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Historical Division, Office of Information, Second Air Force Headquarters, Second Air Force Historical Data From 1 July Through December 31, 1958. May 1959, Secret, Excerpt, Excised Copy

- S•COND Al• FOIICE f • · - - t· • ' - i- - • · · • · • r - -r · r J - _ ' __ _ 5 · •---·' - J' i¥f# 'f l _ · l ' F _ _ _ - t t' •- J 11 jf UNCLASSIFIED · - - · - - - f - UNCLASSIFIED SECOND AIP FCP GE H S70RICA DATA UNCLASSIFIED TITLE FROM l JULY THROUGH 3 l DECEMBER 19 5 8 HISTORICAL DIVISION OFFICE OF INFORl' TION HEADQUARTERS SECOND AIR FORCE MAY J 959 UNCLASSIFIED 2- UNCLASSIFIED 2AF' Histvri cal Data J - Dece m e r 195 FOP B'-IK RD Thi s is he 19th volume ir a series recCl'cing_ the life cf tbe re s abliebed Second Air Force The first Yolume ot trJ s6r1es covered he initial period from the Command's reestablishment on l November 19 9 through jl December 1949 Seventeen othe -s follow9d semiannually embracing the p ariods of January t hrcugh i1 -ie anc Jlµ y through December This the 19th vol ume covers tbe period from l JUly tbro gh 31 Decembez 19 8 A 20th vol1 1J1Je will be released in Cctobe z- 1959 It m l r c mt d Yelcpme te du ing th first six 11la nths ot 1959 Otbei will r ollow semiaimually Th nan-a iv6 of thia volume is based on tho rough research both within and wittaut Headqua f ters Second Air Force Cara ha J been t akan to ar c lyze anrl evalua a tta evidence t-c es abl h t ce facts by reconciling conflicting evidence L lC to present these factE in an orga zed synthesis that in o t1ay violates ths spirit c f' t z- h f lit i r thro igh poor perspective or the emission or distortion of i'ect 5- t i s beli-aved th t a l accurate ic ure is prea at d ho ver if any i iig 11 Ilcant o mis i n or i 1acc1 raey 1 co· -ec his n r -at1v is ir bject to r evision S- -- --- •· - __ RO UNCLASSIFIED 2 UN D l 2AF His orical Data J y DiJcem·oer 19 e TABLE OF CONTENTS I TIM COM RESSION - ALERT POSTlJRE EVOLUTION BAGXGROUND ••••• • • • • • • • • • • l RULBI CONCEPT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7 Problems In Control • • • • • • • 30 Support • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lt-5 Forward Base Posture • • • • • • • • • 53 HOME STATION ALERT ••••• • • • • • • • TANKER SUPPORT I N REFLEI OP JUT IONS • • • DISTURBlNG FACTORS IJ MAINTAINING AL T PORCE • • • • Ill • • • • fl • • • • • • DISP oRSAL IN PLAN AND ACTION BUILD-UP OF B-52 IC-135 FORCE ENTRY INTO HO IQ STATION ALlmT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 60 6S 86 101 ll 7 MIDDLB EAST - LEBANON CRISIS AND B-52 POSTURE • • • • •· • • • • • • • • • • • • 133 B0 1BER STP EA 1 MISSIONS AND B-52 TRAINING 140 III MANi 'iING ON-T rlE-JOB TRAINING •••••••••••• AIRMAN QUALITY CONTROL ••• • • • • EARLY REI EASE OF AIRMEN • • • • • • • • • DlRECTED RETRAINING •• • ••• • • • • • -' JJ ·-· VL INC 146 169 174 178 _ I ' I UNCLASSIFIED 2AF Hist ori cal Data SEC i RD July - Decemb r 19 8 A IR MEN RETENTION •••••••••• • • OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS P E s ORTING • • • • CIVILIAN PEBSONHEL • • • • • • • • • • IV FACILITIES MILITARY CONSTRUCTION • •• • • • • • • At Dispersal Bases ••••• Interim Alert Facilities •• Runway Problems •••••• General Construction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • FAMILl HOUSING ••••••• • • • • • General Situation ••••••• • • Capehart B0Ua11ing • • • • • • • Wherry Housing ••••••• • • • • • • • V COi 1JM# ND STATUS ORGANIZATION - 30 JUNE 1958 • • • • • • ORGANIZATION CHANGES - JULY-DECJl mER 1958 Headquarters And Combat Wing •••• The Base Complex • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • APPENDIC A STATISTICAL Su 1MARY - JOLY-DECEMBER 1958 B UNI' S' RUCTUP 2 F 30 JmlE 1958 18l 186 189 196 201 210 2lt 221 227 227 230 237 C ROSTER -DY PERSONNEL HQ 2AF JO JtJNIS 1958 D ROSTER UY PERSONNEL HQ 2AF 31 DECEMBER 1958 E C IL ND CHANGES-AIR DIV_ISIONS WINGS B ASES F LIS 01 EZHI3ITS UNCLA§§lf lEQ UNCLASSIFIED 2l F His orical J ta July· D ce b l95S FRO CHAPllR I TD IE COMPRESSION - ALERT POSTURE EVOLUTION 2At Ris crica D a ruly -· D cambar 1Sr5S BAC1WROOND Racognitic that d $ o coruprsssion of timei ths ability to react very quickly o act of aggres sion b' cc-mes ncree sil gly important s s the Soviet weapons systems improve has been the key to Strategic Air Command SAC and in turn Second Air Force ope -ational doctrine Th s ie e-vident throughout tbe history of Second Ai ' Force particularly during tbe tim frO II early 1954 to ehe pres$nt casica J ly th hist -ory of Second Ait- l o -ca operation during t p3rioc Febr w ry 1953 tb roug 195g is a doc1 ltl en- atlon or the application of the B-47 madiu n bcmber to the United States grand strategy of the maintenance or ineluctable force with 6estructive power ur a ocept- · l able to an enemy n U The e aluation of the B-47 Emergency War Order 110 doctrine i 5 d-3picted in sJries of operational con ap a and xarcisas Followi g th davelopmsn f timing methods and procedll 'es ror singl wing l'l 1 ssioae Second Air Fore in early 1954 planned ancl a 'Cl cuted a then new concept aimed at uiore cc r 1let utiliz-ati• m 1 Col Alexand r Sheridan Impact or tha Missile on Warfare Air University Quarterly Review Su -nmer 1957 1 121 - 130 l ----- Iv UNCLASSIFIED I I _ p H aoo ·c ce l ila NC7 -U -31 t J y - D cs n' --- r · 1 _ 5t c th - nge speed a nd depe ncisbili ty cf the B-4-7 Label8d HIGH GEAR p i e o j9ctive of thie ooera- • 2 ticn was to decr ese the combat strike launch tims This operaticr t by eans of a accelerated deployment and strike schedule reduced time of the first bomb strike by four days as compared tc the EWO 50-53 then curren Under the HIGH OEAR plan the air division and necsaeary support personnel and declaration of host11itie toe forward ope -ating basa sing the KC-97'a of both wing The B-471 3 of beth wings ware reacied by pereonn l of the remaining wiog and routed tb -ou h a bomb pick-up site to the £orward base Beginning on X-day tha B-47 1 s were deployed at the rate of 15 p r day per wing Enroute ir refueling eliminet d tbe n d for staging and the task force co mmande r at the forward base the 'l law1ched 2 2AF Rist Data Jul-Dec 19 4 p 1 2 li'u l l objec- t ives ot HIGH GEAR were to 1 d 1craas a-·ti lle re- quir9d t o 12 wich com t strik s f ll wi t da a -a tio i or hoat ilities 2 de r ae- v1 1lnerabil i t v c SAC resourcas on fort1ard bas c S J incr ase strike rr i ti-aJ nn fc 11 i 1 ba2 l si 4 inc -eia se op eratior £ 1 iexi b il i ty 5 decre3Sti I cg is ti cal me cpa - s t ic al l'lu- ' 1 ' a f 1·•- -1 - - • • _ J •• • - -- 1 ··n·- ' - •J __ _ l•J V L 1 1- C' J v • e 11 1 •- C a c _ _C v n t l'S 1r l t - n• I 7 ut-r 1 in pcs it w·a co t •ol of ai craft by th SAC cOJD Dander - _r---------- - - ----· A UNCLASSIFIED • - - ---------- ---- __ - - ··- ______ -_- - - -- - - -- ·- ·- -N - _ _ • 1 1 • • maxi1r um strikes on plus t c thrae 'our e 'lc fi •t lollowing e ch s i the b mbers retur ed to th r c i r- 'd bas an- c fte n i l imll 1 crew rest- and mai n tenance returned tQ the ZI air refu2ling enrocte Deployed tar leers and support person iel remained at 3 the forward base to sustain repeat operations µ Ne t development was the LEAP FROG concept with the goal of arlier strikeo and rsductiQn of 4 force v- J na ability at tn6 for-r1 u·c base It d ffer d fron1 HIGH G AR in that twica refualorl B-47's we t direct rrom ZI base to targ t ana retu -nad to a post strike base Prepositionad tankers rG fueled the first bomber flight sfueling capability was then built up in the forward area by tanker deplo 'll1ent a£ter the strike execution order 'l'be size of suc ce9ding strikes then depended on ·t hs siz9 of the tanker forces Appro tlmately one-half oi tha Sec nd Air Fo 'ce KC--97 air refueling ca bilit - Wa$ organizad 3 Ibid PF• 191-192 J I6fd P• 19 F1 1rth-er objectiv s f LEAJ FROG were to l circumvent political prvbla s essc ciatec with lau lching special -wg 1 i - r s· rik-9 fro r foreigr t a ses 2 increase c perational 'le ci bility J reduce special weapons ferry require ments 4J dacraasa forwcrd base lcgia lcal arttl operational requiraments a d 5 reduce dependency on MATS · UN UNCLASSIFIED 2AF Eist 01·ical D t a - ' ·· A July - D 'We i' 1958 into five -cask i'o ' s to Sl l-ppcrt tts op-arat ion A si h f ere of some 50 tanka rs was siigr e 1 the e r LEAP FROG cotcept er ebl d an entire air division to executa its strikes t o day5 earlier than tmder the HIGH GE R pr1n iple with the result that LEt J FROG 5 methods were adopted temporarily for the EL· O Th se s r tegems were further polished by stock ing i'l$ap ns at ·eh Z bases wave oparation night formation r6fueling and post strike au por b1 tem pvl 'aTY du y J i lits at forwa1 d bases Fu rthel' exercises t hruug h 1956 made pro -ision tor B-47 w ather scouts dev l oPment of a QUICK STRIKE capability s nd refine- • 6 ment cf tanker utilizatio I L Toward the later part of 1956 Second Air Force 1 s 38th Air Division1 at f 1 lter Air Fr il c Ba C 3 J g ia tested a new projection when on 20 October it ltas dl t'l Cl ad to rucint ain o ne- h i d of H s foi·c o t alei•t scatus 24 hours a dayJ seven day5 a wsek Ne manning increase w s 1utho izod ' i'his test TRY our cie n- n st rated that a B-47 wing could maintain ·this alert • ibid 1 PP• 196-210 6 2AF Hist DataJ Jan-Jun 1957 P• J5l ______ __ ------- 1 A I - ---------- UNCLASSIFIED 2A f f i s ori l Data J r - D 1 c 9 0 ' 19 5 · · undar ce tair cDndi - ions ' t leee conditions ' 1 5 1 a rcrew pl a a ratic 100 perce t body enG 85 ma1 leaves no o f-base school quotas r c higher headCjuarters flying requirements a d acceptance of 7 a degree of morale deterioration µ_ Most of these conditions were unacceptable and SAC planners set out to find a solut on Since th'9 cau s of the E'a'O reqt irem nt was not cont ollab e this sol tion h3d to ba foU ld within SAC 7s existing structura From the Hunter AFB test 1 TRY OUT it waa deta 7 ned that a structU al reorganization would be required to support the one-third launch s ' within 15 minutes alert concept f A l Second Air Force service-tested its propcsal for rtilorga 1ization at Little Rock Air Force Base Arkansas from l AprU to 30 November 1957• Four major cilat e i w 2•1 1 exami11ae 1 fcu r in t3c1d of three tactical bomb sgt adrons 2 dept y co 'lla de s in place of directcrs aru a sp cial sta fr 3 sepa ration of maintenance from supply and 4 tha 7 8 Ibid pp 403 404 Hist Study No 71 Vol I Structural-Func tional Reorganizaticn of 1958 •1 Introduction filed 2AF Hist Archives i • 1' H ist or ca D u 2 - LA - - Du nb ' l 956 ·- cc ir uct d a sit ' i ar test at M1Ji m - in riomi AFB Idaho from l July to l December 19 57 This t-est emphasi2ed the strong squacron o ga nization ccncept The results of TRY OUT Little P ock 1 and Mour tain Home tests were e r ha11 s tively sttldied by SAC After this s udy new organiza 9 ticn al ci 'ectiva datee 24 July 1958 was published iJJ This cirectiY SJ CR 20-15a provid- c an crgan za·· tional structure capable of sus aini ng co ubat r adi 01 S 3 while maintaining a contiuuol ls alert Und r the ns11 crganizatio a tactical wing cor 11 r de ' was ei ithoriz - Jd a d puty contmandez· for operations and e deputy commander fo maintenance Administration peraonnal supply safety and the comptroller remained staff asa icy functions E-ach b2sa n rmally a s auth• ri-t-sd a combat s1lpport gro ip The support group commender in turn as authorized a vices ane for installation3 engineering Basically the r 9W structure c' ntr1 1lizi d in- il ar 'w ctic ut with s im O 10 and cl -s ly clefina ccir mand ch3A l nel s U 9 Ibio 10 SAOR 20-15R Hq SAGJ l Org ar1i'h tio cf faun a Eor oz • Forca Tactical a 'ld Suppol'ting Units B-9lr w Major Subordinate Command Level 11 24 Jt l 1956 - - r - r- 2 · f D · · - 4 YNGLA§§1f 1§P UNCLASSIFIED 2Al-' H1 t oric3l D tfi July - De ember 1955 Seco ' d Air Force s mission d1 i •ins 1956 · aa tb sre fcre m'Jl tip e 2 shorten alert time had to be s11s'l° inad while units wez-e being rie-organized through out the force Addi ionally B-52 strategic wings were being r iannsd eq pped trained toward combat readiness and dispersed M REFLY l CONCEPT To inc ease the speed of reactio aquirsd to had origir atad devalopad and tested a plaj cr n-ing the summer cf 1957•L Mr Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a l c FRD jcJllow1ng these tests in September 1957 SAC directed the establishment of an alert force in each combat wing on l October 19 7 with operations schedulQd to bag in in January 1958 lfl t - A- ·- _JTc aieec this commitment the 2c JOgth Bcmb 11 Msg TS a C NCSAC t o l jor Sub-Comclrs DOB 62756 lo Sep 57 UNC r of v Air Force b 3 42 USC sec 216E aXI c FRD Additionally the 4 4 th and 32lst Bonb Wings were to deploy from their home stations to anc from Loring Air Force Basa Maine Th tasic rotational requiremont was fivs B-47's 12 '1l ' per wing Y A A pot fh t 3 REFL81 ACTION a th code r ame i an this opa -atior in the tbz'ee forward a ·eas - N crth Africa the Uni·tee Kingdom a lc t he r10rtbeaste l United States These rea will be consid rsd separately in succeeding pages of this r-arreti v·e since different 'Wingo and for ward units were involved as wall as different climatic ana navigational conditions ' 'ha mission and methods j nvolving all of Second Air Force's B-47 wings were 13 the same J '7 Ni nltl Gi cond li1· Fore E-4 7 wing • l ' eoir tt d 14 to R i FL ml AC'r ON on 1 Jarxa ry 1958 cl 12 2AF Hi t D ta J 'l-Jun 1956 P • 25li--255• 13 OPORD 96-57 1 Rq 2AF Annex A -5 Nov 1957 as amended l Feb 1958 Exhibit l 14 Ibid Annex A I i - --·--·-·-- - -- -- - J A- UNC7LASIF D I 1 - - A r ato ·ica i 1 J uy - D cembe r J 9 5 f • I'- Air F orcc b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a l c FRD ·•15 H On 'ede ployment t air eiaeling J one day cales ial pressure lin$ of position one gunnery misoioni ons fighter ts ac t o 1g cl ct -onics ccl ' t -measures SCH run three ho U s visual ro rmation two radar cam-ar-a attacks anc three radar bomb sccred RSS runs were 16 ·- scheduled - t F 15 lb An ex A 16 'l 'i' '-4 i A • • r pp L - nlleX C Exhibit l Dot _ t ' I i'11 3 J - • t t u - 1 I I UNCLASS ' M_ SEC5¢'FRD A UNCLA§§lflEQ I j I ' UNCLASSIFIED ·· · Air force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD -L Air Force b X3 42 use sec 2168 a t c FRD lbic App 2 Annex A Thid App 4 # I4 18X A la · b u o- 4 2AF stcri Lata J 1ly - D-B a Jba ' 19 5 $ l2 s cb d J le c ur g this peric-C was dargoir g evaluation G raws t'1e re recept v-e t-c tbis fa t Cn lD Jaz u ary 1958 the J06-c h Bomb Wi l g repo -ted i REF' EX ir -eme ts 22 thr- ugh Z 4 as su cessful mi s-siot1s T rai ng requi el len s were ccr side -ed only pa tly succe5sful Various c s usee fer ha loss cf these aining requirements were g ven Fi 'ty-four aBS radar sttacks were lost due to route changes by higher h adquarte s Mainter ance c ifficulties anc air refueling rendezvous were respons ble for others T nker support was ger erally adequate iJ Reflex miss ons for the period 19 throt gh 3 - Ja m1a ry 195$ we -e repc ed as st ccess ul by the 379th Bomb Wing Shortages of fuel and ra a malfuz cticns precluded some scb dU ed training This same wi g c 23 January re or-ted that its 1-19 Janua y missions were successful • OOc 19 Msg Gomdr Reflex Sidi o Comdr 2A li' ZIPPO SECP ET P EXJD5G 58-3-0978 OC-27 Report fer period l Feb 5c - rt ii'el- 5 i O - - e C _ c_ -n n- -r Q ' ir -0 a J O -• uw r _ t 1 '-•6 J J '-' l-'1 1 JJ J D C H 2 i' _ · · - · · 1 • - ---• lit- • I I ' • v-- Cc ' ' AT c r- m -1- Ai ' 7J - nr J 'nR - ri1 u ' t· r- 1 t 1 - 6 1 • Hi • v V l L l - t'1 l '-t 4 _ • I - sv• - V - u u- i ' 'Tr' l3 nr 11 1 e- l v I - _ o I _ __ V- i'll' __ '1 w l - c ✓ ✓ on file Coriba tng Br Cps Div D C Eq 2 AF ' - - ' 1 - -SECRET P O r-A UNCLASSIFIED a I I I r-------------------- - ·u _ _ On 27 Janu · y and 10 February the 305th Bomb l 3 Wing stated succinctly Mission highly succeaetul no new activity repcrted by crew members comment on adequacy or s1lpport it ems excellent through satisfac tory tu Although th3 306th Bomb Wir g had a successful mission with adaquat ta i ka · suppo t on its JanWl 'Y 15th deployment certain refueling and weath r condi tions were reported The ta ker rendezvous point was moved 02 degress east from the oriefed coo dinates b Second Air Force The tankers apparently did not r· lceivo this r hange and the refueling rende VOl 'l S waG accomplishac' approximately 60 nautical miles m l inst ad or the last tank g3ve the rendezvous in et ru ctiQnS and number 2 ii Tid 3 tanka- -'a tra ilad 10 tv 12 dles ca sing the B-471 e to over-run on desc nt SECRETA'tRD UNC IFIED J'- ------------------·---·· •- - -- 1 l - wi tr the r swt tta t refuel r g 1SS acco plish ci r weathei· at 18 000 feet nsticE c1 tha b -ie 'ac 16 000 22 fe t µ In Seconc Air Fore plar nitg total scrties pro grammed through each base anc air refueling area ware founded O 'J certain numerical factors In the air refugling area Kindley was scheduled for 80 sorties per month five each on Tuesday through Friday weekly North ast OCLUS outside ccr tin en al li its of United States when s orties wa -a available from inta ·-base ta okar i •eaou rces redeployment tms to l a accomplished u sir g the '' follow'' route La jas was programmsd for 60 sorties per month dUring January Feb --uary and March and was reducac ·to 40 per month dUl 'ing the SLwmiar 23 months At 'th-i nrcuto bases Kindley w 1s prog ·a ll led fot' approximately seven B-47 1 5 per month dropping in £or Lajes Field was estirr ated for apprc d t51Y five B-47's per mon-r h 'With an addition 1 15 f n' gt•ounc re ru' ling and staging this latter fig incraa d to l 5 p r --- -· _ __ --•-----·---- r io'nth durir g January February and Ma ·ch Loring 22 23 _ ___ __ __ _ Msg _Cqmdr 6AD to Comdr 2AF ZIPPO SECRET 02-025C B-27 96-57 2AF 306B Wi Rel'le7 Act ion 10 Feb 1956 on file Combat Rptng Br Cps Div H9 2AF OPORD 96-57 Hq ZAF 15 fo· 1957• dii'cit 1 ·---------------- - ----------- Night zr ass air re 'ueling lSACR 50-S was to b giv n only for five aircraft refueling in one tr ck A 1 Rafle c air z•e f eling was to be sc accomplished u dng 'the r n track in the scheduled area Base air r fu ling altitude at the Kindley e ea was set at 25 · The foregoing planning fQctors in Reflsx refu3l irig if the reader will bear ttem in mind explain many later probleJns as well as the pl'e'licua 306th Bomb Wing referel1c to its deployment on 15 January U An e uunpla cf the weather effect on the Reflex mission was also noted ir thia same 306t h Bomb Win 'las not as brief ec ancl crews wera required to remain ov night at La jas due to a M illta t' I 1 i1· Traµspor Service MATS emerger cy and Air Tz-a ftic Co1 trol ATRC claar inca c fficulty Socenc Air Fcr e was notified and the execution order was reque ted o 10002 1 -· -·-·--·-----·--• 1 Fabruary Base fac111t1es w re not properly notified 24 Ibid 25 loid sE-rr' RD µ Of'T M IED U CLA -· t 2AF Histo ical ta July - Dvcoztbsz- l 1 and a 5C-nllnute delay in ta ke-c r z·a iulted rcws han be n briefed fo1 0 60-65 knot h adwin ls bu actl al l66 knot winds wsra encci urt oe ca• tsing the aircraft 26 to lane at Kindley cue to fuel shortage LV Reflex missions for the month of Fe'oruary 1958 wera eported succ ssful by the 379th Bomb Wing Four constants had ha 'lllpered this unit in its training pro gram on R fl x deploym nts These WP re the 200 000 pDur1d grosa weigr t limi ation the 15 minute loss of t'lying time due to the departurG bottleneckri at Howestoad a lo se ot · 20 minutel5 flying time in avoid ing warning areas at th e Jacksonville Baach coast-out route and finally iha fuel off-loac at refueling of 36 0CO po da of wbich sometimes as much as 10 000 27 e - pounds had beer aviation gas AVGAS 1 µ No clf f 1 cul t ie 3 were e cpa ·ieuct c lt th'$ 1arly d lloy - mer t and radaploymant phases All aircraft were on schedule and only one rede plojDlont -w a s o laysc for 0 19 -- ·· · - 26 ------------- I I I i' Howavsr some dsployment and redeployment delays were a x parianced This incident w- as resclved locelly as f'ar as possible Crew m-orale problems entered the picture about this time As previously men ioned the 9-16 day crew 28 - - - -------29- · - 29 Dot I ' • l t '1ft it I Ooi i 3 J - UNCLASSIFIED SECRET P n · 2AF Eistcr al Data July - Decemhs 195 ti be g evalua ec it the e d of Ma c 1958 the maj a id ccr siCerad it awkwa d a d ur satiffac ory e s five cay alert pa iod was considered as too lor g a d a cor f'i ed anci restless behavio esci ted since the crews were constantly eware of their alert statv s Crews as a whole were unable to snjcy a leisurel y meal or seci 'e a gooc night s rest due to the consta t threat cf an a er The majority cf the cre s at this JO 11 1_ time favored a ten c ew to five aircraf ratio YJlwJ From the crew vie'ilpoint the redeplo Y1 er t schedule at this time was als o unsatisi'actory As the redeploy ing crew was on du ty until 0$ 302 o n depe rture days they did not have adequate time o brief tha new crews er prepare for the retg rn rip When aircraft were executed tc arrive at oth9r than the l000-l200Z sche duled ti et additional problems confronted the o d c w none instance the airc a ft ci 4' Tivec at OJJOZ and was met by the alert ready to redeploy crew Thi cre II we lt back to bed a apprc xi 1 a ely 053oz an 'than we re up t 070CZ to attend the OSOOZ briefing ooc · b r 3 ' J n • _ ·- - - - - pl RET FftD V CLASSIFIED - i - -- - - -·· - --·- - - - UNCLASSIFIED 2 hi E t -l t l i t Jul - - r e -- - - - 9 · r • · C Air Force b 3 42 use soc 2168 a lXc FRD - • jup at o6ooz the following day this crew attendee the 070oz pre-take off briefing and ere ch-inge-over at 0800Z i'ollowec by final px-e- 'light Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 aXl c FRD • •·- J 31 In this J05th fing i nstc nc Arnbe - rcut3 wa'l on tha 24 hour ro 'te selection iith individual clea ance while and Kindley The basic diffarence betwaan th t o was Uiat the M- 2 reflecit ed a r- gu st for a lOOOZ take-off while Ar ibar rout er tai ae a 140oz toike-cft -· _ ·- 31 Ibid Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD J ea n° - 'C'°' O -• '- - _ JW--• - ----------- SEC D M UNCLAS FIED ·· ·- F f i 5 Ol i ' r J 1 - Da t UNCLASSIFIED i i s ·s e vJe' 'e G t L t t tje JC- h 3-c t raf c- · 0 2 - · · J r· · -h • -- pf M Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD ----- · · -- - t ·•·· z - - _ ------------- J -Prr- c - 'l'h ' ' •· SE c zo e _ ' - r · JA f ------ ----- -- UNCL A recomr11endaticn was rr ade to chang ti ia to l000Z during he hct racr ths si cs this woul l allow g ou d a id flight c ''ff'r S tc pre 'lig 1-it during th coc hou -z of early morning wher runway temper turas would be 3 4 is Q t r H 'r ' 21 lower and flight crews less ratiglled ' 'l'be weekly and 24 hour route selections con 1gd to present dif£iculties Basically this was caused by the invol vment of Air Trc1 ffic Control and siinilax• agencie$ in a co nbat r ratic 1tl plan This is c is C lssad at greate length later in this narra ti ve si n E it is commor to other foz-ward ra flex a reas e'j A l ' l ·- - - -··---- 2Ai Hist· iri ce l UNCLASSrF - ·- - - - J A -- - - VI t - 11 t ake-o ff s fre m er ct t e-' ops ho 'le st -e tio s e id ccnsistsnt -with critical field 1 n£5ths -fo ' water alcohol tr ust augmentation and e xisting I il 'lwa y tem 35 -- I ' perature and pressura alti udes tA - 22 On redeployment RBS was accompiished on Springfield Richmond Charlott-s tla ---ita an J Littl Rock A 12 minute separation for bomber s ream was J - 36 Ibid Anna e 37 Ibid Annex B S lbid Annex B A 00£ bJ JJ 1 ·1 · 39 29 Jan11ary 1958 tha JOStn Bomb Wing mission was reported due tc intangibles wit h a result in lo ss in trai riing and an almost impoasible maintenance scheduling problem i 'I ' USN5 S71FJ D 2 F H st r cei Dat J ly - D c3mb2r J 95f g ound staging t c th 1 base as impractical and felt that a non-stop air refuelint route was a ne es 40 sity for deployments Tbe 384th Bomb Wing Ja nuary 1956 operations were considered successful from the standpoint of he Reflex Action posture but only marginal as far as 50-S ·r rainin Redeployment of the five 384th Borr b Wing cycle -wa d roppec cut There was an acldi•tional delay cf two days anci eventually th y w e redaploy c on an alternate rout e via Lejes Hunter and then o Little Rock Thia wing1 howeverJ forecast better trai ing l l ✓ I l with improving wea_ther i _ On 7 February 1958 th 308th B mb Wing had terminate e su cessful missicn period t this point the 8th Air Division made a series of recou1• mancatior1s to impro a Rarlex Air Force b 3 l 42 use sec 2168 · a l c FRD UNCLA RD I -------·- - nUinbe of ruc s on Lendon RES was ct P o wh was expected T 'l £ lt 000 feat s3pa -aticn on this F BS wae ccnsider c a ceesive and some aircraft had tc bcmb ' from as high as 41 000 feet well above optimum anc 42 __ __ - where necessary spaed could not be main·tained The 384tc Bomb Wing on 20 February also oomplainad about the time altitude separation over London RBS plot This wing's thirc and fourth wa e missions were tactically successful but again marginal as far as 50-8 accomplishmen s During this time of adversa weathar Sacond Air ere was launching aircraft on schedule using tha alternate islanc hopping southern route rather than delaying for weather in the refuel ing area and along primary routes Weather ill the northern refueling areas caused excessive tanker chase on d9ploymmJt cf the third JB b Bomb Wing wave ant 43 A- the light commander had to divert o Goos AFB r· 42 I -1 - Msg Comdr J8AD to Comdr 2 A F ZIPPO SEORET 02'--C-119 B-27 96-57 2AF J08BW Reflex Action 7 F b 19 50 on rne Jombat Rptng Er Ope Div t C H i - M s Com •r l ' 5AD 'tc Comdr 2A F ZTPPO SECR ET 2-¼ E Z zZAF t W eflex Action •20 _Feb 195d1 r • J 1- 01 at -ptn B Ops Div Die liq 2 li' _ ___________ __ UNCLASSIFIED I I I I -· - - -------------- ope -ati cnal phase of R fl x fo tte hre W l dcat - 1· i ' _ n _ v •• c 1i u Air refueling improvGc as the weather improved All a1rcr ft were deployed as scheduled n e%ecution orders Problems continued in the redeployment phase Results for e ample indicated that Goose Air Base ga re b tter support for g -ound staging ·t han did Loring 44 En -o tte bas- support for missed ai r afueling was considered sub-stB l dard Airc aft redeploym nt as so fr uently del yad that their availability for scbe uling coul net be dependad upon u til at least five days averags after their scheduled return date It was felt tha·t cancellations anc rescheduling devia tions could be minimized to some extent by establishi g a hl gheri priority cf ma ntenance fer Re 'ls c aircreft 45 ·-'- IJ at enroute support bases l _ r n mications coordination were continuing problems fer r hes ·th r • r wings i n thair shuttles b a k and fcrt h 4 45 s c c 7FRD l UNCLASSIFIED ' ·------------ 2A1 Historical D ta July - December 1956 S CREf fRD a crosa the Atlantic The first two of these were generally a result of the winter weather 8' ll 27 The third forward area of Second Air Force Reflex operations during early months of 1958 was Loring Air Force Base Maine This phase of the operation involved continuous non-stop non-refueled deployment and redeployJDent by the 44th and 321st Bomb Wings Code named SADDLE CREEK this mission was to provide from each or the two wings a minimum of three combat crewe and three combat equipped B-47 aircraft loaded with WB war ready weaponB and nnelear capsules on one bour alert at Loring for strike against designated targetB in event o-£ the execution of 't hs BWP Maxi mmn 50-S training was also schedUled on this Reflex J f operation 81 · '' lbe 44 tb and 32lst-Bomb Wi ag s deployment days were Monday Tuesday and Wednesday redeploying on Wednesday Thursday and Friday of each week Planned aJTiva1 time at Loring AFB was 2000Z depart'uree at 19 0Z Route selecti·ons were· based on RBS availabilit y at ZI plots 47 ¢ u 46 OPORD 96-57t Hg 2AF Annex 0 Loring AFB SADDLE OREa n 15 Nev 1957 Exhibit l 47 is• Annex C i r -- - 4· f 8 I• 'P A · 1 • t -•- ' vn 3 Feb f•uar-y 1958 he 2lst Sc b Wing repo t d ' ts foiti-al ir o itb 1 Ja m 1a ry ac iirity a e succe ss 'ul major problems Ttif wir g folt ch t thg weathe deploy- e t problems woulr l be allev-iated bf daployment of all threa aircraft on Tuesday of each week If waathe delays were encountered all three could be deploy$d at th€ first br'3ak ir the w athP r Tb J2lst Wing consid rc d th t t1 is syat em -W•L'1d eliminate en i r-- c ra ft ftrri ving on sch dU e a Loring while the others were delayed M e inte na ce was hampo •ec by extremely contrarv weather ccr c i tl cns at thi •rn r y rlorthern ZI 4 8 base j J A The 44th Bomb Wing cie_plo Yed its first B-47 on 6 Jcinuary 1958 recleployme nt of the first six crews ls m 3 cl c 7 February 195- ' 'his winz cid not con sider its initial REFLEX ope -at lon as very successft tl erratic due to i a ther nd haza cous rur way la ndi le conditions c cn·a tim th-e t e w c· r in crew -s a d aight airc r-e ft in place at Lor- i ng ag ir 't a r c uire t nt o ' l M 11 ' ·1-- - - ----•· IM - - I • o Sg vCinar J 'ff 0 ti f' ' •_ LJ l' rV l J'JlW l V -vV- B-27 ' •r ' T1QiF - j 'U • r 'e • 10°'0 ·••1•1 __ 1 t rt '-•Jo WM V la- J r- 'J _ 1 -11 J 9 VVhlWd Rptn Br Ops Di-v D 0 Eq 2 F I A •i I ------ ----- r --------- four and hree Once in aca t Lc ing the 44th Bomb Wing ccusidered the alert situation as satis factory ths nonps rormance result was on 50-S training and mainteLance schedulir g at the home base 49 Ohennault Jl» This situation continued for the 44 th Wing in February The Loring commander began to execute the aircraft on deployment after 28 Februa ry accepting operational control after tak •off from Ch ault using a ceiling minimum of 500 feet and one nautical 50 mila visability This irr proved f orwarc control conaic arably In March this wing reported n eflex operations have become standardized Depl0Yt1ent and 51 ii redeployment ill 11 arch have bean normal 11 Y ' A During April 3g eews from the two SADDLE CREEK wing p f o rmec alert duty Crews a 'ld aircraft r3turned to their home stations on time with the exception of 52 thcsa d layed by weather 50 51 SEC R D _A 1- UNCLAS l ' t I 1 'J I JC were on alert at Lo rir g ' 'est alerts e t c i g c i r r this mo11tt sr1ow-ad t ha t B-4 7 crews cc ud vez-aga 5 6 rninut e to rec h 53 raacb Brs o Alph2 etatl s and 11 l min11tez to t Thus another two of Second Air Force's B 47 wings completed what might be te 'llled their basic training in Reflex Action operations did not however have the air refueling r dezvcus and flight clearance probleris of their Second Air Fcroe sister wL gs froblams In Control Up -cc this point pla ing cf F E L 1 h s be15r outlined accomplishment of the directed missions by an d 3ome o their p -oblems have bean discuss da Remain iag at tile purely operational 1-e-rel in ordsr to rooz·e f ly comyreher c what was entailad b1 tha Reflex oi eration1 it is now necessary to look a t some of SEC I UNCLASSIFIED I -- ·· · - _ ·•· 2AF Historical Data Jul - D-ne embe-r 955 - Saccnc' ilr Force Co manci p •cble l ir- cor1trollj ng the ope -a- cr U One c ift'iculty was ca tas by failure of aircrews tc comply with execution orders by diverting to land at other than specified bases Ic addition to being an air discipline problem this ca ed an unbalanced maintena 'lce support condition where unscheduled lanc ir gs were made This was brougr c to the attention of the three air divisions concerned the 6th JSth and 823d on 21 March 195e with instructions to brief tbeir aircrews that Reflex execution orders w re di rectiv·e and must be complied with in detail unless safety 5 J J l considerations dictated a change y1 IV' Rout-e and commuuica tions situations began to develop with the International Civil Aviatio Organization lICAO and tha Air Traffic Control Centers ATRC An illustratior of this problem was the 306th Bcrnb Wing -ed plc s 1t en '7 i -ch 1 Cd ' J'l otC I• _ c Route selection was made on 6 March to use Peach Alpha route wi h takd-orr at 140oz on 7 March Four airc att wa -e e tecut3d to fly Peach -Upha Twc aircraft wel'·e -1 ·'· UN ' ' IF 2i Eistori c«l Data h l C c- imb ' l-r 19 6 sch dulad to go via 1t1J1be - ' 1 1t ·l' th take-off 1 t 100oz 02 6 lt trch C'n th 9th of Me rch th t·ee mo 'l9 306th B• b Wing aircraft we e executed to 1ajes the o MacDill via the Amber route The oth r aircraft were 5 r ed ployed as e ecuted »- Op- ratio lal necessity had requi 'ed Of t j rr r ft tc be deleted f rom the bloclc to d liver the engine to Laj s It was ntencled that the o·th9r t'ot r 2 irc raft usa the reserved blcck Three c id but the fourth had to ground abort due to lack or a replacement TC filed a complaint but this was obviously an TC i11t rnal oro· -JJ1J cdcatior o problem Seco«d Ai - Force waa making ary a fort tc notify ATC ag ci s of cancel lations and delays affecting the block altitude 55 Mag Cor d ' 2AF t o C N- 3AC DOC 9784 Route SeltlcC1 on 3 Apr 19 56 i cilibi t J • • • I wora· mada to tar sas City C l'qf a -id N etri York Gats'f ey to a1vts' ' th aa nc - o f t h changi Th ur it initiating the cr ange ATC agency also call d a e cancelled with the 56 fr rF #M local Incidents such as the preceding continued to hampG Refla% operations They 3lso callee attention tc a cornmunica ions problem 'Within SAC itself the ban on us 3 or higb frequency position - porting Ladt of adequate position reports created ar unacc eptable btu'den ell the ICAO centers As a result th capa bility of obtaining altitude reservatio s for fteflex aircraft w s jeopardized since these rezervati ons were extremely w steful of airspace d becama further a Tavat d when the centera ware not kept infor ned 57 Ji by position report a 7 J On 14 July 195i Seconc Air Fo -ce requested position rsporting Factors underlying the request 5e 50 carafully outlinatl Ibid 'Rsg Com r 2AF to CINCSAC DC 11 15 1' -iigh r 'j•eq ehCJ i1 po rt iug 14 Jul l u J hibit ill • xainpl cf Civil Air Traffic Pa A ngrican Airways has five Boeing 707 flighta daily to Paris ai 707''1 eetly to Lo nt lon Time 16 Mar 1959 p 19 - j I UNCLASSIFIED 21F Histori al Data h il - D ar- b- 1' 51J ·j Ti ava in raazi g i' eq 1 i• j- o BO comet flights is alre- dy co tlplicating the alticuce r sar• at io problar i - d t t tc thccir r g ina- ig - ·c tion of jet s rvi e by u S A r cariers wilJ U JH icubted i y make the probleT- mol ' acu e The uss c1 altitude reser a ion acvually saturatee three times ths eirs ace that would be recuireci for any given fl ght utilizing stand arc ARfC sapa ation The factors dictating this waste of airspace are first the fact that an airplane ce n be as much s one hour ahead or o e hour behind it8 ET without tne knowledge of ARTC which utilizes a twc hour block of airspace Secondly ICAO aircraft separation standards rescribe that there will be at least jO v inuta ·separation ahdac of and behind the aircraft These factors when addec together dicta e the reservation of a olock of airspec at least th '-ea hours o - 1275 t-l M long a --ic 120 miles wiag when the altitud rese vation eyst m i s utili ad If aircraft wsrs claarad under stancard cl9ar nce criteria only on hour 30 minutes ahead anc 30 minutes cehind would be blocked over a ·given ru which would net a 2 hour sav-ing over the system currently in ueg The ICAO centers are unable to reduce this airspaca lllisus as long as the SAC p aition o n Hig l-i Freqt1e lcy repoi--ting is maintained If the use of High Frequency reporting is reinstated the Oceanic Cente s will be able to reduce t he airspa- ut iliz si to that oresently utilized uz ider stanhria d cle tmce cz•it_ei i namely _ 30 - ' A minu es a ea anct 3v minu s ben1nd he aircrQ Lt _vc vv hiih frequency position repo -t g for REFLEX D-ircrdt eir phasiz -1 the fellowing pcir lis 59 lb i -------- 1 ·-1 I UNCLASSIFIED 2AF H Cstcrical Dat• · 7 j Jtly - D c mb r 19 S l Gt u- d r f- onc t o r and Prestwi lc lCAO centers will unqu-as'tion bly 'be f crcac to rafu e to appro-vo e rese 'uations in the ne r future for nefle Action aircraft aue to the unraa so J abla usa of airspace by altitude reserva tions coupled wi h the sma 11 number of aircre ft utilizing tee ai sp ce It is the posi ion of Second Air Force tha aircraft must be prcvidad with altitude reservations since fuel reserves in a la ge n1llllber of cases will not permit any deviati oru from optimum alti tudt which may b ictat c by clearan es rscei vs c if flights are conducted or an individual clearence besie 2 The raceipt of ragular po iticn repc -ts by High Frsauency 'adio through CAO ti Orc- l ld radio statio 3 will ena le th c '30t '9ri3 to continually pinpoint the progress of P aflaz Action airc -aft and tbus enable them to el1m inat a the e -ctra- · rag0-l'lt cushions n-e e ssit eted by the uncel - tainty c f the a'ira-e ft cicat ion oo tr pa et' th' AP TC agaccies since airer aft c ---re tly ma y be an hou - es rly or late witi 1 iut advising tl e lCAC c91t r This will aduc the a ir pece requirement from a tlU'e hour co a one hour block 3 This system will provide altitude -eaorvation privile ges for Reflex Action aircrafc w1thou·t the unnecesea t•y waste of airspace otherw1 s incurt·ed l 'rhe m 'llber of ARTC vii ilar io-ns processed by Control Agencies resulting from r porting discrepancies will be subetant ally reduced This co D lland has r c ved one formal viol tion a d numerous complaints directly attributable to this procedure 5 Sec li'ity will not be jaopardized in thdt nefl x J cticn m ·aiua tz s ·a ow made on dailv ba3i3 and all Ra lax ction aircraft move imder special route call signs not associatec with the unit tactical call eign -· _ ---------- UNCLAS UNCLASSIFIED 2A July Histuricel ·· D nt - ilate J 5$ · position reporting en all Reflex aircraft moveme ts 60 36 regardless of type of flight pl r filed In addi• tion3 SAC took exc ption to other procedures used by 6l tha ICAO centers and requested USAF assistar ce 60 61 D- l i ng July l 957 w ini t iP ted our lte f lex ope atior ov r standard rou es on an air lin-e YPj C 3diile s c 93s the Atlantic Oc iiL L _ _____ - J Air Traffic co trol p -oced·ures in C O areas WG e no completely compatible with our oper tion at th start and within the pest sir months period hava become acute Im Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a I c FRD Pre5cnt ICAO operating procedures and eomn1unieations systems will only accomo date a limited number o f aircraft OU - uRefleJtn operation w s the first contin uous eJctenaive lilt operation in the North Atlantic area L · ·· ·- · · Air Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a l c FRD Ltr Maj Gen Jamee V Ed nu dson 'Maj Gen John P McConn ll Comdr Traf'tic Cl arance Prucr ldures 7 25 Exhibit 5 J D 0 SAC to 2AF -Air 1- N ' r 19 S Ltr G Thoma3 S Fowsr CINCSAC to Lt Gen Dea n C S •oth 't' Dep Ch Op retiQ'lS Hq USA 11 i ir Traffic Control ProceduresJ 11 Exhibit 6 This i i t'3 r ou11li lec neede i changes in stand3ra p1•ocedurtrs • · · 1 I I 1 • - · ---· - - --- - ---------- UNCLASSIFIED · 2AF H stori c D t Jt y - De mr b-' l ' 1958 r-- _ j O n2 p 'c° lera wtich e and cu in p i- ti cLllar is the lack of sta darc op ratir g rocedures Ee h IC AO agency can change procedures 1 ithin its ar a of raspcnsibility marely by fil1ng an exception to the nor nal pro- cedure This complicates the picture for crews flying in ifferent lCAC areas inasmuch as se-oa ate directives and procedures appiy for each area The primary difficulties and procedures apply for each area The primary cliffi cult1es ara being e cperienced ir the Goose-Gandar Pre twick She nnon CAO areas A _ An Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 ul ll lr FDni _ 'J £ v - - In his rsqut 3t I Osne 'al P0t11er pointed out t ha1 c 4- 000 foot altiti1dg separation for aircraft p z·ating in the Nort Atlan-tic araa caus d a shortage c£ air space with th result that many Reflex aircraft alti- ·tude assignments wer incompatible with fuel rese -ves Tr 3 incomp r ability forced landings at altarnatc basas This dia -upted P E i'Lel scheduling and incraased grou ld staging sup1 ort requi r ment s Anot har rlif't'iculty deq loped i t Ju nt 1 1 58J wtJen ir1gle heading ano si ngle and Pre8twir k ICAO centers d ectinz that all flight plans bo £il tc crocs a3ch 10 d greoe cf longitud at a whole de 7e o latit e This r si llted in an ir c -aasa in ovarall distances and raquirad frequent v Ii anrcuta haading char gas YN 62 Ibid UN9LASSI FIED -7 - ···• ·· • 2Af Hi t or· i c lJ Jata Jul r Je tb · 95S He al$o emphasized he t connnunicatio s l e wee il ICAO cent rs were w eliable and Reflex aircraft we often o a a ing in an IOAC area wtile th con trolling agency was unawa -e of their presence By taking exception to thei ow n agen 's standard loss o coz cations procedures Gander and Prestwick ruled that aircraft would maintain the latest assigned altitude or th minimum safe altitude whi ch ver wa2 highor aince his s generally workabla in j t ope1·ation s many Re flex aircraft were forc-sd to declare 61 an eme gency and climb tc higher altitudes U 01 ll raJ Pow-er snao it r lear thP t SAC w 1 issat isfied with the r sults of IC AO response to req1lests fo resolution of hese problems For that reason he was reguasting Air Staff to render assistance in ardizing rcceduras and emphasizing to this agencl4the optimun altitude characteristics of j t aircraft U Another t roublesom g area ·to Second Air Forca at mid•l95S w i i tha ccnzidarabla confusion axis ting 11' UK Reflex daployruent and r-adeplor 11ent mo11ements 63 Ibid 64 lbid UNCLASSIFIED -- f r i E i _ i J - a J-- - ' - f lS 11 m h rj- 'i 5- _ 'c ' of gro1 llld rules Nurne -cus delays -as ted f x•om Eighth Air Force failure to provide tanker support the day fts r a flight dt3lay due to weather or ct her causes Eighth Air Force bad alsc denied Second Air Force the option of sta ging through other bas s when weather or fu81 re5erves made Loring Air Force Basa und rsirable Thara was e l o anoth r area cf disagreema t s v th Air Division during tha 3pring establishad a poli q w ich raguir ad test light toi• Ratlex air craft which had not fl ow - l for 18 conaec ti ve days _· -- ·- --· - MFCHCC bX-3 - 42 use sec 2168 ___ _ a l c FRD Jrt was felt by that 1 u1it chat a matori- l failura u d1 't lightw' ight co di•tior s could b- detect oc in the test flight and a possibl2 accident 66 Msg Cumdr 2AF to Comdrs 8 and 15AF Info C1NCSAC I_ 97 1 flft flax ction to the United Kingdom 1 i p r- 1 5 '5 Exh fM t 7 ilis _7th A Di f - ls 1 i-Jl 1 11 5 ol l • 150 _ r • l ' ' ' l D l ' r J I uI 1 r a • ' I' '' l'J • · 'P 65 '-•--·· ' __ -· · J _' ·· e -v •··- C C · S '1d l5P lf _fo CJ •ICEAC 00 S1 7i l 1' 1$flc Action to the United Kin gdom 1 Apr 195s Bbmibit 7 - ------- UNCLASSIFIED 2AF is orical Data 4D July - December 1958 The foree cdng problsins refueling suppol' t staging bases and the test flight requiremsnt will be eY amined again la er in this oe rrative U Air Force bX3 42 use cc 2168 - a I c FRD 67 j AA No of B-47's Qili - ··Air Force h 3 I 42 USC Sec 2168 a l c FRD Ope -ations Order 96-56 Reflex Action 11 Hq 2Ali' 20 May 1958 ' Annex A i 1 chive 3 His Di 1 1 J 1 Hq 2Al' C Pc b 1J 2AF Hietoric l Data 41 July - December 1958 Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 _ outes and training ·equir m ntr- · a l c FRD basically were unchanged from the January 1958 plan some additional routes had been added as the number a nd location ct the fon ard area ba es chan ged · Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD _ · - '68 - · - --M In order to a neliorate the J RTC clearance problem en altitude Reservation Request ManUt l was distributed to all participating units and ARTO Centers This manual contained complete route clearance request for -- _ __ __ - - •-' •••- - - • - - - • r - -•--•- - -•- •-- ••- - - - - - • - - all Retlex routes and became effective l JUl y 1958 Headquarters Second Air Force continued to coordinate block clearances with the ARTC agencies Route selec tions covering one week's deployment redeployment --·2 RD t LI YNGI n ' 2A Hl t f'i l Dat July - December 1955 UNCLASSIFIED f - l t•I primary and alte -nate rout es were macle at 21 i OOZ ciri Saturde ys nine days p ' 'eced lng the effected weelc Final ro e selection was made approY mately 24 hours prior to scheduled leu ch tj_me On -eceipt of this selection its we e reqUirec to cancel ar y ro ' t es take-off time required by fol ecast winds for the date of the mission diractlY tp t b e This inforltlation was to be lo c al A RTC ag ency r· - - - Air Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 l c FRD 70 f ished With minor changes to meet flu tua ting eitua cic-r a the trans-Atlantic shuttle of Second dr Force B-1 - ts continued -through the end of 1958 Second Air Force Operations Order 96-58 guided theee operations and was e 'f'e tive i' -om l July 1958 th rotigh 31 December 195g An in-place capability had to be mainta inad at all times Reflex operations had hi rd priority for uP e or airspace tar leer aircraft and base facilities Only SAC directed large scale exercises a ld S-AC directed 71 wing strength overseas movements he d higher prioritie 3 ----· ------------ 70 Ibid 71 Air Oparations Schedule Peacetim1 -Tentative Hq 2 F FY 1959 1 Jun 1958 SECRE'I' ir archives Hi t Div or Hq 2P - • • _ · 4 m _ 4 l - SsrFIED -··--- ----------- UNCLASSIFIED '··-- --- · 1A r 2AP Hi torical Dat July - December 1958 Ou 5 Wovember 19581 Second Air Force was ble to report to SAC that the mission of ttdeploying and redeploying -three aircraft weekly from its involv6c unite to forward bases had been executed es dirGcted dt ring tha period 4- J ugu st through 4 O tober 1958 assignments due to clearance problems resulting in less than predicted tuel reserve at desti stion Assistance was requested rrom SAC in obtaining climb ing flight path over-water clearances Ta11ker $U ort cor t nuctd to be a problem in the Ne -thee t e r a J t p On 25 Ifovember 1958 Second J ir Force 1-ess advisE d t hat a seriee of steps had been taken to bring air trdfic clearance procedures in the North Atlantic 73 ICAO area ore into line with Reflex operations U 72 73 V sgt Comdr 2AF to CINCSAC ZIPP0 SECP ET ll-116 M-2 96-58 2AF R lex Action 4 Aug - 4 Oot a 5 Nov 195 L on file Combat Rptng Br Ops Div1 n o Hq 2M Ltr Maj Gen James V Edmundsont D 0 SAC to j Gen John P McConnell Comdr 2AF ffLAir 'ir-9 ffic Cleere nee Proce ureeJ er 25 Ne • 195 EY hibit 5 UNCLASSIFIED r • · ' _n-- ta • - - ·- ·- 2AF Historical Data July - December 1956 44 SAC was ao ri ed by lTSAF that this wa s being initiated and there was hope that the circuit could be activated at lea et during the redeployment time period even though SAC would prob bly have to provide the necessary 71 'J IA ftmd 61 JV Also l i i gh fr·equency pceition reporting en all Reflex aircraft movements was authorized LThe 7th Air J SAC also advised that in January 1959 KC-135's would be used for 75 J prcctically all redeployment refueling j J A At this time also Eighth Air Fo1 ce and SAC were inveetigating the problem of inadequate tanker support Second ir i'orce v as notified of the re sulta of these in estigations on 24 December 1958 It was indicated that approximately nine per cent of the Reflex tenker sorties were ineffective dis egarding W¢athel ' and receiver deviations It was alEo found however that 74 Ibid 75 ibid UNCLASSIFIED 2AF Historical Data faly - r e ember 1956 ' t Eighth Air- For hec apprc xirr tely four percent r icr e 'fecti 1 re tankere t h2 o did units of t he Second P ir Fcrce Supttort 77 To rostain the rotation of J S R flex aircraft and cr nrs Second Air Force h ed to furr ieh persc nr Etl and reateriel augmer1ta tio ' I to the forward ba ss Addi tional adjustment had eo be made at the home bases to prepare the B-47•e for deployment e nd to meet train ng operational maintenance requirements without eny increase in perso L -iel ·· · · · - --· ' 1 •£ b 3 ·- 76 '7 42 tJSC sec 2168 a l c FRD Ltr Maj Gen James V Edreu nd5 n D 0 SAC to Ji j Gen John P McConnell Comdr 2 2 t 11'7ie nsx 'J'ank1 -r SupportJ 0 2 - Dec 195e Exhib1 t s · For personnsl oreakdcwn by grade fo1--ward base and JJISCr sea Exhibit 9 J- ' I t ' ·- - -·---------------- UNCLASSIFIED ·•- _ ft· ' - •• · '· _ • • •• J Historical D t2 July - December 195$ l o E b 3 -·-42 usc·sec 2168 I _ U --· The success of the rotation al missions during 195g w s a t r-ibute t _o be loyalLy anci er recti l r es or th $e vnd Air Force maintenance teams A J ¥laintena 11ce responsibility for Reflex was i i video d u ty augmentation packages were responsible f'c1 sor vicing and unscheduled maintenance Tbe hom e base of the aircraft was charged wit b all peist-flight periodic inspections and other scheduled i lain·tenance or modifi cstions I tmadiate action echnical ord rs era acccmplishad at the b $€ where the aircraft were 79 jrl A physically located on receipt or th or er 7B 79 c----· ' - Afr Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a l_ c _ 0 -'0 tD 9t -58 1 Hq 2 F Annex D 20 May 19 r 1 p in a 1' 1 -h t v s ii tst Div or I Hq '1 t F J S· • r ·• · • ' •- • ' ·' -- ••• - r · • '-------------- u - ------- - ' Ooi j • I · l C '2 AF H tori cal t ata July - D cember 1950 UNCLASSIFIED no· - J f n -oute m inte na nee st p at Dy E ti t c i1 - f t or 2 5° longitude we -s suppcrte d by the horo$ base land i ngs east uf 25° longitude we as dir cted by the Sixteenth Air Fo ce or th Air Division Er l 'oute staging tee ms were positioned by Second A ir Force at Kindley Lajes - --- • _ __ tl'i _ _______ --· - · · - ·-· - ·-··-- ----· -- er a and Loring AFB 1 p Comple_ E sq to flyaway Y i s _lef a engine • were deployed to ach fcrward location except Lajes and Kitt i ley Only the p ·e- aud Post-- sttlk-e--n-nrti ·on s-···· -· -- - -- · ·- ·--- - r- of che kits were positioned at the lett- 1 enroute bases ' 4 yz1 A 80 Ibid •• P• 15 8'1 - d P P • 18-J 9 $2 bid •• PP• 18-19 sL •·•0_o A------- uNcLAss1E1 0 I · AF Eist c ·i cc1l Duta July - December 1958 · E c- h participat ing w tng cle ployE' c ftmr ir board and two outbo a -d J-47 power pa ks Lajes and liindle 1 power packs consisted of a new and an old 40-KVA outboard one 20-KVA out boar cl t one hydraulic and on e non-hydraulic inboard R upply o · t- tuur-e pcwe - packs packs from tbe home stati ms on a one-for-one basis using either MATS or Second Air Foree ·ca rier resources No report cf any delay in this re-supply was received _ ·_· - jr Force ' b 3 42 USC sec 2168 J a l c FRD Bencb stc•cks and pz-e-issue i t' 'li S ihich could not be sttJ pli d from t ha deployed flyaway kit w re made t P by the forward area base supply to the degree possibl e The balanc of the se itetns was then usade up by· the home base Tools and equipment were deployed by the B-47 wings this included armament and lectronics b nch 84- sets and test equipment During the latter half of 1958 after skill and experleace b eei oveieo ue the rettU 1e · types· c f mai·t ten ice and n ater· el probl'3tr s a few ar aa ra iait ed 8 3 H- c- ·· ·z · • rr - ·0 -- N _ _ 1 ✓ _____________ __ - - IIMCfn - • ·I UNCLASSIFIED SECPP D p 2AF Hi turi al DaCa 49 July - December 1958 which required special attention These were main ten nce or booster pUlJJPS radar end gu mery eyetems alld the continuity of maintenance 'A A retrofit program was es ao isaeo by SAC in early September 1958 to replace all main tank booster pumps with a greatly improved pump If this modification proved successful it was planned to modify a d retrofit 11 B-17 type p ps instellod in al ' T iliary tanks 27 October SAO advised that OCAMA had a sufficient quantity of these pumps to bring the FAK up to the authorized allowance Bases sub itted equisitions on or about 85 28 October 1 A_ The 8th Air Div sion with its wjngs refleY og to the United Kingdom piaceo emphasis on radar and gunnery systems ' r c · 0 5 f p v ti 3 -- I t' ·- ' · 2A f ' Hh to 1 ical Dar a July - December 1 58 UNCLASSIFIED J t the bor e base position the 05th Bomb Wing had recmmnenced that nc airc rai't written up s Radar-non recommended ior reco-r i bo1t1bing be sent on REFLEX As Second Air Force could not j solate aircraft i nder thes conait-ion 11 the 6th P ir £ii Ii' · $ tained equally and that identification of specific ai - 86 1 -A A era ft for specific missions could not be condoned y r Duo to the 60-day rotation of p r-sonnel $ome co11ti11uity of maintenance was lost SAC approved 7th Air Di ri i n ar ing document £or support cf R F Bi i n the JK n e pern1a nent change 0£ station be si end s-r e p a were taken to have these personnel in pla ce at the earliest_p actical date but not later than l 87 Apl il 1959 ' Each wing and forward base a -ea inv l'l ed in REFLEX was requested to furnish data for a comparison of maintenance aborts versu 47 _u_2unc t me Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a c FRD t was fourld that th medie n time on the ground t 'es 86 See note ahov·e a7 See note above RD er v -V • UNCLAS J 2AF Hietorical Data J' lly - De ember 1958 UNCLASSIFIED 0- r ' • _r 51 5 8 days 'fhe ew rage a bo t rate for- the grocp ' f 2 irc -aft ha ting gr und times lor ger than this was 9 2 per cent Those having less t1me hat a rate of 10 7 per c nt During op ration TRYOUT tha abort ret bao be-en 11 pc r cent for B-4-7 s the t h d e e -vi d rrorn fcur BS t ll days on alert -A'b Later in the year 20 November 1958 an analysis was made to d termine if there ere any other i1 jdica tions of maintenance quality other than the simple record of hether or not a ma S itenan abort had ZI lau 'lchea bu t Operations Ar alys s r elt that the val idit•Y of th s Uffered from a lack of e ata from forward bas6s on overseas launches As a result of a study of 695 sorties the abort rate showed up lowest fer group launcl1ed during the second and third weeks o i the ground The relatively small sample 14 sortigs launched c uring tbs fcw th W6ek on thG ground showed a rather high abort rate of 21 4 per cent $8 Momo -f'cr Rc 'C d 0 He j I n T- --J' ' a __ CI •- I - - •• f ' 1 I •--' ' • 1 ••'I j -1 L l• of Ma hr1· e1 1ance Jttiorts Ve B-47 Ground Time r 17 Ssp 1958 E hibit lj Ibid · - - ··- - - D Ir·•·' ------------ --- tJf e A Ji• I iotct-i cal Lia Va July - Decembe 1 5e UNCLASSIFIED - - J D-- 1ring the P p il-August 195 p rloo arlcther pos sible indication of maintenance quality was t he pex-centag e or actual plus potential aborts A poten tial abort was defined as aircraft upon which major maintenance had been pe -formed during the gro1 2uci time h ad not been corrected This could ·be ccnsidere d as an inclication of the abort rate to be expected if majo mair itent1nc e c ipa bility did not exist at the launch base In 551 REFLEX ZI launches th re was an a tue l per cu11t combined i6 3 pc • ce ot The aircraft quaJ it_y generat ed by the frequent inspecti ons and the high per entaga requiring r ia jer r te iat esence resulted in a low mah1- tenance abort rate at launch The analysis concluded 90 1 emo for Recc rd o - -fo 2AF usec nd Interim Repor-t of Mainteoa n ce Abo rts vs B-47 Ground Time 11 20 • ov 19 58 EY hibit 14 • ' UNCLASSIFIED 2hF i et ori al Dc1 t a July - December 1958 53 that ther was not ar apparent change in the rata with ground time on Z launches DOE b 3 · 4i use sec 2168 l aXl c FRD · • I I J91 fSIJ A ffl ··-·---- µ Forward Base P st 92 Staff visits and inspections of the REFLEX ope a tion at the forwarl bases indicated great improv ment in all areas Facilities were better reorale had impioved and r iGre e nr erieaeed stiJ erwieiea Pcsultnd in a more effective operation U 91 Jhi 92 Operations Orcler- 96-5G i Re r lex Acr j onJ 1' Hq 21 F 20 May 1958 in archi ves H st Uiv or Rq UF s - m A YNG1 A§§IEIEP -------------- - UNCLASSIFIED 21 F Hi et ul ' i 1 c1 l Data Ju r - De ember 195g Air Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a l c FRD _- J • •• ' • 2 X J-•• t l Cl'· U 1 nu njne three msn crews we e in position there from the At this base reception of REFLEX Cl4' WS wa - ·1e1 y effactive On landing incoming crews •fllere rne by the staff and old REFLEX craws and immediately down loaded aDd transpo 'ved to the customs and debriefing sec1 ions Tb9 cebrief'ings were c onduct e d expe d3t i ously with an-- concerned aganc1es a a1lable to recP iV thu ecGSSary information and fo1--ma a ilities were availablo fo Ooc i ----- -- money exchange combat rations a 1d medical sui 1 lif S were issued as needed A compr hensi·v-a ind octrinaeion was later given by the Deputy REFLEX COil lllander 93 07 Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD - -----·-------- AA • J' 'h UNCLASSIFIED 2AF' iti s tc r-ical r ata July - December 1958 mair1tenai1ce structure at this ba ee was c o r posed c 55 personllel fr om 'the J920tb Air Wing Jvls-c Botrib w·i g e nd 7th Air 3ase Group 2d Bomb 91 c I 1J D risicn Y - 0 # --' Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD ammunition ca ns and installing loaded camera magazin s az after-flight inspec ion was per ormed and all maintenance was accoillplished which would debar refuel ing The air•cl a±'t was then loaded to capacity with SP- ft el and any udditional ul lscheduled meint nance was the 11 pf rforr 1 d A'I'O l acks nd bott les wer loaded Tr•aining ammu l l tion and chaff were removed and the pre-loaded combat items were installed r l eE b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a IJ c FRD · ·----··- ·•----------- -------------- Air Force b 3 -·- 42US -ee-8----·------------- a 1Xc FRD 95 ------· 94 95 Ibiu i1· st ·' Dl 0 -i - J 1 5 t· - 1 ory J - Jr •J S l O v ul U '1 'J '01 t r 1 -f i1· - 1-- ·r •r c iJ 1•s nJ·_ r lT l·'q ' Ti' I - 'f •• 1 • C • • • - •• J • _ C • # ' r - l CHEf P _______ __ __ __________ __ UNCLASSIFIED SECf D 2AF ·lisvorical Da a July - December 1956 Air Force b 3 42 USC sec 2168 a I c FRD average time was 12 44 how s from 3 July to l October the time bad increased to 14 e9 hours During the latter period the JOlst Bomb Wiog tim e averaged 13 5 how -s - Air · F o rc_e _ ___ ____ _______ __ _ 42 use sec 2168 a I c F'RD D _£ ' b 3 · 42 use sec 2168 aXl c FRD I · 96 q o n - ' I 5jr #v lowest single aircraft time at this station durinz 97 the period had been two hours and 50 minutes Y'' AA The Second Air Force Inspector reported • •• I __ 7 'V• $ · •· i• J A _ CLASSIFIED · · ------· -- -- •• - k UNCLASSIFIED A ---- -- -··- ------- - ·----- - - _ _ p __ __ - · _ _ · - -·- ·- 2i i' Hi t i l D t July - December 195e on 28 Octobel 1956 the t morale of c -ev- s at this st r ion was the highest observed curing the past two yeiars · · ·- · - · Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 · a l c FRD -- - - --- -· _ a1 nte11ence supply suppo -t a id flight line ccnditioris were considel d 98 ' i to be v·ery satisfactory t A It w s op rated by the S - · · _ _ h -- __ CLASSIFIED ✓ t ' ' ' L UNCLASSIFIED --- · · 2AF r i$torical Data 56 uJ y - De emQer 958 3973d Air Base Gr m p A n w 11 CI foot r· 1 lway had been cons ructed at this facility U r_ Afr Force b 3i 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD ·J Base uppo --t was generally excellent The quarters food recreation and off d ty interests were abcve Second Air Force average c· Air Force b 3 · 42 use sec 2168·· _ ____ a l c FRD doing an eJccellent job although there was a le ck cf proper consolidation with the overall base mllir tenar1ce program The temporary duty REFLEX' Commander wa s maintaining an c rgar1izational and functional capability similar to that of early S C wing deployments rather than the integrated force directed by 96-58 operational - -----· - ----·· · -- r r r basesndntenan •• ---·· -•---- ·····--- _ _ _ __ __ __ - _ - - Air orce 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD I MCI ASSISlliP J Anot her UNCLASSIFIED 2Ai' nistvri cal IJat July - Dece be 19 S l 'esult was a mild misunci erst ancli -ig between bo se activitias and other than iiEFLE i t nants as to tho 99 '- ne d for all the e1npbasis ou ci ·E rw comfort Sl F«O Air Force b 3 42 VSC sec 2168 a l c FRD J g µ_ C --- -Fo ce- b 3 42 use sec 2168- a l c FRD f J 1aunch t-fme· c - iteria 1------ - - - m e_t e_x_ce p t for southerly t k offs 100 101 Afr Fo_w e b 3 42-Y-SCsec 2168 • · -· a l c FRD ··- · ·· 100 m '11ha could have beer1 JAOCP ANFE ···--·· - ·- ' I · ------ ----·- ·-· UNCLASSIFIED _____ _ _ _ - _ _ JA -· 2Jil llist oric l D t-a July - December 1958 armamer t and electron i c n1ai nter1 ncs Doi b J ' Jr Force o 3r J Ove r·all condition of eircraft on 2rrivel was excellent 42 USC sec 2168 1 ta l c FRJ r DoE b 3 42 use sec 2168 lill l fRD HO E STATION AL RT 'l'he o-cher face of Second Air Forc e' s B-4 eJ ert picture was the home tation alert ThE SAC Plar ni ng Factors anual 0 1 P lart cl®fined REFLEX ACTION as a method o f maintaining a bomber tanker 2lert force in the Zone of I terior or ovsrsea area i tring the period l Jviy 1958 through 30 June 960 tbe l unch timing requiremen·t fer both alert force B-47 and tanker - · --·- r i r-craft- wa·s--f -i rrei -drawn· -- rsti e e-i sa wePe--t G------__ -- -- --------- be airborne within 20 minutes after receipt of the --- -· ··- -- -- ettM --en•-me-s-s-age ---' wi-t-h-sab-s-e-eu-c-¼1-t--ai-l -e-r-aet --to l owill- 2 --- -- ----- - 102 103 Do£ b UNCLASSIFIED - -• - - - -••• • •••- -a••-•• ••••--•- - ••• __ • -- z•-#---•--•--•-•• ----- C' r- - - -- 2 -iF Iistori cal ava -· July - December 195S laun b direct to ta r•get without plan 'led pra-striks opera t io ·1s Som$ bc 1u bers we1 e ul l nr1ed fc i r rion-stop 10 u U eiueled stl ikes while others had air refuelings Ee oh EFI EX 3-47 wing of Second Air Force was expcc ed to mai tain cne two aircraft en ho e taticn alert beginning 1 July 195S Ho 'e·- er assumption of this posture was delayed until 1 September for various reasons principally the full SAC alert occasioned by 105 A the Lebanon crisis in July 1958 jt On 31 Decemb J the home E tat i on alert line was as f oliows J05th Bomb Wing cne D-4-7E 71 4 hr urs 306th Bomb Wing one B-47E 744 hours 30Sth Bomb Wing two B-4 Ers - 1468 hours 32lst Bomb Wing one DB-47B 741 hours and J84th Bomb Wing two B-47Ets 1468 houi-s As required by the SAC E lO 50-59 the home station alert • - • o I •• • • • • • force was mai a e 24 h_ours a ay seven days a week · · -- ··· · · ----One--eemp l --e-t-e-l- r-0emh-a-t--El•G fl£-i-gl 1 -a tr a- -tt-- a-n-1 t-one-c om _______ ____ _ bat resdy lead or select crew was maintained on alert _06 A --··-- -··---- ---- ---s-t-at4¼8---- Qf'---ce ¢ ai n f l-e e- P-g et s ---· - --- ---·····----- ---- -- lOlto J 05 Cf D v - -• ' fl'- DG SAGM 27-1 Hq SAC Plar ning Fa cto -s lvfanual on Alai· 11 Aug 1958 SRDj Interview MSgt J V LABlanc Ht ' tor•ian wi th Lt Col J M Werner Combat Operat ions r Ops Pi v r- c·· i H q - 2 - t i ' aP • d 1 •• - •• j rn - •• l O a k e_ 1 om b a t --1 ·r 11- -r l· ' -•i r r '- H 2 li' 13 I 1a 5s· -f - ---- - •_i • LJ_ l q • - - -11 pr • I I J • t l t I 1 •• a J r · J l'l'l' l• 1 v '1c- L -· - · J l uY c pc r 1Ql' l- f 2oid i ngt l ' - t C-Vl • Er 2tj ' as -or Jl uec l ' -St nn A jj ol •U tA1ssf 2AF Historical Data J Jy - December 195g with thEt reor ga i ation of bases and · in s ur cter the deputy comir ancier concept• the responsibility for r urnishi ' g aircrews for the alert was 1 ot ated amcr g the four tact i cal squadrons A tY ical B-47 wing the 2d Bcrr b Wing cC n f ormed to r he alert r·equit·ew1 n 1 in the following i thod Basically t 'lis system with minor variatio s to euit local conditio11s was followed 107 throughout the B-47 force U Four tactical squadrons the 20th 49th 96th a nd 429th Bomb Sq'l tadrons rot ated alert responsibility en n weekl • basts e The ccimmancle1 of the squadron on ale -t wes designat-ed as the ffAlerrt Force Oommandar'' 108 and his sq ladron was the duty sq Jadron ' A The duty squadron rotation start ed on Monclay 29 Sepi einber with the 429th followed by the other th ree squa dron wit a new crew oming on alert every Monday at 073 0 hou s The uty squadron was also ·--··re-qu±rei t--t-cr-furn · sh·-th- -e ri-maey--i H Hi- one- a i s p ar_a_ _ _ _ _ crews for the REFLEX deployment on Tuesday of their -··-----···----· --------- --- ---- _ _ _ 107 Bon1b Wings 2-SAC-Vl Hq Ui F a C f 'l J Sep_ ember Jl October JO Novemb r a no 31 D cE mber 1956 on file D Gomptrollar Ho '2 f F r-fonu al 1- 2d Bombardment· Wing Ale --t cr-ce 501' 1 s He 2d BWt 1 Oct 1958 A ert SOP I o 2 11Scbeduling Of Alert and Reflex Crews 11 Hq d Bo -1b Wing in Hi st ory 2d BfJmb Wi ne Crt 195f-s Exhibit 26 r·· 1 0· I INe AssU Mi·c -- - --- ------ ____ ___ UNCLASSIFIED - ·• ·------·· ·----- ---- ---- --- 2AF Historical Data Julr - December 195S 1 09 duty week Alert airc -ews we -e che nged three t imes each week Tours of duty began on Monday Thursday and Saturday Typical daily schedules were as follows Mo11day and SaturC '3y 0730-0o00 Brief1rig i n squ w '011 bri1 1fing rooi 'ii 0800-0830 Draw S CM 100-1 KAC-1 and KAC-72 and weapons 0830-1000 Preflight aircraft 000- Cha a-over at the aircraft old end new -ew • • --• ---r -•--• •- ---_ _ __ TuesdaY Wednesday and Friday 07 0-0800 Briefing in squadron briefing room 0830-1000 Preflight aircraft Thursday aircraft change-o rer day 0 700 0730 _ Dr aw_ p ersoP al equipment rat ion etc fot' 1 ncoming ai rc aft 110 ··- · - J0· -0-90O· -- 7J-omp tepntti--ght- -o-f-i-r ·combi -g-tl-r-el a ft---·- 1000-1030 Brie 'ing in squadron briefing room -------- -----roti r111 5 -·-weap Ons-·cfC Y aptan-ce · cll-e ck -·-t·owifi-g• ·------- 'ld cocking 109 Ibid SOP No 2 110 Ibid • SOP No 3 TTCrew Schedulf end Pr-·ocedures j_ j UNCLASSIFIED c _crdFRD r--•1· 2AF Histcrical Data J- tl y - December 1958 lM 5-1200 1200- C 930-110 1000-1130 Old c -ew ur e o ks outgoi lg ail ·c1·a ft and removes E P materials Change-over at the airc ait cltl and new crews Sundav 3riafing in squac -on Preflight aircraft tj I' On aircraft change-over days if maintenance difficulties preoludad the new aircraft from being put into the alert line as sched uled the new aircrew ____ f _z e - g ted and a_ c - -ed t 1- -- l- - irc a __ h '3- l -li _ _ 1_ relieving the old crew or alert respons fbi11ty Y Alert crews were requjred to keep the command post ·notii'ied -of their location a t all times Prior to leaving one lo ation crews had to call giving b r dest_ np ic m d _on_ arrival were again required to call an9 give the tele_phone nwnber of · -· --- th-a·-lo-cati on • N ·-f-a-ci1 -i-t-y--wa·s--vi- -i-t -e d · u-nl-f ss--a-k-1-s n---- -- --· -- -- --- --- horn was installed Alert aircrews had complete ·fr-ee dom- of- -mo-v·ement -ucun-cl---t-he ba-e-e--pPovi-ding- a klaxon horn was ir the immediate vicinity of their location these horns were i nst lled at 27 locations 111 • 21g_ SOP No 3 UNC 2Ju i Hisi ori ca2 Da a -1uly - December 1 S1 58 -----···--- ·-·--·- ·--•·----- -- - ----· Government transpor ation wae i 'u -r ished the of the alert force by a SkC l lcrt crews al rted l y to use one priv·at a vehicle per ere ror the duration 113 r QI IA of the SAC Alert r· Before placing a n aircraft into 1 ibe alert status a complete interior and exterior preflight inspection Daily p -cf'lights wsre then per-formed il' he lert crew If ll'lcl i ntenance as requi1 ed on an ale ·t air- - crart t ·he-·n'ight· 5re s u cockao·t be aire1' a ft a Ttl notj fied t-be cornroanC post After maintenance was con p let ed _a-ind nspec ted by th al l ' t r_o -W 1 he c_ mmand __ post was agai notified Th establishe schedules ·-- · · --·--·-··----- --- · · --r·or a 1r raf t --ctra- g r ti er-a t rowetl· -tn -f- -i-ght-erettS·- --- an d one-half hours of uninterr·Jpted preflight cime · · ·· ·-··-- --pr tor t o·-t·lTe· -ioatli'ng · ·of 'th·e weapnn· -1 - '0 r ·arnro tJ-n i M e-1' -·- ···- -- -- -·--· ·· - - -·- z nd ot le ' co- ke requi ·emsnts 114 y1 I 112 113 114 Ibid SO o 3 J Md P OP tJo 4 bio • SOl Jfo 11 • t1 s int en2 nce hle 1 t Aircra ft • I · aa -- -------------- UNCLA IED SECRp FRD AA 2AF His Go i cal Data 66 Ju ly - Dect lmb--er 195e tenence was required to keep one compl tely combat configured aircraft on t-he line at all ti1- ies In the svent cf maintsna ice difficulties on the prin ary 1 J1 rt a ir re f't 1 the maint n nce alert a rcraf 't -n• E pr·efl l ghted l nd accept eel by the 1- l't t r-ew Tl maintenance alert aircraft remained on ·the line for on a week at a time It was preflightad t wice weekly once on Monday and again on ·r11ursday Non-combat n some instances to perforn1 th - _p_ -01£'1 £ t f or pr n cti ce unce Q Q J cor f1 u- - • -- - • - •- -• • - I • ••- •• • • - - •-- • - ration provided tht l' were under t he s' pervisia of s fully quali ied combat ready crew member Standard fuel weights for alsrt aircraft we'1 '8 astablished a-s· follows 51-52 odels 112 395 pounds nd 53 models 112- 395 differ ing pr incip ally l J d - ributio in the 115 forward and aft main tanks jiJA upon noti e of an alert actual or practice On - receipE' o f alert1'iot•ic e ·crews-·pro-ceerle-d direetly- to thsir aircreft and accomplished the l rt scrar 1ble check on arrival lhen fligbt rew arrived before ---------------- ·-------- SSfFlst-------- - - UNCLASSIFIED · - Ow ••- · - - -· - · · - ··-__ __ _____ _ • ·· ···-----• ··---- - - __ _ _____ - --•- _ _ ___ __ _ __ _ -- --------- - -·- - _ ___ 2Al ni t d c Da i July - December 1956 the ground ci-·ew they 2tarted 'the po er unit to w 1 rm up the radic1s provided the navigators had a VB lid perm i t to operate the 1'-iD-3 power plant Engines were not ste rted ur tjl t e ground crew a ri red a lc announced '1ffeacy on l• • ' 'he n vigator stayed en the grour cl ur til the t -p c f' alert was · erifi d Sa fing wires and manual look pins could be removed only on 116 an actual Positive Control launch JJA Specific types of alert were as fol lows Alfa Bravo Coco • R meo and EWO launch Wher1 ready to start eng lnes on ALEAi the cc mmand p o t was c ont ected and not 1f l ed Ni ckDarue Ready 'l'he c ·ew t h n rema ined cm command post frequency until t ei minatio11 of ·alert ··· In ·a· BR aV0 -- dart- -· mgi-n1 -s ·were started· and the ccimmand post was notified Ready to tar i n µi t e G Q G Q a J t 1 re - proc g 9- s i BRAVO notifying t 1 e c9n rri od post rrrax i ing'' and changing -- · · ·---·· -t-ower-fre-quen-cy--caH -±n·g- - -N-i-c lrn-ame -i-t 'lg ---- The tower announced runway directio11 al imeter setting ··and· wir ds-·ev--ery· two--minutes• - -·The · air-era-ft - ·- • - --·-- was taxied on to the runway beld bre kes app1ie1 116 • llif1 SOP Ko 4 1 AJert ffot i f' i r at ion And Launch Proce ur es 11 I UNCLASSIFIED 2 AF Hist orical L ta July - December 1950 take-off p owsr cut ir watel' re du cad pc-ti r md ·taxi eo ba c k to the parlcit g area Fer tihe f vlf • alert c1 ews procee iad as r ox- 1 COCO J E l t i XcfJpt th t teke-off was to be comple ed and tne Battle Cry m -s lor1 fl O ffl The r a ke-o f i t i me wc s Kla ou if conditic11s per mitted In the actual EWO launch crews we re scheduled to proceed as in the Romeo alert eJCcept that the EWO 117 AA routes were flown i D caus of the faf t that mocl Grn day military strategic aircraft require xt ensive aerial in-flight refueling iri oi·c i r t J r·each tb e ir tc tr·ge•i s • tl· 1 total operation becomes c lepen-den t up vl'l a critically linked chain or events involving 1 the availability of aerial tank er ba ee -- hin tlle continent al United States and over seas - all of which are subject to the same manner of oblite1 ation and the need for discouragingly quick resp·onse --ttme-s that-apply-Goe t-h-e- Pe gul r h omher force as a matter of fact this could be the major weak link in the chain 2 a critically programmed and extre ine l r-· --comp l i cete d--F-equ e mer t f o __ read sveu-s eeeti11gs b tween the sur vi ing bomber and tanker forces st the right time and at the right place and with the right amount cf fuel available 118 U 117 Jbio J SUP No 14s Alert t otific ation tnd -a tmch r'J 4 or edt r7s 11e E tra ct f r Ltr by J r Job J i lli 'ley r1• • j ·· r ___ _ - ----------- - UNCLASSIFIED z F' Hisr vri 1J1 l t a July - December 1958 KC-97 tarJter support operations for REFLEI aircraf''t deploying and radepl oying t °ol ·ward bases emphasized the critical rendezvov s problems of air re f'ueling To support t he ltE fl'LEX bor1ber force two met boos of re f t teling opera ion wer emp oyect Yo-f ci off-load nd returrl to the launch ba se Leap Frog refueling called for home base launch of the tankers re idezvous refueling enroute a nd landing at a f'or wa 'd base Yo-Yo operations then continued from the _ ---- 'ar --- ____________ t'J J -••·• ____ ·- ---- -· •J•· ·-·-······--·---·-- - - -·· Cm deployment two aj r r-r t'u eling areas Seit Spray and Sandy Bea h were serviced by the 303d Air iiefu eli ng Squadron ' with a J if l off-load reql ire ment Estima ted arrival times ETA for rendez· rous ' 18 eos t 'e O eratienal nalysis Sect- i on of Genere l Electric Co 's Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Dept to the President of the United States on 14 Jan 1959 Reprinted on p 67 16 V r 1959 i ssue of Aviatio 1 Week ma E a ine 119 SJi CM 27-1 Planni11g Factors Manual on Alert Hq SAC P ug 195$ ''Operational Concept s 11 p 15 in - rch i ves Hiet Jiv 01 H 2Aii' Vi s ____ __ __ _ UNCLASSIFIED C 11 ¢· • J ' --- I · ··- --- -··-··-·- -· ·_·_· _ ___ _ 2AF Historical Data July - De camber 1958 70 Kindley Air Force Base was used f cr missed air refueling alternate in the 303d Ail efueling · Squadron areas and Loring Air Force Base £or the Dow 120 Air Force Base areas P1AA Redeployment air refueling was somewhat more co licated involvi some nine air refueling areas and Second Air Force rotational tanker uni ts In the Lajes refueling area with the exception of Island V aid the off-load requirement was q M The Goose Air Base area varied from 26M to oM GJ ··--· ·---- • These air craft were on call 120 -- ticne n - o Of -J 6 rtRef'1 ex -t' r n u Hn ' 'i' I ·r-•'--' - • ' ' - _ _ - o -- - r ·- - -'- _ 20 ¥ ay 1958 in archives Hist Div or Hg 2AF 121 Ibic UNCLASSIFIED 2AF Historical Da a July e ember l 58 il cepable cf becol ' ine airl·wrn wit hin 30 minutes 'l'hg Ojd was also required to provide one KG-97 on strip alert for emergency ail refueling during B-47 deployment into ground staging at Kindley J FB and during periods of over-flig it an gro nd tegi g on 122 reueplCJyrLierJt An inter·es t ing sidelight c 11 t he strip alert tankers was that durint the 1 January - 0 June 1958 period1 the maximum dollar value credi table to strip alert scrambles was $1JO t'IQO compared to the estimated cost of f3 million to orovide this 12 · service J t1' __ - •- ' _ _ ___ ____ _ __ __ ___ _ --··-·- ·---- -····-·---·----·-- ·-- In the NEAC air refueling areas weather scouts were provided by the e ir refueling squadron responsible ror r9fuel1ng support In the Kindley areas on deploy me_nt each bomb wing furnished a B-47 modified weather scout on an as needed basis Weather scouts recon noitred e route to the air ref eling area and provided ·- - -·--·- ---co-1 i-rerage or a t our-boar peri'Y -pri r to-s-c·lmh tl--e d-- ---·-· refueling A K0-97 scout tor the Lajes refueling areas was furnished by the Lajes rotational air refueling 122 123 Ibid Memo for Record tJ r E O BerdahlT Chief'• Office Of r - i- or-Q J•no -1'1 ''i ' µ w II r p Rit 't T • · -• t - - J _ __ ' r_ f - _ - Headqt 1a 0ters SAC• 30 June-2 Ju y 1958j n d Ex hibit 21 SECR9fFRD UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED -· ·• · ' - ' --·- --···- --· 2Af' Histu1-·i c i t July - Dece liher 1955 Dt dng tha wj nter months 1 l t was imm cliatc-dy apparcmt i hat- a non-sto'-1 air reiueling rour e was 125 practically e necessi y for deployment At ·' Refueling Wir g in 1 he NEAC E ll eas as satisfactory but t 'JGir launch ability dtL-ing the winter was i 11adequat e The critical weather and t ime i'ac·tors in Atlant ic air refueling was i llu trated by the 6 March problem ncovllt red by t-he 379th Howb Wir1g R efueling was i11c1icati cns that the refueling was not accompl ishe6 we -e the landing repor s from Lajas witb no corr merit a '3 to tbs reason for la nding Interrogatio11 eit crews 126 ·--------- on their return to Ho estead Air For e Base re ealed toat air ref ling h d been cancelled be use Lajes · · ·-rm si-vt d- l-Wea t-h e1 sb i rep c r t th cit- ttn r ea-ttrcr--wa-s-- ----------- --·· ---- unsuitable fo refueling operations The aircrews SECHE7 '21ID A ONMSSIFIED r ----------- - t · ' UNCLASSIFIED -·· - ·· - ···------ - · -· -- --·-✓-- -- ·------ --· _ ·---- 2AF Historical Data July - December 1956 I reported that the refueling area lljaather was clear with unlimited visibility Due to crew rest require ments the conflicting report a were not reconciled 127 Al As the weather improved in the NEAq area reeulting improvement in wing launch schedules bett rsd tho Qntira REFLEX cpera ion Aircraft ccrr - rnanders of deploying aircrcl ft in the Fighting Fox area reported that co D% Jon discrepancies existed with tanker ai craft for example faulty director lights 128 hydraulic leaks and boom malfunctions Missed air refuelings caused landings at alternate baBes with resultant axcessive fuel burn-off Principal complaints were that sufficient tankers were not always airborne tankers were not ad ising receivers of weather conditions in the rendezvous - ---- '-----B·HS --an-d- tha-t--th-ey-wePe--net--a¼wa-ys-m i-n-t-a4ni-11-g-ssJ Pe•et ---· •·------ 127 Msg Comdr l9AD to Comdr AF ZIPPO SECRET 03-041 Special B-27 96-57 2AF 379'3ii Reflex --- --- - •U U o l Shot GUA 11 r 19SS on f-t l e 'loitbi t Rptng Br Ops Div D 0 Hq 2AF 128 Ibid 129 Msg Comdr 825AD to Comer 2AF ZIPPC SECRET O'J-066 B-27 96-57 J64'FI'fl Reflex Action tlilcicat Alpha 11 March 1958 on file Combat Rptng Br Ops Div D 0 Hq 2AF SEC0 RD ----------- 7 J LASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ---------- --L¥ - 2AF Historical Data July - December 19 8 4 forms ti on 1 or- displaying prcpE ' color beacons Relatively J however there were few REF1EX refueling sorties lost due to tanker abor s Th 19th Bomb Wing hed e pe ienced the most concentrated loss on 131 12 i ebru ry - five son j es on redeploymentH tj A n i· 6 -1 1 L •• - c t - 'W Jl'-I _ 195° · U•4 Ml Qe _ _ _ - _ _ A ore - Inspector General checked the three bases principally concerned -wit h refueling support ·-· LaJes a fr- Base· Azo es Goose Air Base Labrador and Kindley Air Base Bermuda 1 A Goose was visited on 6 Octobar The 301s Air ·'-- - ---------------------------·---------- ------ Refueling Squadron was preparing for redeployment to the ZI at this time Adva11ce personnel from the 4 th Ai Refueling Squadron were in position pending deployment of their aqua dron The operational comt ' it ment at this base required alert ·cankers from t-he in-place sguadro augmented by two REFLEX tankers ---- --f- 111-t-ae-3 6t- Ai e tueling Sqne c1ran • Surf icient ____ __________ _ in-commission KC-97 aircraft were available to sup port the EWO at this time Weather was not adve -se - -------- --•--------------------- 130 131 Dli' Control Div to D 0 Hq 2AF Rc fu elir g Sorties Lost on Reflex Due to 1'anker Aborts ii 6 Oct 195S EY hibit 22 sc ------ 2AF istor cal De L ul y - J e emtier 195e r-eporte l the c dnt er contir ued adclitiona 1 c aint ene nce personnel wc uld be required to assist crews in keeping t he aircraft f -ee of ice a r d snow a ld ree dy fer irnrr ed a e launch 'acil ties fer support o f t ne -anke ' airc -e fr l ere base a id t ie tell' porary duty 'functio 'ls Crews ware well briefed al'ld were furnished the latest weather 132 in 'c -n ation for their missions j A On 21 October the 70th Air Refueling Squadron w3s or de-p loyment to Lajes Air Bese t was cons l d 1 ed fully capable of cal ryine -•Ut its E viO a d me t ing aULEX comwit nts The squadron had 29 rews available to meet flyi g and alart requiremen s 133 bl JJ Twenty-six of these c ews were combat ready 7 1 V pot - ·---·· r ' - --- 132 DF IG Hq 2AF to Comc 1 2 F rrneport vf Staff Visit-Goo e Air Base J i-luv 195e E l hi' it 23 • • 1·r tJ 2 · ' · 2 ' F 11 t J' ' •r • ' - t I Ill _ 1 q r v l' ll l A 1 2 L t lSl 0 Laj es ir Base Azores rt 3 cv 19 5a E Y h b t i- S z PJA __________ --- _______ --- UNCLASSIFIED 2 1 l iiistvri cal Dot a July - December 1958 delays in execution orders by Se o 1c an c Sixt se th _ C h Urs end in no case less than 24 hours had 1 c be in c ncellaticns also refJik 1 t ed i l r St 'Ved ir spaces being m inte ined a-c the expense of other eirc - ti't The resliriction on the use of iigh frequency ·t rans missions by tanker irc -aft del lyed roelay of w9ather s ccut 1 nforma tion off-loo cl re ort E v1c r ther r pera icnal data m til the aircraft c u J cc r t ct the rathoI' limited UNH UHF i' acilitie s i n the 1 ocal erea Satisfactory alert facilit ies were on hand or had bsen programmed 134 J lJ l'h e 30Jd Air Refueling Squadron at Kindley Air Force Base was visited cm 22 October 195Et 4 review in comrr ission aL1d 12 cut for minor me int ena i ce The lci tter group cf a ir-cra t could ha · re been a ener ted w thin ix hours f 11 crews on lert hac beer brie- ' -e d _________ ··-- on their responsibilities Daily br i fines indudj ig ' µ _ _ UN SIFI --------------- UNCLASSIFIED 2AF Histcricci ata Juj y - December 1958 There was l pyra miC alert syst ru _ rovi dee but due Ti to off base hous i ng poor tele hone syetetr s and bucdy transportation effective r e co 11 of per on el 135 1 a required one hot 0 V · the week-end and delayed B-47 movement rules th -ough the Ei ghth Air Force are On week-emds air refuelir g was not provided T anker sttoport was cancelled for 136 a 1Y B-47 movements delayed more ·than fou r hours The Northeast ir r 1oling e were also • • • • • •• I a - • • I • • • I - I • 11 • - -• - - U - • _ • • r •- • • c enters of tra fi c c ong stion whi h i n turn c usec clearance prc 1bl 1 -11s Gonf ict be ltween SAC miseicms a11d REFLEX occurred since most of th a ta1 1lcer su ppo rt wes in thi s area which al so was p imsry su pport area for DEVIL FISH and SWORD FlSH missions S y percent of ' he tanker support for REFLEX was also accomplished - ·- ·----------i--h1 LJ i V ' ··g - · c i JQ · • ·-lf 111 e - e • '-• i -d -• i a - _ - ow • - e i- a _ c r · · - _ ---- __ __ A # • A-1i o - 4 • • •- - - --- ___ __ _ that SAC restrict the use of hese areas anci if possible limit test type rnissicms and unit sin uleteci -----------·-·--- -·---·--·•-·- -- 135 DF IG Hq 2PJ °' t o ' c rr ar 21- F Report of Staff Visit to Kin liley ft ir Ba5ei ir 3 ifov 1958 Eyhihi' 25 OPORn 06-i 6 p c f 1 f _r _• n ii t 1· A O i•• · i • -· • • • • r- r • • · ·- l 1958 - in archivesr Hist Di v C Ir Hq 2AF _ _ r UNCLASSIFIED 2f l His l ol ie a l Data J- i ly - December 1958 SECP cor bat r 1issicns USCMs c De riods of th e day whic 1 - 137 would not i terf re wit h REFLEX flights 1 A Inadequate support such a5 short oif-loatls C l' less then the required number of tankers also caused clsara11 e p r -otilems Receivt r aircraft were forced t o destination Shortage o tanlcers caused ca ncellat ion of altitude rese vations when less than three 138 receivers were able to continue the mission ------------ L a c k o f e r ective te r1ker support had an adver-se ·i effect on some of the wing train i11g J 1rog ra Jl'IS For • • - • 6 1 _ _ • - - • ' --- - - • •• ·' · • • · • -' _• 15 • - - - - ·· · - - - ____ -·- example during the period 1 July througl1 Jl Dec6mb r 1958 the 19th Bcmb Wing had 54 tanker sortie aborts out o f 4 6S e cheduled re rue lings alo g with 26 tanker cancellations This represented approximately 17 5 par cent of total scheduled ref uelings and had t-wo effec s non combat-ready crew upgr ding was retarded - ··· -··-and-tt re-win-g-su ff-ered · -e-on·s ·el·erabl-y-i--n--the-S W-lVia r1 ag e - l39 - - ---·--·· - - ---···- - -· ment Control System Again in Decembsr the 68th Ltr ej e-en J P MeCcnnell Coma- --t o __1 1' 0----J-j _______ _ Gen James V Ec mu '1dson D 0 Hq St C Lftefl9X Problen1s Areas anc Recommenc ationil n c Exhibit 26 Ibid Air Training Report for S p-Dec 1958 3-StC-T-12 Hq 19th Bomb 1 ing cmrr ander's Rerr arks Part III on file Crew Su veillance Br ' f'y ng Djv• D 0 I-lei 2 i J · A NCLASSIFIED -------- -- ---• UNCLASSIFIED _ -· ---- -J- ''-• • - • •· --- - -·- - -- li E tC i l Da- a ru y Decerob r l 95 • •· t 1- - u u 79 t ra i ning perioe it haC 1pgra c ed lj non combat-reeC y crews to ready stat ui - ' 'he wiri g l i d rJ t ai qu i x·e maxi m' 111 poin'us h-1 tbe zr anagement control systetn for t bis e ffor as six of t hesa cr- ws wer·e upgr oed priruary reason fol this 6 elay was the unreliability of KC-97 tanke support during the last three months 140 of the year The J2lst Bomb Win g dU 'ing the same period reported 7 tanker borts as compared to 15 11F1 lA r ceiver bort a t hree to one ratio 7 r' t EFLEX r fue ing was a subject tor r o centr-ateo attantic n fror 1 th e Seco 1d Air il'c1 ce comrnc ru5Gr nd hi staff' Opera·cions Analysts compl t ec cieveral refuel ing studies - · ·-·-··- ·-··- ·· ------------------- Doe' _ 1 t e nai --y-S 5--f-e-e-$J1 ffle-l 'l-ee-e- -th- tr-t 1e----J at t e J lr - --- uni s refueling capability should be improved by adding an extra UHF antenna oj the top si e of some lf-1- i UNCLASSIFIED SE D fa - -···· ---· tt ra i a l _ w '- -'4 _ c - C W'G Ju y _- J ce r •b_e_r 56 levelst anc directional refer1 1nce T nese studies ' ei e being r ont j_utH r with a vi w t owar6 givirtg a re l ist ic pictt e f the best g O perf o -m n e 142 e q C cr ed fr·c n - he KC-97 E-47 orr bi 1atic n Because of an inadequate n' lrober of con bat ready ci ews in Secc nd Air F'c --ce units the i ntArvaJ bat 5tH th same re son l' ews we r·e not given adaquc te t ime off upon cieplc yrr nt This we s aggrc tve t c l 14 3 req irement for the home station alert • by the fi A --- -------- ---- On Hl-19 November 1956 Second Hr Fo1 ce cc •n- ucted a symposium for f eflex Action Home Station 14 - ___ __ d l e r L OP t ure -----tl J $--Qpi-n-i-0u-s- -a4--e-emme-H-1 -s •·El ----- al srt cr_ew perso 1nel were a penet ating critique of tha t rai ing ar d sccri -- g proc d- 'es now p 1 ·esurr e to - 1 2 ll -3• JV Di uA Hq 2A tc c s 2Ali' aHspcr-c 01 Hecent Cverseas Gomrnenc' St ai'f Vi it to Das es Involve d l r 1 r 1 · - 1v1• ' r c l · 5 11 i t it 2 r · t i- -iL 1 I__ nt i T R C1 · _ r' • ' t • •· j_ 1' 1'0 ' C€- ' 01 UH · t J y - t - - er bc1-- 1 i 5 - • r ' p • _ • J 1· T •• • i q - s Jt l ' 1 - ·iJ - J -''t• l il St 1 1 v - q ' · ' ' - _ - 't - t t ' t r _ t •ri'1 · - 14_ b i i it- UNCLASSIFIED - UNCLASSIFIED S -r D ---·7' - 21- F' Uistvr·ical tat1 1 July - Decen ber 19 55 ' ' 'hat t hese procec ures a -e cc nsidereci inequitab e a d in certain instar ces ricic lous might bG Gis garded in tccord enc with t ime-worn 1 1 lita -y t r1 c t on i ' i t dj d not so cl rl y i rnpl y weeknesses 1- hi ch cr u -i b 145 Mtact rcphj_cc n A Fron the r·ema rks made by· crew membe -s during t _he symposiut1 t can be concluded hat wheneve pe for mance scor i ng au produce an adve -se effect on the pay of an individual or che professior- ll stand in of a _u _njt t he fu 11 a t_e ntic n nf r l 1 co 1' G O ' s d is likely to bE uirect d t-oward b-s t-ing the scorir ey t m rllHm t hj s suc t teo s • 1t not only leads t o commanc failure but enganders a false aT mospbere o f relia 146 bility where very little may exist cy A ------- - --··--· This h d been a matter of gr at concern to t e Commander Second Air Force On 6 November 1958 he -- -e-X- ' H e- a -t-M-ei on cern-- ·o---t -h - er •L-• -- 147 S-trategic Ail Oocnna ld pf Iv ___________________ _ p LASSIFIED ------- --- __ l I UNCLASSIFIED SE oA 2 AF' Histo1 i 3 s l Iia a Jtµ ' - Df lc mpef l ' 5 _ The i icreasec alert uosture whi h beccrries effective in January 1s59· has ca l l sed me great concern over our capability t c maintain such a force for a extended period of time The Strategic Air Command corr bat crews have done a magn1£icent job in shouldering the responsibility of the alert force From the very begi 'ming of the alert program t hey have expressed strol1g approval nd pi--ide at e-i- ' ___ o ' i They '-a b1y --re - '''r a t1a- v £ u• 4 ca u v ca l' - cic' lt 1 va of t hs progress that has een n ade in irr proving their living conditions while on alert But they have expressed die satis faction with the imposition of ar alert which kesps tharn away from tbei - farnil i ss mora and more without a proportionate reduction in other requirernents lie-must take a fresh look ae tl e al eas ffJ Qt Jlg t•ht COD Pat crew Our gµi_d h oi ld b t a cz-ews ei the- r be on alert lyi-ngf or o f c-fl y and home w i th l h lr fa ro11J es believe we can provide th m with this type schedule without any reduction in p oficiency or saf ty stauclai ds One area that neacls some very drastic action is personnel movements Immediate aet ion shoo-ld--be- t-ak-e»-b-e i e- ff-P B-nel- ···· · - --•···--- ·- a Strategic Air Command and the Numbered Air Force Headquarters past their standard tour It would mea cur-tailing transfer to service schools It would affect other move- - - ---- · -•--men·t-s- b-a ·n-from--t-wo l -v·e--t-o- _ i_ ht--9el'l- ll·t---h-s------··· -- -• - ---·--- • I h' b '• it would ave a sta 1lizing E ff ect 011 the combat crew inventory My net gain in the Ja uary-September ----pe r io d t b -S-¥ a 1· Uf ara di ng l 9J B-4 7 crews was 38 Only 27 of these crews were lost to the B-52 program Almost every trans fer of a rated officer ultin1ately re sults in the rr overnen't of an otf' i er f rom a combat crew This constant d ain will never allow us t o build a crew inventory adequate to support c e-thi1• J of the f orc€i m1 ale rt or the requjremonts er n a bo na lert - -- - · -····- ---------------- 2AF i tcri cal Data Jt ly - Pece nl er 19 a The Cornmande · Second Ai Force rna of cert aiJ l l e oumen iations regarding the tre ining e rd ste nciard izati on rograms He emphasized r he irnpracticabilitr of operating the alert force u r der old busineee-es us a ' poli cies and r tt1tudes ' I'o meet t bt expanded t aining program should be carefully rev·i ewed and 148 tailored to fit the Alert Concept Only· those i tams -chat can be scheduled fo · a crew while on alert should be required anc these should be based on a m i ni mu n P four hou - s e d 1 y Su b i e x s c s S1 rvi •el and physiological training which require t mporary duty shc uld be elimi l ated except for the initial indoctrination or when radical changes 1n equipment 149 _gf1 required fU ther re-training J ------- - - --- ------------ Flyir g training requirements ror combat ready crews were excessive wh le performing REFLEX ACTION · ------·-· ----I- f--t -h-e- 1r i- s-e·i--cn · ·-ciffere- t---on ly--r1r t ·g-et-arn i ___________ __ recovery base frorr the primary mission then repeated ____ practice should fulfill the major training requirement __ _ __________ ---- The Commander consicered the t demonst tsd proficiency F t RE - LEX s houlci suff ice fer eveJ uat on xcept for -------·--·--- 148 _ 11 c Ibid 9 • - - --- -' - 2i Y Histo 'i cal Iiata hf y ·December 1 •5f l'ligh sa 'e y i-r ams -maxin um perf0rma ice u a n-euvers Cid in -r r ent pro i-cieney i-ec0mmencla tion • r • - • c ontinuec Cl · reduce Fo p-Dp ··profi'c i •ey tr ail ing -· - 'rom two to one n is io p e - training pe ri· ·4 - '- e ali ' ' - depot sq µadr on lqad±ng pra'ct ice ana USA1'$ uercit $ · -· • • I ' I • • • • • • qci reca' _ai_rc e w ·anc1 _ µ- -d E ll _whiA -'4 '' no ' · • •• •' · • I · • • ' • • • ' • • • ' • _- y· - · · · · ' t• ' _· -· - · t tn'3 ut te the al - rt · f·o r ce • e #e1 t1-A z gr a - ' · --•- ·------ r • • • r • I tt •- 'l J • • · -·•· _ · · •• _ - - _ •· ' QT aeeompi ishmeilt Of re ec SQ t i MS- • S - Q'iid ffi a _ · - - _ _' - _ -- --- - i i I l l_ - '' ' - · _· · - - - 5 1 · F rc e ·u lits were respc lsible for the 'ol1 cwii -s te '_ - -·· ·---oonru t -me t-s-d-r- -s-i is a L Xe 9 zi SWORD FISH -170 GRAY FO X -24- SILVER L NntG 192_ and SUN BID -19 f'cr a tot al o 891 sqrt1 e ·s - 51 - ··------ types t 150 5 L Ibid d21 £• of these r• f · · •· • - - k - _ t' 1• _-• • I UNCLASSIFIED Ser -D t T a f D LA i- ' • ' - 2 i F His orical Jata o5 fuly - December 1958 General l- cCc-nnell fv rt her saj c -we are in a new era and p ecemeal ef orts to modify an olcl system to meet t a new concepts are just net ade quate Business-as-usual attitudgs still are prevalent and are hindering O' r effcrts to sup ort 1 2 one-thil d er the fo -ce on tle t r JA The ten B J -47 u oi s of Second Air Force o l July l958 had a to al of 682 crews of whi h 496 were combat ready 0 Jl December the total had h i 'raa sad to 716 c1 ews o t 1-mi ch 51 7 were combat __ _ -------- -- 153 reedy 7he average nu Ilber of c - s ws per u 'li t ut the end of non combat the year was 54 7 combat reacy and 16 9 ready _ __ - · Air Force b 3 ' 42 use sec 2168 -----1 a ll- l l J JER D-4- _ ____ _ 54 j t M ·r ·----· -·----· 1-5 2 r-o1·a - 153 ur -o Personnel to OI Hq 2AF History of 1 Combat Crew Force l July 1958 to Jl December 195 17 Feb 1959 Exhibit Jl 154• Analysis of Combat Crew Training Period ---'---En-a-1- ugt1st 1956 in ar-chives His-c-···fltt-i v ---- 01 Hq 2J' F - -·· --- ----- 2AF Historical D t July - December 1958 CHAPTER II HEAVY BOMBER INTEGP ATION ------ •- ••·· ·· _ _________ _ ·-------···- ·--··-·-·· -------------·-·- ----- ---_ __ _ • I 2AF· Histcri c al Da· a July Deceober 1956 DISPE SAL IN LAN i ND ACTION The process of integr·ating B-52 KC-l 35 aircraft into the Second Air Force weapons sys em involved a series of acti ns which were inter-related and often concurrent Existing win gs I equi • ii d wi t i to a state of combat readiness and new wings· were being activated organi d equipped and trained This heavy force was being dispersed to reduce its ·rllln rability and hastsn its peaa o s a c i7o n ------------- Operational readiness in the EWO W ·s · graduelly unfolding U D spersal began in 8 11 C in le te 1957 a Ld was sc eduled £or completion by 30 June 1963 Origi nally unoer tna eispersal eoneept some -he-e --vy----- wings we re to be located on bases 1ofhi ch were not self sufficient This would have required performance of ·-----------···--·- certain functions particularly in heavy maintenance 1 at a base known as a main or home base Depende t Strategic Air Cornrr nd repr gram ming in 1958 provided U ED SE tRD 2AF Historical Data T'Jly - December 1958 a elf-sufficient cc1 pability in each strat egic wing 1 y A Under this dispersal concept eech neavy bomb wing was divided into th ree 'clly capable orga 'Uzatio s wieh one-third cf the heavy bombers and associated tar ker aircraft assigned c each organization One of the organizations was to retain the designation of the original wing while the other two units were to be designated as C 7 strategic wings Maximwn aircraft population 2·· _ o n -9ach base • 11 s t _o_b e 15 B 52' s end 10 l C- l 3 5 's Once independent maintenance capability was established the primary difference between a main and a satellite base was the location of the air division on the main base At ye •s end 1958 Second Air Force's active heavy --- - · ----- - •T· b-c mb--strat-eg±-c--wi-ng7 ompi-er-i·n-tbe-Zl--wa-s--a-a--- 3 M JA follows 1 V' --- -------------·-·----- 1 Study t Maintene nce Diste -sel B-52 KC-1 5 • Home atellite Concept ' Hg SAC on £ile D Pl Hq 2AF · Ibid 2 AT Monthly Analysis De ember 1958r 25 Jan 1959 prep by D Oomptroller Hq 2A Exhibit 32 - ' A 1 INCi ASSIFIED 9' UNCLAS IED _- - -- ffRD fa' '- • 2AF Hi toric l Dste July - December 195g MAIN BASE g DIVISION Carswell 19th 7th Bomb Wing 7th Air Ref Sq 4l2J d Strat Wing Barksdale th 4 2JStb Strat Wi 1g 913th Air Ref Sq Alt e 816th ll th Bomb Wing 96th Air Ref Sq se DISPERSAL BASE Bergstrom 4J 30tb Strat Wing 910th A ir Ref Sq Columbus 422etn Btrat wine 901st Ai nef Sq C int c l--Sherman 902d llir Ref Sq The foregoing was· t e dispersal complex for six l ________ B_- 5_2_a_n_d_s_i_x_K_C_-_1 3_5_un_ _s_ __ B y 3 l_D_e_c_91rlD_ _e_r_· _l_9_5_8 _t_·w_o _______ _ of the s a u n i t _$ th 13 th QmQ_ ltpg a ry t t- P it Jg Strategic Wing had l eached combat ready 1 1'tatv s 4 graduating on 27 and 20 October respectively Manning equipping and training urd ts at the other bases was progressing Combat ready statttS was co11ti11- gent principally on delivery- of B-52 c nd K0-135_ aircraft construction of fa ilities and supply - 5 ------ -· --buii -d-up --6-rew--mann-i 'lg--wa-s on-s-ehedl l-1-c JA-------- 4 Progress Repo1 t Jo 16 2AF Supp t J S C Pr gramm g Pla 1 ll• l7 1 iv rsi·on Df 7 e • llt h B-er b • • f g -HH --lauus aF -- r -o -- ------------ Organization of' the 123d Stre teg i c Wing Cat s11 ell Air i i'orce E se Status o f 31 October 1958 22 Nov 1958 d ibi t 33 5 2AF lfont hly i naly i ne - emb1 r l S o i 5 i n 1959• Exhibit J2 -Jfa A t ·-1 I UNCLASSIFIED 2A r- i-list vr·i cE l ta July - December 1953 In t he last t rae months 0 ar a - - 7' 1 i ve of the six KC-135 air refueling squad -or s cit ed he -e were ' l pgra cing to combat ready status Th s 96th at Al us had conve ted from KC-97 to KC-135 air aft the 7th convar-sion and or- build-up The 902d at Clinton Sherma had not yet been ac ivated however the 915th at Ramey Air Fo -ce Ba 1 te Puerto Rico was bwl l din L_µp The latter nnit had ste ed equipping wi t h -KC-l-J-5 t s -in Decel lber al though it s p l 0 0 t 1 ing • _ the 72d Hea y Bomb ling lted n t e s yet re ei vec' a 1y B-52's and hence was not included in the active base list Progress toward combat rsady status for the refuslir1g l mits was s __ a_ t sfC1ctory and in most casea ---· -0- eJ cellent A _ Concurrently with conversicm of heavy bomber -----· · · ·· ---- i n ' g s _ - Seconc Air-li'orce wifS r' o b ·in-g-theM into the Strategic Alert Concept as rapidly as 05sible This required eveloping a capability of ------ ---------- getting the first E-52 airborne within JO rr il utes after l eceipt of the exec ltion message with ----·---------- 6 See below p - -- ' • · -' ' CLASSIFIE •------- I ' U Ristc z'iOal I tc July - December 1958 s i bsequent ai -crai'- a two-rr ir uta intervals Pre para ti ons were also being rnade to begin eust aining continuous-airborne alert operations - r ' Under the home base-satellite concept d isper sal 1tas to b' ll accomplished b r pl ac ng 13-S2's on beses as Construction Program Two major deficiencies made this eaz-ly dispersal concept inadequate Distances between horns b sea and satellites were in some insta r ces as much as 1700 miles a factor which not cru r 1d n at _ L s p an c- f _ con ' ol PJ ciples- bu t on ____ - -- - - - ocr a s i cJn crc ss d Ai I' Force boundaries Prc-W- e mming in 1957 had re ulted in mc st main bases be ng located in Fifteenth Air Fol' ce geographical area while most satellite bases were in Second Ai ' Force ___terz•i __ tory _ _______ _ The second defect was la k of maint e11a 11ce self'- sui'fi_ciency f_p the ate llite ba$e Air raft 'Were --·----•-----t-o-be ferrhn l to am 1 1e home 15a-sa or pe-r1oa c - i11spection and heavy ma inten ce resulting in reduc E • J tio 'l of in-commission aircraft at the satellite ba se vs t-' A SACM 5-12A tt Hr Operations Peacetime - Alert Force 11 Hq Sile A igu st 1956 in arc 1-ii res Hist Div OI Hq 2kF' Cl- 1 y 111 i '- c - an no r -i ep re 1 R- Vf' _ 1 'l c Uc 1-• --1 -· - L v- •• ____ _ - --• - _ r _ · Satalli a Cc nc pt Hq SAC on file D Pl t aq 2 F' ---------- r - u Mo _ •71 I '•• '1 AF· His-c or cal Data July - December 195 In early 1958 SAC tmi r s 'l'ere r 1 0granm ed o occupJr 22 bases i -J the Se ond Air Force area by the end cf June 1961 'l'hirtee11 of' these basas some of whjcb helonged to other comm@ nos were to be aquipped it 1 he nry bomb units Mai- pcwcr re-qtire ments fer the completely seli'-suff icie · t type of ba c he d been p ·e sented to Heaoqaarters USAF' by SA_C in January 1958 and ·tentative app 'oval had been received As SAC had made the proposal to Air Sta ff that each of the haavv b ses be cornuletely self-suffigient the Com na- der to the dsvelopraent cf a comrr and s truct- xe which r culd p O rida effe cti ve upervieiori in the heavy bo nber complex 9 A Based c-11 his conclusion that the homoge nous --- · ·--··------- ------------- grouping of three dispersal bases under a single command would provide a balanced struc ure with the supervirton needed to - l ure bun-a up r- t l heav-y unit General McConnell made 'our re corr ntenda tions t o t ·h s ' omm_n d er - n-Ch' J e_ f' t S '· r on 7 J anuary 1°58 • ---- ·· _________ _ __ __ ·------ These were l that fo r ir div zicns te esteblished 9 Ltr c j Gen J ' Gor' nel to G·e 'l'ho r c 1 Power nnispersal PJ an P - 1 d Reco nmendat icm r 7 Je r 1958 fahibit Jl i 0 · A_ •• · ii f i -4- ___________________ --- a I IIIG 0 SS E EP 2J Histo ical Data July ·- Decemb r 1958 C _ in t he Second A i r Fc rce hegvy compl1 x 2 that aa h o' these divisions evercise command su perv sion of SAC u its en tnree cisperssl bases that Ramey Air Fc ce Base be sduced from a main base eonfigu rr- ti on enc tS Sume self-E- fi cien't tra tegi wing status un ler dir·ee t Se ct l d i i11 Foi c- i cc ntrol e 1id 4 that· facilities needed to make each dispei ·sal base self-sufficient be fu ished as quickly as posei'ble ' 'his pla 'l was designed to provide exper- ---'-- ____ _ _linced s enior office -s fer a sound connr aod structu -e -r--ee-u-c-e--the- S-e-cor -d -Ai - F or-eQ Co1r m n cer s- ep an of 10 control f om 22 com a de -s to twelve Jl The SAC Co lmlander-In-Chief on 23 Jen' U' ry replied that the base rslat-ionships recomme 1c ed by the Second Air Force Oomma cder were very nearly in line with SAC's prelimina -y findings in egard to revision of dispersal plans for the heavy unit bases ----·····------ sermr1c1ency for all of th' -·bas eint cJi-gi g the early geographic grouoing were two objectives • 11 on which CINCSAC was acting at this time 10 Ibid 11 Ltr Gen Thorn s M Power• - o J•faj Gen r P McConnell 23 Jen 1958 P hibit 35 ---------- 2 ft lis cri cal liat 9 3 J'Jly - December 955 DJ C r6as mirig 0 1 need for se J f-s li'iic sncy 12 is outlined in g 'aar er det ail below --------- An arialy eis of th e aircraft distribu tion is suppo t of alert places one third on alert th or-e-third of the aircraft 2vailable to training and one--cbird available to mai 'lt enance l 000 hours per month a r-e c-equir-ed tc t •·p- -· -r n1·nr• r -· ··- o·· I' iv y1w• t l '·• dJ E -' -V iU u _ _ _ satellite bas9 The fly·ing tims- usi d to £erry aircraft from he satellite to the home base must be orovided from this 1 000 hours Fiying time ssd in retuiT1ing ai c aft for per- iodic j_nspections can be fully utilized ro training both ways with the remainin flyin t ime oe -ween ome ase an t e sa e ts b fl ing J1 l n pr o d u cti v e _ __ _ Tbis _r ep -c 1'1 sents a loss 0£ 2i pa C$11t · of ·the ava ilttble tir11e or for t le 22 satel lite-sJI a total or 14 aircraft per day This is the equival9nt of the ale1·t torce of orie wing and is consid ered to be entirelr unacceotable •••••• for an addi tional 21 000 boo faci lities and equipment can be provided to pe r•111it true--dic persa- -tStrl'f'-mlf -------- --- ci ency of the heavy forces and thus reduce an aggressor's ability to imm9bil ze the SAC str lµ g fprce _ _______ ek de¥o t_i_t_i_o_n_s_o_f_a _s_u_i _ _p_I_•1_· s e _________ ___ ···- ---· On 21 March 1958 suppo ting co cepts for the new dispersal plan were spelled out in more detail ·--- - ----for the Second Air Force staff Theee conce pts were S t•o·v ffTf l J·r t n inrA - 1 c •' Ql Cli R- 2 K -1 5 • J a t J • J_ ·• - • ' - - •• - • j• - • _ - t - 4f • - • t Home Satelli e Cot ' c pt 1 0 1 file D Pl Hq 2AF ' P F His vrical Data July - December 1955 as a f ine l prog -am by SAC Gensi a1 highlights cf l the plan were that t he air· di ision woulJ l e c bsigru 1G to the main base with t he satellite wing com ar oers lJ r S onsi bl e o the air ri i l sion comua i der s A control when more tha i ona wing was involved ct l mr wise the wing wotld control ite own 1r issions with the division monitoring The communications net __ 1_11_ t n Q s to- eg9 ci A r Fo i Cle --In tbi -- - ·e1h _pj- 1 evicfontly n o c omm1 11ication char 1J --isl was pla _ 1e d from the numbered air force dire t ly to tha zat0ll ite ' Twency-four hour cont ol rocrr1s we -e to be established -----·--·-···---- -o n § Ch base _ EWO J lann g was o be a compl shed m1 der the supervision of the air di vision inci i vi dual targ et assignments flighi plans and crew folders - 14 - - -· -·----·-- -e-re · t -o-br--e_p_r-ep_ar_e a-a-t e-a_c_h __ b_a_s_e_ ___ f' M This March 1958 revision of' the dispersal plan till did not provi ie fcl main e ianca eelf-st ff ci5ri CY• 13 H • DF D lar s Eq 2A I o s 2AF Suppo -tj ng C-011c sr ts fo D spsrsa1 1 21 fv ar 1958 Exhi it J6 IbiC 2 F Bist-ur• i e licit- Ju 1 y - December 195$ maini• enan i -e and most field maintenance at the satellite bases There was no change i 1 th e 'gquirement that each - mit be capable of mobility 95 This was not acc pt ble The nun1' er of combat crews a d aircraft available for ls t duty a the hc me base would have baan dec-reased Scheciuli ng wo1 21 d h we become OmpH rated t-ar 2 1 l crews an· · 1 i rcr i fi• ¢ 3 t9- q -t·e-- do91' -m 4 -nt enano r--'wea-t h9r------ ---·--·---·-·-·--·----··· -·-··· ·· - ·- cir othe fl yi g saf'et-y i--ea1 ona Second A r F'oroe operaticms ste ff recommended that each strat egic 6 wir g be made fully capa let r iaintenance-wise It was ap_p_ -ent t-het r iany delays would r •ault and co isiderable liaison wo- ll d hs ve to e kept up bet ween sai telli te and ta in base to make the 10 i-fo1 r ch plan system der - nded one 1tboss n It was also co1 1sidered __________ 1- cti cal to st ere base l AK packages at the satsil li tes e nd then e irli ft the to t he main base a t th --·- -··---- ---· • • - ·-----·-·-- 15 16 11M intenance Exhibit 37 ------·-···· __ _ 2AF Hl Lc --i c 2 Dat July - De oember 1958 time they ware to be usec ii On 15 May 19 8 Headquarters USAF approved a change in the mcintenru ioe concep't fer he heavy bomber dispersal plan providing complete w n nten nce cepat- ili t y· 2t heavy c se s s opposed t o the fore notified o this change on 2 • May and at the same time SAC onsidsrillg the time factor s 'tremely critical required the completed progra m for Second U ·r Force base s to be i n SAC_ Eea dq Je rte -s by '30 g Ju i e J9 d _ _ rf the dispersal c oncepr which affected Sec'-' t Air Force during 1958 was crganization of cor m1and 2nd contro mli chinsry of t- tl'_Fogran hot _ fun t-ionally and geographically SAC had raquested the Seconcl Air Force Cornmander· to examine existing structure in and dispersal the advent of the ballistic missiles into the weapons inventory and the epproaching $pace e a 1 11 cf the SAC 1 ur bered ir force co ntlers l • l I • l ___ 1 j - - - kffsicfe $51r 1't n '· --- - 1AF H st ori cal ata 12ly - De- err t-er 1958 had beer given s ic --t J •- I o iefi g er thi ssue st t e 19 Ca nmande ts Conference e rlier in the year U On 14 Tuly 1958' SAC outlined the problem mc -e bases an r pe rsor r el be added t-o t' ·1a e i ist L1 g coimracJld structure or shocl d an addir ior al Ai - I'-orce ype organization be acti vatecrt How many units equipped with radic lly different weapc ns sys tarns• can a su ordi 1a te con -nand directly sa tJarvise Wha t is the ------ --------eff 'ecit of gaography or1 St ' 's oz-g n d · __________ _ be v e- •aff r c t of 1·ecl· ga11izati 1 1 C L'l l 0 c c it rr ri 20 power picture' ' U Primarily the recommendation was that units and ___ -----··· ·--- - i i'ses shoul d be adde d to the __ e7- is i - g c Qmtnend t ru'- '--c -------------- ture Major General J P McConnell Secon d Ah• For ce Commander considered that a '11 add it-i t l m utbered air force wcald i11si re bette1 span cf cc trc l b i t that it would not justify the cost in manpower ---· _ed -insitr 1tive overhead an f 2 cilitie_ • His recorn- r r UNCLASSIFIED S ·f m0 I A t i_ • ll ' - 2i F HistC ' •i al u Tu-1-y ----- De-cember -19§$ axpa rdsc to su Ort m iltiple we por s ysta ma pre - gr2mrnec missile wi gs and groups be abolished in termediate euperviso -y commands oo established with ne ces sary cellular augn1entat on and finally the nt bel ed air forces l'e ealigned on a south on the n eed to i I1sure tbat each force gain expel' ience in co trol of the va -ious weapons systems as well as a fa ir share of both goocl an d bad clime tic 0 - tober that three basic consid era tic-rts wotu d g- i de staff planr in g 'or the proposed fut m·e command con trol of SAO Briefly a fourth nmnbe ed air force would be formed __ _o educe span of co11 tr-ol the mis sile o ganizations would b integrated at nm obered air -force a 11d ci vision levels and the south-north ·-------·-····--- - AfuR15ROi'ir lWJiie'IIErr A- Dit - o n -- c - e -- p lt -- w - o tu- •1r a r 5 -- e a -- d nh - e r- e a _- ti ' o C- i t- r -J- -a l # i--vt - c-5- rn g ----------- 22 - 4·· • ' A bases under each numbe ed air force These 23 I t IA g' li dalines were _confirrr ed on 18 October ft 21 -----·-- Lt V- · J P 1- r - ' r• ' - · t f • l lc lJ • uer • • • l' C jC U 18 l JCJ lC Al ' 1 Q a • Gen Charles B Westover D PlA - 'q SAC aL omman ci an c' Control of th Future 8AG Ji crc- 7 11 a ln ig 1958t Exhibit 1 DF D Pl t q 2A to c s 2AF 1iC r ma11t Goi1trol i l Oct 195e E dlibit 42 t t r '1i r c - n - ' ' I ' • - _ _ -1 i - - -1 · T T ' 'C • - ' hp1 J vJ t ' L ' i -0 l CL rC 1 • • -• i •t ' ni' J J 1 1 t 4T ncc r m1araders r C SSIF cf ct l 9 58 E bibit 4 ' ' UNCLASSIFIED 2 -- f' liistori cal D tc July - December 19 5 6 Cc mmari oer- l n-Chiei and the tn tr 1be 'ed P ir fcirce 99 commanders and or 0 iecetr ber 1958 e geogrl' hicd air f c rcG ppare ntly ha ct b- oe11 sh z l ve l t c r - he t-iliie 24 being U Under the realignment t yr ee a -eas we -e drawn vertically from north 'to south The center s ctc r was assignee to Second Air Fore-al the eastarn to 3i ghi _h ir Force and ·the wec ter 1 t Fi rt ee-r th ld r w s to lose Homestead Me cDill end McCoy ir Florida The ----· -·------ _ _ would be lost through tr -isfer to Eight_h Air Force Tri tu rn Secol'lcl Air Fo -ce wa o to gain imme diat ly from Eighth AiI' Force R • I Bong i11 Wisconsin Bunker H ll 1n ncli ne lor-bes 1 n Ita11$a s L ' co Ln in 1ebraska and Whiteman in Missouri Fifteenth Air Fo ce was to be little affect-ed by the _____________ reali gn- ___ _ ----------·-- ------- ' J M g CINCSJ C tc• Gorrd1 2 t FI et al IP7 99 nf eaJj g1 1m nt of SAC Ccm mand St -uctu -e 11 JO Dec 195e E h l ·°'it J I - 2 r· Hi i o · i ca De La J'J l y _ ·Decemba ' 1958 100 g ined fr im Eight A r Fore l- hi e li t• b ses were to 25 be lost o 1 ithe Second or Eight-h Air Force U In his public announcement General 1borr as S Power r ommander- -Ch sf Stretegic Ai Ccm nd naturen and designed 11 to provide more ef fective command and control of its bombf rdment and missile bases It was expectec ttto achieve greater equali- _____ ---·· ----- Z s t 1 c Lln L-10 f ___ · r e b a - s i c a s- c il Jti c_ _ _a n d p e r s o n nu e L JL o f S aAJ JC t s1--__________ _ 26 tb -ee m un ercd ir fcrocs in the Uniteo S t- tcs 0 C 27 General Power ts c n mc msr t also emphaeized The marty cher g s ·r·es lting from SAO' s bases development orogram tne integra tior of ijtei conti nt l ballistics mis siles ICBM u lits into the bcobe r force and i _ keeping wi t J t i t s co11cept of maxi- _ mum dispersal of the retaliatory strike force required th rsgrouping Good nana gen1ent cii ctated th-at the bases t L'1der the operational eontrol of the three --------- ---- -·- ·--· ___ ______ cn - u m berec air forces b realigned ·eo provide more effective co t ol feete con mwitcaticm and gi ea tar sell -suffi ciency Additiona lly the generally 11ortr -south alignment er be ses t ithi11 each numbered air force will further strength-sn tL16 cc mma11 a·t a ab i L- 1- tc y -- zt' c ----------- --- ---- carry o t its erti e issic U 25 26 27 ·----------------- Z··- -·•· - 1A - ' J • ' - v ' I u LAS IFiEp---- - r F Histvrical Data July December 19 8 The new yeer was to be faced witll ne-w b2ses new the meantime build-'J p ot· the he v r force NO 101 reaay and ciispersed ·es matt er of concert ed act-ton li 'O Jll D y F 'l l c l rrr J _ 1 't n r v J J - r fl v- j J • 1 -fi•• • By 1 ruly 1958 Second Air For e was movir g for ward rapidly in r -onve -t ing activating anc squip ling units and beses designated for B-52 d soa sal ma -a c n 20 Ji n u j' 195 t t o i be l t h B -n1b l 1ir•g -it• 28 1 · l t u s a · 1· r F' orce P uase Ok1 a h oma ' ' 1_ J u 1 y 1-9 _ 8' SAC-wida the B-52 flaet at t hat time nu nbered 335 Six of the refuelir g c szociates of thz heavy bomber the K 1 135 tanke -s hac also been d eli vared to ie c no - J r Force by tliat cat - 'l'wo wings t e tTti'ifiesvy Bomb Wing and the 4123d Strategic Wing the latter then temporarily t ining at Gars t ell had received t heir full B-5 bve11tory 'l'he 7t-b He ffy Bc-mb Viir g ' nao C lh- l t 29 receive d nine B-52ts 0A t r 0 r·er s t r p rt 1- c • i 11 t - J0 ·1 r t 1 n o f t hs ll-ti1 c h trii 1 g u q ll t11 Jt Jl J z r1 f r Eistc -y J _l' _t _ Li f • t • r· J · t - i l n _ • · · · • -t ·• a 1 · • -- C • · -- u L · - l t J ED A J ----- --- 7 2AF Histcrical tata JuJ J-- •- -Deeembe-r-- l95El Six months Liter· C l December- 195S 1 Seco 'ld ir F-orce possessed 93 B-52 1s distributed in four wings ith Heavy oomb wing - 30 3-52 F s llt h i iecn•y Bomb Wing - 32 B-5 E•s 4123d Strategic Wing - 16 B-52Ets and the t 23St1 St rat egjc Wine - 15 R-52F•s 5jxty five KC-135's wera d et ib ted me - f i e r refuol 30 ing squadrons A- 'J be 7th a d 11th Heavy Bomb Wings epperentlywere over-equipped under the dispersal concept This was a cernporary situation as two heayy bomb units were being quipped at b th Alt v s end 9ar w l Aif Force Bases with Et- - nt· Jal tran fer of one of t-hes units f1 om each base to another location in strategi c wing status 0 J A ____ A_t_ t_h at t e progra ir g plans weE tentative for- nine more heavy wings to be activated in Second Air Fo -ce -Two of these the 4lJ0th Strat egi c Wing at Bergstrom Air Force Base and tne 4228th Strategic Wing at Colu bus Air Force Base were already in active proce_s_s_ _ __ A_ ---------------- ____ _ 29 cont c d Statistical Summary 2AF July - December 1958 Append ix A 30P See not ehova 2A f ' 1iis vr·icc D c J·u ly - Vecembe ' 958 the llth Heavy Bomb W in • ' l J ci St a tegi c Wi g and 3 - the 7th He vy Bomb 1ii tg was on s hac i 21 e A fou h uni the 42J 8t h Stratggic Wing e t arl sd il e Air tlac t t ima a 1 c ugl1 1 t b ct Vt E S t i·· '- e1 veci r1y 32 At that time ths four Second Ah· Force B-52 units had 12 combat ready and 65 o l-com'bat ready crews Three ICC-135 U lit s had a t-c t al c-f 21 crews o ' w1Ji ch t '110 ki 're --ornbat ready By Jl 129 tc ital re 'I' 89 were comba t -e r i y squadl'O S hao 69 cre -1s i 7 combat ee dy ct r 33 B-52 a nd KC-135 cmnbat crew inttial training - - - --- -r onducted iiC Jir Jor LB se Stl i fornia -- ---- -·- -- 31 32 33 Progress Report o 13 2AF Supplement to SAC Pregr rn nf ·flan l-571 nconversio of -t e 11th Borr b din H Al us Air ----B a e --a r d _O r g • ------------ 1 zetion of the 4 l2Jd Strategic Wi -1g 1 Ca -sw ll Air Fol ce Base rr 5 Sep 1958 Ext ib1 t 46 -egress Reper No 6 2AF Supplerr en· to SAC Progl a triming Plan 15-57 • 11C -1wersic n o r the 7th oomb W i ng H Carswell Air F'C1r e Bast __ ________ _ ano Organization of the l JSth St rc tegic wing- Be rl ec al2 Air Force Base 11 29 Jul l 95 Exhibit 47 t F D He 4F t to C orr l 1t fJ r•e Fe rec - 195 17 F9b 1959 0 • iq 2AF' i1History c l J ly 195B to 31 Ds c bcr E i1j_ i t 31 -·-··· 1FIE'Cll -D------- · ·- ZJ r 2 - l oI'i cal iata 101 J ' lly - Dec mbe 1956 of the 93d Bombe -o ment Wing 15th AF This initial phase trair ir g was c signed to provicie selected heavy c ew members with the bowledgl required to opera te$ to cheir wings to continue up-gracing to combat Jl ready st atu s i l'-- After approx i mat ely eight no ths o trai11ins by t l°'a 4 13 Jd Stre1t qi C W1aa nd IJiQO lwO lt i hr - - j e October 1958 They were cr idnrc 1 cc lplet ely cap abl9 of pe fcr ing their ssigned EWO unter the B 52 weapo 1 s system The 11th Heavy Bomb Wing flew 535 t l C • • h hi r 2 m r g m i ssiom ar a 4 e n7- ng 2 o·Jrs in reac r _g- ___________ ·- combat i-eci dy Eitatus with 27 reac y crews The li 12Jd St·rat egic- ·wing became c mba-t reed wi-th 13 ready crews afte -- flying 200 trRir i missio s ir vcl virlg l 736 tra ining hours · j il' I JI SA0 h 1 - al 27-2 rz-52 Planni ng actors Ja11u ary 1958 35 Progress Report c 6 2AF Supp to SAO fro graremin g Plar 11-57 r cornrerdor cf the 11th Bomb vf i ng H · 1t1 t ir Force B ee and Orgar i Z tic 1 of tbs 4 J 23 l c tra- '- gi c 1 ri ngJ C rswell Air Fcrce D ss 5t at s of Jl October C · r • - '- -·-- i - r i 7 · • 1 ' •- - · •· J • _ • 1 • - • _ • -M • t - - V -· 4 ' '· J UNC tf src7 - Lh F lii tur ce l D ta T iJy - De - e T ber· J 956 by 31 December 1955 to supp l t a coni'b readiness capability Aircraft e s ignrnent s 'or these win s hich we re combat ready the 4238th had seven _of its 36 16 a ssig11ed crews in ready status The fifth 1 130th St rE1 tegic Wing at Ee stroo1 Ai Fo1 ce Base f c r t h i s w i ng w l e t-i be tr·ans ferr·e- int-o HE11 gs rcr 7 Ai i'B from Lc ring liYB i 11 Janu c y 1959 ' J Developn1ent of combat readi '1sss iri t he 11th Heavy Bomb Wing a11d the 4123d Str·at gic Wil1g was a unique operation which provided Second J ir Force nd ----·-•----- - --------- 'IC Jo 3 7 Progrsss Report Ko 12 2J F Suppl€ ll'1ent to SAC Progranuning Plan 15-57 11 Co1wersion c f tlte 7th Bomb Wing H Ca swell Air For e Baee and Organization of the 4235th Strategi Wing n - l e a __ li'-c• ' e ' of ·t - 1 C - -#' ' - --- -· - s- a t7 1- ir • _ c D _ e J _ - v J _ ci oe1 19581 n 27 Jan 9 59 - Y hibi t S Progre s Repc irt fo l 2J F Supple r iett tc S1 C Progra r - ming Plan 16-5c nB-52 Un i t Gem version and Di pers 1 s St e t ls of 31 Di ce mher 195e u 27 1' n 1959 J x 1itJit 1 9• UNCLASSIFIED SECR D 2 t F iis u1--ical t t ti Ju y - De ernber 1958 - -·• cur11stE 1 1 es l'hi e wf 21 g began i opsrs i onal training n 3-52 rs at il2 tus ir F o -ce B1 se ne i 1- 236 Strategic c nd constr-uction lere completG at the latter base In Ju y 2 958 wh0n trc ining wa a finally on a full schedule wit h ll aircz-aft delivered 2 t Altus Ai r orce Base• the rullway t 'lere ws s condemr ad for u sa D_ _ ··r o'' --be - r y 0 - - '- - 1 e - ' '· o n · t - r r J J I I --- --- _ _ _ w - ·--- c E -- c • J eYacu a t-ion of aircraft f LJ - app1 0 X inetely six months Op9ration INDIAN CL Y was developed tc perform th l s task This oper· t ion pl_ r directed the 11th Hea·ry Borr b Wing with assig ied aircraft and suppor·t e lement s an d the J 7th USAF Hospital tc move on 38 · ·-· ··· --- · ---t·-a-mp-o-r a-r-y-a-t-Jt-y--±-o -_ _e_rJ- p-r-c- - - r- 1 - t_e_l_y_s_1 ·-y-- -re- 0-1- t_fi_s_t_o_t _•1-1- ' _c_n __________ _ Sherman and Carswell Ai ' Force Bases begiI'-ni11g 1 August or i s soon s s prac i eble t nerea- 'ter Opere- --- ·---- ---------·---·- _ __ __ --- i•-- CJ i P r-ati 011s Plai il•3-5B 11 pe1•2t icn Hq 11th omb Wing s in 1 is e y 1t i J'ul y l95t Exhib t J i • - r tPl 1 _ _l' a --• -- -t 1 l Bri J tJj_ng 2AF Histcric l t ta July - ecembe 1958 107 periodic ins ec i o s and heevy n ai tenc r c weI'e t o be - accCJrnplished at Carswell Tl lo i 11th was direct d tv move minimum essential unit mission equipment m r E • I n- • • l • nnd um t support equipmenlj v Jc a 1 l rJg w J 1 1 u p_po C-t • Flight aircraft to Clinton-She -man anc Carswell and to attain ir ru imum capability as soon as p ossible after the movement was accomplished The wing w s r equired to maintain maximum EWO and alert capability at Cli_p tcu-Shet'lllan nd maint iin a state cf mobility J9 readine s o meet cu re t equire ments Ths ordar 40 i as e r ecu- ed OZ' i l3 t ugus 1958 jJ The Clinton-Sherman ramp was designed t o handle one B-52 wing and a 10-aircraft KC-135 squadron Tb e ----------'--- 11th Bomb Wing had to place two tactical squadrons and a -co ave-rting l'ef-1 1eli• 1-g -$qu tcl O ' l· OP b t b § •- ·-- refueling unit t trt-n i Z s t z· et 1 g tln1- l v· n g---·----- 41 before the temporary duty was finished U ·---·-----·------ $16 kD et alr S 11916 l vh Bomb Wi g ugust ' · - - -· UNCLA§§IFJEP ' '· 'I r 2i t n lie · ice Dat July - December 1958 tac ical sque c rons were coP ibi 'led into cme operat l onaJ sqvad 'o One personal aq i pme ee c i c 1 '1a s ee tab li shed e nd mainta ineo by personnel of the three ec uadl 'cns Key pereom1 1 f 'on these 1 l '1 it s and field all times The two 3-52 sq adr·ons were able by vir tue of the sj_milarity of hair missions to combine and rotate operatior S p rso msl Combat cr·ews of the two tactj ce Sq' r3d '0DS pla 'e i t biei- mi ssiQn at _ _ Ao r l t i s _________ _ 1- 2 goi11 to CJ inton Sbe -mar o lr t o fly- · U As the emporary c t ty o r-at ion d evelopeci it w2 s discc vered that th ' wo1 kloa d would not perrni t hea· -y maintena ice at Carswell J ccordingly all heavy main• enanoe with th e exceotic1n o f those recn d -e- - N- · • ··• ·---------- menta raed up during the Cerswell inspections was performed at Cli'nto l-SheTI l e'J'l Work h-a-d -·to ·be -acr on - ·---- -·-· ··--••·--- r -' 1 r s if c ' _ e - rd-- ri n- t r - e - o p -- e - - - l T 1 - a ra- r · -z-r 1- e i1- c1 - C - 0 - 1 ' ' C i 1 ' '' t - -1- -o - S- -- s 'i- r- - c -- a ----•--------- th ere were no iocks or hangars at Clinton-Sherman _ _ -·------··· 'i'his requirement for inspectio1 s and heavy mainter ance Jr st two rr cr ths of t he c pe ' 'at ic- i wh en th e wine w s l -2 Ibid - -- J '- U LASSIFIE• ------- - l ·- ·-- -·-- --- - ---- UNCLAS Jijfu SECR V 2 P istvrical D a July - Jec mbe - 1958 at Carswell a-r a 1y o 1e im1 Tnis Cleme ncled comiie tje realignment cf Lhe ma inte11ctn sc hecu le which r· sult1 ll in generation of a lesser number of orties Having less airc1 ft t 0 work wj r h J me am th it more a Lr-crc it on hsnd ad to be pt in 'lj d le o citicn d tl- lee selectivity in sircrsft·- to ··g no at e l J - 9 M · ·· Only noticeable pause in the for-ward pace of the 11th Wing wae car n llatio of thr-Cile of the sche duled bon ber stream miss l o 'lS fol t be month of August lli i t h 30 B-52- d rcraft ava i 1 - hle for t r-ainine purp i5F s 115 of 13 so1 t l r- s sdH dUl6o 1 1• flo tln ilwolvin g 44 e96 30 hours of B- $2 flyi 1g ti In September ere flown Octooer 'l3ring hours totalled 1 257 il r -- -•--· - - ---- ----------·-------------- -- B-52's including seve bo er strer m missions 'Without let-up curi r g this _period of spli t-- o pe ti-o ns - ·- -·-- ----- t_ '•r-c -- e- -- w 1 n- g - m e__ 1n eainaa cm1t inucua str1p #lert $ pa t·ti zj - ------ pated in t e bom ing corr petition a d other missio11s Ureoted by higher headquarters and kept up required air anc1 gr ouncl tra i r ir g equ lra nent-s The p2 a UNCLASSIFIED _µ I - --·-·· --· - ii l y - December 195 month the 11th eavy 3om Wing accompljs e d lts gradua-cion roissi 1 a um sirm ilet-ed co r ba- mission ALL S'l'JJts 45 0 M_ d monstrate capability of the llt a Heavy Bomb wing o er ecute its ernergsncy war orde in accordance th 50-59 1 - 3quirem nts upon ci tmplet ion cif c nversion to _______ B-52 e quipment During the e ercise the wlng WE S •j - 1_ -- a - - - J ercise off-1 oad wee pons• laur1 ob airCl 6 ft at d conduct a 1 el ectronic counter -n ee sur es penetration nd ter et defeneive t cti cs gainst 17cu d controlled intercept air interce t fighters and anti-airc ai t artillery rnissi o u c ont rol - 4 j_ J Al_ L S- 'tR was nt o - a r 1t _ 1-----t- ' - '-r t-t -- _ _ t--- t r_ s------------ - c 1- -· '-' -- -• -·· also the graduat ou er ercise for the 4123d Strategic 45 Report Air Trair ing Report f o - September 1956 11Commanderts Rema rks 11 in Hi stor·y 1 llt b Bomb ii- 110' C r- 10 -r l c-1• -i c h° yr -11 i 'f• 6 0PbiH1 i '20 5s d t - iAR · · 1th y n c t l 95 rl 1stC _1Y' llt j E-c- r t 11ling cva 1 er 195f 3J'J o r J_2 ------------ · r u t ' • nV • r r _ •• L-V-• - -Qlt ilG4 J ily - Decer ber 1958 ll i r·iefings by di ie ·ent sr ai'f tean s - - er-a p -apared a 1 6 off at two mirmt e i11ter-vals otith two aircraft in es ch ·- j oinGd the t ci ll th Wing a i r·craft to 'c rlii a t brGa stip cell The j l23d aircraft flew 1 500 feet abo' 19 tbe higbest 2ir-craft in t l 11th Wing cell neit her wing was au-chorized to delay or wait or ti 1e ot h r c d • I ••f 10-6t '·t '· • in -hi ch gen ration pha a an cl l und1 pha oi ld its graduat i r n exercise a l overall succe -s Certain a1 _eas i ol imprpve e_r 1t were __ noted y t e wing commander to launch aircraft un oa he ext'cutic n o tic n s lected extenci eci the ci raticm of the e xe r c se s cezsi vely ------------ ------- ' ··- -· '7· • UNCLA§§1f1EQ ---------· - UNCLASSIFIED r- 7' 0 ·r - • t·'t D e i ·1'- zr I ilistor i c l Lsta iul ' - December J 958 · r •• - -··r•--- ·ic pa•·1· --er 'Jl't -·· •·e -• 1- •• 'b •· r i c 'lC' e • 11 c -' w- - w ' o c _ - ci c c c _ c • l L u in e ' ensive air traffic cc r t rol clea1 al'H e changes and delays 'lne comma rider recommentied t ha in i'utuz·e exercises of this type if more than one unit is ii wolvec only one unit- llo tld prepare t be _operat 1 co1s Oi- l--1· _ 1 1 c a J • cont 'ol should be invested in the U li t which prepar·ecl the ope 'ations ore er anci aircraft should be prepe red anci launched accord i ng t c a 1 ass perJetration option in order to shorte 1 the overall hunch t ime Th-a J l t 1 W L ig Commanoer ' 'e1t ch t t h 1 s type of option i 1•0uld prov de - rncr-e 1--i 'a list ic t ei t c f a 1 riit ' s ce abil5 ty to g1 erate and launch Uli de r cbe most s e c treme operational iiirr ing f A Second Air Fcrce staff teams c0i- 1pose J of repre sentCttives cf the Operations M a te -i l and Intelli genc Dir ector ate s We e P re sep-t t 1 pth _Ca r_swell ap d 'I nese observe s consicered the overall performance of both wings to be highly satiEfactory aJ1d that oth •------ --- ------ -----------------·-··- -·-·-·-- wings were fully capable of performi g t heir· ass gii ed 49 i JA z ·to rr1issio - s I 48 _ LASS R ED $ 2Ai Histc•ic l Data July - December 1958 ll ' 'hirti n 4123d W 1g airc t wsr committed to flight and l flew the issicn as briefed Three ircraft substitutious wer uecessary two air abo ts caused two sorties to be rescheduled for a total of 1 scheduled sorties All aircr-a i't were launched withi the rec uired 30 mir u tes cf adju te tc ke-off time Thirt en sorties t•ere airboi ne exa ctiy on time one aircraf·t was launched five m1 1utes and another 26 minutes after take-off time Airc -aft cll post- trike landed at Carswell AFB Twenty-two 11th Wing aircraft were commi ted fc - flight All aunched on ima in acoo clanca with the pre-plannac schedula 50 with post-strike landings at Olinton-Sherman J J 'B In the mea ntime runway i epai -E at 1 tus AF a were completed ahead of schedule Four days afte its graduation exercise the 11th Bo nb Wing completed ope1 atio11 _INDIA N C AY and retu -ned to i ts ho1ne ·-----stJtiou rt--kl-t1 1-s-kF-B 51 # --------------------- - 49 cont'd 4123d Strategic W L g Heavy 03 l swell AFB Texas 5 Dec 195s EY hibit 51 ·---''i' f-0 0 ------ 'i - l l• J - rn $ 14 Jn- UPene- e o JT t - _ _ ______ _ _ J- J •• '1 - l - to tV 44 _ t' U_ Y I t l ' l i - i a -- V - to J ltn Bombardmer t Wing Heavy Clinton-She1 'ma11 FB Oklahoma tt 5 Dec 1958 EJ hibit 52 apcrt Fir alJ rrstatus of 11th Bc nb t'Jing Cperaticn WIAI CLAY ae of 1 Decer bor 195a Hq 1th 3W in P istor f 11th Bor i b Wing No· ember 1958 E dlibit l SIFt---- - --- ·--- ·· ·· 2f F Hi to1 ·i cal lit t-a JuJ y - e cember- 1 S 5£ l l i Clir t on-3herman i FBs prese teo a r 1y-re i6 of obstacles o effective o erat on of unit co - ver t ing r o new equipment In spita o ' the 1 e s a res zJ t of' CJ ce - lent oocrc inati n a ld coc-pe --a -ion e s weD es - 'e 'ive e -· · · r b 1-1 I · ' u · ·· _ ·· l e 1 • 1· • ' •·· - 'G-·' · '- rz'V I Y JJ gu€ 1 l QO f c 1 I J J v l VJ _ •11 IJ Wi ig atta i ned combat readiness as schc culed Durj ng the tempora -y duty at Cli n t on-SherIDa t wa a fou d that the orga 1 i ation becalile more closely Im it because the maJ rity of t he eople pa - -icule rly together but lived to ether They ct to b1ow e ch other bctb professionally and 'ocielly and t e rd esult was a better tr tinten r ce organizat i on lorki g tcge _her as c te s 1' ' nd ge 11_ rating rnor·e sort ies t han ------ ---- ---- originally thought pcssibl U After five mo i hs of training the 96th Air combet readiness or 26 fover ber- 1958 with 20 ready crews rhe tu it was declared oi' 'icially ready 011 15 ----- ·-------··----·-- ---- - r-u _ ___ _______ ____ ·---- - UNC LAS I-' £CRE - 2t l ' l istoi i cal Date July - December 1958 aircr·aft spa --es ar d e uipr ant be 7t h Air Refueling So uadrc -n CarsweJ Ai r F'or c e Ba f e had ready crews n Noirember By year's en 1 this squadror SAC established combat ready dats wvr th hesci cf tbs 5 o _February 1959 Acti rat5 cr and equipping of the 913th Air Refueli11g Squad -on was on s1 '1eduI e with deli vary com pleted on ten KC-1 35 's in December Su i'ficient In the case of tm 901 t Air Refueling Squadron at Columbus Air Fcrce Base tre ir1ing w as delayed due --· ---·-··· ···------------------- Progress Report No 9 Final 2AF' Supplement to SAC Programming Plan _l _-58_ ConversioI_l f the 96th Air Refueling Squadron H Altus Air Force ----- ---3-tt a- -to-K-a-- -1-3 Airel·aft1 St tus----a-s--vf--j-6-l rh o - '3 e 1 '11'1t- g I-------- l958 ti 24 Dec 195$ Er h1Dit 53 51 Progress Report No 9 2AF Supplen ent to SAC Programmin g Plan 6-58 t'P cti vation and Equipping of the 7th Air Refueling Squad on H Carswell ------- 14' c i i L-h e- Bt ee Sti t1 1s a cf 31 De e besr lS56 11 27 Jen 1959 EJ11ibit 54 55 Progress Report N • 7 2AF Supplement to SAC Pl ·ogramming lan 8-56 t Acti v tior and Equipp ng of tbe c th Id Rai'11 i · ' ' 3 1 ' • - _ • _ __ •--- --•--g •- ---- -•••1 -a-•-'-'-C A r Fc1·ce Faf e Status as nf 31 ecernber 195$ 27 Jan 1959 E x h i b ' - 55 Sr r- 1 II - 0 fa _ _ --------- 1 I EP ·--- • U mlED sE7 FRD V F H stvr1cal Dea ta July - Iie cember 1958 to cracking and brae king o tbe rur w ys _ • I at tt1at hasa 'l'he 901st had teen programrn d o receive two Kc-13 1 s ir November we to the --w 1w y problem these aircrs t plus eight others had been delivered to Be rl sdale ttii F·orce Be e pending avaHahili t y of 7 January 1959 that ColUJtibus runways were conciitionally ac epted and training began This e p ia dron had 12 56 GCTS craws assigned JJ' Ma miri g a tior s a 'ld lay-in of base spares and 2quipp ing o r ti1 -- 9i5 N1 Hr Hei 1 -i ' e sq_ dron at Ramey 11 ir- Force E se anc 1 the 9 -0 ir B ei'neling Squadron at Bergstrom Air Force Base were considered satisfactory at year --end The 915·th received its first KC-l 5 on 5 December with four e Gditional air- - --------·------- craft c ue f o - deli very d iring that month Crew - 57 training was to commence on l r uary 1959 56 P1'ogr ss Report Ne 5 1 2 t F u 1- f l iMint _u f C Program1dng Plan 14-58 L v1 i va-tion 2nd Equ if ping o f the 901st Air Ret'uel r _t Sq- c· 1 b 1s dr Fo1 c_ e Bas Stat us as of 31 I 2 cniber 1S52 i -- ------n Jan 19 9 fn 1 tib 1i tt-5 t6 •----------------- 57 Prr1 ' 'r·ets le-pc 1·t f c Final AF Supplement ·1 c S ' rct r ti 111 i a - m 15M58 rri ctivation and Z tdpp i ng _ - t t t J t · · ir Refueling sauadr·cn if i 1- Y id r· c r • Fl Status as of 31 L ecember -9 7' 11 ' Li r l S- 55' ' xhibi t 57 2 • i lstur• cl ca J uy - f c cem r 1952 at this 58 Ease 59 1 ta se i nd the 911th at • • 1 - -· I Sey Dour-Johr so 11 ir l orc t he enc of f c mber Re 'ueling S uadr·ons were Lo be r·elievec1 L'l Otii assigrl ment to Second Air orce and reassig ed to Eighth Ai 60 would be 11 l · wi_th one combat re d • unit t e 96th __ill _ ·- ± - L fl f i - c t-hers _j n ' t_r f- l f i r gress t c w 1 d comb t re a d b ss J'J JA _ __ _____ Dependent 011 theil combat ready st tus in relc - ti o to crews aircraft inven ory tl d aintener e 5e £'rOt l''3SS f epc rt r o l 21 F Su ploli1G 1t to C rror r tn1 n1 n s e 1a ' 6-5 ia_ct i - - J - ' · or H 2 1 l '' i- sr c 1 y· of 'luly 19 e to l JGC8i b r J i i - 1 - s#ieo e----- ---z- - UNCLA FIED -r--1Qc- RD ' t _ ' • 2 _1 o I stor-ica l Dd ta July• Dec mber 1958 -- p bil i t ' c Secc nd i i - orce- 5-52 w iugs wer-e reqairad to integrate into the $AC Aler Force on a graduelly in rea sing basis dU 'ir g -the final siY months of 1958 The 11th Heavy Bomb ·t1il' g began strip horr-e stia ti on al13r1 on i July with combe t cr w and ratio1 the 4123d Strategic Wing assumed this posture ori 1 Sept ember Both wings ere required to meet the full SAC alert area requirame ts by tbe end cf 62 11 December after havin reached full conibat re diness - Y - ---·-------- -- -- a__ - _ __-- -------- ___ __ AJ r Fi QY1 J -c1 ___ i i i _f ' l t f t 9-1'' 1 $ - w 1e_ - 11 - elsrt ore duty For eaoh f lircraft 011 alert• 35 combat ready c- -ews were requir d on the al art roster Seven crew aays per week wsre available fo alert - - a- '•·- r- ' 'he 4 35 ratio permitted sufficient Gime to perforrn ·-'-- --- ----·- --- other required cuties suer ea flying ground traininb tower a 11d -briefing officer necessary t emp_orary dµ ty 63 leave an t lme off 11 Prior to upgrading to combat ready statas each E-52 c ew was required to undergo an alert proceciures 62 1- I ---- ----------·--- 2Af Hi st ric l Dat Jt4 1y - Decel' lber 1955 proticiency check Crews wer s hei lsi fer o a clay ts training under upe r vis i on of qual l f I d instruc crs for each rew csi'tiion in p -c ceduras fer pre-flighting c11cl cocking 2 n tl --a 't In st uctcrz tben siU ' lated the alert warninc d the cr w in t ·aining 1 - s requirt tl t list progress o 'iLFA a d then to BRAvO alert condition ' 'he wing cor lLland pc-sts were notified wben these alert conditions were attained and that e ig i nes wei s be l ng __ shnt ooJrro Fo11owi n eng ine ere ft Inetr-uct rs ther cl i tiqu d 1 h ern J fti r this crit ique the ert was a gair simul s- te-_ £ nd the c l ew was required to follow th 'ough to a COCA ondit1on ______ Alert procedures wer 1acs a part of the proficiency check by standardization perscn el prier to upgrading 61 a crew to combat re dy status U Sin a aircraft were on e I ert 'o-i- s ve 1 d ys a lc airc ews far either three o - fo' I 1ays a definite plan was followed for crew changeover ta insure con tinuous coverage ot assignsc lert 1 -crties t lthcc gh ---------·-----·•---·- f l • ' 2 F tc i al Jata J uy - December 1958 · _ _ Bomb wing The 4123d Wing changed it s Scrtie No l crews c n i•fonday and Fri day i 'i e t he aircraf1 en Sortie l c 2 wera assigned as dir·ected by Se - oncl A ir Force Opera - tions O •d r· 50-59 C ews were requi -ed t o complete necessary target and r-oute study ar d other aler·t 'll l • -- - • • --·- -- - it affectGd t beir ae signGd missS c -J s 'ii'e ther· br ief irigs were corlducted daily at 0600 f c r all 4-12J d alert c ews at whi h ·t iroe a flimsy was given t o the e i1•craft comtnallder A seconci flimsy was pi kad up by the crew bGtwsen 1800 and 2200 hours CST Briefings and · flimsys inclurled target ··a lti t-uce enroute winds and fore ast contour hsight s A gei e ·al out look for target anci post-strike· areas was also provided at the b iRfing To covar all phases of che Alsrt For ce b I uNcu s SEC rRD T 'ul e noo e 1 t -u 1- 1 L-•01 i•'l ' •v to 1 er I ' • • U t - • __ f c - a- • -·• t -• 1 1 - - ••--- l 'orce Eases was ii 1 eluded in each flims • ¥ 'her ever depart-i re and enroute weather acco -ding t o the EwO sc -tie number 66 iN All al --t aircrews were thoroughly farnil i i rj zed w t th SAC JlOSi ti v·e orrc -ol 'P c clures Pcsi ti ve con the Alert Fo -ce ail'•bc 'ne s c c 1 its 1 Y to the t r get with the positive a sst11 ence t 1at l'lO aircraft would penetrc te euamy terri or-1 CJr the e a lY wa1 l1ing net without further pe ific orders to proceed on the - - st -ike mission Each alsl t sortie ha d its pcsi tive control point beyc1 d which he flight could not cori received The le t crew i c aft comn ar ier was required · to sign 2 pos i i- i ve cor t rc l ce t if l cat e ---------- ·- ·- · · 1 J IFI - - _ED------- - L I r I I· ' l ' -·-·- Jul ' - Decembe - 1958 Ot her of'fi er crew memb rs were raq1Jirec to cou - er-- sign the ce tiiic a e 67 JI' Selected 4123d S rategic Wing aircraft were cycles w re applied to an alert aii raft prep r - tion for alert# I - Airc raft cockeo11 end in alert status a11rl III - removal from alel 1 status Ale t aircraft were e ssigned the highsst mair tE nar ce ale -t status t 1ese grotl ld crews were t-equir-ed to thoroughly study Ale1·t Force SCP rs The day befol'• coming on lert they were required to ' l 'loergo several practice ru ls according to the checlr-list mce1 ·the supervision of the ··aiert for ce-s line ·- ·· - 6C chief U ·-- -·--·---------- SR l lert Force SCP 55-7 Positi e Ccint i •c J ' q li-l2Jd St rat Vig 22 Sef_ 1958 i n H sto 'y • l l2 3d Strat wg te 1te rc ber 195S Exhibit 7 l lGrt r- ''orce SO 66-1 Strip Alsrt ll'iaintu an ce Force Procedures tt Hq 412 3 l Sti st Wg 1 22 Se 1958 i n History 4123d St re wg Septe -J er l 5b xhibit 7 S _ SIFI ' - - -- T ··--· UNC J -f jgD _ Vl SEC HRD 2 F istorical ta J ly - December 19 6 Whan an aircraft as de la r•ed a ld cesignatec as a11 alert aircreo i''t the follo 1ing actions were akan t o place it iri tbe e1 e1·t config 69 uration l ircraf't was towed to fuel pit 2 total alert gross weight 3 Aircraft ws s fueled to alert load 4 Aromu ition was loaded -------- 5 '----- Eeguireci ECM was installed 7 Ccl l eras l e -e ir i st allecl and loec1ed S Liquid c • 'gen we a fully se viced 9 Water was serviced if required 10 Bomb bay in desired cor Iigure tion and ·----·------ ·----- -·· ---------- ring-out current 11 Weapons were loaded after aircraft was epot ed· on ·alert 12 tny other munition requirement was met · 13 'All air inlet wing and vertical - stcrbilizer- - p u gs wer·e remover 14 Grzmaries were p1 t en board lJ UNC S SEC D ZAl Ii st vri al Do ta July - Decexr ber 1958 ' J Occe these steps were acco1tpli she j th i Ti-3 and MA-ll wiits were plugged into he a rcra t gr·oWLd wires we -e connected chocks e nd £ire e xtin guishers were positioned plugs and co ers were replaced as requirec 1 e U pe nels docirs l ld hatohes ' 1 door lock and by-pass keys wel e l 'emovetl a i d t l e grou d interphone wes col ected and properly stowed The aircraft were moved each l S hours to rotate the ______ ___ tires liquid 0 i 7ge i was sarviced daily and ·tanks r · -- - ---------1' Z ere tapped off aft er au b engin o J 0-1 v 1 gll t________ _ ' and maintenan ce c rews were required t 1 p re-flight 70 the air craft daily U Aviation depot squadrons were required to lead thermo-nuclear weepo11s and 50 calibre AP ammtmition Thermite grenades were furnished the grotmd crew at the time of weapons loading OoE b 3 142 ·use -sec -·-2 t68 · a l c FRD · ·· ··--- -- - · ---· - __ Parachu tes were not lns alled en these weapons ·-· __ _ -- - - --- Aii- Poree b 3 Sir ce this weepon was gas --·•--- --- -• --- -- ·- _ --r• - • - · - -· 42 use sec 2168 a I c FRD I i UNCLASSIFIE -0----- - ' i _ _ _ __ ' I ' j L----·- ·- ···-· i I ' l l UN riD SE -- - D I '-' 2AF f is crical Jata July - Decen be r 1 58 125 boosr ed bon b be y cic•o s had to r -e lef t ' pen et e 11 times wher the weapon was i t the bay Grou ld and safety procedures were rigidly followed anc i 1 the event of bc l'l'b hay cloc1 closure• av r t i 011 epot parsonnel were r-aqui eci to run e st fer a ny tritiur J saB le kage A ci a ily li -re i ispectio 1 of wee pons including visual check and humidity readings was 71 r o - made Pr O As in Second Ai Force's B-47 wi gs quarters crews As in the medium bomb w ngs lso the h avy alert forco was est- d periodically under the four types of alert conditions ' 0 aler-t in osition on the llt h Heevy Bomb Wing and41 2Jd Strategic Wing did not change the primary objective of upgrading silfficis11t combat sortira'-wise The u grac ing program dur i ng July- --------------·- 71 Alert Force SOP 1 36-1 11Munitions Support 11 i q 412Jd St rat g 22 Sep 1958 ir Eis' c 'y 1 4123 Sti ·ati t 1 g Se1Jtet ber 2 95 t E l i b 1 t 7 f t I UN ED SEC FRD f' i svvri cal Dat a T j_y - e embe ' 1958 Stratesic Wings £-52 c1•ew personnel we1·e ob cdned principally f rcm for' rer B- 36 cre lls B-i 7 trained crew members end ex-lJ-52 c e members Minimum require- - • ' ne ti- ' 4017th Coir bat Crew Training Sqt rrin at Castle Ai ' Force Base The formed crewe were th ln assig ied to their home B-52 wing for intensive p ofi ciency training to reach coin E ft ready stetus ' 'his entailed ---·------------ ------------ ------------------- - --- records were sc14 eE-n d by t he wj ng t o valuai e his previous performance al1d to ic ent i fy his areas of w-eak-r ess - i'he 1· s±n-ce···r he ·- r-ew memb'er-s ·wou id' live ·· together rrr ch of the tirne duxing alert and similar assignments their compatibility with one another was determined in as much as possible The third step was--a--t-b-erc ugh -ai r and- ·grou nd ·prof-±·yiericy ·tT1 i n ing - C 'cle with emphasis on emergen y procedures related satj sfy the Ste nder izztio 1 D dsion thc t tl ey wGra -------------- ----· - --------------1'1 'LV I ' A ' E t J c i c t l l i - -1- July - Da cei 'ibe 19 5 - i -- rJ iftar 2 3sigr ment tc their nome wing t he ne r - of ground t r ainirig per-cirient to he B-52 Spread Reporting L• hours Eje tion Se t 'l'l' 'f liner 4 hcurz Special Weapons 16 ho --s Aircraft S ecialized Bombillg Systerns 1• hc w s 1 Positive Cc-nt ·ol Proceduref l hom ' C 'uise c_' -rol Perfc nnanc Comput er l hou 1 y·steam 2 l ours Pneu n tics 2 hctu S c u1d Targe t Study l O houl 'S 'he r ii 'c 'ai't comm rn der a 1ci o-pilc t were· requ-ir·ed to· ' dergo e 1-1 Of · these · Th e- n-avi-ga to r- radar naviagtor ECM Ol c ' tor and gunner irl•e -e e i cu ed - ----·-··- ·----------- from some pri cipally those subjects concerned th 74 aircraft flight ope -atio1 ror exar rple engines U · Jlhe -fl-yi-1 -g · trt·i n i-ng -cycle· ·wa-s divided -in-t-o--- fo- -1r -- - phases 1'hese were the p1 e-sclo post-solo st nda rd- - • - • - - • • --- -•1N II • •• 1 - • • - • • - • • •-- • •-• • • · JA - · N' -- - _ -___ _ •• lf ED · 1 t -------------··- ·------------------- UNCLAS SEC RD '--- 2 AJ ' Hist C l ical l a a July - Decembe1 1958 I --- 1'he pre-solo pht se fcm ra ly c-nsi stec of -ch 6C missicll1s Refueling was schedulec on every miseiou The first mission i11cluci ed guttrier··y p -$olo tran sitioc for the aircreft commander ano co-pilo ref ueling ECM and pre-solo check fc llciVigatcrs The thi -d consis ed of l la Vigation bombing Ct i a nd pre-solo checks for pilots a 'l'tcl the ECM operators Pµrp ose of the pre-solo phase was to complete each cr ew member in SA CR 51 19 requirerr nt s an rl o g i v ee ch CI'ew meniber fl'ee pract- i ce at work bafo a flyirlg 75 for re ord U f lten a c1 ew had complete i •ts pre-solo checks it was then declared to be a ombat ready crew and ready for e try into the po st-solo phase This required the meeting of all combat ready l equi ements tH ····sp c'i ftet by-·S·AtJR· 50--t ·· Train·ing·-rro·gress-f Or ·B e- · -· -- · Unj ts and ircrews for one trair ir g period with he ·· -_ mp l ·· F- t-h -i a d°i i-aticn ·ijSe - -w fct1 as --df -e c·t ·ee _ _ __ by higher hea lq1 i_arters were usuir lly allo atec t or this phase of upgrade ··- _ __ _ ·--·-·------· - -·--•-- ' 2 E· listo i al 8ata T'J lY - De ember 1956 D Af - 129 uch as tankers and --Qder bomb scori11g RBS sit1 1s si vely devoted to rader RBS ievigation pilot 76 proficiency and G11i U readiness ir a y giv9n area until it had accomplia d consecutively the nun1bar of items callee for by SACR 50-8 wit h a realiabil ty of 7 per· ce it or better F 1 eY amp i' i ve ra«5ar R3S runs wer-e c emencied by 50-81 a crew i 'l t h e J p rading pro ess ad to f-how 75 percent o b tt r r' lli1 1 b ilj_ty cn1 their five most recent runs tv m though i v was not a recurrjng 3ACR 50-6 raquiren e 1t c 'ews ware expe ted to attain e night heavy we ight -e fu eline apabili ty before being designated combat ready Svery effort was mace to include tanker rendezvous whenever pos- '77 · si b e cu i' 1g 'thl l pe' 1 it· ·--sc 1tn· 1is•s- i ons- ·-·· ·-fU· ···· 'when the post-solo phase was completed• the • ·-·---·- -- - - -· - · ·-···· ---- ···--·-· ·•--·--•- c-•- - ' Cr · ' l S----Wl l e- ·cln cke l by· fre-St--amlar-di-za t ·i-c n ·• ·Dirl s i o · · - _______ ___ __ -·------·-··· ·- · 6 77 •· -- - · • · - _ UNCLASSIFIED SE RD 2 J l istori ca Lat a July - vecember l956 generall y duri ig two eight-hour s rt ecs If the crew passed this check system t hen it was eligible for upgrad ng to combat ready status end entry · 1nto 7G it s wing's Ew plan Di maru1er with the exceptio s o ' these c per tions pe cu liar to the operat o of ta ike - air raft such as fuel handling in airborne hook-ups rendezvous operations and aquatic surv-lva l Initial training was also ------·------ -------- ---------- ---- --------------- ---•--·••- conduct ea by the tre in jng u nit at ast le k f U · Resu t·s ·of thi's intensive cr-ew up-grace ·tr ir i1 g in the B-52 wings in Seconc Air FN·ce dttr i 1 g the July December 1958 pe -io6 are best vold by looking at the reco ci of prog ess At the end of July _________________ the llth _ ___ Hea 'Y Bomb Wing he d 35 B-52 crews a ssig 'l edj seven were combat readyt the remaining 28 were non-co nbat ratio of 1 6 ·to 1 he wing had 72 9 percent of its ---· rograrr med-·crews- ·assigned -· Twel -ve· KG--13-5 crews 'ef'e --·· ·· --· ' · _· -·· - - - - 11 o J i 'w 4 I UN SSIFIEO • i- ·_l UN IED SEC r r · ·· AIL-- 2lF nistc io l D a July - De ernb6r 1956 the llt h i' ' 1 ' s -St1 J ir Refueling Squad cn 0 thase nine crews wa e Three or these were still in 1 raini 1e at Castle Air Force E se rir1 additional nim li 0-135 crews cu- o been fcrmec s t aioinG cre - s so these were also at Castle t this time but The 7th He H'Y Bomb tling ha 1 26 E-52 and ssven KC-135 ta ti al c re s which had completed Castle trc il' ing Jictually this wil ig l ac J2 B-52 e 11 d 1e KP-115 t'Pl Ji•ed r r-ewe_ assigr a d _ In a e i t I _ pn_ 1 n are were five B-52 a '1 two KC-135 staff cr ws Dllr'ing July Ghree B-52 cl ews and five KC-135 crews entered Oastle trE i11ing The 4123d hed a total of 13 crews assigned at the end of July fi re o f these were combat reaciy The fourth cf the 3-52 wings in Second Air Force at micl-year whic 1 1 ad a crew comple ment -w·a·s· the - 4E J$th -S·t -nt eg·±c· Wing at·· Earksdai-e -P i -r·- · · Force Baseo Al ho igh this wing had l1C B-52 ai 'craft - -_ -·--e -ss-if n-etl --i-t ni1cl one- eor - Jat- 0 1 e-aciy 3 -5£ --ex-ew··an-d r·-· a ·- --· -- 80 l DF D P Hq 2A to OI Hq 2A t7 t• ·listory of Corubat C1·ew Force - l J ily 1 56 to Ji Daca nba - 1958 n 17 Feb 1959 Zxhibit 31 RBport Comdr th BmWg to C i N J C 11 B- 52 'onverei· o' ' p __ 0 c e -r 1 0 i J c·c 11 V £ ••- JQ- _ _ t j -'1-J• 'J • • • o J-• ¥ • L 7 'J J'-'1 in Hietory 19th Aj Divisirn l-31 July 195e 11 xhibit 3 UNCLAJ mo· SEC' 7 · · 2A istorlcal Data J· ilY - December 1958 non -ready c e s 1e1 e tlere seven nori- ci ir t l'ead -' 62 KC-135 crews assigned JA The Se om Air Force conime nd tctal on l July 1958 consisted of two combat ready and 22 non-combat ready KC-1J 5 r re ws and l combat ready c _l'ld 6 n O ' l• l' u B r hs a d cf O t-c be - t-h e llt-h Heavy Bomb Wing and 4123d Str- tegic ir 1 t had reached full combat readiness end demonstrated t ds on 20 QI Novemb9r By 31 Decemb9r the 7th a d 423b'th 85 Wings we e on the V9rge of full readiness Se cond Ai - Force - ew st-at n s en tr t date wes as f'ollm s _ B-52 - 89 • 1ttiba't r·eady arid ' ° non-combat 'ee dy- K0-135 - 11-7 combat 1 eady and 22 r1on-combat ready This repre sented a command net ge i of 77 B-52 co nbat ready crews and i J KC-135 combat ready crew _t_h_a_ -- --- 82 a por t- tHea vy- Bomba dment l aining · B eport -- 'l' ay June July 195g Hq 412Jd Strat Jig in His ory 4123d Strat Wing 1-31 July 195A --··-· · ·Extri-bt -·1 1 · -·-· · ··-·-----··-· · --···· - · - ·----- -· · e-3 DF j 1' Hq 21- F to CI Hg 2AF 1 11History of Combat rew Force - 1 July 1958 o 1 Dece ber 19587 '- l 7 -F eb - 5-9 -EY hibit jL ··- ··-·-·-·- -· - - - - ---s4 • ·Pro-gre-ss ·-Rep-ort-'- u -· t2 '-ZKF 'Supp-·t-o- -SAC Pr --- - -- · - - -- · rair in·g Ple n lJ -57 Cor v-er-s±on ·of the ll th'···· t' orab Wing H Alt s Alr Force Base and Orgard atio i or the 4123 d Strategic Wi 1g Carswall Air Force Base Status as cf 31 October 195e 22 fov 1958 Ex l-dbit 33 85 2AE' Monthly Analysis iecerr ber 1958 25 JF n 1 ·59 lzdlibit 32 ··- - -------------- UNC 1 A sE c7 RD IV L A His ical ata July - Deceoiber 1958 J MIDDLE Bf ST-LEBANON CRISIS J iD B- 52 ALERT OS1 l1 UflE f ull st nd-down J J ale-rt on l 5 Jcly 1958 as tical crisis proved profitable to the 7t h end 4123d Strategic Wings at Ca swell d the llth Heavy Bomb Wing at Altus This conm and ale t which lastec through 21 uly en blad Hsadauarte s Second Air _____ ____ _ _ _ _ $'7 bring a B-52 wing to a state of collibat readiness At Ca swell Air Force 3ase only the 4i2Jd Strategic Wing heel e combat epability at he tir e ---------- 'fhree of 'the 7th Bomb Wi 1g's c--ews and aircraft e e - -·· --- ·-- temporarily integrated into the 4123d Wing during the COlr lli t ment • The 11th Bomb W'i 1g at Altus Air Force - · ··-------- - - ·- -· - G6 - F---- l l p Hq o _r t t ' l q f ie' l t -J ST' ·0 1·y· •l' 1' ' - I c L J • __ • - r _ '• · - Gomba t Crew Force - 1 Tt ' ly 195c to 31 iece -r - ber 1958 tr 17 Feb 1959 Exhibit 31 Msg Com4r 19th k i tc Comer 2f F f c ET ZIP Ci 07- i 0 0 11 eP l t i l i fi r - - t tl' er f Ri rp C• J _ • - - '- • ' - -r P•• - J - - -- - • tR i'ra 1- l 1-'our r T •• i 1•ru il J i l -• Ql· 71 - 7 1 r J Y - Uu t Y L 1- • • i C J J i IJ 29 j u l 1958 lli hi bH 1 Ibid - - Iv _ • cjtl6L ASSIFIED ------ '· ' - --· -------- - -- 2A nl 8 l u ·i al Del La iulr - De ernbe - 1958 134 B - tse w th JO air 'ai't an ri 35 crem e ssigno ci l o 3 e itered the alert at 1400 hours on 15 _Tuly - A 'I'he 19th Air Di dsic i at Carswell AF3 su pe - visor r comrr an d at the t me for the 7th and 4123 d Wings c• 1sidered this Eta nc-co - particu e rly ready posture Plans and procedures U 'l er develop ment at the time fol mainte - ance gens -ation the ·alert force a d command post were test d a- d 90 ________ e_v_a_l_ua_ t_e_c_•--- r - JA _________ ___________ ---- - - ----'$ e L m valid p os f - i v e- eo r -1 - _ Ql - p_yel W s 11•er-o_ c- 1 ________ _ ha d and issued to 4123d Wing eircraft o menders o f the seven VICK ST3 IKE crews r-equired under Option 14 Se ond Air Force 50-59 wo Thirte n of 15 combat crews aeeigned were available t Ji ble hcur Cf these 13 crews t'v ware lead t ree were comba't - • • • · • • • • 1 - ••- •• - - I • • • I ready and five ware SACR 51-19 solo non-combat ·readlr··bt rt-··c-0 1 sidereu- ·cap·abie· ·of· -er e·out· l n g···an · EWO···· mission Three of the cr-ews h d lot cottpleted ·· --·-- -·· _ ----·--r -1 90 Repo -t Win5 ·G·eirnn andar· s ·Repor li · B t -2 -7- oi- ·Shi · Alert 15 Ju ly 56-21 Jul y 5fj 11 P q 11 BW n History 11th Bomb Wing l-31 July 1958 tx hibit 7 l r C z lot· t - - 1 -p •isg om ir _ n _ J o m oz· • t Llr L ' 07-086 11 ' fe • -t 2 n 'i _ tic ' - - i•o t • -- 'r'- - • --- • -J ' - -t f •cr1i Ablf ' Hc1ur 15 Ju y Thru hle Fl ue- S i x Day·y rr 29 Jul l 950 E th i bi t 61 · ' ' ' -1t Jm LASSIFIE - UNCLASSIFIED CP D 21- F l isto10 ica l Da - a Jtl r - e embe 1958 135 EWO mission Consequently ten -l2 3c W L'1g rews were assigned for EnO 50-5 so ties The th ee 7th Heavy Bomb Wi lg combat read r eJ -B-52 instru t or crews on stat j on 2 -r toe- tit' e we -e n5signeo three e edit-ional assigned the 4123d Wing wer-e co re eci immediately A lLi th sortie was e ssig ed to a non-combat ready but quaiified crew which had rat urn ad fr lli lea Ye on 21 91 - IA July j'J t he flon- -eady c -ews prior to beginning the SACM 55-7 92 schedule for take-o f f ge iel ation 3 --------------------- 'l' he 412Jd Wing had been initially scheduled tc start alert force operations with one aircreft ano crew ··on-·3 --Augus·t 195e SAC· ·e t·e i·ded this sntry · i I'l·to the alert concept U 'ltil such time as ten co bat ready ··· · _ ···•e Fews °' i eule°• -be- a-v- ai-iat le • g_aa s-eciuei-itTy i t -ei-i- ·- - fc1 cilit ies were not completely op ati cr e l c r 15 Jul '• 'l'he conm i t 1t e -1t · u1riar O t or 14 of the Eii '0 t o seven -------·-·--·- ----- ---··- 91 9 Ibid Ibid -- - •p• · - • A - • - J · -------- UNC - sR 2 AE1 l-ii f o •·ical Jal c July - December 1958 136 te ke-of'fs at E hour plQS 40 e ri d E p us 1 03 naces si t a ted es-ra blishm ent 01' alei·t i e cil i ties 2J1d housi1 i for a tottl of' -- ine cre 's o i b se t pl actice te t 1 euorte-d t tl aeir· air-craft i l fr-01 1 i ll l·ee to 3ight - '1 al and one-half minutes J M Fifteen aircraft -were assigned to the 4123d at Able hour ·l'hirt een of these air- - raft were generated two could not be fo ecast due to ajar structural ---··-------·----------·------------------------------- _________ r_e F_Jt ___ - i_ r ____ o_ _c_n_e_ « · c __ ·_a rn ---- - t- l k l i r t J ·- J _ f_ u e a· l - l _ o a l ----------- 94 on thra other l l DoE b 3f · 42 use sec 2168 ---------- a tl -e f_FR Br --·--·---------- -----•·----···-·--·--·- ·· ---- - -- -- - -· - -- -· ------- __ ·--· - - · ____ --- -- - ---- _ 4 - · Ji · Ger eration r te i' r ie tli p6 r ed £-52 equacrcn z --·---- ------ 93 Ibid 9 Thi d • 95 lbic -✓ I j - UNCLASSIFIED 2 F Historical Dst2 July - Decemb r 1956 ------------· - 2 ACR 55- was n et or ex ed a wit h cf th ee r ircraft Air Force b 3 42 use sec 2168 a l c FRD 137 The 11th Bomb ili g gene -atiot rate was hincie ·eC to a degree as a result of the aforementioned weapon loading decision and also because o f ECM' equipment deficiencies The Ei O required that weapon lo di g be accomplis 'lad in a msximum limit of two and ot1e unable -co meet thie ti ne limit because t uth criz ed K-l heists had been s cstit tsc fer- by C-9 heists which we -e extret1tely poor in design age anc q ia 1 tity shortage of c' ual capability racks caueecl additional --------- - ------ 1 o ad in g difficulty of the 60 du l ra clts required by 97 J A the wing only 52 were available 'l J ' was enco ntered by the lltr Bomb Wing early in he ale1 t-- - --8ub-s·e-qtien to·- 60--hcurs ·enough EeivJ--equi-pment ---•-···-· --·· ·- -- - -------- ·------- ·-- - WC acq rire i to e-c ip 27 e ircraft in t e 7-hcle -· ------- -----·---- --- ------ ' ' - ----------------- UNC ED JA sECf • uU VV 2iiff l istvrioal Dcit July - ecembe 1958 A co ifigu ati ' Followil1g tbe resUli p ic in of normal activities the 4123d iiing O l 23 July wa required t-o put e n a maximum ef'fort 10-ai rcraf't bomber strea l'l mission Weapons were downlo oed a d the ircre tt '1 ere 6efuej l O drop tanks 'l'he pw ··posa of t iis missio i pa -tly was to teei' the quality of mai ltena ce provic d durir g the alert geperatiorJ phase N i ie of t - e t en scheduled aircraft accomplished take-offs at 12 minute ir 1 terval s 'I'he tenth ai rera ft abortec o t-ak -off due to materiel f ilm•e of a pne- tmatie duct tb1 -s t-er h ' I' 'f i toc l c ff J 12 hours later All ten ai rcraft flew the mi ssicm as briefed No major ma ir te 1E n e troubles were noted The alert by spotlighti _g status of Second hir Fo -ce I s B-52 training eifo s stimulated p -og -ess duri11g the following months 0l 'ganizational and c ontr ol dei' ect s wer-e--r emedi-e-d on tte--•St Qt -l-n -moE 't-·- instance s during the a_ert ter1el anc equipm nt _ _ c eri c ia ncies al er - f acilities a d t su b J c ig- - 99 - ---- ---·-- ·--- ---·---·--·- -----· items were again c£lle6 o the et ention of 98 co UNCLASSIFIED SEC RDµ Historical Jaca July e- ember 195 termnce equipr shor ges wGre s p --cbl r i e rc fc r all heavy bs ses r o n erly echeduled s sa1 ellites scl program required c major adjust mi nt in tbe J ir ateriei Ccrn - i nd equipment buy pr·og -am vn l liugu st Sl lC acl·ll'ised Se ond Air orce that the equipn1e11t would unit be avaiJab e a t a time compatible wit h programmed 100 move J A Const ruction c - ---- -·------ were being very clcssly monitored by SAC That h ad qua rters st ted that the p -ogl am fer occu pancy cf Second Air F'o --ce bases sho• tld proceed as scheduled with the exception of Shep pal d Air_ F'orce Ease which was to activate a B-52 strategic wi g in -Tanuar r 1959 Tb is program ttas e ected to slip frcm four family housi11g MB-2 docks heavy duty access ramps requiring close s- f s pel'visic 1 tr rou d iou't tba -101 f '1 d 1 ru 1 D • '1Q • r par o ro _ v • y o 3- ·eca oer 1956 T lCJC 101 Lt Hq A ic Comd ' 21- 1 1 JF'I '' P1' bl 1 iJ ' 11J J · F il E H 1 ij · i - e ·Sc l B es Aug 195li Exhibit 62 J reas H - Th £ -- sn ·-Afo -------- - ' ' J I UNCLASSIFI RD 2AF Hi bc ·i a l Dc t Tuly - re ember 1955 • r _ A fine l sig11ificant operati mal consideration d ring tha 1958 B-52 KC-l 35 intGgr tion pe -iod was t be application c f bomber stream ta ti s to t a ning tactic developed f or one phase of the operations of high-speed high altitud jct air ra 't Th G aircraft low on target penetration and approach resembles he fl uw cf a b L ·ser i a - nootl cc 1 Ln e · pt ed pl o •-e - sion either siugly or 1n cells o ' air·craf t A principal di f'ferenca between bomber st eam and the earlier i'ot'ILation flying is i ilat reference t o othe r s ir reft is by electronic rat her t lun visual mean s -- -----' he--hee- Oftd---M P-oo -wi-th 2 52 ai t pi-- --------- craft in operation were required to fly from one to eight bomber st ea rr missions ea h month J 1 ' c1 ximum crew training as outlined in SACR 50-li J was required to be accornplished 1 these r dssi This ·as in 02 nterview MSgt J V LeBJancs jf · nr-if 1 wi•·h JI-Taj H R Eriar'ter Combat Opn 1 Brs Ops Divs D 0 Hq 2t Ii·t 19 J y 1959 A A -- 1jMCLASSIFIED ------ ---- UNC B SEC rrh --··-- · --· - __ _____ _ - ··----- ----------·-· - 2kil histc ri cal Data Ju y - December 195S The 1th Heavy Bonib Wing 1r issic 1 of ll 1 -Tuly 1 was a typical e am pl e of trc ii ii lg re_qw r·ec i c ur lng - str·ec m rr ission 'l'here ere eight requiremenr s o - e ground position indi ca tor GP nav-bo r b r lieeion 7-i CI radar bomb ecoring tB8 runs t-wo grou 110 con- -v-11 - v ·' 1 i c p 7 -··•1- --- - f •· '• ' ' --5- --l - _ -- -- '1iii i' Wv - J W t J a Lt' U J QL 1 I I t g_g --C leg vr i th pressur-e line of pcsitiori LO one night celestial grie leg axir um gutnery one jet penetrc - tioo 1 v -ou 11d cc ntx-clled approach OCA ar1c al' ding 103 a '1d one ans simula tor j JA of enipha sis being placed on training du ri11g the bo ttbe stream was d velopad by h6 11th Heavy Bomo Wing Com m noer at the Second Air Fo ce Co mr ance ts Con fere cs on 4 Ncvemb r 1958 This stucy w s based on the problem of increasir g the percentage of c 'ews and 104 ·--·- _ aJ i tlr cr af t -' i er s us-- tr ainin g -st encla - d s • - · ---·--1 4#-··---· Basic proble the 11th Sornb Wing Cornr ander felt - ------------ - _____ s t err n ad from sor tiiL a l'l cL onsequent training 1§ e s -·- -· -·-·' - ---------------·-- ------ i herent in a air t aining up to c-r e-thir cf e irc1 art ---·------------- 1 03 l 11 ----t·• ' 1-•0Rn f Ot - t P 11 uorni- 0 tre 'l' 1·-1 • 1 n1 ' 'or ill ·- - ·- l J ···- -- r - • - - - _ - lJ July 19581 n Hq 1 lth BWJ 6 Jun J 95f ' _n Hist-01 y 11th 3or11b Wg 1 -31 huy 1956 E hi bit 14 Stud r nEcn bar St1 e6 Ill Cc11 ept u b t Ccl f 11 T O ' t'l c - 1- 1 J '1 - 1•1 - e e1 • e•c' • - • '- - r r1• - •ir • ' '••• 4 - V • l L _ 1 r f J v- C J _ w '- • _ Force Conm anderts Jon 'erence 4 Hov 1956 Exhibit 63 - 4o#urnfe SSH IED 2Af' Histori al D ta Ju ly - December 19 e 142 ori e lert while eont j r uing the t ame stftr ci ards o f trei ing with this lesser c ew end ei craft avail ability Three dii'fere nt sol tions were cori'sidered The first idea had beet the gG a ation of edditional sortiesr this was diecerded beceuse cr ws did ot sorties The second thought was to decrease the trair irig -equirement both air a 'ld grotn1d Th is was not considered a satis actoi r a11swer 'i'he third solution a system l'ih ieh would partly solve the 105 problem W s to J ncrea e sor t ic effe ctivene The 11th Wing Ocrnma cer offered three methods of accomplishing thie third pla '1 These we e first more afficient use of available human resources secondly bstter use of available facilities such as RBS sites and gwu1ery rangGs and finally better evaluation of what was bei g done Every possible ·-·-----------mir ute of th9 eort ie needed to be eff ecti vely 106 utilized A The 11th Wing Comma oer felt that bomber stream miesior s ccul best att in these cbjectives Th5y would reduce the number of i no i due lly pla-cn ed Ibid 1 ✓ • • t r t i - U---- --- 2AF H L stc n ·ic l D t July - December 1958 work c_ould be do11e and close r supe ·vision would be possible To make bett e - use of training facilities he proposed to p oduce more aircraft per hour over the facilitr Bomber streams also pro ridi d iden tical Y U iuns for- all ci•e·vo s In 'this way cr ws could be evaluated aga nst other crGws over the same targets and under the same conditions IA His plan was that Gach lllli t would have three pre-plannad bomber stream missions and these missions •Jould provide all 50-8 re- ' irct'lents -except profic i e ' cy Each crew wpuld normally fl these th 'ee mieeions twice c cb training period and in addit ion fly two pilot proficiency and two optional missions per quarter These latter missions ware to proviae fer missed 50-8 traini 1g on the streaxn missions and for enmhasis on detected weaknesses o l the part of the - --- - - ___ t lO 7 crews f A -- Four advantages would esult 1 a unit usir g bomber st-rea rns woultl require only one-thiro the S site ti e tili ed un er t c e isti g sorties system 2 all craws would r ieet existi ng 50-8 requirements 107 I INCi ASSIEIED -- 2AF His orical jata J· 11y - Je - e rr be r 1958 even with one-thirc of the air raf en alert 3 a valid yardstick wc d be pro iced tc me surs all crews and 4 t e air divisio woi J d be p o 'i Ged 108 with the same yardstick vO evaluate its wings In bis co clusion the ll h Wi g c mma lder req iested Second Air Ferce to allocate training facilities or a whole training period rour rnont 6 in advance a d tc schedule these facilities to match the bomber straan concept A reques was then made· that the 11th Bomb Wing be directed to make t le trial run of this co cep d % i g the tra ning period starting 1 January 1959 that a B-47 wing be i ludec 109 a d that necessary ac lities che uling be provided VJ On 19 Noverr ber 19 8 Second Air Force grar ted this req est to so utilise the l January 1959 trainir g period aBS time was mace available except that air traffic control clearances were to be a responsi bility of the u it I authc izing this test hcwe er Second Air Force made a preciction en which this r ar- ative of Second t i4 F rce B-52 KC-135 conversion 110 p -ogress ir 1958 - ill oa clcsed 11 'l'l a bomber ioe 109 110 Ibic Ibid l J BE 1 o - u u•v - t' r • -o Y r o i •• L t _ _ _ -AD 1 Jr -id - 11th EW DOTO - -19204 Borr e er Streatc cr ca it '' 19 Kov 195S d1icit 64 ___________ ESQ· fFR · -------- -e __ -tJlJNcLAss1F1Eo IFI FRD 2AF niBtO i cal Jal a 145 July - December 195Ei stream onc ept has cc r $ic1 erable riiei•H However it is £1 IJticipatec the B-52 force ill cornr ence al'l airborne alert in the ne a r f 'uti i 'e anc SA CR 50-S and 51-26 and other trainine- rer -1 lations will be - rewritten to be ccrepctibl t with this ne cncept T Grefc re c test ty a SO-aircraft B-52 wing would not obtain data valid for future ail' operations UN ------ ---- - - ' I FOJA 31 73