f DECLASSIFIED Autnority NNbQl YoGZ Sy NARAD2te 1 ' I • - •- - - - d u 1- A f J J e 4 DEPARTMENT OF' STATE MEMORANDUM S 5 ATTACHMENTS From P Ronald I Spiers US-UK Nuclear Relations 1971 - · 1- CUL A • Captlon re ved '-t - -fi m'lflerer'red tc 0 fADRC Cat B • Tron o red le 0 fADRC ' NSSM 123 Tab E called for a rev o LIXW ca n t Ea r relations with the UK On July 1 we briefed you on the issues Tab D and the study which had been prepared in response to NSSM 123 Tab C The NSC Staff has now asked for agency views on the paper and the policy options contained therein Tab B We find the report satisfactory Because we do npt wish to restrict the nuclear cooperative program with the UK unless there are overriding political reasons we - believe that we should support sub-option 2b which pro vides for maximum flexibility in executing the program but a case by case review of any potentially troublesome issues ·As brought out in the briefing we believe that it is particularly important in the period ahead that Defen e keep the Department abreast of those · operational aspects of the cooperative nuclear progi aJJwu ·i n ---- h h h l NOD S REVIEW w ic may ave politica overtones ecoromendati ns sub-option 2b tJ r i' • a r tlon oomoved 1- --1 '- • rred to 0 FADRC to P FADRC P '7iewed by li --- - Di sap D o · - J 1 ' - ' '------ - - --·· •' I DECLASSIFIED · I Authority 1v tJ h9 b YO bl Sy i G_ NARA D2te ahJH TOP SECRET SENSITIVE b Approve the attached Eliot to Kissinger Memorandum Tab A Approve ____ _ Disapprove ____ _ Attachments Tab A Tab B Tab C Tab D Tab E - Eliot Kissinger Memorandum - NSC Memorandum of July 2 - NSSM 123 Report Briefing Memorandum of June 30 NSSM 123 TOP SECRET SENSIT°IVE WITH RD ATTACHMENTS ' ' Drafted PM AE JTKena ick bpw 7 8 71 _a x20620 Concurrences L PM - Mr Fields l EUR -Mr Hillenbrand1' draft ' TOP I DECLASSIFIED Aut 1ority JL qb 9057 Sy NARA D2te 6 SECRETl TIVElNop s MEMORANDUM FOR MR HENRY A KISSINGER THE YUlTE HOUSE Subject Department of State Posi tion on Response t o NSSM 123 -- US-UI Nuclear Relations The Department of State is eatisfied with the study on US-UK NL1clcar Relations response to NSSM 123 as drafted The Departme11t favors sub option 2b page 39 The Department recomt euds that the supplementary a c tion outlined under Operational Considerations pages 40-42 be carried ottt The Department of State fully endorses the program of cooperation wi th HMG on Super Antelope it realiz es how ever that there may be ome aspects of t he program as the study points out which would be ill•timed and have adverse political impact during the forthcoming period It is for this reason that the Department whi le not wishing to interfer e with the operational aspects of the project suppor ts establishment of a coordination process that will bring t o its attention in timely fashion those British requests or elements of the program which may h- ive political implications J 4 Jr V '4t '-' 1heoQore L Eliot Jr r-- 1' s Drafted PM AE JTKendrick bpwEY ecutive ecretary 7 8 71 x20620 ' ft Concurrences b f e• - b PM - Mr S iers L PM 1 ···-n 1 i · v7 EUR _ M Rille brand l ' _ Mr Irwin r' _OP SECRET SENS TIVE NODIS PIES TO PC M ACTION S S-S i1r2 - •· · DECLASSIFfED Auttiority tJNbQb Y061 - f NARA D2te 7109984 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON O C 20S0S NODIS July 2 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Under Secretary of State John N Irwin II Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H Moorer · Director Central Intelligence Richard Helms US-UK Nuclear Relations NSSM 123 ·Attached is the study on US- UK Nuclear Relations prepared by the Ad Hoc Group in response to NSSM 123 In order to prepare for early decisions on this issue may we please have written agency views on the paper particu larly the·options by close of business Thursday July 8 Attachment cc Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Chairman Atomic Energy Commission TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NODI S A ' l V1 - DC PARTMENT OF STATE fm e 7 5 d l JUN 8 O 1971 To The Under Secretary From PM - Ronald I Spiers US-UK Nuclear Relations Background · NSSM 123 Tab D called for a review of our nuclear relations with the UK with particular emphasis on Super Antelope a program to assure the survivability and penetrability of their Polaris system against Soviet ABM's When the British request for assistance in this field first oecame known last February we outlined in a memorandum to you some of the approaching problems Tab B Subsequently Mr Packard submitted to Dr Kissinger a b ief report on the program · Tab C The attached _draft report Tab A in response to NSSM 123 has· been prepared by State AEC Defense and ACDA at the working level It has of course not yet received policy level review and approval of the respective agenc es I intend to forward the report to the NSC staff in order that it can be scheduled at an early date for the SRG at which time formal agencies views can be set forth Major Issues The principle issue requiring an early decision is how we should respond to a UK request for technical advice and assistance in upgrading their Polaris system They also want continued access to US underground nuclear tests in - order to expose ·UK hardware samples and possibly the use of US flight test facilities The extent and nature of - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD • I I ' l DECLASSIFIED I Authority tJNh9b Yob Sy £ _ _ NARA D2tellhJ N -1 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD 2 the assistance we are able to provide thus has both mili tary and political significance Although the British are only asking our assistance through the Project Definition phase it is probable that they will seek further US support of some kind in develop ment production and testing once they decide to proceed beyo d Project Definition Should they do so this would have important longer range implications for our relations with the British the F rench NATO and insofar as it may have a bearing on SALT we have previously consi•dered the possibility of a no transfer provision on US-USSR relations While we in State do not believe that the SALT issue will be a major stumbling block with the Soviets ACDA may well ·take a more jaUndiced view of continuing US-UK cooperation · US-UK cooperation in the nuclear field has a long history and this most recent request of the British is but a continuation of past work and commitment in the field ' As a pr ctical matter all agencies agree and the response to the NSSM makes clear that we do not have a good alterna tive to continued technical assistance to Super Antelope To refuse to go forward would cause a major change in US-UK relations which is not warranted At the same time· the UK request does represent a new plateau in our relations The British Government has rna de a decision to proceed with Super Antelope up to this point HMG has simple been ex ploring alternatives and as suggested previously we may well find ourselves inextricably drawn into new and more far reaching efforts to assist her to keep her nuclear forces viable An examination of continued US-UK nuclear relations raises fundamental questions of how US interests are affected by the development of third country nuclear forces in Europe and thus the direction of our future European nutlear policy Assisting the British in Project Definition of Super Antelope will continue and solidify our relationship with them in the nuclear field At the same time this cooperation may make it more difficult for the British to move toward a European Force assuming it were in our mutual interest for them to TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD 3 do so As long as Britain rel es on our technology and assistance she is less likely to look to cooperative E ropean efforts In addition we would have Congres sional problems in pennitting her to share technology gained from us with other NATO states The paper records a consensus of the Ad Hoc Group that_ -- it is not in the US interest to terminate abruptly the present cooperation with the British to reverse our course would undoubtedly have a major adverse impact on our relations with the UK -- there are no compelling needs at this time for the US to ·develop a finn position on the question of a future European Nuclear Force · There are still too many imponderables before we can or should try to reach such a decision -- ·our interests ·would seem to ·be best served by pursuing a course which would give us the greatest assurance of being able to hedge any major decisions for several years Such a course would presumably permit us to continue to cooperate discreetly with the UK on Proj ct Definition of Super Antelope If our cooperation with the British were accompanied with too ·much fanfare it is conceivable that the SALT negotiations could be affected as well as stimulate French second thoughts about UK integra tion into the Europe n Community For the above reasons we favor Option 2 a of the report which calls fo a rather tight control on the cooperative projects and a low public visibility Several secondary but not unimportant issues largely of an operational nature emerged from this exercise One is the degree to which State should appropriately be in volved in the evolving nature of this relationship with the UK Because of the potentially significant political implications we believe it essential to ensure that in TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD • • • ' - •c- 11 1• • •• - - •• • • • • • - - • • •• 1 1 1' I' ·· • _ ' l I Ott LA 1i-1tu Au nority N N b9 b 1067 Sy iL _ NARA D2te ahJH TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD 4 future programs with the Britis h we keep abreast of developments coordination has not been adequate hereto fore in order that w are better able to assess the political consequences of particular proposed actions We believe these assurances of coordination are written into the paper The second issue concerned the question of an approach to the British at the political-level HMG decided at the Ministerial level t o proceed with Super Antel ope and to ask for US assistance Contact with the US has so far been limited to the defense technical level While we agree that our formal reply should be made through defense ·channels we be lieve that the issue has political overtones We accordingly have taken the position that assuming the decision is made to continue cooperation we should confirm to the British at ·the diploma tic level that an explicit · governmental decision has been made to approve the British request Not only would this underline that on our side we recognize the significance of the cooperation we are pursuing but •it would also provide an opportunity for us ' to point out for the record that we assume the British realize we can accept no responsibility for success or failure since we have not participated in the formulation of the project There is apparently still a reasonable doubt among our scientists about the merit of the British approach and a disjoiner of responsibility at this juncture might protect us from possible British ire in the event of a failure DOD was for a long time reluctant to have State discuss this matter in any form with the Foreign Office but has now agreed to incorporate this point in the paper We would be glad to discuss the above issues with you prior to transmitting the paper to the NSC staff Attachments See attached sheet TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD I 1 -- l 1 _ · - • • -- ••- •- - •••- •••• fr o I ' • I 'T' ·- --· ·- -··-· ·-· ------ -·-- _ ' 11-41'1i-· ---··· -- -- DECLASSIFIED Aut 1ority N Nb9b YOGI 6y NARA D2te TOP EGRET SENSITIVE RD Attac hments Tab A - NSSM 123 Response Tab B - Memorandum dated February 17 Tab C - Letter from DepSecDef Packard to Mr Kissinger of March 25 with Fact Sheet Tab D - NSSM 123 April 17 T Drafted PM AE JTKendrick S PC SWeiss bpw 6 30 71 x20620 · Concurrences EUR BMI - Mr Burns EUR RPM - Mr Humphreys TOP SECRET SENSITIVE RD 5 ' I ucvl hvv111L 1 1 I Authority tJ qb 100 Sy i L_ NARA 02te P840U8C -041 NSSM 123 Report S S 7109914 TAB D PIES TO I DECLASSl -ltU I Au l orily N Mb 10 _ _ Sy iLNARA D2teahd _ ·· · · t-' tJ 41 0 U d 7 u 1- · •• · • 1 • • · • • • • t N' t'ION l SECUl ITY COUNCIL W 1·111- C TON D C 20 0G TOP SECRJ T SENSlTJVE April 1 1 971 _ I · r r C ' • I - C -• 1 '' • f u ---· TO A CTION The Secretary of State The Secretary of Dc ens e Director o Central Intelligence UR PC S SUBJECT US- UK Nuclear Relations S-S -· l· I The President has directed that a study be prepared to review current is sues of nuclear cooperation with Great Britain In particular the study should address 1 The extent to which we arc already committed to assist'the UK in improving its strategic nuclear fo1 ce under existing agreements 2 The implications of US assistance io the British in their efforts t o irnprove the capability of theil' p esent Polaris sysiem s through 3 the 11 project definition phase 11 The long run im plicalions for the US of a deeper involvem ent in the UK effort to develop and deploy an improved Polaris system i ncluding an asscss1ncnt of British strategic obJectives and a possible future UK request for· MIRV technology ··- This study will be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group cornprising representative l- of the addressees and the NSC staf f a'nd chaired by the Chairinan of the NSC f Intcrdepartm cntal Political Milii uy Group The completed study which - will be consjde red by the Senior Review Group should be forwarded to the -- Assistant io the Pre sident for National Security Affairs not later than May 1 O ' ·--7fr --7 -- · · Henry A Kis sin3cr cc Ch 1irm n Joint Chiefs of Staff _ TOP _ SECJ T SEl 'Sl T J VF' _____ -·--- --- ·- ·-·- ·--··--