Deciasifed in Par — Santized Copy Approved fr Release 2012 0522 C RDPSOT0Ot14R0odecnseocor—s 9— Ale me 415 8° _6 a Filf m mee neSOY n g7—20125¢ @ om 3 orecronite or nrewusence ri8m_ L_ 2 Docemte our Soviet Perspectives on a New US—USSR Scientific Cooperation Agreement Summary Assuring the upcoming Washington summit goes well we expect the Gorbacher regime to pursue and perhaps attempt to necelerat talks leading o a new intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in basic selence We believe the Soviets have multiple objectives in secking such an agreement Support Gorbachev economic modernization program Enhance military capabilities Advance basic science Such an agreement would be an added step in improving Gorbachev‘ domestic and international reputation Gorbachev probably sees such an agreement as a means of further enhancing his image as a world leader interested in peaceful cooperation and able to deal effectively withthe United States on complex Issues asia While we are certain that from Moscon‘s perspective the benefits significantly outweigh the risks the Soviets probably are apprehensive about the costs of resuming scientific cooperation Their concerns probably focus on an agreement‘ implications for Continuing technologleal dependence on the West Giving the US access t the Sovit S T complex Potential transfer o science technology to the United States Possible defections of Soviet scientists jee At present discussions on a formal agreement restrict cooperation tothe basic sciences But we believe the Soviets are likely o push the boundaries toward engineering and industrial applications We expect them to use the definitional differences and ambiguities associate with the term basic science to promote thir Interests Moreover we are certain that their Intelligence ervices will expllt any agreement as they have in the past to acquire militarily significant US scientific know how and technology The Soviets know that their ability to stisy their objectives will depend not Just on how the terms of cooperation are defined bat also on how an agreement is implemented and its activities are subsequently managed 290 is m es Oticcticeitcns 251 TeeRFRRIRR TERR sagan ue ssose is nii Brcnoin br Con pte suena rnin BTR Zha sov ainsi 2581 2s 2s Dectassifed in Rat — Santized Copy Approved fr Release 201210522 C1—ROSOTOT 14Roodeooseo001—8 Decissifed in Par — Santized Copy Approved for Release 201210522 iR—RDP30Toot t4roonsooseo001 s asa Background Bilateral S T Cooperation During the 1970s i AAt the May 1972 Nicon Breshney summit in Moscow highlighted by the signing of the SALT I Trea the US and USSR concluded an Agreement for Cooperation inthe Fields of Science and Technology that covered a broad spectrum of actives n the basic and applied sciences This agreement was one of 11 bilateral agreements signed between the two countries in the early 1970s that provided the framework for expanded exchanges in various areas of scence and technology see table 1 During the 10 years in which the S T Agreement was in effect more than 1 000 US scientists participated in more than 400 organized activies and some 3000 publications resulted from these exchanges joe Soe ind Tesmnlat Gvoperiton Agreement Physs Merobicogy Chemica Cause Marotogy Bcince Paley Ecronetatirgy Corosion PotmerScinces Host and Mass Tanstr Banh Scinces 2a Expanded S T cooperation under these bilteral programs became a centerpiece of ‘US —Soviet relations a symbol of detente and a central element in Moscon‘s drive to obtain Western knowhow technology and credit to help modernize the Soviet economy The high point in bilateral cooperation was th rendervous and docking ofthe Apollo and Soue spacecraft in 1975 se Shortly thereafter cooperation began to fade with the cooling ofthe political limate and mounting US concern over the problem of the potential transfer to the Soviets of US technology Soviet inteligence services were exploiting the ilateralsto gain access t and asa Declassifed in Pat — Santized Copy Approved or Release 201210522 Ci RDP3DToor t4reonsodseoo0r e Beclasifed in Par — Santized Gopy Approved for Release 201210522 Ci RDPsotoot t4roooso0se0001 2 asa sequire miltary significant scientic know how and technology Paricpa— Poa tion i exchange programs also declined as indignation over haman rights abuses in the USSR treatment of dissidents restriction of Jewish emigration curbs on scientfic freedozms became an issue within the American scientic community In reaction o the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 Soviet complicit in the imposition of martial law in Poland and the KAL incldent the United States terminated or allowed to lapse several cooperative programs The United States then did not act to renew the basic S T Agreement when it expired in 1982 As a resul te level of oin S T activity fell and by the autumn of 1983 stood at les than one—fith of what it was in 1979 The number of formal agreements dropped from 1 to seven ars ‘US reviews of the exchange programs point to positve results for both sides in almost all scientific elds However there was also a general concern that the Soviets had not always lived up to the spirt of the agreement Reciprocity was lacking in terms of access to Soviet facilties and qualified scentits Overall the distribution of benefits from the agreement was heavily weighted towards the Sovit Union H9 As a consequence of the general understanding on exchanges reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva and Reyijavik sumit meetings interest in improving seentifi cooperation has been rekindled Over the past two years new cooperative programs have been intated and some old ones have been revitalized More importanty the Gorbachev egime has taken some steps to address what had been a major stumbling block from the US perspective the human rights fis Although many factors contributed to the sharp decline of cooperative efforts during the late 1970s and early 19805 the arrest and internal exile of Academician Andrey Sakharov in 1980 was the final extalystin the demise of oficial US cooperation in S T His recent release is one signal that Moscou now s eager to resume increased bilateral scientic exchanges fm asa Declassifed in Pat — Santized Gapy Approved or Release 20120522 GiR RDFSpron— raroonsonsenoo1 s Declassified in Par — Saniized Copy Approved for Release 2012105722 C1 ROPSTOPY14R000s00800001—8 aso On 5—6 October 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union held exploratory talks in Moscow on a new intergovernmental base science agreement notto be confused with the agreement between the US and USSR academics of sciences The Soviet delegation was led by officials of the State Committe for Science and Technology and included representatives from the USSR Academy of Siences The topics proposed by the Soviets lead us to believe that they are pursuing a mix of economic miltary and scientific objectives 2581 Soviet Objectives for a New Agreement in Basic Sciences Gorbachev is pursuing a new agreement to raise the quali and productivity o Soviet science and make it competitive with the West Whereas the previous agreements were based on a narrow perspective of modernization on the cheap with emphasis on technology transfer the present approach t an agreement reflects a commitment to revitalizing the Soviet S T establishment itself and then using this sector as a catalyst to modernize the Soviet economy see table 2 We belie the Soviets also hope that a new 1ound of scientic exchanges with the United States will enhance heir military capabilities advance basic science and improve Gorbachev domestic and international reputation 2591 New Materals Coroson Coals wang mantbrane Technology Intusra tases Besectnology #7 ntomaten Trecrteai Physics Mathomates Bolcoy Phoy Chemisty Heat Engnaeing Eath Sciances Irgesizpsonter 2581 asm Decassiied in Pat — Santized Gopy Approved or Release 20120522 C ROPSOTOPH 14R000200000001 3 asa — Support Economic Modernization Moscon‘s main objective for this cooperation agreement is in our opinion to focus activites on applied areas that are crieal for rapid S T advance Indeed the Soviet delegatio‘s entering position during the October iscissions was that cooperation should be both n basic ience and in applied technolo— gies—as was the case under the orginal SRT cooperation agreement Furthermore many of the topics proposed by the Soviets center on areas in which—by their own admision—the USSR appreciably lags behind the United States Gorbachev has made faster scientic and technological progress the linchpin of his economic revitalization program Such an agreement would support Gorbachev‘ strategy t use science to help modernize the economy and meet the technological challenge of the West Because of Gorbacher‘s SRT policy and strategies we believe the Academy of Sciences and the State Commitee for Science and Technology GKNT willbe unde tremendous pressure to push the boundaries of cooperation and avenves of actviy into applied areas see box The continued efforts ofthe Soviet delegation during the October 1987 talks to pres for applied topics despite ostensibly agreeing to US insistence on basic research tends to confirm our supicions s9a paramer unde he proposed agreements being rstuclied and reorari evards more eppled research and now technology development The Acadamy of Sciances athough sil the naton‘s Jeacing parma of basic researc is baconing increasingly more applcatons—ctertes Wit he Acar deparment hav boon erated and intsies reorganized or read ts spacatze n imeehintulitng processos actomaten ard compute scances zea anpled RKD row conises d to 50 parcen othe Acadary‘s os vork 2581 Also intieatve of Soviet intentions was their proposal that research be conducted wunder the auspices ofinterbranch scientific and technical complexes MNTKs to use the Declassfed in Par — Santized Copy Approved for Release 20121022 Ci ROPoOtooraronosooseo001 s Difassifed in Par — Santised Copy Approved or Release 201210522 iA Rops0root taroonsooseoo01 s ase Russian acronym As new nationalevel organizations the complexes are charged with spearheading the development of many ertcal new technologies Their esponsiblites span the research to production eyle Basic research is not the primary much less the sole forus of their mission The inclusion ofthese complexes under an agreement would serve to steer cooperation towards application oriented research J Ams Enhance Miltary Capabilities The Soviets are also keenly nterested in pursuing esearch areas and deriving scientific benefis that could have posible military applieat ons Many of their proposed topics forus on dual—use technologies and on research areas hat could improve Soviet defense production capabilities or weapons system designs — Some of the MNTKs that would head cooperative efforts are known to have tis t the defense industres or include institutes that conduct research under contact for the miltary While the Soviets will undoubtedly tyto exploit any agreement to enhance defense capabilites we do not believe this is the primary foree behind their negotiations To acquire sensitive cient information and COCOM—controlled technology they will more likely rely on an already aggressive programmed collection effort and wellestab— Hished acquisition mechanisms si Advance Basic Science There is genuine Soviet interes in negotiating an agreement to advance basic science but we do not believe that this is Moscow‘s primary objective ‘Under Gorbachev there is heightened concern about te status and direction of Soviet basic science There is a new appreciation of basi science as the source for fundamentally new technologies Moreover Gorbachev is determined to bring Sovict science up to world levels As one way to overcome its deficiencies the USSR is expanding its foreign S T cooperative effors Through an agreement with the United States the Soviets also hope to refurbish the international prestige as a world leader n basic esearch They also seek to better monitor trends and capabilities in US basic science The Soviets have traditionally Iitence taon ain tu vn a oats front prat ty te ti ams ase Declassifed in Pat — Santized Gopy Approved or Release 201210522 in Ropeotoo— taraonsonsenoot s Dectassifed in Par — Santized Gopy Approved for Release 201210522 C RDP30Toot14roonso0se0001 s asa used such information to develop forecast and prioitze their own scientific effort in both civilian and military areas ‘heir dependence on such information was lustrated ina recent Soviet press article which emphasized that they had fallen behind the West in membrane technology—an area proposed by Moscow for cooperation——because is re— searchers did not have access to what was going on in the West and therefore were notable to draw up realiti forecasts 2581 Obtain Political Benefits General Secretary Gorbachev would like very much to obtain a scientifi cooperation agreement with the United States during the remaining period of the Reagan adininistration when the two countries are making progress on arms control and other bilateral issues An agreement on scientific exchange with a President who has made denial of military related technology to the USSR a fundamental element of his foreign policy would help gain suppport for Gorbachev‘s foreign policy program among conservative elements in the Kremlin Gorbachev probably also sees the process of negotiating such an agreement as a means of enhancing his image asa world leader interested in peaceful cooperation Moreover he would lie to use an agreement and the improved politcal climate t increase access to the influential US scientif communiy 2591 Soviet Concerns 2591 published statements by Sovit poltical and scientific leaders indicate that they strongly favo a new round of scientic exchanges with the United States At thesame time there s good evidence suggesting that they also worry about the possible cost of resuming cooperative activites Based upon the experience of the 19705 theyare probably approaching a new agreement with a sense of pragmatism and asa 1 Declassifed in Rat — Santized Copy Approved for Release 201210523 Cis—RDPabtoor t4rooosonsco0or a Deciassifed in Par — Santized Copy Approved for Release 201210522 it—Rops0toot t4roonsoossooor s caution From Moscon‘s perspective the results ofthe past agreement were not all positive nor did they fully yield the expected benefits In general Soviet concerns likely focus on at Teast fou isues — Continuing technological dependence on the West US access to the Soviet S T complex Potential science technology los Possible defection of Soviet scientists esa S T Dependence on the West Although the Gorbachev regime has emphatically stressed that Soviet selentits be supplied information on Western scientic advances there isa concern that this scientic interaction can reenforce Soviet dependence on the West The leadership is worried about scientic and technological mediocrity and unneeded mimicry and Gorbachev has warned that catching up with the West should not be interpreted as copying the West By allowing Western trends and standards to dictte Soviet S T forecasting and determine future avenues and priority areas fo research Moscow fears relegating itself to permanent second place in developing new areas of science and technology During his April 1986 visit to East Germany Gorbachev caled upon ‘scientists designers and inventors to stop looking at average levels asthe guidepost abandon the position of imitation and direct your efforts at developing and producing fundamentally new products that willbe th best inthe world Party Second Secretary Yegor Ligacher n a November 1985 speech imilarl eriicized Soviet scientists for following the tracks of foreign researchers emphasizing that tis impossible not to see that while we go for whatis considered new today others move further shead and avay at the same time This immediately predetermines a technological Ig jn ‘US Access to Soviet S T Complex Moscow knous that the United States obtains access to institutions and scientists and earns a good deal about Soviet scientific asa beciassifed in Pat — Sanlized Copy Approved for Release 201210822 Cis RDpootooraronosmossono a Qeciassifed in Par — Santized Gopy Approved or Release 201210522 CR RDPS0TOD114R000R0ss0001 8 CoC Eu capabilities through the exchanges US participants gain information on specific research projects experimental results and how Soviet R D is organized and managed thi asa Possible Defection of Soviet Scientists The Soviets are clearly leery about the opportunites for defection or recruitment of Soviet researchers They protested loudly in December 1984 when Artem Kuli an Academy nuclear physicist defected while on an extended research vist t a US laboratory under the auspices of an exchange agreement As a resul the regime pushed for US assurances that such incidents would not be allowed asa peciassifed in Pat — Santized Cop Approved for Release 2012022 CiA ROPoOtoortaronosooseoo01 s Decassifed in Par — Santized Copy Approved or Release 201210522 CR Ropsproot taroonsoossoo0t s asa R to reoccur under future éooperative programs 2ex1 25x1 ‘Under the new arrangements whenever a top Soviet scientists invited t vst the United States he will be accompanied by a second scientist selected by the Soviets 2681 Moscow‘s Net Assessment The Soviet leadership almost certainly believes that the gains from a new agreement signifcanty outweigh the potenta losses given the USSR‘s technological lg They would clearly prefer an agreement that encompasses applications oriented research because this is where they are weakest and can obtain more immediate benefits Nevertheless in October the Soviet Union reluctantly accepted the US approach to restrict cooperation to basic science effecting their strong interest in an accord Even within such a framework — w asa Sovit leaders probably calculate that they can secure significant gains Indeed during the recent exploratory tals the Academy of Sciences foreign relations chief announced plans to double or triple the volume of scientic exchanges with the US National Academy of Sciences Moreover based on the perceived politcal benefit the Gorbachev leadership might enter nto a basic science agreement even before substantive areas are deined2 2591 2me ia ST agnenenvacupetston nece sona te nee atop asa 2581 10 Declassifed in Pat — Santized Copy Approved or Release 201210522 Cin RopapToot t4raonsoosenoot s Dédssifed in Par — Santied Copy Approved for Release 201210522 CiA RDP30T0D taronosooseono a asa A the same time the Sovits are likely to eck to push the boundaries of cooperation toward basic engineering and industrial applications We expect them to use the defintion al differences and ambiguities associated with the term basic science to promote thir interests The Soviets know that thir ability to satiy their objectives will depend no fst on how the terms of cooperation are defined but also on how an agreement is implemented and its activites are managed We expect that Moscow will ty to maximize its access to ey US scientic information and institutions While obviously concerned about US access to unique Soviet facilties and sensitive location —a major sticking point in past exchanges—Moscow may be more flexible on this issue The Gorbachev egime‘s new flexibility along these lines already evident in the drat arms control agreement may portend their wilingness to ease US concerns over reciprociy see asa a Dectassifed in Pat — Santized Copy Approved for Release 201250522 Gi ROPaotoot taroonsooseo001 2