour However inadequate cooling at altitude and the interference to air foil by six breaks in the leading edge of the wing led to cancellation of production plans for the C model In 1950 and 1951 A and D models were converted respectively to RB—36E# see 1 April 1950 and B—36Ds The A to RB—36E conversion was completed in 1950 but the B to B—36D modifi— cation program extended into 1951 because of the larger number of aircraft involved The first B—36Ds were officially delivered to the Strategic Air Command in November 1950 ‘The first test flight of a ten engine B—36D had been conducted by Convair on 21 Mazch 1949 and on 24 August 1950 the lith Bombardment Group had been assigned bne aircraft for training purposes The _ B—36Da and RB—36E# were the first B 26s considered operationally _ capable This was true for a variety of reasons In the D and E models many modifications were made which had caused serious problems with the A and B models and which greatly improved the combat capability of the aircraft An especially outstanding feature of the Dand E models which greatly increased the capabilities of the B—36 was that they were provided with four additional jet engines General Electric J—47 in two pods of two each on either wing on thie outer side of the six piston engines The addition of the four jet engines which each provided 5 200 pounds of static thrust almost doubled the power of the aircraft and greatly added to ite speed and combat capability The jets were cut in only on takeoff to gain altitude or when speed was needed Their use shortened takeoff run to 3 500 feet a sav« ing of over 1 500 feet Like the B model both B—36D# ind RB—36Bs were equipped with 3 500 horsepower Pratt and Whitney R—4360—41 engines All B—36D models coming off the production Hine were equipped with Phase I or II Mark IV and VI for both phases atomic—carrying capability The last D and E models were delivered to the Strategic Air Command in early 1951 In the B—36Fe the first of which were delivered to the State gic Air Command in May of 1951 new Pratt and Whitney R 4630—53 lc ig — —— «—— iE B—%6 Lonc—Ranos somBaxDMENr rorcs 1968—195 ‘ — Gontinued engines increased horsepower from 3 500 to 3 800 The same engines were also used in the H and 3 models The P models possessed Phase 11 atomic—weapon carrying capability when they came off the production line The last P model was re— ceived by the Strategic Air Command in December of 191 The principal change in the H model the first of which was de— Hivered to the Steategic Air Command in December of 1951 was that two seats were provided at the engineers position and twin tail radomes were added to house the AN APG 41A tail radar H models were equipped on the production line with Phase Vit atomic—weapon carrying capability Strategic Alr Command received the last H model in September of 1953 In the I models the gross weight was increased from 370 000 — to 410 000 by the installation of internal integral outer panel fel tanks holding 2 800 gallons each Furthermore all ‘I models were Fully Peatherweighfed Configuration I1 see below and __ had Phase % atomic capability The first J model was assignid __ to the command in November of 1953 and the last on 14 August 1954 q v 7 This was the last B36 of any type to be assigned and no farther production of B—368 was programmed The peak number of operational B—36s in the command was 209 and the total number received into the command was 232 for RB—36 I assignments see 1 April 1950 7 Between 1948 and 30 June 1956 22 B—36s of various modela® and five RB 36Hs® crashed There was no particular trend by model of aircraft season of the yeas unit or operating conditions However landing gear modifications were made on the basis of landing gear failures which accounted for two of the crashes Only one aireraft was ‘ lost by fire in flight but nacelle modifications were made and a fire barrier was placed on wing trailing edges in the interest of fire prevention Sixteen B—36Ds one in 1949 before the airerat was officially assigned to the Strategic Air Command two each in 1950 and 1951 five in 1952 one in 1953 three in 1954 two In 1955 I and none in the first half of 1956 three B— 36m» in 1982 I two B—36He in 1953 one B—367 in 1955 Two Feather— weighted aircraft see below ‘were lost in crashes one Configuration If and one Configuration It Three in 1953 one in 1954 and one in the first half of 1956 2 193 Joc o omous vin egiguney meme i zie 8 3 LonG—RaNGE BOMBARDMENT Force 1948—1956 _ Continued The process of modifying all B 36 models to improved atomic weapon carrying and other similar configurations was a con tinuing one Beyond what capabilities aireraft had as they came off the production line they were constantly modified to new atomic and more advanced configurations either by Air Mate viel Command teams working at home bases or on the produc» ton line at the Air Materiel Command depot Convaiz Begin— ning in March 1952 under Project ON TOP code name only B—36Ds were provided along with the rest of the B—36 feet with a Phase III Mark V V1 and XVI atomic capability RB—36Es coming off the production line were not provided with any atomic—weapon carrying capability However beginning in August 1953 under ON TOP they were provided with their 6 first bombardment and atomic capability Phase VIL Mark V V1 and XVI to which phase the entire B—36 feet was also converted Only I2 B—368 were converted to the Phase IV Mark VIH configuration The entire B—36 feet was converted __ to Phase VDI Mark V ¥L and XVII By 30 June 1956 all Bais __ had been converted through Phase X and Phase XIl and all RB—36s scheduled for late phase out that had received the Phase X A modification were in the process of being converted to Phase Xi A Phase X and X A provided B RB—36s with a potent Mark XVI and XXIV capability and Phase XII and XI A provided them with an even more powerful Mark XV XX and XXVI capability The Experimental ¥B—60 j An improved version of the B—36 which offered capabilities somewhat similar to those of the B—52 but which never went i beyond the experimental stages and was never accepted into the I w Strategic Ale Command inventory was the Consolidated— Vultee YB—60 This aircraft was an cight—engine jot Pratt and Whitney 1—57 awept—back wing version of the B—36 — n the i fall of 1951 two B—362 were taken from the production lines at I the Gonvaiz Plant in Port Worth for mockups and modifications A contract was awarded to Consolidated—Vultee for the produc— tion of two atrezaft on 15 March 1951 Eight months later the first of the two planes was—ready for engines The YB—60 made its first test flight at Carswell Air Force Base Texas on 18 April 1952 staying aloft for one hour and six minstes y 198 — J 4 docs Tim »—3% Lonc—rnamas nomsarpmeENr Force 1948—1956 — Gontimued — — However the United States Air Force chose the B—52 in pre ference to the ¥B—60 because of its greater speed and altitude capability Also the B—52 was an entively new aircraft designed according to particular specifications Assignment of Atrcratt I The assignment of B—368 was very slow during the period 1948 1950 but in 1951 the aircraft began to come into the command in large numbers ‘The number of B—36s assigned reached its peak in 1954 and 1955 and in the first half of 1956 B—36Ds began to be phased out as the B—52 conversion program accelerated see 29 June 1955 J B—% Aircraft Assigned By Model ises—r956 as or sxal B b oro m g_ teuP 10 _ 31 December 1948 — 20 18 3s 31 December 1949 21° 59 so 31 December 1950 39 13° se 31 December 1951 sro % 107 31 December 1952 e as os 1s 31 December 1953 mors on ot as 31 December 1954 To an me ss — 208 31 December 1955 69 an ors se zos 30 June 1956 1 at on ors se rso x ¥ Ix 1950 B—36As were converted to RB—36Ee — Conversion of B—3%Bs to B—36Ds took place in 1950 and 1951 The decrease in total aizeraft at the end of 1950 as compared to 1989 is due to the loss of the 21 B—36As to the RB force and to seven B—36Bs in the depot being modified to B—36Ds Until 1951 aircraft in depots were dropped from the Strategic Air Gom« mand inventory 19s J Po Tite B—36 Lono—namom poMBarDMENT Force 1966—1956 Gontinued 1 Does not include RB—36s which became part of the bombard— ment force on 1 June 1954 when the primary mission of the four Heavy Strategic Reconnaissance Wings was changed from reconnaissance to bombardment On 1 October 1955 the four wings were officially redesignated as Heavy Bombardment ings See 1 April 1950 2 Including aircraft in modification depots beginning in 1951 Prior to that time aircraft in the Ar Materiel Command depot Gonvaiz Plant had been dropped from the Strategie Air Com— mand inventory From 1951 on the number of aircraft in depots at any one time averaged about 15—25 the figures being higher after 1953 and 1954 when the SAM—SAG IRAN and Feather— weight Programs see below were initiated See Wing Equipment and Combat—Ready Status Chart below 3 There was a total of 22 B—36A models produced One of them __ was assigned to the Alz Materiel Command on 20 August 147 __ sometime before any models were assigned to the Strategic Air Command 4 During the first half of 1956 the 428 Wing which was begtaning its conversion to B—52e phased out 9 B—36Ds the 95th 15 and the 924 Wing one Development of the Long—Range Bombardment Force 1948—1956 Because of the numerous problems encountered with the new and revolutionary B—36 progress in the unit conversion program tms was very slow during the period 1948—1951 — At the end of 1948 two Heavy unite were in existence the 7th Heavy Bombardment Wing which had been redesignated from a Very Heavy bombard ment unit on 1 August 1948 see 12 July — 1 August 1948 and ihe lith Heavy Bombardment Group which had been activated ‘on 1 December 1948 v and attached to the 7th Wing Both units were located at Carswell Air Force Bae Texas Eighth Ris Force In 1949 another wing was added to the heavy force when the 26th Medium Bombardment Wing Rapid City Air Force pase South Dakota Fifteenth Air Force was redesignated a 196 L J © THE B—3% LONG—nangs BoMBaRbmzNT Force ifs6ti9sé Continued Heavy unit see 16 May 1949 7 The three wing each had some aircraft assigned at the end of 1949 but most of them were assigned to the 7th Wing The 28th Heavy Bombardment Wing was redesi— grated a Strategic Recomnaissance Wing on 1 April 1950 and reas— signed to the Eighth Air Force q v _ and then on 16 July 1950 preparatory to receiving RB—36s it was redesignated a Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Heavy This left only two Heavy bombard— ment wings at the end of 1950 the 7th and the lith ‘The 9th Strate— gic Reconnaissance Wing Fairfield—Suisun Alr_ Force Base Califon had becn reassigned from the Second to the Fifteenth Air Force und redesignated the 9th Heavy Bombardment Wing on 1 April 1950 9 v but it was again redesignated as the 9th Medium Bombardment Wing on 2 October 1950 q v 7 Only one B—36 had been assigned to the unit during the year Both the 7th and 11th Winge attained combat readiness in 1951 The 924 Medium Bombaidment Wing Fairchild Air Force Base xs Washington Fifteenth—Aix Force sas redesignated a Heavy __ — Bombardment Wing on 16 June 1951 q v _ It had no aircraft assigned at the end of the year but It began receiving B—36# in January 1952 From 1951 on the long—range force expanded rapidly as larger numbers of aireraft came into the command increasing from two combat—ready wings at the end of 1951 to four at the end of 1952 Bach unit was authorized 35 aircraft 1 The development of the long—range bombardment force culmina— ted in the assignment of a primary mission of bombardment to f the four RB—36—equipped wings on 1 June 1954 and their formal acceptance into the lorg—range bombardment force on 1 October 1955 when they were officially designated as Heavy Bombard— 1 ment Wings s 197 I —of ases 3 sus B36 Lona—ranos romBanpmeNt rorce 1918—956 AS Gontimed Long—Range Bombardment Wing E Equipment and Combat—Ready Status B and RB—36 4 Areratt 1952—1956 j 1 a All Wings GombatiReady Except Those Designated NCR E As of Unit Air Force No Acft Avg No in and Loca— Assigned Depot at anyla — Tim ‘ond time dus ——— __ MMB _____— ___ ing‘previous 31 December 1952 6th — Bighth Air Force 26 F Walker sr Tih —— Bighth Air Force 24 D Carswell ir 2m ith Bighth Air Force 16 D Epg rece p a x mizl tms inm— —— — 920 Fifteenth Air Force 32D Pairchita 95th Bighth Air Fore O NCR Biggs ___ is 31 December 1953 6th Bighth Alr Force 29 F# 6 Walker 9 s Tth — Eighth Air Force 28 Hs — 0 Garewell 21 Mil 11th Bighth Air Force 25 Hs o 1 Garewell $s o 42° — ighth Air Force — 19 Ds NCR 2 Limestone 12 ite 92d Rifteenth Air Fore 33 Ds 3 Fairchit i 3 osth gighth Air Force 22 Ds NCR Ta— the 198 1 J THE B—% LONG—RANGE BompaRbacent romce 1948—1956 j Gontinued As ot Unit Air Force No Acft Avg No inDe— and Loca— Assigned pots at any one tion time during —— — fie ___ ——— — privious yar 4 31 December 1954 6th Eighth Air Force 31 Fs a f Walker 738 Tth Righth Air Force 29 H a Carswell 64 Lith Eighth Air Force 29 H s 1 Carwell 63 42d Eighth Air Force 11 D 7 i Limestone 16 t 83 __ 920 S¥fteepth Aiz renet p «00 _L __ s 95th Eighth Air Force 30 D NCR — Biggs # 208 I 31 December 1955° 5th Fifteenth Air as reson s Force Travis d E 6th Fifteenth Air 31 B—sp a Force Walker —— 6 B—363 Tth Second Air Force 29 B—36H a Carswell 6 B—s63 llth Second Air Force 29 B—36H a Carswell 6 B—s6r 28th Fifteenth Air 33 RB—36H 3 Force Ellsworth 424 — Eighth Air Force 10 B—3%D 1 Loring formerly 15 B—36H Limestone a noses j j — 199 — I Rovcir % 1968 THE B—3%6 LONG—RANGE BOMBARDMENT FORGE 1918—1956 Continued C As of Unit Afr Force No Acft Avg No in De— and Loca— Assigned pots at any one — tion time during previous year 1 72d Second Air Force 13 RB—3p a — Ramey m rp—seB 924 Fifteenth Air Force 29 B—36D a Fairchild 6 B—363 95th Fifteenth Alr Force 30 B—3D 3 Biggs 99th Fifteenth Air Force 23 RB—36F a Fairchild 2 ors—s60 ricon ine 7 May 1954 7 205 B—36s 132 RB—36e 1 30 June 19565 5th Fifteenth Air Force — 35 RB—36H 4 Travis 6th — Fifteenth Air Force — 31 B—36P s Walker 6 m—s61 Tth Second Air Force 29 n—s6n 2 Carswell 4 B—363 ® lit Second Air Force 29 n—s6i 2 Carswell a B—363 28th Fifteenth Air Force 33 nB—36H 5 « Elsworth 7 42d Eighth Air Force 10 B—36m nom a Loring 1 meses °¢ 200 — aoe a THE B—36 LONG—RANGE FOMmanpment FORGE 1986—1956 Gontinued As ot Unit Air Force No Act Avg No in De— and Loca— Assigned pots at any one tion time during previous year T2 — Second Air Force 12 rm—sep° o Ramey 21 rB—sB i rB—sp 928 Fifteenth Air Force 29 B—3D a Fairchita 6 B—363 95th Fifteenth Alr Force 14 B—36p 1 Bigge s ps6 11 B—363 99th Fifteenth ‘Air Force — 22 RB—3F a Faizchilq ___zocrs—sin ricon L_ __ ase 7 May 1954 7 179 B—36s 131 RB—362 1 The 6th Medium Bombardment Wing was redesignated a Heavy R Bombardment Wing on 16 June 1952 g v 7 2 The 95th Medium Bombardment Wing was redesignated a Heavy Bombardment Wing on 8 November 1952 q v i w 3 The 424 Heavy Bombardment Wing was activated on 25 February 1983 g v 4 Does not include the RB—36 equipped 5th 28th 72d and 99th 1 Strategic Reconnaissance Wings Heavy which were given a i primary mission of bombardment on 1 June 1954 but were not redesignated as Heavy Bombardment Wings until 1 October 1955 See 1 April 1950 2 20 — — THE B—3% LONG—RANGE BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1946—1956 Continued C 5 Though not considered combat ready because it was equipped with old model Ds the 95th Wing was considered capable of performing its Emergency War Plan EWP mission 6 Does not include the 934 Heavy Bombardment Wing which was redesignated from a Medium Bombardment Wing on 1 February 1955 preparatory to its conversion to B—52s see 29 June 1988 7 7 The 424 Heavy Bombardment Wing was beginning its con version to B52 see 29 June 1955 The unit phased out nine B—36Ds during the period January—June 1956 8 The 724 phased out one RB—36D prior to 30 June 1956 1 — Integration of LongeRange Reconnaissance nits whes ica Into the Bombardment Foree From July of 1950 when the first long—range reconnaissance planes RB—362 were assigned to the command until mid—1954 they were used almost exclusively for reconnaissance purposes for the long—range reconnaissance program and RB—36 equip ment status gee 1 April 19507 They did not possess any bom bardment capability until August of 1953 when conversion of the entize RB—36 fleet to an atomic—carrier configuration Phase VIM was begun under Project ON TOP This program was completed on 25 Januazy 1954 by which time all long—range reconnaissance units had been given a secondary mission of bombardment Then on 1 June 1954 the primazy mission of the four long—range RB 36—equipped reconnaissance wings was he changed from reconnaissance to bombardment the units having begun training under dual—capability requirements on 1 May 1954 For special FIGON RB—3 project see 7 May 1954 7 The final step in the integration of reconnaissance units inco the bombardment force occurred more than a year later on 1 October 1955 when the four wings were officially redesignated as Heavy Rombardment Wings With the development of air refueling — 200 19 July 1948 f medium—range B—¥ts reconnais — sance aircralt acquired a Tong—range capability freeing the long—range reconnaissance force for bombardment duty 202 pe Meany — ——ucoug ree R 6 THE »—3% LonG—raNor BoMBARDMENT FORGE 1948—1956 E Continued h Conversion Problems The size and complexity alone of the revolutionary new B—36 brought about numerous complications in the conversion pro— E gram and many of the specific malfunctioning problems en— E countered with the B—36 were similar to thore presented by any E new aircraft However a great many problems arose because E in its eagerness to develop the potentialities of the aircraft the E Strategic Ai Command accepted it before it was operationally ¢ ready Thus it assumed responsibility for service—testing 1 functions that would normally be accomplished by the Air Mate— riel Command and in #o doing took a calculated risk in removing f the 7th Wing the first to convert from the combat—ready bombard— f ment force From 1948 through 1951 problems in B—36 conversion were I especially critical A serious supply problem existed from 1948 __ through 1950 and maintehance was severely handicapped by a i_ __ B lack of supplies and spares which was partly caused by insul ficient funds Por a time cannibalization had to be resorted to in order to maintain the maximum number of planes on an in—com— R 4 mission status From 1949 through 1951 a shortage of engines acted as a deterrent to a thorough training problem Because of the time required to train maintenance personnel in the complexities j of the aircraft for some time a serious shortage of maintenance specialists existed During 1949 especially maintenance difficul ties were a particular problem with the new and complicated B—36 Specific malfunctioning or operational problems caused considerable difficulty and became so serious that on 1 May 1950 an Operational Engineering Program for B—36# was put into affect the object of which was to obtain a completely tactical B—36 at the earliest possible date This program proved to be inu highly successful beginning to show results immediately By 1951 the B—36 was considered to be operationally capable Of course even after operationally capable aircraft became avail— able they were continually taken out of operation for depot modifications either for Technical Order changes or to improve their atomic—weapon carrying capability Puel leaks were one of the major problems encountered with the B—36 By mid—1950 however this problem was almost zos J — — 1948 THE B—3%6 LONG—RANGE BoMBARDMENT FORGE 1948—1956 an Gontinued completely resolved for warm climates but well into 1951 it remained a problem in cold climates Other problem areas c included oil leaks the ignition system the power plant and landing gear structural items Oil leaks were prevalent in the propeller oil system and the power plant and oil spewing from the power plant at altitude also presented difficulties Power plant exhaust system leaks resulted in engine fires Burned pistons were also prevalent lead fouling on spark plugs and magneto difficulties created the principal ignition system problems Power collapse at altitude was encountered especially with the ——41 model of the R 4360 Pratt and Whitney engine utilized on B D and E model aircraft The B—% was the first aircraft equipped with AC electric power and con siderable difficulty was experienced with the alternators and the constant speed drives — Most malfunctioning and opera— tional problems were solved by the end of 1951 thanks partly to the Operational Engineering Program except for some very _ serious gunnery equipment deficiencies which produced a veryi_ __ serious defensive armament problem To solve this problem Project Fire—Away was established in May 1952 and as a result in 1953 a significant increase in fire—out rates was effected see p 55 7 j Training Program The intricacies of the B—36 made it essential to have the highest caliber of aizmen and officers assigned as air and ground crews To train these men numerous schools had to be established Extensive factory training vas also wilized as were also Mobile Training Units MTUs and various on—the—job training programs Not until 1951 were m there adequate numbers of trained personnel available to man B and RB—36 units The introduction of jet pods and new radar equipment in later models made necessary new train— ing programs and resulted in addit‘c ial supply and maintenance problems each overcome in turn ‘The training of skilled technicians and the procurement of suitable maintenance equip— ment such as docks empennage stands refueling hydrants and hangars played an important part in providing a more satisfactory in—commission rate in 1950 and 1951 and re— sulted in a substantial increase in fying per aircraft zos Be « s Tis B—36 LoNG—RANGE BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1948—1956 4 ° CT Continued — H Fiying hours per aircraft and the in—commission rate showed a steady and rapid improvement During 1949 an average of He Approctinately 20 hours per plane per month was flown in E 1950 this increased to approximately 39 hours and in 1951 ke to approximately 60 hours During 1949 the in—commission rate was approximately 17 percent In 1950 it increased to % approximately 35 percent and in 1951 jumped to a high of 77 1 percent Such increases were accomplished through improved R techniques better equipment a greater supply of spares and 5 the utilization of a core of highly trained personnel many R trained through utilization of facilities within the command All crew training was accomplished by the Strategic Als Com» f mand rather than the Afr Training Command Until 1952 units Conducted their oun flying training programs the first crews 4 of the 7th Wing being checked out at the Gonsolidated—Vultee plant When unite becaine operationally ready they assisted _ in the izathing of other wings undergeing conversion In —— — f October of 1952 the 4017th Training Squadron Provisional was A activated at Carswell Air Force Base Texas the 7th and 11th j Wings providing aixcraft and crews for the squadron Grews from heavy units in the command were trained by the squadron until it was inactivated on 1 January 1954 _ On 8 June 1955 the unit was reactivated as the 4017th Combat Crew Training School SAG for B—52 conversion See 29 June 1955 _ After that time the bulk of the command‘s crews being trained wits again conducted theix own limited fying training programs— As of 31 October 1953 a total of 177 B—36 crews were assigned to heavy bombardment units 108 of there being combat ready By the end of 1954 crews totaled 202 out of an authorization in of 216 and 151 crews were combat—ready Crew strength and likc combat—readiness status remained at about the same level throughout 1955 _ Featherweight Program The Featherweight Program was one of the three mosh important B RB—36 modification projects The other two were the SAM—SAG IRAN Modification and Modernization Program and Project ON TOP for atomic—weapon carrying modifications Other J zos you Lal 1918 iE p—% LGNG—RANGE pomBArbMeNT rorce 1948—1956 — _ Gentimeed — —— — — types of aixcraft than the B—36 also underwent ON TOP modifi— cations The Featherweight Program was an important step in increasing B—36 and RB 36 capabilities Early in 1953 the project was tested when six aircraft of the 7th Bombardment Wing and three from the 11th Wing were Peatherweighted for i service tests The program which was carried out both at the Convaix Plant Port Worth and the San Antonio Alr Materiel Arex GABMA depot was set up in December 1983 and atreratt began to be modified in January of 1954 It was completed for B—36s in December of 1954 and the last RB—36 underwent the Featherweight modification in March of 1955 — Because both Featherweight configurations were permanent ones all modi— fication had to be accomplished at the depot Featherweighted aircraft were lightened by the removal of all but minimum en sential equipment in the interest of additional fuel—carzying capability Previously fuel tanks could not be filled because of weight limitations Peatherweighting was considered __ primazily as a range extension capability for all R RB—36s _L __ with a secondary high attitude 50 000 feet capability in all but B—36Ds and RB—36Bs because of engine limitations Its greatest advantage was that Tong—range bombardment aircraft could avoid pre— and post«strike staging to the maximum degree Featherweighted B RB—36s were of two configurations the Fully Featherweighted Configuration II and the Tactically Stripped Featherweighted Configuration II The only dif— ference between the two was that Fully Peatherweighted air— craft had all guns stripped except the tail gon and therefore had a higher altitude and additional range capability than did the Tactically Stripped Featherweighted In the Fully Feather weighted aircraft drag was reduced by the elimination of all but minimum essential external protrusions Because no de % tensive armament was removed in Tactically Stripped Peather— weighted aircraft this gave part of the force that might be required to fly daylight missions some armament capability In Fully Featherweighted B—36# two gunners were eliminated and the crew was reduced from 15 to 13 In RB—36s crew size was reduced from 22 Reconnaissance or 20 Bombard— ment to 18 and 16 respectively in both the Tactically Stripped nd Fully Featherweighted configurations All atrraft in the Th lth and 95th Wings were Fully Peatherweighted In the 5th 6th 26th 420 Ted 924 and 99th Wings 11 aircraft from — each wing were Fully Featherweighted and the balance of the air— Craft Tactically Stripped J 206 — pi al Cou 19ee THE B—% Lonu—«ANGE BOMBARDMENT FORCE 1948—1956 _ C Gontmueg t o SAM—SAG RAN Modification and — Modernization Programs The SAM—SAG or IRAN Modification and Modernization Program was instituted on 25 April 1953 to maintain B— and RB—36 air— eraft in the best possible mechanical and operational condition It was a progressive recycling of the fleet for modernization and reconditioning calling for inspection and repair and the incorporation of outstanding Technical Order changes It included Phase It Electronic Countermeasures EGM modifica— tion for both Bs and RBs and Phase X A ON TOP for RB—36s — but these projects were also accomplished in a separate fy—in program The primazy purpose of the SAM SAC program which was carried out at the Convair Plant through coorina tion with San Antonio Ar Materiel Area SAAMA was to in— crease combat capability and secondarily to reduce unit maintenance workloads The program was accomplished on _ a two—eyele basis Airesaft were putinto the prageam after _L __ being in service 24 months but priority was given at the start of the program to the aircraft in service the longest Practically L all B—36s and RB—36s had gone through at east Cycle 1 by 30 June 1956 Only those aircraft staying in the active inventory — the longest before phasing out were processed through Gycle 11 The program was still in progress as of 30 une 1956 in— eluding some Cycle I The last aircraft under the SAM—SAC project was scheduled to be completed in May 1957 25 June 1948 — 30 September 1949 Berlin Airlite Although the Strategic Air Command did not participate directly in af the Berlin Airlift it did play an important role in international diplomacy at the time by serving as a deterrent force to further aggressive Russian actions see 27 June — 17 July 1948 The Berlin Airlift was initiated by the United States with the assistance of the Western European nations because of the ground blockade imposed by Russia Inspect and Repair as Necessary 3 zor 0 ims — on the city of Berlin In an airlift unparalleled in the annals of air development the people of Berlin were provided with all the necessities of life by the United States Air Force and Allied air forces During the period 25 June 1948 to 12 May 1949 the airlift was in full force However after 12 May 1949 when the emergency had passed the airlift was continued on a gradual basis to build up stock piles and forestall any future Ruesian manewers of a similar nature On 30 September 1949 the airlift officially ended A total of 2 343 301 5 tons of supplies had been carried on 277 264 fights Of the total tonnage United States planes had carried 1 783 826 tons The Berlin Airlift‘s biggest day had been on 16 April 1949 when 12 940 tons had been delivered by 1 398 Aights 27 June — 17 July f Emergency Alert in Support of the Berlin Airlift Three Bombardment Groups Deployed to Europe — The Strategic Air Command dB not participate directly In the Berlin‘ Airlift but it played an important role in international diplomacy at s the time by serving as a deterrent force to further aggressive Russian actions Apparently fecling that the Berlin Blockade might presage further Russian aggression Headquarters United States Air Force on 27 June gave the Strategic Air Command verbal instructions to build up its forces in Europe which at the time consisted of only one squad ron of the 30ist Bombardment Group which was stationed in Germany as part of the squadron rotation program see 22 January — 12 August 1948 7 In a three—week period during which the Steateglc Air Com— mands capabilities in an emergency were tested the commant‘s strength in Europe was increased ninefold By 17 July three bom« bardment groups were operational in Europe and three groups were constantly in attendance there throughout the remainder of 1948 » Reconnaissance forces were also built up because of the Berlin Blockade Five RB—29s of the 16th Reconnaissance Squadron Special of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Group departed McGuire Air Force on 30 August 1948 arriving in England on 31 August They were later joined by another RB—29 The reconnaissance aircraft were based at Lakenheath Masham Seampton and Waddington Unite Alerted Upon receiving instructions from Headquarters United States Air Force on £7 June to build up its forces in Europe the 3 — 20s Bit BERLIN BLOCKADE ALERT Gontinued 1 Strategic Air Command immediately placed the 30st and 307th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups on three—hour alert the 28th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups ontwelve —hour alert and all other unite on 24—hour alert The squadron rotation program to Goose Bay Labrador see c 1 June — 4 September 1968 the normal staging point for Europe was temporarily discontinued during the period 28 June — 14 August to facilitate the movement of groups to Europe On L7 July when the deployment of the three groups to Europe was completed the alert was relaxed for all other units 301st Group to Germany In the first step in the deployment of its forces the Strategie ‘Air Gommand on 27 June directed the 30ist Group Smoky Hill Air Force Base Kansas Fifteenth Air Force to send ite two squadrons remaining in the United States the 324 and 3524 to join the third squadron otline group the 3530 that was already see stationed at Firstenfeldbzuck Germany as part oCthe squadron __ rotation program to Europe see 22 January — 12 August 1918 7 The first increment of the two—equadron flight arrived in Germany 1 on 29 June within 45 hours after being alerted By 2 July all 13 but two B—29s of the two squadrons vere in place in Germany ‘The two squadrons stayed there only little more than a month completing their return to their home base with the third squad— ron by 12 August 1948 for record flight of one of the aircraft on the return trip to the United States see 6 August 1948 During the entize time the unit was stationed in Germany it was on emergency alert and as a result accomplished little or no operational training ‘The 301st Group was replaced in Europe by the 24 Group which was assigned to the United Kingdom rather than Germany gee 6 August — 19 November 1948 in October however the 30Ist returned to Europe replacing the © x 28th Group see 17 October 1948 — 20 January 1943 i 26th and 307th Groups to England First United States Bombers to be Stationed in United Kingdom Since World war 11 and First 90—Day Group Deployment to Europe® The other two groups scheduled for assignment to England coud IH We epa ET tapldly as the 3biat Group because some time For — t of a group to the Far East see gn first 20 doy depigyent of a srour # 3 209 Ee s Mas a 1908 BERLIN BLOCKADE ALERT Continued was required to ready bases in England and make the necessary arrangements with the British authorities So it was not until mid—July that the two groups arrived in England Deploying under the code name Project LOOKER the first increment of the 28th Bombardment Group Rapid Gity Air Force Base South Dakota Fifteenth Air Force departed its home station on 16 July 12 aireraft arriving in England via Goose Bay Labrador and Prestwick Scotland on 17 July The Group‘s 30 aircraft were based at the Royal Air Force Station at Marham England 1 Flying time was limited by United States Alr Force in Burope USAFE to seven hours per aircraft per week and was restricted to the confines of the British Isles The 26th Group the first in the Strategic Air Command to be rotated to Europe for a full 90—day peried began its return trip to the United States on 18 October and completed the movement to ite home station on 20 October It was replaced by the 30lst Group see 17 October 1948 20 January 19497 ——— The 307th Bombardment Group MacDill Air Force Base Flozida _ Headquarters Strategic Air Command which had to discontinue its antisubmarine training program for Strategic Air Command units because of its overseas assignment see 14 January 1947 7 12 received its movement orders on 15 July and the first aircraft arrived in England shortly after those of the 26th Group on 17 i July Two squadrons were based at the Royal Air Force Station ‘ at Scampton England and one at Waddington Royal Air Force Station Though its flying activities were severely restricted like the two other groups serving in Europe at the same time 1 the 307th Group did participate in Operation DAGGER in which i British fighter atreraft attempted to intercept a simulated bomb— ing attack on London by American B—29s during the celebration of Battle of Britain Day The Group began the return flight to hak MacDill Atr Force Base on 2 November being replaced by the 22d Group hee 15 November — 17 February 1949 1 Significance The international implications of the Berlin Blockade had far reaching significance for the Strategic Air Command Avakening as it did the people of the United States and the Free World to the serious threat imposed by Russian aggression the Berlin 3 210 1 is _ BERLIN BLOCKADE ALERT Continued Blockade more than any other single factor was responsible for the subsequent buildup of the armed forces of the Western Powers in which the Steategic Air Command was to play a vital part Forces were put into motion that were to be in— strumental in helping the Strategic Air Command become what it had been created to bes a powerful military force capable of sustained worldwide operations — No longer was the Free World to be apathetic in the face of Soviet aggression Prior to the Berlin Blockade Strategic Ar Command training in Europe limited though it had been see 13 November — 4 December 1946 and 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 had been hampered by restrictions imposed by the Western Powers see for example 3 July 1947 — 28 January 1948 and 22 January i j August 1948 7 Subsequent to the Berlin Blockade the Allied Powers were much more cooperative and they were more receptive to the stationing of Strategic Air Command forces in Europe The Berlin Blockade masked the beginning of the Straté— — gic Alr—Command European buildup Throughout 1949 and 1950 — negotiations were successfully carried out with Britain and France a tor the use of bases see 1 March 1948 A program for the renovation of United Ringdom and North African bases was estab ta lished and in 1951 the Fifth and Seventh Air Divisions were acti— i vated in North Africa and the United Kingdom see respectively t 14 January 1951 and 20 March 195 These new major—commant— level headquazters supervised the base construction program in theis respective areas and provided housekeeping maintenance and other facilities for Strategic Air Command unite on rotation i The stimulus of the Berlin Blockade also resulted in the estab I lishment of a group 90—day rotation program which had been unsuccessfully tried for 30 and 90 days on two earlier occasions % in 1947 and 1948 see 3 July 1947 — 20 January 1948 and 18 © February — 20 April 1948 and abandoned either because of the inadequacy of United States Air Porce resources or diplomatic complications Following the Berlin Alert three full groups were constantly on hand in Europe in 1948 because of the emergency However in 1949 and 1950 there was a gradual reduction of Strategie Air 4 a — 19s BERLIN BLOGKADE ALERT Gontinued — Command strength in Europe as the international tension subsided Yet there was no time in 1949 or 1950 when at least one full group was not stationed in Europe The redue— ton in forces following the Berlin Alert was a gradual one The three—group rotation program gave way to a two—group program which was in effect from Pebruary until August of 1949 In February of 1949 the 92d Group see 4 February — 20 May 19497 and the 307th Group gee 11 February — 3 May 1949 were rotated to the United Kingdom In May they were replaced by the 96th Group see 15 May — 19 August 1949 and the 509th Group tee —— May — —— August 1949 7 From August of 1949 through June of 1950 only one group was assigned to the United Kingdom at a time ‘The following groups served iitthis order 434 22d 2d and 30lst Lace respectively 16 August — al November 1949 14 November 1949 — 20 February 1950 18 Pebruazy — 14 May 1950 and 19 May — 1 December 1950 After July of 1950 three groups were itationed‘in the United Kingdom the 301st being joined in July by the 934 ind 97th Groups see 12 July 1950 — 4 am February J951 and 12 Tal — 15 Febmaxy 19517 _The 30lst 920 ___ and 97th Groups all served six month tours 3 29 June 55th Reconnaissance Group VLR Mapping MacDill Air Force Base Florida 311th Air Division Reconnaissance redesignated the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Group The other active reconnaissance group the 9lst was redesignated a Strategic Reconnaissance Group on 10 November 1948 g v 7 For reorganization and relocation of 31ith Air Division Recon— naissance white see 19 July 1948 and for reconnaissance not activities 1946—1949 see 22 April 1946 1 July c Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Topeka Air Force Base Kansas from the Military Air Transport Service MATS placed it on active status and assigned it to the 311th Air Division Reconnaissance 3 me 1918 For assignment of 311th Air Division Reconnaissance units to Topeka Air Porce Base see 19 July 1946 1 July Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Camp Hood Airstrip Killeen Texas and assigned it to the Eighth Air Force Prior to this time the base had been occupied under a joint use agreement with the Air Materiel Command 1 July Strategic Air Command assumed jurisdiction of Campbell Air Force Base Gamp Campbell Kentucky and assigned it to the Eighth Air Force in the last half of 1949 Campbell Air Force Base was made a sub—base of Carswell Air Force Base Texas I i 12 July — 1 August All Bombardment and Fighter Unite Reorganized Very Heavy Bombard— went Wings and Groups Replaced by Medium or Heavy Bombardment Wings and Groups Airdrome Groups Replaced by Air Base Groups In two phases on 12 July and 1 August Very Heavy Bombardment Wings and Groups see 15 August — 1 December 1947 7 were replaced» by Medium or Heavy Bombardment Wings and Groups The tactical _ unit however continued to be the group until 19 January 1951 q v 7 when combat wings were established Until that time wing commanders continued to be responsible for base management and administration As part of the July August 1948 reorganization only one Heavy Bom» — bardment Wing was established the remainder being Medium Wings % All aiedrome Groups were replaced by Air Base Groups under the Wing—Base Plan and the fighter wings were all reorganized Re— _ connaissance Wings were not established whtil 19 Juty 1948 3 v 7 and 10 November 1968 q v 7 In the reorganization Very Heavy Bombardment Wings were inactivated and in their place were activated Medium or Heavy Bombardment Wings The three support groups of the wings 213 i8es were inactivated and reactivated Air Base Groups replacing — Airdrome Groups The combat groups Very Heavy Bombard— ment Groups were reorganized and redesignated as Medium or Heavy Bombardment Groups and assigned to the newly acti— vated wings The following wings and groups were established 12 July on olay ube Assignment Lecation 2a Eighth Alr Force — Davis—Monthan Attached to 43¢ Bombardment Wing same date 200 Fifteenth Air Force Rapid City E Fifteenth Air Force Spokane 9% Fifteenth Air Force Castle 97m pae Air Force — Biggs y sem Fifteenth Air Force Spokane — Attached to S20 Bombardment Wing same date sols Fifteenth Air Force Smoky Hill sore Headquarters Maebin Strategic Air Command The Air Force Staging Areas Separation Points and Assembly Stations at MacDill and Smoky Hill Air Force Bases were assigned to the 307th and 30lst Als Base Groups respectively The Air Force Separation Point 1 and Assembly Station at Rapid City Air Force Base were assigned to the 28th Air Base Group and the Air Force Separation Points at Spokane and Castle Air Force Bases to the 92d and 934 Air Base groups respectively The 44th 90th 3030 and 305th Very Heavy Bombardment Groups which were inactive and unmanned at this time and assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command were not reorganized They were reasaigned to the Desaiment of The HX Force on 6 September 1988 ase 1 Tuly 991 t e 2 3 — Met mtome Loan oo crmmepermennormenin § 1 August New Heavy Assignment Location Wings and CC Groups Tm Eighth Air #orce — Carswell or conversion of this unit to B—36s zee 23 June 19187 New Medium Wings and Groups Assignment Location 220 Fifteenth Air Force Smoly Hill Attached to 30st Medium Bombard— ment Wing same late ise Eighth Alr Force — Davis—Monthar‘ — — soum Eighth Air Force Walker NOTE The 306th Very Heavy Bombardment Group Headquarters Strategic Air Command was attached to the 307th Medium Bombardment Wing Headquarters Strategic Air Command on 1 August 1948 ‘9 v 7 but it was not redesignated a Medium Bombardment Wing untilli August 1948 Lav 7 New Fighter L Wings and ° Groups Assignment Location ath Headquarters Stza— Andrews tegic Afr Command 27m Eighth Afr Force Kearney 334 Eighth Ar Force Walker Attached to 509th — ai iment Weim Robag ament 3 zs $ to rrnbage— 100 198 wew Fighter Wings and Groaps Assignment Location — seth Headquarters Stre sertridee qegic Air Comment see ‘mengquarters S127 Grenier qegie Ais Command ncachea to 30h MeSuP Bombard Whan wing Macpilt air Fort pase Frovign same date fhe air poree Smging MSF separation Pointe 250 Assembly Stationt at bavis—Monthan WalkETs Garewells dettiage ase Foree BMTCZ Wore assigned respectively to the a34 509th Mn us 56m ate Base Groupe The © S Pores separation Poe ‘wg assembly Station at Arcus ase perce Base Assigned to the 4th Alt pase Group i sea se use —— « _L — I i Demy — v J 3%