1 A NO J 198'3 P- t' fl 'liirlP' '%i ct-1lJi lelk Ar 1uAl tJv l'183· V -- I u ' Lei J lr 1- J C ' I - Jj l J' '- A --- Lv Classification L This document is classified J T5$7i in accordb - c J n · · h oJL _ __ _ paragraph 10 AFR 205-lA Warning This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States as such information is defined in paragraph 10 AFR 205-J A and wi hin· the DJ e ing of the Espionage Laws 1itle 18 U S Ce sections 793 ana -794 The transmission or revelation of its contents in any way to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law It will be transported used safe guarded and accounted for as directed _ by AFR 205-1 as amended Individmµ portions of the document m'3ir be reproduced to satisfy offici'al needs of' agencies within the United States Air Force but th document m not be reproduced in its entirety without permission of' the office of origin Release of portions or the whole of the document to agencies outside the Uni ed States Air Force is forbidden without permission of' the office of' origin · · This page is marked -lllt tn accordance with paragraph 34a AFR 205-lC However its actue 1 classification is UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED A- z bS - I JI s r S 9 5tf r -· ¼ · PENGHUS PESCADORES I • · - MAJOR AIRFii Los • CITi°Es -·•'-tz• DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES CHIAYI TAIWAN FORMOSA J1 t11 '½t • l1 l o __ ___ 46 1 INCH 46 STATUTE MILES 1------28° AIR OPERATIONS IN THE TAIWAN CRISIS OF 1958 U By Jacob Van Staaveren November 1962 USAF Historical Division Liaison Office FOREWORD Air Operations in Taiwan Crisis S f is one of a series of studies on air operations in international incidents prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office at the reque-st of the Directorate of Plans Headquarters USAF This historical narrative by Jacob Van Staaveren is based on primary source materials available in 196O--messages and correspondence and on histories from many levels of the Air Force including units commands and the Air Staff Origina°lly prepared in a very few copies the study has been in great demand by the Air Staff major coil' lillands and Department of Defense agencies and is now being published for wider dissemination The defense of Taiwan has been and will continue to be a source of major concern to the United States and especially to the U S armed services It is likely that there may be more military crises involving Taiwan and its related islands The crisis in 1958 provided a test of American military planning concepts that should prove of value for future planning Occur ring in the Pacific almost simultaneously with the Lebanon crisis of July-August 1958 it created certain planning operationar and logistic problems that had not been anticipated JOSEPH ·w ANGELL JR Chief USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ' I II III IV v CONTENTS The Taiwan Crisis of 1954-55 •••••••••••••••••••••• U S Policy toward Taiwa 1949-54 ·•••••••••••• U S Air Operations during the 1954-55 Crisis •• Interval between Crises•••••••••••••••••••••••• The Renewed Communist Threat to Taiwan···•·•••••·• Initial U S and Chinese Nationalist Reactions •• Bombardment of the Kinmens ••••••••••••••••••••• Deployment of USAF Units••··········•·•··•••••• Deployment of Navy Marine and Army Units •••••• U S Military Preparations on Taiwan ••••••••••••••• Planning for Nonnuclear Operations •••••••••••••• Strengthening Air Defenses •••••••••••••••••••••• Communication and Logistic Problems •••••••• ••• • • The Controlled Conflict •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The War in the Air•••••••••·••••••••••••••••• The 11War at Sea•••••••••••···••••••••••••••••• The Communi-st Cease-Fire ••••••••••••••••••••••• Redeployment •··••••••••••••••••••••e••••••••••• An Appraisal ••••e••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 3 5 10 13 14 17 19 2 3 'Z7 Z7 32 34 37 37 40 4 3 46 50 NOTES••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• 59 GLOSSARY •••••••••••ao••••••••••••eoooeo•••••••••••••••• 69 APPENDIX 1 CASF X-Ray Tango Units and Their Home Stations· 71 2 USAF Units Available to PACAF _after Deployment • • 72 MAPS AND CHARTS The Taiwan Area •••••••••••••••••••• Frontispiece Following u s and Chinese Nationalist Command Relations 12 May 1958 ••• Jl U S Command Relations on Taiwan 11 September 1958 ••••• 31 I THE TAIWAN CRISIS OF 1954-55 Ioring about 100 miles off the mainland of China is the island of Taiwan ·also known to the Western ¼urld as Formosa Its 13 429 square miles roughly equal the combined area of the states of Massachusetts --- ----w Connecticut and Rhode Island Taiwan is 243 miles long and from 60 ·to 80 miles wide With the U So-held island of Okinawa 350 miles to the northeast and the Philippine Islands 225 miles to the southeast Taiwan is one of the most important military bastions in the western Pacific About 25 miles from the island in the Taiwan Strait are the Penghus a cluster of islets also called the Pescadores His torically an appendage of Taiwan they too are important because of their strategic position The people of Taiwan are primarily of Chinese stock derived mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces although some come from the south China plateau About 2 percent are aborigines During the twentieth century the population of Taiwan expanded rapidly from about 3 6 mil lion in 1920 to about 10 million in 1956 The latter figure included some 2 million refugees who fled from the mainland in 1946-49 About 480 000 Japanese were repatriated to Japan in 1945 China ceded Taiwan and the Penghus to Japan at the end of the Sino Japanese War of 1894-95 but 50 years later these territories were again in Chinese hands In the Cairo Declaration of November·1943 t e United States together with the United Kingdom and the Republic of China called for the return to China of all t rpitories taken from that country by J BRE 2 ··· the Japanese At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 the United States and the United Kingdom with the concurrence of China and the subsequent adherence of the Soviet Union signed a declaration stipulating that the terms of the Cairo Declaration be carried out With the defeat of Japan China assumed acL inistrative control over Taiwan and the Penghus In Septerr ber 1951 as a last formality Japan and 26 oth8r nations not in eluding the Soviet Union signed a treaty of peace wherein Japan re- nounced all title and claim to these islands At the end of World War II the civil war that had been smoldering since the late 1920's broke out anew between the Chinese Nationalist government under President Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communist forces entrenched-in north China By March 1948 the'communists controlled Man- _churia by year's end they had seized virtually all of the country north of the Yangtze River Defeat followed defeat _until the Nationalis½s were driven off the mainland of China They fled to Taiwan the Penghus and a number of offshore islands primarily the Kinmen Quemoy Matsu and Tachen groups In December 1949 Taipei became the provisional capital - of the remnants of the Republic of China Meanwhile in Peiping on 1 October 1949 the Chinese Communists established a new People's Republic of China a regime recognized by the Soviet Union two days later The Kinmen group consists of Big and Little Kinmen plus four other islands all within 10 miles of Fukien Province Big Kinmen about 13 miles long and 8 miles across at its widest point lies only five miles from Fukien Province and Communist-held Amey Island The Matsu group consists of seven islands also about 10 miles from Fukien Province They lie just outside the Min River estuary at the northern entrance to the Taiwan Strait and are about 155 nautical miles northeast of the K inmens The Tachen proup consists of 2 main islands Shang and Hsia about 10 miles from Ch kiang Province plus 23 smaller islands The Tachens lie about 250 nautical miles north of Taiwan 7 9 9RII IIORil 3 U S Policy towaro·Taiw n 1949-54 During the immediate postwar period a United States mission head ed by Gen George C Marshall made an unsuccessful attempt to mediate the Chinese civil war After the Nationalists lost mainland China the U S State Department attributed the defeat to internal political eco nomic and military weaknesses that had been beyond the power of the United States to remedy save through outright intervention Althoug sympathetic to the Nationalists the United States initially avoided a policy that would risk involvement in the Chinese civil war President Trmnan stated on 5 January 1950 that the U S Government would provide no military aid for Chinese forces and desired no special rights privi leges or military bases on Taiwan 1 The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 ended this policy and led to the military neutralization of Taiwan Observing that its loss to the Communists would threaten the security of the Pacific area and U S forces se rving in that area President Truman directed the U S Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Taiwan At the same time the fleet was ordered to prevent any sea or air operations by th Na tionalist government against the mainland In July the JCS affirm d the strategic value of the island to the United States Their recom mendations resulted in renewal of military assistance to the Nationalists in February 1951 and the establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group MAAG in Taipei in November 1952 2 In February 1953 shortly after assuming of fic e President Eisen hower altered u s policy toward Taiwan when he declared that the u s ··••· 4 l OR 'f Seventh Fleet would cease to shield Communist China from the National- t 3 l S Se However the unleashed military forces of the Chiang govern ment did not attack the mainland and the action had no major impact on the Korean War The cessation of hostilities in Korea in July 1953 eased tension in the Far East only temporarily The Chinese Communists renewed their assistance to the Indochinese revolutionaries who were fighting French rule French defeats led to the establishment of a Communist government in North Vietnam This prompted the United States to enter into new military defense arrangements It took the lead in concluding a seven nation Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed in Manil in September 19540' Then on 2 December it signed a bilateral mutual de fense treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government assuring the defense f Taiwan and the Penghus and such other territories as might be deter mined by mutual consent--an allusion tot he small offshore islands In an exchange of notes between the two governments on 10 December 1954 the United States recognized that the Nationalists possessed the inherent right of self- defense not only for Taiwan and the Penghus but also for other territory under their control i e the offshore is lands e On their part the Nationalists accepted a limitation on their freedom of actione The use of force in this area by either the Nation alist government or the United States would be a joint decision except in an emergency when the Nationalists clearly might have to defend them selves 5 The notes reflected U S fear that conflict with the Communists might arise from unilateral action by the Nationalists who fervently wished to repossess the ma inland By this time the status of the Nationalist-held offshoTe islands had become··an · increasingly acute problem for the United States The Communists made unsuccessful attempts to invade the Tachens in May and August 1954 Big Kirunen in September and Wuchiu Island about _60 les northeast of Big Kw men in Novembero In addition the Communists on ·the mainland engaged in periodic artillery duels with the Nationalists on the Kinmens and Tachens Against this background of tension U S Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 1 December 1954 publicly discussed· the U So commitment to defend the other territories re ferred to in the mutual defense treaty Explaining that the status of the offshore islands was not affected by the treaty he said that their defense b the United states would depend on· the nature of the specific islands under attack and whether this attack was deemed part of the de fense of Taiwan On this matter the President would probably make the final decisione6 Ak Operations during the· -2 2 Crisis Meanwhile Chinese Communist forays against the offshore islands and limited air action by both the Nationalist and Communist air forces spurred U S military preparations in the areao On 4 September 1954 the JCS warned the Commander-in-Cqief Far East ClNCFE Gen John E Hull in Tokyo and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific CINCPAC Adm Felix Bo Stump in Hawaii that it might be necessary to implement the 5 latter's Ops Plan 51-53 is pla called for augmentation of CINCPAC's air and naval ui1its and for U S participation with Nationalist forces ' 'The JCS had transferred responsibility for the defense of Taiwan the Penghus and the Philippines from CINCFE to CINCPAC on 15 March 19 52 l OIH if - - 6 918ftCT if authorized in the defense of Taiwan the Penghus and some of the offsho e islands In approving-the plan the JCS had directed the es tablishment of a USAF component of the Pacific Command and on l July 1954 the Air Force had formed the Pacific Air Force primarily for this purpose Its commander was ubordinate to the commander of the Far·East Air Forces FEAF --a major command of CINCFE-in matters pertaining solely to the Air Force and subordinate to CINCPAC in matters relating to the defense of Taiwan the Penghus and the Philippines In November JCS directed the Air Force to designate a fighter wing within FEAF for dispatch to Taiwan on short notice For FEAF the pos sibility of deploying a wing posed manifold logistical maintenance communication and fuel problemsa FEAF was also mindful of CINCFE's concern lest the transfer of too many military units to Taiwan jeopar dize the defense of other areas ' Korea Japan and Okinawa It was finally detennined that a show of force if necessary could be made from Taiwan by rotating squadrons of FEAF9s 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing F-S6ts from Japan to the island as part of a training and familiari zation program The State and Defense Departments concu VTed in the rotation plan on 22 January 1955 during another period of rising ten sion in the Taiwan Strait 7 On 17 January Ichiang a small island northwest of the Tachens had fallen to Communist forces On 24 January President Eisenhower asked Congress for a resolution to authorize him to employ the armed forces promptly and effectively to assure the security of Taiwan and the Penghus The President's request was approved by overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate late in January 8 passed by the Congress read as followsg ' he resolution Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in ongress assembled That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Anned forces of the pnited States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Fonnosa and the Pesca dores against armed attack this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions _ and- terl itories of that -area now in friendly hands and the tak ing of such other measures as he judges to be required or ap propriate in assuring the defense of Fonnosa and the Pescadores 7 This resolution shall expire when the President shall deter mine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably as sured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise and shall so report to the Congress Also on 24 January JCS with State and Defense approval ordered the entire 18th Fighter Bomber Wing to Taiwan nie change in plans re sulted from a sudden U So decisibn to evacuate about 40 000 Chinese Nationalist soldiers and civilians from the Tachen Is ands which were considered indefensible Ships and amphibious elements of CINCFEts naval forces joined the U S Seventh Fleet in assisting the evacuation Following preBminary air deployments on 26 January three squadrons of the lath Wing flew from Japan and the Philippines to bases at Chiayii Tainan and Taoyuan on Taiwan Transports of the Fifth Air Force's 315th Air Division lifted personnel supplies and equipment 9 To direct air operations from Taiwan the Fifth Air Force estab- - lished Headquarters Air Task Force Fifth Provisional at Taipei Its mission was to cover the Navy's evacuation of the islands protect the carrier Princeton and in coordination with the Chinese Nationalist Air Force CNAF provide for air defense search and rescue in an 0 0 0 10 area south and west of a line 2r N 125 E to 28 N 121 E • 8 SElllt On 3 February the 18th Wing had on hand 65 combat-ready aircraft and 78 combat-ready pilots For a brief period it flew training a d familiar ization missions During the evacuation of the Tachens which began on 9 February and continued until the 13th the 18th flew 206 sorties 184 ot them over the Tachen and Nanchi islandsA in direct support missions The CNAF -jointly responsible with the U s Navy for antisubmarine ·patrol south of 27°N new P4Y aircraft at 1 000 feet and maintained top cover with their F-47's and F-84•s All forces were cautioned to remain at least three miles from the Chinese mainl nd In acqordance with JCS in structions operational control of the 18th Wing passed from CINCFE FEAF to CINCPAC Pacific Air Force 11 Thus what had been initially planned as a show of for e through a training exercise became a tactical operation After the successful com pletion of the evacuation without Communist opposition the Taiwan Strait crisis began to wane By the end of February the 18th9s aircraft return ed to their home stations ending CINCPAC's control over the wing The United States continued to display its air strength on Taiwan however CINCPAC's squadron rotation plan was put into effect by JCS directive The first unit to rotate the 69th Fighter-Bomber Squadron te po rily stationed at Clark AB flew to Chiayi AB in February 1955 Other fighter-bomber or fighter-interceptor squadrons followed initially at about two-week intervals and after 1 July 1955 for longer periods 12 In January 1958 units again began to deploy more frequently for shorter periods •Fan 24 Februa ry t he Nationalists also voluntarily bandoned the Nanchi group midway between Taiwan and the Tachens and 25 miles from the China coast r 'S kli 4Etftif 9 The Tachen evacuation focused attention on the ability of U s and Chinese Nationalist forces to defend aiwan the Penghus and the off shore islands and to conduct joint air operations from Taiwan The operational problems were fonnidable The major deficiency was com munications for U S forces had to rely on inadequate and unreliable Nationalist on- and off-island telephone teletype radio and radar systems The Joint Operations Center JOC a Chinese agency was al most inoperable and the use of Chinese installers operators and maintenance men created a language barrier that compounded communica tion difficulties An important logistical deficiency was the severe shortage of F-86 drop tanks-sufficient for only two days of sustained operations An intricate UeS command structure on Taiwan complicated both logistical support and liaison with the Nationalists There was also an urgent need for closer u s and Nationalist defense planning And the CNAF needed more and better aircraft 13 To rectify some of the deficiencies plans were prepared for im- ·' proved communication and radar systems and air-base facilities A U S section of the Chinese JOC was established in June 19550 Meanwhile U S and Chinese Nationalist representatives held a series of defense coordination conferences in March and April As a result of the latter conference Admiral Stump established a Formosa Liaison Center in May as an integral part of the Fo nnosa Defense Command permitting more intimate U S and Chinese working relationships in planning opera- fflprevious defense· coordination conferences had been held in May and December 1953 and October 1954 10 ••••• tions and training The CNAF was also strengthened by the acquisition of F-86F fighter-interceptors Contr-a- ey to U s military advice the Nationalists bolstered the defenses r the Quemoy group with an addi tional division of troops from Taiwan 14 Interval between Crises Nearly three and a half years elapsed before Chinese Comrmmist pressure against the offshore islands created a new crisis in August - 1958 During this interval the United States and the Nationalists made numerous changes in their defenses in the area The U S Air Force off set a decrease of units and personnel by introducing more modern air craft capable of carrying a variety of nuclear weapons and by sta ion ing a Matador missile squadron on Ta twan in February 1958 The expansion i of the CNAF ·also helped o offset tpe decrease in USAF's numerical strength By the middle of 1958 Pacific Air Forces possessed 879 aircraft including 129 bombers pnd 401 fighters The CNAF had nearly I oo jet aircraft largely F-84 's and F-86ts As it grew air facili ties on Taiwan improved bµt inadequacies remained The communica- tion net was especially weak ' since u s plans for major expansion of the net had been rejected as too cost1y 15 The period also witnessed the development of a new role for tne Tac tical Air Command TAC In 1955 Headquarters USAF directed TAC to develop a·mob lle Composite Air Strike Force CASF with an atomic capa bility to be used in small localized wars Earmarked for CASF 1J lder TAC's plan Blue Blade subsequently renamed Double Trouble were fighter fighter-bomber reconnaissance troop carrier refueling communication FEAF was redesignated Pacific Air Forces PACAF on 1 July 1957 The Paci fie Air Force was dissolved at this time · 160Rii 11 and supply u its Assigned to the Nineteenth Air Force f or specific op erations CASF units made practice deployments ·including one in November 1957 to the Far East under the code name Mobile Zebra A PACAF-TAC agree ment signed in May 195S set forth the conditions under which TAC forces would deploy to the Pacific_ 16 The U S comr11and strocture in th Pacific also underwent change The U S Navy emerged as the executive agent for the entire area on 1 July 1957 when the Far eas t Command with headquarters in Tokyo was disestablished and its responsibilities were transfe' ' 'ed to the Pacific Conunand in Hawaii In the realignment of subordinate commands_ FEAF was redesignated the Pacific Air Forces PACAF also with headquarters in Hawaii PACAF was the principal USAF command in the entire Pacific area 17 At JCS direction service commanders sought ways to further streamline arrangements on Taiwan Here three separate headquarters existed Taiwan Defense Command TDC Military Assistance Adrisory Group MAAG and Air Task Force ATF 13 P The Air Force and the Army wanted to eliminate TDC and consolidate all military activities on Taiwan under a Chief MAAG who would be an Army lieutenant general but Admiral Stmnp considered such an arrangement impractical and politically in feasible at the time He cautioned against a change that might imply a decline in U S interest in Taiwan Early in 1958 with JCS approval TDC and MAAG were combined into a single headquarters under a vice ad miral The commander of ATF 13 also served as chief of Air Force--Section MAAG This centralization of command provided one rather than three 12 points of contact between U S and Chinese military authorities and also permitted reduction of the U S headquarters staff and facilities T • 18 on aiwan Admiral Stump had major responsibility for overall operational planning On 16 May 1958 he published Ops Plan 25-58 to guide his major subordinate commanders in updating their respective operational plans These subordinates were Gen Laurence S Kuter Commander-in-Chief Pa cific Air Forces CINCPACAF Vice Adm Herbert C Hopwood Comrnander in-Chief Pacific Fleet CINCPACFLT and Gen Isaac D White Commander in-Chief Army Pacific CINCARPAC 19 Between 1955 and 1958 the United States made no basic changes in its Taiwan policies This country would insure the military security of Taiwan and the Penghus the defense of the offshore islands a matter of Presidential discretion and it would support the Nationalist govern ment as a free alternative to the Chinese Co mnunist government Maintaining Nationalist morale was deemed essential Howeve frustrations on Taiwan mounted as Nationalists saw their hopes of recapturing mainland China fadej their position in the international community decline and their national existence continue to be dependent on the United States The detennination of the Nationalists to hold the Kinmen and Matsu islands now defended by more than 100 000 of their 450 000 regular ground troops troubled U S policy planners On the eve of a new Taiwan crisis the nature of U S reaction to a Chinese Communist attack or an air and sea blockade of the offshore islands was still under discussion by the Nation al Security Councii 2O For command channels in May 1958 see chart following p 32 ttell I · I' 'r ilfllt Il THE RENEWED COMMUNIST THREAT TD TAIWAN There were signs of renewed trouble in the Taiwan Strait in July 1958 following the overthrow of the Iraqi government and the sudden dispatch o ru s and British troops to Lebanon and Jordan respectiv ly to stabilize the situation in these countries l In China the Communists restricted western diplomats to the city of Peiping and in tensified the propaganda war especially their threats to liberaten Taiwan After four days of secret talks Premier Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung added ta the tension by their joint communique from Peiping on 3 August demahding the withdrawal of UaSo and British forces from the Middle East 2 More ominous were signs of Chinese Communist military preparations Heretofore _unoccupied airfields in Fukien Province across the strait from Taiwan soon held an estimated 200 fighters including Mig-17's Air defense against CNAF reconnaissance and fighter sorties over the mainland became more effective Between 23 June and 8 August · ·10 CNAF aircraft were shot down 7 in air engagements and 3 by AAA fire Com munist overflights of the Kinmen and Matsu islands begane ·Across from the Kinmens the Communists augmented their artillery strength on 18 August they fired about 100 shells at the islands Three days later 'For a discussion of this operation sea study by USAF Historical Division Liaison Office A r Operations J n Lebanon Qtl ii_ 2f l958 · J IRllf 13 14 the war of nerves was intensified by the Soviet·Union's public pledge to assist the Peiping government's efforts to free Taiwan 3 Initial Y § sms Chinese Nationalist Reactions React ing to the Communist military bu i ldup the Nationalist govern ment early in August declared a state of emergency for the offshore is l ds 4 It asked the United States to speoo up military assistance particularly F-S6F aircraft and Sidewinder missiles and reconsider a previously denied request for F-lOOD aircraft The Nationalists also urged the deployment or USAF units to Taiwan 5 President Chiang Kai shek in a meeting with American Ambassador Everett F Drumwright and the new Commander-in-Chief Pacific Adm Harry D Felt stressed the gravity of the crisis decried U S and British failure to act decisive ly in the Middle East especially in Iraq and wamed that this would encourage an attack on Taiwan Reminded of ·his 1 reaty commitments with respect to military action against the Communists i e the 10 December 1954 notes Chiang resentfully promised that his government would honor 6 them · linprovement of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force which now had 87 000 men and 826 aircraft 497 of them jets had previously been der consi4eration by U S authorities On August the-Department of Defense approved sending 60 ehabilitated F-86F1s to the· CNAF and on the 15th the JCS decided that the CNAF should be built up and maintained in such a condition that it is qualitatively superior to·the Chinese Communist Air Force Pending approval of this decision by the Secretary of Defense commanders were directed to take all practicable steps-to provide the CNAF em1• illlit' 15 with suitable aircraft and necessary pilot trainingo A week later the Secretary of Defense approved the diversion to Taiwan of six F-lOOD aircraft- earmarked for NA TOo7 On 15 July the day U S troops began debarking in Lebanon the Air Force had placed all of its commands on alert Ten days later when the Middle East crisis appeared to have subsided Headquarters USAF authorized field commanders to decrease their alert status and resume crew and combat-readiness training PACAF intelligence mean 1virl l e concluded that the next most likely trouble spot would be in the Taiwan area a prediction given substance by the movement of Mig aircraft to airfields opposite Taiwan and the growing belligerency of the Chinese Cormnunists On 6 August the Air Force directed commanders concerned to reexamine their plans to support CINCPAC's Ops Plan 25-58 Gen Otto P Weyland TAC commander was asked to review his commal'ld's capability to deploy CASF X-Ray Tango to the Pacific while Lt Gen William F Tunner of MATS and General Kuter of PACAF wel e asked to determine their capabilities to support this deployment Weyland responded by trans er ing planning and operational responsibility for deployment of CASF X-Ray Tango to the Twelfth Air Force because the Nineteenth was preoccupied in the Middle East with its CASF Bravo force 8 Kuter distributed the main portions of PACAF's interim Ops Plan 25- 58 to his subordinate commanders on 7 August It provided for U S mili tary assistance to the Chinese Nationalist forces in three phases Phase I patrol and reconnaissance activities already under way Phase ll the defeat of the attacki g force Phase III air operations to destroy 16 the Chinese Communist capability to make waro The last phase would be conducted primarily by the Strategic Air Command SAC with the support of CINCPAC forces Most irriportant to Kuter was Phase II Assuming con ditions short of a general war and the use of atomic weapons by both sides PACAF would be responsible for striking 32 of the 62 pre-planned targets Initial atomic strikes would be launched from Clark AB in ·the Philippines and Kadena AB in Okinawa with additional strikes as the situation dictated The Thirteenth Air Force at Clark AB would handle detailed planning of air ope ations for both PACAF and Chinese National ist air units The Fifth Air Force with headquarters in Japan would proviqe tanker_ tactical and reconnaissance support to the Thirteenth during the early stages of operations 9 Phase II was amended on 18 · August when the Air Force alerted five Guam-based B-47's'that had Mark ' ' 6 weapons with C cores to insure the most effective insta htaneous re taliatory strikes against coastal airfields This move gave SAC a role in limited war It was uncertain however whether these plans could be fully implemented because the American ambassador to JaP an Douglas MacArthur II warned that t e Japanese government might aek t he·United States not to use Japanese bases in a war against the Chinese Coriununists 10 PACAF's Ops Plan 25-58 was completed with little tjme ·to spare Kuter distributed Annex F the logistical part on 14 August It re quired air· unit moving to forward bases to deploy only the minimum equipment essential to the success of their missions and to make ma o m um use of prestocked equipment 11· The Pian itself was not published un il 20 August only three days before the Taiwan crisis broke into full force 8 1111 iCOlif 17 Bombardment of the Kinmens On 23 August the Chinese Communists using an estimated 300 guns unleashed a tremendous artillery bombardment against the Ki nm en is lands -firing- more than 40 000 rounds on the first day Communist planes strafed the islands and sank a Nationalist 1ST Artille cy fir-0- on-the e cond day was egually severe for each of the succeeding five days it averaged about 10 000 rounds sufficient to impose a tight artillery blockade Stepping up its propaganda war Peiping radio - ged the Nationalist garrisons to surrender Leaflets dropped on Little Kinmen boasted that the defenders were isolated and that the People's Republic of China had an at omic stockpile 12 When the bombardment began Secretaey Dulles wamed the Peiping government not to seize the Kinmens or M atsus lest such an attempt threaten the peace To back up his warning the JCS on 24 and 25 Au gust ordered the carriers Essex in the Mediterranean and Midway at Pearl Harbor and their destroyer escorts plus·other ships to speed to the Taiwan Strait to reinforce the Seventh Fleeta The Army·was or dered to expedite the shipment of a Nike battalion to Taiwan and more modern equipment for seven Nationalist army divisions on the offsho e islands Air commanders were directed to be ready to assist National- ist forces by striking coastal air bases if a major attack threatened the principal offshore islands ·They-were cautioned that probably The principal islands were defined as Big K en Lit le Kinmen and five islands of the Matsu group Mel 1 18 ••• only conventional weapons would be initially autr orized but they were also instructed to be prepared to make atomic strikes deep into Chinese Communist territory •13 u s intelligence concluded initially that the Commtmists were test ing U S and Chinese Nationalist reaction and might try to seize-one or more of the islands if not convinced that the United States would inter vene However an amphibious force for possible invasion of Big or Little Kinmen had not yet been observed Intelligence sources did not anticipate an immediate strike at Taiwan or the Penghus for they did not believe that either the Peiping government or the Soviet Union w nted a major war But they warned of the danger of a Nationalist attack against the mainland if pressure against the offshore islands became too great 14 Meanwhile the United States prohibited_ retaliatory aerial a trikes against the Communists Chiang Kai-shek vigorously protested against this injunction as inhuman and unfair Although he promised to consult with the United States before taking any military action the Generalis simo doubted whether he could control the morale of his armed forces and the public for more than a few days unless he was granted authority to bomb Communist gun positions airfields and communication centers 1 When the bombardment continued into the second week Secretary Dulles announced that the United States had not decided whether the artillery attack on the islands related to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus pursuant to the joint congressional resolution of January 1955 16 'l'h is ••••• siCAil 19 served to keep both Chiang and the Communists guessing as to whether the United States would assist the Nationalists in defense of their offshore islands Deployment oi' § E Shortly after the bombardment of the offshore islands began USAF field commanders requested additional air strength in the Pacific es pecially on Taiwan On Z3 August the commander of ATF 13 Brig Gen Fred M Dean asked ·ror the Fifth Air Force's 16th Fighter-Interceptor Squa ron stationed on Okinawa Two days later General Kuter urged the immediate deplo_yment of part of TAC's CA SF X-Ray Tango force from i he United States specifically an advance command element an F-100 squad ron a C-130 squadron and part bf a communication and control group Six RF-101 9s already on Taiwan on rotation were included in the -CASF 7 These requests were not immediately approved U s military forces were still in the Middle East and the meaning of the Chinese Communist bombardment was still uncertain Washington authorities did not authorize any major air deployments within or to the Pacific for several days until they had evaluated all intelligence data and the in ternational consequences of possible U S involvement in the Taiwan area 18 As a result about five days elapsed before the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was authorized to move On the 29th all but two The CASF force for the Pacific was initially composed of two segments CASF X-Ray Tango and CASF Yankee Only CASF X-Ray Ta_ngo deployments were made during the 1958 Taiwan crisis · 20 IEIIIT of its F-86D's flew from Kadena AB Okinawa to Tainan AB Taiwan and were combat-ready seven and a half hours after the movement order On the same day TAC began the CASF X-Ray Tango deployment Preceded by tankers sent to staging bases en route part of the force depari ed from George and Hamilton AFB's in California Brig Gen Al-yin P Tacon and members of his advance command element were the first to reach their destination Clark AB in the Philippines on 1 September 19 Since the JCS had indicated that only nonnuclear weapons probably -ould be initially authorized to counter a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands Kuter asked on 31 August for additional CASF · units Wotirt g that one B-36 could carry mo e 1 000-pound HE bombs than an F-100 squadron he also recommended alerting one SAC B-36 squadron The JCS disapproved a portion of Kuter's request and the alert of a B-36 unit but on 2 September it authorized the deploYJ lent of the remaining force known as CASF X-Ray Tango Balance · Finally Kuter received permission on 6 September to deploy one F-lOlA squadron to Okinawa and 12 Air Defense Command 'ADC F-104's to Taiwan Although nei her had been previously ·identified as CASF X-Ray units the F-101 squadron was designated CASF X-Ray Tango Augmented because it belonged to TAC 20 The entire CASF deployment beginning on 29 August and ending on 12 September took place in three distinct stages following each other • i'or a list of CASF X-Ray Tango units and their home stations see App 1 iEOAii 1 lflft 21 so closely in time that they blended into one contirmous operationQ Be cause of the great distances one or two air refuelings were required for F-100 F-101 and RF-101 aircraft flying from California to Hawaii then to Midway or Guam en route to Okinawa or the Philippines g The Twelfth Air Force controlled overall deployment from an air operations center at its headquarters in Wacoi Texaso21 The movement of CASF X- ay Tango from the United States to Taiwan Philippines Okinawa and Japan was generally successful Travel times varied from about two to six days depending on a variety of circum- ' stancesQ The tropical storm Grace which swept through Guam on 2 Sep tember delayed initial F-100 and C-130 flights for 24 hours Eight aircraft aborted or were delayed en route for maintenance some not arriving until 26 September 22 This large-scale deployment was not achieved without overcom ng obstacles B-57 and C-130 flights were hazardous because there was only one pennanent weather-reporting station for the 2 200 miles between the California bases and Hickam AFB 9 F awaiio Without accurate upper-air data aircraft had to buck high-altitude winds and arrived with only minimum fuel reserves Some arrived and departed without proper car- goes in part because of insufficient infonnation concerning the cargc personnel load and destination of each plane Seaweed equipment prestocked at en route bases was either inadequate or in poor condition Time was lost during deployment because refueling tankers had to be sent first to forward bases Finally limited cryptographic and other com munication facilities at these bases hampered security coordination and control 23 410Aih 22 Slif While the CASF X Ray Tango fighter and reconnaissance aircraft flew all the way with the aid of refuelings the ADC F-104's had to be disassembled and transported in C-124 transports Under the code name Jonah Able the first F-104 Starfighter left Hamilton AFB Calif on 8 September was reassembled at Tao yuan AB Taiwan and made its first flight on 12 Septembero All 12 aircraft were not in place and operational however until 19 September Their mission was to fly combat air patrol 24 ADC had not anticipated this deployment which was primarily for psychological purposes Although the Starfighters had departed in_ great secrecy their arrival on Taiwan quickly became a matter of public know ledge Kuter believed that this type of publicity would firmly convince both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists that the United States would support the former with the latest weapons 25 Support airlift for CASF X-Ray Tango was provided by MATS Ops Pian 115-58 Double Trouble Like TAC MATS receiyed orders on 29 August to begin the CASF deploymento Its original plan called for support of the CASF in a single tupackage of 36 airlift trips But the deplo 1I1ent in three stages rather than one and the inclusion of an additional F-101 unit made this plan inapplicable MATS C-118's C-12l's and C-124's I made 81 trips 19 for the f rst stage 52 for the second and 10 for the third In all 1 472 passengers and 860 1 tons of cargo were carried One C-124 was lost crashing near Guam and killing its 6-man crew and 12 passengerso Although numerous changes in plans considerably increased transport needs MATS was able to provide TAC with the neces sary support 26 'MRr E81iis To airlift the F-104's including personnel and essential cargo it was necessaey--to make 20 C 1 24 and- 4 C-97 -t-rips · Only the w _11gs tail and nose assembly of the Starfighter had to be detached in order to fit it into the maw of the giant Globemaster This was the first large-scale movement of high-performance aircraft by C-1249s to a troubled area 27 23 After the deplo yment PACAF had 68 more tactical aircraft avail able 42 offensive fighters or an increase of 24 percent 14 bombers or an increase of 28 percent and 12 defense fighters or an increase of 6 percent Adding reconnaissance transport tanker and other sup porting units t e augmentation totaled 123 aircrafte The number of PACAF' atomic aircraft reached 183 On Taiwan the center of activity there were about 4 400 USAF officers and airmen on 29 Septernber 28 Deplo yment Q Marine and Am Units The major U S naval deployments to the Taiwan area consisted of the super carriers Midway and and their destroyer escorts The Midwa y under JCS directions of 25 August left Pearl Harbor on the 27th arrived northeast of Taiwan and commenced operations on 4 Sep tember about 10 days later The Essex ordered to the Pacific on the 24th passed through the Suez Ca nal on 29 August escorted by Soviet ·submarines and joined the Seventh Fleet on 16 September about 22 days after the movement directive was issued The arrival of the two car riers their destroyer escorts plus other reinforcements made this For a list of USAF units available to PACAF after deplojm ent see App 2 Sith 24 £ 81if fleet the largest naval force assembled since the Korean War During the aU@D entation period the -Seventh Fleet changed its position in the Ta wan Strait to cover general war targets farther north requiring PACAF units to cover as many fonner Navy targets as possible The Navy maintained peak strength in the Strait only briefly for some elements including carriers were soon withdrawn in accordance with the fleet rotation plan 29 The Marines deployed 56 aircraft of Marine A ir Group 11 MAG-11 from Atsugi NAS Japan to Taiwan The Seventh Fleet commander Vice Adm Wallace M Beakley recommended this mo re after the JCS on 25 August instructed Admiral Felt and the TDC commander Vice Adm Ronald N Smoot to reinforce the air defense of Taiwan MAG-11 had been a lerted on 24 August but most of the unit did not move to Taiwan for nearly two weeks awaiting the selection of a suitable· airfield An advance Marine party spent several days surveying airfields and nego-· tiating with USAF representatives over the use of one to meet Seventh Fleet requirements Naval and Marine commanders rejected the first two that were suggested because they did not have an 8 000-foot runway and their select on would create logistical problems The Navy also in sisted that MAG-11 be located in an area where it could not only help The Seventh Fleet now had 6 carriers · 3 heavy cruisers about 40 · destroyers a submarine division and about 20 other supporting craft Carriers in addition· to the Midway and Essex were the Hancock Shangri la Lex ington and Princeton Their aircraft included Sky-warriors Skyhawks supersonic Crusaders and Tigers about 96 could deliver atomic weapons The heavy cruisers were the Helena Angeles and Columbus EiGDli 25 defend Taiwan but also provide air cover and support for the fleet and augment its carrier strike force On·29 August agreement was finally reached on a third airfield Pingtung North which could meet require ments 30 MA G-11 deployment began partly to support a previously scheduled Marine training exercise Land Ho Twelve aircraft of the initial MAG-11 squadron left Atsugi on 31 August and arrived that day at Tainan AB to participate in Land Ho but six scheduled for Pingtung were de layed for nearly two days because of mechanical difficulties or typhoon Gracee The other two squadrons· of the group flew from Atsugi to Ping tung nonstop on 6 and 7 September respectively 31 The support airlift between 29 August and 11 September carried about 500 men and 205 tons of cargo in 54 trips--43 by 1'furine transports 6 by· Navy and 5 by Air Force A sealift from Yokohama brought an additional 1 150 men and 3 900 tons of cargo The gap created in Japan's air de fenses by the departure of MAG-11 was quickly filled by the transfer of MAG-13 from Hawaii to Atsugi NAS 3 2 MAG-11 was ready for 1 imited air i - def ense operations on 8 September and on the 11th it began flying night cover sorties for the Nationalists and the U S Navy who were resupplying the offshore islands The 12 aircraft at Tainan rejoined the main Marine unit at Pingtung North and MAG-11 became fully operational about 18 Sep tember Taking into account all the obstacles encountered the Marines ¾with the arrival of the Marine aircraft on Taiwan 10 FJ4 30 F4D 2 TV-2 and 2 R4D aircraft were stationed at Pingtung North and 12 FJ4 temporarily at Tainan •1%1 ' 26 considered most noteworthy the deployment of MAG-11 and its achievement of a Limited -Qperat ionaL status 10 days_ after the selection of an air field 33 The JCS instructions of 25 August called for the expeditious ship ment of a Nike-Hercules· battalion to Taiwan Certain types of modern equipment for the seven Nationalist divisions stationed on the offshore islands were also required within 60 to 90 days As operational plans had not provided for the deployment of a Nike-Hercules unit a ·month - passed before it left Fort Bliss Texa3 Meanwhile a battalion head quarters and four firing battery sites were selected and construction of semipermanent facilities began at Taoyuan on 15 September The -advance party of the 71st Artillery 2d Missile Battalion arrived by air on 17 S$ptember and the inder of the battalion arrived by ship on 9 - October It did not become operational until 25 October 34 9EJHI -· 27 SfORff III U S MILITARY PREPARATIONS ON TAIWAN The heavy influx of aircraft personnel supplies and equipment into Pacific bases during the first half of September created some initial confusion Some air units did not arrive at their assigned destinations upsetting logistical arrangements Since more USAF air craft went to Taiwan than planned such as the ADC F-104's air bases were overtaxed requiring expensiYe crash improvement projects Under TAC's operational plan for CASF X-Ray Tango the command element under General Tacon would have exercised operational administrative and logistical control Because the CASF units had to be widely dispersed General Kuter scrapped this plan split ·up the command element and in tegrated its personnel into the Thirteenth Air Forceo Only a small CASF headquarters redesignated the Thirteenth Air Force Command Ele ment Ryukyus remained at Kadena AB Okinawa 1 Planning for Nonnuclear Operations Some of these adjustments reflected in part the lack of firm oper ational plans at the beginning of the Taiwan crisis There was insuf ficient time after th PACAF-TAC agreement of May 1958 to exchange infonnation The delay in obtaining JCS approval of PACAF's Ops Plan 25-58 prevented Kuter from completing and distributing this plan until shortly before the Communists began their bombardment on 23 August and subordinate commanders had little or no time for detailed planning More tuportant however was the b ated formulation of U S policy on 28 ilElllt defense of Taiwan the Penghus and the offshore islands Operational planners were not prepared for the JCS instruction of 25 August that required them to assume more responsibility for the air defense of Tai wan and __ the Pengb us t_han they had anticipated and also to assist the Nationalists in defending the principal offshore islands initially without nucl ar weapons This led to changes in plans modification of the command structure and a new disposition of air units 2 On the same day--25 August-Admiral Felt infonned his major sub ordinate commanders that he intended to prepare a special nonnuclear Annex H to his Ops Plan 25-58 and he asked them to take similar action Observing that his original plan envisaged the employment of nuclear weapons and that the accompanying logistical system would be inadequate for nonnuclear operations he requested an immediate appraisal of the nonnuclear capabilities of his commands 3 The possible U S injunction against nuclear weapons caused Felt and his subordinates much anxiety They believed that the Communists had sufficient aircraft to stop the resupply of the offshore islands UeS ai rpower would be necessary to prevent their capture and U S nonnuclear defense might not be successful Kuter was particularly apprehensive about conducting nonnuclear operations that would require a high sortie rate and weaken his ability to support his emer ency-war plane He believed insufficient effort had been made to convince the National Security Council that the most effective way to deal with the enemy's numerical superiority was to use nuclear weapons However if nonnuclear operations had to be undertaken he recommended that u s 9 8ft f lililt 29 participation be limited to striking Communist coastal airfields op- •-1- - - - - -4 posi e Taiwan Th·e fears expressed by field commanders concerning a U s non nuclear policy in the Taiwan area were to no avail On 29 August the JCS defined three new intermediate phases of possible Chinese Communist actfon against the offshore islands Taiwan and the Penghus and it forbade the use of atomic weapons during each phaseo President -Eisen hower made a more definitive statement of this policy on 6 September when he granted the JCS emergency authority to order the use of only conventional weapons against any major Communist assault on the off shore islands 5 Meanwhilej Felt informed the JCS on 5 September that his nonnuc ear forces consisted of four F-100 and one B-57 USAF squadrons stationed at Clark Kadena Naha and Chiayi Air Bases and aircraft on four Navy carriers The squadrons could fly 170 sorties and deliver 400 600 pounds of bombs daily and each carrier cow -d -launch up to 64 sorties and deliver 265 000 pounds of oombs daily but in bad weather each could manage only 12 sorties per dayo The Air Force units had a 30- day supply of POL spare parts support items nonnuclear or iron bombs and 20-mm ammunition but only a 15-day supply of external fuel tanks and pylons for F l00's Bomb supplies aboard Navy carriers were sufficient for only 24 to 48 hours but were backed by an 18-day reserve in the Pacific area A substantial amount of aircraft ammunition was available and logistical support for the carriers was adequate The lill ' -4 30 111118 CNAF could fly 650 bomb carrying sorties daily In his assessment of his nonnuclear strength CINCPAC did not specify the nature or location ft of Communist targets or the expected aircraft attritiono' On 11 September Felt issued his nonnuclear Annex H This docu ment and similar annexes prepared by subordinate commanders sought to define more precisely possible Communist action and U S and Nationalist reaction in the Taiwan area in order to control if possible a threat ening military situation without resort to nuclear weapons CINCPAC's original Ops Plan 25-5S had included Phase I patrol and reconnaissance _ --- and Phase II defeat of the attacking force It had anticipated a -- possible transition phase between the two Annex H spelled out three intermediate phases of conflict between Phases I and II as defined by the JCS on 25 August In Phase I-H when there was no indication that the Communists would attempt to capture the principal offshore islands U S forces would provide only logistical assistance to the Nationalists In Phase II H when the Communists would attempt to capture one or more of the principal offshore islands UoSa forces ¼uuld assist the Nationalists in attacking Communist invasion forces artillery positions and air fields in the vicinity of the islands under attack In Phase III-H when the Communists would extend the battle to Taiwan and the Penghus or to international waters close to both areas U S and Nationalist aircraft would attack Communist airfields GCI sites military control cINCPAC 's hastily assembled report on USAF capabilities appeared un duly optimistic in the light of subsequent analyses of the supply reserves in the Pacific See below pp 34-36 «eKEi6 aliE Alii centers adjacent to coastal airfields and fixed targetso They would attack the airfields on a carefully controlled basis in a gradually expanding arc until they had destroyed all bases in an 000-mile radius capable of supporting Russian-built IL-28 Beagle aircraft 31 To coordinate the three inter-mediate phases of action Admiral Felt designated the TDC commander Admiral Smoot as his subordinate unified commander on 11 September Felt had maintained that the command struc ture on Taiwan had to be changed from a highly centralized control of a limited mobile nuclear force to less centralized control of nonnuclear units To Kuter such a change seemed unnecessary since it might break _ up the integrity of PACAF units He also noted that the command struc ture would again need revision if nuclear weapons were authorized at a later date On 10 September however JCS authorized the establishment of a subordinate unified command on Taiwan 8 Smoot would guide the Nationalists on· current or projected·military operations establish and operate a combined operations center CCC on Taiwan and assume operational control of specified U S forces He w-ould also conduct patrol and sea and air reconnaissance in coordina tion with Nationalist forces His three major subordinates on Taiwan were the commanding general of U S Army Forces Taiwan who was also chief of MAAG Taiwan the commander of the Taiwan ·Patrol Force Navy and the commander of ATF 13 Air Force As the designated air defense conimander under Smoot the commander of ATF l3-General Dea n--would carry out· air defense measures includ 1J tbit8 · SZ@RI U S AND CHINESE NATIONALIST COMMAND RELATIONS IN THE TAIWAN AREA COMCIAPAC i----4 COMCIA TAIWAN CINCUSARPAC OTHER PARTI Cl - PATI NG FORCES CINCPACFLT - DIRECT SUPPORT l I - I GRC FORCE UNDER I I I · I CCC I U S OPERATIONAL I I CONTROL l --------·-- - I - OTHER PARTICI CINCPACAF PATING FORCES 12 MAY 1958 COMTNIWi NDEFCOM ' ' ' ' MINISTRY OF IIUllal 1ao I I I I I U S GRC COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER NATIONAL DEFENSE COFS CHINESE NATIONAL ST ARMY I I I - _IE CNO CHINESE i NATIONAL ST NAVY I - I - I COFS CHiNESE L • NATIONALIST AIR FORCE DIRECT SUPPORT •-•-• Bl---- GRC FORCE UNDER I I U S OPERATIONAL L-- OJ __ J COMMAND LINES OPERATIONAL CONTROL -·-·-·- COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS ' '111111111111 ADV I SES ON u s MI LIT ARY POLI CY AND COORDINATION OF U S AND GRC PLANS ___ __ _ __ ___ Source CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 16 MAY 58 'ESRET COMMAND RELATIONS ON TAIWAN AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND I CG U S ARMY a FORCES TAIWAN AND CHIEF MAAG TAIWAN 11 SEPTEMBER 1958 I C INC PAC I COMT A I WAN DEF COM AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDER COMMANDER b TAIWAN PATROL FORCE I COMMANDtR c AIR TASK FORCE 13 PROVIS I ONAU · a CONTROLS ARMY UN ITS ASSIGNED TO TAIWAN LESS MAAG PERSONNEL b CONTROLS UNITS ASSIGNED TO TAIWAN PATROL FORCE PLUS MARINE CORPS UNITS DEPLOYED TO TAIWAN c CONTROLS UN ITS ASSIGNED TO ATF· 13 P ALSO DESIGNATED AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER OF TAIWAN-PENGHUS EFFECTIVE 16 SEP 58 32 Btlii• ing defense of naval units on request and protect Nationalist ships resupplying the Kinmens and Matsus These operations would be conducted in accordance with limitations imposed by the U s policy of avoiding hostilities except as necessary to support the Nationalists and in self defense Operations conducted w ith any other forces of the Pacific Com mand in support of the Nationalists and by any Nationalist forces placed under U S operational control would also be coordinated through the Taiwan coc 9 Kuter and his Army and Navy equivalen s relinquished to Smoot the operational control of their units They were responsible however for p r9_vidi ng emergency logistical support to these units and to Na tiQpalist forces and for furnishing facilities and personnel to the UoS• sector of the COC Kuter's manifold duties also included aug menting the CNA F's grol Uld environment system providing personnel for· ACW systems_and other comn11mication nets on the island and bringing to - - - - operational readiness the coordination-centers-in the Philippines and Japan_ 10 Strengthening k Defenses The Taiwan crisis did not expand beyond intermediate Phase I-H Overt conflict was limited to Nationalist and Comnnmist artillery ex changes occasional aerial battles over t e Ta wan Strai _ _and small sea engagements as the Nationalists tried to resupply the offshore islands Free from direct participation in military action the U S forces could spend the critical weeks of September and October in ad vising and assisting the Nationalists and in strengthening their own military posture in the Taiwan area l tllifA • 1 l· 33 8E9Dlit On 16 September Admiral Smoot assumed responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan arid the Perighus ·and desigriated ··aeneral Dean as his air defense commander An exchange of letters between Smoot and the chief of the general staff of the Ministry of National Defense Geno Wang Shu-Ming confirmed previous U S and Nationalist verbal agree ments on air defense arrangements Most of the CNAF could be used to defend the offshore islands against attack provide aerial cover for surface resupply efrorts or strike at Communist mainland targets if necessaryo About 121 aircraft were eventually assigned air defense missions 49 USAF F-1047 s F-86 s and F-lOOD's 56 Marine FJ4's and Fi D's and 16 CNAF F-86 9 s and F-84G's These planes were stationed at Chiayi Hsinchu T inan Taoyuan and Pingtung Air Bases on Taiwan Dean did not exercise complete control of the Marine aircraft howevero The commander of the Seventh Fleet Admiral Beakley insisted that they remain an integral part of his fleet because his carrier · strike force tailored for a nuclear confiic was deficient in es cort aircraft for nonnuclear strikes o After some controversy M 4 G-11 was given a three-fold mission air defense which would have over riding priority only if Taiwan and the Penghus were attacked or in imminent danger of attack air support and cover for the Seventh Fleet and augmentation of the fleet's strike force 11 The air defense of Taiwan called for 8 USAF 2 Marine and 8 CNAF aircraft to be placed on 5- and 15-rninute day alerts and 8 USAF and 2 Marine aircraft on 5- and 15-minute night all-weather alerts Fortu nately there was sufficient time to train those pilots who had not yet attained the desired standard of operational readiness 12 9 pftp a 34 · £ii6REi Communication and Logistic Prob1ems The concentration of-airpower-on Taiwan quickly drew attention to the most critical U S deficiency in the Pacific--communications U S air units depending largely on the Chinese communication net faced formidable pz oblems of language security and reliability Overclas sified messages nearly all dispatched as operational immediate created lengthy delays Circuits from Taiwan to the Philippines Okinawa and Japan were woefully inadequate The lack of sufficient on-line teletype communications alone could have made it virtually im possible to conduct combat operations 13 Because UoS plans for major improvements had been rejected as too costly crash communication projects had to be undertaken During Sep tember and October about $4 million worth of Army equipment and about $2 million of USAF equipment were flown in Between 25 August and 25 October communication circuits on Taiwan increased from 25 to 200 including 120 voice and 30 teletype on-island circuits and 20 and 30 teletype off-island circuits About 655 CASF AAcs and other personnel arrived for temporary duty on Taiwan during the critical period to assist in manning communication facilities 14 The prospect of engaging initially in nonnuclear operations also required immediate adjustments in logistical requirements During the crisis PACAF could make limited use of the Seaweed stocks earmarked for its emergency war plan but Kuter was apprehensive about the adequacy r of the stocks Up to August 1958 stockpiling of Seaweed items was only 75 to 77 percent complete and of absolute essential equipment items only about 63 percent complete Some very essential items were not EditEP 35 iillAi stocked at all The critically short items included certain types of conventional ammunitionQ Because of these shortages and the prospect of a nonnuclear war the Air Materiel Command's supply retrenchment pro gram in the Pacific was halted 15 To meet the urgent need for supplies and equipment the Fifth Air Force airlifted about 1 100 tons of essential items to Taiwan during the first two weeks of the bombardment Thirteenth Air Force transports also brought vitally needed items And large quantities of supplies were dispatched by sea Starting and refueling units war consumables housekeeping supplies and equipment and a tactical hospital comprised the bulk of these items From PACAF and the United States came Side w inder and other nonnuclear rockets ammunition and conventional bombs External fuel tanks were also needed and at least 3 500· tanks were flow from Korea and Japan to Okinawa and the Philippines while some were airlifted from· the United States 16 Prestocked items were not only insuffic ent but some were in poor condition Some were also at the wrong bases and had to be airlifted to where they were most neededa This required considerable intratheater airlift and time and there was no assurance that both would always be available in a crisiso USAF officers on the scene believed that USAF units could not have sustained more than three da ys of nonnuclear opera tions and that the Navy9s carrier strike force was in a similar pre dicament 17 While MATS was diverting much of its effort in early September to support the deployment of CASF X-Ray Tango and other units a serious IIIR8 36 £E8ft f backlog of' channel airlift• items accumulated at Travis AFB Calif the main departure point To improve this situation about the middle of the month MATS began to use commercial airlift letting contracts to 10 commercial li nes for 807 tons bu not for an additional 179 tons because of excessive costs Through commercial airlift and the graduai return of many MA TS aircraft to the regular runs the backlog at Travis was reduced but the problem persisted until the end of Octobero By then 5 554 tons had been moved to the Pacifico18 The backlog at Travis reflected certain deficiencies in airlift planning and operations for the Taiwan crisis All the· services had failed to inform MATS fully of their greatly increased supply require ments Units constantly upgraded their supply requisitions because of new priorities MATS delayed procurement of commercial airlift and 19 occasionally items were brought by air that should have gone by ea A regular supply airlift as distinct from the airlift of the air craft supplies and equipment of a t ctical unito lilll 1 37 TIT THE CONTROLLED COI TFLICT The deployment of U S air units to the Pacific and augmentation of base facilities and supplies occurred against a background of lim ited air and s ea clashes between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces in the Taiwan area Under the rules of engagement laid down by the United States for Phase I-H the CNAF in self-defense could only attack Communist aircraft while thE 'IJ CNAF were on patrol and recon naissance missions or defending the offshore islands and the convoys engaged in resupply operations 1 Wheth r the United States could retain control over CNA F's opera tions was uncertain Nationalist frustrations because of military restrictions increased early in Septemb r when the United States and Comnmnist-chi a-agreed to discuss the Taiwan crisis through thei representatives at Warsaw Poland Aware t t the Nationalists feared possible·u s concessions American authorities continued to anticipate some unilateral action such as CNAF bombing of Communist artillery po sitions Both Ch ng Kai-shek and the Nationalis Assembly in Taipei strongly advocated such action 2 Happily the U S fears were not realized It was conjectured that the lack of a firm U S commitment on the defense of the offshore islands kept the Nationalist government generally amenable to the re strictions on its air operations This restraint was matched by the S CftS• 38 IIIRM · numerically superior Chir ese Communist Air Force which flew primarily defensive patrols Thus the anticipated struggle for aerial supremac-tJ over the Taiwan Strait did not materialize but was limited to occasional air clashes between the two Chinese air forces The results were surprisin During the period of crisis the CNAF in about 25 separate air engagements destroyed 32 aircraft probably destroyed 3 others and damaged lOo It lost only 2 F-86Fts and 2 ' F-84G1s Most of the encounters were between CNAF F-869s and Communist Mig-17 9 so3 The first major air battle occurred on 8 September when 12 F-86's fought 12 Mig-17 s destroying 7 and possibly 2 otherso I three separate engagements on 24 September the CNAF destroyed 10 and dam aged 3 • This victory was highlighted by the destruction of 4 Migs _by Sidewinder missiles with which 20 CNAF F-86ts had recently been equipped A third significant air battle on 10 October resulted in the destruction of 5 Migs 1 of which was rammed by an F-86 The larger encounters occurred when escorted CNAF reconnaissance flights were dispatched to photograph mainland or coastal targets and the smaller ones during routine air patrols 4 Analyses of the air-to-air clashes indicated that neither side employed unusual fighter tactics their tactics were s imilar to those used during the Korean War CNAF routine patrols normally flew at· 35 000 to 37 000 feet whereas Communist patrols flew at 40 000 to 42 000 feet When-anticipating action the CNAF used four flights made up of four aircraft each and kept other patrols in the area on call if neededa iliRiLr 39 Migs generally outnumbered the F-86's by about 3 to 1 but the Commun ists usually dispatched only a single flight to engage Although pos sessing an altitude advantage Mig pilots frequently demonstrated a lack of skill by permitting F-86ts to get on their tailsa Nor were Communist pilots very aggressive CNAF pilots could shake pursuing Migs by making six OT seven turns at lower altitudes The Ccmmu _ ists were also reluctant to pull more than two and a half or three and a half G's They always tended to make left turns at higher-altitudes Their steep er turns two or three G's were made at lower altitudes likewise to the left Their discipline and teamwork were poor permitting CNAF pilots to attack stragglers Communist pilots used an afterburner on one and possibly two occasions to escape Their inferior showing are generally attribut ed to poor Soviet training and to a Communist decision to limit operations to their coastal areas CNAF pilots 1 by comparison ' were well trained confident flew excellent combat foma tions were eager to make kills and pressed every advantages err early the Chinese Communist Air Force had been highly overrated 5 The CNAF reconnaissance force consisted of seven RF-86F's 25 RF-84F's and one RB-57A At the insistence of the United States late in September the CNAF curtailed the activities of this force to lessen the provocation arising from flights too near or over the Chinese Com munist mainland 6 Meanwhile during the period of crisisj the CNAF received or was in the pro-cess of receiving t-wo additional RB-57's sL 'C F-l00Fts originally earmarked for NATO many F-86F 1s that had been scheduled for Korea and EefU f•• 40 ' Japan and 16 C ll9 t-ran-sports- -Many of these aircraft · such as the transports were on loan By the time most of the trans fers were ef fected and the pilots trained however the Taiwan crisis had passede 7 War at Considerably less successful than CNAF operations was the National ists' initial naval effort to break the artillery blockade of the Kin mens These islands inhabited by 40 000 civilians were defended by 86 000 troops and 56 medium artillery 252 light artilleryi1 and 160 A 4 A weapons With the Nationalists outgunned about 4 to 1 the JCS on 29 August expedited shipments of 8 inch howitzers from the United States and Okinawa to the offshore islands On the same day the JCS ordered elements of the Seventh Fleet to convoy- Nationalist resupply ships to the offshore islands when necessary These convoys would be limited however to Big and Little Kirunen and the five principal islands of the Matsu group The Navy was also advised t be ready to turn over to the Nationalists up to 8 LCM1 s and 28 LCVP1 s 8 On the basis or these instructions the United States and the Na tionalists quickly prepared a convoy plan providing for U S_ a ir and surface escort to within three nautical miles of the Kirunens if Com munist batteries could be avoided within that range Admiral Felt The Matsu islands not under seige were inhabited by 10 000 civilians and defended by 23 000 troops and 8 medium artillery- 84 light artil lery- and 108 AAA weapons EiSB i 41 indicated that the immediate objective was to lift the seige of the Kin mens and to increase the Nationalists' counterartillery fire To fore stall resupply the Peiping government announced its sovereignty over the territorial -a ter-s to a distance of 12 nautical miles a claim 9 prom tly ignored by the U S State Department Between 23 August and 15 September the Nationalists made only four organized attempts to resupply the Kinmens The first attempt on 6 September during a lull in the bombardment was successful but three others in the following week were not Communist artillery fire aver aging about 6 675 rounds per day hazardous sea conditions poor equip ment lack of skills in handling supplies incompetent logistical planning and Hutterly unbelievable' military command relationships combined to defeat their effort CNAF C-46ts made a few airdrops but these'provided only token supplies since about half the items initially dropped were either lost or severely damaged By the third week in·September USAF Headquarters estimated that the total Nationalist deliveries by sea and air amounted to no more than one dayfs requirement then estimated at 700 tons 10 To U S authorities on the scene it was apparent that the Nation alists were exerting less than an all-out effort to break the artillery blockade In Washington the Office of the Secretary of·Defense the JCS and the State Department were deeply concerned over the National ists9 failure to _re upply the Kinmens ·Suggesting that the Nationalists were being deliberately inept in order to draw the United States into conflict with the Conununists the JCS insisted that they demonstrate an IEOll lk 42 illfi ability to resupply the islands· or prove that their difficulties were insurmountable despite U S training advice and assistance 11 Under lying this insistence was the belief that the Warsaw talks would pro vide no solution to the Taiwan crisis that the United states faced another Berlin blockade with Peiping applying Umited but sustained military pressure to exact political and diplomatic gains and that the Natio a list goverr1ment would probably collapse if forced to withdraw from the offshore islands Meanwhile the Nationalists· continued to t hreaten unilateral action to prevent the loss of the offshore islands by ·default demilitarization or neutralization 12 •with-JCS prodding and U S advice and assistance the resupply pic ture began to improve On 19 September thre Nationalist ships success fully completed their missions under heavy fire the largest number to reach the islands in one day Shortly afterward Admiral Felt reported that a U S Navy beachjumper·unit and a beach master plus organized beach parties for receiving supplies had helped improve supply-handling Better underwater demolition work opened up additional beach areas and permitted greater dispersion of arriving vessels With u s Marine air cover Nationalist C-46 airdrops increased in frequency and in deliver ies As with the resupply success at sea the CNAF's improved airdrop performance was due principally to U s advice and assistance The picture further brightened when estimated supply requirements for the Kinmens were revised downwards to JOO tons and then 200 tons per day In vie r of these developP-ents on 26 September Admiral Felt instructed Admiral Smoot to undertake a massive resupply ·ef fort using all types of fishing boats junks and CNAF and Civil Air Transport aircraft 13 A Chinese Nationalist civil airlinea IMAlil 43 Although Communist land-based artillery and gun and torpedo boats i 7J i'licted losses on the Nationalists - resupply during the last week of September proved highly successful By month's end a total of 3 400 tons had been delivered to the beleagured islands-2 560 tons by surface ships 210 tons by native junks and 630 tons by air The CNAF appeared able to airdrop more than the 200 tons required daily When the first large scale daylight airdrop drew Communist aircraft and an intense bombardments U S and Nationalist officials agreed to nighttime aerial resupply with daytime missions to be conducted only at irregular intervals 14 Early in October the chief of the U S Army Section MAAG Taiwan verified the fact that the Nationalists had exaggerated the critical nature of the supply situation On a visit to Big Kinmen he found no grave supply problem surprisingly little damage from 430 000 rounds of artillery except in the area of Nationalist batteries low casualties spectacular improvements in beach operations with junks proving very successful and morale activity and appearance of the Nationalist soldiers better than before 23 AugustG15 This encouraging report and the advent of a temporary cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait presaged the end of the resupply problem The Communist Cease-Fire Expectation that the Chinese Communists would resist the success ful resupply efforts proved unfounded when the Communist Minister of ¾ Between 23 August and 24 September these losses were as follows LST's-1 torpedoed 2 damaged LCM's--3 sunk 1 swamped PC's- damaged LVT's-est imated 3 sunk 5 damaged 111111 44 _______ -··· ---··--·--- -·-· -- -···- - 3 81S Defense Marshal Peng Teh-huai 7 on 6 October suddenly ordered a one week suspension of shelling t'lout of humanitarian considerations Call ing for a reconciliation with the Nationalists he authorized them to resupply the offshore islands provided they did not use U S9 Navy es corts The United States quickly agreed to halt its convoying opera tions but warned they would be resumed if the Communists reopened fire on the islands The Nationalists also reluctantly agreed to stop fir- 16 ing but considered the suspension only the calm before a new stonn In effect the Communists were aclmowledging that the artiller y blockade of the offshore islands had been broken and that they were not prepared to reimpose it or to capture the islandsa UsSo intelligence believed t at the Communists motivated by psychological and political considerations were attempting to elicit U S proposals concerning the offshore islands in order to strain U S and Nationalist relations They were also tacitly urging defection to the Communist cause and emphasizing the civil war nature of the conflict On 13 October-the cease fire was extended for a week permitting the Nationalists who were strongly protesting U S suspension of convoy service to continue unhampered resupply of their islands 17 The cease-fire gave U S authorities an opportunity to e ert great er pressure on the Nationalist government to evacuate or at least reduce military garrisons on the offshore islands particularly on smaller rocks like the two Tans of the Kinmen group regarded as indefensible In the artillery duels between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists from 23 August to 6 October the following rounds were fired against all the Kinmens 558 000 from the Kinmens 88 045 against the Matsus 183 from the Matsus 13 iiORU of little strategic value and logistica burdens 18 When Secretary - ·- - -- -- -- -- Dulles conferred with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei during 20-22 October he emphasized the Nationalists' loss of Free World support because of the continuing strife and urged Chiang and his goyernment to display 45 less belligerency8 Dulles secured Chiang's consent to reduce the military forces on the offshore islands in exchange for t1 ro battalions cf 240-mm howitzers that would improve considerably the counterfire capability of the Nationalists Dulles envisaged a reduction of 15 9 000 to 20 000 Nationalist troops after Communist pressure subsidedo19 In a joint communique issued at the end of their conferences Chiang also agreed to forego the use of force to restore his government on the mainland 20 another significant concession in the light of his previous utterances The arrival of Secretary Dulles in Taipei had coincided with the end of the cease-fire allegedly because a U S Navy ship had violated the truce tenn s -l a charge quickly denied Communist antiaircraft fire 21 · against the Nationalist airdrops was only moderate however Five days later the Corrummists placed the bombardment of the Kinmens on an every-other-day sched ule·and permitted wt the Nationalists to replenish their offshore islands on even-numbered days Taking full advantage of Communist concessions the Nationalists delivered some 43 200 tons of supplies during October-40 300 by surface ships 1 500 by junks and 1 400 by air Total CNA F resupply losses because of ground fire were two C-46 9s destroyed and two damaged 22 'Builes believed that the Communists were prepared to use any prete ict to break the cease-fire t CRt b 46 RE Ali'L Redeployment_ With the artillery blockade broken and the danger of an enlargement of the conflict decreasing U So commanders began to consider redeploy ment of their forces from the Pacific The withdrawal began at the end of October when Adrno Arleigh Burke Chief of Naval Operations authorized Admiral Felt to reduce his naval strength in the Taiwan Straito Felt was instructed to leave two aircraft carriers and supporti 11g ships on station and send the others to Subic Bay in the Philippines or to Yokosuka Japan 23 Major redeployment of air units did not begin until Decen'l be Both Navy an Air Force authorities in the Pacific recognized the political and psyehelogical implications of this withdrawal They were certain that the Chinese Communists would play it up as evidence of U S _ abandonment of the Chinese Nationalists and that the Nationalists would probably feel militarily weakened They agreed therefore to couple any reduction of air strength with improvement of the CNAF especially • its air defense and all-weather capability Kuter believed that Mig 191s Mig-217s and a Soviet version of the Sidewinder would surely appear in the Chinese Communist air force inventory at an early datea24 The Air Force and Navy did not agree however on publicity for the return to the United States Kuter strongly recommended a highly pub licized movement of TAC B-57's F-1Ol's and F-lOO's through Japan Korea Taiwan Thailand and the Philippines to show that the United States was withdrawing with confidence and strength He believed this would also rectify a previous imbalance in service_publicity since the movement of Navy carriers to the Taiwan Strait at the beginning of the crisis had received much public cover e and the Air Force deployments 1 81 itlfiif relatively littlea _Although Ku ter_ was _supported in principle by Head Ii quarters USAF Felt recommended no country tour by units and as little publicity as possible The issue was resolved early in Dece ber when the State· PE £ rtment supported Felt f s position 25 47 In preparation for the redeployment Felt transferred responsibility for1 he air defense of Taiwan and the Penghus assumed by the United States in September t back to the Nationalist goverrunent 26 PACAF and TAC agreed late in November on a Twelfth Air Force redeployment plan Ops Plan 37-58 e CASF F-100 and F RF-101 units would fly to Andersen AFB Guam where the Twelfth Air Force would assume operational control of the units B-57's would go directly to Wake Island and from there to Hickam AFB Hawaii CASF tactical units redeploying according to a prearranged order of precedence would be supported by two C-130 troop carrier squadrons and a KB-50 air refueling squadron 27 The movement of CASF units to the United States began on 9 December As in deployment the F-1009s and F RF-10l's passing through Pacific bases had one or two air refuelings The C-130 transports carried military co ordinating teams and the cornma nd element in addition to unit support equipment and personnel MATS aircraft also provided airlift Redeploy ment of the tactical units was completed on 18 Decembera28 The redeployment was successful but it pointed up a number of prob lems There was not enough time to distribute the Twelfth Air Force's Hq USAF believed that the country tours should be limited however to Thailand and the Philippines see above p ·33 48 Ops Plan 37-58 No_prQyi iQ l had been made foz weather reconnaissance aircraft between Hickam AFB and air refueling areas ·Military coordi at ing center units were undermanned for 24-hour dutyo The receiving base for B-57's had to be changed from Moffett NAS Calif to George AFB Calif because of unfavorable weather conditions and inadequate facil itt - at the former base Tne Twelfth Air Force operations center at Waco Texas had trouble encrypting messages to PACAF and many launch messages arrived either with little time to spare or too late for implementation The problem was sufficiently acute to warrant waiving the encryption requirement in order to insure a reasonable efficiency in redeployment 29 Meanwhile F-86D F-104 and MAG-11 µnits remaining on Taiwan were soon subject to rotation An F-86D squadron from Okinawa and elem ents of another from Tainan AB replaced a redeployed F-100 unit at Chiayi AB A Starfighter squadron on Okinawa replaced the F-104 unit at Tao-· yuan AB Both Felt and Kuter desired F-104's on Taiwan for psycholog ical reasons and they hoped that the CNAF would soon receive these fighters MAG-11 units-began to return to Japan on 1 Februa J 1959 and by mid-March only a small Marine squadron remained on Taiwan 0 The redeployment underlined anew the importance of modernizing the CNAF in accordance with JGS decisions In addition to aircraft transferred or being transferred during the Taiwan crisis further progress in 1958 and early 1959 in luded approval and fundmg under the Military Assist ance Program MAP of 6 F-100F1s SO F l00A9s 4 RF-100A's and 4 RF 10l's Several of the reconnaissance aircraft were delivered by the tillMs 49 SiORAa end of 1958 The Air Force also considered transferring under grant aid the 16 C ll9 transports on loan to the CNAFo No immediate action was taken on recommendations by Felt and Kuter to further augment the CNAF with 10 RF-84F's one F-104 squadron ·one F-86D squadron or ther MAP-financed aircrafto3l 50 iiORiir Ve AN APPRAISAL The Taiwan c ises of 1954-55 Bnd 1958 were both preceded by numerous indications of Chinese Communist pressure against the offshore islands The initial UoS response in each instance reflected an ambiguous policy toward the islands In January 1955 this country hastily decided to evacuate Nationalist military and civilian personnel from the Tachens only two days after making a decision to meet the Chinese Communist threat by a show of air strength from Taiwan In mid-August 1958 despite considerable evidence of renewed Communist pressure the U S Government still debated what its military response and its public policy should be in the event of a blockade or an attack against the islands Not until 25 August two days after the artillery bombardment of the Kin mens began did the JCS direct U S forces in he Pacific to prepare to assist in the defense of only the principal offshore islands Al most a week elapsed after the beginning of the Communist artillerj - bombardment before Washington authorized the deployment of USAF units within or to the Pacific Meanwhile the military initiative was left in the hands of the Communists U S policy was based on the recognition that the importance of the offshore islands was political and psychological to the Chinese Nationalists rather than strategic1 and that their defense was a matter of Presidential discretion Whatever the merits of this policy it made military planning difficult USAF commanders 1mderstandably 9ECKEI• SiOIH if 51 chafed -at the slmv-ness of the decision lllak i ng machinery11 in Washl n oton after there was a 'Ilple evidence in their opinion of -an im ending mili ta ry- threat in the Taiwan Strait They re uncertain whether they would be required to fight or bluff The JCS subsequently agreed that political guidance had been inadequate for developing defense plans for the offshore islands 2 I n the area of diplomacy the United States followed the policy of keeping the Japanese government fully informed during the crisis about this country-Vs utilization of military bases in Japan This assuaged Japanese feelings sufficiently to make unnecessary a request for per mission -to-- use· t han 3 The 1958 Taiwan crisis underscored a need for more expeditious and more definitive operat_ional planning PACAF did not is ue its opera tions plan until shortly before 23 August thus precluding detailed implementation by subordinate commands Planning between PACAF and TAC was incomplete on the eve of the crisis _ PACAF believed that TAC-9s failure to provide sufficient detail such as the type of equip ment and the number of people required did not enable the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to plan for adequate support 4 The unexpected JCS instruction not to use nuclear weapons dlµ'ing the initial stage of conflict upset previous planning'assumptions for air units were operationally and logistically tailored primarily for nuclear warfareo USAF and Navy commanders viewed the injunction with apprehension for they were dubious of the success of nonnuclear opera tions against a_ Chinese Communist air force of unknown quality but formidable size Air Force commanders were particularly concerned lest such operations affect their em ergency war plans They considered s IRlf c 52 - -- ----- J'WPB a nonnuclear requirement as a st -p gkward in the art of warfare and a retrogression in national ·defens-e·-po-lrcy 5 If U s policy makers intended to autho rrize only a few nonnuclear strikes in o rder to warn the Chinese Communists against enlarging the conflict it might be argued that this anxiety was overdrawn and that there had been no change in U S weapon policy 6 However the JCS directive of 29 August strongly suggests that relatively extensive non nuclear operations were envisaged In Phases II-Hand O I-H U S air power would make only iron bomb attacks against a widening range of coastal a fields GCI sites military control centers and fixed tar gets plus certain other airfields up to a radius ef 800 miles Unless the Chinese Communist air force and antiaircraft defenses proved woe fully weak it appears doubtful that available airpower in the Pacific could have engaged in such sustained operations 7 Whether adequate and timely augmentation of aircraft supplies and equipment would have been forthcoming is questionable General Kuter thought not Certainly the field commanders believed that neit her their military planning assumptions nor their prestocked assets were compatible with the concept of operations for the Taiwan strait area directed by Based on established USAF war planning factors PACAF concluded that it would require four squadrons of F-1001s or B-571s or 20 squadrons of F-1011s operating from Kadena or Clark Air Bases to neutralize one Com munist airfi eld with bombings every fourth day to sustain neutralization · The aircraft requirement was based on the asslD llption that the Chinese Communists had more than 200 jet interceptors on coastal airfields and concentrations of hea ry- and mediu i11-t y pe antiaii'cra ft defenses MORHz 53 NIRli Washington authorities They also agreed that the most important les son learned11V during the 1958 Taiwan crisis was the need for a firm U S nuclear weapon policy 8 U S authorities banned early use of nuclear weapons undoubtedly because they were determined to keep military activity localized in the Taiwan Strait while working for a cease-fire They believed that a U S -Chir ese Communist conflict could be kept from expanding into an all-out war if U S forces limited themselves to using only conventional bombsQ The goal of localizing the conflict was achieved but since the e was no test of the concept that the use of nonnuclear weapons would mini mize the danger of all-out war its validity can only be conjecturedQ That the United States belat_edly modified its weapon policy for the Taiwan area appears borne out by the strong reaction of military com manders to the_prohibition against the initial use of nuclear we pons It is also indicated in A Imiral Felt's query in midcrisis about his nonnu clear capability his decision to prepare a nonnuclear annex to his operations planj his establishment of a subordinate unified command· on Taiwan to conduct nonnuclear operations and his subsequent de cisian to amend all contingency operations plans to provide for non nuclear warfare For the JCS the iron bomb policy reemphasized the need for an awareness by military planners of political objectives and by political authorities of the impli ations of their decisions on mili tary planning 9 Whether the command structure on Taiwan should have been altered in preparation for possible iron bomb operations remains debatable MUREi a 54 ------ - ----- --- ------- ---------•--- -- -- _ Felt believed the need for a subordinate u T1ified commane was confi - ued by subsequent events but Kutel -did not 10 Once the change was made it functioned satisfactorily and the appointment of the commander of ATF 13 General Dean to head the air defense system on Taiwan created no important difficultiesa The major objection to the subordinate unified command was that in the event of nuclear war there would be 11 insufficient time to revert to a more centralized commando Unit movements to and within the Pacific theater were achieved without major difficultyo TAC 9s Trr relfth Air Force believed that the CASF concept of deploying substantial mobile tactical forces to a troubled are in_a short time appeared confirmed although Kuter thought the deployments were not quite as rapid as advertised 12 The Marine commander of MAG-11 believed that his unit displayed much greater mobility in the transfer from Japan to Taiwan than did GASF X-Ray Tan goe13 This seems a highly questionable comparison in view of the greater problems inherent in flying tactical aircraft over vast dis tances of the Pacifico The deployments did not follow original operational plans in every respect largely because the Air Force had earlier diverted some tac tical and support untis to the Middle East follow ing the outbreak of the Lebanon crisis in July For example TAC reassigned responsibility for deploy ing X-Ray Tango units from the Nineteenth Air Force to the Twelfth Air Force X-Ray Tango units left the United States in three closely related stages rather than in one stage and the movements of 12 F-104 starfighters and MAG-11 to Taiwan were not provided for in ·t· l 1 • 14 ini i a p annmg IBIIEl4 I 55 MATS airlift f f bot CASF anq non-CASF units was adequate but its channel airlift was not and had to be augmented by commercial car riers Even this did not eliminate the substantial backlog of sup plies that existed at the MATS Pacific coast terminal Travis AFB during September and October The backlog varied but a contributing cause was the failure of commands to inform MATS in time of their increased requirements The supply problems also confirmed the need for high-speed surface transportation to the Pacific outpostso15 The U S injunction against early use of nuclear eapons gave re newed importance to the possession of well-equipped well-stocked fo r 'll'ard bases Military assets at these ba_ses were seriously ii 1ad equate with iron bombs ammunition and auxiliary fuel tanks topping - the list of critically deficient items in addition to insufficient spare parts and equipment Many logistical experts believed tha prep arations for iron bomb operations would require a partial reversal of the trend toward direct resupply from the United States 16 Even more serious was the communication problem in the Pacific especially on Taiwan Fully recognized during the 1954-55 Taiwan crisis deficiences had not been greatly remedied by 1958 The Hard-· tack high-altitude nuclear tests of August 1958 which resulted in widespread disruption of radio signals also pointed up the inadequacy and the vulnerability of the military communication net in the Pacific 17 ¾cessive costs precluded MATS from contracting for as much commercial airlift as was needed -SECKEF 56 The Air Force conceded that in public relations the U S Navy was more successful during the Taiwan crisis primarily because command responsibility in the Pac ic gave it a preferred position News media representatives were cleared by Navy officers Navy information offices were also generally better staffed USAF information offi rs claimed that releases on units and personnel were either withheld or pared to the bone by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs The Air Force believed many of its informational problans oould be allevia ed by raising the profes sional standards of 18 its career information officers The 1958-Tai ran crisis provided a good test of the relations be tween the United States and the Chinese Nati nalists Politically the Nationalists proved more amenable to U s advice and practiced greater restraint than expected The willingness of President Chiang Kai' shek to agree to a reduction of his Army forces·on the offshore islands in exchange for more artillery from the United States and his ''remmcia tion of force statement with Secretary Dulles in October 1958 were milestones in U S efforts to ameliorate the problem of the offshore islands In Nationalist military operations there were pluses and minuses The CNAF was tactically much superior to the Commlll1 ist Air Force and its pilots were quick to learn how to fiy later-model aircraft and use more advanced weapons such as the Sidewinder missile Its limited air lift capa_city also contributed to alleviating the artillery blockade of the K inmens The CNAF demonstrated how a force that had been reasonably · modernized and well trained under the U S Military Assistance Program al IIHi _ 57 Ji68Rlifr could aid in the attairnnent of UaSe objectives in a localized conf'licto The CNAF was -also -overgenerous in-prov-idir-i- g USAF forces on- Taiwan with supplies _and facilities Deficiencies were most apparent in Nationalist counterartillery-fire and ·in logistical planning for and surface resupply of the offshore islands The Nation list navy in contrast with the CNAF •perfo nned poorly at first and required much U S urging rainin and guidance before demonstrating effectiveness A_ need for more com patible Nationalist and U S military planning was also evident 19 In summary the Taiwan crisis of 1958 remained a localized conflict and subsided without loss of Nationalist-held territory to the Chinese Communists The reasons given for the success of U S policy were varied and inevitably reflected service and command viewpoints In Kuter 9s opinion the full-speed convergence of the ''mass ve Seventh Fleet to ward the aiwan Strait and the deployment of TAC1_s and ADC's Century fighters scored the greatest psychologica1 impact on the Communists The naval movement had the most immediate in'i'luence only because it was the most publicimedo20 The UoSo Navy believed that its attack carriers and combat Marines were principally responsible for keep g the con flicts in both the Taiwan Strait and in Lebanon from spreading Th is _yiew was strongly challenged by the USAF Chief of Staff Gen Thomas D White who gave primary cre it to the Strategic Air Command 21 Re ard 1 less of service claims it seems likely that the u s tactical show of force ba cked by strate c airpower deterred the Chinese Connnunists from ·- enlarging the conflict after the artillery blockade or the Kinmens was broken Other factorl - -that undoubtedly contributed to U S ·success 'included 58 Kll 'f ·· intelligence assessments of Chinese Communist probing operations and the diplcn1acy used to pr vent the -Ghinese Nationa-lists- -from taking unilateral military action The ultimate success of U So policy in 1958 did not obviate the fact that the United States was confronted with great risk in the Taiwan Strait area$ These risks were intensified by the requirement that tactical forces be prepared to conduct nonnuclear operations for ' which they were ill prepared from the standpoint of aircraft supplies equipment 9 and facilitiesw There was evidence that UQS$ weapon policy --as not fi rm and that a balance in tactical and logistical strength to conduct nonnuclear as well as nuclear operations remained to be achieiredo Failure to achieve this balance could deprive the United States of a choice of weapons--nonnuclear or nuclear--to deal with a future mili-• tacy crisis In view of the possible even likely recurrence of trouble in the Taiwan Strait the lessons of the 1958 crisis held great significance for U So political and military leaders lf IREf NOTES CHAPTER I 59 L Dept Stat e-9- United st-ates Relations mh Washington 1949 pp iii-xviii Department Qf State Bulletin 16 Jan 50 p 79 2 Dept State Bull 3 Jul 50 p 5 Hearings Before the Senate Cmte on Armed -Services and the Qnte on Foreign Relations 82d Cong 1st Sess 1951 Military Situation in the Far East p 9030 3o Dept State Bull 9 Feb 53 pp 207-11 4 House Rpt Treaty Provisions Relating to the Use of U S Forces Q Mutual Defense 27 Dec 56 84th Cong 2d Sess pp 26-30 Staff Brief ing 15 Sep 54 App 53 in Hist FEALF 1 Jul 31 Dec 54 Vol II 5 Ae Doak Barnetti Communist ll published for the Council on Foreign Relations New York 1960 pp 411-12 60 Staff Briefings on Formosa and Southeast Asia 15 Sep thru 8 Dec 54 Apps 53-57 in Hist FEALF 1 Jul-31 Dec 54 Vol ll Senate Rpt 13 Senate Miscellaneous Reperts Q l Public Bills 84th Cong 1st Sesf 1955 7o FEC uNC Comd Rpt Oct 54 pp 37-41 Hist FEAF 1 Jan-30 Jlln 55 Vol I Pt II pp 19-22 8 Senate Rpt 13 1955 9o FEC uNC Comd Rpt Oct 54 pp 37-41 Hist FEAF 1 Jan-30 Jun 55 Vol I Pt II pp 20-22 Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in Formosa 25 Jan-1 Jun 55 pp 24-25 10 Fifth Air Force in Formosa pp 24-25 36 11 Ibid pp 36-42 Hist FEAF 1 Jan-30 Jun 55 Vol I Pt ll pp 20- 24 12 rlf Times 25 27 Feb 55 12 Fifth Air Force in Formosa pp 36-42 Hist FEAF 1 Jan-30 Jun 55 Vol I Pt II pp 20-24 Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in Taiwan 1 Jun-31 Dec 55 pp l0-11 13 Fifth Air Force in Fo nnosa pp 30-32 45-46 69-97 14 1 ei4 pp 45-55 105 Hist FEAF 1 Jan-30 Jun 55 Vol I Pt I pp 28-29 Fifth Air Force in Taiwan pp 10-11 30-32 Hist ATF 13 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 p 20 file 381 China 29 Nov 50 Sec 3 in Federal atREP 60 Records Center FRC 15e Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 dtd 31 Dec 58 p 14 Hist PACAF 1 Jul-31 Dec 57 Vol I Pt I p 11 and 1 Jan-JO Jun 58 Vol I Pt 1 p 11 OCB Rpt U So Policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China dtd 16 Apr 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 1 Jan-25 Aug 58 AIIR -IR '71-7 58 subj Air Order of Battle for the Chinese Nationaliat Air Force - as of 31-Aug 58 dtd 30 Sep 58 in AC S Intel Hist Div 13th AF Special Rpt Taiwan Straits Operations p 63 Briefings by Brig Gen Alvin P Tacon Lessons Learned in CASF Deployments to the Far East at Senior Operations Officers Conference Maxwell AFB 29-30 Jan 59 pp 9-12 16 iannual Report of the Secretary of Defense 1956 p 266 1957 pp 301-2 Hist PACAF 1 Jul-31 Dec58 Vol I Pt II pp 76-77 17 Semiannual Rpt of SOD - 1957 p 296 18 File Ops 6-33 1 Jan-12 Sep 58 in D Plans Hist ATF 13 1 Jul 31 Dec 58 p 17 19 CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 16 May 58 in D Plans 20 OCB Rpt US Policy toward ••• China CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 p D-6 memo Exec Secy NSC to NSC subj The Situation in the Taiwan Straits Area 13 Aug 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 1 3 6 CHAPTER II For a discussion of this operation see s udy by USAF Historical Divi sion Liaison Office Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis- File Ops 221 1 Jan 59 in D Plans Nfil CYork Times 4 Aug 58 Hist PACAF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Vol I Pt I pp 158-61 Vol II Doc 1 Rpt Taiwan Straits Crisis by Col H B Hull Dec 58 AIIR m-468-58 subj Scope and Policy of Reconnaissance and Photography Missions for F-84's 11 Jul 58 Aim m-575-58 subj Recap of CAF Aircraft Destroyed by CHICOM MIGS and AAA Fire 11 Aug 58 in AC S Intel Nfil' X£r £ 5 Aug 580 Msg TDC MAAG to CINCPAC 4 Aug 58 msg 1757 Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 6 Aug 58 in FRC Msg 127 Taipei to Secy State 4 Aug 58 in FRC CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 16 May 58 p D-6 msg Hq USAF to CINCPACAF 7 Aug 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 5 Jun-21 Aug 58 msg JCS 946950 91111 1• •• z • COFSUSAF to CNO COFSA 2i al 22 Aug 58 in FRC Hist D Ops Hq -USAF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 pp 42-43 • 8 0 Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 pl msgs 1992 175'6'Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 25 Jul 6 Aug 58 in FRC Presentation by Gen Laurence s Kuter at ZI Com manders Conf Patrick AFB 20-21 Nov 58 Hist MA TS 1 Jul-31 Dec -§8 - -Chap IV a 9 Msg CINCPACAF to ALMAJSUBCOM 7 Aug 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 msg 1971 CINq ACAF to COFSUSAF 19 Aug 58 in FRC 61 10 Msg 1961 Hq USAF to CINCPACAF personal LeMay to Kuter 18 Aug 58 msg 1971 CINCPAC AF to COFSUSAF 19 Aug 58 both in FRC msg 361 Tokyo to SECY STATJ 1$ Aug 5g in D Plans Ops 20-9 11 Hist 5th AF l Jul-31 Dec 58 p 108 12 Hull Rpt as cited inn 3 Hist A'IF 13 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 pp 10-11 13 Dept State l 6 Sep 58 p 379 msg 2052 CNO to CINCSPECOMME 24 Aug 58 in FRC msg JCS 947046 JCS to CINCPAC COMTDC 25 Aug 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 22 Aug-17 Sep 58 14 Memo for COFSUSAF from Actg D Plans 28 Aug 58 memo for COFSUSAF from Asst NSC Af fairs s11bj Probable Developments in the Taiwan Straits Area 5 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 26 Aug-18 Sep 58 msg 2465 Hq USAF to ATIC ARDC tl al 11 Sep 58 in FRC 15 Msg 2223 COMTDC to JCS 31 Aug 58 in FRC 16 Press Release Text of Dulles Statement oh 4 September 1958 on 'l'aiwan Situationo · 17 Kuter Presentation msg 2040 CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 25 Aug 58 in FRC Hist 12th AF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Pt III p 1 Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in ••• Crisis p 11 Hist 12th AF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Pt III p 20 18 Interview J Van Staaveren with Lt Col G E Tormoen D Ops 21 Jan 60a 19 Msg 3130C 58-206 313th AD to 5th AF App 2 in Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in_ ••• Crisis Kuter Presentation Chief of Staff's Policy Book 1959 Item 140 Hist 12th AF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Pt I Pa 20 CINCP ACAFWs Conclusions in Hist PACAF 1 Ju1 31 Dec 58 Vol I Pt I pp 265-66 msg 2212 CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 31 Aug 58 msg 2211 3 Rti • 62 J BfJb 1 CINCPACAF t ClN PAC 31 Aug 58 msgs 2224 2320 CINCPAC to JCS 9 31 Aug 6 Sep 58 msg 2330 Hq USAF to TAC tl al 6 Sep 58 all in FRC Hist 12th AF l Jul-31 Dec 58 Pt I pp 24-28 • 21 Hist 12th AF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Pt III p 11 22 Ibid Pt I p 28 Briefing by Col Wm F Barns Lessons Learned Taiwan Stralts Situation at Senior Ops Officers Conf 29-30 Jan 59 p 4 Chief of Staff's Policy Book 1959 Items 140 140-20 23 Hist 12th AF Pt I p 28 Pt III pp 2 20-21 24 Hist ADC 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 p 173- Barns Briefing p 4 Kuter Presentation 25 Hist ADC 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 p 173 msg PACAF to 13th AF person al Kuter to Moorman 8 Sep 58 App 43 in Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in • • e Crisis 26 Hist _ MATS 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Chap IV Chief of Staff's Policy Book 1959 Items 140 140-2 Z7 See sources in n 26 msg 3295 CINCPAC to JCS J 5 Dec 58 in JCS files 28 Anx B in Hq PACAF ll Report of Taiwan-Quemoy Operation Dec 58 in D Plans Kuter Presentation Air Force Operational Readiness Report 29 Sep 58 29 Msg 9876 COMSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT 4 Sep 58 in Marine Historical Archives MHA msg JCS 947046 es cited inn 13 Kuter Presentation Barns Rriefingi p 5 New I l tk Times1 17 Sep 58 Im k He ald Tribune 25 Sep 58 CINCPACAF•s Conclusions as cited inn 20 msg 6359 CINCPACFLT to COMSEVENTHFLT nd in MHA msg 669 7 CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 15 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 22 Aug-17 Sep 58e 30 'Msg JCS 947046 as cited in n 13 msg 7094 CO tvSEVENTHFLT to CINCPACFLT Z7 Aug 58 msgs First MAW to CG FMFPAC Oll64CYl 17082CZ Sep 58 CO MAG-11 Rpt 29 Aug-11 Dec 58 p 21 Command Diary Narrative Account of MAG-11 1-30 Sep 58 Sec II p 1 all in MHA Ame B pp 3-4 in PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op 31 MAG-11 Comd Diary Sep 58 App G msg CG FMFPAC to CMJ 26 Aug 58 msg First MAW to CG FMFPAC 170820Z Sep 58 CO MAG-11 Rpt p 12 all in MHA l2 lrf AG-11 Comd Diary Sep 58 Sec II p l msg CINCPACFLT to CG FMFPAC 11 Sep 58 in MHA 338 Msg 1297 COMSEVENTHFLT to COMPACFLT 081 35CYl Sep 58 MAG-11 Comd 9Nft1J4 l Oft lf 63 Diary Sep 58 Sec II p 5 Oct 58 pp 1 9 13-14 CO MAG-11 Rpt pp- 1 4 22 -- -msg --FirtffMAW to CG FMFPA C 170820Z Sep 58 a11 · in MHAo 340 Msg JCS 947046 as cited inn 13 Kuter Presentation Hist ATF 13 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 p 17 CHAPTER III 1 Hist Div 13th AFs Special Rpt Taiwan Straits Operations pp 30- 311 117 158 msg 2552 CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 18 Sep 58 in FRC Hq 313th AD GO 33 13 Oct 58 App 9 in Special Rpt Fifth Ai T Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 2 Hq PACAF Report of Taiwan-Quemoy Operation Dec 58 _p 6 inter view JG Van Staaveren with Lt Col G@ E • Tormoen D Ops 21 Jan 60 msg JCS 947046 JCS to CINCPAC COMTDC 25 Aug 58 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 224v msg 9937 CINCPAC to CNO 5 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 6-33 Sec 2 3o M' sg 2051 11 CINCPAC to CINCPACF' LT et al 25 Aug 58 in FRC 4 Msg 2076 CINCPAC to JCS 26 Aug 58 msg 2064 CINCPACAF to COMUSJAPAN 26 Aug 58 msg 2085 CINCPACAF to CINCPAC 26 Aug 58 all in FRC 5 Msg 2159 JCS 247298 JCS to CINCPAC COMTDC 29 Aug 58 in D Plans memo for Gens Taylor White Pate Adm Burke from ·chmn JCS Twining subj Authority for Emergency Action on Defense of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands 15 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 26 Aug-18 Sep 58 Sec 2 60 Msg 0243 CINCPAC to JCS 5 Sep 58 in FRC 7 Arne H 10 Sep 58 to CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 Amt N 15 Oct 58 to CINCPACAF Ops Plan 25-58 both in D Plans msg 2450 CINCPAC to ALSUBCOM 11 Sep 58 in FRC 8 Msg 2450 CINCPAC to ALSUBCOM 11 Sep 58 msg CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 6 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 6-33 msg 2437 J CS 947808 JCS to COMNAVPHIL Snagly Point RP 10 Sep 58 in FRC 9 Ame H CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 10 - 11 e Taiwan file in MHA msg 2157 Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 29 Aug 58 in FRC Hist ATF 13 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 pp 19-20 Arne B to PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op 120 Hist ATF 13 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 pp 19-20 129-30 SECREI• 64 IEIIS 13 Barns Briefing p 3 Tacon Briefing pp 9-llj both at Senior Ops_ 0ffice rs--Conf· ·· 29-30 Jan 59rHist 12th AF l Jul-31 Dec 58 pt 1 pp 37-38 14 3th AF Rpt Taiwan St its Ops pp· 63-64 Hist 12th AF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Ft 1 pp 37-38 15 o Anx F 20 Aug 58 to CINCPACAF Ops Plan 25-58 Briefings for Ge r- Kuter by Lt Col Wm D Morrison 26 Sep and 5 Nov 58 Apps 47 and 48 in Rpt Fifth Air Force in Q o Crisis Kuter Presentation 20- 21 Nov 58 AU Evaluation Staff Study of Taiwan Crisis dtd 1959 13th· AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 75 16 3th AF Rpt T iwan Straits Ops p 75 Arne C pp 10-11 9 PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op Briefings for Kuter by Morrison 17a AU Eval Study of Taiwan 18 PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op p 17 Hist MATS l Jul- 31 Dec 58 Chap IV 19 Kuter Presentation 13th AF Rpt Taiwan straits Ops pp 79-80 AU Eval Study of Taiwan PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op pp 17-19 Briefing by Tac Div D Ops USAF Lessons Learned in Lebanon and Taiwan-1958 p 40 CHAPTER IV 1 Msg 2159 JCS 247298 ° JCS to CINCPAC 29 Aug 58 Ame H to ·cINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 both in D Pla ns 2a Baltimore § yn 8 Sep 58 msgs 2484 2586 s Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 12 19 Sep 58 both in FRCo 3 Msg CINCPAC to JCS 150127Z Sep 58 in D Plans msg 2295 Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 4 Sep 58 in FRC PACAF Rpt of Taiwan-Quemoy Op p 6 DAF Journal of Mutual Security llI Nov 58 p 67 4 AllS IR-789 58 subj Fighter Aircraft Performance and Tactics in Air Battle of 24 September 1958 3 Oct 58 AilS m-734-58 subj Resume of CHICOM and CHINAT Participating Pilots 7 Oct 58 Hist ATF 13 1 ·Jul-31 Dec 58 p 26 msg 'COMTDC MAAG to CNO 23 Sep 58 in FRC AIIS IR-731-58 subj Fighter Aircraft Performance and Tactics in Air Battle of 10 Oct 58 14 Oct 58 5o AllS IR-734-58 7 Oct 58 Fifth Air Force Commander's Briefing by Capt Go N Earnhart Jr 25 Sep 58 Doc 15 in Special Rpt Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 AU Evaluation Staff Study of Taiwan Crisis l OREJb IEIRl f 65 6e Memo for DCS P P from Dep DiWar Plans subj CNAF Reconnaissance Capability 27 Aug 58 in D Plans- -9Ps 20-5 Sec 4 Washington -- and Times Herald 16 Oct 58a 7 Rpt Firth Air Force in •• Crisis pp 15 81-82 Hist ATF 13 p 26 memo for Gens Moore Gerhart Roberts and A dm Dennison subj- I inpro-t rement of' Chinese Nationalist Air Force Capability 18 Aug 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 5 Jun-21 Aug 58 8 Memo for jcs from Dept Navy subj Resupply of Govt of Republic of China-Held Offshore Islands 1 15 Sep -589 in D PlanB Ops 20-5 Sec 4 msg1 COMTDC to CINCPAC 21 Sep· 58 in FRC msg 2159 as cited in n l msg 8090 COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF 72 30 Aug 58 in MHA 9 Msg 2248 CIN'CPAC to COMTDC 1 Sep 58 msg 2276 COMTDC to CNO 3 Sep 58 both in FRC York 4 Sep 58 Herald Tribune 4 Sep 58 10 Msg COMTDC to CINCPAC 6 Sep 58 msg 2518 COMTDC MAAG to CNO 1 Sep 58 both in FRC memo for JCS from Dept Navy 5 Se_p 58 as cited in- n 8 msg CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 24 Sep 58 m D Plans Ops 20-5 Seo 5 msg 6830 COMTDC to CINCPAC 25 Sep 58 in MHA msg 400 Taipei to SecyJState 15 Sep 58 msg 2586 Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 19 Sep 58 both in FRCQ 11 Msg 2276 COMTDC to CNO 3 Sep 58 msg 2303 CINCPAC to JCS 5 Sep 58 msg 2494 CNO to COMTDC CINCPAC 12 Sep 58 msg 2482 JCS to CINCPACAF et al 12 Sep 58 all in FRC 12 Memo of Conversation subj The Taiwan Strait Crisis _Dept State Dulles Twining sl• 20 Sep 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 msgs 2629 2630 CINCPAC to JCS both 22 Sep 58 msg 2694 Hq USAF to ALMAJCOM 26 Sep 58 msg 2725 COMTDC MAAG to CINCPAC 27 Sep 58 all in FRC 13_ Msgs 2586 · 2694 Hq USAF to AI MAJCOM 19 26 Sep 58 msg 2629 CINCPAC to JCS 22 Sep 58 msg 2705 CINCPAC to COMTDC 26 Sep 58 all in FRC Rpt ·Taiwan Straits Crisis by Col H B Hull Doc 1 in Hist PACAF 1 Ju1-31 Dec 58 Vol n 14 Hu11 Rpt Taiwan Straits Crisis msg 2790 COMTDC to CINCPAC 4 Oct 58 in FRC msg 6432 CINCPAC to COMTDC 2_ al 24 Sep 58 in MHAc 15 Msg 2817 COMTDC to CINCPAC 8 Oct 58 in FRC 16 ·· Msg COMTDC MAAG to CINCPAC 2 Oct 58 in FRC N2 York ' 6-7 Oct 58» Herald T1 •ibune 6 Oet 58 Hist ATF 13 1 Ju1-31 Dec 58 p 11 17a Msgs 2853 2896 Hq USAF to AIMAJCOM 10 17 Oct 58 in FRC fork T imes 13 Oct 58 66 110111 18 • Msg 0853 COi fl'DC to CIN CPAC 9 Oct 58 in FRC 19 Memo for - Asst SOD ISA from Chief Mutual Security Div DA subj Provision of 240mm Howitzers to Taiwan under MAP 29 Oct 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 memo for Twining JCS from Taylor 22 Oct 58 in D Plans Taiwan 01 02 20 Wasb i_ p g'ton Post lrui Times He-ralg 24 Oct 58 21 Ne w Herald Tribune 20 Oct 58 memo for Twining JCS from Tay 9r _ 1_0 58 _ in D Plans Taiwan 01 02 York Times1 25 Oct_ 58 msg COMrDC to CINCPAC tl ilo 3 Nov 58 in FRC 22 York Times 25 Oct 58 msg COMrDC to CINCPAC il il• 3 Nov 58 DAF Journal of Mutual Security XII Nov 58 p 67 23 Msg JOO0 CNO to CINCPAC 30 Oct 58 in FRC 24 Msg 3158 CINCPAC to CNO 22 Nov 58 msg Hq AFMI'C to Hq USAF pe sopa ltuter to Gerhart 23 Nov 58 both in FRC 25 Msg CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF 16 Nov 58 in D Plans Ops 20-6 Sec 5 msg Kuter to Gerhart as cited inn 24 msg 3162 Hq AFMI'C to Hq us - i lso Kuter to Gerhart 23 Nov 58 in FRC memo for COFSUSAF fromD Plans subj Prepared JCS Reply to CINCPAC Msg 22 Nov 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 Sec 6 msg 3158 as cited inn 24 msg 3245 Hq USAF to COMI'AC 5 Dec 58 in FRC 26v Msg 3203 CINCPAC to COMI'DC 27 Nov 58 msg 3206 COMI'DC A G to CINCPAC 28 Nov 58 1 both in FRC 2 7 Hist 12th AF'il l Jul-31 Dec·58 Pt III pp 29-30 28 1 2i d Pt I pp 42-43 Pt III pp 11 30-32 29 I '2i9 a Pt III pp 32-34 43 30 Rpt Fifth Air Force in ••• Crisis pp 94-95 AF Opnl Readiness Rpt 29 Dec 58 Hist ATF 13 1 Jan-30 Jun 59 p 16 msg 3158 msg from Kuter to Gerhart both as cited inn 24 memo prep by D Plans subj Disposition and Redeployment of USAF Forces Committed to Support Taiwan 25 Nov 58 in D Plans Ops 20-5 Sec 6 MAG-11 Command Diary 1 Feb-16 Mar 59 App D in MHA 31 Hist Asst Mutual Security 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Sec 4 memo for D Plans from Asst D Policy D Plans subj Improvement of Chinese Nationalist Air Force Capability 15 Jan 59 in D Plans Ops 20-5 Sec 6 memo for DCS P P from Actg D Plans 9 Apr 59 in D Plans RL 59 244 Foreign Aids China Sec 2 msg CINCPACAF to COFSUSAF ii 15 Nov 58 in D Plans Ops 20 5 Sec 5 msg 3158 msg from Kuter to Gerhart both as cited inn 24 9i0Aiiis 4ECREI CHAPTER V 1 CINCPAC Ops Plan 25-58 16 May 58 2 Kuter Presentation 20 21 Nov 58 AU Evaluation Staff Study of Taiwan Crisis 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 28 • 3 File Ops-·22 ·1 Jan 59 in D Plans 4 Hist PACAF 1 Jul- 31 Dec 58 Vol I Pt 1 p 167 5 lhla• pp 265-72 Hist ATF 13 1 Jul- 31 Dec 58 p 131 AU Eval Study of Taiwan 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 222 Kuter Presentation 6 Interview J Van Staaveren with Lt Col G E To rmoen D Ops 21 Jan 60 7 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops pp 222-23 80 Ltr l Kuter to LeMay 31 Dec 5S in D Plans Ops 20-9 Sec 4 Kuter Presentation AU Eval Study of Taiwan Hist 12th AF 1 Jul 31 Dec 58 Pt III p 13 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 220 Tacon Briefing at Senior Ops Officers Conf 29-30 Jan 59 pp 7-8 msg CINCPAC to JCS 15 Dec 58 in JCS files 67 9 Msg 0243 CINCPAC to JCS 5 Sep 58 in FRC msg CINCPAC to JC 15 Dec ltr Kuter to LeMay 31 Dec both as cited inn 8 file Ops 22 1 Jan 59 10 Msg CINCPAC to JCS 15 Dec ltr Kuter to LeMay 31 Dec both as cited inn 8 ll Hist A TF 13 _ 1 Jul 31 Dec 58 p 127 - 12 Msg CINCPAC to JCS 15 Dec 58 msg COMTAC to COFSUSAF 16 Dec 58 in D Plans Ops 20-9 Sec 4 Kuter Presentation Hist PACAF 1 Jul 31 Dec 58 Vol I Pt 1 p 270 13 CO MAG-11 Rpt 29 Aug-11 Dec 58 p 22 in MHA 14 File Ops 22 1 Jan 59 15 Kuter Presentation AU Eval Study of Taiwan file Ops 22 1 Jan 59 16 File Ops 22 1 Jan 59 AU Eval Study of Taiwan 17 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 70 18 Memo for DCS P P • from Dir Info Svs subj Public Infonnation Policies 17 Sep 5911 in D Plans RL 59 Policy toward Taiwano 911Rif £ 68 19 Silftti - Mag CINCPAC to JCS 15 Dec 58 AU Eval Study of Taiwan file Ops 22 1 Jan 59 13th AF Rpt Taiwan Straits Ops p 228 20 · Msg CINCPAC to JCS 15 Dec 58 file Ops 22 1 Jan 59 Hist PACAF 1 Jul-31 Dec 58 Vol I Pt 1 p 268 21 Hearings Before the Subcmte of the House Cmte on Appropriations 86th Cong 1st Sess Appropriations 1960 Pt 1 pp 894-95 lUHll J r AACS A CW __ AFMTC AIIR AIMAJCOMs Anx AOC ATF 13 P ATIC CASF CCC CINCARPAC CINCFE CINCPAC CINCPACAF CINCSPECOMME CMC CNAF CNO coc COMCIAPAC COMNAVPHIL COMSEVENTHFLT COMTAIWANDEFCOM COMTDC COMUSJAPAN DA FEAF FEALF FEC UNC FMFPAC FRC GCI GRC HE JCC JOC 69 GLOSSARY Airways and Air Communications Service Aircraft control and warning Air Force Missile Test Center Air Intelligence Information Report All major commands Annex Air'operations center Air Task Force 13 Provisional Air Technical Intelligence Center Composite air strike force Combat control center Commander-in-Chief Anny Pacific Commander-in-Chief Far East Commander-in-Chief Pacific Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Forces Commander-in-Chief Special Command Middle East Commander Marine· Corps Chinese Nationalist Air Force Chief of Naval Operations Combined operations center Commander Central 'Intelligence Agency Pacific Commander Na vy Philippines Commander Seventh Fleet Commander Taiwan Defense Command Commander Taiwan Defense Command Commander United States in Japan Department of Arrrry Far East Air Forces Far East Air Logistic Force Far East Command United Nations Command Fleet Marine Force Pacific Federal Records Center Ground control intercept Government Republic of China High explosive Joint I communication centsr Joint operations center 70 MAAG MAG MAW MATS MHA NAS OCB RP TDC Military Assistance Advisory Group Marine air group Marine air wing Military Air Transport Service Marine Historical Archives Naval Air Station Operations Coordinating Board Republic of Philippines Taiwan Defense Command 71 Appendix 1 - X -RV Tanm Units Their HQm Stations Parent_ Yfil hE Deployed A£ _ Station 3T2th TF Wg 3S-8th TF Sq F-100 Cannon AFB N Mex 312th TF Wg 477th TF Sq F-100 Cannon AFB Mex 27th TF Wg 522d TF Sq F-101 Bergstrom AFB Tex 345th TB Wg 499th TB Sq B-57 Langley AFB Va 314th TC Wg 5oth TC Sq C-130 Sewart AFB Tenn 463d TC Wg 773d TC Sq C-130 Ardmore AFB Okla 837th AD 17th TR Sq RF-101 Shaw AFB SC 837th AD 20th TR Sq RF-101 Shaw AFBs S C I 4505 AR Wg 429th AR Sq KB-50 Langley AF B Va 507th Tac Control Gp Comm Control Ele Shaw AFB $ C 2d Tac Depot Sq Comd Ele Langley AFB Va 72 Appendix 2 1lfil lliJlli Available 1 2 lliAE after Deployment Country Jill il r A£ ri Mission Taiwan Taoyuan 83 FIS NORAD 12 F-104 Air defense Hsinchu 26 FIS 13th AF 6 F-86D Air defense Tainan 16 FIS 5th AF 25 F-86D Air defense Chiayi 388 TFS CASF 16 F-lOOD F Air defense and HE offense Tainan 868 TMS 13th AF 20 TM-61 Offense atomic Tainan · ·· di spersed 507 Comm Control Comi11 el ct Taiwa n-Kadena Command Ele Command aug Philipp ines Clark 1 WMT CASF Atomic weapon ma int Clark 26 FIS 13th AF 7 F-86D Air offense Clark 72 TFS 25 F-100D F Offense Clark 50 TCS CASF 15 C-130 Airlift Clark 17 TRS CASF 6 RF-101 'Recon Clark 4505 ARW CASF 5 KB-50 Refueling Okinawa Naha 25 FIS 5th AF 29 F-86D Air defense Kadena 522 TFS CASF 13 F-101 Offense Kadena 477 TFS CASF 16 F-101D F Air defense Kadena 499 TBS CASF 14 B-57 Offense Kadena 20 TRS CASF 6 RF-101 Reconnaissance Naha 429 ARS CA SF 5 KB-50 Refueling Japan Ashiya 773 TCS CASF 16 C-130 Airlift 111111 a ·•· - 73 __________ L -------· J DISTRIBUTION g US l li' Other SAFS - 1 AFRAE - l ASI - 2 SAFUS - 1 AFRDC - l ASI RAF - 5 SAFFM 1 AFRDP 1 ASI HA - 5 - SAFIE 1 AFRST l PJulD 3 SAFMA - l AFSDC - 2 WSEG - 2 SAFMP - 1 AFSLP - 1 AFCHO - 47 SAFRD - 1 AFSME - 1 Stock SAFA A - 1 AFSMP - 1 S AFLL - l AFSMS - l SAFOI - 1 AFSPM - 1 TOTAL 200 AFCCS - 1 AFSSA - 1 AFCVC - l AFSSS - 1 AFCAV 1 AFSSV - 1 AFCSS - l AFSTP - 1 AFAAC l PJ TAC 1 AFAAF 1 AFXDC 2 JI FABF l AFXl D 5 JU'AMA - 1 AFXPR - 1 AFASC - 1 AFCC - 1 AFAUJJ - 1 P FCAC - 1 AFCAS - 1 Major Commands AFCIG - 5 C AFCIN 5 ACIC 1 AFCJA - 1 ADC - 2 ' '1 AFCOA - l AFCS - 2 AFCRF l KFLfJ 5 AFCSA - 1 AFSC - 5 AFOCC - 1 P rC - 2 AFOOE - 1 AU 2 AFODC - 2 AF AFC - 1 AFOMO - l AAC - l AFOOP - 2 CAIRAC - l AFORQ - 2 CONAC - 2 AFOWX - 1 HEDCOM - l AFPCH - l MATS - 5 AFPCP - l OAR - 1 AFPDC - 2 PAC AF - 5 AFPDP - l SAC - 7 rTM - 1 TAC 5 AFPMP - l US AFE - 5 P- FPTR - 1 USAFSS - 3 USAFA - l