March 5 1959 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PR ESIDENT March 5 L959 - 10 17 AM Special Meeting after regular NSC Meeting Others presentr Vice President Nixon Secretary Herter Secretary Anderson Secretary McElroy Attorney General ftogers General Twining Mr Allen Dulles Mr Merchant Mr George A1len Governor Hoegh Mr Gordon Gray Mr Jarnes Lay General Persons General Goodpaster Major Eisenhower The purpose of this rneeting was to discuss contingency planning in tJ' e Berlin crisis At the meeting of January 29th an initial plan had been forrnulated which included rrreasures which rnight be taken up to and in cluding the eventuality of a srnall probe between Heknste and Berlin In the event t Lat this probe were stopped by force it had then been de cided that we should rnarshal world opinion on preparing for general war The President opened this meeding by expressing the view tleat our courses of action to irnplernent this general design to marshal public opinion and prepare for war have not been sufficiently clarified Specifi calIy he is suspicious of tJle capability of the United Nations to afford positive action colnmensurate with the dire situation once one of our coo voys has been stopped by tJ e GDR He felt that we have not placed enough thought on ways to rnake the Soviets tJre aggressor in tllis case The President asked the Deparbnents of State and Defense how far t Le ques tion has been thought through Secretary Herter in response referred to the January 29th contingency paper and stated that our tripartite working group in Bonn is refining it There are in his view sorne doubtful points as brought up by tJ e OECLASSIFIED iEfr n sw ffirm -2- j I President namely I The British position rylartivs o the perrnissibility of GDR officials Placing a Itdate starnptr on convoy identification papers He feels the British would not be willing to go to war ovei the principle of paper starnping However the Gerrnans have pointed out that such at act in significant in itself would be the beginning of a ttslippery s1ope t' 21 The utility of the United Nations in this connection The working grouP at Bonn has asked our delegation in New York to canvass the United Nations for its attitude Dr this connection Arnbassador Lodge has pointed out the great utility of the United Nations for rnaintaining any status quo The President agreed as to the usefulness of the United Nations rnaintain ing a status quo situation but specified that its usefulness would be confined to the period between now and the terrnination of the ultirnaturn rather than to the period in which t Le crisis had becorne acute The President went on to refer to a paper subrnitted to hirn this rnorning suggesting a naval blockade of the North sea as a counterrneasure against stopping of Berlin convoys' He exPressed disagreernent with the concept prirnarily because it would allow tirne to continue working on the side of the Soviets In other words if we took no action other than a blockader w€ would be ap plying pressure which would be effective only after a considerable tirne whereas Berlin would very quickly shrivel Secretary Herter pointed out that tleis PaPer had represented only a request for a study and not a policy deterrnination The President then questioned the recognition status of the GDR in the neutralist world Specifically he desired to cornpare the status of the GDR with that of the Federal Republic To tJ is Secretary Herter answered that Yugoslavia is the only naiion which has recognized the GDR other than the Soviets and further pointed out that talk of a peace treaty with the GDR on the part of tle Soviets is invalid A peace treaty between the USSR and tJ' e GDR already exists any action to which Khrushchev might refer would be rnerely the relinquishrnent of certain rights which have been reserved in their current treaty Secretary Herter then referred to a report over the ticker tape of a state ment by Khrushchev on possible extension of the May Z th deadline but the President disrnissed this statement largely as propaganda Secretary Herter then brought up the question of the extent and the tirning of a conscious effort to be rnade to irnpress tfre American people with the IUT STORET- -3- fact that the situation in Berlin is rnore serious than public reaction to it would indicate On this question two opposing considerations rnani fest thernselves One expressed by Secretary McElroy was that excessive efforts in this direction rnight cause an excess of concern on the part of ttre public This viewpoint was reinforced later by Secretary Anderson who is of the opinion that the public is rnore con cerned about this crisis than we rnight realize The other consideration is tl at actions to prepare the public for possible dire possibilities rnust be expedited In this connection Secretary Dulles has previously ex pressed the view that the public realization is not adequate The rnatter of indicating the concern of the goverrunent over this cris brought up two specific problerns One was the announcernent of tJ is rneeting itself witJ the objective of indicating to the public that the rnat ter is being considered by rnernbers of the National Security Council After discussion the President agreed that an announcernent should be rnade that he had called a special National Security Council meeting to address the Berlin crisis In connection with this he requested Mr Gordon Gray to explain the rnatter to Mr Stans and Dr Libby the two rnernbers absent The other rnatter growing out of the question of publicity was that of Congressional relations This rnatter was brought up by General Persons and was reinforced by Mr Nixon In Mr Nixonrs view t Le objective which the President has been following as to his public posi tion is to appear firrn without being provocative Mr Nixon cited the rejection of irnrnediate rnobilization as a sign of the Presidentrs desire not to be provocative In Mr Nixonts view however there is a seg rnent in Congress and in the press whichwill criticize an alleged lack of firrnness He feels therefore that rneetings such as the Leadership rneeting proposed by General Persons and announcernent of todayrs rneeting would be useful in this respect With relation to the Congres sional Leaders Mr Nixon pointed out tJrat sonse of these people have shown great restraint He feels tJ at the bipartisan atrrosphere would be increased by any rneeting in which Congressional Leaders were rnade to feel a greater share in this rnatter The Presid ent agreed to the principle of a rneeting with Congressional Leaders but explained his reticence to hold such a rneeting on the basis of Mr Macrnillanrs irnpending visit to tJle United States later tJris rnonth He pointed out the changeability of the positions of various leaders in the allied world Specifically he referred to that of Adenauer Adenauer has shown considerable evidence of weakening his initial position on such rnatters as starnping of papers by the GDR The rnain reason why the r$Eflffifr -4- Unitgd States has taken a firrn if not rigid position on the inadrnissibility of starnping of documents by the GDR is to support Adenauer In recent rneetings it has been reported that Adenauer has given assent to a fal1- back position of perrnitting suctr activities by GDR officials Secretary Herter noted that Adenauer is in poor physical condition at the rnornent and is sustaining serious defections within his own party The presidentrs Purpose in referring to the change in Adenauerrs position is that he visual izes tJ e possibility of sorne change in his own position after the Macmillan visit Essentially he feels that Macmillanrs visit will not bring forth rnuch of a substantive nature but he considers the possibility sufficient to rnake hirn hesitant about prernaturely disclosing plans to Mernbers of Congress At the urging of the Vice President and General Persons the presid ent decided to hold a rneeting witJr Congressior al Leaders both before and after the Macrnillan visit Considerable discussion then ensued relative to the details The Presidentrs decision in tJlis rnatter was to rneet with congressional Leaders on Friday March 6th inviting Senators Johnson and Dirksen and Representatives Rayburn and Halleck He feels that he can see Senator Fulbright inforrnally later on Present from the Executive Branch should be secretary Herter Mr McElroy and the Vice President The purpose of t Le rneeting should be prirnarily to al low tJle Mernbers of Congress to express their views on the Berlin situa tion and to outline to thern the general tack and the general posture that the United States desires to present before the world on this rnatter During the discussion Secretary Herter pointed out the danger of too rnuch discussion of diplornatic tactics Not only are these tactics not yet firrn but any rnatters which might leak as the result of such a rneeting would have a serious effect on olrr flexibility in dealing witJr the Soviets ' Other rnatters brought up irx the rneeting were 1 Military actions which are being or have been taken This was given to the rneeting by General Twining and included primarily actions to reinforce our security situation in the short run as well as to indicate preparations to the Soviets The Presid ent issued one caution on these rnatters that nothing should be atternpted which could be d etected as a phony General Twining also outlined other proposals such as a slight buildup in Arrny forces tire rnovernent of the Second Fleet to the ffiTUffE r F Toffi -5- North Atlantic and positioning of an ad ditional TAC rotational unit at Adana The President approved the principle of irnplernenting such actions for psychological purposes but evidenced solrre shock at the idea of rnoving an additional division to Europe These actions are all included in the enclosure to trris t rurno rdurn 21 The size of force necessa to hold o round access routes to Berlin The President pointed out in this connection that any military operation to open ground accesses will be a rnajor operation which he estirnates as three to four corPs He pointed out the infeasibility of holding one highway open without considerable territory on either side of it In his view it is nearly a rnatter of general war once rnilitary action of any sort is opened 3 The question of rnovernent of dependents to Berlin This rnatter was brought up by General persons General Twining ex Pressed the view that we should stop all fl ow of dependents to Berlin as of now rffhile not fully comrnitting hirnseU the president d id adrnit that such an action would reduce the nurnbers that rnight have to be evacu- ated at a future date lt4l D ifficulties wllich might be encountered witJ the attitude of the allies The Presid'ent again pointed out the absolute r ity for concurrence of the French and the Gerrnans in our actions in that we cannot fight a battle without a line of cornrnunication He further touched on the d ifficulties which would accrue frorn a rnarked softening of attitude on the part of Willy Brandt Willy Brandt has been sornewhat receptive to t e idea of internationalizing Berlin and has been inconsistent in his positions The President pointed out that it would be untenable for us to be placed in a position where we are saving people who do not d esire to be saved tg J V Ms pfu John S D Eisenhower esrtz