elan co oo mpgn o rhe LEBANON operation or toss __ __‘ A STUDY OF THE CRISIS ROLE _ fie uss per porppammfeerm —— mao LLLZt t Remmeh commutintes 00 — I cagmia at iar eile cain 3 Iyets o A TOR _ 7 _ Institute of Naval Studies © — © a eereee man _ Cs LP INO Idnfitenwos some Rerentg 0000 _ sno rato c mfam‘ nts MUSA— _ Mail _ iotintar orem l eral‘ f i URCLASSEE uictasstrren usor revovas or mictosure 1 Center for ‘npprpprcnsmmtanmmmnmmmmonemsnmessssrnmmensmesenssemnmmsenccclVQVAF rerindrieomient nirgont meses revescone Analyses nS 00e0—71 — 16 waren 2972 From Director Institute of Naval Studies To Distribution List Subj Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution No 153 fomarding of Encl 2 CHM RC 153 The Lebanon Operation of 1958 A Study of the Crisis Role of the Stxth Flees 4 Dissen of 1 February 1971 i Enclosure 1 4s forwarded as a matter of possible interest Tt discusses the crisis and events of the sumer and early autumn of 2958 during which time a U S force was landed in Lebanon Mach has been written on this subject but the political and military aspects have usually been considered independently Because the two were closely intervoven this paper examines them together 3 Research Contributions are distributed for their potential vate in other studies on analyses They do not necessariiy represent the opinion of the Department of the New £ s pivm kasine Dizector Institute of Haval Stuttes mat seqimirt UBE SSEED huwdd uicussre s 10 Mazeh 1971 vicrasszrzen urow resovat or enctosure Subj Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution No 153 formazding of orstazsurzon tise Central Intelligence Agency Atm Becnazd Gorden National Security Agency U S Information Agency Attm David Malle Assistant Director for Near East South asia Depaztment of State Under Secretary of State John Irvin II U S Ame Control Disarmament Agency Andrew % Kiligore Bureau of Near Eastern South Mean Affairs Michael Sterner Bureau of ear Eastern South Asian Affairs Albert A Vaccaro Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of Defense OisD IGA Near East South neta Director Defense Intelligence Agency Commandant National War College Defense Documentation Center 2 RADH Laurence R Gets Chief of Information op—0sps 3 VADM Francis J Blouin DCHO Plans Policy 0p—06 op—s0 op—sos op—sr Op—6118 Chez Herman C Absiein VADM Janes L Holloway III Deputy Chief of Stat cmemat cmcmureir — YADH Maldemaz P A Wendt cmicusuavevn YipH Isas xide cosnmiete VADM James Calvert Superintendent U S Naval Acadeny » VADM Richard G Colbert President Maval War Collage CDR Janes A Barber Jr Plans Officer Office of es‘t Chief of Staff for Plans Operations Naval waz College Jack Shulimson Mistorical Branch G—3 Div MqUBNC Office of the Chief of Military History Dept of the Arry Commandant Army Naz College Office of Miz Porce History Deptof the Miz Force Superintendent Air University UXCLASSIIED f ee 10 march 2971 vnctasszezzo uron newovat or swcrosures Subj Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution No 153 formazing of vremetmurton tzst continued tom attn ganes King mhc men Bernard eich maro RMYD washington office Attn mr Willian 8 Quandt sax apm George m anderson Us Ret Room 3004 01d Executive office puilding washington D C Anbassador Robert Mcclintock The american Embassy caracas venezuta Anbassador villian a puffin The American Enbassy Beirut tebanon is mae is unctassricor center ron navat anauyses s Instit of Naval Studies neseancn conrmeurion tso ‘The Labsnon Opertion of 1988 A Study of th Crits Rola of th Sith Flos U GeomeS Dregnich Suptember 1970 vercantas ae anna oseie—sacson Erdos 1 to 100U®71 cont 10 tush 1971 UNCLASSEFE unciassiriep ABSTRACT By July 1988 the pro—Wester government of Lebanon was in a precarious poston folowing two months of sever cil war When the pro Mestem goverment of Ing was ovetivoun on July 14 in what appeared to be a UARdirected coup Pesdent Chamoun of Lebsnon fearing a sini fat requested armed interention by the United State Great Btain and France Concerned lest the coup in Ing spread elsewhere the United States landed approximately 2000 Marines in Lebanon on July 15 The U S fors which eventually topped 14 000 men vas wthdraun completly from Lebanon by October 25 after Lebanon elected and inaugurated a new Presdent This pager i an examination of that cris and miltuy operation While much has been writen on this mbject the politcal aect or the miltary aspect has usualy been studied to the exchudon of the other Because the two were cowly interwoven in the Lebanon cas this paper hs examined them together cevease staat unciassifiep UNCLASSIFIED 4 8 Y oR R a MEDITERRANEAN _ Ac sea safty Ely —— E — wal p — #22 FAP — X3 sone — ss _ BreJ yes vor d a £i» Bests p PhysioGRAPNY or LEBANON fnnfogft_s P U cine @averse sua UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Taste or contents — Page Beli coool n ena o n onic oo hanes nen ne ae all Background to the Griet 11 0 0 000000000 nn ncn on nn nin $ TheSBlite soo noni inn connina nope nn nnn eens db Tne decision to tatervene 1 0 0 0 0000000000000 nn nn 0 0 2 ‘Tne miliary buckground and contingency pleasing 1 00 0 0 3 ‘The move into Beir and buildup of forces in the Lebinon operational ghee nna nanan a ee eed erie nene deere a e BP Lebanese resctiont to Untied Sates tatervention 1 2 00 1020 0 0 0 0 45 International reactions to the landing and the United Sates‘ response — 47 The continuing presence « « e ele e ee ce cn ees c nee een n $9 Mr operation u u 2 een nnn cc nn nn nna ann nnnne n — 89 CVA operations 2 102222 e nc can nn cnc rn nnn nicl $9 ASW operations u 12 00ee enc een nn cnc nn ncaa nn @ Adr Force opesstious u 2 11000000000 n cnn nnn n0 nn 64 Overiiigh problema s u 2 1000000000000 0 000000000 66 Gommuntéattoni o c 20000 n enn cnc nnn n ncn nnn neon 78 1_TL_IBFPSBSSDEDCCCCDERCCDCCCRSSSDRSSSSAE — Lm — — HASSSpSSSSSDDSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSCSEET furans eni nn Pein eneneannensenencnenee 8f eti enna eden ed PPDEADERE DEEP RER R e eRe — 99 Appendix A — Chronology of the Letbnnon operation 14 Jily—25 October Appendix B — Command structure during Lebanon operation of 1998 B—L Appendix G — The Risenbower Doctriity « u u «uue 0 uc enn Col Appendix D — Forse levela of the 6th lee in 1958 1 v D—L Appendix R — Plow deployment cant of 31° longtrade during the e eet a ense cous not El Appendix R — Lehsnon operation of 1998 6° decailed comporition Fl Appendix G — Map plete 13 July — $ September 1988 GL x @averse sari UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED reerace Thie to an examination of he rote played by the Sixth Fleet in the Lebenon landing of 1998 It exarnines the complexities of a feet operation in a major intrnationit cetate discusses in detail the diplomaric aepects ofthat landing and mtudlen the coordination of flt operations with U S policy obfectiven and accommodation of these objectives to the senaitvitien of the Lebanese The report is timely it discunses operation experience pertinent to antlyses of tradeotte beoveen land—based and sen—based tactical aircrai as well ao studies of future force levele tn the Mediterranean and the effects of changing political pescerno in the Middle East on miliary operations in the eastern Maditerrsncan ne aften heare the question Would the U 3 intervene in Lebenon agatat Ussally the question implies that the U 8 would not ncervene because or the new Inhibiting presence of the Soriec Madizerzanean squadron _s thts paper plate ou the miliary uncertalotion of a tactical engagement beoveen the Sixth Rloe and the Soviee aquadzon are noe the only issue ‘The aubor ake more pectinantly whether Lebanon would favite anothes incervention and whether the 1 6 would assume the risks once apaia of becoming embroiled in Lebanese factional diopuces The paper notes that President Chamoun sought U 8 intervention for mouth before i inally took place The U 8 for iss par tntervened only aot cess ne fie the coup jo meghced might Induce a Chala reaction in Beteue ant Amman Siace the Six—Day War of 1967 it has become increasingly dificult for the governments of modezite Arab states to maincain relations with the United Staves In the October 1969 criata for instance Lebenon sppererely preferzed UAR mediation to grest—power tavoivement annees to the of povelble U S tetervestion must grapple with the poly invom har iterate poito mie em Jack M Schick cein @everse mang UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sinorss f On L4 fly the pro«Wertern gorernment of Iraq was toppled in what appeazed to Washington to be a UAR—directed coup d‘etat Lebanon had been in a sate of irl war since May and President Chamoun fearing a similas fre roquestea — Western intervention Virmally all 79 shipe of the 6th Fleet sailed at irs ligh 18 July for the custern Meditersanesn Both the Artancic and Pacific Fleets were placed on 4—tour alert SAC was placed in a condition of Improved readiness MATS vas alerted and a TAC Comporite Strike Force took off from the United States for Incielik AB Adana Turkey A Marine Rualion Landing Team BLT alzeaty near Lebanon landed its 1800 Mazines near Betruc at 1900 Betrurtisi 18 July On the morning of 16 July another BLT from the 6th Fleet landed and Admizal Holloway few in from London to head the operation Amy troops in Germany began ther atzlit to Lebanon via Adana Turkey that day Os 17 July Robert Murphy Deputy Undezsectetary of Stam arzived in Lebanon as a special emtanazy of President Bisenhower Following a request for asstarance from King Hussein of Jordan Great Britain atelifted the first of 2500 Briinh troops from Cyprus to Amman the same day By the ead of 17 July virtually all of the 6th Fleee wan in the Sadtent Meditercansen including 4 ahipe in the Lebanon operational arse ‘The th Fleot‘s tind BLT and a Marine group tha had boen flown from the United Statee tended ar Beru on 18 July bringing the total to more than 6000 men On 19 Jaly Army ezcops from Germany bald over in Turkey began their airlit to Beli The same day the alert level for the Atlante and Pacifc Fleote was relazed from 4 houze to 12 hours However SAG conttamed to helgizen its alert by 20 July much of ss forse wan on 18—mimite alest ‘Troop landings continued i Lebanon by he end of 20 July over 11 000 troops were there Most of the troops were kept out of Bateat and Ameztcan policy was to avoid consaes with he rebel forces As the danger of a larger conllcc paased the aler levels of the Artanitc and Pacific Fleets were again reduced on 23 July rom 12 bouze to 24 Undersecretary Musphy and Ambassador Raber McClintock had mean while been working to see thas the Presidential elections i Lebanos scheduled for 31 July were held Gen Chehab the commander of the Lebanese Army was popilas with bch aida and won enctly The seriement of the Lebanese tnternal criete then became much easter On 2 August the United Sates recognized the naw government of ea which bad feared that the United States would use Lebanon as a springboard for operations againat it Adm Holloway was ordered to begtn planning for withiraval on 5 August — and the Nery announced on 7 August that the Atlante and Pacifc Fleets had cemoed normal sperastona U5 forene to Lebanon reacted a post eeagth _ of more than 14 000 by 8 August ‘On 12 August the day before the C NC cx UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Ausermbly met to discuss the Midite East situation the United Sates announced Bat one batralion of Marines would begin withdrawing on 13 August The caries — atrike force left the Lebanon ares for Ratian ports on 5 September and 2 more Marine battalions began to withdraw on 14 September Genezal Chehab was inaugurated on 23 September but severe disturbances beoke out in Berat when he appolated a leader of the former opponition forces as his Prima Miatoter American troop withdravals continued howerer and the United States announced on 8 October that withdraval would be complete by the end of the month The Lebanese government formed a compromise cabloce on 14 Octaber and the countzy begen to return to normal The last Americas troops left Lebanon on 25 October a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED iNTRODUCTION When U S Marines landed near Beleut on 15 July 1958 Lebanon had already undergone 2 months of civil waz On 14 July however the pro—Western gorerament ot frag had been overthroun in what appeared to Washington to he a UAR dizected coup deta The U5 had evidence thas the UAR Rgype and Syria had alzondy s given atguificant aneistance to the Lebanese rebel and Washington row clC t had to give an affirmative response to President Chamoun‘s request fo Intervention if Nasser and Communtam were to be stopped in the Micite Rast To meet this challenge the United States Congress had passed the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Mid Bast the Eisentover Doctrine in 1957 According to Herman Pileger who helped Seczetary of Site Dulles deaf t the Eisentover Doctrine was a dizect result of the Suez existe of 1996 Dulles foresew further troubles and wanted the United States to be ina position to act prompely L ‘The Eisenhower Doctrine offered economic assistance and declared Furthermore the United States regard as vial to he mational interest and world peace the preservation o the independence and integrity of the nations ofthe Midte Rast ‘To this end if the President determines the necessity thereot the United States in prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such mations requesting asgistance agninet armed agpreapton from any county controlled by international communion o — Secretary Datles explainet What we ae trying to create in the area is a greater sense of security greater degree of calm more graig of government and elimination of the influence of the Communists pormemmenrrmins sos cow i Piteger Herman Legal Advisor Department of Sate in 1950 Phleger Transcript The Dalles Oral History Collection The Princeton University Libeazy 1967 p 65 Department o State Bttetin 36 25 Mazch 1957 p 481 See appendix for complete tex 3 congzess—ttouse Committee on Foreign Attaizs Hearing on House Joint Resolution 117 Government Printing Office Washington 1957 p 6 # UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED President Chamoun of Lebanon readily subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1997 — Although regional and international factors intensified the Lebanese cziate of 1956 its origins vere internal Since Lebanon represents a balance of con— Micting forces a precarious republic 1 —— some diecussion of theve forces and of Lebanon itself should facilitate an understanding of the 1938 crisis Lebanon ts a very small country cecupytag an area no more than 125 miles from north to south and 34 miles from east to we in 1958 it had approximately 1 S mtlon Intabitancs Today there are approximately 2 5 millon In saditon mote than a million Lebanese live abroad Lebanon is a prosperous country That prosperity however is dependent on external sources Though Lebanon has some light Inustry It primacy product is services Inthis role Beirut the capfal plays the major past Betrut has more banks than London 3 and these encouzage a steady flow of goods and Capital through Lebanon Its aleport is the main ats link becween Burope and Asta and its hasbor is one f the mont active in the region Beirut is also the center of United Nations activity in the Midate Rast ® More aver the American University of Beirut and other colleges and universities in Beir have made Lebanon a clearing house for ideas —— for the Middle Rast especially but also for the rest of the so—called Third World In 1958 mort coustries malitained larger embassies tn Beieue than anywhere else tn t Middle Bast Other Lebanese post cities Teipolt inthe north and Sidon in the south —— serve ag outlets for more than half of all the Middle Rast ol piped to the Medier ranean 5 Tourism too is an important source of income large numbers of people come rom Europe and elsewhere in the Middle Bast ‘tadson Michael C The Precarious Republic Political Modernization in Lebanon Random House New York 1968 The Mddle Bast and North Africa 1968—0 18th ed Busops Publications London 1968 p 432 JGopelan Miles The Game of Nations Tne Amoralty of Power Poliics Wilmer Brothers Lid Birvenbend 1969 p 195 UNRWA Headquarters UNICEE Mediversanenn Ofice UN Regional Social — Affatze Office for the Middle Eas TLO Ares Office ON Information Genter The Middle East and North Africa 1968—49 op cit p 48 a— UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Despite he amall population and size Lebanon is very complex because of its diverse religtous groupings itis to beginwith the only Aah comtey with a significant number of Christian intabitants In fic the mountatn ares fn central Lebanon known as Mount Lebanon at the time of the Ortoman Empize is almost totally Christin — After World War 1 this aren and Syria were given to France as mandates ‘ Lebanon finally became independent tn 1963 the fast French soldter leaving in 1946 _ However when forming Greater Lebaron as a seperate mandate In 1920 France had assigned a greater area to Lebanon than the Sanjaq I of Letance had under the Orzoman Empize and the Chriatian—Moiem ratio became 65 By 195% the population was probbly divided evenly ‘Today it seems Likely that the Moslems are slightly in the majority to complete census has been conducted offilaly since 1939 This 1 attrittaple to the Miher Moslem bizth rate os— pecially among the Shia sect and to the greater Christian emigration ‘The words Obztatian® and Moslem give no inkling of Lebanon‘s religious compleatty — On the Christin alde there are In order of atze in 1950 Maronites ith aleptance to Rome Greek Orthodox Greek Catholic MelKten Armenian Orthodox Gregorian Armenian Catholic Protestant Syrian Cattollc Syrian Orthodox acobitea Reman Catholic Nestortans and Chaldeans On the Moslem tide are the Surnt ant Shia sects Officially the Sunnis are the larger of the tre me the Suiltes declare that they have become the major Mosler seee since the 1939 census Another lacge and Important sect in Lebanon is the Druze who broke off Latam inthe 12th century and established themselves in southern Lebanon There are also Jeus mainly in Betecc The founders of he Lebanese Republic realized given this religous complexty thar to etagle leader could hold the loyalty of more thin one—third of the population To create a workable form of government Letanon‘s two most prominent leaders Bechara Khoury Maronite and Riad Sul Gunn worked out in 1983 an oral compromise called the National Covenant Basically the National Covenare held that Lebanon was an Arab country with a epecial character ‘Christians were to forego secking foreign Western especially Frenct protection and Moslema were to recognize Lebanon‘s sovereignty and to forego any attempt to bring Lebanon foto a larger Arab unlon — Lebanon was to remain nestenl in ay inter—Arap atrugate Non—technlcal public officen were to be diided along religous tives and the three leading positions in he government were t he divided according to the majority nects This the President would be a Maronite Christian the Prime Mintater a Sunni Moslem and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Moslem An administrative onit in the Ottoman Empire # UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Similar allocations were made in the cabinct The Chamber of Deputios tseit 1s divided by zeligion in accorcance wath the 65 ratio Thore are at least 17 x political parties tn Lebanon aut the religtous aspect of Lebanese politics busts much of theie significance Political parties that co endure usually have some religious assoclation Most of the Deputies however do not belong to any pary 2 The Lebanese Constitution limits the President to a singto 6—year corm Pastiament elects him and he appoints a Prime Minister who in turn forms a Cabinet During the French Mixdate power was centralized around the Fronch High Commissioners since Lebanon‘s independence tis contraliacion has been carried over to the postion of President Thus the presidency is much the stronger offi Bechara al—Khoury was the fest elected President of the Republic 1943 and he appointed Riad Sulh as the iest Prime Minister In 1948 President Khoury used his majority representation rom the 1947 pazttamentazy elections which many believed to have been rigged to suspend the past ofthe Constination that deals with succession so that he could be re—elocted in 198 3 Many Lebanese leaders —— Moslem and Christian —— feeling that his administration was corut finally succeeded in unifying the growing opposition Prime Minister Riad Sulp broke with Khoury in 1951 taking many Mostom notables out of the goversment Suth was assaasiated in July 1991 During the spring and summer of 1952 the opposition aided by effective demonstzations railies and general stzikes was able to bring Khoury‘s government to a neae—standtill in September 1952 Khouzy‘s new Prime Minister Sami Sulh Riad Sulh‘s cousin publicly charged Khoury with corruption and resigned Unable to form a new government President Khouzy resigned later in the month after naming Gen Fuad Chebab the Army‘s Commander as Prime Miaister Gen Chehab who had commanded the Army since its formation under the Allies in World Wer IL had refused to let the armed forces become tavolved in the dispate _ Scll malrtaining his alootnens Chehab was acting hoad of state for ess than a week when new elections could be held Camille Chamoun a Maronite Deputy had been one of the original opposition leaders expecting to be the next President promising sweeping reforms he was elected Auteiman Michael W Lebanon Chapter 11 Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East Temal Tareq ¥ e8 Dorsey Press Homewood Hlliots 1970 p 238 durevite J C Middle ast Poltics ‘The Miliazy Dimenalon Prederick A Pracger New York 1969 p 383 PHatson Michael C op cit p 105 Arturevite op cit p 394 — a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED shckorount to mis caisis 1t ts ironic that 6 years after ousting President Khoury President Chamoun his adeniniateation clouded by corzuption was attempting to amend the Comicon in order to run again Fahim Qubsln suggests two main causes for the Lebanese eriels ot 1998 Wizst «— and baste to the trouble Chamoun attempted to eliminate — important traditional leaders from politicl If By the beginning of 1958 almost every major Lebanese political leader many had supported him in 1950 was iis personal enemy Second Chamoun tried to succeed himaelf in contravention of the Constitution % Before Chamoun‘s refusal to break diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain over Suez in November 1950 the Lebanese opposition had been an amorphous growing of Individuals and politcal groups Betveen November 1956 and March 1957 however the government and oppotion gradually deifted to extreme poles ‘Chamoun‘s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March and the comming pesttamentary elections of June accelerated this trend Many members ot the opponitn formed the United National Prone in April 1957 It was made up Hargely but by no means exclustvely —— of Moslems Though the Front was Nasserist in ortentation it included political elements rom the sight and left Communtats supported the Front but there was no official link and thete ald was noe solitec On 30 May the Ezont sponsored a demonstration in Beleat which was cit shor by police and gendarmes who killed some demonstrators and wounded many more According to Qubain Chamoun‘s administeation in a contain sense ceased to he a government inthe proper meaning of the word from that day on ° Hnstead of the re—establishment of order lawessness and terrorism became wide spread The opposition did not lose powers is strength grew unil it viewualy he— came another government Inthe parliamentary elections of June 1957 Chamoun managed by fraudulent mean and intensive electioncezing to defeat most of the Deputios who were gprased to the constitulonst amendment that would allow him to run again Though Chamoun is a dedicated anti—Communtat he o also a dedicated politician his ‘qubatin Fahim L etate to Lebanon the Middle Rast ftitue Washington 1961 p 169 Qubatn‘s book the mort comprobenatve English—language diss cussion of the Lebanese criss of 1958 ts used extensively in this section Amid p 5s Smid p 50 — UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED exusade for reelection was probably in large past a result of his personal ambition Besides increasing the personal animosity to him the denial of parliamentary expression led many members of the moderate opposition into the — radical camp Compromise is indispensable in Lebanese politics Chamoun‘s had—line style was rare for that countsy Most of the opposition leaders were prestigous powerfi personalities The Front Included three of President Chamoun‘s former Prime Ministers Abdallah Yatt Seeb Salam and Rashid Karam I also included Kamal Jumblat the Druze leader and founder of the Progressive Socialist Paty who had supported Chamoun in the 1952 presidental crisi Although the Moslems did most of the fighting on the opposition side the opposition leaders mentioned above were Mortem the crisis was not a Moslem— Christian ight per ae Chamoun was largely responsible for giving the conflict a religtous color by his attempt to win Chatotian support avay from strong Chatatian leaders in the opposition Mary prominent Christiana such as former President Khoury Butzos—Soulus Meouchy the Maronite Patriarch and Khoury‘s cousin Charles Helou who was elected President in 1964 and Suleiman Feaniieh wo was elected President in 1970 were members of either the Front or other opposition groups in addition to the Eront a group known as the Third Force appeared on the poltcal scene t was compored primarily of Christians Ted by Henri Pharoan Greek Catholic opposed in principle to Chamoun‘s contravention of the Constiution — Though the Third Force was formed to act as a neseral mediator time brought it very close to the Froot 1t should be noted that in 1957 the opposition platorm did no include resort to violence or early removal of President Chamoun The Syztan leaders wanted Lebanon to be part of the UAR but the Lebanese zebel leaders erthusiaom for such a move did not last The rebels were gratefil for ald from the UAR inx even tn 1998 during the most violent stage ofthe ceisis they genezally contined thete demands to removal of Chamoun Chamoun‘s alienation of political personalities and attempe to succeed him« self may have been the primazy causes of the Lebanese crisis but regional and international factore abeent from the 1952 presidential controversy accounted for the violent natuze of the 1958 exists A restooal factor in the Lebanese ceteis was the Intervention in Lebanon‘s attatz by the United Arab Republic which had been formed by Bayne and Syria on 1 February 1958 Chamoun had been at odds withthe two countzies since 1956 when he had refused to break diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain over Suez Chamoun‘s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957 » Aqusata op cite pe 89 mod p 170 4 UNCLASSIFIED URCLASSIFIED musrnoe is unccassineo exacerbated this animonity By 1958 in spite of he National Covenant Chamoun bad placed Lebanon in the fraqi—lordantan camp which was solidly opposed to te — van ‘The UAR tnfltrated men toto Lebanon but ts primary role was to satiety the oppositlon‘s greater need money and arms ‘he UAR fanned he crista by carrying on a vitiperative radio and newapaper campaign in what Amtassador Faber McClintock has called autto—rinual aggression In ths intenaive ctor the UAB also gave Ananclal support to Lebanese opposition nevapapers and — elandestine radio stations operating within Lebanon On the Internattonal level he National Covenant was ignored when Chamoun laced Lebanon under the aegle of the Eisenhower Doctrine Chamoun as American oftcials n Beteue reported in 1957 net Lebanon emly on the aide of the United States in the strugale hecveen the West and International communion for the Midtle Bust 1 ‘The Rineahower Doctzine was approved by Congress‘ on 9 March a few days fates Congressman James Richards was sent on a Freidential mission to the Midle Bast to police support for it President Chamoun has aatd tha the United tates wanted his countey to be the first to aubscribe t it2 and indeed Ambassador Rlcharda‘ first stop was Lebanon Certalnly Lebanon was Important to the Eisenhower Doctrine As Seazstary on Sate Dulles said before the House Committee on Foreign Aflairs 6 Janiacy 1957 Lebanon ts a coustzy which particularly needs our help and support at this present time It is one ofthe most western—oriented f the countries of the area It s very concerned about what is poing on in its neighborhood 1 think very much can he done and needs to e done to bolster ‘up a government like Lebanon Perhaps the example set there would have an ffluence tn the rest of the ares 3 ——_________ 1 — Both Presiden Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were very conscious of the necessity of proceeding tn accordance with Constiutional power and authority and Herman Pleger believes tha it would noe have been possible to make the Lebsnese landings unless the Eisenbower resolotion had been passed Pileger geccit por f Chamoun Camille Chamoun Transerize The Dulles Oral History Collection the Princeton University Library 1967 p 6 Congress—ttouse Committee on Foreign Attitzs op cit p 68 a UHSLASSIRED — Richards also received a favorable reception in Izaq Turkey Pakisten Iran Ethiopia and Israel but Lebanon was the only country make a tem committe to the Eisertower Doctrine President Eizentower had hoped that King Saud of Saudi Arabia might eventually rival Nassor as an Arab leader but Saud did not find i politically expedient to accede to the Eisenhower Doctzine _ As for Jordan youg King Husseln‘s tenvous hold on his throne made it preferable to extend U S economic assistance through other means As for Eqype President Naster sent word privately to Ammssador Richards saying that ho would like to see him Richards however zefused Dulles having instructed him to accent an otticial invitation only 3 Bgype and Syria then assailed the Bisentower Docteine vehemently Before Ambassador Robert McClieock took up Mis post in Lebanon in Januazy 1958 he was warned by the Department of State that volaile tsoues were involved 4 On his arzival in Reut he sought out all sides of opinon to the chagetn ot President Chamoun The mew Ambassador leaned at est to the view that Chamoun should be reelected he later switched to the opposite opinion 5 After Investigation McClintock recommended to the Department of Sate that the United States tell Chamoun thas we hoped he could support some other candidate in 195% with the Iden of running again in 6 years 0 Altough the Britsh Ambassador Siz George Mideton had similar mingivings this view was not shazed by all American officals inBeteue Tne Deparment ot Suite how ever realized that any other course of action might result in an taternal conflict of uipredictable dimensions and instructed the Ambassador to query Chamoun on this poise 8 Aisenhower Dwight D The White House Years Waging Pesce 1956—1961 Doubleday Co Gerden City 1968 p 263 Ambassador James P Richanda radlo and televison addrens of 8 May Department of Sate Bulletin 36 27 May 1957 p 841 3nichante James P Ambassador American Mission to the Middle East in 1957 Rlonands Transcript The Dulles Oral History Collection The Princeton University Libeasy 1967 p 32 4Boreign Service Dispatch American Embaney Beirnt Ambassador Robert McClintock An Embassy to Lebanon ‘The First Year—1958 No 21 Secret 1s Juty 1988 p Scopeland op cit p 198 CMcCiintock An Embasey to Lebanon Secret p 6 Copeland op ci p 198 — SweCumtock An Embasey to Lebanon Secret p 6 as n A T UNCLASSIFIED Accordingly the Ambassador met with President Chamoun on 5 March but found him very contident of victory Amiaseacor McClintock felt that Chamoun‘s id contidence was uneusessted but State did not foul it advisable to pross Chamoun C further at the time 1 — Os 1 April Gen Chatab ell in command of the Army told Ambassador MeCliamnck that Chamoun‘s attemapt at reelection would bring on civil trite and poosbly ctvil was The Genesal expressed a atmidar view Chainoin‘s foreign minister Charles Malie 2 Tn mid—Aprily Chamous made a spurious otter of the presidency to Gen Chala Inoving that the Generai‘s lontaese trom politics would cause him to reture ® Chamom lost no time amouncing the rejection implying that he himaelf was the only suitable candidate for President On 15 Apri Chamoun told an American oficial that he would aempe to secure the necessary constinatonal amendment in the midele of May It he failes he would try aputn in July but he noted that he expected success in May Foreign Miniter Charles Malt also reported this plan to the Ambassador on 18 April Geozge A a pro—Chamoun Deputy anounced on 24 April his Revegiont tie peoise Propieme Gamooes Mail ned th foal h ie me meet cet l SH a caug On 3 Mey the French Britiih and American ambassadors met to discuss a request from President Chamoun fon support in his bid for reelection They » were auze that Chamoun would confront them with the attirmazive anrvers of » Han Iraq Tuzkay Pakistan and Jordan Por this zeasoo and because of the foax that any other candidate might call for now paritamentary election 0 thar ‘might change Is pro—Wertern orientation esch ambassador recommended o ie qorerament that Chamoun be supported ‘Tey adted the caveat howeres that a diferent cancidite ether Gen Chatab or someone whom Chamoun would agree t would be a better alternative Jmit Seczou p 7 Zoid Secret p $ mid Secret p 8 Bast Misso 10 Z Apuit 1958 p 6 the Presidential elections were held this fons did noe materialize TmsCtistock An Entasey to Lebnon Secret p 9 % INE RSAC UNCLLSSAED Uit Kamp UNCLASSIFIED Be ormnes en isuenier iecises nammumcrein me Secretazy Dulles who was in Copeshagen aitenting a TO meeting sent the nopmismieutenntieacumrame 0 0 it should be done wholobaaztedy though the message of support should ull be given only A ss Ambsseados MeCHistock gare Chamoun oral assurance of American support on 7 May this was followed by similar assurences from the ® French and Britsh ° ‘mid Seczot pe 9 a 10— mint NReGeie — UiLUMSsritD SOLAS m muspaoe is mcuassireo Tus cont war On 8 May the Christian editor o on anti—Chamown newspaper was murdered in Beteue The incldent sparked severe rioting in Tripoli the nex ta A goneeal strike was declared in the Basta the Moslem quarter of Belews and fighting sec spread throughout the country It vas already evident tat the UMA wus auiniying the rebels with money and aeme — as Egypt and Syria stepped up tha‘r radio and press campaign against Chamoun On 11 May when the insurrection was only 2 days old Foreign Ministor Malik declared that Syeta had sent a horde of soldiers tnto Lehanon the night beford and anked Ambassador MeCHerock to have the 6th Floge‘s Marines ready to land in the event that Lobanese forces were overvteimed 1 Chamoun in reference to Mallk‘s zemask told McCListock that same day that th landing of a Marine diiaton would be necessary if Syzia Invaded Lebanon 2 On 13 May President Chamoun summoned the American British and Erench Ammssadors individually and requested that theis governments cossider the possisilty that he would agk them to land armed forces in Lebanon vithin 24 hours after such an appeal President Eiserhower met with Seczetay Dulles and others that day to consider Presidere Chamoun‘s request According to Presiden Bisentowen Behind everything was our deep—seated conviction that the Communtata were principally responsible for the rouble and that President Chamoun was motivated by a strong feeling of patriotism 4 During this meeting Secretary Dulles argued for an immediate affimative response while Mis brother CI Director Allen Duiles argued for a delay of 24 hours before answering Chamoun Ahayer Charies W Diplomat Hasper Bros New York 1959 p 8 McClintock Robert The American Landing tn Lebanon U S Naval fotirice Proceedings 88 October 1960 p 66 Topservez The Landing in Lebemon Foreign Service Jounal 44 July 1967 p as atisentower op cit p 266 to p 266 on 8C ASEE RC AS Mui ndds I ‘The Prosident decided to answer Chamoun‘s request affirmatively but not wanting to fet Chamoun think that he had a blank check the President made his statement conditional On 14 May Ambassador McClintock was authorized to — inform President Chamoun ot te condittns for dizect military assistance ° 1 Lebanon must fil a complaint withthe United Nations Security Council 2 Some Arab states must be prepared to give public support to a request or assistance 3 Intervention must not center on the domestic issue of the Lebanese Presidential election 4 — An appel for aid must come from the government of Lebaron not from the President alone On May 15 Chamoun informed the Ambassador that more Syrian partisans nad entered Lebenon and that he might need help notin forty—eight or beenty—foue houes but in stx hours 2 A bastc assumption undesiying direct military assistance was that Lebanon‘s own forces would prove inadequate ‘The Army‘s small size —— 9000 men — did ot cause as much concern as its degree of willingness to engage the rebels Gen Chehab had told the Ambassador a few days cartier 11 May that though opposed to Chamoun‘s reelection he would support the President unc te end of his term tn September 3 As in fhe 1952 presideatial crtala the Army trled to remain aloot fom the atugsle Gen Chetak fele that the crtate was an internal Conflict which would distntegrate the Army along zeligtous lines if he committed it to stzongly on the aide of te gorernment Chamoun on the other hand be« Hieved that Chehab had presidential ambitions and that no revolution would have started except by the fll consent of Chehab © ‘The Army‘s abstinence ‘McClintock The American Landing in Lebanon p 69 McClintock An American Embassy to Lebmon Secret p 15 Stig Secret p 11 ‘tn many countries Gen Cheab‘s zeluetance to help his President would be considered treason in Lebanon the Constitution is ambiguous on the relation— hip benveen those two positions ‘Hudson op cit p 299 MeClstock The American Landing tn Lebanon p 67 Chamoun op cit p 24 « az I I sep p eof msmnor isuncumssirieo rom poliieal activity kept t and Gen Chotab a Maronite Christian popular ‘wih most of the Lebanese population t should also be nored that Chetab came — com an aristoczatic Lebanese family and must have been influenced by the fact thas mast of the opposition leaders did too All of the opposition leaders according to Qubain were his personal friends ‘The zebels had three strongholds Rashid Kazami a Sunni Moslems led the insurgents in Tripel which was largely Moslem in population Absallsh Yat and Saeb Salam led the revel forces who were centered in the Basta Peirut‘s Moslem quarter Kamal Jumblat led his Druze forces inthe Chout the mountain — area in the south The army fought these forces only when atached or when the rebels had overstepped the imaginazy boundaries that the Army had created Although toral suppression of the rebels might not have becn easy especially in the Chout there is no doute that the Army had the military capability to destroy the Basta in a matter of hours But them the government had the power to cut off electricty water and telephone service to the Basta—— which i never did Etimates of the forces on the insurgent side have varied greatly Some run as high at 15 000 bus Ambassador McClintock has stated tha the number probably never exceeded 6 or 7 thousand the bulk of these being Lebanese The rebels operated in lightly armed bands of 400 to 2000 men but without central leaderahip Because Beteit was the key city most of the UAR ald went to the zebels there As mentioned cartier the UAR‘s primazy role in the erists was to send money and aem to the rebels The UAR also inflteated troops ° Uit June 1958 the UAR prefered to tnflteate Palestinians astt—Chamoun Lebanese emigeants and Syrian Druze tato Lebanon 7 Mary of the last were Druze whom the UAR had zeleased from the Syrian Jat Army to join Kamat Jurmblat‘s Druze forces in the Chou Stavgat Stukalz former Syrian Chiet of Sta inllteated into Lebanon on 18 May and took command of Jumblat‘s forces 5 Jqubatn op cit p 61 Wew York Times 22 July 1958 p 3 s MeCLintock The American Landing in Lebanon p 67 dsmatimeon Jack Mazines in Lebanon 1958 U S Marine Corps Historical Branch G—8 Diviston My U S Marine Corps 1966 p 11 Scepelant up cit p 197 gor a detailed summazy of UAR subversion n Lebmmon see Under Secretary » of State Hester‘s Report to Congress New York Times 17 July 1958 p 3 hes York Times Hestes‘s sepory 17 July 1958 p 9 Teide p 9 Qubato op cit p 142 —is URCLASSIRED bee C In all atou 8p Druze joined Jmbla On 6 Jin Syria openly established £ Peiiiit met or ee etn Pelmacers to fig in Inseson 1 home of tie UA Regine Soigy teoops who tntlcented into Lebanon were Syrian there were a few Repeians 3 Because te Army‘s troops were loyal to Gen Chela Chamoun wan forced to depend o his armed civilian supporters to meet the fnnirpents There were Rew 1300 men to te Lebanese gendarmente under an offices loyal t Chamous Mees the oppentinn‘s ieee demrptzation 20 ter 1097 hoveress the Amy had Anpomed command ot this forse 3 A yeas latex 20 May 1998 the goversmen Anfomced t formation ofa Milita of National Volunteers ontenstily to relieve n Texdarmezte and insued arma to them Chamoun‘s owo largort bands of armed uivifans came from the miitase Chrtecian Pualangiet Katzeb Parey and the Frrst Fepiiaize Synion the doctrines of these pasties are prposed bos both fle at he time tat tete very existence rode with Chamoun e ctritien bands ‘Were seat paneloats of goma andt some money — clandentialy from Jordan Tacky irae and teng 5 Altough the U S wan otten anked to help arm the cmb sand t such requests were refused and Ambassador MeCLiseock Buited publicly on 27 May thas U S arme ahtpments to Lebanon would be stopped if thay were diverted rom the official security forces 0 In compHtance withthe conditions see by the U on 14 May Presides Chamoun mid Ambassador NeCliseack on 20 May thar he was not going to mn s kptin and due the question of hi reelection was ns longer an true The Stan Beprztmest hoveres disectad MecHiseock to make ceri pat Chamoun eult d mt dink bn had a blane check on American fntervention On the night of Toap ——— — me p 9 2 — ‘te UKR alerted its milly personnel in Lebanon June 19 to he ready to reosen imsediazaly in the event tae UN troops or Anglo—Amezican forcen landed Tn Lebasos Nex York Times Hezter‘s zeport 17 July 195% p 9 3 — According to Qubais this more was past o a compromise sentement to end a gronsal veiee calied by the United National Frome Quin op cit p 56 4 — tne PFS wan outlawed after an abortive coup againat President Chui tn 1962 it wan Inglized along with the Communtot and Beath parties again tro days before the 1970 prosideatial election 5° noCistock An Amestcen Hmbasey to Lebanon Sectet p 15 Irag‘s rote was sereniod at the public trials of ropallo when the Iragt erolirionacy Porermment opened many of the state pepers lef by the monazeiy Quai fy at p iss ® unatle Bast Miszor Beiint Lebanon 10 §Jue 1988 p 6 7 meCtszock An American Embassy to Lebanon Secret p 17 M se 1 5 UNCLASS FIED useno is nerassireo 23 May Chamoun summoned the French British and American «massadors to tll them what he had alteady told McClimock that he was nit yoing to em A again The ambassadors fel hat hie meeting complied withthe State Bepast« ment dizective to McClintock On 23 and 27 May Prime Miniate Suth announced publicly that his government had no intention of seeking a constttonal amerd ment concerning succession for President Chamoun On 21 and 22 May Lebanon filed a complain against the UAR with coth he Comeil of the Arab League and the U N Security Council thus fltilling another condition for American aastetince The Security Council met on 27 May Just long enough to postpone further discussion pending the outcome of the Azeh League dellbezations which were to begin on 1 June ‘The Arab League Council held four sessions the outcome of which was a compromise drafe resolution that condemned notther party The resolution vas unopposed by the UAR delegation and approved is the Lebanese delegation The Lebanese gorernmene however rejected the musolution on 5 June o the surprise ot lis delegation On 6 June Eorelgn Minister Mallk lodged a formal protest witn the United Nations Security Council against the UAR‘s intervention 1t appears that the Lebanese Government never gave the Arab League Council serious thought Malik bypassed the meetingn and went dizectly to New York inatead To be suze the dismal record of the Arab League along with the fact that the rest of ts members were Moslem pestially explains Chamoun‘s behavior Furthermore by Internationilizing the crisis at the U N level Chamoun hoped to expose Nasser to world aplaton Chamoun might have been holding out for foreign Hntervestion which would bolster his regime He was pleased when the 100 member United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon UNOOIL was authorized hy the U N Security Council on 11 June and the first officers began arziving on 12 June Contzary to Chamoun‘s expectations UNOGIL was an ineffective opecation Chamoun never tried to hide his biterness On 18 June U N Secretary General Dag Hammazaidold arrived tn Lebanon for a short ay at the conclusion of which he sald that he had seen no evidence ot massive infltzation in its firs dfficil eport dated 1 July UNOGHL Likewise reported no evidence of he massive intleration from the UAR charged by the gorermment of Lebanon Yer at this time the UNOGIL group had access to only the 18 kilometers under government coatzol of the 200—kilometer Lehenose—Byzian border Permission from the opposition forces for ful access to theiz areas did not come uatil 15 July and was not implemented unti 31 July «se URGLASSIAED ‘The Lebanese—Syzian border rune along a mountaln range and is dificult to paso as was recently demonstzated again when the Lebanese Army aempred to curb tibliration of fedayeen from Syzia _Iniialiy UNOG had very tew aizcents and plystcal accensthlity to even the border areas not undes rebel cosecol was £ neasty impossible for morse vehicles For a long while UNOGH did ase work at ight when tntleratton would be moet lkely 2 0 N Secretary Hammazsidold howeres told he U S delegation to New York 2 July tt he had been convinced from the beginning tha the UAR had tntervenad in Lebanese aftates and thas he 3 Anropiznd the tase of DB insiiiennsnn moet alto foie is dld Anmesticle the tree of tan most also tol as ole thas is efect was miitmal compared wiih Chamonn‘s own handling of the criss On 7 June Preaidest Nasser approached the U S Ambassador to Cairo Reymond Have with a plan to ond the extate Acconting to the plan President Chiamoun would appotst Gen Chaba Prime Minister as i 1952 with the under— erunding that Chaka would become Presiden at the cad of Chamonn‘s term in September Fuether ammonty was to be granted the repel eadess Chamoun Aatly retard it and any other coming from Nasser 9 The actual resolution of the cxiste followed Nasser‘s plan closely June began routtnal for the 6th Fleet although Ambassador McCHitock cetised a Naval request thas a 6th Flee port call be granted for Belrwe because he del tae such a move could agprarate the tense atisaton On 14 Juxe the f heariast fitting that etews was to expezionce tok place # and Mallk asked if the U 6 eod leverrene at oce If so requated On the following day Ogu Cheliab tld the Ambansaddo that his army had lose the tnitattve to the rebele 5 Ammasador — MeCiseack aked the Depestment or Sate to consides Lebenon in a state of siexs a request thas was granted and announced thaz day Also on that same cay 15 June Provident Chamoun told MeCHieock that be would sack Chebab after U S rompe had landed 0 o———_—_____ Robert Diplomat Among Warziess Doubleday Co Garden can Bin‘ in 2 — rew York Times 19 June 1958 ps 1 AlcAbeam M Heiki 17 June 1958 3 Riseshower on cit p 26¢ quais on cit p 75 5 MeCHisock An American Embasey to Lebanon Secre p 19 $ mik Secret p19 rse UNCLASSIFIED £ Washington‘s reaction was one of alasm since the cooperation of the ratmnsse Army yas coneidened baste wo a U 5 miltary operation tn Lebanon Ar Secrenary Dulles direction MeCLiszocy again went over conditions les for inseregtion with Ghamoun on 16 Jian Fates tt tap Alamos sataint vound him the power to request unilatecaly the assistance of foreign tope it necessary thus fitting the last conditén that such a request would have to be # made by the goversment of Lebanon nit by the Presides thong Iraq Jordan and Turkey bad aizeady agreed to support such a request publicly Both frag and Turkey fle that Chamoun was inttepensabte _ ea offered on 11 June to ftzevene miliartly t the United Sterns would fuzninh the necessary ate corer 3 Turkey exerted prossure tor direct U5 titervention _ though ne Traqt Prime Maieten Nast Said old U 5 Aminapador Waltome® Gllinia Ko June tit his goversmere would po to back a L request for Awerters miliary asstotance 4 the fragt Foreign Minister later 23 June added the caveat that Anglo—American iitervestion would be undesirable and that Lebanon should request troupe from the Arab Unlon lag and Jordan under Asieda SL o the U N Chastaz On 28 June Lebanon asked for U N forces to soa its routers and Presiden Chamoun atnnnced that he might tind it —— necessary to request ouside ntervention under Article 51 of the U N Charter Although Britsh Ambassador Middteron stared Ambeseador MeCistoci‘s — ‘view that Wortern intervention wan undasteable the Britsh govenmens was more ceopenatve to its ambassadors tn Taq and Jordin who segued that British ineereass in those comies would benefit from forsefdt acion in Lebanon The f British Foreign ofice also argued tit the Wert mure help Chamoun I Nasser was to be steppes 5 Dulles told the Canadian Ambassador on 21 Mey that we were extremely reluctant to see matters in Lebeson develop in such a way as to sequize azmed tscerventton We had howeres the Impression that the Britsh were serie to ‘coud us on miltary intervention Th Secret p 19 1 MeCtstock The American Lenting in Lebanon p 6 3 neCtismoct An American Embaney to Lebanon Secret p 22 Ats cover had been of prmazy consern to Must Seid for years He told Ambeasacor Gallman again on 12 uly tha though tes was willing to undertake mlicary action on Lebanon‘s beialf it could not act lowe ‘because ot aix coverage Gellman Waldemaz Iraq under General Nuxt My Recollection of Nust Al—Sid 1954—1988 Tne Johne Hopkins Prese 1964 p 165 150 Gatimen on cit p 16 5 new York Times 26 June 1958 p 1 $ — New York Times 15 Ju 1958 p 4 7 MeClmock An American Embassy tn Lebanon Secret p 16 «a a ac UNCLASSEER musrnoe isuncuasseieor All ofthe three major Teaders in the Lebanese government deaized Western intervention Prime Minister Sulh wanted a 19th century solution in which U $ shipe would destroy the rebel sector of etzut by naval guntize At times he — also asked for British and French ships He was probably the most vehoment in wanting to remove Gen Chetab The most alarmist governmental leader was probably Foreign Mintater Malik who also wanted to dismiss Gen Chenab Chamoun shazed Sulh‘s and MalWF‘# dislike of Gen Chehab but worzied more about a the Generai‘s populartty Like Sulh and Malik however Chamoun was persistent in seeking U S miltary assistance Tvice in June Chamoun came very close to making a formal request Both times Ambassador McClintock felt thas the requests were not in line with prevailing conditons and was able to dissuade Chamoun from pursuing them President Chamoun had been cooped up for weeks in the prosideatial palace behind steel stuzters Rebels had been fig at it wih small arms for much of this time and the Ambassador felt that this attuation was enough to unnerve any— one But while urging President Chamoun to be pattere Ambassador McCLintock had taken significant precauttonazy measures In response to his eariter request and unkmown to President Chamoun 2 6th Fleet destroyers had been cruising 20 miles one hour‘s steaming time of the Lebanese coust since May A special communications ctzcult kepe the Ambassador in constant touch with these shipe which also acted as a relay to the 6th Fleet flagship which was then in the western Mediterzaneen The French Brits and American ambsosedors again met simultaneously with Chamoun on 1 Jly and found him sull umeilling to go beyond Prime Mintatec Sulb‘s statement of 27 May The ambassadors felt that the Prosident‘s re— election was still a major fssue and that Chamoun would refuse to make a public announcement himeelfuseil he had exhausted all poosibli¢ies Finally during an interview with Newweek and UPI reporters on 8 July ° Chamoun acknowledged publicly that he would not wun again prayer on cit p 24 1 may p as 3 new York Times Sem Pope Brewer 2 July 1958 p 3 Newsweek 52 14 July 1958 p 3 crs UNCLASSIFIED Meanwhile sp otticials tn Washington had been debating potentsl military imrotvement in Lebanon since May Publicly the government bad shown itelf — resuorive to such a possiblity Doring his press conference of 20 May Seccetacy Duiles was asked if the Risenbower Docerine was applicable to Lebanon Dulies answered that while the United Sates dld not perceive an azmed sack from a country undes the control o imernational Communiam the provision in the Eisentowor Doctrine that declared the independence of the Middle Eastern countries vital to peace and tothe national iterest of tho United Stroy was cerrainly a mandate to do something if such a threat ectazed As t the acuual use of troops Dulles answered I would noe wane to give a catmporical yes—oz—no answer to hae particulae question L When the serece rioting of 14 June erupted in Beteut Allen and John Foster Duites cut shore their stay at a Princeton reunion to reruzn to Washington Meetings of the Presidenc Secretary of Sate and other key officials Ailed Sunday 15 June Foreign Minister Malik who had flown to Washington Joined ane of these conferences it was not certain thge intervention could be avoided Flans were therefore developed in great detail During his press conference of 17 June Dulles stated tht even though at the moment the dissurtance m Lebanon assumes in part at least the — chasacter of a cil disuirhance itis covered by the United Nations resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression This denounces the fomenation from without St civit steife 3 Dalles went on to say that f a U M atfont in Lebanon called or U S milliary participation the U S would be Inclined togo along but that United States military action in Lebanon would not he limited toa U call it should be noted however thatin public and classified discussions Dulles did say that milly intervention in Lebanon was a measure of last resort $ By the ime the National Security Council met on 18 June the Lebanese situation had calmed down someviat t did ot faze up again unil the Iraqi coup of 14 July 6 There wese thase in the Depasement o Seite who were opposed to Dulles® willingness to imervene and in fact thought that a Lebanon landing would be ‘Department ot Sate Buttern 38 9 June 1959 p 945 butles Eleanor Esnalig Jom Foster Dulles ‘The Last Year Harcoust Brace World New York 1968 p 132 Ipepastment ot State Buttetin 39 July 1958 p 8 foi p 10 5For example the Dulles press conference o 1 July 1958 Department of Ste Bulletin 39 Z1 July 1958 p 106 outles op et p 183 ms UNCLASSIFIED UnNciassiFiED a tercible mistake 1 There was certainly the risk that t might create as much trouble as it would seive It would be Miel for Communist propaganda and the Chamoun governmene migh fall as soon as American troops withdrew More ver as some miliary experts in the Peseagon argued the United Scates might tind leelt auick in a proteacted gueezill wae auch as the one thas the Erench were then expertencing in Algeria 2 The Joint Chiefs of Saft however felt that imervention was a sound more 3 twining Nathan Chatemas Joint Chiefs of Seat in 1958 Twining Transcstp ‘The Dutlés Orel History Collection The Princeton Univezsity Libeasy 1967 p 12 tew York Times 26 June 1958 p 1 ruining op cit p 13 oan UNCLASSIFIED SSFAED UNGLASs — Tus peciston to nrreavans 1s easty Pty te appeared thas the Lebanon cxtets would pass without h Weesmen miliary aseiacance I hus the simition changed zadically and suddenly on 14 July Tragt oops under Brig Gen Abdul Kazim Kassem were being sent to Jordan Inotad they mirned aside ar Baghdad tia morning and over ‘rew the pro—Western gorersment of Nust Seid and the royal family of ea in what appeared to be a UKR—dirvcrnd coup datas President Chamoun feazing a stile tare requested fornign inteyersion Chamoun summoned sepecazly the United Seance Britsh and French dislomatic representatives that morning and asked for Britsh and French assistance within 24 hours dnd American aselstence within 48 hours The lame request was based ‘on the biet devived trom newspapers thas he 6h Flees was targaty deplored in the weeteen Mediterssnean and could not reach Lebanon soonez5 Chamoun made His dectaton 2 to 3 hours atts learning of te Traqt coup 4 He based it on no more than sadlo reporte from Catzo Dermascus and Baghtad and one tele gram from the British Smbmaey in Baghiad 5 Ambassador MeClinick tole tar thia was insuitiiess for such a sectous request and noted in his wlegram to ‘Washington thas while the State Department would probebly decide on the request in the perspective of the whole Middle Bast sttmzion circumstances in Lebmon Heselt did noe weresse itesrention A similes opinion was expressed by the Ameztcan change dittiizes in Jordan 6 Atisenbower op cit p 289 prime Mintotes Nust Sad had told Ambassador Galiman 12 July that an fst — forse wan atzendy on the Teaqt—Jortantan treaties in sxictpatton of an appel from Amman Oaltmwas Iest pr 200 It has been augpested that Gen Kassem‘s forces were being sent t Jonas where ho would open sealed ondes for a move agitun Orzta Childers Reskine The Road to Suen A Sealy of Wentemn—haab Ralastont MacGibison Kee Leadon 1962 p 906 lode Michanl Divide and Lose The Arab Revels 1986—1998 Geotéeny Blas Lodon 1960 p 24 PueCiisroct The American Landing io Leben p 6 Mort ofthe major combatsate were indeed in the western Medirerzaneas Chamomn however was — not avaze of the amphibious its cperating neer Lebeion chamom op ctr p 12 CMeCiiarect An American Empasey to Lebence Secews p 22 ®morsh Wilhelinies tod Lil Rebest D Atr Operation in the Lebemon Crtata ot 1988 0 USAF Hintorteat Division Lininon Office Seczet erim — in 1999 October 1962 p 13 f Aan IN d UNCLASSIFIED nersoe i ncuassirieo The coup in rag took Washington by surprise CLA Dizector Allen Duiles Icarned of t at 0300 EDT on July 14 At 0730 EDT when the fest fragmentary reps res had been clarifled President Eisenhower was informed of the overts in Iraq Seczetazy Dulles arrived at the Stace Department ac OBIS EDT for an intelligence beteting and a look at the most urgent cables Chamoun‘s request eached Washington at 0838 EDT President Risembower met wih the National Sesuriyy Council at 0930 EDT Secrerary Dulles joined the conference at 1030 EDT ° according to Karl Hare Special Aaslstat to President Eisennowoz the Secretary of Sate had quicky decided for intervention and macshaled his aigo— ments to that ffece before he met with the President As soon as Secretary Dulles exated the room President Eisentower said You don‘t have to say a word Foster I‘ve already made up my mind We‘ve going in The teal coup was the caralyst in the decision Eisenhower was concerned thar the Irant coup might resultin a complete elimination of Weszern intuence in the Middle Bast 4 Waokingzon had reliaple information thas a similar coup vas planned against King Hussein for 17 July 5 Ambaseador Henry Gabot Loage told the U N Securiey Council on 16 July he grave developments in Iraq and the recently organized plot to overthrow the laviul government of Jordan were prime considerations which prompred the United Sates response to the Lebanese request for assistance in maintaining is independence 6 Though the immediate purpose of intervention was to blust a regional tireat by the UAR Presiden Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles fele tha intervention in Lebanon was necessary to reattiem U 5 support to the remaining members of the Baghdad Pace as well as to ilies around the globe who depended on U S commitments Ths decision to intervene was also taken ou of regard fo ito atfect on amall nitons 7 especially those sll unsure of what theis relationship with the West should be Istutimeon op cit p 6 buttes ap cit p 149 Marr Kazi Special Ansistane to President Eisenhower in 1958 Haze Transorips ‘The Dulles Oral Hletory Collection The Princeton University Library 1987 p 59 Risentower op ci p 269 MeCietock The American Landing in Lebanon p 69 $Depaztment of Sate Bulletin 99 4 August 1988 p 190 ‘Observer op cit p 45 ann UNCLASSIFIED itis nor surpetaing that for Secretary Dulles atleast the Bast—West con rontation overshadowed the Middle Base stmation however important the later was in imelf 1 Resliex in 1956 the United Stated had found ftoelt powerless to stop the Sories invasion of Hargazy and now after Sputnik the credibility of U S power was in question 2 President Chamoun had por the 0 5 dilemina suceinedly when he told Ambassador McClintock on 14 July that he wanted an answer Not by words ue by acton 3 Preaidonc Risentowet sav this as a chance to do something concrete toward improving the United Sates® stature in the world 4 As for the Soriets® resction U S leaders were convinced that hey would ‘not intervene Thay felt tae the United States was tn an excellent posidon militarily and tat the Soviets were awae of this face 8 As Secretary Dulles told Senator George Alken I know well enough that if we land in Letanon the Russians won‘t do a daran thing about it even though they have thrcatened to Having decided to ntervene the President met with his political and miliary advisors in the morning and afternoon of 14 July t vork out the satire of tha intervention and to amend contingency plane where necessary Operations in Traq were viewed as remote since the deaths of the royal family and Prime Minister Nuct Sld pat direct tervention there oue of the plcture 8 An for Lebanon troops were to be landed in Seut contzary to the recom— mendations of some of the U S milltary howeres occupation of the Mzecland was not contemplated Eisenhower reasoned thas the government of Lobaton would have to e at least that populaz or the United States probably should not be in Lebenos 5 re—————— Muspty Raber Deputy Under Secretary of Sate in 1959 Murphy Transcript The Dulles Oral History Collection ‘he Ernests Datvecaty Libra 16 p 57 New York Times _ Hanton Baldwin 31 July 1958 p 4 Cramoun op cit p 13 Eisenhower op ci p 266 Murphy Duttes Oral History Transcript p 52 Stuining op cit p 13 Aiken George 0 5 Senator in 1958 Alkmn Transcripy The Duties Oui History Collection The Princeton University Libeazy 1987 p 6 5tisentower op cit p 271 Pig p 275 aas UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Although contingency plans tor a Lebanon operation envisioned British participation President Bisentower felt that U 5 forces would be adequate ‘Tne British agreed to keep theis troops in Cyprus as a reserve for expected but unplanned—tor operations in Jordan This arzangment also mer French objections The Mtidéte East had tradilonally been an object o Anglo French rivalsy Accordingly the French though aware tha their Algerian troubles added t thaiz colonial experience in Lebanon made it advisable for them to avoid association with Western intervention were nevertheless suspicious of British intentions and wanted totake pare in any intervention where the British were represented 1 ‘The French were amenable to imervention in Lebanon by the United Suites alone however Even so Great Britain and the United States dld not consult France during these final deltorations 2 Fornately the French were satistied witha token port call to Beira by the crulser De Grasse u7 i8 polys A 1430 EDT 14 July President Risentower met with a bipartisan group of key members of Congress to explata the aimiation 3 At I716 EDT President Bizenhover tol the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Nithan Tetning Send them tn 4 It was agreed that the Marines could lind by 0900 EDT 1500 Betzut ime dnd the news announcement was released at tat time 5 Aip maca‘ Suez Beneath the Cedars The Economist 187 28 June 1989 p 1161 New York Times 20 July 1988 p« 13 Eisenhower op cit p 271 % Sagenty James Press Seczetazy to President Risentower in 1950 Hagenty Transcript The Dulles Oral Hlatory Collection The Princeton University Librasy 1567 p 23 Piadd H A Onters Flam but Flexible U S Naval Intiiee Proceedings 88 Oetober 1968 p 83 m UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED f Ts Murrary rackorounD anp conmnicency ruanimic — Ac the time United Scares contingency plans for a Middle Eastern crists were based on CNCSPECONMME Commander—in—Chit Specified Command Middle Bast ® Opecational Plan 215—58 ‘The posltion of CNCSFECONNE then held by GINCNELM Commander—in—Chiet 0 5 Naval Forces Eastorn Atlantic and Mediteranean in London had no assigned forces unt a Midcle Eastern operstlon was otfcialy opened by the Jone Chiets of Sat The com mand had been activated once before using the Suez criats of 1956 2 and the original contingency plan was concerned with Arab«loraelt hooliics» In November 1957 the 1CS had informed CICNBLM tha the critical siue tion in the Middle East and the fear of an anei Western coup in Jordan — and to a lesser extens in Lobanon required an immediate upcating of Opecaconal Flan 215—56 to take tntp account potetial operations associated with the Bizentower Doctzine 3 The resulting updating CRICSPECOMME Operational Plan 213—59 was deawn up in close liaison with USCRICEUR CINCUSAREUR CNCUSAFE and COMSILTHPLEET As n the earlier operational plan the th Flees with its Maines was the lead force to be committed The normal opecational area of the 6th Fleet extends from the Strait of Oibealiar to the Bosphorus at Itanbul The normal deploymene of the Fleet in 1998 consiated o two 6—month cruises During a cruise the Flot spent 2 months each in the western central and exstern Medterzanoon In 1958 the normal organization of the 6th Fleet was 4 Task Forse 60 Auack Carzier Seriking Force 61 — Amphibious Force 62 — Amphibious Troops 63 — Service Force 64 Special Task Force 65 — Surface Action and Patrol Force 6 — Antisubmazine Force 67 — Fleet Atr Forces Mediterranean 68 — Mine and Mine Countermeasures Force 6 Submarine Force ‘a specified command differs from a verified commend principally in that forces are commonly from a single service Temporary allocation of une from other services dons not change the chazacter of the command New York Times 16 July 1958 p 3 Stalimeon op eit p 7 mius descripeion of the 6th Fleet is dexived primaztly from U S Stith Fleet Command Hlstory A Brief Hlowry of the United Saree Stith Fleet i the Mellarmmnem Aite 198051900 I May 1999 tp Poll aad a antlcos by William Heneles Ce Stith Fleet i the Mediterzanesn The Reporter 18 20 Pebnunsy 1990 Sint #lest Senied Up for a Bigger Dec Ni Institue Proceedings $8 August 1959 as UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ‘The CVA strike force consisted of 2 atzeratt carziers usually one of these was of the Midway or Forrestal class ‘ Approximately 20 destsoyers operated with the 2 CVA‘s A guided missile cruiser either the Canbersa or bestow £ ordinarily operated with this force too ‘The ASW force consiating of one CVS and approximately 6 ASW destroyer escorts joined the Fleet for 3 monia a year The amphibious force of aboue 6 ships carried a Ratalion Landing Team s LT of approsimately 1200 Marines The submarine force normally Included only 2 submarines The eveize 6th Fleet comprised 50 ships altough 50 ships were deployed in the middle of May 1958 ‘While many of the auppore ahips were hormeported ia the Mediterranean COMSIETHELT‘s Aagahip a cruiser was the only combat vessel in tie Mediterranean on a continious busts» The aack carriers the destsoyers the amphibious ships some service ships and submatines routed with ships from the Atlaaeie Fleet after tours lasting from 2 months for submaztnes to 6 months for atack carriers The 6th Fleet‘s peacetime mission in May 1958 was 2 1« To help preserve the peace 2 ‘To assuze Meditereansan countzies of our friendship and readiness to help them 3 To protect and support U S citizens interests and policies in the Mediterranean aree 4 To be prepezed to carry out such wassime assignments as superior U S or NATO commants may order 5 To perfect working relationships with our friends and alles 6 To provide realistic wartime training for ships and men of he Nery 7 To familazize U S Navy personnal with this strategic aren ot the world According to Viém Charles frown COMSDCTEELT ts 198% fhe Fieers primazy mission vas readiness fo its NATO Tos 1958 the 6h Fleet had Acs Seywassior airecafy which were capable of careyiag nucleas weapons to porential argets inthe Soviet Unlon and the Fleet‘s mobility pave it an excellent chance of aveviving a Soviet fest atzike agains it Adm Brows howerer was not sblivious to the oriale role of the éth Flee I‘m siting on a volcaco When it mumbles I ahif the Flea‘ conter of gravity toward the rumble 4 f ‘Moothly Memoreatom of Composition ot Task Forces Chief o Naval Operations Fleet Operations Diviston Navy Depazsment 15 May 1950 30 9 Nary Zects About the United States Stith Fleet i the Medterrenesn Public Information Office Commandar Stith Fleet 7 May 1988 pp 9—4 Manto Hazold Cat Brown‘s Kimens Have Clawe Stpurtey Eroning Pont 229 2 Max 1957 p 82 Stith Fleet to Ready Confidems ees s L rot issn p 32 Chapelle Dickey Cat Beown——Master of the Mod Readers Digeat Mas 1959 p 78 mas UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED on 2 May 1957 CNO had tesued a directive that while the Broad mission of she 6th Flees remained the maintenance of stability in the area and protection of C S nationals Fleet support would be avallable f directed in an emec» geaey in support o the Eisenhower Doctrine tn April 1957 with Depanmen of Sate consirence the 6th Fleet Cncluting the GVA‘s Forrestal and Lake Champlain had moved eo the eastern Meditereanean for a show of force while s King Hussein of Jordan weathered an internal threat t his throne The Rorsestal sayed out o sight of and while other units including the Marine force made a port call to Belzat Units of the Britsh Nary Joined the Gn Fleer in this show of force Both were able t leave the eastern Mediterranean after 2 weeks The 6h Fleet Including the CVA‘s Randolph and Inccenid renuzned for another show of foree trom August to November 1957 during a period of Turkish—Syrian tension 2 In May a few days after the Lebanese internal crists took a vislent tm as mentioned cartier the Lebanese government stated that it might have to request Western intervention On 14 May the day the U 5 told Chamoun the conditions for intervention the U 5 Navy announced tat the 6th Fleet and British Nayat ‘nite were about to begtn routine manewrers in the centeal Mediterzancen Within a week both forces were operating in strength in the eastern Mediter ranean by 19 May the Atlantic Fleet had been put on a 4—day alert and was seid to be ceprouning to improve our defense capabilities during the present unsetted period 4 On the same day the British Admizalty announced tat the NATO naval exercise had been shifled to the eastern Mediterzancan so that warships of Beitain and the United States could evacuate theis nationals from Lebanon t neces» say When the criste broke out British oops in Cyprus were for the first few days the only Western forces close enough for an immediate response to a Lebnese request for troupe 6 On May 14 the United States also anounced thar it was doubling Its amptibious strength in the Mediterranean Previous planning now proved tts worth in pare response to the November 1957 JGS directive Headquarters 2nd Provistonal Marine Force under BGen Sidaey Wade was established at Camp LeJeune N G on 10 Janazy 1998 to plan and conduct Combine It ‘his exercise was to he a pesctice landing operation off the coast of Serdinta I Summay of Arack Carzier Support of U Foreign Polley Since the Korean We The Congressional Record Vol 115 No 140 12 Sep 1969 p 10495 mid p 10498 New York Times 15 May 1958 p 1 New York Times 20 May 1958 p 10 Sceening‘s Contemporasy Archives 17—24 May 1958 p 16183 ® New York Times Haneon Baldwin 20 June 1958 Sot Tiss The author has used Stulimecn‘s Marines in Lebanon 1958 as his main source of Information on the Marine butldip a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED imolving the 0 5 Mazines Orirish Royal Mazines and Units of the Italian Sary the and Peaisioay s ne Pree was comp maf 2 BL Tiss BLT 1 8 lst Butalion 8th Mazines inthe Mediterransan and BLT 2 2 in North Carolina » TRANSPHIPRON 6 caree ne SLT 2 2 aczived tn the Mediterranean on It May to replace TRANSFHIRRON a ‘ALT 1 5 which hac ho tn 6th Fleet landing foree since Tanmamy whin a n % amolced that bach nubs task Cocous ould remain n the Mecincesane n « ‘on 13 May Ges Wade was ordered to suspend planing for Combine II which was not canceled until 1 July and move his headquarters t the Medi torranean area immediately The General and his staff departed the following day Gen Wade had bee briefed ovice before 31 March and 14 April for just such a move in connecdie withthe Lebaron aitiation BLT 1 8 had deawn up a Lebanon contingency plan for itself early in 1958 after sending its battalion operations officer incognito on a tour of Beizut‘s beaches On 18 May Gen Wade and RAdm Rober Cavenagh the amphibious task force commander established theis headquarters aboard the AGC amphibious force flagship Mount MeKurley then offthe const of Grete and began work on amending that plan to include 2 RLT‘# Most of the details had been completed y 21 May when they were joined off he coast of Cyprus by 2 British gonerals trom Cyprus to formulate plans for an Anglo—Amorican linding in Lebanon On 22 May BGen David Gzay of the U 5 11th Alrborne Division arzived in Cyprus to preside over the meeting At a oneday conference the group established the position of CINCAMBRITEOR Commander in—Chief American British Force and agreed that it would be is id by CNCNELM and developed a contingency plan for a joint Lebanon landing Operational Plan 1—58 known as Blucbat ‘An ad vance pasty of GINCAMBRITEOR was deployed tothe Mediterranean for 3 weeks and then returned to London Operation Blvcbat envistoned 2 possible miliazy actions One was a simul« taneous landing of 2 Marine BLT‘s one was to land south of Beirut to seize the alzpor while th other BLT landed northeast of Beinit to secure that sector of the city Including the bridges and water supply systems simated there The other course of action was for 2 American aizhorne bale groups to land or be dropped at the airport On 17 May 2 0 5 Army battle groups in Germany ere placed on alert hey were still on alert when President Chamoun requested American eroops on 14 Julys2 in either case a Britsh airborne group was to be flown in when the airport lid been secured ‘When the Sciish brigade had landed the American troops at the airport were to move foto the city and cake control of the port area The object of the plan vas to support the Lebanese gorermment against Imrasion specifically against the Syrian Ist Army which was near the Lebanese border ASnutimeon op cite pe 8 New York Times 18 July 1988 p« 5 New York Times Henson Baldwin s 16 Joy 199 5 10 on UNCLASSIFIED a UNCLASSIFIED Miliacy ald was already being given to Lebanon On 14 May the United Statze also announced hat i was rushing police equipment ordered in 1956 to Lebanon— 1 On 28 May 1# M 41 lite sanks were delivered under a similarly accelerated assistance péogeam The United Sizes delivezed several landing erat for moving troops along the Lebanese coust 2 On 10 June the United Kingdom and the United Sttes anncaneed thas they would give foley 12 Hawker « Hunter jets to Lebanon and 38 other Jets to Jordan and Teaq o In June 6h Fleet and Driish Naval units conimied operations in the eastern Meditersanéan U S Marines conticted landing exercises sort of amie Turkey in the middle of the month the addition of an ASW task force whore schedile was alighly accelerated brought the rumber of ships in he 6 Fleet to 64 5 The British conginged thelr buildup of teoops into Cyprus peaking at 37 000 men by 23 Jime © So lazge a force was on Cyprus lacgoly because ot the volatile simation in Cyprus Iselt although at lease 5000 teoops were set aside as a strategie reserve for operations in Lebanon Since by tate Jin the immediate danger had passed and the hostile Arab pres was well aware of the 6th Fleet‘s presence the Department of State waned the Fleet to relax to avoid needlessly provocative deployments 8 About 1 July most of the Fleet left the Lebanon area for various porte in te Mediter» — ranean 9 leaving TRANSPHIBRON 6 GLT 2 2 approximately 100 miles from Lebanon and 2 destroyers Just over the hortzon from Seieuc On 12 July RAgm Howard Yeager on the AGC Pocono relieved Adm Cavenagh as Amphibious Task Forse Commandes off the canst of Grete and Gen Wade tanaterzed his headquarters from the Mount McKinley to the Pocono According to former President Chamoun the UNOGIL report o 1 July showing no massive infltration from the UAR had an immediate repercussion on American policy and the 6th Fleat‘s departure was a dizect result of this report 1 Some Briish units also lett the eastern Mediterzancan Tre British anack carcies Ark Royal zemurned to the United Kingdom to be replaced later in the Medicercanean by the CVA Ragles ‘new York Times 15 May 1988 p 5 7 New York Times 24 June 1958 p 3 oid p 3 $ Scez Beneath the Gedaze The Eeononar 187 2 Juse 1959 p 1161 Menthly Memorandum of Componition of Task Forces Chiet o Naval Operations Flee Operations Division Navy Depastment 15 June 1958 New York Times 24 June 1958 Mav fork Times Nex York Times rew Middleron 16 July 1958 p 1 Cesestrup Peter Limited Wae and the Lessons of Lebanon The Reporter 20 0 April 1589 p 25 shutimeon op cit p 9 ®Pchamown op cit p 29 — s UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED When the pro—Hestern government of feaq was overthroum on 14 July the 6th Fleet was spread over much of the Mediterranean There were 74 ships withthe Fleet 2 CVA‘s one GVS 2 cruisers 22 destroyers and 47 other ships 2 CVA Seratopa 1h company with 7 destroyers was at Canes the cruiser and 6h Fleet Aagship Des Moines was at Villefranche 9 the ASW carzior ‘Wasp tn company with 7 destroyer escorts was as Naples CVA Rasex in com« pany with 3 destroyers was at Piseus Athens 4 the guided missile cruiser a Boston In company with 3 destroyers was at Rhodes and 2 destroyers vere near Beirut ‘The Fleet was in an untevorable position and the Chief of Neval Operations Adm Arleigh Buke took steps to improve the aituaion He teleptonea Rham Duerfeldt Depary GINCNELM in London at 0930 EDT 1590 2 1590 Beiewe time to tsswe preparatory orders that Marines might have o be landed in Lebanon witin 48 hours Gen Wade was stmilasly alerted at 1L1S BDT Moreover Adm Bake advised CNCNELM COMSCTHFLT CNCLANTELT and CNICFACFLT abour 1500 EDT tha the dectaton to land Mazines was imminent 5 A 1823 EDT 0023 Beizut time CNO relayed President Risenhower‘s order to Hand and dizécted Adm Holloway GINCNELM in London to land the Marines asll he 6th Floer easorard and join he command ship Tacontc in Beirut as cmcsrscoms 6 ‘Tue 6h Pleat units cha were in port were ordered to sal a fies light 18 uly to avold the speculation thas would accompany a night—time depacture ‘Tbe diam Z hours after Ui Masts landed CNO plied the Allante Fleer on 4 baurs‘ sailing notice Adm Burke vith Presidental approval placed the Pucific Fleet on the same alert on the assumption thie Communist China might tey t take advantage of U S invotvement in the Middle Bast ‘Beaestrup op cit p 25 Smitimacn op € p 7 New York Times 15 July 1959 p 5 New York Times 13 July 1958 p 5 ‘New York Times 16 July 1958 p 3 Statimacn 5p cit p 9 Sstatimace op ci p 10 Murpty Charles New Miz Fortume August 1993 p 88 New York Times 16 Juby 1958 p 2 «so UNCLASSIFIED con ese A Whask l nn A 2C 1B — Wf UNCLASSIFIED Te canomo « Adm Mitke despite State Depastment opposition to his bitdup of the 6th Fieet‘s amphibious force sought to maintain that increased force Tevel When TRANSPHIRON 2 BLT 3 6 was sent to relieve TRANSPRIBRON 4 CLT 1 9 me relief maneuver ip the Mediterzanean was stretched from the usual one or 2 days to 1A or 12 days © TRANSPHIRRCN 2 aczived in the Mediterzanean on 3 July and TRANSIIBRON 4 was on its way out of the Mediterranean when te traqh coup cccurzed on 14 July Adm Holloway had argued suecesstilly tha in the event o Intervention a Maine landing aczons the beach was preferable toa pacatroop drop at the alt port that a Marine landing could be contined to a amatler acca was much more contzollable and in the event of reststance had the advantage of naval guntie support O the 3 TRANSPHIBRONS only TRANSPHBRON 6 BLT 272 was close 120 miles to Lebanon on 14 Jity t was decided however not to wait or another and BLT 2 2 was disected to and south of Btrut and seize the alzport implementing as much ot Bluebet as possible TRANSPHIRON 6 consisted of 6 shipe the command ship AGC Taconic the atack transport APA Monsovia the anack cargo ship AKA Gapricomnis and 2 tam landing ship L91%0 Walworth County and Traverse County ‘tne 6 ship the dock fancing sip LSD Plymouth Rock was entoure to Malta for emergency repalts The Evgex vas to provide ate support ‘The destroyers Wadleigh and The Sullivans alzeady off Beleut were to be used as quatite auppont ships Theis effectiveness in this ole would have been seriously limited if the landing had been opposed since the destroyers previously stationed there had neglected to tarn orer the necessary grid chare and naval gunfize support operations overlay upon being selleveds ‘The fest ship appeared offohore at 1330 Beteue time 18 July By 1400 all 5 avallable shipe from TRANSPHERON 6 nuiled at 000 Beirut ime and the 2 destroyers could be seen on the horizon thy seacted the pooitons off the landing beach by 1490 ‘The landing site was 4 miles south of beirut and 700 yards from the atzport LYTP‘s Landing Vehicles Teacked Reesonnel were Inancted fiest followed by rogilar landing craft Te first Marines ht the beach as 1504 26 ioure aod 20 mirutes after President Chamoun had requested them Scaried but friendly susbathers were on hand to greet the Marines Tes croam and sot drink vencors immediately hiked their prices for what becarse as good a market as any American this taitarie seems to have been Adm Buska‘s When asked viather the State Department bad qudged him in hie direction he anavered No they nidged the other way Burke Transcrip The Dilles Oral Aiatory Collection Tue Princeton University Librazy 1907 p 34 s New York Times 29 Juse 1958 p 9 an UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED touststs had ever been Meeting no restetance other than upeer airport admiata« ators the Marines were able to secure Betrut National Alzport within 40 misuses Tos Fiymouth Reck‘s absence grouly hindered the landing becaue the — $ Masine shose passy the Neral beath group and the underwater demolition wam were all on the Fymouth Rock Thay were badly needed and Ez Col A Hadd the commander of BLT 2 2 has concluded tae the dalay in gating tha material to the beach would hve been disastrous if he landing had been j cpposed 2 All of BLT 2 2‘s arillecy and 2 of is 5 aria were also on the Plymouth Rock Tne 3 inks available tothe 2 2 Maxtnes did noe reach the beach ust 12 fours ater the Marines bad landed ive take from BT 3 6 arztred on bear the Fort Snelling 5 hours ater th landing but shore of ammunition a peacetime aafery precaution rinse rescinded Leve the owo in nepecate ships ‘Iwoue days lases 27 July a U S Army can bacalton landed 78 M 18 tanks and 17 asmored persomel Cartiess Toe State Depestment had tnserued Ambassador MeCHisrack on the morning ot 13 Jily to tnform Chamoun no Taree tian noun thar Marines would be loading at 1300 Stace had also instruetnd McClintock to ell Chamoun thae the U States would expect fill cooperation from the Lebanese semed force 3 ‘Tne Uit Statme was deeply concerned with the rescrion of te Lebanese Army to an American lending # oepecialy since Gan Chelwb had told Ambassador Megiintock on 23 May tha if alled foroas landed in Lebwson to provee Ctamoun the army would give no suppors to the imterventton 5 Lares 13 Jne ste Genezal had aatd that he would reeign if uz troops landed An a precaution therstore te 0 5 Marines were instructed to consider all Lebenese Army units untstendiy usetl mey proved othonise 7 When Ambsssador MeCLimtock informed Presiden Chamoun of he impentiag Janitag the lacses foaxing repercunstont from the Labinese Army requested that the Arbassador withhold thas tnformation from Gene Chehab unul 1330 Aa the Ambassados and the General were speaking the landing ships appeared dermis se as ju 1989 p 17 op cit p 17 Stulimeon notes Thae statement desmnazised the poliicai nature of he Lebenon operation Miltary loptical etfctizenese on she See day of he ending bad t be secritiend In onder to meer the ime umi o Riseshower‘s smomeement SueCiintock The American Landing tn Lebmnon p 70 MeCHimock The American Landing in Lebens 5 69 CMcCiintock The American Emnasey to Lebanon Secret p 17 Smud Seczet p 19 s Statimeon op cit p» 20 s UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED pz MEDITERRANEAN As SEA Los wh 7 sf ost sR3 — aay SSS dst I premier 5 f Voges Ca M Oitiies o — sm Ses Aue — — hp 2 — — fie io Cho Se Ry P Z iF T tars mg i 3 c8 MCB 1 En ttesia e B f n pguermiegly es AVP e g RWVISEONN en haw‘ 4 — my § Wal motte i oy Css pte — MMAP 33y2S5r marine tanomes C 3 Tor k f _ anp omctives 2 hase Ol rfeiass I A § Prs SF PH b manninnanmnmmemmmm UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED on the horizon The General declasod that the landing would provoke many of his troops into Joining the rebels and asked ifthe Marines could be kepe aboard ship in the harbor unl he could be sure of Ml orn forces 1 As Chenab later — told the 0 5 Army Amach some Lebanese Army officers had that morning proposed a coup to forestall a landing 2 However when the Ambassador tried to radio the close—in destroyers on his special communications link—up the eircute was dead » Ambassador MeCListock had not been tnformed of the Marines landing site but finally learned from Journalists thatthe Marines were landing near the airport he sent his Naval Aresché to the immedate commander of the troops Ls Col Hadd requesting a delay Le Col Hadd who received the request 20 minutes after he had acnilly landed zeferved the request to the senior officer presere Capt McCrea inthe Taconic Capt McCrea feeling bound by what he tole were Inflexible orders Informed the Ambassador thas he took his orders from the Commander of the Gth Fleet and the miliary chain of command and that all troops have landed and will remain ashore in vielaity of atrport until further orders 3 That his ordecs were so inflexible is not certain Adm Brown in his message to Cape Victor McCrea regarding th latex‘s dental of the Ambsssador‘s request stated your action approved Dectslon to use beach or hashor belongs to the commander on the scene 4 A similax incident occurred less than an houe later President Chamoun telephoned MeClimock to tell him that an Army coup was panned for that afterncon When McClintock asked for Marines and tanks t quard the Prosi« dential Palace as Chamoun had requested Lt Col Hadd refused on the grounds thas his tro098 were alseaty overentended 5 ‘The Ambassador then called Gen heli and told him that the most disagrseable consequences would arise from any attemp at a coup Gen Chatab not knowing that the Ambassador was lufting replied tat he had tried to disouade Mi otters before and that he would recomment to them that they stay the coup 0 McClintock The American Landing tn Lebanon p 70 Isnattmaon op cit p 12 toid p 13 Quoting Ambassador McClintock‘s message to Depaztment of Sate 15 July 1958 foig p 14 add op ctt p 84 CweCLintock RBeRE The Meaning of Limited War Boston Houghton Mitin 1967 p 109 x UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Gen Chetub was able to stop the lamned coup but Ambassador McClintock has noted That these measures proved succonstul in no way diminishes the % isk which was nun nor the posstble consequences it in fic the President of Lebanon had been assassinated while the Marines had landed and accorting to the traditional doctrine had the situation well in hand I — Because of the contzorezsy as to whether the Ambassador as the personal representative of the President was the senior officer present Seczouary Dulles sent a telegram In case of difference between the military commander and the local U S Diplomatic Representative in regard to pollucal matiess celacing exclusively ts Lebanon the views of the latter shall be controlng 2 in Washington contingency planning regueding the Suate Department‘s relation to the milly in a Lebanon operation had been conducted by the Counselor‘s attics Since this ottice was very smal Counselor Reinharte and one assistant and operated on an ad hoc basis owo additional men were added as soon as imervention in Lebanon was decided upon The Counselor‘s office became the focus of the Sate Depaztment‘s Haison with the JCS and Secretary of Defense dealing with questions of ovectlight rights and otter politcal problems A President Eisenhower on Secretary Dulles‘ recommenta « — tom 3 seat Deputy Underseczetary of Suate Robert Murphy to Lebanon on 16 July D—day 1 to be a political adrisor to Adm Holloway 6 AmeCHintock op cit The American Lending to Lebanon p 71 AveChitock The American Landing tn Lebanon p 74 the Comselor‘s ottice was the forerumes of States 7th floor Operations Center Atetnentt G Frederick Comselon Department of Sate in 1958 Relntarde Transeripe The Dulles Ofal History Collection The Princeton University Library 1987 p 27 Eisenhower op cit p 279 Murphy Dutles Oral History Transcript p 52 —a @evense sano UNCLASSIFIED v imusrsoe isuncuassirio THE MOVE ino BEIRUT ab sutour or roRces — Is vie LEBANON oreraIONaL arA Adm Helloway arzived at Beteut International Alrport with the London element ot his Joint Saft at 0400 Beirut cme on 16 uly D—tay 1 and wene directly o his command ship Taconic ‘The Taconic was barely ready for Adm Holloway with Capt McCrea disembarking as he came aboard After the Lebanon operation it was Adm Holloway‘s recommendation that forthe near inure a suttable 2agship should be ready in he Mecitersanean at all times for his quick embarkation Gen Wade and Adm Yeager arrived at Beirut at 0615 on the AGC Pocono and Joined Adm Holloway on the Taconic Landings of men and equipment goreinded through the night of IS July by midday 16 July there were approximately 5000 Marines in Lebanon Marine Baration Landing Team 3 6 landed at 0730 18 July and relieved BLT 2 2 of it ateport position so that the later could move foto the pore area at 0930 When the port was secured the Pocono and Taconic were to move int the harbor Following Adm Holloway‘s instructions Gen Wade left at approximately 920 on 16 July to see Ambassador McClintock at the Embassy stopping of at the command post of BLT 2 2 Gen Wade on arztving at the Embassy found the Ambassador on the telephone with Gen Chehab both of them concerned about possible Lebanese Army resistance I should be recalled that Chamoun bad not consulted or even informed the miltary authorities about his reqyenc and many Lebanese officers tended to regard the landing as an invasion ‘The Ambassador with some difficulty persuaded Gen Wade to postpone the movement o his tzoops lato the city fie two men then called on President Chamoun who urged immedlate entry ‘Oo theis return to the Embassy the Ambassador telephoned Gen Chehab who urged that the Mazines hold up their advance for another 30 minites Gen Wade agreed to this request and ordered Lt Col Hadd to begin his advance at 1090 However while Gen Wade was with Ambsssador McClintock the Beirut gactison formed a roadilock of tanks and arilley between the atzport and the ely Hearing of this the General returned to his troops passing through the roadblock without faterference t was Mi opinton then that the Lebanese Army would not fire and the BLT hegan to move out at 1030 Just then a Lebanese captaln approsched Gene Wade and Lt Col Hadd with information that he Ambassador and Gen Chehab were in conference he requested that the Marines walt 30 minutes more Gen Wade refused on the grounds tat he had firm orders to proceed without delay but when the Marine column came face to face with the Lebanese Army roadblock it became obious tha the acter was serious in ° Jts suicidal stand and Gen Wade delayed the move unl 1100 Awade Sidney Operation Blucbat Marine Corps Gazette 43 uly 1999 p 13 Aqubatn op ci p 116 —» UKCLASSIRED Adm Holloway axzived from his ship shortly thereat and set out for the Embassy to comnile withthe Ambassadors be came upon the Ambassador and Gen Chetab at the roadblock ‘The Ambassador fecling the situation y grow graver by the minute had persuaded Chehab to accompany him to the roadblock in an eft to clear that impasse A compromise aolition was reached on the apov A amaller force escorted by Lebanese Army patrols vould moe along the oursitsza of Belzut to he port area The Ambassador Adm Holloway and Gen Chehab then went to a nearby military achool witch had a direct telephone link wp withthe Lebanese General Sail and Chehab per suaded his staff to halt its resistance President Chamoun has charged that the officers‘ resistance was clearly known to Gen Chetab beforehand 2 Gen Chetab did in fact tell Ambassador MeClimock Inter that he had known of a conspizacy against Chamoun but had had no idea of Its magnitude thae on the morning of 16 uly he thought that perhaps a squad of rebellious trogps had confeomied he Marines and was shocked to ase the whole Beirut gneetson there Fahim Qubalo tn his book Crisis in Lebanon asserts that Chehab did in fct know that Col ¥ Chait at EeBacese Remy headquarters hag given the onder to fre if the American troops attempted to enter the city Ambassador MeCLineock has sald that he suspected tis a the ime but with the incident resolved and given the aced for funize Lebanese Army cooperation he felt it unvise to press Chatab on this point 5 Adm Holloway assumed personal tactical command of the Mazine column and at 1390 with the Ambassador and Gen Chebab in the lead car the troops begin thetz advance to the port area By 1900 on 16 July D day 1 the Mazines had taken control ofthe port area secured the bridges over the Beirut River and furnished guards for the Embassy and the Ambessador‘a residence A second dangerous incident occurred on the mosning of 16 uly when Company 4 of BLT 376 found lts objective north of the aiztteld alzeady occupled by a Lebanese armored detachment which refused to leave Forninately after BLT 2 2‘s contromation with Lebanese tesops was resolved the com— mander of BLT 3 6 was able to settle these differences —¥me author has tried to recoustruct tis Incident accuentely For slightly different views see Qubata‘s Crints in Lebanon Ambassador MeCitmrock‘s artele and book Stulimeon‘s Marines In Lebeon 1958 Gen Sidney Wade‘s article in the Marine Gorpe Gizete Thayes‘s Dijloat and President Chamon‘s doncributon to the Dalles Ozet fiatary Collection Ichamoun op c p 18 McClintock op cit An American Embassy in Lebanon Seczer p 27 Squsatn op cit p 117 Personal tnterview with Ambassador McClintock speing 1969 »ao— UNCLASSIFIED Gen Wade met with Gon Chehab 17 July D—day 2 to discuss coopera tion beowsen the Lebaness Army and the Mazines Gen Chetab who feared I that continued Marine movement imo the cy would aplt his arm‘ was especially concerned that American troop deployment might give the appessance of ocou— pation forces Gen Wade acknowledged his concern and agreed to anach Lebanese officers immediately to his headquarters staf and to each of he Marine batualions These Hiatson officers proved extremely usofut in developing a rapport benveen the two nations‘ miliary forces For example on 17 fay D—aay 2 the Lebanese officer assigned to BLT 2 2 requested the the 2 Mazine companics goading the beidges over the Beimt River and the eastern approsches to he ity be withdrawn so thc the Lebanese Amy units already there could save face After consultation wich Embassy officials this action was taken the same day on 18 July D—day 3 it was agreed that the 2 Marine companies would be stationed further east of Beirue but stil close enough for a zapld response if danger azose in that seccor ‘Tae 6th Fleet continued its btldup tn the eastern Meditercanean ‘The CAG Baston was in the Lebanon operating area on 15 July and the CVA Segex and CVS Wasp arzived the folowing day By the ond of he day on 17 July D—day 2 44 shipe of the 6h Fleet 32 of them compataste includtig GVASaritogs CVS Wisp and CA Des Moines were operating east o 31 degrees E longiida Five more non —combatant ships entered the operational area on 18 July D—day 3 bringing the mumber there to $ By this time 70 ships of the 6th Fleet were in the eastern Mediterranean 2 On 23 July D— ay 8 the 6h Fleet resched its peak strength east of 31 degrees © longieide On that day S2 ships including 33 combatants were operating in the Lebanon operational area On 18 July «tay 3 COMSIXTHELT Adm Brown took his agship the Des Moines Into Beirut for a one—day conference with Adm Holloway and then renuzned to the same general operating ares as the CVA‘s 1 degrees N« 33 degrees E During the period of CWICSPECOMME activation COMSICTHELT served as Commander American Naval Forces Specified Command Middle Base COMAMAYEOR as provided for in CINCSPECOMME Oplan 21550 Measmhile the tr009 butldup had cortioued at a capid pace BLT 1 3 Handed 4 miles north o Beirut on 18 Jaly «day 3 and a Maxine aiclie carrying 1200 troops from Camp Lejeune N C via Port Lyautey Morocco arcived later thas day on 19 uly D—tay 4 the 1st Alsborne Bale Group TE Alpha 187th Intantzy 24th Diviston which bad been stationed in Germany landed at Beirut ‘wade op cit p 14 New York Times 19 July 1958 p 6 CAwarde Manal Amex IL List 5 Lebanon SECNAVINST 1650 10 CH—s 9 Nov 1966 pp 1i 16 The Fleet reached a tol atrength of 87 shipe in mide August care UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED atzport The troop lit was staged through Incirlik AB Jeased from Turkey just ouside Adana Altough it lef Germany on 16 July the toree dld not fly on to Beirut until 13 July —vay 4 following negotiations with the Lebanese ¢ government TE Chasile a support unit was flown int Bett on 20 July D—day 5 bringing the tat force level to approsimately 11 400 troops TE Beavo the second Race Group in he Anglo Amertcan Blucbat plan was not sene but was kept on alert in Germany uneit 12 September Daly 9 A Pentagon spokesman announced that the Atmy trong were a zeseere force and had no mission othee than to avait developments With the arztval of U S Army troops a problem of command arose According to the Bluebec plan the American general vas to command the Joint land forces but since atothee American contingent had come in place of the British Adm Holloway was faced with the dilemma of oro American brigadier generals of diferent services In response to his request for an officer ot higher sank Maj Gen Paul Adams U S Army arzived i Bein on 24 July D—day 9 to become Commander American Land Forces Spectfied Command Middle Bast The increase in American troops brought otiec problems as well Adm Holloway who had moored the Taconic in Beteut hashor on 17 July had left moat of his CCNELM staff in London under Rear Admial Duertela Depury CIICNELM CICSPECOMNME Oplan 215—50 dld not provide for a separate administesttve staft and the absence of such a sail proved unsatis factory for the organization and functioning of the operation Though temporary measuzes were successful Oplan 215—38 was revised accordingly ater the Lebanese operation Given the absence of British pasicipation in Lebamos CINCAMBRITEOR Oplan 1 58 was largely ignored ‘tn toes the operational plan for Sluebec was available to most commants in outline form only On 16 fly day D U S eubcommanders were directed to follow CRICSFECONMME Oplan 213—56 for devalled American operations As mentioned earliee Great Britain on 14 July anticipated an appeal trom King Hussels and took certain precaudonazy moves the folowing day ‘Tue British ligh cruiser Sheffield already operating neas Cyprus valed near the Lebanese coast ‘On 16 July «day 1 CVA Raple and Hite Sxutsor Bermuda satled from Maca to Join the Sheitild ® On that same tay King Hussein re quested miliary Intervention from the United Stats and Great Britain Agee the section on Ar Operations for a further discussion of these atzitte tew York Times 20 July 1958 gt 14 kecsing‘s Contemporazy Archives 9—16 Aug 1958 p 16397 iew York Times 16 July 1964 p 3 —a— UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED King Hussein would have been happy with only token American paricipation British troops had lft Jordan in 1956 when King Hussein had abrogated the Anglo—Jordanian Treaty dusing the Sues cristo Hussein obviously feared that imervention by Great Britain alone would look ike re—occupation by a colonial power Prime Minister Haxold MacMillan likewise urged Presiden Sisentower to make the Jordan expedition an Anglo—American operation ‘The President refused however on the grounds that he did not have Congressional authoriza— tion to go tive Jordan 1 On I7 July Q—day 2 the British hegan an atzift of 2600 tesops trom Cyprus to Amman In other British actions the Admizalty sent the commando carries Bulvazk from Mombasa Kenya on 16 July toward the Persian Gulf When British troops were town to Jordan another beigude on Cyprus was held on 24—houz alest for a similar move to Sudan hut the second unie was never requested 3 Lest the leant coup be repeated in Libya the cruiser Bermuda and frigute Toray pus ito Rove Mines sstore at Tebmik on 19 July D—day tJ to retaforce an infantry bawalion that was alzeaty there undez an extacing Anglo—Libyan treaty % A brigade of troops was sent from Kenya to Rabrein and another brigade from Great Britain to Cyprus The Royal Rhodesian Air Force flew a squadron ot Jere and 1 1 2 squadrons of transports to Aden where they were attached to te Rar 3 Atisentower op cit p 279 See the Atr Operations section of this paper for a further discussion of the British atziits to Jordan Jhew York Times 19 Oct 1958 p 27 ‘iew York Times 20 July 1958 p 1« 5Keestng‘s Gontemporasy Archives 9—16 Aug 1958 p 16397 as reverse samo UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED tesaniess Reactions to untrep sates mvreavention — The 6h Flees was well known in Lebanon Beteue was a customazy port of calls Moreover units of the 6th Fleet had stood by in Beieue during the Jordanian crisis of Apeit 1957 c When the United Front‘s ant—American press campaign began in earnest on 16 May 1956 the Fone accused the United States of secrec movements of the th Fleet and dectazed that the people were no taken in by such intimidation and threats tn the past and would resist this interference to the end L Rumors of 6th Plese imervertion in May were widely believed by Jumblat‘s forces in the south who also bellered that Americans might be pllotng the Lebsnase Aiz Force planes belng used against them Theis alsem howees was not ypleal of Lebanon For example on 9 June news agencies reported that major 6th Fleet units were tn the easter Mediter ranean hut the only comment in the Belzut opposition papers was thac there would be no American intervercion in Lebanon because the United States feared the Series reaction When the 6h Fleet did imesvene the following month the oppositin‘s reaction could best be described as stunned A Although vehement in fs denunctation o the landing the opposition‘s scions in no way matshed is previous threats Of like importance was the face tat Gen Chehab had on 14 fly asked the rebel leaders notto take action in te wake of the Traqt revois Seeb Salam had told an American corzespondent two weeks earlier You tell those Marines that if one Mazine sees foot on the soll of my country Twill regard it as an ass of aggression and commit my forces against them 4 After the landing an 15 July Salam announced We dectase thie we stall sepel this aggression with all ouz strength and meane and we will appeal for help of all sorts from all ree people in the world without discrimization 9 In fact he ld nothing ofthe kind ‘me Speker of the Chamber of Deputies who had some weeks casiier old the Ambassador that he would personally lead armed resistance to an American Handing contined his peovent to a condemnatory telegram seat to Seczemy« General Hammarakfold and President Eizenbower in time some opposition Headers would acini thatthe landing was beneficial tn that t speeded a resolution of the tnternal political conti Take Shat s UAgwani Motamimed 5 Statement by the opposition pasties refuring the chirgen made by the government on 16 May 1958 17 May 1958 The Lebanese Oztats 1958 New York Asia Publishing House 1969 p 72 Amarpby Duites Oral History Teansceips p #9 Istutimson op cit p 12 Pierce Prilip N Show of Forse Lebanon Leatherneck 45 September 1962 p 36 radio Damascus 16 July 1958 aas UNCLASSIFIED unciassifiEp ‘me Lebanese Army held together the desertion sate was no higher than before the landing ‘The bitterness in ne oficer corps subsided quickly ater it became evident that American eepope had not come to keep Chamoun in power Chelib later old Ambassador MeCHintock thas the lending had indeed foiled an army coup thas had heen achediled for 15 Jly Altough the Iraqt Army‘s successful coup on 14 Jily was probably an influencing factor the Army‘ planned coup apparently was independen of diseccion by the UAR or the opposition In fact some important officers seem to have questioned the later‘s sinceriiy«1 A group of difrent officers disgruntled with the Army‘s Inaction may have even planned to overthrow Gen Chehab and suppress the opposition but this plan never matertalized 2 President Chamoun and his supporters were of course Jubdlan at the Handing they soon became dismayed and opealy biter however because the American te00p8 did not engage the rebels Plesse Cemal the Phalangist Header had aclemly warned againat a Lebanese Munict®3 and to many of Chamoin‘s supporters this is what was happening According to Ambsssador McClintock many of the militant Christians belleved thas te sole purpose of the h Eloet‘s intervention was to squelch the Moslem opposition by a classic bombardment of the Basta« Chamoun himself wanted the Mazines to move on the Busta 5 Instead of bombs USAF aircraft on 21 July Otay 6 dropped a million Icatics over Lebanon with an explanation trom President Risentover concerning the presence of U S troops Amatson op cit p 114 quain op cit p 89 Suticate East Micro 10 8 June 1959 p 9 dueCtimock The American landing tn Lebanon p 75 Copeland op cit p 203 — Ps UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED itemmationat Reactions To Tie Lavome AND rite untrep stares‘ Resrouse According to Henzy Cabor Lodge the most difficult U N encounter the Eisenhower Administeation faced ——no the most dramatic o the mone publi efzec——but the most complicated arduous the most dificult thing we ever A had was the Lebanon crtsts in 1938 A Joseph Sisco has said tae there was a genezal feeling thar outtelent considecation hat nge been gtven to how this United States action could be defended politically Sisco and his associates howerer were able to comince Secretary Dulles that the U S should make a simultandous mave in the U N at the very time that we were acheduled to land our Marines 3 ‘The U S strategy was to om — hasize that we were zesponding to a specific request from the government of Lebanon and that the Unite States was perfectly prepazed to have the United Nations take over this soe ‘Therefore the United Sates took the position that oue landing had been in accordance with Article S1 of the U N Charter and auch U N satements as the Besentials for Peace and Peace through Deeds resolutions Article S1 states Nothing in the present Charter shall impate th tnterene righ of indirical or collective selt—defense if an armed atack occur against a Member of the United Nations until he Securtey Council has taken the measures necessary to malncain international peace and security Accordingly Ambassador Lodge announced on 1S July that 9 5 troops will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take over Secrecasy Dulles had sen a message to Ambassador McClintock on 14 May telling him thae the citcumatances of the moment would not allow imesvention to ll under Section 2 of the Bisenbower Doctrine which mentioned acdion by a Communist or Communist directed outside power 0 When President Biseshower in hie memoirs» Waging Passe sald that oue incpevention would be a response in accordance w Best Doctrine 7 he probably had in mind the geneeal aspect of the Doctrine which was the preservation of the independence and Integrity of the nations of the Middle East c rermgnmenenged Lodge Heney Cabor U S Ambassador to the U N in 1958 Dulles Oral History Collection The Princetsa University Libeuzy 1967 Lodge Transoript p 42 lees Joseph @Roliical Advisor U Delegation UNGA ta 1958 Dulles Oral ske Collection Sisco Transcript The Prineetso University Library 1967 p 13 peas Cou p 16 s Department ot State Bulletin 39 4 Aug 1959 p 197 CMeCintock The Meaning ot Limited Was p 102 Rtsentower op cit p 271 — UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ‘Tne landing had repercussions throughout the world and immediately became the major issue at the U N Security Council By going into Lebanon alone the United States was able to dissociate itself fom the Feench and Britsh colonial tradiion and to have much more latade in its diplomatic as well as militsy actriy Os 16 July Ambassador Lodge formally submited a dratt resolution which called for a U force to zeplace the Amezican troops in Lebanon Since many countzies tele that we were legally Justified in sending troops bus that it was destzable to get them out as soon as possible the Lodge resolution vas an imagral part of the U S policy in the U N 1tis tnterssting to note that Quincy Wright in a detailed analysis ofthe American Intervention in Lebanon has concluded that its legal premises vere inadequate 1 According to Wrigh the U S chazge of indizect aggresston cannot ment the traditions interpretation of armed atack which Article S1 demands as Justification for tatervention While he does nix recopnize the apolicabilty of Article S1 Wright does grant that the inviacion trom the gorern« ment of Lebanon was sufficient to legalize the intervention if President Chamoun‘s worezament was the defacto government of Lebanon Since the rebels were in comzol of much of Lebason this poine was certainly open to question 1 however the United States could prove that the insurrection vas primarily he result of subversive intervention from outside Lebanon the American response o the de jure goreenment‘s request would be legal under international lw mme Udon Sli AZ nln an to pron large mt fered the soto of Ohh giver sion in Lebanon including a memorandum from Under Secretary Herter Although President Eisenbames and his advisors did not believe thas the USSR would be a serious threat they cid noe treat the Sortes reaction lily Thus when Secretary Dulles went to New York he communicated immediately with the Soviet U N representative Andrat Gromyto to zy to work oue a formula foe goteing thom fe Marines ous thas boul sole the problem in the aree and dimintah the mation vith the Sorter Union 9 ‘Tne Soviet Unton had begun a vitrilic propaganda campaign in May accusing the United States and Great Britta of sending their fleets to the eastern Medcer ranean tn preperation for a Marine landing tn Lebmon The propsganda amacks hoverer often ended hopefully ‘Wright Quincy Untted Bates Intervention in the Lebanon American Journal ot International Liw S3 anuary 1999 pp 112«125 € New York Times 17 July 1958 p 9 3Ereers Edvazd Director Office Eastem European Affaire Department of Sate in 1958 Freese Tesaseripe The Dulles Oral Hlstory Collection The Princeton University Libeazy 1967 p 23 ose UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED The leading USSR cizcles express contidence that no power will resort to Interference in the internal affaire o Lepanon o mater what form this Interference might take and that no power will permit the formation of a dangerous hotbed of war in he area I ‘The Sories according to their radio and press appeat to have been fully n aware ofthe United Sates‘ capability to fncervene in Letanon and of tete oun inadequacy in preventing such action After the Marines landed Tass zeported 16 July tas The Sortet Government dectares that the Soviet Union camnot remain indifferent to events creating a grave menace in an ares siucing on ite frontiers and reserves the right to ake the necessary measures dictated by the Interests of peace and security 2 ‘Tne one passtbly significant threat fom the Soviet Unton was that it would invade tran If the United States invaded teng The USSR carsled on segulacly scheduled maneuvers bit with more than usial fanfare along the Turkish and Iranian borders and in the Blick Sea and airlted troops from Odessa to Bulgaria Both Turkey and fran diemninsed this activity as emipey saber rattling ‘Tae Sorter inability to infuence events by te threat of armed force became learer on 19 Jil when Khrushchev urged an immediate summit conference be held at any time and at any place including Washington 3 President Rlscahower replied on 22 July Iam not aware of any facial basta for your extravaganty expressed fear of the danger of geaecal waz and zeminded Kixushcier tial the USSR had beoken off negotiations for a Berlin summit conference only a month eartier 16 Jne ‘Two more lerters were exchanged between the owo leaders On 5 August however Kbrushchev charged tat the United Staces hnd wrecied all chances for a summit proposal and withdrew his support for a summit messing Soviet propaganda during the Lebanon operation stcessed that the U S buildup in Lebanon was intended for a larges operation in tie Male Bast expeciatly against Teng Western intervention in Lebanon and Jordan aroused Hraqt fears of a similar operation there and initally had th effect of moving Trag‘a revolutlonary government closer to the local Communist pasty and te USSR for support and protection tase 18 May 1958 ®tass Text ot Soviet Government Statement on Events in the Middle Bas 16 July 1958 3 Deparsment at Sate Bulletin 39 11 August 1988 pp 232 233——hrushcter terres ot 19 July ‘mid p 23 «s UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ‘The coup In frag changed some countries‘ opinions about imervention in Lebanon For example Tran had previously warmed thit Western Intervention e in Lebaron would be unvise ‘even if U action failed Heveves fran readily ined on 16 July D‘day l with the cemaining Moslems memory of the paghdad Pret In gtring stone public approval wo the landing ban Turkey ram and Jordan all felt that Baghoad Pact ncerventon In eng was Junitied King Saud of Saud Arabla also privately urged intervention tn lag Tursey told the United States that it had decided to move Into Iraq and asked for material and moral support 2 bu the United States dissuaded the Turkish government from the move Pertaps the Lebanon operation had its mont significant etfect on President Nasser ofthe UAR ‘General Chehab told Ambsssador McClintock that a number of Moslem sources had told hm that Neaser was quite shaken by the svi and effective American miliary intervention Deputy Under Secretary Murphy also tel from his viol to Catzo that the etfect on Nasser personally was great Nasger had been vialting President Tito tn Yupontavia when the landing occurred and he Immediately New to Moscow before rerurning to the UAR ‘The ibility of the Sovies to do anything for him became quickly and painfully clear Raymond Hare Ambassador to Calzo during both the Suez and Lebanese exten has sald that in 1950 no doubt extsted in Neaser‘a mind that t had been the United States not the Sovies Union that kept France the United Kingdon and Israel from succeeding during the Suez war Arab neopaganda betreen 1930 and 1982 however had emphasized and exaggerated the zole ofthe USSR and if Nasser had not come to bellere ha own thetorie many other Headers and much of he population had Egyptian propaganda stresne tit when the Western ets steam in the Mediterzancan the Eastern feets move tso to malatin the balance of power 4 the Soviets however remained in the Black Sea In this conte the Impacc of the Lebanon operation was signit— cane throughoot the Middle Sasc Perceptions of the 6th Fleet Ielf changed To Nasser and to many oter observers in he Middle Ease the most obvious zole of te 6a Pleat was o show the flag and exhibit rare shows of force ‘A typleal view at this ime — was that the 6th ilet‘s main purpose in the Mediterranean i a political one a threat directed at he Middle Eastern countries 5 ou that it was an empty threat mataly because of the Sovies Union mmm Risentower op cit p 270 mi p 277 Murphy Dutles Oral Hutory Transcripe p 49 Acatro Home Service 24 June 1958 Gun Boat Diplomacy or the Inpotence of Sea Power in the ante Meditersancen s The Eipprian Economic and folltical Review 4 December 1987 p 20 aso UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED a ‘contincer‘ he 6h Fleet and its arendant weapons sutter rom owo disabilities I is far too large and imposing to allow Ite active pesticloation inthe amallent Lite wae where it loosesale noen of ts ® alse as an active factor for its very presence might provote a large wa for which it in inadeauately equipped Is super cancioce and ded miselle cruisers loose sic thee capacity to impress by their s very invitation to the Russtana spectacularly accepted by theve to go gre betters what with hele imtercontinencal miauties and Spomize Oe Soviets seem to have successtily stolen he 6th Fleat‘s thunder in the process even the 6th Fleets role as a someviae plundering politcal ‘ and diplomas weapon has been neutralized withous the fring of a singte shor I Before the Lebanon landing Nansen did not believe the United States capable of firm action 2 According to Ambsssador Hare afte the landing Nasser saw the m Ple ae a very real thrent Quokedt by an American willingness to use 10 and an a fictor to cechon within firure foreign policy decietons 9 Nessen it appeass perceived a dette threat of invasion during the Lebaron opecation Ausall He had a particularly adverse reaction to te 0 8 note verile of 7 July D—daye2 which sait in pace tat % any atack on Untied Sates forces by miliary units of the United Arab Republic or under Unit connol could Inrolve grave consequences seriously impairing our relations According to President Eisenhower the Egyptians viewed the U S warning an an ultimatum $ The British troop buildup on Cyprus the laxgest since the Anglo—French Invasion of Egype in 1956 when Cyprus and Mata had been used as suagng grounds surely took on a more ominous note after Arin troops were town from there to Jordan on 17 July @tay 2 On 19 July the UAR excablished a ROcmile defensive zone off Alerandeia — After the British landed esos tn Lip Musser deployed troops west of Alexandeta again a perceived trent of attack from that tersitory Hesser flew to Syeta on 21 Jty D—dayse and conferred with the command o the Syzian tet Army on defense planning while the Syrian border was being atrengthoned 6 On 28 fly Alexandria and Latakia Sycia were closed to slght shipping 7 On 30 Joly —dayst5 the UKR Foreign Minisery went so far ‘mt p 20 Eisentower op cit p 290 Iiusham Sharaby suppeats that it may not be te —feshed to suppone that the U 5 intervention In 1988 was among the stimult of the Egpcian belie that planes from the @h Fleet intervened during the Jne War of 1967 Paleatine and foract Ine Lethal Dilemma Pegaaus New York 190% p 70 tew York Times 18 July 1958 p 3 Eisenhower op cit p 277 SBayption Home Service 21 July 1988 Matte East Mtezor 10 27 Juty 1958 p 24 si UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED as w call n the West German Balin Ethiopian Libyan Tunisian and Moroccan ambsssadors to ak them what thete pesiion would be f the Ontted s Suates and the United Kingdom were to lawnch an atack on the United Arab — Republic ms rance New York Times 30 July 1958 p 4 sn UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Tus conte reesence Chatab later told the French Ambssondor that though oue landing bad saved his state tes catalyse had been the fesgh coup and tat the breivencion bad taken place for larger strategte reasons After the Lg revolution tored out to be a localized event Chehab went on the American forces found that « theiz Middle Eastern theater had shrunk to he Bate and they were conlronred with a completely dierent problem ‘hat problems the Lebanese ineemal eriate was resolved by Jota milfay—tiplomatis itor General Wade accompanied by the Atrtorne commander Bete General Darld Gray mee with General Chetab again on 21 Jly 0—iy20 Arrange ments were made fo the assignment of Letenese atfcers to the alstomne vat and an agreement wan made that Integrated miliary police pacroie composed of men from the Lehnnese Army the 0 5 Army the Nery and t Nachos bn merind aensest Ctetab also annoueed that he was Placing Letarepe troupe between the Bust and the American forces to provent Slaotes General Wade has noted hat The most unssual problem encountered n the Lebanon operation was that of the need to negotiate fos oectives in Ne of setzing them % American troops replaced some Lemasese tisops in the guarding of supply routes and the American section of the ci oatensioly to re— eve them for other dition 3 The Lebenese troops however usually moved to another postion that would put them between the sebels and the Anerican troops The Lebanese crops continued to maintain the tetas quo and desplie te American presence did not make any sertous atempta to crush the retels even i Buiruu While the buildup tn Beira continued other theaters and forces were active but at a slower pace On 19 July D—day@4 the alert levels of the Acizaia and Bucific Fleets were relazed from 4 to 12 hore The CVA Ateam and a a chartered Victory shipe had begun loading a Mazin ate group and regiment landing tearm composed of 2 BLT s tn Norfolk on 18 Joly o—day d for caey in Lebunon by the time the loading was completed on 21 July day#6 tovever a deciston was made to snd the force to Puerto Rico for manewrers intend This was done because Adm Holloway‘s sation reports advised resulactor Pacclimating the Lebanese to our presence and because space ashore vas becoming acarce £ More Important President Risenbower tad indicated tht he was not in favor of further movements of alsable reinforcements to Lebanon Snr ere ene Wade op cit p 15 mid p 19 Shiew York Times 28 September 1958 p 12 hew York Times Statimecs op cit p 26 ose UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Similarly the Department of Sate had the Army seturn iss atomic weapons which had been brouht by snp from Germany The Marines had thee own o actical atomic capability but this wenvonzy was let on board their ships 2 ‘The Department of Stare alee reresned the seaborne movement o BLT 3 3 from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf Following the Ieagl coup the JGS had recommended that a BLT be sene to the Gull to puaed against a poosinle fragt move bro Kovait a or any other threats to friendly governments in the area When It became obvious That the Iraq coup was localized State fel tat auch a move would only sgravate the delicate politcal attuation in that area Likewise the Britsh Foreign Office reversed the course of the commando carzter Bulwark which was steaming toward the Persian Gulf from Kenya ‘Tme area occupled by Amerfcan troops in Lebanon was lselt a amall ares 20 kilometers at its base and extending 16 kilometers at its deepent poin ‘The iactieal pootire was that ofa requlae miliary beacthead ‘There wae a cecon— nalssance and security ine in from of a main line of resistance MLR with reserves centrally located The troops were prepared to converge invard as well as move ounvards 5 U S miltary vehicles were conti to well masked main supply routes NSR‘s which were patrolled 24 hours a day by American troops rong points ware strengthened by ank and troops when necessary Until he Marines began thle withdrawal the Amy troops were kept in the atzpore area Most of the Maines were also inthis general ares although as mentioned earlier there were Maines stiloned In the port area and north of the eit from the beginning of the Lebanon operations General Adams tad established COMAMLANEOR headquarters at the American Community School then In summer recess ‘The AGC‘s Taconic and Pocono were in the harbor nearby ‘Tne first American troops were granted liberty to go lato Bezut on 9 Aupist D—daye25 As the American land forces lived under requiae feld conditions including pup tens and G—ratlons Liberty was an important morale factor ppm rmmmogmmm Twining op clt p 16 new York Times 16 July 1958 p 3 Stollmson op cit p 28 Eisenhower op cit p 278 Similazly the DD Holder — operating tn the Steait of Titan » was nidited 17 ful mae is need not may out of sigh of fand its presence was considered likely t stabilize the local stuation This action was not reversed s Somith Lyon D Lebanon—Professtonalism At ts Best Miliary Review 39 June 1999 p 39 «se— UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Liberty however was Umited to 15 percent of the American personnel daily and was contined to te coastal atea of Bete on he other sice of oun from « the Busta 2 ‘The fic that most American troops were kept ot of sight resulted in minimal damage t nationat seatments and made it easter for te opposition to accept ther presence in Lehinon Similacty the blk of British troops in Jordan were kept at the Amman alzport avay from the city itoelt 3 1t should not be thought however that the American presence was never emphasized Since no combat opecations‘ ened the politcal sole of he — United Stares forces became much greater and was carctily manipolaced for maximum etfect For instance the American troops were given striet orders notto ire unless fired upon and then only when the target could be seen Byen then the troops usually held theie fire the result being that not a single Lelanese was killed by the American forces Not nurprtatagly tis lod to troublesome sniping ontl Ambessador Murphy called on Seeb Satam‘s subordinates Murphy pointed out tat trough Adnizal Holloway was a patient man he could not as a miltary commander colecate continued anipng Surely Murphy went on the revels underawod that the Isa could be destzoyed in a matter of minutes and thit Adnteal Followay could only be expected to Impose grave sanctions i t continued Murphy‘s warning tad an immediate efect the sniping dropped dramatically Similacty Admizal Holloway instated hat the Sed Medtom Tank Butalion from Bremertaven be landed even though the miltary need had passed before they arzived on 27 July D—dayst2 because he felt that the dieplay of armored rnlght would Impro the Lebanese ® _ Armored team made up of 2 to 3 tanks 3 LYTP‘W and an infntey platoon were occastonally deployed fo shows of force® ‘tn addtion tanka were placed at major street intersections when it vas fels tt tete presence could dampen otherwise volatle segments of he population On the other hand American troops were kept out of he cio when fr err rmrmcs Wade op cit p 15 hew York Times 9 August 1958 p 3 umat Was Gatned by Intervention New Republi 199 4 August 1989 p 11 Muspty Diplomat Among Wartiors p 408 Sstatimecn op ett p 31 ‘mi p 31 ass UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 1s yas fal that thaiz presence would have the oppontte efect such as during the presidentiat intuguration on 23 Seprembez ‘The Lebnon operation ts a good example of a situation to which an American troop presence was used selectively and Judtctounly aided by ctose miltary and diplomatic cooperation Despite their bid sat the miltary and diplomatic per — sonne developed a rapport which has been praised by both CBCSPECOMNME was given coples ofall Embassy message teattc Admizal Holloway and Am Iessador MeCHimtock Jotnly drafted many policy mensages and mont of Am — Imasador MeCHineock‘s reports wore dlesated n the pregence of me Adnizal Ambassador Muzzy met daily with Admiral Holloway Despite the presence o U S troops however Amimasador McClintock felt tha a solution to the Lebanese cria could not he forced thatit could best be resolved by negotiation Rober Murphy who arzived in Beirut on 17 Joly D day 2 soon accepted this view Consoquently both men puc thatz efforts imo agring tat the Presidential election was held on 31 Joly te acheduied date A part of hin etrt Murphy met with key figures in Lebanon 18 July — General Chehab Prime Minister Suh and the Spenter of the Glumber of Deyuries 19 July — President Chamoun 20 Joly « Monseigneuz Meouchy Maronite Pacriarct 21 Juy — Abdalish Yeft Uoited National Fron and Henzi Pharomn Tisa Forse 22 July — Greek Orthodox Primate and the Greek Catholic Blatop of Beirut 23 July — Perse Gemayel Keateb — Chetetin Plangiet Party 25 July — President Chamoun and Kamal Jamblot Druze apportion leades 26 July President Chamoun ‘new York Times 22 September 1958 p 10 McClintock The American Lending in Lebanon p 77 R Isnatimaon op cit p 38 Awurpby Diplomat Among Wazztors p 404 «see UNCLASSIFIED Jmapinsins Gadisuur ICH Murphy did not meee withthe most extceme rebel leader Sach Salam until 4 August bu Charroun was not suprisingly upsec hit Muzely met wi the opposition at all During his meatings with the oppostcon Mirpny sought to convince them thatthe United Scates had not intervened simply to promote the political ambitions of one man namely Chamoun fhen Murpiy mes pith Presidene Chamoun on 19 July the latter ed noe tete his palace for 67 days Murphy found him nervous and deprossc4 5 As time passed Chamoun became quite biter at the United States‘ sencenin Chamoun fel tit afer his staunch anci—NManser stand his adherence to the Eigentewer Doctrine and words ot support from the Wester powers the United Staten had beseayed him lndead the United Staten inreatened to with— draw its troops If Chamoun delayed the lections 5 Foreign Mintater Mallk was pertupe even more disuppolated in the per— formance of the U S forces since he wanted the taltary operations in Lebanon to be par of a tol Middle Bast operation and said t if they were nor our action would be one o the greatest farces in Mltory At the very lean the three governmental leaders Chamoun Malik and Sulh expected tct the U 5 presence would eaable them to sick Geneeal Chatab 6 he sil refored o Intessity his campaign againat the insuerectiontere _ Bom MeCLintock and Murphy however fel hat Chetai‘a wide appest made him th ouly accepuable compromise candicute Conequentty Meciinc tld te rime Miatoter tat f trouble followed Chetab‘s dtamniasal th use of American pore mmmmmmmmes Murphy Dulles Ocal History Tesnscripe p 54 Atuzpty Diplomat Among Warriors p 400 3ria pression Améicaine Hatt tete que F‘amizal communtant in Stime Floste menace de retier ses forces at Ie vor n intervenatt pa a coue ante The American pressure was such that the Admiral commanding the Sith Fleet threatened to withdraw his forcen if the election did not take place at thar date Chamoun Camille Crise au Moyen— Orient Gallimard Parte 1963 p 428 valtk was less than perfecly discreet Almont exactly the same wording appeazed in an article veluen for an American magazine by a top autiontty from the Mids Hast — a man who cannot be idetited by same but who has heen tn close contact wit developments in the current crieln ® Nasserand the Rta — Can They be Stopped U S News and World Report 45 I Aupust 1959 p % — ELAGORED ‘hho mussace is mcussineor troops was out of the question Chenab Anally agreed to run and was elected by an overvielining vore 8 t 8 on 31 July by the Chamber of Deputies that ad been elected in 1995 Murphy temporarily let Legon on the eve of the election to minimize the appestance of U S influence 2 While in te Middle Ease Murphy visited teaq Jordan tseael Egypt and Ethlopia at Haile Selasste‘s requen His ob jective in these visits was to convince Middle Eastern leaders te the American Handing was a stabilizing influence Looking back Murphy has salts tink the impact of American force the way it was used on the Arab mind was one of the bese things that we possibly could have done 3 in addition to Ambassador Murpby‘s etfort the Volce of America tripled its broadcasts to the Middle East $ es Kis » McClireock An American Embassy to Lebanon Secret p 30 PMuepty Diplomat Among Waszioes p 408 Murphy Dutles Oral History Transcripe p 50 % Anew York Times 22 Juby 1958 p 6 ‘ » «see URCLASSIRED UROLASSRE AlL Adc am oremations American air power both combat and logistical was very important ou the Lebanon operation lik Bleat ate — rathoe than naval — arrack was the main danger the US forces faced during the Lebanon operation The Sortet naval presence in t Mediterranean was minimal Syzta‘s navy was practically nd and Egypr‘s avbmarines which were a porenial threat and destroyers rasoly sorned far from Alexanteia Both Syria and Egype on the other hand were equipped with modern Soviet iil atzeraf Ruzther a Sorie ate arack could be laynched from the USSR or Buigacta Second aizorat were responalile fos much of the troop bulldup ater the Marines had secused the Reieue atzport Rusthermore though the greater volume of materiel was sone by sea aircraft were gtven the responsiblity for much of he resupply of priority materiel This section is an examination of ate actly during the Lebanon operation Emphaste i placed on the period from 15 July when the Marines landed to 5 Semenber uten Taak Force 6 and the Sertvogs lee for Naples veing his period 6th Heer airezaft flew approximately 11 000 sorties of al spes As mertioned earlier there were 3 aizerat cassiors in the Mediterssnesn on 15 July CVA Seratoga‘at Cannes CVS Wasp ac Naples and CVA Roses at Pirsevs Athena Operation Bleat had envisioned fine ate support with the Britsh for a Lebanon landing with RAF planes fing ais cover and 6th Flect alreraft providing close air support during the actual landing tn aneicipation however that British troops would have to be sent t Jordan to bolster King Huaseln‘s government a contingency not earatoned in the cpecational plan U 5 atzsrat an well as troops assumed the entize burden of the Lebaron operation ova orematious ‘The Ease at Athena 700 miles away was the closest cerzios and was given responnliliey fo ate cores Although the Raver sailed at last 4 hours before the reat of the Gt Flee 1 July ies planes had to stage tough Cyprus to seach Belew There is some dispute about thie acsival time ‘Tne Copain ot the Bases has stated that his planes were on staion over Selru by 1490 but the official time has been placed at about 15 mimites after the Marines landed 2 30 5 6th Fleet Commun Himosy op cit 5 14 stutiimson op cite pe 40 «ss Widusorc tn his Project Recap an after—sction evaluation CBICSPECOMME says tar given the improbability of smed oppoeitin the miliary riska involved were Justified bythe political necessity of landing the troops at 1500 before President — Rivertowe‘s announcement tha they had alzeady dane so According to a memser of the Britsh training mission in Lebanon however 6 Lebanese planes in he air during the landing were ordernd by an element of the Lebanese General Sut to anack the Marines but refused on the grounds that the order had noe come — through thiz squadron commander A By 17 July all 3 carciers were on ataton southwest of Lebanon 13°—38°8 On that diy more than 50 atzeraft from the Sezatope and Eeoex tlew a one—hour and 10—miaite low»level show of force over the west hank ot Jordan before the fest aczival of Beitsh troops 2 The Seratogn was alerted on 17 Jaly «day 2 for poastble ate evacuation of King Hussein the alert was canceled the same day ‘The Briish carrier Bugle which had been in Malta when the cztats beske epersted berween the American carriees and the const of Leraal to provide ate cover for the Britsh atrl to Amman The Bagle operated there from 18 July D—day 3 to 23 July after which t sailed to Cyprus waters On 18 July 24 aireraft 12 from the Eovex and 12 from the Sarstop flew a show of force over Lebanon 3 Likewise the Navy conducted a 2—houe Oyorer of Lebanon‘s major cities on 29 uly D day 8 This and other auch Ayorers during the Lebanon operation were billed as a salute to the people of Lebsson 5 As might be expected air operations were most irenatve dizing the fest phase of the Lebeson operation For example the CVA‘s were on lge aler 24 hours a day for a leat the ftest 10 days In the first 20 days of air operations there vas a lasach or a recovery every 50 minutes day and nighe ‘When hoch CVA s wore on atation they oten sent outa total of 250 sorties a day although the modernized WW It carzier Bovex was able to send out 148 sorties by eself during the ceitical move Into Belrit on 16 July D day 1 7 Together the Esex and Saratoga passed the 3000—sortie mark y 3 August 8 foams me Burch and Linde op ct Sécant p 19 New York Times 18 July 1958 p 2 U S Mews and World Report 8 uly $8hp m 0 Inte York Times 20 July 1958 p 49 ‘bit p 16 Shiew York Times 24 July 1958 p 5 Regula ats opecations over Lebanon vere vibeted reecomatioance Aigtes Log Arnold LCde U S Operation in Lebanon 14 uly 28 October 1958 U ‘ Secret 1989 p 116 HeldbyNevalHletory Div a Sneweveek 11 August 1958 p 17 ‘ew York Times 18 July 1958 p 2 Shiew York Times 4 August 1958 p 4 «so— UECLISSEAED During the period of CVA ate operations 15 July to 5 Seprember the Essex and Saratoga sent out 6983 sorties in support of the Lebanon operation an average of more than 200 a day fos the toral ime thas both carriers were on vation Tnroughout the Lebanon operation refueling of the alzceut carriers was done at night so as to minimize imerference with air operations ova am oreRtioN is Jux to s serteimer sorties Flying hours day Fiying hours night Saratoge 1 20 Tase Lim Essex aus s 0s iss Toul es 12518 218 Note COMCARDIY 6 to COMSIXTHELT O6114S2 confidential September 1958 Thsoughout the period of aie opesacions the CVA task force gonesaly operated neue BCN 0B bat never in a compect gesep Instead the ath Hee vas #6 ployed in a scagiezed ormation the Mayrrace moue for protection agaiont mclear ariack 1 Since the CVA‘s were operating avay from Lebanon Itself CVA planes on missions over that country were dizected from the Tactical As Contzol Gazeer aboard the AGC Pocono at Barut when they were within 60 miles of Reteat« At fest Army and Mazine helicopters and Aemy ligte planes operated under COMAMLANEOR withou reference to the TACC as did commercial United Nattons and Lebanese miliary aircraft Although th original plans called for separate atz contzot by the services the resulting contusion the amall size of Lebanon and the ased to coordinate RAF operations from Cyprus led to the transfer of 0 5 ats conezol to COMANNAVEOR See map ‘The Beteutateport iselt atzendy crouded with civilan Lebanese miliary and UNOGIL atzeraf quickly became semszated when tand—Lased Navy parrol planes Army and Marine hellcopeess Army lighe planes and Al Force trans « ports Became additional users Had here been even mince combat operations the need for additional atr personnel facilis and more precise operating procedures would have been critical By 23 Jily «day 8 the cntets had lessened to the pain where the Resex wae able to take a 3—day zest in the eastern Mediterranean after which the Saratope did the same ‘On 5 August D—day 21 the Nery announced that abour half of the 6th Fleet including the Basex was heating for livery posts in Turkey Greece and Raly ‘The Saratoga took a similes rest period when the Eavex revuznad on station after a 9—tay absence On 20 August Day 30 pram New York Times 4 August 1958 p 4 ew York Times 21 July 1958 p 6 CRICSPECOMME 5 Specified Command Midite Bast Project Recap Secret 7 November 1988 Aue York Times 6 August 1958 p 3 ma UKCLASSIFED UKOLASSIHED WCL ASSIREEN UKCLASSIRIED the Eavex lef the eastern Meditereanean for a short por visk to Naples and then with 4 destroyers transited the Suez Canal on 28 Augurt entoute o the Formosa Straits to strengthen the 7th Fleet which was then ivolved tn the Quemoy—Matsu ceisis No replacement for the Easex was sent to the 6h Fleet az me time On 26 August Adm Brown who felt ths the mobily and ato striking capably of the 6th Flee had been compromised recommended to Adm Holloway thas he be allowed to opecace as fas wost as the Tyzzhenian Sea This requent was granted and on 5 September Taek Force 60 lat for Naples CVA‘s Forrestal and Randolph Joined the 6th Fleet on 12 September to relieve the Saratope which lef the Medizeszanean on 21 September The Randolph was in the Lebenon operational area from 23—28 September and seme aircraft orer Lebanon to familiarize ie piloen withthe area 2 An operational vis to Belrue vias canceled however lest it be mitzzespreted the Randolph went to Turkey instead asw orerations ‘When the nternal cztate in Lebanon fess surfaced in May 1958 the CVS ‘Wan was operating on the ast Count of the United Scates It wan ordered to the Mediterzanean ahead of schedule with im 7 Dealey—class ASW DB‘s Wasp moved with othar major unl of the 6th Floet foto the eastern Mediterzanesn and made port calle at Souchas Bay Crete and Rhodes with CVA Seratopa s complement was approximately S0 ASW airczatt G28‘e and helicopters Haring departed the eastern Medizerzanesn after the Lebanese internal existe subsided in June the Wasp was in Naples when the Iraat revolution exapted on 14 July ‘The Wasp lef Naples for the eastern Mediterranean the following day and after passing through the Steal of Messioa alowed down to redice the distance separating it from the Suratoge which had sailed from Cames During the passage to the Lebanon cperational ares the Wasp zan as mich as 100 milen ahead of the Sezacopt piteugh tte submarine threat during this translt was minimal planes from the Wasp putzols around the Saratoge At might be noted hese that bock CVA‘s Serntoge and Bases had a limited ASW capability but the presence ofthe Wasp ask force allowed them to devere thatz time to other atr operations As soon as Wasp arcived in the operational area on 17 July D tay 2 it sailed disectly to Beirut and offloded a contingent of Masines Later in the Lebanon operation the Wasp also escorted a tzoopebip fom the middle of he Mediserraneen to the operational area or the fest few daye the Wasp‘s 7 DBs operated near i fter tas howeres they scarred operating to a larger extent as sepacaie unite Sometimes the DBs operated together to form submatine beszlovs Generally the Wasp held 3 DB‘s and sent out 4 ‘The f 4 searchers usually operated in conjunction with the Wasp‘s lance hex York Times 28 August 1988 p 1 Mitte East Micros No 10 28 September 1988 p 3 ass — JBO jootritn RuLAVUN u musrot isncuusmiieo During daylight hours the Wasp operated as a distinct uni at aige it was assigned to one of the CVA‘s mainly to provide an emergency deck Alttough the Wasp tried to maimata aircraft in the ate around the clock land—based £ PAV‘a also flew patrols around the carriess as nighe ‘There were 2 VP and—hased patzol aircrat squadrons tn the Mediterranean each comprising 12 PAV‘s VP 10 was as Port Lyaitey Mozocco and VP 21 at Sigonella laly« VP 21 ad alzeady moved to a seri—permanent ataging base at Malka when the Marines landed in Lebanon on 18 July The following day VP 21 Gew to Soudhis Bay Crew and VP 10 flew to Malia On 17 July Day 2 in deference to the Greek gorernment‘s sensitivity over use ofits atespace PAV squadrons were ordered not to fy out of Soudhas Bay unless a serious snbmazine threat evolved ‘That day 3 of the ateceat few to Boteut all tit could be accommodated and the rest of VP 21 flew back to Malis After the Army trooplif to Lebanon iid passed through Adana Turkey 6 planes from VP 21 tew there and conticted dally patrols after 21 July D day 6 VP 10 contimed to Ay patrols bevween Malta and Pore Lyautey ‘The submarine threat was minimal during the Lebanon operation oo sub mazines were found in the aastern Mediterranean ‘A destroyer and submarine pozzolled the area around Alexandria but the Egyprian submarine activity was almost ail Duzing the Lebanon operation the Wasp took 2 long reste in August and then left the Medizerzanean in the middle of September without a replacement Whenever the Warp lef the operational ares it was replaced by a single PZV and 2 destroyers Had there been a serious submarine threat the land—based facilities alone would have been inadequate When the Wasp was withdraws in September for daty on the East Coast Ite tour inthe Mediterranonn had alceady been extended Adm Holloway had space atthe Beirut airport t accommodate only 6 more F2V‘s as a replacement ATR FoRCE orERATION As provided in the operational pln for a Lebanon operation a TAG Com— posite Als Strike Forse conalating mataly of F—100‘s and 8—57‘a from the United Scates New to Inciellk AB Tuskay 230 milan north of Betewt and 460 miles from the USSR In 1988 TAC had been given the mission of sering up a rapldresponse theater deployment force for peripheral or brust—tire wars Since the Depastment of Suite had vetood earlier Ate Force deployment to Adina as posencially provocative 1 the Lebisnon operation provided a rel tent for TAC‘s Compolte Als Strike Force TAG‘s reaction time was slower thin expected in all filrzess however it should be recognized that thore atrcentt had to fly 400 miles to ge there Two squadrons ot F—100 D BF‘s at Cannon AFB New Mexico had been — wasigned for the move to Turkey but could not take off with All loads because Porno intnnremmmcoome Braestrup op cit p 26 M sen of raray construction Instead 2 squadrons from Myecle AFB South Carolina Hse ordered to Turtes Howeves thase aquadrons had no over water or nignt refueling experienced and of the ist squadeon 12 planes sent on IS July only 4 planes made t nonetop to Adana by 16 July 2 On 17 July D—day 2 8 of the second 12—plane groups made it to Adana although all had to stop at Chutesurous France and ¥natius MB Libya because tankers were unavailable Bo storms snarled the refueling the assigned KB—50J tankers could not Ay above he weather ‘Tne fllow—up jets for the TAC force had to be held in France vari the saturation caused by the USAFE United States Alr Force Europe trooplif from Germany subsided at Incellk AB ® By 20 July D—day 5 the fll complement of 1 planes had reached Adana The 12 assigned B—57‘s let Langley AFB Virginia on 13 Ary oxo and —a—half hours before the fires fires goe ot However because of mechanical and communications difficultes 8 were forced to land at Eenest Harmon AB Newfoundland The fest 2 B—37‘s fally reached Adara on the morning of 17 July the cest azzived by the end of 18 July ‘me B—57 also made a scheduled stop at Chateaurous France By the end of 18 Jly D—day 3 there were 33 TAC combat aizerat in Adana out of 54 commited plus 2 TAG G—130‘s ‘Forty other loglatical arcratr were being held enroute in Europe untll the saturation at Adina could clear Inctelik AB reached saturation on 16 July D—day 1 For this reason a USAFE alsti of 198 sorties bringing a support task force for the Arny mate Group had to be held in Euzope afte iss fest 7 planes reached Adana Tne atrlt was resumed on 19 July D—day 4 when the Bale Group few from Adana to Bete following negolationn with the Lehanege government TAC fighters from Adana provided aiz cover for this Aighe Originally USAFE planned to send combat aircraft to Turkey but the TAG force from the United States was subsituzed because of the possiblity of a spread ot hollies to Europe Similarly TAG was directed to use lis oun transports — instead of MATS wherever possible agatast the possiblity tha the Army genes Army Corps GTRAC in the United States might have to be atclited taman s » ©‘Domell James F Operation Double Trouble Saturday Evening Post No 231 20 September 1988 p 49 it Iocaestrup op cit p 26 Img 5 26 md 5 25 hiew York Times 20 July 1958 p 14 Smarch and Lule op ctt p 7 Secret aas Alttough the operational nn for a Lebanon operation recognized th m probabiliy of atomic wastace all component forces were nonetheless ordered by the JCS to maintain tra capability Tals requirement was waived for TAC however since the 6 Fleet atzoady had the capability Had the TAC been requized to maintain such a capabiliy the additional alreratt personnel and support mazertal would have placed an even greater steain on Adana‘s facilities £ in its after —acticn repose the 19th Ale Forse noted thatthe Lebanon opezstion had been the ligest requirement and tha the problems and deficiencies would have been greatly magnified in a graver sitwaion As provided in the operational plan a SAC medium bomber wing was earmarked tor CRCSPECOMME operations On IS July SAG was ordered into an improved readiness condition® and SAC tankers were deployed to a forward position This was done openly Presiden Elsenbower waned our determination to be clearly keown2 By 20 Jily D—day 3 much of SAG was on 1S—minite alest 3 rematning n tis posture throughout July overruiont rrosioms ‘When the Marines had secused the Beirut aimpony the Army Bane Group in Germany was sere to Beieue by way of Adana Intally the G—130‘% flew over Austria to Realy and then continued to Adana The G—119‘s and G—L2t‘s followed the longer route of Masseliles Naples Athene Adina Austria however closed her airspace to all millary ovestliges on 17 July D day 2 Austria tok tite action even though the Austrian Foreign Maister expressed fill spproral and undesszanding of the U S action on 13 Joly it had been assumed tat where orestligh rigs in suppors ot a CBICSTE COMME operation were not granted they would be ignored The United States contimed to overtly Austria until 20 July D—day 3 when the American Ambassador in Viens reported that the continuation of unauthorized orertlites ‘would weaken sertously our moral and propaganda position and afte the Defense Minister of Austria announced tae the Austrian Al Force had orders to shoot down any intruding miliary airernt Te Svinw goresnmem bad dented a U S request for use of ts atzapace on 18 July and 10 July and viesually closed it on 17 July D—tay 2 by requtring 4 days notice for ll miltary overtighs mora march and Lids op eit Secret p 79 tisentower op tit p 276 Juew York Times 21 July 1988 p 9 scmwarsz David G et al A Sudy on Crisis Management Foreign Policy Research instiute University of Pennsylvania p C—tl CINCSPECOMME Command Report operation Blucbee 15 Jul—25 Oct 1958 0 $ December 1988 Serial 00970 Section 6 Secret p 1 Sew York Times 22 July 1988 p 1 Cbetstisn Science Monitor 19 July 1958 p 1 ‘ew York Times 26 July 1958 p 3 «se — musiaos is ncuussineor More serious was the partial clonuse of Greek airspace on 16 July D lay 1 Eoemunately th atzborne Barde Group had ltt Gecmany that morning and was able to land ae Adana the same day ‘The Oreck gorersmen amovnent We shall cboesve all the obliguions springing from ouz friendatip o the United States shore of meting in hoatilty againat the Arabe bu also announced that requests for use of ais bares would be denied unless NATO was imrolved Tro s Greek government in 1958 was biter a its NATO allies because of Cyprus in the Greek campaign or Cypriot independence Foreign Minister Avecall fad Just finished conferzing wich Presidents Tho and Nasser when the American landings began On 17 July Greece restricted landings at Athens to westbound teat only and required 48 hours‘ notice Later that day Greece refused all excepe emergency high overfights were peesnited Ove por ae were ete ae a — e 20 fly D day 5 eastbound trafic was granted pesmiaston to land at igh at atetields other than Athens mass Algies however were prohibiied Whaekus AB Libya was unexpectodiy ewamped when many atrcentt had to take this longer but open route to eleue aly was a tey country on this rome — Moreaver mximm usage of the G 119‘s in Resope was tot possinle when the shorter route was closed necessitating a request 18 Jol that the number of G 124‘s in Euzope be increased by one tind fom 36 to 80 Spain and Pormpal were oo of the most cooperaure countates They quicidy give All approval fo the staging of oop atrlite from the Unid States through their cosneries On the othas hand the most erzatic response came from lstacl King Hhussetn of Jordan requested Westorn tervention on 16 July and an alie of British paratroopers lef Mcouta Cyprus for Amman very early on the morning of 17 July D—day 2 The airlift wan forced to wire ace while atthorne because lezael had not yer granted clearance for overtiigs Before granting permiesion the Lsraeli Prime Miniates David Be—ourton lled Eesaldens Risentwez 0230 BDT 0830 lopat time to make auce thee he United States backed the British mare to Jordan ° The iret comtngent of 300 paratroopers begun aeziving at Amman 0930 local ime 7 houre ater th atelit had remened Tubers Trey All Sand The Economist 198 26 July 1980 p 273 Anew York Times 19 july 1958 p 2 where They All Stand The Economiat 188 26 July 1959 p 273 Per miaston for overiligh privllcgue in sul dificult to receive The present Greek gorerament resteteted U S miliary overtligs during he June Was of 1907 to evacuation Algize only tisentower op cit p 279 «ar to Cyprus The fess phase of his aiclf took 18 houes longer than ortgiea planned 1 Te aizlit ppronmately 2600 mes was compleied on t aerncon of 18 July Duzing the aictit British Aighrees from Cyprus and later from the — British aicezaft carzier Eagle provided an escort for th troop planes Jordas faced a critical storage of o almost immediacely after the coup in frag The United Sates and Britain decided to satisty Jordan‘ emergancy s needa by a U S airlift of FOL feom the British base at Sahzain in e Feosinn Gull via the Amezican aiz base at Dhahess Saudt Arabia Crown Prince Faisal refused peetalasion fo the POL overttigh hawerer and it was decided t y she ol from Bains instead tn an extreme emeegency it might have become necessary to ignore the Such Arabian decision @ Isael did grant clearance for this atlift from Beirut but only if own above 14 500 fee this meant that G—119 s which would have been more economical on this shorter nus could not be used Thirteen G—150‘s from the support task force being held in Adana were diverted to hlp 17 G—124‘s then in Beeae complete this aisle ‘The British requested American atd for a second atsiit ot supplies from Cyprue to san from 24 July to 1 August Israel granted cleazance for tis averigh although it had requested on 22 July D—aay 7 tae the Britsh find anomer route to Jordan No other zou was open ‘The istaelis complained that the Zlghes had been disorderly and had lasted too long On 28 July Dday 13 the Britsh sequested American aid for an indefinite cargo if to van after 1 August The JCS however authorized one wort 6 upust only atnce there were nor enough transports for a continuing ic Plans were made In the All expectation that Iact would continue perzplasion for overs Mighes On 3 August however lezael denied permiaston On 4 August lerael announced that it would be constrained to tire on 0 5 and Reiush planes it they conttaned to overtly Iscael 0 On 5 August Israel opened pec air space for night overitighcs ba for 5 days only and then closed it again eraet‘s bebavioe is dificult to undezstand since its goversment was flly aware that the nuzival of he existing regimes in Lebanon and Jorden was tot advancage Ben—Guzton declared publicly that Ienel feased enctzclement by Prmmmmmnrommnzemcemces Keesing‘s Contemporazy Archives 26 July—2 August 1958 p 16308 Eisentower op cit p 280 Snarch and Lite op cit Seczet p 53 view York Times 23 July 1958 p 3 New York Times 4 August 1958 p 6 £ Sew York Times 5 August 1958 p 1 New York Times 7 August 1958 p 14 New York Times 11 August 1958 p 3 mss IMap 4 coritn holRooif ico UNCLASSIFIED Nasser‘ on the nigh of 14 July be had urged tha the United States take tort ight actiot inthe Midéle Bant # A possible explanation for lscsel‘s behavior mete ccond o ihe Sloat eampitan of 1986 The consequences of that campaien fo rhich the leesells played a key role had let them with lle specie for famer leroivement with groas powers Moreover locael‘s contouieg etfort vo lmprsre relations with te Third World had auffored as a comequece of Is pervelvation in the Sloat campaign Pinal Prime Minster fen —bucice fod it necessary to mollify leftists in his coulttion goreramencs Sudan basaed British miliary overttighes on 20 July 3 On 1 August Sudan gere ihe United Sates persnianton for atzcrat oot on milly missions to erty tha countey as high altiide and with no atermpt to commer any convol fevers An alr resupply from the Pacifc would have been erea more Aifoute bncuuse Byp Syria leng and Saud Arabia blocked all access to Leoancn and Jordan from th east except for Jordan‘ port of Agabe In adtition lntla wan adamantly aguinat the Lebanon operation and on 29 July Ceylon aceved notice that no aillazy overfliges would be allowed over its reitory ‘Tew York Times 22 July 1958 p 9 New York Times 16 July 1958 p 17 hew York Times 22 August 1988 p 3 «ss uverse suao UNCLASSIFIED reomucs Blackat envisioned a joint miliary transporsation ard MTB but none was established In his aterzsction report CNCSPECOMME scared that a boand should have been created both to improve coordination of loglatical actvine and to relieve the operational commanders o acminiszative aako ns mer — toned earli American planes few a large share of the Sriish supplies and operated he FOL airlf trom Beteuc to Amman American port tranuportation and oll—handling experts were also sent to Agate L Trough resupply was automatic the fit that the land forces alone drew ‘tete logistent atippore from many widely separated organisations avreogtrons CRICSPECOMME‘s recommendation that one command such as ChICUSAREUR should oversee logistial support in fuire operation Fortunately detailed plans had been developed in November 1997 had been tested during h alert of May 1958 and were closely followed Pre—stocking tn expectation of a Middle Raster criate by the Army at Livorso aly by the Als Force at Adana Tukey and by he Mazines in North Cazolina proved valuable BOL usage however was greater than anticipated for both the Nary and Alr Force At ncteilk AFB the high consumption of aviation fuel made resupply a critical problem even though the pipeline from Yumuzzalik was used to capacity and fuel was trucked rom latenderun 3_ Similarly the carsiees‘ sustained ate operations greatly increased the Navy‘s consumption of aviation fel The increased aize of te 6th Fleet isolt about 70 percens larger than normal in August placed an added strain on POL resupply CCSPECOMME in his ater—action report noted that a critical showage vould have renulid if Ll scale combat operations had ensued 2 Adm Holloway in fact fel hat the shorsage of POL was critical whenever the Fleet operated in the eastern Meditersanees bath because of the shortage of oilers and because supply depors were few Ts this requrd he recommended greates use of Intigenous supplies and establishment of NATO Common Infrastrucuure POL storages ac Soudtas Bay Crate ‘There were some shortages of cern open of ammunition increased atorage space was buil n Spain afterward to remedy this situation The Mitary Sen Transport Service fest diversed 15 of ito cargo vessels to resupply the Lebanese operation it soon had to lease 27 commeccial vessels $ Resupply by MSTS was satitactory throughout the operation Als resupply on the other hand foundered on the problem o overitighe righ Further had the Quemey—Massu criie fared up at the same time Instead ot a month liter both TAG and MATS mighe have found thie resources eitier hew York Times 3 August 1954 p 9 CMCSPECOMME op ct Secter p J—4 Nex York Times 23 July 1958 p 3 no inadequate or seriously straiza 1 During the Lebanon crisis the Milicy Alr Teansport Service tcu to someact atrctat from privare aiziicens but these retised without a de—laration of rational emergoncy 2 propably because it was the neighe of the auremer toustsc season ‘There was also a sectous shortage of andine space tn Lebanon itso Boinve lcersational Alrpors the sargent and mos modein in te WMiodle Base £ quickly became overcronded Similac problems were encountered in the port area The Belcwt tastor became sanitated and had the aoesation been opposed woule have pecome a serious borleneck Too much reliance was placed on Indigesous lator in unloading and in Adm Helloway‘s ugment the rate could wt have met the requirement of a combat sttwtion The fic that thore were no acs comat operations even became a segative factor tn that comut supplies were not used up4 Space nanially was a problem abd th storage of so much nosed ammunition inthe heass of the ciy was dangeronss ‘The Mastnes adhering to their traditonnt role as a striking forse landed with only 20 days of compa supplies Initially Marine rtle companies were gullet ofthe Hine to handle supplies 5 ‘The Marines sooo formed a Lopletcal Support Group from the support elements of the 3 BLT‘s in Lepanons ‘They vere given valuable logistical aid by the Army Logistical Command which tad Seon brought Ito Lebanon to support 2 Army battle groups 0 ‘Trcop replacements weee no problem since the Mazines were at 3 tines their moonal # Hleee strength and the Crisis naver reached the proportions feased and only one of the 2 Army banle groups plamned came trom Germany Regarting unite of the 6th Float lisef all regutas mainsemance had to be suspended daring the Lebanon operation The Amphion a repale ship vas deployed wien an ocean—going tug t the 6th Fleet for the amptiblous stipe and other heavy units while the regular 6th Fleet ende was unod pamacly tor destroyer repairs The CINCNELM Annual Report concludes tha If the Amphion bad not heen deployed to the Milerzaneas the Wth Flea tender could not have kept up with ensential repates Indeed COMDRASTEOR‘s 11 August request for another destroyer east of the Suez Canal vas denied by Aim Brows laipely because the extended operation in he Lebanon ares had sesslied ina sorious bnckiog of necessary repatss Tsr ren te mmm Buzch and Lide op cits Seczot p 80 Incsesteup ope cite p 27 t Smail War Gomes Is U S Ready 0 5 News World Report 45 5 September 19590 p 32 Sade op cite p 21 Sbeaestzup op cite p 26 Sor the Army teogps 47 percent were in Logtatics in contrast to 17 percent $ of the Marines Shulimson op cit p 31 he seasons were the Fleet‘s ncseased size orer 80 sips in Augusy an the pressures associated with a crisi operacon n— URCLASSIRED UNCLASSIFIED As a result of the sede that the extended operations placed on the 6th Pleat y CRICLANTELT recommended October 1959 that in addtion to the exiting 2nd and 6th Fleets tn the Arlantic Fleet a third numbered eet to be called the #h sit Flee be formed ‘This plan contemplated the periodic rotation of the 3 floats for duty t the Mediterranean as inograted forces in place of the rouation of indiriduel ships tate the 6th Fleet One feet would be relatively inactive undergoing necessary shipyard work while the other two operated in the Atlantic and Mediterranean t is not surprising that tis expensive suppestion was not accepted For a time CNO was ed to beliere hit no additional funds would be alloted tothe Navy butige for the Lebanon operation 2 — fer New York Times 26 October 1958 p 34 por task Times Reber Mizply hag eatimated the total cast of the Lebanon operation at $200 million Muzpty Diplomat Among Wazziers p 409 aa @evease stan UNCLASSIFIED y comtnications Adm Brown had complained aboutthe inadequacy of communications space ¢ inthe Flee Aagabip Des Moines as carly as June 1957 fils problem vas symptomatic of the general communications condition Even before the Lebanese czieis broke out Navy fillies in Washington wore handling 40 000 messages a week far above the peak Korean War load Classified message teaffc alone was nianing 50 porcere heavier man in 1997 Nonetheless the Nary‘s gersonnel reduction of FY—1958 had cue communications personnel by 12 perce h Although Minimize cestzictions on all non—essental messages thas would ordinary be transmitied electronically was immediately imposed the message backlog quickly reached gargantuan proportions For example a COMSITHIELT Priaetey Sitrep issued one howe afterthe landing took 10 houre to reach CNO Top Secree message teattlc increased 500 percent and Secrec rattle increased 92 percent ‘In an attempt to speed their own messages many uni commanders aver—rated them thereby nullifying Minimize Few messages carcied lover than a Priority precedence ‘The shorsage of qualified communications personel was critical at both ends Although the Bure of Naval Personnel through its Augment Ras program sent additonal personnel their unfamiliariy with te specifce of CROSPECOMM® Oplan 215—58 severely limited the coniberion during the erica early stages of the Lebanon operation In both CNCSPECOMNE Oplan 215—98 and CINCAMBRITEOR Oplan 1—38 the communication plans were noe standard operating procedure and thiz high classification prevented many people from becoming familias with them Although the Atr Forse and the Army provided qualified personnel these proved insufficient and Adm Holloway was foreed to request addilonal communications persomel from CNO Altough ‘here were Instances of Inadequate communications facilities —« — neither the bas Maines ‘Tcsnle nor the relay station for the Persian Gult was adequate the lack of qualified persomel appears o be the main reason for the fatlire of Minimize r———_—— Low op cit Secznt p 98 use averse samo o — URCLASSEFEF hoLndui IC wimorawat On 31 July Day 16 the day that 1800 reinforcements arzived in Set Secretary of State Dulles anounced tha the withdeawel of Amerioan forces from Lebaton would begin as soon as the Lebanese government requasmed it The cxedibiliey of the Secresary‘ statement was not helped when 2200 more troops reached Beirut by ship from Bremerhaven 3 days later Adm Holloway ex plained that hese were chiefly syppore tecaps and were aimply past of to pipeline of the original force 1 They were but many Azabe did not believe cate By 8 August @—day 20 U 5 forces in Lebanon were ata poak strength — of 14 357 men G§1S Army 5842 Marines 2 _ On 5 Augost Drday 21 Adm Holloway was ordered to begin planning for withdraval 3 President—Rlect Chehab however wan in no huety to see the Amezican teoope go # and said that the Moslem leaders tele the same way 5 Mose of the Mootam leaders were aware thas the United States had pressed Chaman to hold elections and for the time being troop withdraval was not an immediate feowe Murhy nouethelens belleved it might be possible to with— draw tzoape and avit avoid a heary U N bulldip and Adm Holloway cominced Chehab of the political advantages of at least a symbolle withdraval Chetab ‘aated no pore than a token witidraval though unl the aecurty aimation improved ‘The Security Council held ts tied meeting on 7 August Both the United Statee and the Soriet Union called for an emergency seaslon of the Gonezal As sembly A meeting was held on 8 August with a second meating set for 13 August to allow various delegaten to arzive On 12 August Ad Holloway ancounced the withdrawal of Marine BLT 2 2 beginning on the following day This force did not withdraw immediately from the eastern Mediterrsnens but stayed as a Moating reserve _ Adm Holloway decided to witadraw the Maztnes first since he did ot teroe thatz continied use as a searle rather than striking force The witdrawal was meest to colncide with the meeting of the Genezal Arsembly to show the world thas the United Stare was withe drawing not building up its forces in Lebanon before an official Lebsnese request ‘The USSR had sait Thiew York Times 4 Auguet 1958 p 4 nisentiawer op cit p 286 statimaon op cits p» 34 duturply Diplomat Among Warzioes p 408 SveCliniock An American Embassy to Lebanon Seczet p 32 ° Sstutiimzon op cits p 34 xeestng‘s Coomemporezy Archives 11—18 October 1958 p 1641 EStatimeon ope tic p 34 new York Times 31 August 1958 p 1 ane mus pace is werassiieos However in all cass we know of American troops staying on foreign territory thore is not a single case of tie Americans leaving any one of hom of theie own tree will According to Andrew Service the U N staf fle thas the Lebanese crists was alseady settled when the Murines landed on 18 July Agceement had been reached beween and amon tne pasties on Sunday 2 cays before the Marines came in on Tuesday and therelore the task from that momene on had to be s on what means ca get the Marines ou 2 UNOGIE grew rapidly afte the landing probably because of the fear of international confict Inerestingly enough ¢ grew mont after the crisls was on the downnien as indleate in the following dara 3 28 jin 15 ol 10 Aug 209e9 Oct b4rer Number of cbservece se uis caso asr mee an Number of peemanently wau— manned suions 65ouB 2003 as # Number of vehicles 74 Noe Noe 1‘s ao waite avail able — able Jun pol Aug Seel Oct Number of ate sorties pee mond 1s am mo air aos By the time the General Assembly met both the Lebanese and Jordanian exises had calmed down considerably Lebron had elected a new Presidents UNOGIL had undergone a lacge buildup Lebanon the United Kingdom and the United Sates had recognized teag 30 July 1 August 2 August respectively and the United States had begun the withirawal ot its troops Withdrawal added to Chetab‘s election enabled the UAR to save fase and join other Arsh states in sponsoring a compromise resolution which was adopted unanimounly by the General Assembly on 21 August ‘The Arab resolution called for the early withiraval of foreign oops but mentioned no deadline and reaffiemed the Arab League‘s principle of independence and sovereignty for each member state The resolution embareasned the sories Unton because the Joint paricipation of he UAR Lebanon fraq and Jordan let no role for Moscow to play ‘The absence of a withdraal cate was a moral victory for the United Sates and the moderate tone of he resolution belinted Soviet efforts to icenaily he cristo TSoriet Buzopean Service 20 june 1958 — contier Andrew Executive Assistant o U N Secretary General in 1959 Cortier Transcript The Dulles Oral History Collection The Princeton University Library 1967 p 15 aubain op eit » pp 146 181 152 «me URCLASSEIED URGLASSIFIED Cp it dugast President Chamoun said hat he saw so prpapecs of asking for a U S withdraval before he left office on 23 September Ou 25 August ho wld Ambassador MeCHintock tha he would be willing to make acezet aezange nests whereby American troops could say in Lebanon On 5 Sertenben he ‘id American trous should romain indefinitely so tat the United omas woul have a foothold in the Midala Bast«® On the same day President—Rlect Chetab asked the Ambassador if a second Marine bazalion could —e withdramn to stake up the more fanatic pro—Chamoun elements The United Sates were funther and began the withdrawal of 2 more Marine beralions on 14 Septembez he exeznal ctor by this ime was minimal On the nigh of 25 Augunt Lebanese Army trucks had even transported the Syzten forces in the Besta back i tis in border 3 The internal crisis Gared again however when a journalist of the Pralangist Pacey was murdered on 19 September In response uno Phalangist called a geneeal strike which was far more paralyzing than the Unied Eroncs eastier strike since the principal business and financial entesprises of Retrut vere eurned by Cheiatisns The opposition now became those who tad easiies been described as the government forces On 20 September the Unied States sccredy New Prine Minister Sulh at his request to Turkey 4 President Chehab inaugurated on 23 September aggravated the crisis when he appointed Rashid Karam the rebel leades from Tripoli as No Prime Miniter Karam formed a Cabinet of moderate mempers of the former cppositon and the Third Force While It in hard to believe that Chelab really thought the Karam Cabinet was a Cabinet of reconcitition as he told Mccliscock it should be noted that on 5 September he had offered Chamoun a hand in selecting the Cabloct and the later had refused $ With 2 armed camps tn Beteat the impasse gretr more serious as large numbers of Chamoun‘s partisans gathered at his mouneatn receeat to call oe action agains the new gurermment Chet held Chamoun zespousible for the long Airaion of the cxtats and for the failure of the 2 atdes to find a aciuion Chamoun could hardly have been expected to b hagpy wit the tien of events On 27 September Prime Minister Karam and his Foreign Minister urged Ambassador MeCHintock to speak with leaders of both facto ‘The following day Plecee Gemayel clled on the Ambassador with a similar request sug— gesting a peace without victory aolution 0 Accordingly the Ambassador fern New York Times 19 August 1958 p 1 weCuinrock An American Embassy to Lebanon Secret p 23 mid p 38 Seceet hew York Times 21 September 1958 p 1 weClinock An American Embeany to Lebanon Secret p 34 Cwew York Times 2 October 1958 p 11 as URCLASSIFED rms race isomcuasmrieos assembled the Phalangiat leadors and members of Kazami‘s group at his residence on the aight of 20 September but Karam himself withdrew at te last minute Neverthelens the meesing was very important because it drew together important figures from the 2 opposing groups for the Hirst time since the cziste had begun £ Unfortunately the clashes continued As a last resort President Chehab ried to set up a military cabinec but failed October when Kazami‘s own street mobs foreed him to back down on resigning as he would have had to do for this plan to succeed A Although the intial Lebanese cisle moved tto a new phase Ambassador McClintock suggests that te continuing presence of the American troops ald mich to dampen the exploalve sinition in Belzut For example American tanks nimbled through Beteut streets co the night of 8 October and taco the Jate evening of 9 Ostober in an attempt to deter violence between the 2 factions Efforts at setlement were given a needed boot when on 10 October the Lebanese trade unlous called for a geaecel strike The spector ofthis calamity aided by an all—day effort at mediation Kazami Gemayel Chebib and McClintock met together led t a solution that nigh Under a ao victor— no vanquished® setiement Karami remained as Prime Minister but ivited Gemayel ico his new cabinet The country began to return to normal immediately and on 17 October the Chamber of Depuclea all unchanged from 1957 gave the new gorerament a unanimous vote of contidence The last Marines in Lebanon commenced re—emberiation on 28 September Dday 15 and aailed from Beirut on 1 October leaving 7500 Army troops in Lebanon 4 On 4 October the Army began tts withdrewal of combat eoops Secretary Dulles had said on 9 September US WTC itil thes Se developnsnate as yer indicate a tol withdrawal at any date which we could now fix 3 A month later on 8 October eS States unilaterally announced it intention to leave Lebanon by the end of the mouth barzing unforescen developments 0 On 9 etober Adm Holloway and Adm Rkatsom who hid relieved Adm Brown 48 COMSIXTIIFLT on 30 September zeriewed theis withizawal plans with Prime Minister Kasam fan mae New York Times 1 October 1958 p 11 Chretien Science Moaltor 11 October 1958 p 4° New York Times 11 October 1958 fre commom Priew York Times 9 October 1958 p 4 New York Times 10 Octaber 1958 p 3 hew York Times 29 September 1958 p 7 hew fork Times Department of State Bulletin 39 19 September 1988 p 493 Spepassment of State Butledn 39 27 October 1988 p 680 s hiittte East Mirror 10 12 October 1959 p 7 — a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED The reolscerncot Crue OLT 2 6 for the th Flot was seme directly form he Unird S ates to Bescar an a eesvrve force during th final stages of withe view at While at Beirut 29 September — 18 October Its Marines fomuined » billeted on thel sips and went ashore for liberty only 1 Gen Wade and Adm Yeager let Lebanon in early October On 18 October the Department of State authorized the dependencs of U S officals to revuen to Lebanon Adm Holloway le‘ Lebanon on 22 October and the miliacy operation in Lebanon was closed on 25 October U 5 withdrawal from Lobanon was linked to the British withdrawal from © Jordan 2 and for this reason the Department of State rejected Ambassador MeClintack‘s request that the United Scates withdraw its troops from Lebanon by 15 Octaber he United Kingdom announced on 1 October thatit would begin withdrawal on 20 October ‘Alter U M Sectecasy General HammazolJold negotiated with the UAR and Great Briain the UAR agreed on 11 October to Het British planes overtly Syria on their rewurn to Cyprus After a test fight on 24 October 4 the airlift was begun in earnest the following day t lasted through 29 Ostober On 27 October the 6 RAF fighters that had been stationed in Amman flew hack to Cyprus 5 ‘The last British troops lek Jordan on 2 November from Aabe Although the resumption of completely normal operations by the 6th Flee was not ordered until 1 December 19586 the Fleet had ineffect renuened to normal operations on 5 September D— ay 52 when the entize Arack Carries Striking Force Task Force 60 left the Lebanon operational area for central Medirrancan ports The only restrictions on the 6th Fleat‘s movements from the Marine withraval ual the Army completed ito withdrawal vere that ane cazzier group would opecate east of 13 degrees E Naples one ampitblous force east ot degrees R Marseilles one amphibious force east of 20 degrees E Benghazi and 2 destroyers on the EAS TMED patrol with one in the Beirut area Naval guatize support was withdravn from Beirut itself on 1 October Semmmmmmmen mrismuurm Hew York Times 4 October 1998 p 4 New York Times 6 October 1958 pis 0C CC The Lebanese Middle The Rconomist 188 2 August 1958 p 381 New York Times 2 October 1958 p 11 wew York Times 26 October 1958 p 30 5—Review of vents in the Médic Base Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 78 April 199 p 26 «sn UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Toe aler for Artantic and Pacitte Fleets had been reduced to 24 hours on 33 Joly O—tay © 1 and was gradually reduced unil both weme off aler on 7 Augist —day 23 2 Subsequent alerts were associated with the Quemoy— Matsu critls not the Lebanon operation On 13 November Secretary of Datense Mell McSleoy announced that the 85 000—man cut in American armed forces delayed by the Lebanon operation would be resumed Os $ December Ambassador McClintock handed Prime Minister Karam a $10 million check from the United States to s the Lebanese economy recover from the months of civil war it had undergone 5 On 10 December Prine Mintster Kazam announced that the government of Lebanon considered the Eisentower Doctrine ® of date and we no longer feel bound by the terms of this declaration « promemmmen ms mena Murphy Charles New Mix p 182 ® Inew York Times 8 August 1958 p 2 New York Times 6 December 1958 p 10 hew York Times 11 December 1958 p 2 «an UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED concuusions ears Depaesmant otti ais cxpressed the view on 26 October that the keban operation had er ited in a net political in for the United Sares Beas cason were 1 it had dampened tiasser‘s ardor for intervention and Lebnon‘s indo oe ence had been prescrved 2 It had shown thatthe United Sates keeps ts word and is capable of foreefil action without using such action for permanont gain 3 The American inte vention gave heass to other Arab leaders noubly Bourpiiba of minisia — who were concerned about their countries independence According to Secretary Dulles 7 November the 2 major accomplishments of the landing were the reassurance to small countries in the world ta if they felt imperiled they could get help and the stabilized aisution tn th Middle Bast 2 rities of American intervention saw the Lebanon operation in a diferent ugh 14 t had been decided in a moment of panic on the incorrect assumption that th feal coup was the atart of a UAR chain resction 2 The intervertion stiffened the intransigence ofthe Chamoun forces against a compromise solution and then infuriated these forces when the Americans declined to use force against the rebels or move tnto rebel teritory At the same time th fact of foreign intervention strengthened the rebel cause 3 The net result was that the Lebanese crtals was aggravated and prolonged 1 The propaganda benefit to Catzo was greater than any encouragoment the U S action might have gtven to independent Arab loaders — t Indeed any sich assurance was given A variation on these 2 sets of views bi arsacnlspnd for the wrong reason olan the results were quite salutary 4 This weiter 1s aympathetic to such a view but hastens to add that the aalizary results wore not a mater of chance bue of skill diplomacy in the Middle Ease and in Washington even if th policies tht pat teoopa into Lebanon in the ies piace are more controversial or oue pazt we pestape should not have perpnited aus Gold Wer concerns to draw us so deeply lato an incenhrab struggle 5 I tt appeared to many Arab romans New York Times 27 October 1958 p 4 Department ot State Bullen 39 24 November 1959 p 84 Juew York Times 27 October 1958 p 4 Lisagor Peter diplomatic corzespondess Washington in 1959 Lisagos Tesn— seripe Dulles Oral History Collection The Princeton University Library 1907 p 24 Sorserver op cit p 46 aas UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED leaders before the landing that the Unt States wanted to keep Chamoun in gover o carry on hs struggle with Nasser 0 9 betavior after te lasding id much to alter this image 1 Lebaron Itself this change was largely the result of the continuing efforts ® or Anbatsador MeClinack and later of Ambassador Murpiy ‘by folowing an impaseial course MeCLintock raised th tre of both the oppontton and Presiiere Chamoun bu the end resule was a more realistic and donable sclagonatip beaveen the United Stites and Lebanon After the election bat aull at te £ beight o the American presence in Lebanon Seb Salem pestape tie mont exxzeme rebel leader said United States Ambassator NcGlinet fo one of ihe best ambaseadore we have bad in understanding Lepanese problem Perhaps he came to late on the scene I in dealing withthe rest ofthe Midate Rast the United Scates was fortunate in having capable representatives in other key atates rag Jordan and the UAR who were able to ameliorate much of the damaging offece of the frag coup dae and maximize the positive effects of Americas tervention Tie sending of a genio dilomax Rober Murphy to he aren has been fapeled the Great White Father appreach 2 Even so Mucply‘s presence proved valuable in ecortivating American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East ‘Badly handled the Lebanon operation would have been a disaster for the United Scates the porental for political gain was Just as grea for the Soviet Union and the UK ‘The advantage of 12 yeas‘ hindaight allows one to look back to discern ‘whether American mtervention really stabilized the aces This wetter believes thatthe icervention did have a swabilzing effect The Lebanese themacizes seem to have realized how close they came to disaster The nese parllanenary cisco tions were peacotil ant in 1901 Chazies Helou was innugunated Presiden following a pencetil election Likewise aftor Suleiman PraaJich wa elected in 1270 by a very love vote newspapers ofall political ortentatons usged cooperation with the new government Hubert Humpheey‘s charge that te landing was an act of desperation cxpplog 7 yours jn which we groped for a policy without ever avcsceding in producing one seems too harsh in retroepect Granted in one nase it was a atoppep mesure by Secretary Dulles‘ own detiaiton i was a measure of last resore — hu Western miltary Intervention did block Nascer‘s atemipe to surrest Letsson and did halp to preserve the aurerstgnty of yeaan« The Levanon operation also bolstered the credibility of U S commitments and made It clear Pomtemmrnazoems ‘The Chrietian Science Monttor 11 August 1958 p 4 Copeland op cit p 204 dumphrey Hubert A Chronstogy of Fatluze The Reporter 19 7 August 1959 p tl the Lebanon operation ot 1958 has been compared to the Viemam contict ot today on the oue of U S commitments Qbserver op cit p 43 but Robert Murphy has added the careat that he finda a rather titt ailogy betroen Lebaca — and Viemam Robert Muzpty The Lebsnon Experience Foreign Service Journal 44 uy 1967 p 20 cn UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED to the USSR as well as to the UAR thatthe United States was determined to protest ts Interests in the area As a Hmited war for limited cbjecuiven the 7 Lebanon operation was a success 1 The avccesstul miltary diplomatic coordination after the landing demon— #rzates the close interdependence beoveen millazy power and diplomacy wien ezoops are on foreign soll Above all the Lebanon operation of 1958 stould « not be hougte of in ateletly miliary or political terms Without diotomacie dizection the American miliary presence in Lebanon would have heen pouiless Without thas same milly power to give it credbili the associated diplomatic atfore would have been less effective L Similac the absence of actual combat operations duzing the Lebanon operation demonstrates that use of the miliary in diplomacy need not lead to hostile action and thatit can be a Cexible instrument i cristo management in the case of Lebanon miliary restraint proved the mot effective course of action Ambassador MeCHintock and Robers Murphy have both called the Lebanon operation an exercise in limited waz Given the time frame of the Lebanese ctiele this is an important poin in the perspective of United Stats miliary strategy Secretary Dulles may have discarded massive revaliation as an affective instrument of policy by 1957 after the experience of the Aingustan and Suez crises in 1956 3 Eren so the theory of Hinited was was sulla much debated tole in 1958 in Octaber 1956 Gene Tvining aull callonged the Army‘s thesis that Limited wars were more likely thin a geoeeal was 4 bit though the doctzine of imited war did not come into tts own uneil the Kennedy administration the Lebanon opecation of 1996 guined many coments Secrevary MeBlzoy sad io May 1988 tha a limited waz berween the United States and the USGR was unlikely 5 After the Lebanon operation he announced thatthe United States was recasting ite miltary power to meet Communisc harassment in peripheral areas outside of the main frosts of Ruope and Asta 6 This stzstegy provided for btlding up the ground forces of oue allies around the world Reductions in manpower would contme with the emphasis on the quality ofthe remaining forces The Nary‘a role was to be eananced to keep the sea lanes open If Mazines or Army unite had to be moved quickly Secretary eus_— qubain op cit p 175 AweCHimock op cit The American Landing in Lebanon p 79 3Ereees Edward Dizectox Office Rustern Ruzopean Attire Department of State in 1958 Freers Transcript The Dulles Oral History Collection The s Princeton University Libeasy 1967 p 10 Nex York Times 22 Octaber 1958 p 1 Bid 22 May 1988 p 9 Toid 14 November 1958 p 1 aas UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED MeRizoy noted that atzport facilites in underdeveloped countries were usually Anadeaate and thas the Lebanon simation had shown the Importance of keeping the sea lanes open for miliary movements L — The Lebanon operation also demonstrated that the 6th Flees to a povertit political instrument Its reason for extatence may sll b ite Ainction in a general UA75 va stmation but the Lebenon operation showed tat it has a signiticant s xiate rote an well ° Perception of the $t Fleet may be positive —that its de ployment cin be used consenictively toward the resolution of a cetate —or negative —— tar it in a provacative world‘s policeman‘ that makes resolution of a crisis more ificutt bw there can be tle doube tat it wll b a atgnifiant factor in any Mediterranean cetets With the precedent of the Lebanon landing no Medterranesn statesman will igrore the 6 Fleet Today the impact of the Lebanese operation of 1958 ts sll evidenc During the fall 1969 crisi in Lebanon involving Piletintan fedayeen operating from Lebanon there was frequent reference to the American linding ot 1959 and specutation about the possthliey of a recurrence especially when the th Flect moved toto the eastern Mediterranean Iaqt newspepecs charged The 6th Pleet‘s course toward the caste Mediterranean can have only one Interpretation To provide support for the agent Lebanese authorition tn suppressing the lodayeon acdion s 4 Syritn papers sald that the steadtast people in Lebanon strongly beliere that present U S concern over Lebanon‘s Independence to similaz to the U S concern in 1998 when Marines of the 6th Fleet occupled Lebanon with the help of the agees groupe 3 The sermi—affcial Al—Ahram in Catzo charged that the United Statee had seriously considered another landing in Lebanon but decided against i 4 ‘The Soviet Unlon charged Shine of he U S 6th Fleet and other American Armed Forces which took passin those brato mnontere operated particularly close to the Lebanese coast at the time when the internal pliteat crist in that country suddenly tok a sharp tarn 5 ‘The question of a similes Lebanon landing today ts oren discureed in the West Debate on this question unially revolves around the greatly increased Soriet naval presence in the Mediterranean Many question he determination or the capbilly ot the United Staten to risk a confrontation with the USSR orer Lebanon This writer believes the debate has ipnored the bast questions mmm New York Times 14 November 1958 p 8 xi—fumturtyaty Baghdad 28 October 1989 o m—path Damascus 15 October 1989 Wi—Abram M Hetkal 50 October 1969 Mescom to Yugoslavia radle 30 October 1989 — «ss UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Fizst would the Lebanese government request another intervention Second what would be the Lebanese rather than the Soriet resctiont r First itis ualikely that the Lebanese Government would make such a request today During the October 1969 cists President Helou was reported to have told an Islamic delegation there are some who claim thc thore is a plan to summon U S provection forces My answer is that this plan is an illusion We do not think of commiting such high treason 1 Helou is further reported to have informed the Soriet Ambassador that Lebanon did no Intend or have any plan to call for the 6th Fleet 2 Likewise Lebanon‘s current President Suleiman Franjich who was Minister ot Justice and Economics under Helow would probably hesttate to cll tor American intervention In 1996 Franiieh was opposed to Presidene Chamoun Although he and Chamoun were lator reconciled indeed Chamoun dropped out ofthe 1970 Presidential race in his favor Franjleh‘s main support in the close election came from the Cemer Bloc baad by Seeb Salam Thus the realities of Lebanese Internal politics would seem to dicate moderation and compromise Moreover Franjic is noved for following the umvzitien rules the National Covenant ete of Lebanese polities which keep tis with the West from being very close Since the June War of 1967 with is arendant charges of U S colluston itis unlikely that any Arab leader would risk calling for Americas intervention In any evest the same hostile public rescrton thas would confront an Arab leader would also work against the United States accession to such a request in the first instnce This consideration is a result of move than the June War alone As the pro—Fhalanglst edltor of Le Sote predicted to November 1938 it the conditions tar led to thai landing were to arise again there would not be another landing In 1958 American Intervention stimned the rebels Today because a similar surprize is almost impossible and because of the hostile climate caused by the June 1967 War and the raids and reprisals that have followed the reaction to another American Intervention would almort corataly be more vigorous Duzing the Ostober—1969 existe Mohammed Helkal wrote in Aska that the ‘United States had consldesed a landing in Lebanon hut it appeais tit t mw now been excluded from the lit of Immediate exigencies in view of what t might Gause tn the Arsh world especially n the event of an armed lah becween U S forse and Aeab fedayeen Though the acousstion may be false the ressoning is sound The United Suen fisef afte its Viemam experience would be loss than enthusiastic about risking involvement in another such war — ——— MAmmas Beirut as quoted by the Middle Bast News Agency 26 October 1999 ancNahas Beteat as quoted by the Middle Bast News Agency 28 October 1999 suevey ot Rditoral Opinion on the Lebanese Cristo Midile Rest Forum 33 ov — Dec 1959 ‘AicAbram M Helkal 90 October 1969 sr @everse scamp UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sources rusuic pocumen‘ts avards Manwal Annex It Lise S Lebanon SECNAVST 1650 10 Cit—3 9 Nor 1966 pp li 16 Congress—House Commitiee on Foreign Atfirs Hearings on House Joint Resolution 117 Government Privcing Office Washington 1997 Congress House U5 Defense Policies in 1998 The Library of Congzess Legislative Reference Service House Document 8277 Washingon 199 The Congresstonal Record Vol 115 No 14 10 Sep 1989 p S047 c The Congressional Record Vol 115 No 146 12 Sep 198 p $10#95 Department of Sate Bullen 36 28 Max 6 May 27 May 1997 Depastment of State Mullein 38 2 Jun 9 Jun 16 Jun 30 Jun 1958 Department of tate Bullen 29 7 Jut 14 Jul 21 ul 4 Aug 11 Aug 18 Aug 28 Aug 1 Sep 1S Sep 3 Sep 6 Oct 20 Oct 27 Oct 3 Nov 10 Now 24 Nov 1 Dec 15 Dec 1988 Stallmson Jack Marines in Lebanon 1958 U S Maztne Corps Historical Branch G—4 Diviston 1966 Headquarters 0 5 Marine Corps U S Navy Moathly Memorandim of Composition of Task Forces Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Operations Division Jan—Dec 1958 U 5 6h Fleet Paess About the United States Stith Fleet i the Mediterzancan Public Information Office Comsiathlt 7 May 1958 U S h Fleet Command History A Briet History of the United States Sth Fleet in the Mediterranean Area 1990—1950 5 May 199 soors Agwani Mohammed S The Lebanese Crisis 1958 A Documentary Seudy Asian Publishing House New York 1998 Baldwin Hanson Strateg Background Chap 5 The Soviet Nery Saunders M G Caz ReN ed Exodarice A Pracgor New Tore SB Binder Leonard ed Politics tn Lebanon John Wiley Sons Inc New York 1966 Chamoun Camille Crise as Moyen—Orient Gallimazd Pasis 1963 Copeland Miles ‘The Game of Nations the Amorality of Power Wilmer Bros Lid Birkenhead 1969 Dulles Eleanor Lansing John Foster Dulles The Last Year Hexcourt Brace World New York 1963 Eizentower Dwight D The White House Years ‘Waging Peace 1956—1961 Doubleday and Co Gazden City 1963 mas UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Caliman Waldemaz lea Under Genaral Nort My Recollections of Nazi al—said 1954—1982 me John‘ Hopkins Press Baltimore 1904 Halpern Manfed The Morality and Politics of Iervention Chap 9 ° ntwrnacionat Aspects of Civil Strife Rosenau James N ed Princeron Onharsiy Frese Fiircson Dol — Hudson Michael C The Precarious Republi Political Modernization in Lebanon Random House 2«w York 1969 Hurewite J C Middle East Polities The Military Dimenston Frederick A Praeger New York 1969 Tonldes Michael Divide and Lose The Arab Revolt 1955—1958 Geatfey Bles London 1980 King James E Jt Collective Defense The Mary Commitment Allance Folicy in the Cold Waz Wolfers Arnold ed Jomns Hopkins Press Beltimore 1959 MeCLintock Robert The Meaning of Limited War Houghton Mifflin Boston 1967 Meo Lells Lebanon Improbable Nation Iniana University Press Bloomington 1965 The Middle East 1958 6h ed Burope Piblications London 1958 The Midéle East and North Africa 1968—69 15th ed Europe Publications London 196 Milles Richard L Dag lismmazskjold and Crists Diplomacy Pyramid New York 1961 Muzply Robert Diplomat Among Wazziors Doubleday Co Garden City 1964 Qubsin Fahim L Crisis in Lebanon Middle Bast Itis Washington D C i901 Shazabi Hisham Palestine and Israels ‘The Lethal Dilemma Pepusus New York 1969 Stewart Desmond Turmoil in Seirut Wingate London 1959 Suleiman Michael W Lebanon Chap IL Gorernments and Polites of the Contemporary Midile East Tomaet Tazeq Y ed Dorsey Press —— me Thayer Charles W Diplomat Harper Bros New York 1959 arnictes anp rertopicats Alan Ray Lebanon Bildup to a Breakdown The Reporter 18 29 May 1959 po drei Baitridge Eovazd F Lebanon and Quemey The Nery‘s Role U S Naval Insticate Erossedings 87 Feb 1961 pp 94—100 Big Wazt The Chances U S News World Report 45 28 Jut 19898 pp 31—33 aso UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Brsestrup Peter Limited Wars and the Lessons of Lebanon The Reporter 20 G0 Ape 1999 pp 28—27 Bundy William R How Foreign Policy 1s Made — Logle and Experience University ot Pusburgh Law Review 30 Gpzing 1955 pp 437 i Chamoun — It‘s Nasser‘s War Newameek S2 1 Jut 1958 p 35 Chapello Dickey Gat Brown— Master of the Med Readers Dignny 72 hie 1988 pp 76—81 Christian Science Monitor May—Nor 1968 The Clock Stzuck 2 Newsweek S2 28 Jul 1958 pp 23—24 Gotic Teis Capital Secks Dramatic Plan for Future Summi Talks The New Leader 4 4—L Aug 1959 pp 3—5 Developments of the Quarter — Chronology July 1 — September 15 1988 Middle East Jounal 12 Atum 1989 pp 418 47 Developments of the Quarter — Chronology Jemmazy 1 Mazch 31 1958 Middle East Journal 12 Spring 1958 pp 170—194 Developments of the Quarter — Chronology April 1 — Juse 30 1988 Middle Hast Journal 12 Gummer 1958 pp 256—817 Developments of the Quarter — Chronology September 16 — December 15 1958 Middle East Journal 13 Wiater 1999 pp 77—96 Eive—Star Diplomat Time 72 25 Aug 1950 pp 11 13 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report May—Nov 1956 Eye Willism R Lebanon Story Behind the Headlines Foreign Policy Bulletin 98 1 Nov 1959 pp 25—27 Gaspard J The Mystery of Chetabisme How Lebanon Suzvives The New Middle Bast No 7 Ape 1989 pp 32—97 Gun Boat Diplomacy or the Impotence of Sea Paver in the Eastern Mediterzanesn Egyptian Beonomc and Political Review 4 Dec 1957 pp 18 21 Had H A Cols USMC Orders Flem but Flexible U S Neral mtiute Proceedings 88 Oct 1962 pp $1 99 Hands—off Lebanon The New Republic 199 7 Jut 1958 p 4 Hessler Wiliam H Our Strth Fleet in the Mediterzanean The Reporter 18 20 Feb 1988 pp 21—24 Sith Fleet Booted Up for a Bigger Job U S Neal Exon Pescondiiqg 34 Aug 1950 pp 23—30 High Stakes in the Midéle Bast Bustocss Week No 1507 19 Jul 1980 pp 23—25 Horminger Arnold Zu‘ama and Pasties in the Lebanese Crisls of 1958 Midle East Journal 15 pring 1961 pp 127—140 ain UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED How Big a Beachbend The Economiay 188 19 Jul 1959 pp 216—219 tas Huber H A Chronology of Failure The Reporter 19 7 Aug 19% If Linde Wars Come U S Sixth Flees —— The Punch Sehind the Doctrine Mevatueek 49 LL Feb 1957 pp 49—82 U Small War Comes — Is U S Ready U S News World Report 45 8 Sep 1956 po sis Israel on the Sidelines The Economist 188 16 Aug 1958 p S39 lezacl The Inrerrupted Aizlit The Economist 168 16 Aug 1958 p S13 teenel Question Time The Economiat 168 9 Aug 1959 pp 439—40 Israel Doubts and Fears The Economint 198 26 Jul 1958 p 300 Keesing‘s Contemporary Archives May—Oct 1958 Kezz Malcolm H Lebanese Views on the 1958 Ceisis Middle East fouenal 1 ring 1961 pp 211—217 Lav John With the Marines in Beirut U S News World Report 45 2s Jut 1988 pp 36—37 The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective The World Today 14 Sep 1958 pp 38—380 The Lebanese Muddle The Economist 188 2 Aug 1959 pp 360—381 Lebazon Awaits a Decision The Economist 187 24 May 1958 pp 711 712 The Lebanon Buildup Time 72 28 Jut 1988 pp 10—11 Lebsson ‘The Inconstant Crisis The Economist 188 12 Jul 1959 po liz—Lis Lebanon Landing The Economit 188 19 Jul 1999 p 206 Lebanon ‘The Marines Have Landed Time 72 28 Jul 1959 p 18 Lebanon Posing the Right Question Time 72 7 Jul 1980 pp 18—20 Lebanon Sea Change Time 72 14 Jut 1958 pp 22—23 Lebanon What the Shooting‘s All About U S News World Repory 45 11 jut 1959 pp 60—62 oat the Mideast U S News World Report 45 15 Aug 1958 op 55—60 ‘Lide Wars a Theest—it U S is Ready U 9 News World Report 4 10 Jan 190 pp 50—42 MeClimock Robert The American Lending in Lebanon U S Neral Istituce Proceedings 88 Oct 1962 pp 65—79 C C Massin Harold H Car Brown‘s Kitens Have Clave Semurday Evening Post 229 2 Mar 1987 pp 32 tt ane UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Mideast Crists Moves to Summit Business Week No 1508 26 Jul 1950 po 15—07 Mideast Mirror 10 Jan—Dec 1958 Morgenthas Hans J The Lebanese Disaster The New Republic 199 4 Aug 1958 pp Moir Murphy Chasies J V New Mix Fortune 60 Aug 1959 pp 77 f Murphy Rbert The Lebanon Experience Foreign Service Journal 44 t 1960 p 20 Wasver and the Reds Can Thay Be Stpped® U S News World Report 45 1 Aug 1950 pp 48—51 Mavy‘s ‘Good Drill‘ Cools off the Crisis Lite 42 18 May 1957 p 32 New York Times May—Dec 1958 Observer The Landing in Lebanon Foreign Service Journal 44 uly 1967 po 20—46 O‘Dammelt James P Operation Double Trouble Saturday Evening Post 231 20 Sep 1958 pp 44 t Orders Siz Tight and Take i U S News World Report 45 1 Aug 1950 p 35 Pepper Gursts G and Stockton Bayard On—Scene Lebanon Newsweek 52 28 jt 1959 pp Tr—18 Picking Ourselves Up The New Republc 139 4 Aug 1959 pp 3—4 The Presidency An Act in Time Time 72 28 Jut 1959 pp 10—13 Red Navy ‘Resaliatei® U S News World Report 42 28 Jun 1957 p 14 Restrained Power Time 72 4 Aug 1959 pp 10—14 Review of vents in the Middle East Army Quarterly and Defense Journal 78 L Ape 1959 p 28 Stith Flee io Ready Confident Aviation Week 66 1 Jut 1957 pp 32—39 Shih Flee‘s Show of Roroe Planes Atomic Peover Mazines U S News World Repors 42 10 May 1957 pp $0—82 Smith Lynn D Gol USA Lebinon—Profeoslonatiom at its Best Miltary Review No 35 un 1999 pp 36—1 Story of a Decision U S News World Report 45 25 Jul 1989 pp 66—70 Stemusz—thupe Robert 0 5 Funize in the Middle Bast — Real Meaning of the Crists U S News World Repose 45 25 Jul 1958 pp 6466 Suez Beneath the Cedazs The Economist 187 20 Jun 1988 pp 1161—L62 survey of Bdlortal Opiaton on the Lebanese Crists Mddle Baat Forum 33 Nov—Dee 1950 ass UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Taylor Masvell D Gen USA Improving Our Capabilities for Limited Wa Asmy Information Digest ‘14 Feb 1959 pp 2 9 Teiman Hey S President Had No Other Cholce U $ News World Repos — as as nit 1988 p o Wade Sidney S Beig Gen USMC Operation Bluebat Marine Corps Gasene as gul 1989 pp 10—25 A What was Gained by Intervention The New Republic 139 4 Aug 1958 p 11 When Trouble Came in the Mediteczaneas Tne Story of a U S Fleet in Action U S News World Report 41 14 Dec 1950 pp 90 42 Where They All Sand The Economist 188 26 Jul 1958 pp 272—273 why The Maines Went tn — And How The World Reacted 0 8 News World Report 45 28 jut 1958 pp rect Why U N Doesn‘t Setle Mideast Trouble U S News World Report 45 22 Aug 1950 pp 7677 Why U 5 Risked a World Blowup U S News World Report 45 25 Jul 1988 po 40—i6 Weight Quiney United Staten Intervention in the Lebanon American Journal of Internationa Law 53 Jan 1999 pp 1M2—125 U S Zone—Nlae miles by Two Newsweek 52 11 Aug 1958 p 29 A Very Strange Revolution Newweek 52 Jut 1958 pp 30—31 Yolkor Leos The Bliffing Game K Must lay — With Kibitzess Newsweek sa as fut 1950 p 19 omer sources Howe Jonathan T LGdz USN The Influence of the Stith Fleet on Soriet Foreign Policy linpublised paper covering Lebanon Czinis of 1958 and June Wae of 1967 30 Jan 1956 Sciwaztz Ded et al A Stidy on Ceisle Management Foreign Policy Research Istiure University of Rennoyivanta 1968 The Duiles Oral History Collection The Princeton University Libeary 1967 Trnseriot nterviewee‘s position in 1958 Aiken George 0 5 Senor Brice Devid K U Ambassador to Germany Bike Arleigh Chict of Nevat Operations Chamoun Camie restdem of Lebanon Cordier Andrew Executive Assistant to U N Secretary General Eben Abba Ambassador to U 3 A Frees Edvard L Disector Office Baotern Buzopean Attis Department of Sate Pr UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Gates Thomas Secretary of the Nary Hagerty James C Presidential Press Secretary Harz Kart Special Assistant to President Eisenhower Hertzog Yaacor Suit Embassy of lnzeel Washington tevin John Assistant Secretary of Detense fos Intex national Security Attairs Lambert Gerasd Eriend of John Foster Dulles — LeMay Currie Commandar—inGhiet Strategic Alr Force Lisagot Peter Diplomatic Corzespondem Washington Lodge Henry Gabor U S Representative to the U N » Malik Charles Foreign Minister Lebanon Musply Robert Deputy Under Secretary ot State Fhieges Herman Legal Advisor Department o State Reishasts G Frederick Cainselor Department of Suite Richards James P Ambassador American Mission to the Maile Bast 1957 Sisco Joseph Political Advisor U 5 delegation U N G A Twining Nathan Chateman Joint Chiots or Satt rexsonat mteavisus nterviewee‘s posttion during Lebanon Interviewees crisis ot 1958 Anderson George Commander Task Force 60 Atack Cartiess Sth Fleeo Barnes Mervin B Executive Officer CVS Wasp and otter attcers ot ovs wasn Burke Arleigh Chief of Navat Operations Haze Raymond 0 8 Ambassador to the United Arab Republic Hex Passer T U S Const General Damascus Howard Hezzy N Stat 0 5 Embassy Beirut Hvis Jo Ausistart Seczetary of Defense Iter national Security Attaies McClintock Robert U S Ambassador to Lebenon Murphy Rebore Deputy Under Secretary of State Rockwell Suazt Deputy Disector Office of Near Basten Adtaiza Depassment o State Zogby Ghom Sut 0 5 Embasey Beinee ass @everse stag UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED mmoex a Cw of Nt Opeaion ne aio Bute Abies Gin Prt a2 5¢ Hoge 3 20 F5 Rartog s css Angin tie me Citamatron 1s a 1s Anton iss Cicumrer ss has tripe is CRERELM nemo Hotomy hame 25 24 Art Union 17 ® 9 — a mes CBEPEEOME e aso Hotomy ined 25 Adunic Feet 2 27 30 83 82 20 40 0 0 0 66 71 78 MKE cocoontedn on Smmamns resign tis fom wee e s Adirs P 2 5 61 Contant Auatiia Nont Foon ee aho ppattias Tom caa a a ® Poco iinms Conmunne 5 1 n 1 20 00 68 Botalo Landing Tein cosncntrir as 26 34 1 1 to Th Baloo 3a tnppus 2% 0 an — 2 31 3035 041 77 ge % t no einer a Jn om Cm 2428 19 3a St sos 0 0 o int Inemitonnt Raon 2 33 35 61 22 Sine Lauro 2 4 1 19 Drone 2 Sia hats Enmament ot time 20 37 Aaa the m o Briant ot Suan B10 ta te o n 2 27 Hise Bu Operon 2833 42 99 EXXCEROEOC Boren US 30 31 41 Ber Mots US 20 31 at 25 Roma tes a Bain aie m it Brows Adm Clares ee ato COMSIXTHRLT Doie ote Foe 1 7 10 1 17 19 20 263030 41 60 727500 257 a m wo meas pron tie a 00 Buke Adm 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Lod aay Cabo a7 ti C ten 3136 w thie Sims 5s Shadle Turid 18 Aummunljel Du is 16 81 wate chate 1 18 1s 10 57 Hes Raymond 1650 51 S ons ther Kar 22 Mares US e ao Betalon Landog Tem fie tala ag n Roon Muze Fom ms Toni me Chit 00 1 11 0s a In a 5 5 5 Hohay Adm Tins ne ao CBC and — $2009 24 CNESTECOMOU 2 20 37 3940 5 voemon Rober 241 1218 21 34 36 37 5530 6% 04717700 81 00 4s 50 51 1 tous saas Enuncdlimartel Met Ge Vion 36 30 Hamgn cue o 956 23 hcadontieg pog Heacn ing 8 2 27 10 8 67 westy Bwvordoci 6 16 Matin Crone 8 17 t Miltary Ar Tenipon Srvce OUTS 6 71 72 Initl Al Bw Tukey 42 64 6 1 Miltary Sr Tamipot Sevice OTS 71 ta 0 Maimce 75 nie tst0 1 Aone uss 3 hood uss 5 Nome 2 tand 9 10 00 10 Moon Neking uss 21 29 s to 79 14 17 19 2129 45 50 54 5 69 Maqny Roten 97 Sok m 64 65 se lout 5 38 re ® tude 28 32 7 Nase Gand Abdel 1 6 15 16 50 51 6364 Nater Comat 3 7 «ss UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED NiConmmeen Suneps Arny Co BTRA0 6s Nina Seany Const 9 22 duin 0 Noh Athene Tray Ogpeiion Nato 10 ire ct o 1986 1 5 6253 5 5 07 65 1 27 hcee Su mas 3 4 Sub Sim «9 18 15 5750 s Te Sution Uss 33 Sarti co Serra son Sre tire ab Yared Anh Republ 1 3 6 5 Toliten 82 10 tras is 16 27 5100 61 t6 Faianent n Chamber o Depute Prs Popsace Syoen 13 5 teriae Gat 5e PAidinge Bay 13 56 9 60 Bee use 35 36 30 4 75 mis Taal Ar Comd TAO ¢ 6 71 fepme‘‘s Tak Foc Pyro Rec is 23 3¢ Alte Arcon Uss 2539 84 1 rane Regler Cate an Propet Secilar By 6 Tick x sa wt Haine Fos tu 27 28 o fone Have Fire ‘ir Metin Tk Balon 55 a Trow 06 0 Chun Flin 5 1s 10 TAY Qoemey aun ca ot 1958 76 71 $2 Fou 2631 33 a i mii n ® Drren Chang Uss 3 Rundoph uss 1 0 ips Latnon2 1 12 Remlatt 0 Retios 27 Toe 6 9 14 17 2h 9 0 50 Rbotancts Tring Ge Natan 2 05 Ridunts hoe 1 6 v s Unind Arsh Ruble e sho Rev ant Sy su Nu in 21 28 1 6 1 oue 21 an Sout ro a tas Salen Seb 613 45 57 64 07 Ui Natooal row 3 6 a3 Sevom t83 30 31 41 041 60 hind Natem 2 14 1 67 78 Sat King 8 1 hind Natom Gion Analy 7 74 Sudl andl 8 30 6 @ Uhind Nitow Obener Gp in Latinos Seen fet 6 root 1s 16 m 1 7% cor hed Natew Sesaty Comat 12 15 48 77 Shak Shige 13 useceun as doo lation 2 UBS ue Sore Uso Suen Tough 67 Sean mew in 16 2 asan 200 at 4850 v $1 wea ta 73 al is af mou t 0 41 9 Yoee o Ameria 1s puien e omnes TeUiseih ansi sn own Stowe At Conmund A0 66 Sow Tse s aso UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED % # Contiset Water‘ Coy uss 23 wa Uss 20 91 a1 50 0 Wherin A Bae labya 65 67 Wie Ooi 48 v von asta 13 56 Yours him Howard 93961 «in— UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX A UCL ASSIFIED cHronorooy or tis Lemanon oreration 14 juLY — as octosen 19se As juty 19se CIA Director Allen Dulles leacned o traqi coup President Chamoun officially requested U military intervention in Lebanon CNO telephoned EONECON Raden Duerfeldt Deputy CINCNELM in London to wazn of the situation and Lerued prepasstory ontere for NELM an sicmurcr CN alerted General Wade of 2nd Provisional Mazine Force SNO tha afternson directed COMIDEASTEOR to keep one DD in he vicinity of Dbakran Saud Arabia CNO informed CINCLANTFLT CNCPACELT CNCNELM and COMSICTHELT ofthe imminence of President Siscabower‘s decision President Eisenhower told General Teining Chairman of the JGS Sead them in GNO directed CINCNELM and COMSIXTHELT to land Marines at 19008 Beirut ime CNO also dizected CNCNELM CINCSPECOMME and COMBIXTHPLT t a Follow Blisbat concept so far as possible There is sull some question whether British will follow U S Marines into Lebanon or will go to frag Submit hourly strmees CNCUSAREUR alested Force Alpha It Atzbome Bare Gp 187th In Reinforced in Germany @ French caszters Lefeyeme and Arsomanches sailed from Toulon tran mobilized USAF C—124‘s few to Germany 1s fay CNO directed CINCBACFLT to send all available Marine RSD transport atrotait from the Weet Coase to Cherzy Poin N C for a oop Lif t the Rastern Mediteranen CNO directed CWICLANTELT to load troops and equipment in RSD and RQ atzsrat and send them to Port Lyautey Morocco for omand routing by comnmirct TRANSPHIRON 6 landed the 272 Marines at Beirut as 19008 hei NussEE CNO that afternoon put the Adlantc and Paci Fleets on 4 hours satling notice The American mbasey in Amman reported that POL sinition in Jordan was critical and requested an immediate atriit CNO suspended deactivation of 4 carziezs 4 cruisers one destroyer ano 4 submarines COMIDEASTEOR in Greenwich Bay AVP 41 moved to a sation in the northern Persian Galt and ordered Maredith DD—230 to remain in the Diahean ares TE—24 in Scandinavian ports was ordered to contime the scheduled midahipmen cruise bac be on 4 hours noice to sail to Gibraltar TE—23 COMCARDIY 1 in Forrestal with Randolph and appropriate DD‘s was organized to assemble at Norfolk and operate off the Virginia Capes COMASDEFORLANT ordered an ate—submazine intelligence barrier bemween Greentant—Iceland Fseroes using 5 S8 from Fish Play exercise and 2 S rom the midshipmen cruise and increasing VP airezaft at feeland from 6 to 12 COMASDERORLANT ordered AS surveillance igtes off the East Coast increased to one datly from both Norfolk and Bermuda normally alternace days from these stations Nine hindred replacement troops of the 2nd Mazine Division began an atrlie to tzut from Cherzy Point N C via Braztl and Morocco TE —14 was alersed It comprised 3 CVA task groups and 2 CVS task groups on the West Const Turkey completely approved th landings De Gaulle backed the United States West Germany didn‘t commit itself and Realy asked for a NATO mecting 16 paty Beirut alrport opened to civilian atzcraft as long as they didn‘ interfere with milkary operations Adm Holloway CINCSPECOMME CRICNELM arzived at Beteut altport 04008 with London element of is Join staff and broke his fag in TACONIC TRANSPHISRON 2 landed the 3 6 Marines at Beinuc CNO concurred with COMIDEASTEOR that Holder DB—819 operating in the Serai of Tehran need nat stay ou of sig of land because this prosence of U Naval power was considezed likely to stabilize the ocal situation TE—Alpha began iss depasture from Germany TE Bravo 603rd Aistornc on 12 hour alert in Germany Naval aircraft couldn‘t use Adana for 3 days because of TE Alpha movement dizected to use Nicosia Cyprus we President Eisenhower sent Undersecretary of Sate Murphy to Lebanon as his special politica s—presentative United Sates said no action was plamed ausinat the Lebanese rebels British transports concentzated at Cyprus Nasser conferred with Khrushchev 16 and 17 July in Moscow and warned that an attack on Iraq would be considered an azack on the UAR Permanent Council of NATO endorsed the U S landing Mosiem members ot Baghdad Pact Turkey Tran and Pakistan approved U S landing Red China the USSR Chana Japan and India disapproved o U landing 17 jay CNO directed CRICPACFLT so load and sil one Mazine BLT from Okinava to the Persian Gult and warned of possible augmentation to an RLF CNO directed CWNCPAGELT to cancel rele of Holder in MDEASTFOR and it was ordered to pazzol in the victity of the Strait of Tehran at the northern end ot the Red Sea Ensoute refueling at Athens reported as an urgent requtzement British teoope allifeed from Cyprus began landing in Jordan 0930 local time SDCTHELT alzerafy made a demonstration over the West Bank of Jordan immediately ater the landing at Amman by Beith troops CNCSPECOMME advised CNO that the 6th Flect was ready to evacuate King Hussein CNO cancelled the alert 13 houes later COMSICTHELT directed that P2V combat patrols would not be fown out of Soudhas Bay Crete unless a serious submazine threat evolved Aizezatt dizected to leave Betzut as soon as possible because of insuticient parking space TE—Bravo on 24—houe alert in Germany CRICLANTELT directed the Atlantic Pleat to exacute a dispersal measute which restricts type and number of ships that can be concentrated in port British ervisez Sheffield and 2 DD‘s off Tripolt Lebanon French CLAA D Grasse and 3 DD‘s arrived at Beat stated purpose posslble evacuation of French nationals No present irention to become em brolled in local simation Thsee—fiths of SIXTHELT of Lebanon Robert Murphy azzived in Ner to do everything possthle to restore peace and tranqullty in Lebanon and to assiet the government o President Chamoun in so doing ars UCL ASSIHED Greece deastically restricted landings at Athens United States was required to give 48—houe notice Greece refused further U S aizerat landings High overtlighes and emergency landings approved No overflighes of Austria permed 18 futy British CVA Eagle operated off Hatt Terael to provide atreorer for British troop atelie CL Sheffield off Teipoll Lebsnon Nicosia to Amman airlift completed TRANSPHIRON 4 landed the 1 8 Marines at Beiruc Alslited Mazine replacements from CONUS begun arztving at Betruc Augmentation of 26 C—126‘s in Burope to S4 requested as soon as possible since closure of Athens prevents maximum usage of G—119‘s British cruiser was off Libya for th possible evacuation of King zis eas ot a UAR coup CNO directed CNCNELM CINCSPECOMME and COMIDEASTFOR to be in complete Haison with the British both in London and the Middle Bast CNO tnformed CIICPACELT that MSTS shipping in WESTPAC did not have to be held for the Mazine RLT lie Bulgarian army began well—poblicized maneuvers using Soviet air support nea the Turkish border 1 jay French ships departed Beirut When the French ships were off Sidon Lebanon on the 13th they precipitated rebel operations to repel an expected French landing Tuskey considezed the Dilgazian manewrers big stick propaganda and was not greatly concerned Large scale Russian manewress In Trans—Caugasus Tuekmen S6 and Black Sea began on 17 July CNCLANTELT ordered prepasations for an atack carster striking force under COMSECONDELT by combining TF —23 COMCARDIV 4 in Forrestal with Randolph and 10 DD‘s in Norfolk and TF—24 midohipmen cruise force arziving 19 July in North Sea ports ‘The alert stamis of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets was relaxed from 4 hours to 12 hours Khrustcher sends message to Eisentower asking summit on 28 Joly British landed commandos in Libya to bolater goreenment there hes URCLASSIRED UNGLASSIHEU Combat Ate Loglatic Support unit from USAFE arzived at Beirut airport Composite Alz Stzike Force from CONUS closed at Adana Turkey 20 jug Forse G 1400 eroops began landing at Beinut airport CRICLANTELT ordered a Mine Division to the Medierranean to join the th Fleet hey were used to protect the amphibious ships from possible enemy small craid Mack of SAC now on 15—minite aler Rluckat westbound cargo allowed to overly Gzeece Eastbound could land at dark at bases other hin Actns Saeb Salam eebel leader in Btu was reported to have said tat he would call for valumreers from the USSR and UAR If U S forces tzied to enter rebel territory Jordan breaks relations with the UAR a pay TAG atzeraft delivery problems could not overfly North Africa Greece or Cie Beiish had strengthoned theiz Baiein gareison to 1000 men No overflight of Saudt Arabia Necessary to use lighters for unloading congestion on docks and storage was a major problem USAF dropped one millon leatlts over Lebanon explaining American miliary presence in Lebanon CNO advised CINCLANTFLT CNCPACFLT and CNCNELM that presen commitments in the Middle Rast would have to be met within current personne and fiscal iits 2 pay ‘The Soriet Navy in he Baltic and Arctic Seas was on alert CNO dizected CRICLANTELT t sail TG—44 0 amphibious ahipping with 2 Maine BLT to Vieques Puesto Rico for training MSTS charsered 12 dry cargo ships and 15 tankers for Middle Bust support acs UCL ASSIFIED an uly UK CVA Eagle withdrew to Cyprus area since alrcover no longer needed for eroop airif to Jorcan CNO directed that cruiser Salem remain active proceed with inactivation or all other ships which have reported for inactivation Essex and 2 DD‘s withdrew to 34 286 for a 3—day rest period Wasp ® suspended Sight opezations for 24 hours on—station zest period but kept 2 ASW planes ready as fly CNO notifed that Spanish authorities gave immediate and terozable response « U S request for clearance to use Rota and other Joint—use bases in support of the Lebanese operation CTE—61 reported that all amphibious offonding at Beteut was completed and a zotation schedule was se up to permit visit away from the area Status of Forces Agreement forwarded to Department of Sate Maj Gen Past Adams arsived at Beirut to take command of American land forces COMAMLANEOR in Lebanon ‘The Pacific Fleet was placed on 24—hour sailing notice Regular joint American—Lebanese patrols began in Beteut as paty Risentower in reply to latest Khrushcher note agreed in principle to a summit meeting bu dectazed thae 28 July was too early a date ‘Tne first American troops weze granted Liberty to go toto Beirut 26 uly CNCSPRECOMME recommended to USCICEUR that in view of the tentous U 5 position resultant from the current Mideast eventa every reasonable pre« eaution be taken to avoid actions which may be tnterproted as provocative or hostile Constane use of ate transport led to a serious maintenance backlog by this dare Sixth Fleet and Ate Force planes conducted an aestal demonsteation over Lebanon as pay Gen Adams as COMAMLANEOR established his headquazters in the American Community School which was on vacation Gen Fuad Chehab agreed to nun for President As URCLASSIRIED UntL ASSIRED 2 piy Another aerial demonateation was flown over Lebanon Stamus of Forces Agreement approved by Deparsment of Sate at pay Gen Chetab was elected President 1 August U S airceatt not on miliary misslons allowed to overtly Sadan if no arempt was made to contact control towers and if flown at high altitudes CNO directed COMIDEASTFOR to transfer his command to CINCSPECOME with forces assigned USNS Upaliiz firse troop transport arsived with 1800 soldiers of Force Det Aless Stam of Force Bravo in Germany seduced to one company at 12 hours the rest at 24 hours 2 August GOMIDEASTEOR and assigned forces reported to CNCSPECOMME for operational control French ships depasted Eastern Mediterranean for Toulon Ambassador MeCLintack declared that the prosene sttition was bert than at any ime since the revolt broke out tn May ‘The United States recognized the new Ieagl government Hntael tld the United States and Great Britain to stop overilights immediately Soriet protests given as reason USNS Gen Randall arzived with 2260 soldiers of Forse Delta and Force Echo SNO directed CNCSPECOMM® and CNCPACFLT to rewn TP 74 1 amphibious ahipe in the indian Ocean enroute to the Persian Gulf beck to Singapore at request of Deparment of State 4 Augure GTF —61 ordered the TRANSPHIBRONS to be prepared to reemback Marine BLT‘s if directed A conterence of component commanders and subordinates concerned was held at COMAMTLANEOR Headquazzers in etrut to establish olodly acceptable operational procedizes by which ate operations would be directed and controlled Hstacli overtigtes canceled ar UCLSSEED UndLASoiricD $ August Khrushchev withdrew his proposal Or a summit conference 6 August CTF —40 cartiez strike force gave detailed orders and schedutes for his force to operate in the eastern Medizercanean with one CVA one cruiser and ® aboue half of the DD‘s at sea and the other half of TF—0 in yout Status of Forces Agreement accepted in fll by the Government of Lebanon 8 August CNCLANTELT in reply to CNO‘s request for is views on the relief of the ASH carsier group in the Mediterranean recommended % Reduce amphibious forces in the Stith Fleet to 2 PHIBRONS with 2 BLT and RLT headquarters Reduce from 2 to one AGC amphibious force Dagship ater the Mazines are withdrawn from Lebanon 6 Return the HUK group to CONUS in September without relict 9 August Fiest Livery for U 5 forces in Lebanon TE Bravo in Germany seduced to 48—hour ales 11 August Fizst Marine resupply shipping arzived COMIDEASTEOR requested one more DD from CNCSPECOMME Request dented by COMSIXTHELT because ot s Increased demands on 6th Flest DD‘s % Maintenance problems caused by extended operations associated with the Lebanese crista 13 August CNCSPECOMME concurred with JCS proposal to release Force Bravo in Germany from aler Maine BLT 2 2 commenced reloading into TRANSPIERON 6 at Beizuc 14 August CNO canceled eartier orders on readiness for ships n port to ge undervay and pu the Fleets on normal steaming notice wes URCLASSIRED LB o 15 August TRANSPHIBRON 6 with BLT 272 embasked sailed from Beirut to operate ar sea Opesstlonal conezo passed from COMAMLANEOR Gen Adame to ComAhNAVEOR Adm Brown e 16 August Greenland—Lceland—Faezoes ASW surveillance drastically reduced 19 August CNCRACFLT directed sailing TB 74 1 74 3 and 74 4 amphibious task force with DD‘ from Singapore to the indlan Ocean about 25 August 22 August CNO advised CINCSPECOMME that Wasp and its DB‘s would be withdraun from the Mediterzanean at the ond of September without rellet and that CINCLANTFLT would deploy addtional VP atzoraf f CNCNELM required 23 Auguet CWCPACFLT ordered reversion to normal ASW patrols inthe Japan Philippines and Alaska areas to begin on 1 September 24 August GOMSEVENTHELT deactivated TG—74 3 2 DD‘s and TG—74 4 1—A0 and 1 AF ordering all excepe the oiler to aail from Singapore 26 August GOMSIXTHELT recommended to CINCSPECOMME that Saratog and TF—60 be seleased from the eastern Mediterranesn to resume normal operations as far west as the Tyrrhenian Sea 27 August CNCSPECOMME requested 6 additional PAY atzcrat from CONUS to replace Wasp CCSPECOMME authorized Seratoge and TE—4 to operate as fas vest as 13 degrees East allowed port visit to Naples after 4 September COMAMAIRFOR ordered to conduct aix operations in Lebenon through 21 September 28 August Eesex transits Sue Canal enzoute to Pacific Fleet ten tmvolred in Quemoy — Masu crist 31 August Wasp and DBs depart eastern Mediterzaneen for Adriatic ports as UCL ASSIIED URCLASSERED 2 September A NELM setlet force TB—25 comprised of Ca‘s Salem and Newport N us C¥A‘s Forrestal and Randolph and DD‘s sailed from Novfol to accive in te Mediterranean on 12 September 4 september — CVA Sazatopa CAG Boston and escorts departed operational area for central Mediersatean ports» 11 September Wasp zevuened to eastern Mediterranean left again on 17 September 12 September Forsestal Randolph and Newport News chopped to COMSIXTHELT GOMSECONDFLT in Stem remained under the operational control ot CHCLANT sut 15 September Boton left Gibealtas and chopped to CNCLANTRLT 16 September TRANSPHIERON 4 with the 1 8 and 2 8 Marines embazked sailed from Beizut to stop at Gibealtaz on 23—24 September ensoute to CONUS 18 September CNCSPECOMME submited a plan to JGS for withdraval from Lebanon to be completed by 15 October 19 september 1CS approved CINCSPECONME plan for withdrawal from Lebanon to be diseased by Jos 20 September CINCSPECOMME established limits on 6h Fleet morements during the period following the Mazines withdzawal until the Army withdrew 1 CVA group east of 13 degrees Bast 1 — GVA group unrestricted 1 BLT embarked ina TRANSFHIBRON east of 20 degrees Rast 1 BUT embarked in a TRANGIIBRON east of 5 degrees Base 2 — DD‘s on EASTMED prerol of which one willbe in the Beizue area Tnereatter employment will be normal — aco URELASSIRED URCLASSIFIED 22 Sevtember M Salem and Saratoga leave the Mediterranean for CONUS TRANSPHIBRON B accived as Oibeattar with the 276 Mazines and RLT Hida Co of the 6th Mazines Afror refueling it proceeded to Beirut 5 GNO gave the new targer date for withdraval from Lebanon as the end of October 23 September Wasp chapped to CNCLANTFLT at Gibeatea Gen Chehab was inaugurated as Presidenc of Lebanon 24 September CMCSPECOMME shifted the responsthily for air operations in the Lebaron are from COMANNIAYEOR COMSDCTHELT to COMAMARREOR to be effecave on 27 September TRANSPIRON 4 with the 1 3 and 2 3 Marines embarked sailed from Gibeaitar and chopped to CNCLANTRLT 28 September The 3 6 Marines commenced reembazking in TRANSPHISRON 2 at Bur 29 September COMCARDNY 14 in Wasp with 7 DB‘s sailed from Gibraltar encoute to cons 30 September Adm Bkatzom zelieved Adm Brown as COMSIXTHELT and COMAMNAYEOR on board Des Moines at Villefranche TRANSFHIBRON 2 completed retraction of the 3zd Raralion 6th Mazines from Beirut 1 October IRANSPISRON 2 aatled from Befeut to viste Naples TRANGPHI®RON 6 sailed fom Beirut for CONUS Naval guntice support withdrawn from Betowt 7 October TRANSFRIRON 6 departed Gibealtaz for CONUS and Taconic AGC—17 departed Beirut for CONUS acu URDLASSIFIED URCLASSIED CMCLANTFET informs CNO that 2 TRANSPHIBRONS sould be mareieally mateained in the Mediecrs wan on a watch«and—watch peciod of city arternatine with perid of rest basis He recommended early reductin back to one BLT in t the Medkersanean as well as early retien of Ampnion an augmenting repaic ship 12 October CRCSPECOMME adrieed that during Lebanon phase out operations he intended to 8 Maimain 1 TRANSPHUTRON BLT in the EASTMED ¥ Maintain 1 TRANSPHTBRON BLT east o 5 degrees East 6 Maineain 1 CVA 5zoun east of L1 degrees Eu 18 October TRANSPHINRON 8 with the BLT 2 6 embarked sailed from Beirut for landing exercises in Soudhas Bay during 20—23 October 21 October COMSRCTHELT established COMSIXTHELT Op Order 150—58 to become effective 25 October The EASTMED patrol was ordered to maintain 1 DD at sea In the vicinity of Beirut prepazed to protect American lives and property Another DD was to be maintained of Halta to provide SAR search and rescue facilities for possible air evacuation from Jordan CRICLANTELT explained the TRANSPNIBRON BLT problem to CNO and concladed that LANTFIT did not have adeqmate Lie capability to maiazain 2 standard BLT‘s in the Mediterranean Recommendations were to reduce that foree to one BLT inthe Mediterranean and f this was not practicable to form 6 TRANSPHIBRONS in LANTEIT of reduced size and capably 22 October CINCSPECOMME CINCNELM departed Beizat and shifted his Aag and administration to Londen as of 23 October Further COMAMAIREOR to be deactivated as of 24 October COMAMMNAVEOR t be deactivated as of 25 Octrber COMAMLANEOR to be deactivated as of 25 October COMIDEASTFOR report to CINCNBLM for operational contzol 25 October s 25 October CICNELM chopped CNCNELM to USCINCEUR for operational command wore UCL ASSIFIED APPENDIX B UNCLASSIFIED if # I lge 6 cen 8 i 3 E I J pe——mousanen4 I i 1 Pog iss DB P § $2 LB 0 $o g EE8 Po g £ «£ h 5 BB igs Po i $54 i 4 i € ow is sf to g $23—— ¢ ss € Jl m f as — fliks $ 535 #59 P eP $ $ i 8 ig s $ # 58 5 £128 ig Reverse BtaNIO UNCLASSIFIED 6 APPENDIX C 0 UNCLASSIFIED The Eisenhower Doctrine Public Law 85—7 $5th Congress HJ Res 117 Marsh 9 1557 Jore resorurion f To promote peace and stability inthe Middle ast Resolved by the Senate and House of Represomatives Midite Rast ot we thid saree or imens in empress ecmnien Taa Feswats — he President be and hereby is tongs t cooperate with ansinance and aseise any nation or group of nations in the general CoC aren of the Middle East destzing such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the matncen ance of nationat independence 520 2 The President is authorized to undertake in — Milia the general aren of the Middle Bast millary assistance Emitk programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance Pusthermore the United Sates regards as vical to the national imezest and world peace the preservation of the independence and imegrity of the nations of the Middle Bast To this end If the Provident determines the necessity thereot the United States is prepared to use armed forees to assist any such ation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any countzy controlled by international communism Provided That such employment stall be consonane with the trcaly obligations of the United States and withthe Conatiution of the United States 550 3 The President is hereby authorized to Use ot appro— wise during the balance of seal year 1957 for economic and priafome — miltary asslatance under this Jolnt resolution not to exceed $200 000 000 from any appropriation now available for careying out the provistons of the Munil Secustty Act of 1984 as amended in sccord with the provistons of such Act Provided That whenever the President determines it to be Imjortant to the security of the United Sates auch use may be under the authority ot section 401 a of the Marsal Security Act of 1954 as amended excepe that the provisions of section 10 a thereat shall nae be watved and withous regard to the proviatons of section 108 of the Mumsal Securtty Appropriation Act 1997 Provided furthes ‘Trat obligations tncurred in cazzying out the pusposes of tio fizst sentence of section 2 of this Joint resolution shall be paid oaly out of appropriations for miliary ca UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED assistance and obltestune incurred in case ong ces the pursones of th fires section t this Joint resolucion shall be paid only out of «mnzopcianions omer thas thao or miliary assistance This authortzation is in addin to «ther existing authorizations with respect to the ose of wueh apncopelations None af me addiclonal authorization Restrict» souatied io tis section stall be used unl Often ware mas b alter the Committee on Foreizn Relations ot the Senate D the Commitie on Foreign Atlurs of the House of Repee« — @ifemancs sentatives the Commitiees on Appropriation of the Senate CORmIREC and the House of Representatives and when miliary assistance is imolved the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives tave heen Aurnished a report showing the object of the proposed use the country fo the benefit ot wnicn such use is intended and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carzying our the provisions of he Musial Seczzity Act of 1957 as amended from which the finds are proposed tobe derived Provided That finds available under this section during the Balance at fiscal year 1954 shall in the case of any such zeport submited during the last fitern days of the Ascal year romain available for use under his section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of meen days following the dite of submission of such report Nothing concainea in this joint resolution shallbe construed as fcselt authorizing the appropriation of addtional funds for the pupose of carzying out the provisions of the first section or of the fest sentence of section 2 of this joint resolu tion 580 4 The President should contime to furnish U M Emergenss facilites and military assistance within the provisions pos eet of applicable law and established policles to the United Nattows Emergency Force in the Middle Bast with a view to maintaining the truce in that region SEC 5 The President shall within the months of Reporc s Jantacy and July of each year zeport to the Congress his ¥ action hereunder SEC 6 This joint resolition stall expize when the President shall decermine thas the peace and security of the nations in the general aren of the Middle East ase reasonanly aasuzed by international conditions created by Expiration action ofthe United Nations or othereise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurzene resolution of the two Houses ot Congress £ Approved Mazch 9 1997 ca UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED nocument cno arouse may iss excerrts emehmowek Doctrine x inssion or sncrrieet s eroan mission or sucre FUT REvams tue mamvrenance or stasittry m area avp protection or us namonats x rier suport avaitase ir Dirgcteo m eweroency in surrort or sisentiower cocrante x overeiiont routs Arso requmep x Jor‘t REsoLUTIN or 7 Marck 1957 arrroven sy resent staten rie us reoatbs as virat to Tie nationat mmTerzsr avp worto reace Tue raeseavamon or Tug mberepenics ayp miteority or tue nations or mipots sastx To Tins END ir tus rresient etermnies tue necrssiry ThsRBor THs untrep states is raepARED to use anus Forees to assist any Nation or orour or suck nations Reqs rnc assistance acamsr rip acoression rron Any counmay conrorzsp ay mrreanationat communism ProviDED teat suck Evptovnent sat ss consonant wire re rreary ootioations or Tus untrep sates ap wiry ts constrtumon or tus unirep states request ror iLttaRy atp rRow covernment or mag wourp REcIVE provirr consiperamons m accorpance wrx reovistons poctam® quoren asove x os @everse stan UNCLASSIFIED A APPENDIX D i UNCLASSIFIED arrenonc p rorce Levets or us on rLBE in 1956 The following graph follows the buildup and zetirn to normal size of the 6th Fleet during 1998 The normal complement of the 6th Fleet was approxi— mately 50 ships As the graph shows the peak was reached after the Marines had landed in Lebanon ‘The information shown was deawn from the Monthly Memorandim of Composition of Task Forces Chief of Naval Operations Flest Operations Diviston Department of the Navy for each month except July The New York Times was the source for thit month Bach entry is mace on tie 15th iy of the month except August which is on the 20th day of the month r is so 1s % r $% is w H a 2 «o s 2_ s ho s so «s din Pv Mar hor My in M An — Sp — On Ner one ronce evets or he socmm riser in rose Der @everse samp UNCLASSIFIED i APPENDIX E 0 i « UNCLASSIFIED Offers and gasotine tankers avon ta Go s waccanay o 10 j 22—23 Aug Ss 6 Jut — 11 Aug 58 2—4 Sep se 518 Sep 51 wanns no 57 Asom s 10 Aug 2 Sep 58 mssissnszua no 1» sever o en F asems Ju se ramen 10—27 Aug sn 24—25 Sep St churnwan 0 109 29 Aug — 12 Sep 5¢ cusiauiean moo s» eawortucr ao 108 matrasssser aos 50 NES meas jut se M4—16 Aug 58 as—27 Sep 58 13 Ocr ss Fieet ocean ug acmcnen te uas 2—30 Aug 5s g—10 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED avximay Uniliy aircraft carriers corrzotor cv se murout cu en 22 jar ss 15 Or se Destroyer tender semanbont ap 26 2z 24 po se Ammunition ships susra as 6 wranostt as 19 22 Ju 11 Aug 58 16—25 ut 58 20 Aug — 1 Sep 58 do—41 jut ss 15722 Aug 5s 2—1 Sep 56 Store ships Acbemanan ar 10 vevesora ar 56 9—17 Aug 5s 19—28 Sep S8 iwapes car 2 moe ar so 29—30 Aug Ss 15 Get ss 5—9 Sep so Stores isoue ship mercury xs 20 22025 Aug 58 4 9 Sep so Zs—26 Sep se Cargo ships anrtanes ar 2s Arcon ax 239 6—7 Oce ss Hiott Aug 5s 2126 Aug 56 aos UNCLASSIFIED unciassifiEp seros1 crove tspan 18 Jot — 6 Aug 58 23 Aug 7 Sep so 1 iden Sep se Tank landing ships » averse county Lor 160 suerous county asr us» reoulu st 29 Sep — 1s oct se tar s york county ast urs ickbmune 29 Sep — 1s oct ss war wore county st 160 1ee24 ju se $223 Aug so 16 Sep — 1 oct 5 Usity landing ceatt rou use 1cu miss 15 Jut — 3 oct se 29 Sep — 18 Oct 5s 16—25 ocr 5s pota neu er 17 jut — 16 sep so 179m jase SA © Tecat ja so ® 1—6 Aug 56 Leu meo 23 31 Aug se vre jase 1—7 Sep so $223 Aug 5e reid Sep se 16—30 Sep so S60 160 reo ure 18 jut — 3 Oct se 29 Sep — 18 oct se 16—25 oc sa reu 150 29 Sep — 1s oct se unten sza mes navy suups MSTS tzoop shipe usus oenerat crores ar Rabat uss ornerat ® i at atonrorp Tagus rad is — 2—3 Aug so 15—17 ocr se uss cenerat Leroy emor usus oetome rar 17 t ae 150 $ Aug 5 3—5 or so uss uéshiur rae 190 moa ocr se 1—3 Aug se ges UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED AMPRIBIOUS WaRFARE seies AND cRarT t Amphibious force Angships Mote we kinEy aoe—7 roconlo Acc—16 TacoM acc—17 s tee81 ju sa 16 Jut — 28 Cet S8 — lil a Occ s Atack cargo ships CaRRICORNUS aa—57 O6LE THOR®E aicA—100 Pa‘ Jut 58 29 Sep 18 Oct 56 aval vermmion aa—10m 16 Sep — 1 Oct 58 16—23 Ju S6 MULIPIEN AcA—61 3—22 Aug 58 18 Jot — 6 Aug 88 $ Sep — 1 Oot 58 23 Aug — 6 Sep St 6—25 Ocr 58 14—16 Sep 58 Atack tesnoports MoNROWA APA —31 FREMONT APA44 Lica jar se 18 Jt — 6 Aug ¢ $222 Aug e 23 Aug — 6 Sep 58 16 Sep 1 Oct 58 14—16 Sep 56 canman ara—so ormsten az—1s9 29 Sep 18 Oct 58 18 ut — 6 Aug 56 ciToN arA—38 23—30 Aug Ss 16 23 jut 58 15—16 Sep 58 7o22 Aug Se $ Sep — 1 Oct 58 Rookatibes apa—22 16—25 oct se 16025 ja se 7 22 Aug so $ Sep — 1 Oct 58 16—25 Oct 56 Dock landing ships San MaRcos sp—29 FORT SNELLN LST—30 F % Sep — 18 Oct Sb 18223 Jul $e 7—22 Aug 5s mi R — Sst $f FG ts—2 s sp —1 os ss $223 Aug Ss 16—25 oct 5 f 16—30 Sep Se #7 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED testea oe—102 wantiey s—100 30 Ju — 11 Aug Se 1—ti Ang 54 2241 hos 5s #2—91 Aug Ss 16—47 Sep so 16et7 Sep so jorn wus oe—10m Josep x taussto pe—1030 16—26 Ju se 17 Jut 10 Aug 56 M—21 Aug Se 22 31 Aug 5s 31 Aug — 16 sep so van voormns o—1029 17 Jut — 11 Aug 56 wicutant w woop er—ri8 2241 hos So fou jot se 16—47 Sep s s Jut — 4 ang 50 16 Aug — Sep se Submazines mornmer Gs—am Turma csaa 1 Jut — 20 Sep 58 1 jut — 30 Sep 58 somron ssn—zn 1 Jut — 30 Sep 50 Ocean minesweepers Aconsssive so 2 sheacrty uso—ss 15—23 Aug 56 17 Jut — 2 Aug 56 2—5 Sep se 21 Aug 20 Get so rostrzy sous sar vso—rn 15—23 Aug 58 17 jut — 15 Aug so 2—5 Sep se 9 Sep — 2 Oct $s nne Mso—iss staumant uso—05 17 jt — 18 Aug 5 18 Aug 2 Sep 5 ficf9e t anrott mso—s0 s emmactr uso—sn 15 Aug Sep 58 17 Jt 2 Aug 50 1 Aug — 2 Oct so 2 B6 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED wicurantc Lave po—76» raroupj EuiBoN o—s60 it Sep — 7 Ocr sa T7 oie ae 31 ju se Rooks 00—s09 ghividia trees jor se cove pp—46 Heid Aug 5s 17 a — 2 Aug se s Act Aug s¢ new 00—m18 % 17 Jot — 1 Aug se tx th 11 Aug 5a smiscimc 00—s7 micw 0o—s20 an 17 jut — 11 Aug se bam to ©o—7 santuet roseats po—825 to Ao st 2044 hug ss rorrzst s novat 00—#72 2—10 Sep S8 20—26 Aug 5 sasirone 00—s20 wersorms ©0—890 2 jut 11 Aug 58 31 Aug 7 Sep so rower 00—s39 rorrssr semmaw oo—530 fi—24 Sep so 2o—48 ug Ss non o—z4n suaay ©0339 17—24 ju se pans hit 1 Aug se nosear t wirsoy o0—847 sve Fit — 11 Ae 27—31 Aug 5s chances i rom 0o—s53 jowes moment ©0530 20—26 Aug Se SEIS axeg on—ssq vesors oon—sm0 17 Sep —7 Oct ss 17 hit — 1 Aug se 11520 Aug 5¢ stenmeen on—ss5 f 17—28 jor se pmand 30 Jut 16 Aug 5 teary conan» 31 Aug — 14 Sep Se 1—10 Aug se 19—31 Aug 5s — pearey o8—100 crower or—r01 zon ju se 26—31 Ju se 11522 Aug Sa 1122 ug 5s 31 Aug 14 Sep 58 31 Aug 14 Sep 58 rs UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED em ruger berrorv ENT East or 11% tovertupe Surin Te 1eeAow orera mon jULy—or rosen 195 conan tats Arceatt carriers sssex ova ranpours cva—is 16 jut — 1 Aug se 22s Sep is 1 20 Aug s¢ saratoga cva—so wase cus—i» 17 28 jut se 16 ut 11 Aug so 20 Jt 11 Aug 50 21—31 Aog 5 19 Aug — 15 Sep se 16—27 Sep sa Cruisers soston Cac—» neweort yews ca—iam 15 Jut — 1 Aug se Rican Sep se 9—21 Aug 58 215 Sep Ss ves nomes ca—139 17 Jut — 10 Aug 56 Zn—29 Aug 56 Destroyers and destzoyer escorts muse 00 559 me coma po—4r9 17 Jut 21 Aug Se 18 Jut — 1 Aug S6 4—6 Sep 5s L120 Aug s¢ mie surcivans 00—537 frre 14 Jut 1 Aug S0 me nam on—e79 15—20 Aug 5# 15 Jut — 1 Aug s¢ 27 ug 1 Sep 58 T1 20 Aug so wamey on—ss9 41 Ang N Sep is 17 ju — 21 Aug 5s wabueion p—s00 4—6 Sep so rica jut 5s 6211 Aug so assor no—429 20 Aug — 22 Sep so ir Arg » wate aut o—90 mare ©0—50 Zo—ts Aug 5s inevor 8 o ravnswort ©0—700 wort 00 79 20—29 Aug 5s sa mits ga UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED x w sen Sows sise bett os 5 3 um m i en mn boe n o n i Poet efofonomfiaminlatist ‘9g eS CE— G 1 Ef COH IGECLT X EELS L L_Co————D0 foicsommc—memijia $7 fo im imm CCESS——— 7 O H—S ST 84 e——mE2 57 SSSA TG ie os ntt Inlstal $570 — BT ss ALT UMNITTTTIT i HABeHeHelEHAAAAOAOAAAL #2 — CESS ARASS —21—0CCCTOTTo # 1 TAHITI 8 7 fig — CARICHCCiHsesiet—he— HHA # — LOCC PAHOSA CCCCTECRSCTS 3s —— —7 2% AlIEITT F — wd MSE 4 i MR C C CBAOOCCAATSITORCTS E3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sw sem Sanmee gre em m loon n n a e ane is e i mae oar Tali A_ TU ITD §18 CSE——TH—Z 1 $7 — Cees GSS4H #3 — cee SS— CS ——8S SSSSSH — C2222L_ST TTEE TTOTO § ——— G4 fm L4 Sm 7 Sn am Emm $m im $2 BH eememmnal 8% #m Sam haa gH SF LR § #L #2 l4 7 Sa Sn # LWJ LHA B 4 98 het _ s8 —L RHI OUT # o —OP— m R pr Es #8 THATS is TGS sS fim CBee meesse—eoee—————H §§ 2AA22SSESATC 2 00009 $% ESeSSsSSSes ccc —HHS4AH—A §§ LA L m rs #2 10 R LBO ## T HS—El11 000 stcm user bem ovient East or 31% Lovorrune During Tis Apen prana an July—October f 195 ga p UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED aprenonce » etx surer bervorneN‘t mast or 31% Lovortupe purino Tis LeraNoN oreration JULY—Ccrose® 195 ‘The following charts showing 6h Fleet deployment to the Lebanon opera 4 tional ares were prepared from the Nary‘s Avards Mama Maceied with thet information sources the Avarte Haniel appears all accurate Some explanatory remarks may be useful The ships‘ names can be ascertained from the lists tha follow the chases it can be seen fzom the chases thatthe CVA‘s Essex and Saratoga took turns on station While off station they were never farther than Rhodes from the operational area The major 6th Fleat unis CVA Saratoge CVA Boser CVs Wasp CA Des Moines and CAG Boston are also covered in the map plots appendix American Naval presence in the Lebanon area decreased dramatically when Task Force 60 CVA Sazatopn CAG Boston and escorting DD‘s departed for Mediterzanean ports on 5 September ‘The Randolph CVA 15 appears briefly on the chae after the Forrestal and it had replaced the Sexatoga and the Essex in the Mediterzanean The Randolph‘s short ay east of 310€ longiuide was to familazize its pil wich the Lebanon operational area Similazly the cruiser Newport News made a short trip nto the operational area in late September Regarding smaller units the minesweepers doubled in number during August because they were needed in Ayeatcher roles to guard the amphibious force against small hootile units The apparently ervacic behavior of te amphibious shipe on the chare is auribitable to th face that many left the operational area after disembarking their Marines and cargo and came back later t Ermumpmemren Awards Mammal Amex Il List 5 Lebanon SECNAVBST 1650 10 CH—3 9 November 1956 po 1i i6 aa UNCLASSIFIED 1 XICN3dd¥ « » « UNCLASSIFIED f teamon oreaamion or 1958 6 petaiep comrosmon 20 August 1988 TE 60 Anack Cussler Striking Force Suraop cia Bay er tem tne Suflng Reser CVA 9 — Cone bo ise Des Moines Gh 194 Mereaiin — Do a90 Boston cae Despiv 62 Desbve ss1 besbir s62 Steimaker bor sss New ©0 818 — Rasitone — Od s¢ Leny Dok #79 Rich D0 $20 Daman bor Vescie Dor 876 Eilisen 00 #64 Wilson RL Do a7 Holder bo sis Destve 202 Despre 101 Destw 102 The Sullivans — 00 537 Sherman ©D931 — Aber bo ez Wadteigh ©0687 — fom DD #53 — Aesham — bo 7% MeNate to 679 — Roberts Do #13 Hate bo ei2 McGowan bo 6r8 — Reyat DD 872 Hum bo 64 TE 61 Amphibious Force Pocono AGC 16 — Taconic AGC 17 Fremon — APA 44 Chitto ADA 38 — Monrovia _ APA 31 Molighen — AKAG1 Rockbridge APA 222 Capricomus ARAS Oimed _ APA 44 Vermiion AKA 107 — Pymouth Rock LSD 9 _ Splegel Grove Ls 32 Fort Snelling — 180 30 — Traverse Co LST 1160 Walworth Go — LST 1164 Weed bor ris TE 68 Mine and Mine Coumter—Measuzes Force sin miso #71 Fiseiy wso «s Pimacte MBO 462 Adroie mso soo Nimble MSO 459 Aggreseive — So 422 Sepacty MSo 460 Saba mso ass TF 6 Service Force Grand Caron AD28 — Sama AB6 — Aleberim AF 10 Stenandonh AD 26 — Wrangell — AB 12 Mereuiy — Ars 20 manmmatan Montily Memorendum of Composition of Task Forces Chiet of Naval Operations Fieet Operations Division Department of the Navy 20 August 1958 ‘The Sixth Fleet was at peak strength at his time Asstgned to amphibious objective area as protection aginst possible hostile small cent ra UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED TE A3 Service Forse contimied Alcor AK 25 —— Mississinea — A0 164 tarabesser — A06 52 s Aucitn A0 So — Severn A0 61 Amphion —— AR 13 Chibavan A0 100 —— Weccemaw A0 109 — Aulape _ ATF 19 Marias AO 57 — Chevauemn A0G 50 Alameda Co AVB 1 Tollanarchic — co ist uss TF 65 9 Ease Med Pateot Force ttaitey bo sss miner bo sas TE 66 hnti—submazine Force Wasp cus is Taussig be 1010 wine ve ror Cromven be 1014 Destey DE 1006 Lester be ior Hardey — be 1009 Yon Voorhis DE 1028 Bany no ass TE 6 Submatine Force Trim ss an Pompon se asr Thotmiack — Ss ais ‘Assigned to Beirut area ra UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED arrenpix mar mots is jouy — s seprammen isse Key A Saratoga B Reser C Warp D Des Moines E Boston UNCLASSIFIED » « UNCLASSIFIED PCC 9 dy r 14 ¢ I 3 gif i l @igy6 Ba LL UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED sg f i s q _ ll f % a f e $ 3 U P f I ® so B4 Ml UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED —log f o tec — — E PuITT ¢ q A $_lj I t a 1 A4 i i $— s a F 718 £ 1 is f 15 3 nif Ayah $if i Lf 7 fiili 14 bi fi asf i Tiff 3 2 P4°« 1 Al of «s0se §7 san‘y i f UNCLASSIFIED unclasstriep loc f Jog » Sif ih 4 ai CAR £2 if i fo § tb o f I _ i HP Qs itH Prd I4 Resh l $ hii ¥ h 1 iff Cous i ‘ ffifl 3 » P4« JC i vsvee — al san‘y G— UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED l gd le d i hi 2 nld 3 4 ¢ 7 4 i Fea C R $ mA $ u i in i a Fill H 1 Fak t nif f by a a # diff AACA _ If itd pooa‘k fillt pif i fiif gas H A 22 94 Je ae0u os UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED casts i ¢ Ki_aj © I a A N — i ale uis a f i I f I fl 1 52 f PSB gil ct—ae 5y « © dgi Q 27 — — filial 2 a #1 HHE ‘ 4 p 1‘ iff u # ii15¢ « al Vse ‘ scou s ball f § h 5 san‘s a C6 UNCLASSIFIED UunciassifiED LL——_—okj iB Ghd 15 109 p t M i id fil s t 11 i b T hil a Sy ¢ fig A—R 9 EH af co 1 t 4 fi f é ih #0 HH I 2 F4 I uk i a00w 52 van‘g g 67 unciassifigp unclassified _____ aN # to 3 Si¥rq c a f 11g a 4 w f i id I is f £ $058 f iff o esh pili 2 0 #7 fir e t ¢ b3f 0 3 Hill io i iif 3 w ‘j s f a00u f 4 08 o UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Cl c gf z I 3 —Sulig1l 7 M Y fg ao j leg — D iq f i b2 14 f po pr rae by ‘ # dglh 2 7 0 art Pili ‘ # brid co 105 Pailli s tB s ff1 2 gy 1 o 1_e ® j «scow faye‘ f os UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED f t F s Leas ul 1 Hih I ¥ e i r P N i i I I p hil RES gig i ¢ a Pnrli 8 Coi‘ A 91g t ie 8 Hfild ler ‘3‘l Af «ssa« 52 sana G—10 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Slig IL ___—eL@AAl q O pome l 4 6 io d _ 4 ip il § C 1h «li LP FQa — $iflil Roa‘ Pil t Nu iif 3 »‘ % «a00u 5p lac gs I £p° © ou UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED id i § h i a ___ ecluf qj ©‘ T1 is # DRJ N _ 1 € 4 I P N il 1d RAL A rril ® ai C2 ak $iffi tja in f ® G usssfP iff peers fle p d ipl A Gx % © or UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ah t s nil f J C — ® 4— 11 ig i_aA_j 5 a of bo y N f f i Sal A—p s E9 ll 2 F0 a — a $ifi m‘ooatJ pill S uals f if u‘ B iii54 F ahs ‘y wef «su0u Pea ® g o—13 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ® GIT g — f PJ Cpp bsd S ingly s P $ we—_—___ i 1 $HZ——_ o N PS gil 4—pe By t‘ #ig f 4 tit i f c 1° 4 Pii li « rhs ‘ #0 HHH 3 2 P4 « 4 «sg8e a P sana 5 $ % a 2 9 Gol UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED iq L okt 2 PQs pi _ 8 j 11 i% i_ _ 14 b 4 i $ i is SAL in slp aigif i Io r __ an HHH Mit e $iiff ® ssp illf so P3 JALPd pJ @see 22 03 1oi c—1s UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SICP of I i a «Ad 4 Lone hulu H 7 8 2Odrn GI mel o UNCLASSIFIED Unclassifien t si 7 as nal 1 D ax i C NI f 8 fiil g‘ e B IL f a UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED — L x od I ley vite — ap ‘Alp so §_Bap M __ UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED a Ny B mia — gie § P IL UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CBZ Fo 1 o vf « $22 i bice ppl f % 7 yZvC il UNCLASSIFIED — % J t f HE eu B UunciassifiED UNCLASSIFIED % C_ § L y M i f t ao VH Bats ‘ 8 3 3 iy G $ £ ¢ T 5 Clay h¥ a if 3 Z i i $ $ 5b nif 7 Pill S $ @ Piff ® £ 2 11123 gice pp t % 9 $ § ® a £ cers UNCLASSIFIED inclsssine Wii eonmomoge ——— Institue ot Naval Studien Center for Navat Anatynes — ___ ___ ___ c an attilate of the University of Rochester TL OI The Lebanon Operation of 1998 A Study of the Crists Role of the Str Fleet U Research Contribution — September 1970 ragnich George 5 eepemper i970 ___ d# io s __ e NOOOL4—68—A—0091 Tnavirie of Naval Scatics a ssunsive nnelnlll Research Contribution No 153 % mee imarppppormmmmemmnemremer mme mele None Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy Washington D G 20050 By July 1998 the pro—Western government of Lebanon was in a precarious position following fw months of severe civil war When the pro—HWestern government of Iraq was overthsomn bn July 14 in what appeared to be a UAR—dieected coup President Chamoun of Lebanon fearing a simile tate requested armed Intervention by the United Stites Oreat Britain ad France Concerned lest the coup in Iraq spread elsewhere the United States landed pprorimately 2000 Maztnes to Lebanon on July 1 ‘The U S force which eventually Fopped 14 000 men was withdrawn completely from lebanon by October 25 after Lebanon llectos and Innupucaced a new bronident This paper 1 an examination of that cetels and miltary operation While much has been ritten on this subject the political arpect or the military aspect has usually been studied o the exclusion o the other Because the two were closely interwoven in the Lebanon o ne this paper has examined them togethes DD K id73 men HEHE —— —WMie ___ Crop g T__ ree ___ se es aind aam nems ICH Tertinsamd snp Eebaron ting 1o «iilirasy operation t L 1 I I i i I 1 I DD 22 1473 woo w