· 1 smEEIITII Am FORCE • ' l July - 31 December 1968 ' · Unclassified Title SUBORDINATE UNITS RCS AU D5 I z - 1 0 ti '3' • I ' ' -•- · fif • J IY J 2 '1 1 liiiJ - · 4310th Air Division Et ¥ f 1 65th Air Division De f'en se 1 _· _ _ _' _ _ 3977th Support Group _ - · • 3906thp 3922nd 39-26th 3970-bho 39'73rd 3974th Air Base Gr Oups 393-Gth Air Base Squadron 13th Air Postal ·Squadron ·· 49-bh Communioa tions Squadron 3971st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron 3927th Reconn8issemoe Technical Flight Prepared by i Historical Division Office of Information Services Headquarters 0 16th Air Force swat gio· Air Command United States Air Force i -- _ ' · · CHAPTER IV AtERT FORCE The establishment of the first alert f orce in the Eurcp an Af'rican - - re a t Sidi Sl me ne Ah B e Moro oCJ 0 prortded for B 47 s -bo be ready to gott at a 11 t bn es E x pa nsion of the program known a s Reflex was t ooomplished from l July 1967 through 1 July 1968 at the Mor Ccctm nd Spanish sites with the last two bQses in Spain aooepting R flex ·1 i Gr rt on l Julr 19680 Thus tr mi the origittal 20 ai cr ft at Sidi Slµiane th foro had b6en mpre d to 36 iro tbt si b ses in tha two oountries e ooommodating six e irore f't ee oh u - After this f irat year oi' adjustment Reflex settled into a fairly - even operation Essentiallyi the concept was to deploy the airo aft non stop from the United States o the forward sitesi with one air refueling in the area of Bermudao The planes remained on alert status for 14 daya then were redeployed non stop with refueling in the Azores area if the southern route yas usedg or in the northwest Atlantic if the northern route was flowno Ground staging was limited being used only when necessary i e when high winds precluded reaching the ba e with the req1 ll red gas reserv s or when the aircraft developed trouble in-flight The crews for the planes remained at the forward bases for 23 dayaD rith the aircraft crew ratio placed at 1 i 5 six aircraft with nine crews o u 1 Background informktion on Reflex me v·Ee f'ornd in 16 1 Ji' Eistc•l YD January-June 195B9 Chapter II pgsc 38 87 SE OR8 £ as NO FOl t BION 65 Three airora f't were deployed to e ach forward base e h week with the aircraft soheduled for redeployment rema ini lg in alert con f 'igu r 'a' ' tion until the replacements were e-ompletely pre-flighted e nd armedo u An e n oeption to this deployment-redeployment we s made duririg July when due to tension in the mid-east SAC toroee were plaoed in a ready- alert status For the period of 16 July thrQugh 26 July no Re f'lex· airora ft were rotated and those at the various bases were maintained in alert st tus wtil the orisis had easedo The advise bility of this was questionable since studies oonduoted by the Seventh ' Air Division in Engl and had dete nnined that a two-week period was the longest that l3 47Vs oould remain ·without f'lying and still be completely ope ationalo It was neeessary to exercise the various systems of the aircraft 8 such as the electricaup fuel and oxygen systemsp to assure their reliability This was pa ticulary true at the Moroccan bases where hi_gh temperatures prevailed durin g the summer month so Thus 9 the Sixteenth recommended that during such alert periods the rotation of a iroraf't be continued if all possible U Ass grunent of Bomb Wings The bomb wings assigned to Reflex operations in Spain and Morocco 3 were from the Second Air Force during the la st half of 19580 This included the 19th9 305 306th 308th 11 379th and 384th Bonib Wingso 2 3 Interview 16AF Historian with Major Julian Bo Upton 9 Ta ctioa l ·Operations Branch Operations Divisions Operations Directorate 13 April 19 59 o On 1 Jano 1959 the 305 9 3060 19u 308 379 BW S l '1 tched t rom 2nd AF to 8th AF' in a 66 3 1 l Each wing continued rotv tion at the same base during this six months period thus permitting personnel to become completely fa miliar with one base in the area A map showing these locations may be found on the following page 1 lUJ Crew chedules With nine crews for six aircraft 14 of the 23 days in a forward area were spent on alert by each cr-ew Varying schedules were sub mitted from each base in July 1958 showing the days on - a nd off-duty desired by each group DJ u ALERT CREW SCHEDULES JutY 19 58 67 Base Of£ On Of£' On Off On Of£ On Off 1-1forooco Ben Guerir Air Base l 7 6 7 Nouasseur Air Base 2 3 2 4 l 4 2 3 l Sidi Slirnane Air Base 1 4 3 3 l 3 3 4 Spain Moron Air Baso l 4 4 7 3· 3 Torre j n dr 3o se l 4 2 4 l 3 i l Zara ozi Air Base 1 7 6 7 1 f ' rinw rily such schedules reflected the l ck of nearby recreational npots fnr such sites as Ben Guerir and Zaragoza Thus the six-day off-duty time couJ d be utilized for flights to Spa in Englr nd 1' ' ld Geri mny as avail- i OPEP TION REFL SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE DISTRIBUTION OF BOMB TNGS 31 December 1958 o Torrej on AB 305BW o M ol on AB S84BW • Sidi Sliuw ne AB l9BW Nouareseut AB 308BVl o Ben· Guerir AB S79BW Sourc g l6AF D0O l544 to all ba sesi 11 U Reflex Aotion Subsequent to' 1 Jv ly 11 20 May lS 58 see Exhibit 430 $8 By the end of the year the Sixteenth had given permission to adjust the schedules at each base as desired by the various crewsf as long as the requisite number of persoruLel were available for manning the alert aircraft Dtn ing the July increased readiness 4 period an additional requirement was levied for each site One of the three of'f duty crews had t o remain on the bo se as a replac ement for any crew that m i ght be pulled from alert duty due to illness or 5 injury- of one of its memberso J During the period on ale D crew integrity had to be main·bained to permit all personnel t9 arri at the aircraft at the same time when alerts were oalled·o One vehicle was assigned to each orew9 and certain freedom of the base was giveno Klaxon hornsp used for alert ing were installed in such places aa base exchange» theatrep mes halls and alert force quarterso Maximum use or base facilities was desired for duty crews in keeping with alert launch requirementse Provisions for hot-line alerting was made at each base 9 to be used 6 in event of failure of klaxon h r ns UiiCLASSIFIED Alert Scihedules Three types of alerts were practiced by Reflex c ews 0 with one 7 or more being accomplished during each 24 hour periodo These wereg 4 6 6 r I Msg11 iffl to All Bases -0 2232 UJ Reflex Alert Schedule a9-w 24 July 1958 tffl l6KEl'P-j-0 on f'ile_ flistorioa l Division0 16AFo Listed a a DNIFi Duty Mot In volving Flyingo Ho-tu-Line alerting points were the alert force quarters9 base operationsg fire crash statio11 0 dining halls 0 ·jo ffioers club9 NCO·olub and Service club l g SAC tc l6A F' ZIPP0 02 0Clu st1ji Dcf uition of Typ or Test Alerts 9 1 Jano 1968 SB0HEJ 8 on filep Pla na 9 16 A Fo 69 UNCUSSlf IED --- -·· Alp Crews proo ed to·· a irora ft and when ·ready· to si a rt en n oontaot o on trol and report Ready to start engines lffSJ l u ' - · ·· · Bravo Crews prooeed·to drore tt start en E es 11 eon te ot control room and report 11Rea dy to taxi 11 JpJ u •· Oooa Crews report to airori f't·start engines report·to oontr'ortower atmounoing taxi±n-g for ·te k• o f' f' 11 ta rl to ·rub 'W'8 y ··nola··bralces 11 apply ta ke-of'f' powerp reduoe power and taxi to par - are C 2-1 _ Ro m eo Test launoh of alert aircraft - P u OnlY He dqu rters SACi could direct the Romeo alert in this case _wa t1_ prov t_d f'i i nt a va -ce warningp and the ground rulea 11 o n rn1- -the mi sion to _b f 'lowno Duri ng the year a hal f' no Romeo alerts had been conducted in the Sixteenth areao U ---- _ - · ·· - If local circumstances dictated a local Reflex Commander could ' degrade coca type alerts ·Suoh factors that oould call for this -- d o on in luded local weather phenomenaJ eme genoi s in progress t_the baee or a looal situation where movement 0£ ireraf't could indicate action that might be loc lly misinterpreteda It deoisicrn was made to downgrade suoh a direct d alert I the reasons had to be ·s forw¥ 1ed to Sixteentho · Sixteenthvs control personnel scheduled alpha D 0 and - alert·s following coordination with SACo In addition» the local com ma nders were permitted I upon approval at Sixteenthp to conduct alpha ·9 - type alerts on their owno They als could a1el t up to 50 per cent of the alert force at one time l A 8 Msg l6AF to· A' 11 B ses 9 D0CI 3031 9 uf Ground Exercise of SAFr' p_le rt Fcif e·ej n 8 Oc to 958 C011ffIE 'fI1' L 11 i 1 files I·Iistcr·1 o-a1 Divi sion l6A Fo 70 7 Accomplishment of - suoh_alerts was standardized by SAC Manual 55-2A Command Oper tions that outlined_the st by step proce dures to be followeda This included the use of kle r on horns for the alerting of' personnel 0 as W611 as the detailed instructions requi ed for p ssing along execution instructions from command post to air orewso -Suoh ste ndardize bion then permitted aey crew to operate at e ny Reflex base to whioh they- might be e ssignedo Utilization of these prooedures was stressed within the Sixteenth particularly ·10 during the f'irst months of' the eomplete six base e lert f'oroeu u ··11 Laun eh time for B-4'7 ts and Iro-97 ° ell as outlined by SAO in mid a u '· 1958 oa led for the first aircraft to be airborne within 20 minutes after receipt of the e i e oution messagep with subsequent aircraft a t 13 one-minute int rve l s 'v Alphe _ alerts in July took an average time of 508 minutes at the Sixteenth 9 s bas ei but by the er d cf the year this he d been reduced to 4 minute-so September's bravo alerts averaged 9ol minutes 9 with 14 a reduction to 806 minutes in D cembero Coca test re qu i red 1408 - 5 Tlinutes in September in contrast to 13 minutes in Novem bero Eeomaiu 'DEifl'IAFi VI 9 Msg11 16A F to All Bases 9 OOGD 26859 i J Ref'le i ti ctio11 Alert S-chedules 5 Septo 1958 68fi'IDHN'PIAEh on file Historical Divisionp I6AFo · · · · 10 Msg 16A F to All Bases 0 00 1892 0 n U Alert Procedures 11 20 Tune 1958 Effil6R13ffi see Exhibit 44r msgn 16AF to SAC 9 DOCD l948 9 11 u ·· Testing SAC Manual 55-21 Execution ProC' edures 11 11 2 6 Jvne 1958 · See Exhibit·· 45 msg 16 - F to Spanish AA CS Region9 Madrid 0 -Spa inv DOCEC l940 9 110pere ting Agreeme· nt on Reflex Alerting Procedures 9 11 26 June 1958 SMifflT 9 see Exhibit 460 11 For B 52 and B 36i fi r0 rt e ir0 or·e ft to be air-borne rlthin 30 minutes after receipt of' execution message with subsequent aircraft e t two minute intervals o 1 Sfl6Ef l£'1- 71 fm additional exercise was devised by the Sixteenth's oontrol oenter when a requirement ' 3-s lmed that the normal alerting system 3 at the base not be utilized i e the klaxon horns or tel phoneso Thus the alert personnel had to be notified by methods that would be required during a oOllllllunications failure This normally ealled for comnumd post personnel going by jeep to the area where the orews were located A test ot this m thod on 9 Decemberp increased the reati ness time on a bravo e lert at Sidi Sliman e by only two minutes from - 6 minutes shown on 4 Deoember to 8 minutes on 9 Deoember At Nouas seur the increase 'W 8 8 from l to 3l minutesp at Ben Guerir from 8 to 19 minutes The following table oontains the oomparative data for 11 lEl phases of the alert • lA 1 COMPARISON OF BRAVO ALERTS MOROCCAN AIR BASES 4 and 9 December 1958 Relay Ready Ready Time To Start ' fo 'Ta ici Ben Guerir Air Base 4 Deoemberp Normal Bravo Alert 2 9 DeQember Lost Communications 10 Nouasseur Air B se 4 Decemoer Normal Bra vo Alert l 9 Decemberjl Lost Communications 7 Sidi Slimane Air Base 4 December Iformal Bravo Alert l 9 Decemberp Lost Comm uui cai tions 3 6 27 2 6 12 31 6 8 '72 Sixteenthts Guida noe tor Reflex To further delineate the responsibilities of each portion of the a ert force the Sixteenth Air Foroe published an- Procedures Manual in 'September 1958 In general it covered such items as ihtelli 17 ge-noe procedures billeting maintenanoe and munitions Also outlineq were the command and reflex action organization structures to be utilized within the area These are shown in two oharts on the following pageo l J Alert Reliability Upon arrival of th edroraft scheduled for alert duty and fol lawing parking in the designated areas crew baggage baggage raoks e nd aircraft e4uipment not required for aler t action were removed from the a ircra rt This was followed by the ai'ter flight exterior walk a round inspection and removal of the camera magazines with their replacement by loaded magazines In addition17 the ohaff dispenser side pene1l1 and ammunition oans were removedo UNCLASSIFIED Subssquent operations to enable placing the a irora f't on the alert 12 'SA O Manual · 27-1 11 11 tr s Planning Factors Man ital· on Alert17 August 19'58 SEO tE'f on file• Historical Division 16AF o 13 The times given here were to apply from 1 July 1958 throug h 30 June 1960 e B8RFJq 14 Data prior to September incomplete 15 Excludes Zaragoz- a no ·coca alerts due to l ' mW'e Y stabilization projecto - 16 Report on Alert Exercises 17 Six Bases of Sixteenth Air Foroe for the period of July-December 1958 OONFIBERfTI2i6 17 see Exhibit 470 17 Doco 16AFM 55-12 Vol I mWLASSIFIED j and Volo II E E6KE'f i Alert Procedures Manual 9 11 Sept 1959 see E r hibit 48 0 I Spanish Air Bases Reflex Task Foroe f11ft1ffJJ nder Ret1ex De'baohmen'b fl omm e nder s REFLEX ORGANIZATIONS 0 f ommander • 4310th Air••• • • DiTil on Oper ticna l Respcmsibilitr UNOLA SSIFIED 'BASE tEVEt • Oommander ·Air Base Group I •• I Moroooan Air Bases Reflex Task Foroe oomm nder Reflex Ditaomiumt a omme nd r e I Detaobment Deputy Oonunander Oommanqer • • • Red 'lex • • 0 • 0 • • • 0 O O O • 0 • • a Air Ba Be Group I Action I •• Temporary Duty Operation a staff Temporary Duty Crews • • • 0 e • • • • 0 • 0 0 D Operations Base j Command Post I Oomrnander j Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron I Chief' Maintenance I Temporary •••ooo ooeoo 000•0006 O O Duty 0 Maintenance Of'fioer I Temporary ••••000••00Qoooo9000 Duty • Ths solid line indioates oonnna nd responsibility • Indicates coordination reponsibilityo Maintenance Support II line were outlined in the Alert Proc dures Wianue l cited e boveo The -------------- optimum time required to completely service and arm the plane had been established by SAC a t nine hours ·and efforts v ere made within the Sixteenth1 s area to conform to this criteria m CLA SSIFIED The first step was to ascertain the status of the aircraft fv el system booster pumps from the incoming aircrews and to visually inspect for fuel leakage ·The Field Maintenance personnel then in stalled the ATO raoks and checked out the a iror-af't circuitry P-ersonnel of the Flight Line Maintenance Section then took over to perform the following ftmotionst UNCLASSIFIED · Service a iroraf't with water aloohol mix and perform specific gravity tests U Service with JP-4 fuel U Submit known parts requirement to Base Supply via the ir vehicle radio facilities U Accomplish unscheduled maintenance preparatory to loading U Service oxygen system U Install drag and approach chutes U Following completion of these activities» the Aviation Depot Squadron personnel took over to install ATO bottles» load weapons install ammunition cans and put chaff tapes in strippers The final action prior to placing the a irora f't in e cocked status» was the preflighting of the airoraf-ttby the assigned flight cre11'fs DNCLASSI FIED 75 I z_ While as stated above the desired preparation time had been established at nine hours the Sixteenth's average for the last six months of 1958 w as 10 9 hours This fi SUre was based on data tele 18 phoned by eaoh base upon oompletion of oooking of ea oh aircraft Thust while the times were known the reasons for deviations were not always available To permit additional analysis or delays the Direotorate of Ma intenanoe had established a more complete reporting system that went into effect in January 1959 and this vrould then permit more aoourate data to be compiled For the last half or 1958 · 19 the following table shows the average cooking times per month ' A U COCKING TIMES FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT lSAF JUtY - DECEMBER 1958 Base Jul Aug Sep Oet Nov Deo average 16AF Average 10 s 11 1 u s 11 4 10 4 10 8 10 9 Spanish Bases Moron l2s4 13 5 10 9 10 s 13 2 ll B 12 1 Torrejon 8 8 9 2 11 4 10 7 12 1 13 4 10 9 Zaragoza ·a 1 8 3 7 1 7 6 7 5 9 2 7c9 Moroccan Bases Ben Guerir 12 B 13 4 12 5 20 s 9 0 10 s l3al J iJ'ouasseur 10 5 11 5 18 0 9 7 7 0 10 3 llol Sidi Slimane 8 2 11 4 9 8 9 o 13 5 10 7 10e4 l 18 -Source Ltr 16AF mffii' Alert Force Maintenance Statistics undated w Incl 11Alert Force Maintenance Statisticsp dtd 19 Jan 19 59 5 0' it ET l'rir rir hl'0 0 11 ir 1 1 lWLlYjj r J 76 3 u mUSSiflEU --- By November concern was felt over the maintenance discrepancies being found on the aircraft deployed to Morocco d Spain An ane ly si s over a sixty day period found 280 discrepancies on 190 aircraft that became evident during the deployment alert and redeployment phases This number represented only those discrepancies which pre vented aircraft from either being placed or being retained in a oooked configuration and did not include numerous discrep6 llcies of' 19 a minor nature that were oorrected during the uncocked period For this reason special efforts were being made at the end of the year to isolate the various causes and to pinpoint if' possible responsi bility so as to permit less down time for Reflex aircraft • l A The alert reliability i e •• the actual number of' hours that alert airoraf't were available for exercise as compared to the number of hours on the alert line was affected by down-time resulting from 20 malfunctions During the last six months of 1958 the six bases re ported a total dovm-time of' 6 023 hours resulting from 726 ma l funo tions Of these reported problems the fuel systems presented the principal source of difficulty with a total of 1984 2 hourso In addition 1462 2 hours were reported as downtime resulting from fuel 2 ' systems leaks u Survey of these roblems month by month shov ed a sharp reduc tion from a high of 24 reported in August to a ow of 12 in December 19 Msg ieAF to 2AF DM-3330 0 u Condition of Alert Force Air'- craft 11 3 Nov 1958 O'E Orl El'f see Exhibit 49 20 Alert reliability was based on total amount of time down as out lined in 2 SAC-Vl report compared to hours required for 6 air craft at each base to be on alert f'or 24-hours 21 Ref' Note 18 above E i -tract Alert Phase C rnkhour s 9 nd Mal function - Command Jan-Dec 1958 3'1' lCRBT P sea Exhibit 50 1 Jl11lil0 Lm 1 1 l i 111 11 ii 77 I ' 22 Summarized by base and by month malfunctions were as follows ti · ALERT PEA SE TOTAL WALFUNCTIOWS 16TH AIR FORCE July - December 1953 Ba se Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average 16th AF Average Spanish Bases Moron Air Base Torrejon Air Base Zaragoza Air Base Moroccan Bases Ben Guerir Air Base Nouasseur Air Base Sidi Slimane Air Base 22 6 7 10 5'8 55 19 24 20 20 20 12 13 9 25 7 9 10 61 40 24 31 11 23 17 17 24 22 2 8 19 24 z 21 6 ll 51 38 7 6 28 10 20 13 18 7 33 3'1 16 Here again complete details of all phases of these problems was n ot avaiia ble for ·the entire six months but procedures had been established for obtaining additional information It was possible that high temperatures encountered at some of the bases was a oontri- - - b ing factor as well as suoh other measurable items as number of maintenance personnel available training levels availability of parts and the recorded maintenance history of the aircraft concerned Non-measurable items contributing to e ix-ore rt capability then could inolude interest in the work more le and rela tiori·e hip between the Reflex forces and the base personnel UNCLASSIFIED From the available data the alert reliability a veraged for the ' six month5 period 97 4 p r cent nth the lc- est a era6e at Ben Guerir 11 J in_September 92 3 per cent and the highest at Zaragoza in October · 23 99 9 per cent Summarized by monthsr reliability w-a s as followst U u ALERT RELIABILITY 16TU AIR FORCE July - December 1958 Per Cent Time Available Base Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Deo Average 16th Air Force Average 98 0 96 3 97 4 97 7 97 0 98 5 97 4 Spanish Bases Moron Air Base 99 s 96 9 99 6 97 7 96- 9 97 2 98 0 Torrejon Air Base 98 5 94 8 98 0 96 8 96 3 97 7 96 8 Zaragoza Air Base 9 8 9 99 3 99 2 99 9 96 9 99 8 99 0 Moroccan Air Bases Ben Guerir Air Base 96 2 93 1 92 3 97 5 99 3 9e s 96 l Nouasseur Air Base 98 2 95el 96 9 95 4 97 1 99 0 96 9 Sidi Slime ne Air Base 96 2 98 5 98 7 99 8 95 3 99o0 97 9 Support Facilities The support requirements for Reflex forces were outlined in detail by SAC in their Manual 27-1 Planning Factors h ual on Alert -- in August 1958 which formalized the criteria that had been published ·24 in various messages from July 1957 to mid-1958 Complie nce at base level has been stressed by the appointing of' a special assistance team from the Sixteenth1 s staff to inspect ea oh base to determine 22 23 24 ' Ref Note 181 above bid SACt 27 1 Planning Factors manual'on Alert 11 Augo 1958 03 1ElfH3T 9 on file Historical DivisionJ 16 P F · 79 JC 2' 5 what additional support eaoh site needed to fulfill requirementso In general full oooperation was given throughout the command and • emphasis -was ma de on following directives u A meeting o f' this team known as the 11Ref'lex Aotion Faoili ties Review Pe nel 1 it was held on 30 July to discuss the action necessary to improve alert facilities services and equipment From this caine a progrannning plan outlining the responsibilities for eaoh portion of the staff A few of the items considered as important t this first 26 meeting weret UNCLASSIFIED All possible effort will be made to provide reflex alert personnel with -air conditioned facilities- U Scheduled transportation will be provided to and from rail stations towns and other designated points in aocord anoe with provisions of Joint Tr-avel Regulati-onso Go'V'ern ment transportation although avrllable to ind·ividuals and groups oannot be assigned to a n individual or group a a personal transportation durtng off duty periodso In insolamed areas aircraft may be utili ed to transport reflex orews to cities where reoreational faoilities are availableo U Alert quarters will be furnished o' I lfortablyo R crea tion rooms day roomsp etoop will be adequately furnished to provide for relaxation g mes radios and letter writing facilities U Washers and dryers will be provided U Ma id and janitorial service will be provided for all reflex quarters U To support his program i e to provide for air conditioning quarters provide recreational facilities» and make the necessary 25 Mag 16AF to SAC Personal Geno Powers fromM aj Gen Mooneyp C-1895 · 11 U Alert Crew Facilities» 11 20 June 1958 fOrnff'ifJffifTI Af 11' see Exhibit 51 e 80 building modifications a total - of $468 873 was requested from SACo This represented 14 direct and 8 indirect support projects Of these$ 73 per cent involved air conditioning of the quarters and of support 27 facilities UNCLASSIFIED Following aggressive action by the various base commanders it was possible to considerably improve base facilities and living condi tions for these personnel by the end of' the year At Moron» for ex 28 29 ample quarters were being improved at T rrejon they were consi 30 dered as excellent and at Nouasseur two house trailers were being made ready for occupancy by the crews at the flight line A compre hensive personnel service program was started at each base and orders for the necessary furniture and recreation type items had been 31 included in the second revision to the FY-59 Financial Plan Messing faicili ies for orews were considered as good at all sites and at most bases special menus were available u The primary difficulty in the support field was in providing 32 adequate transportation on base The orews on alert at Sidi Sli me ne 2·5 l6AF Programming Plan 12-58 11Reflex Faoilities 11 Services and Equipment 5 Aug 1958 UNCL ASSIFIEDw ffJ El0HEISN 9 on file 0 Historical Division 16AFo 27 16AF Monthly Ana1ysis Augo 1958 pgo 3 SS0R-l3T § on filep 16AFD Historical Divisiono 28 Mag Reflex Deto Comdr Moron to 2AF Zippo 01-271» B-27 Report Period 11 5 Oct 58 to 31 Jan 59 n 31 Jan 1959 fs SOR E ' see Exhibit 52 ' 29 Mag Reflex ColTlDlander 11 Torrejon Zippo 02-2'71 M-27 16AF Opord 1959 gEeftE'f-r see Exhibit 53 30 Msg Comdr RTF lfouasseur to SACt ZIPFO 01-243 M-27 BAF 96-58 0 11 30 Jan 1959 ' 57 efti39 ' i see Exhibit 54 31 n comptroller Frogress Evaluation'Report Programming Plan 12 58 Novo 1958 9 16AF Ne FORi3IGN $' see Exhibit 55 - ijl j w l r' f fl1 u lw JJJQJ t J V I 18 33 34 Ben Guerir and Zaragoza all reported that available vehicles were hard to start and did not provide sufficient protection·during inolement weather This problem area oould only be solved upon receipt of addi• 35 tional vehicles which were not expected until the spring cf 1959 lA The limited number of airora ft available within the Sixteenth tended at times to be inadequate for the desired rest and recreation flights for alert personnel The Oper tions Directorate of the Six teenth stated in a message to SAC early in 1959 that the assignment 6f additional transport aircraft would permit an increase in such 36 flights IA Whenever possible» problems that arose within the SiA teenthWs area when reported by the various Task For·oe Cfomma ndersp were 37 solved as rapidly as po6Sible · UNCLASSIFIED 52 Msg Reflex Aotion Sidi Sli mane to SAO Zuooi-Ol 390 0 M 27 Re port 11 31 · Jen ·1959 BEOR'M see Exhibit 560 33 Mag Oomdr R'l'F ·Ben Guerir to SAC ZIPP0-01-235 M-27 30 Jane 1959 eESRB'f » Msg RTF Ben Guerir to l6AF ZIPP0-01-2361 Final Mission Report M 27 for 3926th Air Base Group 16AF Opord 96-58 30 Jan 1959 B Offil'f see Exhibit 57 34 Msg 3974ABGI Zaraigoza to 8AF ZIPPO 01-260 o n m 27 Report 11 Re flex Det Zaragoza AB Spain for period 5 October 1958 through 31 January-1959 11 31 Jan 1959 SEODT see Exhibit 58 -35 S C letter 27 Jano 1959 indicated that I6AF would receive 530 new·vehioles estimated arrival was April-May 19590 36 Msg 16AF to· SAC DOM 1328 Survey of· Transport Type Air-cra- f't 11 18 Nov 1958 on· file D Operations 16AFo' 37 Msg§ l6AF to S i C 00-322 11 U Reflex Action M-28 Report 1 July thrbugh 2 August· 1958 11 19 Augo 1958 SECP 8 9 see Exllibit 59 Mag 16AF to SAC 00 3099 11 U Reflex Action M 28 Report 4 Auge through 4 Oct 1958 9 11 14 Octo 1058 EC'ftE - 9 see Exhibit 60 Msg 16AF to SAC$ DO-l352P '' U Reflex Action ¥-F28 Report l Octa through 31 Jane 1959 9 11 6 Feb 1959 6ECRE1' 9 see Exhibit 610 r Retueling Support KC-97 rotations from the ZI to the European and North African threatre were planned to provide refueling support from L jes in the Azores as well as strip alert capability in Moroooo1 Spain and the United Kingdom The first of' the two operations occurring during the last half of 1958 was Operation Black Duck with an effective date of ·- _____ 1 July 1958 This involved the redeployment of the 308th Air Refueling Squadron 308AREFS from Lajes to Hun er AFB and deplo ent of the 19th Air Refueling Squadron 19AREFS In early October the l9AREFS redeployed on Operation Paper - and wa s replaced by the 70th Air Refueling Squadron 70AREFS This latter squadron remained in place until early January 1959 when it _in turnp redeployed following move ment of the 340th Air Refueling Squadron 340AREFS to Lajes on Ogera• Shaq v - uJ Basically the various operations were very similarc The_parent unit prepared the orders that called for movement of these units However upon arrival at the overseas sites the aircraft came under operational control of the Sixteenth with the exception of the two alert aircraft on duty in the United Kingdom which were under control of' the Seventh Air Division U Opera bion Black Duck With an X-Day of l July 1958 the 308AREFS and the 19AREFS were allotted the task of maintaining a strip alert continuity during Operation Black Duck with the lSAREFS deploying 17 aircraft to Lajes and ti l O each to Torrejon Spain Sidi S1imane Morocco » and Bri e 38 Norton United Kingdom Personnel limit ras placed at 514 to Lajes 39 and 30 to each of the other sites Cargo requirements were placed at 115· 0 tons to be airlif'ted by the refueling squadron's aircraft as 40 84 well as 35el tons to be lifted by MA TS Data on the actual execution of this mission was not av ilable in Directorate of Operations files to permit inclusion of descriptive information for this re ort U J Operw bion Sandpaper The return of the l9AREFS to its ZI base following the arrival of the replacement 11 the 70AREFS was provided for in Operation paper Seventeen K0-97's rere scheduled in at Lajes from Little Rook AFB on 1 October with the a irora ft of' the l9AREFS departing the fol ' lowing day The planes for the other three bases were scheduled to arrive on l October with the 19AREFS departing on 3 October 41 u Following the schedule the six alert aircraft for the tvro bases of the Sixteenth and for Brize-Norton left Little Rock AFB on 30 Septembere They were followed on l October by the 17 for Lajes Augmenting this force were two KC-97 1 s from the 308AREFS at Hunter o Personnel deployed totaled 546 0 of whiofu115 were officers and 431 were airmen No provision was ID ade for the deployment of additional mecintenance personnel for the two aircraft to the 308AREFS U 38 l 6AF' Operations Order 33'7 58 UJ Black Duckpli to support SACf2AF Operations Directive 16-1-58 to SAC 2AF Operation Plan 16 58 0 6 June 1958 CO FID Jl'if'l'H tL see 'Sxhibit 620 U CU lS f ltD seeRa While the squadron successfully pe rticipreted in all missions l e quired to support Reflex operations problems were encou tered when last ·minute changes were rrl8 de in refueling arE la s paTticula rly at Lajes Santa Ie ria Air Traffic Control Center required a 48-hour advance notice but would grant changesp when necessary to 24 hours prior to utilization of the areaso One example of such a change occurred when scheduled B-47 deployments planned for 10-12 December were progressively delayed From the normal 3-6-3 aircraft on W -dnesday Thursday and Friday the flights were changed to 0-9-3 th1 n -to 0-0-llp and finally all slipped to Sa turday Each change necessitated negotiations with the Santa Maria center to permit re tu eling During December alone there· wer-e 69 d-evi-ations in sohedulinga ·with a contributing factor being high surface winds at La jes a rid 42 high ·enr-oute ·-winds for receiver aircraft over a 12'-day peri-odo 'lA During this tour at Lajes the KC-97•s took part in 434 sortiesll t taling 3199 hoursc Deployment of this organization was accomplished on 11 and 12 January 1959 9 following a 24-hour delay due to high ·winds u 59 The 30BAREFS was to redeploy 630 personnelo t00NF1BEJM IX¥iJ 40 Cargo redeployment was placed at ll2ol tons by the returning 308AREFS9 plus 49o4 tons by MA TS ECOffl IDfflffIAL 41 Msg6 S M0 9 DOOP0-3143ll' · 11 U Tanker Rotation p 11 13 March 1958 f n Operation Order 16-58t 70th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing9 19th Bomb Wing Operations Directive 2 to 2AF Operation Order 16 58 0 2AF'DODT-11298 Operation Sandpaper SECll E P on file 0 l6A Fo 42 Ltr 826 ADivD 70ARS Letter of Tran smittaI M-27 Report on Operation Sandpa per 0 28 Je n ·1959 see Exhibit 63 85 --1 86 Alert Operation During August the Facilities Review Panel conducted a survey of tajes Field to determine the feasibility of operating a Reflex type alert with KC-97 tankers It was found that the Lajes force was operationally prepared to implement a four crew aircraft alert sched ule on 1 September and that time study tests had established a capa• bility for a 20 minute launch time The only deterrant was a short delay for installation of the Klaxon horn alerting system The first of the tankers on alert was accomplished 9 January 1959 l A Support facilities to permit compliance with the 2 0-minute alert schedule were considered as inadequate as billeting facilities were not available adjacent to the flight line However trailers were planned for the runway area for maintenance personnel but in the meantime temporary quarters would be used in the SAC he ngar At this time i e the end of August a permanent squadron operations building was being constructed and with minor modifications would be ·suitable 43 for alert crew faoili ties•• A J By the end of the year the 70AREFS reported with reference to 44 billeting the followings LU 43 44 Officers quarters Building T-163 were considered to be inadequateo The non-commissioned officers quarters Building 420 were adequate but the building was in a bad state of repair However funds have been requested from 16th AF to rehabilitate this building The airmen and Staff Sergeants- quarters Quonset Huts in the 500 area Msg 16A F to SAC D0-2609 U Alert Requirements for Lajes Rotational Tanke 1 Sq·u aclr-or1 28 Augo 1 358 SEC'RE' E s 1 ee Exhibit 640 -ef' Note 12 above 11 11 I •'· l J 1 JulB ffejQJ j were definitely not adequate • The building leaked drink ing wa ter··was not available in the buildings lartines rere too small and galvanized tin fixtures could n-ot be kept free from rust and the stoves were to small and old to pro vide su f'f'icient heating These inadequacies were written up ea oh month during the Base Medi-cal Inspection ·MATS has let a contract to rehabilitate· this area and the estimated completion date is 50 May 19599 U In addition to the steps taken by MA TS to improve living condi tions the Sixteenth ordered the required furniture and accessories to permit_comi'ortable living for the alert crews This included such items as beds -desks tables and s-ome recree ti-onal items These had 4n been delivered by the encl of the year l lA The 70AREFS found that personnel giving support f'rom both mainte nanoe an'd supply oooperated to the fullest extent However supply time between Nouasseur to Lajes was found to be lengthy vr i ii h AOOP aircraft out of commission for parts and ANFE aircraif't not -fully equipped parts bein delivered in about ten days Vehicles from the Seadweed stocks were considered as sub-standard and seven men from the 7qAREFS were assigned-·to repair themo The base motor maintenance supervi ors were very cooperati ve9 but the parts necessary to repair A the machines were not available l A Operation Ala rm Bell War planning called for the staging of B -52 aircraft at two Moroccan bases Ben uerir a n Nouasseur and at Moron in Spaino 45 isg l6AF to SAC m 3820p 0Aiert Facility Furnishings ff 31 Deco 1958 CONFIDEWPI AI see Exhibit 65 46 rtef Note 42 abo eo 87 88 For this reason SAC directed that B-52 aircraft be rot ted thr ough these bases to fe miliarize person 'lel with the Maintenance and Munitions Loading of the plane Such rotation also would permit crews scheduled for post-strike or recovery in these areas to become familiar with avail able facilities Each B-52 was to remain for a 72-hour period ex cluding Sundays once eaoh·month In November the Fifteenth Air Force was to provide one B-52 the second week o f each month to Nouaaseurp with the E $ ghth Air Force sending -one to Ben Guerir the fourth week of the month The Second Air Force was scheduled to send one to 47· Moron the third· week in January 19 59 e l U l In addition to the regular air crew the sending organization was to supply a crew chief and a fully qualified maintenance officer 48 or a senior non-commissioned maintenance ofi'ic r with the aJ rcra f'to The base was then to select key supervisors and other responsible main tena nce personnel to receive the training Ee oh base prepared a reception and v orking plan to permit full utiliz tion of the hours 4 that the aircraft was on the ground U 50 51 Reported training data from the Ben Guerir and Nouasseur ma inte- nance personnel varied widely so that comparison of training hours -was not possibleo For examplei Ben Guerir reported that weapons loading teams received 1080 hours training in the November exercise while 1fouasseur reporteq 9 hours in their December exeroisec With such data is was not possible to determine the areas of training that 47 Mag 15AF ·to 16AF DOOT-4295 '4 sf-Exeroise of M'o focce n and Span ish Bases by B-52 Aircraft 25 Oct 1958 8EC E see Exhibit 660 48 Ibid I ' 5201 ET needed further emphasis The 28th Bombardment Wing_ Heavy personnel - exercised Nouasseur in December and reported that U While at Nouasseur Air Base the aircraft crew chief oonduoted extensive training for local support personnel i e refueling inspeotions of aircraft systems and major components This training was very difficu1t·for the follow ing reasons 1 The one assigned crew chief was busy pre• paring the iroraf't for launch thus could not devote adequate time to local maintenance personnel and 2 no training aids were available l J Sufficient numbers of maintenance personnel are in plaoe at Nouasseur to launch several aircraft These people are anxious and 'W'illing to be of assistance in any way possible _fowever they are not qualified on B-52 airore tt l l J There are no B-52 parts available at Nouasseur Air Base A B-52 tow bar several airoarts and MD-3 power units were available No qualif'ied a rma ment personnel were available U Transportation base ins·ballations aircraft POL and base facilities are considered adequate for the recovery and launch of a B-52 wing U Due to the laok of sufficient training aids and eq Ctipment it was recommended that this material be made available to the baseo In addition it was felt that an expanded B-52 flyaway ldt maintained at the site would be of assistance U 50 51 52 Msg 16AF to 3922 3926 3973 ABG DMW4 -3337 l l €ifExercise of Moroccan and Spanish Bases by B-52 Aircraft 11 4 Nov 1958 see Exhibit 67 SEC Ef Msg 3926ABG to 16AF CAMS 11-589 11Exercis of Moroccan Ba ses by e 52 Aircraft 11 25 Nov 1958 SH6REl'f Msg 3926 A BG to 16AF CAMS 12-640 11Exer6ise of Moroccan Bases by B-52 Aircraft n 22 Dec 1958 s eKB'f see Exhibit 68 Msg 3922ABG to 16AF DD-16-12-U-315 Project Alarm Bell 11 16 Deo 1958 OEO Rfl see Exhibit 69v ' ' tr 'fBa ' Put1 Po n -1- r r ' r c ' -1-o 15 F Ip -n - _ ·• LJ 1 l 1 vt Jro t u 1-V A - V h-'-- - a C J' Vf A II ' - J 'J V V r J a Uc 4 t Mission Report M-2'7 11 12 Jano 1959 8 6fdil'i' on file D Ma teriel 16AFa lp I 90 Deployment Redeployment Routes In mid-September the Sixteenth noti fied the Seoond Air Force that complaints had been received from both Prestwick and Gander control centers regarding B-47's redeployment flights It developed that on occasion only two B-47's utilized the block altitude reservations originally requested for three aircraft It was felt that such flights violated Second'a directives concerning the requirement that groups of three of more aircraft utilize block reserva ions and that one or two airore i't should file individual flight plans However it was pointed out at that time that since an abort usually occurred after en-gine starts or after the aircraft were actually airborne it was impractical to ca noel the bl9ok reservation and then file individual 53 plane UNCLASSIFIED · SAC advised that when altitude reservation were approved by either center for three or more aircraft and then when only one or two ap• peared the reservations were automatically oanoelled Prestwick stated that in those oases individual flight plans had to be filed Failure to accomplish this would in the future resuit in violations 54 being filed on suoh aircrafto UNCLASSIFIED Until a firm plan could be worked out SAC requested that action be taken to assure that altitude reservations requests would not be submitted for less than three aircraft Additionally when sufficient time approximately three hours existed prior to scheduled departl U'e - 53 Msg 16AF to 2AF D00-1-1205 Reflex Action Altitude Reservations 16 Sept 1958 UNCLASSIFIED ·on file Operations 16AFo 54 l fag SAC to 16AF DO0PF-23948 11Ref'lex Altitude Reservations 11 17 Sept 1958 UlfCLASSIFIED on file Operations 16AFo w- i th a known schedule of less than three aircraft - the request would be o anoelled and individual flight plans f'Ued Such· pl ans were then in accordanoe vri th ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization procedures IDWLASSIFIED On the same day that SAC forwarded the above instructions two aircraft dep rted Zaragoza Spain £or MacDill Air Force Base Florida The Shannon-Prestwick center advised the 7370th Flight Service Squadron that no ICAO flight plan had been filed As a result Gander control advised the refueling squadron that no B-47 1 s were on their way This error was later corrected and refueling for the aircraft was aocom 55 plished UNCLASSIFIED 91 A week later on 24 September SAC instructed that flights of less than three aircra-ft -would cancel altitude reservations when this cir• cumstanoe was known prior to receipt of reservation information Then individual flight plans could be filed However if the reservation had already been received the aircraft would depart and all required ICAO position reports would be mandatory The route call sign and 56 timing were to remain as filed in the original requests UNCLASSIFIED Additional instructions came a few days latero The above outlined plans were expanded by stating that if the two aircraft did not wish to maintain formation the additional flight levels oould be requested enroute Prestwick center had recommended a similar procedure but also 55 56 1st Ind Det 1 7570th Flight Service Sq to l6AF nrncident ReportE 11 26 Sept 1958 UNCLASSIFIED on file Operations 16AF Msg SAC to 16AF DOOPF-24986 11Refle ie Altitude Reservations 24 Sept 1958 UNCLASSIFIED on file Operations l6AFo @0tlFillPJiti IR indicated that altitude reservations must be cancelled if it became 57 known -'prior to departure the t less than three aircraft could operate UNCLASSIFIED On 9 October two east-bound and tt o west-bound B-47 1 s were re ported by the Flight Service Squadron for alleged violations within the Sha nnon-Prestw i ok area on 24-25 September On east-bound flight was enroute from Loring to Torrejon and failed to report as required at 30° west Sinoe it was due there at 0819 and alert was declared at 0920 It was not until 1012 that the alert was secured following notification f'rom Ocean Station that word had been received from the aircraft and that it was safe It had reported on UHF rater than on the required HF The two west- ound f' 1 ght 9 __ e ut from Z'a a oza to Harmon involved flight plans rec ived by phone from the USAF center at Uxbidge England However the oenter had not received a request for a formation flight of two airora-i't or for a block configurationo Then -nearly two hours after departing Spain they reported as flying ·- at 45° North 10° West at 28 600 feeto They were then cleared as a - formation flight l t_ that_ l vel _About an hour later when they had reached 20° West they reported to the center that they were climbing to 30 000 feeto This was done hovrever -without clearance and was 58 into a level not authorized for west-bound flights The third inci d0nt involved a Loring-Brize Norton flight east-bound with the pilot failing to contact - on HF the·Shannon-Prestwiok control center$ 58 Msg SAC to· 16AF DOOPR-27679 ' Refle ic Altitude Resen-a-tionsg ff 29 Septo 1958 UNCLASSIFIED on files Operations 16AF · Ltr Det 1 7370th Flight 8·crvicc Sq_ua dron t6 CO Mc cDill L i'E Incia ent Report 11' 9 Octo 1958 OONFIDEH' l IAL on file Opera tionst 16AF with the result that a vi1lation report was filed by the Scottish Air 59 Traffic Control Center t Subsequent directives from SAC stressed that flight reservation altitudes must be maintained unless approval of IC AO control agencies was received In the event of colIIIIlunicat ion failures the minimum qua d rantal heading for the direction of flight for each leg of the approved altitude reservation was to be adhered to If for safety of flight reasons and during communications outa ge it was necessary to change altitudes the pilot was reqµired to report this as soon as 60 possible UNCLASSIFIED In mid-Oot ober US Navy operations personnel became concerned with uncorrelated radar returns in refueling areas It was recommended by the Chief Liaison Team Lajes Air Base that redeploying B-47 1 s include name and estimate time they expected to be in the refueling 61 areas in their position reports At the same time the SMta Maria Azores Oceanic Control Center stated that B--47 1 s were not reporting on HF radio and were not securing permission to descend to refueling 62· altitudes It was pointed out in both cases that in event of fa ilure of HF communications facilities in the bombers other frequencies were available to permit relaying to the Center the necessary informa tion through either picket ships or through the airborne tankers - ' l - 59 Ltr Det 1 7370th Flight Service Squadron to Co Hunter AFB 11 Incident Report u 9 Oct 1958 CONfimtf'flil i on file Operations 9 16AF 60 Msg SAC to 16AF OOPF-31319 1 tReflex AJ titude Reservationsp 11 10 Oct 1958 UNCIASSIFIED - on file Operations 16AF · · jr dri pl Ll 11 '' 1 tlf iT·t·rITTi ij uU lbi J u r JJ -------------------------------------------------··-- 94 At this time a mee-ting was held at SAC to discuss the problems arising in crossing the Atlantic fo the ICAO areas One of the recom mendations included a change to SACM 55-12 Air Operations Peacetime p to require HF position reporting for all Reflex flights This action was carried out by message on 7 November and re-quired all flight's to report regardless of whether or not they were on block altitude 63 clearance or on individual ICAO flight plans Additionallyp such aircraft were to preflight and have an operating HF radio prior to 64 departure UNCLASSIFIED By the end of the yea r the problems of a ltitude re servations and of conformance to flight plans had been alleviated Such action was necessary in view of the increasing number of civilian jet aircraft operating in the areas formerly utilized s lely by military planes and compliance with east-and west-bound altitude levels of flight req_uired by ICAO serve d' as a measure of protection for both i ypes of fligh·b Add itionally 9 regular reporting would obv iate• the requirement for needlessly alerting of air rescue service conserving utilization of this protective· facilities for emergency only UNCLASSIFIED 61 62 63 64 Msg Chief SAC Liaison Team Lajes to 16 AF SLT l0-045 Conver sation with Commander Barrier Atlantic 15 Oat 1958 4 g on file 9 Operations 1 16AF Msg Ghieft SAO Liaison Team Iejes to 16 DW SLT l0-09 11Reflex Alti tud Reservations 11 15 Oot 195B UNCLASSIFIEDh on file Oper ationst 16AF JVlsg SAC to 16AF D0 40895 9 HF Position Re orting on Reflex Action Missions 11 7 Nov 1958 UNCLASSI F J EDJ on filer Opera tions 16AF Msg9 SAC to 16AF DOClB-0938 rtHF Reporting on Reflex· Action 11 18 Nov 195 8 UNCLASSIFIED h on file 9 Operations 9 J 6AF ri nn - - 1 I 1 ii nJ 1 1 ur11rrnrr111 lJ uv lliJt vJ JJ r t J Local Reactions to July Alert Spanish Madrid's reaction to the American landings was that of general approval although some concern was evidenced as to the delay in accomplishing what was generally considered as necessary The mili tary attaches of Turkey and Italy expre·ssed satisfaction with the move and other diplomats seemed to follow along However comments 65 at time s appeared to be somewhat guarded U Further approval came when the S panish Foreign Minister Sr Castiella had the approval of Generalissimo Franco to state that Spain approved the use of American bases within the country for sup port of the troops iJ 1 Lebanon The Spanish Navy furnished 200 Marines for guard duty after operations at the American Naval installation at 66 Rota were increased based on a request from the American Forces v As time went on some im pa tience was voiced in the controlled Spanish press as to why the US had not wielded a heavier hand One paper called our a o t ions as appeasement 11 while another stated that the middle east nations found it-more dangerous to lean to the West 67 than to the Ea st 65 66 67 Msg 16AF to SAC DICm2209 t 1 l6AF Weekly Military Political Economic ReJ ort 23 July 1958 eONFIDEM'Fiftti - on file D Intelli gence 16AF Msg 16AF to SAC DIC-2248 11Spanif3h Relation to Utilization of US Bases in Support of L banon Operations 11 25 July 1958 H9 1tti on file D Inte Lligence r 16AF Msg 16AF to SAC DI0-2450 16AF1 Weekly Military Political' Economic Reports F August 1958 CONFIJfilffl'ilL - NO POH ElIEIN on file D Intellige1 iCe 16AF - 8 r iiffu n n tf'D fFil n 1r Qr rFN 1w ri il1 1 nirirm 1IT Spanish solid e rity with the US was further evidenced by Foreign Minister Castiella 1s stat ement to US Ambassador Lodge in late A J gust Fie said that Spain would support US proposals as outlined by Presi dent Eisenhower in his address before the United Nations He also volunteered the information that the Egyptian Ambassador had called on him and asked if it was known that the Americans were using Span ish bases to support the Lebanon landings The Minister informed hfa that this was known and that it was considered as an appropriate use 6e of' the Spanish sites U Morooc an Intelligence sources indicated that most Moroccans viewed the coup in Irai4 with approval and regarded it 11 as a logical step towards freedom of the Middle East from colonialist domination and oonsolida b 69 tion with the United Arab Republic All levels of the Moroccan pub lie appeared to be hostile to American and British interventions and considered that such action underlined the United State s I dedication to colonial poli'cies • However no anti-American incidents were re- 70 ported within a week after the crisis occurred U An official Moroccan statement was presented at a press conference on 20 July with the stand that it was considered that the Lebanon situation was an internal matter 'l1hus it was deemed as 11 hostile 11 68 Msg 16Al ' to SAC IC-2487 16AF Weekly Military Political Economic Report 11 26 Aug 1958 OOUFi BEN9 11Al J a NO l R 1 JISN p on file D Intelligence 16AF 69 Moroccans appeared to regard the mid-east events as further proof of Nasser 1 s power and of the Arab's determination to unite Background information on Morocco bas been published in earlier histories of the 5th Air Division and the 16th Air Forc e ----' 1 ri -Lir1 i0 1 urc1rr1 11 l tl -I J I t-l I'll _ - 1 11 J l J 1 UJ 1 1MlL0 llc u ll lUJ - ·71 for foreign intervention to ooov re It was al o r eported by Mr Bou- - - oetta Moroooo 1s Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs to US Embassy • 0 0 • • •• • • • 0 0 I personnel that the use of Moroccan bases for staging troops was - - poli tioe l dynamite and request d that no publioi ty be gi van ii' suoh ·72 · activity took place UJ On 21 July both French and Moroocan papers reprinted an exclusive i tervi granted to a Tun sian 003 respondent by Prime Minister A med B l f ej He reiterated Moroccan opposition to foreign intervention in the mid-ea st and stated that the West we s wrong to extend the zone - of conflict At the same time he brought out that the P meric bas s had been established in Morocco without the permission of the Moroo- - - cans He also stated that American personnel were enjoying status and %' ivE 'leges nsidered te e e x horbita l'_ l and adde __ that it i pr ti oally an extra-territorial regime which we will not permit much longer 1A The next day brought another ai ct emphasizing the anti-interven tion stand of the Moroccans A ship under the Dutch flag 9 the Linjbaan arrived at the port _o Safi to unload a cargo of bombs destined for the American bases Since no prior arrangements had been made to meet it at the dock US Army personnel of the Transportation Detachment were not present The Army's Ca sabanoa office issued 70 7l 7Z Msg l6AF to SAC 'DIC-2130 nrntelligenoe Information Situation Report on Morocco n 17 July 1958 e61fi7 EMN Itdi - on file D Intelligence 16AF ' Msg 16AF to SAC -DIC-2180 Transmittal of Intelligence Inf'orma tion from OSI Dist 6 11 21 July 1958 oE oO FIEEYTii' k on file I' D Intelligence l6AF Ibid instructions f'or this ship to drop anchor outside the harbor to wait entry authorization J On 23 uly they returned to port only to be met by a crowd of local workers armed with sticks who refused to unload a nun uni ti ons to be used against their 11brethren in the Middle East 11 This group was dispersed by some 50 soldiers of the Royal Ifioroccan Army Rtm but the vessel still was not permitted to unload It 73 was instructed by MSTS to return to Leghornii Italy on 25 Julye JA The first few days in August fo'Ulld a complete lull in the talk against intervention activities The significance of this silence 74 was unknown However on 11 August the US Flag commercial ship the African··Patriot was not granted diplomatic clearance to unload muni tions and the Moroccan Government requested diversion because of a tbreatened strikec General cargo shipments at Casablanoeii and the off-loading of petroleum products at Fedala were not aff'ec ed8 and some other 23 US ships and about 60 foreign ships were in and out 1 75 of Casablanca during July without experiencing difficultieso lA The ban on military shipments continued even after the mid-east situation had settled down and by the end of the year there was no indication that the embargo would be li ftedo U 73 Msg 16AF to SAC · DIC 9 -2249 Intelligence Information from OSI District 6 Rabat tr 25 July 1958 CfflH'IDEJ if'fIJ cii • NO FlOili lIGN 9 see Exhibit·10 ' 74- Msg l6AF to SAC DIC-2403 rrTranf mittal of Intelligence Inf'or riatii n from OSI Sources 11 7 August 1958 emtFIDEN'±'ItrL NO FO on file D Intelligence 16AF 75 Msg 26AF to SAC DIC-2435 11Diversion of' SS African Patriot 11 12 Aug 1958 ECRB on files D Intelligence$ 16AF Surmnary The eAt ansion of the Reflex alert force to six of the '16th Air Force bases in Spain and Morocco permitted a tota-1 of 36 B-47• s to be on 24-hour 7-day a week alert A gradual settling of both Reflex and base personnel into fairly routine operational methods resulted in a high alert reliability factor being obtained during the last six months of 1958 In addition the placing of supporting tanker forces on an alert status similar to tha required for the bomber aircraft» gave an added measure of protection for accomplishment of emergency action U Study of the cause of an alert reliability reduction through mechanical malfunctions was accomplished and we a being given increa·sing emphasis at the end of the year Along with this went continued emphasis on providing adequate f'adlities for alert crews and maintenance person nel required for the full time ready status 'L The mid-east orisis had brought out the national reactions to police actions at least insofar as any intervention in essentially Moslem regions of the world were concerned The Spanish accepted the action as necessary and condoned use of the three sites within their borders On the other he nd to the Moroccans the American and British landings were an affront to their newly acquired independence and they considered them as indicating approval of colonialism Their reaotion'placed in jeopardy the ocean supply lines for the Moroccan sites and at the se rne time required that aerial sup' ort be kept to a minimum lest it indicate utilization of the bases to support troop actions considered as undesirable by the local Government U r1 1 r 1 J lit lLrilu 1nJJ Jj l n1r l1JJ STAFF HEADQU1' RTERS SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE 30 June 1958 Commander Major General H K Mooney USAF 589A Deputy Commander Colonel Erne st C • Hardi 11 Jr USAF 8211A Chief of staff Colonel Kenneth E Marts USAF 4416A lW Administrative Services Lieutenant Colonel Edolyne J Reynolds USAF 01297429 Chaplain Colonel Alphonse B Slivinski USAF 18756 A Comptroller Colonel George T Bland US AF 859A Information Services Lieutenant Colonel George Schenkein USAF 9643A Inspector General Colonel Bernard v Ogas USAFp 4518A Installations Engineering Colonel John T Trotter USAF 3012A Intelligence Colonel Paul J Haran USAF 601 SA Judge Advocate Colonel Arnold Lebell USAF 2659A Materiel Colonel Michael J Galer JI USAF 5272A Operations Colonel Alan F Adams USAF 4429A Personnel Colonel Antonio N LaGrippo USAF 2 391A Plans Colonel Martin C MoWilliams USAF 4322A Safety- Lieutenant Colonel Clarence A Lakin USAF A042907 Surgeon Colonel Andr EI G Oliver USAF MC 19127A For changes during the period of 1 January through 30 June 1958 see Exhibit 3