— apProven ror release pate i n @ 08—30—2000 likod J pore ® J —— —100—secusz p s The trcore coiniiidignce isp TOP SECRET L erd Lad 8 feverser 1905 Secretary of tefense Hisshington 0 aboot ear Can Here s a paper 1 proatsed you on the various concepts for the sharing of 501 which the President tatks atouts Yours That HiTHian J Casey Attachaent 4 _ popmrome Torsecatconmot Copy Ne 22 can Can No O5—FG—24 TS No Docement No 4 pmo con a to o yea ty s —rvuercom ms £31203 hut 6s i 1 hovester 1995 © Staring S01 Techrologe with the Soviets o Four distinct tevels of co—meration possible detal1s belon s 1 t0ren taboratertes® El Perfotic meetings of a doint Us—Soriet working group 3 Permunent sitting Us—Sovtet verking groups 4 dntnt control of deployed systems o Oben abe Would pernit vistts to each others SOL research centers Cir ont lats ouch as Uiversort are already vtsiced by Soviet and — other foreisn scientists ye however do not get comarable access to Soviet faciiities Several ways to fplenant an open Tabs proposal —— Exchange of vistes by sctentists i —— Exhange or Personnel for specified perfots of time 7 dointlcoperated Teverstorfes speciol y aet up 1 — dotntly—ran RID progrars at established Tabs o Perfodic metings of a joint U5 Soviet working aroups Would meet on a reinlar tists 23 ttmes a wear Toictiontn sich ike the starotoy Consultative Conntzsion 06 wrich was established following the first SALT agreements Could be used to j —— Ofscass transition to defensive regime —— Discuss pregress tn research —— Raise concerns about developrents viewed as threatening I o Permanent sitting Us—Sorlet working graso s Would involve a neely establisned persorent bilateral institution witch could —— Hest in one country or another in both stmultareausly or in a mvtral third country —— be staffed ty both US‘and Soviet political aftitary and sctenttfic personnel —— Provide a frammwork for continuing inspection of research centers test factHities o detnt control ot Deptared Systems — could encorpass a variety of ‘Port fole artartezents Inc odthy Jotnttrcmmned control com lores Gould also tncluce participation by third partes —— Unttke first three options wich could be put into effect in near—zern and extend throigh RID phases of SOL this option appites only to a later time frame 10—18 years hence —TOP SEeREF orzorgms ___ 2222 —— f rorseren TOP SECRET o Medes for Possible US—Soviet Cooperation on SD —— Aga US—tanadtan fully—tntesrated joint comand the forces ond eariprent that take 16 up are dra from both countries operations are contueted jointly the Comunder—tn—Chief reports to the chief executives of both Canada and the U5 and fntettgence io snared at the comand on a daily bosts ee Attactmist 13 —— Apollo—Sorvs Tess Progran Officially begun after 1972 suentt Metine Mt toot Tests mo price resporait itty for the to working directly with Sovtet counterparts tn Acadery of Sciences State played backseat role Soviets had access to MMSA‘s system for progran documentation training technology and Industrial support 5 gtven core Tinited access ‘to Soviet facilities See Attachent 8 —— us—Sovtet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agrnementss Toehve separate agreatunes Teruften free Tre I doncireater sumait comeing broad spectrun of SHT Adstntstered by mary U56 agrnciis with weak coordination Soviets exptusized technology exchange Us sougt to focus on sctentific exchange to mintnize rise of technologr transfer See Attactvent C —— siisk Reduction Conters®s Senators Yur and Harner have proposed Ereation of tnese centers in kashington and Rosco they do not Currently exist so we have no experience with nis sore of arvengeseit« Rinctiors could tncluce exchange of inforsation adatnistrative support for Mgt—level meetings annual motings to rerie« operations See Attachnent 0 o of these Apolto—Squz probably provides best model for next 5—10 years diring the technotooy devetopnent phase of SOL progran —— Example of hist—techrolouy sharing progran tevaliing reat hardware Soriets probably got better deal 90—10 their favor even thoigh ve did not share our best nest advance space techrotour —— Political success for both sides sore so for Soviets —— Soviets st111 cite as a rade for future cooperation to space o 15 offers to share technology with the Soviets are not unprecedented fee Atachwent E I —— Sargch Plan 1946 proparal to put virtually alt muctear activity under tne megs of an Internationa authority Refected i by Sortets who went on to develop their oun atontc vedpons 2 toP sEoREr— l pr h ___ © «xue assess TOP SECRET » Atom for Peace 1952 Efserhower provosa which evolved into Anternationa1 Atone Enerar Agency IAEA which sonttors rith ntzed results production and noverent or ‘nuctear materials in order to prevent their diverston to military purposes —— ‘Open Sties® 1955 proposal by Eisenhower at Sunalt with Enrustchev in advance of U—2 maisen f1tgns to exchange Blueprints ‘of atlitary bases and allor reciprocal overt1igits without interference Russtans disnisset as a bald espfonage plots » Proposals could be inked to previous proposals for onsite Anspections tn this case though we are not just verifying that Hite Taine ihregal actiorly yoing on » Could also be linked to Canadian and French proposats for international verification or arms control e g PMISAT —— Gould tie open labs plan for SOL technolow to proposals for renmved co—cperation tn space Mgh—leve1 Soviet scientists have Been pushing fda of Joint spice ventures See Attachoent F —— One approach mtht te to turn tables on the Sertets Ask then what they need from us to convince them we are serious about S01 technology sharing o otter thoupts 1 —— Ue wil have to deal with the apparent disconnect betveen SOL technotow sharing and COCOA controls which could create problers with the Alttes c —— Problems of runitoring and verification wi11 sti11 exist ror—sesser — ___ 22222220