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Telephone numbers for he offce are TO3 167—4274 or DSNRE $274 bo NoT RETURN ThIs Document To DTIC eacH activity is resronsise ror pestRuction or Thls DOCUMENT ACCORDING TO APPLICABLE REGULATIONS wok I 53 ‘ 4 1 MEMORANDUM ratssoorsa MoM f THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS AN ANALYSIS U M H Statpocts pre pm a arie nate im a mage Binn teminPIn Ret ented inamctntetynna nytt Poe e a ron mn antna ith ar adam unlit o te Mevriton atea nthe negro a eprundeg Ahad pate o ly ote Dpunentol Beinn O rasa romans fran am ietneloron ermm ri ion te mori nmin nt _——————————————»RANDevae moupes inaerroam powpen i MAIOAIS o SECRET f UNCLASsiFiEp F «au to weysgne _ This study undertaken by RAND for the Office of the Auststant Secretory of Defense International Security Mftatzs represents an attempt to enlarge our knculedge of ertets management and the control of Latted wae I sttuations The present edition of the study ts a condensation thit offers an annotated but conpressed chronology of « i events together with an analysis of the Tetven Strats artete and of its lessons for those concerned vith ertets management The detailed history of this cristo has been reserved for another publication now in preperation which will offer a unique collection of date gleaned from a great variety of sources offictal and othervise The study focuses prinazily on Asertcen decteton niking and Anerica‘s relations with tts Chinese Nettonalist alltes stzply because of the relative scarcity of matertals os Chinese Communtat dectaton saking and on Stno—Boviet relations Many of the date for this study pertfculerty on Communtat behavior cone from unclassified sources Including Weatern and Comuntst newspapers and Communist radio broadcasts In addition the author has examined U 8 governsent clausifted files in verious agencies in Washington Including the Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense te has also consulted materials at CINCPAC headquarters and the Tetuan Defense Command tn Tetpet as well as unclassified materfal tn the Dulles collection at Princeton University Host of the Anestcan dectoton makers fovolved in the etete e a cuse 4 ——— ygst —— 8 five have been pessonslly nterviewed Thee request for ‘ anoupnity has been honored The interviews vere zelted upon mataly to recall noods and fapressions during the erteis and vhere possible to £111 gaps in the story whenever the documents themselves vere incomplete As 1s generally the case the menores of those interviewed vere sometimes hazy as to the details of vist had taken place 1 — —— sueure Apart from ts historical interest the Tetven Straits erfeie of 1958 1s rich in fnplcations for those Anvolved in crtets managesent It points up for exeaple the Eroublescoe problem of assessing the political corte of giving up territory that has 1itele or no aflitery value The difficulty of this essessment led the United States in 1958 to play 1t safe by overesshostzing the consequences of losing Quemoy to the Chiness Communtats 1 Por both Peking and Washington of course the reel 1 Lame vas not the fate of Quesoy but the future of Tetuen Waited States policy on Quency and other off—shore talaods was not at first clear to the Chinese The Comuntats t therefose entarked on a probing operation to test the I strength of the U 5 comsttsent to defend Quesoy In response to Comtat pressure the United States took the Line that Tatwan‘s security depended on the retention of Quemay This posttion encouraged the Nettonatts leadership to hope for Lerger—scale U 8 action in support i of theis atas i Although the Chinese Mattonattst government fatted i to draw the United States into a major military confronts f ton with the Comunist mainland At did rueceed to a wirprising degree in influencing U 8 poter This tendency was offeet to soue extent by the skill with which local U 8 military leaders exercised for political ands the authority delegated to then by the civil adatnte tration in Washington nmmeenmvennremmmvnnmenmnmemmmrnncrcmmmnussmummemcemme seores UNCLASSIFIED ove I Contrary to the optatons of some scholars the Tetuen I ctiets does not provide incontestable evidence of a clash between Moscow and Peking Indeed t vas probably one F of the ast instances of close Stno—Soviet cooperstion in International political manewvering i 1 I I amet nosA® —— — »»dlf Sre wine 5 acoromsmnonts The author ts grateful to those public offictals both retized and stl on active doty who took time fem thet busy schedules to discuss with him the events of the Quenoy erate with vitch they were commseted Aclnouledgment should also be made to officals vio made available to the author the files in viich such of this research was done The author # pertfcularly indebted to Me Jacob van Stasveren who had veitten a previous study of the 1958 crtsts for the Att Force Matortcal Office and generously shared vith the author his knowledge of the existe and sources of docmentation Finally the author wishes to acknoutedge the generous asststence received from u largo number of people at RAD Any attempt to mentfon all of thore sho have commented in one form or another on vertous deafts or vho have othervise asstated in the study would produce a very long Let However special mention shoutd be made of Alexander George wh read the sinuscript at an early point in fts develop— ment and provided the author with a lerge sunber of extremely keen insights that have helped eubstanctally to shape the tnat product P Smamrmmemee mend one mesnprenennn m m nitoene $ ncuassnED 1 _ ees INC AsciriEp i nore on reeanoroot I Tos slends which come under atteck in August 1958 eze referred to by the Chinese Mattonaltats as well as by the I American nilitary as the Kinsen Telands Hovever in accordance with the Depaztsent of State OSD and general I public usage the tem Quenoy‘ to exployed throughout the study The Queney Ieland chain constate of Mg Quemcy j Ltttla Quenoy Te—ten Esh—ten ond severel emalies Sslands 1 The term Quency is used to refer both to thie stogle S Astand of Bg Quenoy and to the entire sland chain The reader should have no difficulty in detemninng in context wit is meant The povernsent which controls Talvan and the Offshore Telends 1s called the Covernment of the Republic of China GRC the term frequently used pertfcu larly within the Dopertment of State Its nore common public designation tho Chinese Netfonelists 1s also 1 exployed The goverment controlling the matoland of China 1s spoken of staply as the Chinase Communtats or wien quoting Comuntat sources as the People‘s Republic of Chine PRC Other abbreviations and deetgnations used are spelled out the first tine they appeet in the text aP _ UNCLASSIFIED iA 3 nonnncnomncnenenern n nm rmmmntone ide Be iecosicccc hetst UNCLASSIFIED mai» Pop nk a ebdonks commits AGHIOMLEDMRNTE cscs ccccecceccccrvemmencencccns Md Section 1 TB USS MIE soc occemnnencn 1 The Criste Erupts ‘The 0 5 Decision to fnitmem olenmunrmntittinindt f The Chinese Communist Prote August 23—91 4 The 0 5 Dectaton to Escort c cnncecens 5 Toe Chinese Commcntsts Reassess Their Sdieieep nnmnennerpnnerdarielentoades 4 The U S Decision to Defend Quemy ncccccn0 6 The Prolonged Blockade — Comotat Noves September 7—0ctob0r 6 «oorcccccnncecnc 8 Tha Prolonged Blockade Reaction on Taiwan ast is the S161 comme iPtiidrces $ The Prolonged Blockade Public Debate and Dectaton Making u u seum nieee cence — 10 Tha Chinese Communist Censefize itoter 6 12 The Ceasefize Portod tn Washington and MeSH nevnsmcnrnceneceoeneneccerieren once — 38 11 me foiet 0 MB CSIS L acces — 13 Chinese Comuntat Perspective on the Crisis 13 Sino—Soviat Relations s uc0 cc e000 0000 0000 39 otc rerspectives on the Celets ccu2ccccc000 — 30 Anatican Perspectives on the Crits «c 34 111 ressons ror caters MGGB®t use cess 39 The Relation of Militery Means to Political B8e renee tninpreinenmataiiniense $8 Comunteating with the Enemy oucouccnccccnos — 46 Alttence Problems «oc ucccncnennrcoccnc cns — $2 Delegation of Authority to the Wilitesy — 37 Expaneton Problems and Incentives s 60 os #A d f C I — z 1 Pe mtussne C f 1 m casts my ster The first sign of a possible cetets in the Tetwan Straits cane on June 30 1958 when the Chinese Communtats desanded a reaueption of the Sino—Aserfcan esbansadorial talks The test a litary action come in late July in the form of alr clashes over the Tetwan Strafts and the Chinese mainland During July the Chinese Netfonaltats began to anticipate a Comunist cove against the Offshore Islands Urging the United States to cout ftself publicly to the defense of the Offshore Islands they also sought sodern equipment for their arsed forces Sncluding the delivery of American Sidevinder mtasties While the United States refused to fssue a public statement indicating thet t vould defend Qenoy tt did Increase its militery ssstatence to the Government of the Republic of Chine GRC and began intenatve contingency planning for a cctate in the Totwen Straits The basic policy of the American government was that it would help defend the Offahore Islands only 1f necessary for the defense of Telwan American officials in the field how ever were authorized to assist the ORC in planning for the defense of the elands and saumed that nucleas wergons would be used to counter anything but very Light probing by the Chinese Comuntate In early August officials in Meshington becsne con— cerned with the possibilty of a erfets although they did not expect the Chinese Communtate to Launch a major ntlitary attick Duzing that sane wonth a consensus j developed that a high—tevel dectaton should be made as to — path __ foo C WCSFAD —— i age UNCLASSiFiE H a sos whet the Anerfcan reaction vould be to an atz—ses inter diction coupeign ageinst the Offshore Islands There vas also strom pressure for a diplomatic warning to the Chinese Commtats that the United States would not toler ute the fall of Query I On August 22 it was decided Just below the prestden— tia level that the United States would perticipite tn the defense of the Offshore Tslands 1f they cass under i attack Tt was agreed that as an atteopt to deter a Chinese Comunitat move a publMc statement clarifying the American position would be Lesued in the form of an exchange of letters between Secretazy of State Dulles and Representative Thomas Morgan me carers exvers me u s pectstou to tirexms On August 23 1958 at 6 30 p m Tawen time the Chinese Comuntats leunched a heavy artillery attick against the Queney Zelands Although anttoipated by a nosber of planners the attack provoled a reevaluation of Amercan policy toverds the Offshore Islands During the weekend of August 23 and 24 offictals in the Pentagon and the State Department worked on position papers for a meeting to be held at the White House on the 25th The bast position paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff like most of the subsequent pajers was prepared in the politfeat—aflitary section of the Office of the Chief of Navel Operations Urging the United States to dnvolve Atself in the defense of the Offshore Islands this paper stated bluntly that although fofttal operations might have to be conventional for poltttcel reson Fporcs 4 UNCLASSIFIED atonte stzikes against the Chinese mataland vould eventually be necessary 1f the Chinase Communist move was to be stopped affectively and quickly At this meeting approval was atven to the Navy paper authorizing CHICPAC to reinforce Anercan capsbility and to prepare to escort supply ships I to the Offshore Islands CLICPAC vas also authorfzed to 1 prepare to assist o the event of a major assault agetest Quemoy Avare of the problems that vould artee 1f the Chinese Netfonalists vere to know the full extent of the American counttment to the Offshore Telands Weshington I ordered the Taiwan Defense Commander not to inform the I CiC of planned Anerfcan moves Tt was also decided that American interests in the Offshore Islands vould be i Mintted to the folends of Big and Little Quesoy and the 1 five larger islands in the Natsu chain American officials on avai and Tetwan approved of Weshington‘s decisions taking exception only to the j possibility that intefal actfons might have to be comven— £ tons CINCPAG responded by ordering his subordinate t commanders to prepare a conventional—veapon annex for the exteting operations plan At the same time in the lest week of August American aflitary actions in the Tefen I Straits and in the Paz Rest in general were substantially stepped up as a means of communicating Avericen deternine tion to the Chinese Comuntate The Chinese Nettoneliate who vere reacting favorably to the steps taken by the United States contloued to press for a publ statement that America vould regard an attack on Quenoy as an attack i on Taiwan They also asked for an American como to i Quemey and stand—by authority for the Taiven Defense —— sre —— mus ‘% % UNCLASSIFIED w 14 Commander to participate in the defense of Quemoy in the — event of an all—out Chinese Communat assault By August 28 American officials in the field were reporting that the exiticel fsase was the supplying of Quenoy aod attention then came to be focused on this problen me cummse cosmntst FAoSE Wupust 23—31 ‘The Chinese Conmintst attack began with the tring of some 40 000 shells agatmst the Quenoy Tslands on August 23 1958 The dnital fixe was directed at a ceremony welcoming the Chinese NatLoosMst Defense Mintater to Quency Following this the Chinese Comntats by a coubtnation of artillery fire and PT boat action succeeded tn preventing any Landing of supplies ustil Anertcon escorted convoys began to sail on September 7 Artiliery fire remained heavy during the first tvo weeks of the exists and was directed mataly at Ancouing comoys At the seme tine a nusber of ate engagements took place tn which the Chinese Motfonattats very quickly demonstrated theis superfority over the Chinese Coomntats Dustng the first two weeks o€ the cttats Chinese Communtat propaganda tended to play down the events in the 1 Tatven Straits The People‘s Daily staply reported what vas in fact taking place Soviet propiganda folloved the I sese line by denying that a major crisis vas occurzing The Chinese Communtats however did begin to been a serine of redto brosdcasts at Quenoy calling upon the I gartison to eurrender and warning that 1t wes cut off and Asotazed oe e I 2 NCLASSIFIED me u s peorston to scout tt Following the dectston to prepare for escort and the ® — tacit dectston that the United States vould defend the Offshore Islands planning in Weshington focused on moves for daterzing a Chinase Comtat fnverton of Quenoy Toa governsent also began to fesue a series of public i atatements strongly suggesting that the United States I would be dnvolved in the defense of Quemoy Concern even came to be expressed at high—level meetings thet the Chinase Netfonalsts might not be dotng ell they could to deal with the ettuetion and might Andeed be trying to pull the Datted States nto a major ver with the Chinese Commntate A second meeting at the Vite House on August 29 authorized Anerican escorts for GRC convoys to within three ailes of Quenoy This decision was immediately disclosed to the GRC and plans vere made for euch coomeying me cutis coesmtors aenssess mein snwreet Intense Chinese Communist military action egetast the Offshore Islands begen to taper off early in Septenber The Netfonalists increasingly confident that the United States would undertake escort operstions begin to I reduce aubstantially their efforts to resupply the Islands At the seme tine the Chiners Comunitat brought thet artillery action to a virtual cessefice after September 2 Chinase Commnet propaganda continued to play dom the criste but did begin to report sous critt etem of the American posttion in the West On September 4 Inronecoemcrmmnncemeeremenmmsemabnnmnmnnmmnesommnncmemmuew 1 UNCLASSIFIED I pge I UNCLASSIFIED I «s the Chinese Comuntate announced thete claim to a tvelve— wile Lintt which would put a11 of the Offshore Islands I withtn thet territorial waters On September 5 Pravda acated in an Observer article that the Soviet Unton coutd not stand Adly by 1f things happened on the frontier territory of tts great ally and thet an attack on the mainland would cause the Soviet Union to help the Chinese Comuntats On September 6 Chinese Comuntst I Prenter Chou En—laf fasued a public statement offering to if reopen the Sino—American anbassadorial talks The Chinese Communist People‘s Datly devoted most of its front page to Chou‘s statement and thereafter began to publicize the I developing ertets Mesmviiie the Metnland Chines Anougureted a serfes of public meetings calling for the Aiberetion of Tatwen me u s pectsron zo perm ouror I Auericen officials hoped that increased American aiiitary action in the Teiwan Straits including the escort of 6C supply vessels to within three attes of Quesoy as well as Averican public statements would i alleviate the ertee by both deterzing a Chinese Comntat dnveston and breaking the blockade The series of American statesents publicly expressing 0 8 dntersst in keeping Quemoy out of Chinese Comntst hands reached a climax after Secretary Dulles not with President Etsenhover at Newport Rhode Island In a fomal statement the American governzent anoounced that the security of Taiwan had becose increasingly related to the defense of Quezoy Following thin statement Dulles held a press briefing Sreaer ___ woussrt — enon amaeee e incuissinen —— u tn which he went very for tovard making cleas the American deterntoatton to defend Quenoy Voile marking time in thet efforts to resupply the Telands the GRC began pressing the United States for per— mteston to boub the matnland and for greater Amertcen dnvelvenent n the cstets Anerfcen officials on Tetwen f urging restraint on the GRC went forverd with plans for an escorted convoy scheduled to set sal on Septesber 7 On September 2 Dulles net with meabers of the Jotat Chief and other top officials to formulate the baste American postion in the crisis and to define Anerican policy in the event of a Chinese Communist favaston of the Offshore Telands At this meting there ves consider— able debate on the question of to what extent Quenoy could be defended without nuctear weapons and on the more R geners1 question of the wisdon of relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence The consenaus reached vas that the use of nucteas weapons would ulttmately be necessary fer the defense of Qsesoy but that the United States should Lint itself nftlally to using conventional forces Tos next meeting on Septeabe 3 authorized a formal peper urging the President to agree to an Anerican defense of the Offshore Islands At the sase tine it wes recognized that 1t wes inportent to make unnatalably clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States vas prepared to fntarvene in order to deter a possible Chinese Communtst move Following this Eisenhower met with Duiles at Newport and then the President returned to Washington for another Shite House consultation on the erfete This meeting considered a paper prepared by the ¢ I — I mnminrsrmmmmmmmires curtsy Jet o Meinrpramesonnrmenmithsdan ‘UNCLASSIFIED i S UNE «% er Classifigy Jotnt Chiafs on proposed American policy in the event of a Communtat nvaeton of Quenoy At the White House meeting on September 6 the A President authorfzed the Joint Chiafs to asploy Asertcen conventional forces in the event of a major assault on the c Offshore Islands Mucteas weapons vere to be used only with the Prestdent‘s persteston mm reovorcen moceaves commtnitor MOVES Septenber 75 october 6 3 On the morning of September 7 the first U S I escorted Chinese Netfonalst comoy set out for Quenoy The comvoy beached in Lao Bay without Anterference and 1 with no Chinese Commnist axtillery fie The beaching operation however was so inept as to led the Tetwen Defense Command to propose a halt in convey operations © t unti1 techniques could be corrected The Chinese Hetton— 2 altsts resected this delay and o September 8 the second convey set out with a reduced escort Tvo hours after the comoy reached the beach the Chinese Comuntats opened fixe with a heavy baszage that prevented the land tng of any supplies Through the month of September the Chinase Nattonelists sent to Quesoy a series of Anerican— escorted convoys that cave under moderate to heavy Commu nat artillery fire and until late n the month succeeded in Landing only very small quantities of supplies Atterpts vere also mide to land supplies by aerial drop a technique that also Snproved in late September Several ate battles enaued in viich the Chinese Nattooaliats ustng the American Sidewinder mtastles merkedly outcleased the Chinese Communists and destroyed a number of MGs e — — snmnene momma nor cerunsomcer oe eneenmeemecne commeemenmsemnemren on n anes f pmontr UNCLASSIFIED Chinese Comunitat propaganda foreign and donentic h focused on the exists during Septenber and easly October i $ On Septenber 8 Soviet Preier Rhrushchey in a letter to f President Eisenhower gave strong support to the Chinese Comuntat position An attack on China he werned vould l be considered an #cteck on the Sovtet Unton and the H Soviets would do everything to defend the security of both states Rhrushchev also argued that the Chinese Comuntat opecation against the Offshore Islands vas a f purely internal affefz During this period the‘Chinese began to fesue a series of verntogs against Aserican Intrusion into Chinese Comtat tercitory a serfes M it they have continued into the present In atd—Septesber Chinese Communist propaganda appeared to be atmed at minintzing the consequences of thet failure to take Quemoy and at the sese time at exacerbating US—GRC # relations On September 19 Khrushchev sent a second I letter to Etsenhover werning that a world waz vas possible I and that the Soviet Unton vould honor fts comttoents to Comuntat Chine The letter was rejected by the Anericon i governsent I ai€_eroroierh sloowibe reaction on remit n ti ne nus From Septenber 7 to October 6 the GRC with U 8 military asststance and convoy support greduelly taproved tts ability to land supplies on Quenoy It also conttnued to press for greater United States Anvolvement in the extate and for perntesion to boub the matatand le GMS offictals still affirmed thet they vould try to honor bromo oof __ I UNCLASSIFIED ® lke UNC ASYIAED __ their comitment to conult the United States before attacking the matnland they stressed that atticks on the mataland might be necessary Apparently the GIC wes utill trying to manipulate events so as to draw the United States into a greater ailitery fovolvenint against the Chinese Comuntate U S officials in the field attempting to develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemay sought to afd the ORC resupply effort and to demonstrate to the Chinese Comunate that the United States would be involved in the defense of the I Offshore Zelands In addition military officers vere engaged in crash planning for possible lerge—seate comven— tonal operstions in the Taiwan Straits This contingency planning produced a bitter reaction asong some officials I who felt that large—scale conventional cpersticns vere unresltstic mme rrotoreeo mocwine _ résute remus wo pecrston mane During September public opposition to Anerfcen dnvolvement in defense of the Offshore Zstands continued to sount in the United States and abroad American offt« cials were avare of this opposition and felt constrained by dt The United States sought to aniver its critics in a series of public statements and to warn Peking that the United States vould be nvolved in the defense of Quesoy In a major address on September 11 President Etsenbover Indicated that Quenoy would not be pernitted to full There vas considerable uncertainty to Weshtngton during Septesbez as to whether or not the Comntst blockade could be beoken by Anertcan—escorted comoys sees s NLMSSEEY Is A mil Evie memang cog ne nape pou ete rors $ % i 25 wclassins ane $ f 5 During this petted some attention ves given to the posst« bility of a negottated settlement Proposele to deat1i 4 tarize the Offshore Telonds originating o the highest office of the State Depaztsent met with considerable skepticism from lover State Department officals and from tha Navy But Anertcan officials vere generally agreed both on the need to defend the Offshore Islands in the event of assault and etso on the need to explain publicly the Anertcan position At the sane tine a consensus was developing that the Chinese Netfonalists were seeking to deag the United States into a mefor military clash and that these efforte had to be restated The question of whether or not the blockade could be beoken becane of considezable tnportence in Weshington dectston making By September 25 Anerican officials had coneluded that the blockade could be beoken and that there was no need to pussie a diplomatic course toverd a % political settlement Following Chou En—lat‘s public statement on September 6 urging reopentag of the Stno—American talks the United States publicly reaffirmed tto willingness privately conveyed to the Chinese Communists prior to August 23 to resuse the telks at an exbassedorial level After sooe futher negotiations with the Chinese Commu nists as vell as the Chinese Nectonatiets U S Asbassador Jacob Bean held the first of the renaved Uersav taike with Chinese Comuntat Asbassador Heng on Septeaber 15 Ducing this and subsequent seetings the United States pressed for a censefize in the Tatvan Streite vile the Chinase Communists denanded that the United States with— draw from the Taiven aree f pntemmiraims carom 1 ivan f Aaa l c NCSS ssessr 2 _ ane ane rue comms coomter Coaserint october 6 dss £ O October 6 1958 tn a zadto broadcast from Peking the Chinese Communist Defense Mintster eanounced that A there vould be a one—weck consefize if the United Scates ceased to escort GIC comoys Chinese Commntat atittmy fire did in fict come to a halt Polloving the cessefize Chicese Communtat propaganda begin to stress disputes between the Untzed States and the Chinese Netfonatate On October 13 the Chinese Comuntats ansounced that they f were continutng the ceasefire for another tvo veeks Hevever on October 20 the Chinese Commintats announced 1 that they were resuming their fire Lecause an Asertcen ship had intruded into Chinese Communist territorial 1 waters On October 25 they aotd that they were agetn suspending thet fire This time they declezed that they would not fixe on even—musbered days agetnst atefields beaches and wharves 1f there vere no Anezicen escort Thin odd—even day ize pattern has continued to the present Following this latest ceasefize Chinese Coms» nist propesends took the line that they had never been Interested to capturing only the Offshore stands but wore determined instead to capture both Tetwan and the Offshore Islands at the same tine ae ctnserthy resto in whowinctor Arp rarest The Chinese proclanation that fts ceasefice wourd continue only so Tong as the United States did not escort comeys touched off debates between the United Stater and the GiG The GRC urged the United States to escort D megeef ___ rnoonvenemmemmmer ——— — ees NCL AS convoys during the initial ceasefize period going tn on the odd days but the United States refused on the grounds 4 that there was no military necessity for comoys Dulles then began to press for a reduction in the Chinese Nation— altst garrison on Quercy dn order to give the topression that the United States had gone about as for as it could in pursuing a policy opposed by Ste—alltes and by the American public On October 21 Dulles arzived on Tetwan In a series of meetlogs with Chiang Kateshek he pressed Chiang for a public statement renouncing the use of force in any attempt to return to the metnland and succeeded in getting GRC acceptance to a communiqué stating this point It was also agreed that there would be a 1inized reduction of the garrison on Quessy in return for increased military fire pover on the Islands UNCLASSIFIED as I 11 me mencr or me ousts t By the end of 1958 events in the Tatvan Seratte had returned to the pre—July level The Chinese Coomuntate continued to fesue serious waznings and to shell Quenoy on odd days but they made no attempt to blockade the Of f shore Zelands Following the Dulles visit to Tetwan and the events which floved from it including the renunciation of force by the GRC and the decrease in the nusber of their troops on the Offshore Telands there vere no major changes in Anexican policy Nevertheless the crtets did affect to some extent the policies of all countries favolved with the Islands This chapter explozes this fapact and a concluding chapter considers the taplications that are of consequence in the manageosnt of crises mess commer ressrecrie on me custs The dostnant lesson for the Chinese Commmntate was Anerica‘s deternination to defend its interests by not allowing Quemsy to fall The hope with viich Peking began the cetets proved in the end to be illusory Hovever it 1s necessary to go beyond this and to estimate for the Chinese the costs and gatns of thete action Thats mojor failure was that the United States did not either force a withdraval from Quesoy or alto ts GMG garzison to fall and so undermine the Chtang Katoshek regime on Tatwan The crfale thus made t clear to the j Chinese Communate that they could not hope to capture Quenoy and that Tatwan vas not 1tkely to be thetze for some tize to cone Vatever gains they vere to make seorer CLASSIFIED _ ncuSSFAE I t elsenteze internally or extemmally they would have to accept the fect that there would contfrse to be a rival regime on Tetwan supported by the United States In addition the Chinese Commntats suffered in thetz ovn eyes and perhaps in the eyes of others from having j started scoething they could not fintsh As noted above they anticipated this cutcose at the bestaning of the existe and began to suggest fately early that they were not Anterested tn cepturing the Offshore Islands They first gave voice to this Line in easly Septenber and atruased it during the cuasefize period Tor exauple Anna Louts Strong do an arttcle veitten n Poking and poblahed in a Soviet Journal argued that Poking pree ferzed to have the Offshore Islands remain in Netfonalist 1 hends More officta1ly the Chinese Coomuntst Foreign Mintater suggested to diplomats in Peldng thet the Chinese were not interested in capturing Quenoy« During the early stages of the crisis the Chinese Comntate kept thes propaganda except that directed exclusively agetest the Offshore Islands in a reasonably low key so as to mitt gate thatz loss of prestige should the operation fei1 i The Chinese Comuntats claim that the United States was a paper tiger proved to be folse thatever the Stno—Boviet understanding about the crtets may have boen it As cless that t tended to dtsprove the Chinese Comm nist position thet the United States wes weak and vould back down under pressure t should be kept in mind hovever that the Russians were shortly to make thet own tent of American resolve over Besiin — F Aros Louts Strong Chinese Strategy in the Tetven f Strat New Tines Moscow Noveaber 1996 » ST __ mrmam_ ___ n ueontr ¢ —»— — UNCLASSIFIED € The Chinese Comuntats woffered a rather significant f loss in the buildup of GRC materfel and equipment free the United States in pesticuler the Stdentoder atz—to—at missiles and the 8—foch houltzers and other artiliery for deployment on Quemoy During the criats and after it the United States pernttced a very major increase in the military defenses of Quenoy including for the first time mining of the waters around Queaoy as vell as atep— ping up military assistance in general to the Metfonalist regime The cries also strengthened the Ansricen coontt— ment to defend the Offshore Ielends which at least in one I sense vas a Toss to Peking The United States also becane wore avere of Chinese Comunitat verknens and caution 0 To scue extent these losses vere offset by a nusber of gains for the Chinese Comnate Most fnportant per— haps was the exacerbstion of U 5 —0C relations in the dzpute over the uey the Chinese Communtate had brought the eries to a halt In addtion Anericen officials on Tetwan and in Meshington belteved all the more firaly that the GLC vented to drag the United Stater into a mejor ver with the Chinese Communists and the GRC vas confirmed in tts belief that the United States did not completely trust it The United States had also demonstrated that it could not be provoked into allowing the CRC to attck the mataland Soon after the crisis there vas negoclated in a manner suggesting two hostile partners a reduction in the atze of the Quenoy gerztson and Chiang in a ccomotque j Assued after the Dulles visit publicly renounced the use s of force to return to the mainland The possibility that the Chinese Matfoneltste with or without American support Ema remmmnamnreramencommnnmmemmeemmmemm mez o0___—___—— uCuSssEE i R UNCLASSIFIED would attempt to zeturn to the mataland ves significantly reduced The American intention to keep the GBC leashed vas made clear Added to Ste impact on U 8 —CRC relations Chinese Comunitat ection in the Tetwen Straits had the effect of aldcteing a stcoug statement of Soviet support The Mhrushchev letters to Eisenhower gave the Chinese Com« nets added assurance that the Soviets vould cone to thet ald to the event of a melear attack by the United States upon the Chinese matoland The Chinese Comuntat action beyond demonstrating China‘s abLlty to exacerbate fnternational tension also served to check the tvo—China trend by tying the Untzed States more closely to the defense of Quenoy and by sep arating the Unted States further from ite alles and neutrel nations Some countrics had been prepared to defend or recognize Taiwan as an independent regine but they were not about to sccept a government on Taiven thet eleimed to be the Covernsent of ell of China Finely the Offshore Telands which had always been mainland Chinese territory rematned in Mettonaliat hands not only as a check against the tvo—China trend but available for pres— wie moves by the Chinese Commntate at any time they night think auch pressure to be in thet interest Thas it would be wrong to conclude that the Chinese CoomnSate would never ugein nove againet the Offehore Islands 1f they thought that they could succeed either because the Unized States might force the Netfonalsts to withdraw frou the slands or by standing aside allow the GRC to be defeated The Chinese Commntats learned f UNCLASSIFIED E £ f ese UNCLASSIRE from the crisis that the United States vould not over« react or altow the GZC to over—react by boublng the mein Jand and they discovered too that there vere considerable gains even from an unauccessful move against the Offabore Istands And whatever cie coats of such a move they vere neither very secfous now permanent The Chinese Commu nate then f they bave reason to believe that their mijor foreign policy objective of securing the elinina« tion of the Chiang Kat—shek regime might be cbeained by renewed pressures against the Offshore Islands may vell be willing to try again sro—sovier setarious I Mich has been written about Sino—Soviet relations in the Quensy ertate Meny analysts have potated to the ertete as one of the £izst concrete instances of Sino— Soviet dizegreement Others Sncluding most goverment officials at the time and some scholaze have concluded thet there ves no Sino—Soviet dizegreesent docing the Quency cttate In determining the truth of this matter it should perhaps be emphaszed at the outset that there 4s virtually no hard evidence Tt # lergely a matter of Interpreting vhat meager data there are There Ss not wo far as the author knove any claset fied information that shedo Light dizectly on the nature of Stno—Soviet relations during the 1958 Tetven Seratte erfate Any analyste of the question depends then on f Inferences deain from overt Soviet behavior ducing the eriete and conjectures about het the Chinese Communtste might have ented the Soviets to do Tt 4s perhaps 1 UNCLASSIFIED k I an AFolkASSpD interesting to cote that a11 goverment analyses made at the tims and seen by the author conclude that there ves clone Sino—Soviet cooperation on all phases of the probe in the Taiwan Straits Whether or not analysts were reluctant to see here the beginning of a major Sino—Soviet disagreement they tended to look at the crisis with the exnectation that there was cooperation and to find con siderable evidence for it Today the ettvation ts dif ferent Host analysts stezt from the supposition that there is considerable Sino—Soviat disagreement a proport« tion that is now dnponsible to doubt Given this orfen— tation they tead to loo for and to find disogreesent in the 1958 extete Perhaps the best way to proceed is to present the argument that there vas substantial Sino—Soviet disogree ment over the Quenoy crfels and then suggest why this does not seem to be the correct interpretation I Two separate questions need to be asked about Sinc— 1 Soviet relations First were the Soviets enthustastic about the erfete and second 1f not were they willing to go along Sone analysts at the time even sugested that the Soviets might have encouraged the Chinese to The apment that there wes substantial Stno—Soviet disagreement during the Quenoy crtets s drewn easentially i fron John R Thomas Soviet Behavious in the Quenoy Criets of 1950 Ocbte Vol VZ Spring 1962 pp 3864 Donald Zexoria The Site—Soviet Conflict 1955—1961 Princeton University Press Princeton 1961 pp 200—201 I Alice Langley Hsieh Communist China‘s Stratory 4n the Miclear Age Prentice—Nail Inc Englewsod Ciiffe 1LJ 1962 pp 1is—230 aporc 7 f UNCLASSiFiE uN ASSINE begin the move in the Teivan Straits There is no evidence that this was the case The Soviets had mich less to gato from a Chinase Comunitat probe in the Telvan Straits then did the Chinese Pusthermore when one considers that the Soviets did not share the convictions of the Chinese Communists that the stzategtc balance betwen Eess and Wast perpttted sore aggressive Sinc—Soviet moves 4t seems highly unlikely thet Khrushchev was the fnstigator of the Chinese probe Eurushchey and Meo almost certainly discussed the Anpending Chinese Commnist move at thet meeting prior j to the ertete If so Meo undoubtedly outlined his strategy and discussed what zole the Chinese would 1ike the Soviets to play Analysts who have argued that there i was intense Sino—Soviet dfasgreesent over the Quency cttaie have based their case alsost entizely on the fetlure of the Soviets to give a strong statement of support to the Chinese Communists at an eetiter stage in the crtets They point to the facts that there was even no seation of Tetwan in the communiqué of the Mirushchev—No meeting Atetle discussion of the probe in the Soviet press and that the first Rirushchey statement did not come until after the Chinese Commntste had offered to reopen the Warsaw talks with the United States This analysis assumes j that the Chinese Communists vould have vented a strong Soviet statement in the early stages of the erfete and At 4» on this that the ergument for a Sino—Soviet dts A agreement depends The assumption that the Likelihood of Chinese Com nat success vould increase if the crists began with a t psi UNCLASSIFIED s _ T o eugie n nll I‘ °° UNCLASSIFIED 22 atrong statement of support by Soviet Preater Khrushchev 4s open to serious challenge On the contrazy the 1tkelt hood of the United States efther forcing the Chinese Metfonalists to absndon the Offabore Telands or tzply standing by and allowing the Ielands to be captured by the Chinese Commntate would have substantially increased if the war had been made to appear steply a part of the Chinese civil war and not a mejor Eest—iest clash ovolving the prestige of the United States and the Soviet Union © In other words 1t vould seem to have been dn fact in the Interest of the Chinese Conmntate to keep the Soviet Union from retaing the stakes by challenging the United States Xover—level statements of support might have been useful and were to some extent forthcoming but as indi cated below even auch statements would have not been in conformity with the best Chinese strategy There remeine only the question of whether Mo and the Chinese Communists would have made this analysts of the situation Rid in fact the Chinese Communists understand that ft was not n thet interest to get a Russian atetesont early On this point one can be much Jess dognatic It does appeat however thet the Chinese Commintats recognized that 1t was in their Interest to test the crist in the early days as a Tov—level effete Anvolving staply a contlmustion of the civil waz Thus at the Rurshchev—Mto meeting Meo might well not have asked the Soviet leader for a public statement of support What he might well have anked for and received was an agreement to cover the Chinese Comtat retreet e IED Arena nere atmn UNCLASS wvecuss NSF —— a «se— to convey to the Chinese Communists ts Involvement in the defense of Quenoy In seeking to tnplement this policy by action the Adatniscretton in Heshington relded in large measure on the initiative of its comenders in the field The major dectstons«—to dispatch a TMC unit from the Unized States to add an attcraft carter group free the 6th Fleet to escort to within three ntles of Quenoy—— were made in Washington but a host of other dectstons dectstons probably critical in making clear Anerican Anvolvenent were made on Tatwan and in CHICRAC hesd— quarters in HeweiL Questions such as how many ships would be Lnvolved in the escort what manewers to carry I out in the Serates and so on were decided there Aser I can stiftary officers in the field were well avare of the 10d task which had been given to them and responded vith I sensitivity to the problems fnvolved They recognized that the objective was to convey Anerican involvenent Fu without being provocative and without bringing on a major clash between the Untzed States and China They recos t nized thet responsibility and fulfi1ted it more essily i atteistet as divest every move von the renrages Tf Hoshington was prepared to transfer authority for pod ailitory manewering in the Tatwen Straits to officers Po in the field t wos determined to keep dectatons on how Do to react to invaston of Quensy centered in Washington fod The main Lssues concerned the necessary degree of detege— sion a€ authority to the detnt thiefs and the astest so which the President had to make up his mind tn advance P There uas general agrcenent that a dectston in principle Po 14 SEora‘r 3 —u— new atrategy Tt is interesting to note thit at this 1 point Soviet propaganda also abtfted to the new poltcy of Mightighting U 5 actfons that had produced a major extete In this second atage once they felt that they could not take Quercy the Chinese Copmntate vere primarily con— corned both to dizgutse thet withdrevel and to prevent an over—resction by the United States thet might led to an attock on the maaland In the letter connection they ceutousty avoided any military attacks on Asertcan versels or atzplanes They also began a propaganda came peign designed to reduce the 1ikelthood that the Untted F States vould react violently Of major Anportsnce tn this cenpaign vas the dramatic Chinese Comuniet offer to reopen the Nersaw talks Tt de clear both from the fect that the Chinese Commntate delayed for several weeks in actually beginning the negotfations and thetz unuiliingnass to negotiate shen the teike began that for the Chinese Comuntats the confrontation was staply a symbolic gesture rather then a move destgned to bring about a diplomatic solutton In Korea they had observed the reluctance of the United States to undertake or continue offensive miltary actions once truce negottattons had begun Per haps now they felt that to begin negotlatons in Worse would reduce the 1ikelhood of an Anezfcan over—resction to the Chinese Communtat probe Tt has frequently been pointed out by those who argue that there was Sino—Soviet dtangreenent in the Quercy ertete that Rirushchay did not rend his first letter to Etsentover until the Chinese had signaled thet intent to withdraw and the rake were therefore at a minimus f i UNCLASSIFIED «manmmmeminemimmemmmnmmen mmmcmmmimammnmmman nt — C fost ID Rovever 1t should be noted that nefther the Soviet Unton or Communist China vould take very serfously a proporal for truce negotiations as necesserily fnétcating a dect« ston to elleviate military pressure In fact both coun» tries are capable of proposing negotiations and then stepping up rather then reducing thatz aflitery activity Thus unloss the Soviets vere intimately avere of the Chinese Communist strategy along the Lines which have been argued eatlier the fect that the Chinese Comntate celled for the reopentg 6f the Warsaw talks vould not‘ wosgast to the Soviets that the Chinese Commntats were necessarily about to lessen theiz stiitery pressure on the Offshore Telands Rather what vas fnportant about the Chinese Communists‘ statenont was that it in fect reduced the 1ikelthood of an Anertcan over—resction This did make it scoevhot safer for the Soviet Unton to nake a _ strong statement in support of the Chinese Commntate provided that the Russians clearly understood that the Chinese Comuntats were not going to push for the capture of quency in the face of Anertcan opposition for exauple by fixing on American ships The Chinass Communists achoing many Western analysts have charged that Soviet a1d case only when the danger had I peased but have not claimed that they vere refused an 4 weriter statement It 4s espectelly ridiculous that the Soviet atatenent sso gives e11 the credit to Soviet nuctear weepons for the Chinese people‘s victory 4 in emashing the arsed provocetions of U 3 tnpertatien in the Taiven Straite n 1958 The Soviet peper Keanata Zvezda Red Star even UNCLASSIFIED 1 as — ONCLASSIFiE gaid on August 25 1963 the nuctear might of the Soviet Union the very country which has now been abused by the standers of Peking hed saved atlitons of Chinese from nucless death and defended the soveretanty security and independence of their country what are the feces In August and Septenber 2958 the sttuation in the Telwen Stratte was indeed very ‘tense as a result of the ageresston and provo catfons by the 0 8 inpertaltats The Soviet leaders expressed thatz support for Chine on September 7 and 19 respectively Atthough at that time the sttuatton in the Teivan Stratte was tense there wss no possibility thet a nucless wee vould bresk out and no need for the Soutet Unton to aup port Chine with tta nuclees weapons It was only when they were cleas that this was the sttuation 4 that the Soviet leaders expressed thet support for Chine Me have not forgotten and will not forget the support which the Soviet people have given to Chin on the question of Tevin The assertion that the first Khrushchev letter case only after the danger of a major Sinc—Aserican vee had passed ts not borne out by the facts The letter arcived tn Washington before it was clear vhat would take place tn the Taiwan Straits The United States had escorted one comvoy to Queroy without being ized on but 1¢ was sti11 a Coment on the Soviet Governsent Statement of August 21 September 1 1963 translation in Peking Reviow VoL VZ No 36 Septésber 6 1963 p 13 hile thia quote gives credence to the argument Chat the Soviet $ support came after the crists had passed the Sino—Soviet exchanges in 1963—64 over the Quemoy ertets still leave the attuation in doubt As indicated in the quote above Chinese statements have been in reaction to Soviet attempts to take alt of the credit for the success of the opere clone tn 1958 In fact each time the 1958 cetsis has cone up in the polentcs it has been at the inttiacive of the UNCLASSIFIED t CLASSIFIEp — «ar D not cercain vhat action the Chinese Commntate vould take in response to American comoying to within thee siles of the Sstand Tt was also not known what the United States would do 1f Anerfcan ships were fired upon or 1f the blockade could not be broken without greater Anezfcen f fnvolvement or a boubing of the metnland There vere many poantbie developments that night have led to a clash between American and Chinase Communist forces and hence to attscks againat the mainland If Khrushchev wes in fect vetting until there vas no danger of a major waz his letter case too soon If this was his strategy he had every reason to watt mocd1 a cleor pattern of activity was established 4n the Tefwan Seraite No one in Weshington poltcy— making efzcles thought that the Soviet Prester‘s letter hed ezzived too late to be taken serfously and for Peking At came just before Communist shells were directed for the first time agatnst U S —escorted comoys To brief an exennation of vhat was occurzing in the Teivan Strait when Mirushchev‘s lecter arrived in ashington does not support the contention that it came only after the danger of a Chinese—Aerican mtlizazy confrontation had possed Thus there would appeet to be no firm evidence of Stno—Soviet dfasgreement in the Telven Straits existe On the contrary the timing of the Khrushchev statement sussests close cooperation between the tvo countries in the inplementatton of the Chinese Communist strategy What the Chinese Communists vented from the Soviet Unton Chinese For the 1963—1966 statements and a discussion — of then see Morton H Halperin China and the Boab Frederick A Praoger New fork 1505 ppr St—42 Pre i UNCLASSIFIED — — UNCLASSiFIEp they had alzeady got dusing the preceding years namely wiffictent atlitery pover for then to blockade Quesey successfully agetmt a GRC defense ‘They also apperently gained the approve of the Soviets to set afoot rusore that the Russtans had agreed at the Kushchev—teo talks to give the Chiness Comuntate nuclear weapons Such nmors provided the threat 1f not the substance of deter rence at a tize when forthright statements of support vere not in thete interests In addftton the Chinese received very strong diplomatic suppost from the Russtans tn the period vhen they vere seeking to disengage frou the crisis I ‘to diagutse thet losses and to prevent an American attack on the mainland On August 30 an Observer article 40 Pravde gave thet couse stzong support This ves followed quickly by the two Rirushchev letters the tvo atroupest statements of suppost thet the Soviets had offered to any country up until that tise To fact At should be noted thet throughout the cries the United States dd aosume that a nucleos attack against the Chinese metatend would be returned tn kind by the Stno—Soviet bloc As has been noted the Chinese Comcntate were probably surprised by the unexpected success of their i artillery shelling in the perfod after September 8 As Septeaber wore on and thet attacks continued the Busstane may have begun to be worried that the Chinese 1 Communtate would press ahead with a blockade despite active American participation in escosting the convoys At this point there may have been at least acoe fnclptent Sino—Soviet dfssgreement the Soviets making t cleer that in pledging thez support they had assused that the E EEoner‘ bt UNCLASSIFIED f Chinese Commntats vere stouly backing avey from the con flict However there 1s no evidence from the artifiery shelling hich vas not Sncreased to the level of imposing i a successful blockade or any other actice by the Chinese — Communists which suggests that they ever case close to —— deciding to press ahead with thee military action in the face of Anectcen involvement tn the resupply of Quenoy i Nevertheless the Soviets may have been scomvhst appre hensive during this pertod Thus two conclustons eserge from this brief analysts of the Soviet role in the 1958 Telwen Straits crtets t 1 There £s no cea evidence that there was a Stno $ Soviet disegreesent The contention that there was dts i agreesent untfornly assuses that the Chinese would have i wanted an early statement of stzong Soviet support Such a statement hovever would not appear to have been in « thet interest a supposttton bore out by the Chinese Communtata® oun propeganda and diplonatie activity in this easly period 2 It would seen tn fact that the Soviets i were prepared to go along with a atnor Chinese Comuntat i probe along the Lines of the Chinese Comuntat strategy outlined previously and that the Observer article and the Khrushchev letcers come at a very early and most opportune time for the Chinese Comuntate in toplesenting their stzategy of stow and dfagutsed withdravel f I€ 4s clear thet major Sino—Soviet disegreements on severs questtons including stzatery and octice toverds t the underdeveloped areas began in the 1957—1958 pertod This s not to feply that the intense Stes—Soviet dtzagree nent beginatng in this pertod end extending up until the secegt anremommnmmememsscemmesmnomesmesmmemmemmmmmmmmmmmmmmze » UNCLASSIFIED — present has been exaggerated It s rathar to argue that the 1958 Tatwen Straits criels rather then being one of the first instances of Sino—Soviet dtsngreesent was in face probebly one of the last instances of close Sinc— Soviet cooperation in international political menewering one rexsrtcrives on m cutsts The Covernsent of the Republic of Chins cane no closer then the Chinese Commntats in attaining ts major objec— tive during the crete Tor the CRC the Communtat move against the Offshore Islands opened up the possibLlity of I a mejor military clash between the United States and Communist Chine The ORC pursued this objective from the fizst signs of a cetate until October constrained ouly by the danger of a too blatant attempt to increase the level of conflict Recopnfzing that the Asertcan objective wes to avoid rather than to bring on a big waz the GRC even fered that the United States resily preferred to see the Offshore Islands turned over to the Chinese Communists as part of a tvo—China arrangement Tf the United States had become convinced that the GRC was trying to being on a majer confrontation 1t might have withdram from active pesticipation in the exfels or tried to force the GRC off the Offshore Zelands At the same time provocative action by the CRC might have led to a Comuntat counter action agetoat which the United States might have refused to retaldate This the GRC was careful to follow the letter and even the aptit of all its explicit agreenents with the United States and sought by other means——primerily over—esttmating the danger of collapse on Quenoy UNCLASSIFIED I f secrets UNCLASsiFiEp _ threatening to boob the mainland and not pursitng the blockade with vigor——to Increase the Anvolvesent of the Unteed States From the stare GRC officiate recognized that even 4f they could not bring on a major confrontation they could secure tvo other objectives stepped up aflitery assistance from the United States and a greater Anerican comttment to the defense of the Offabore Islands The GIC began pressing these tvo points in early July and by the end of the crisis with considerable success The United States rapidly accelerated its military séntstetss 8 Priven boot o betoves the Ausisen soustt» ment and to enable the GRC to handle Communist challenges without requiring direct American involvement The American effort uas designed to improve the GC‘s ability to resupply the Offshore Telands to increase Eizepover and to defest the Chinese Communtats in any atr battles thet might occur Addttfonal landing craft vere thus turned over to the GRC as were ¥—96‘a equipped with Sideninder mfastles 8—tnch howitzers for use on Quesoy and other equipment The GRC‘s attempt to secure an American comitoont to the defonse of the Offshore Telands did not lead to an extension of the Sino—Asecfcan treaty area to include the Islands nor to an unequivocal statement by the Anericen Governsent that 1t considered the defense of Qaemoy neces sary to the defense of Telvan Hvever it did Lead to the Dulles—Horgen exchange and the more publicized Dulles Wewport statement These together with interpretations of then by American officials vent very fas toverd Speare sesrer 1 IF UNCLASSIFIED comitting the United States to the defense of the Offabore Islands Although they were never officially informed of any change in American poltcy GRC officials must have felt when the crists abated that the Unfzed States because of its words and Ste actfons was prepared to defend the Offshore Talands And they probably felt that the Chinese Comuotate also had ittle doube of this ¥otlowing the crisis the GRC may have been reldaved to dfacover that the Unzed States wes not going to prose again for a withdrawal from the Offshore Zelands as it had after the clash of 1954—1955 AlL that the Untted States requested was a token reduction of troops on the Telands and this in return for a substential Increase in GRC fire— pover The G20‘s interest in holding the Islands stems tn pert of course from the fact that they are the only fndiaputebly Chinese territories viich it hots roe tt also oven mich to the GRC‘s comvetion that so Tong as it reastne to possession of the Telands nefther the Holte Redthn ded CHB Svastites us oceet suites and India can fepose a tvo—Chine situation on Tetpet and Poking Thus the events of July—October in the Taiwan Strafts helped to arzest the drift in American and Western a poldey tovard a tvo—China attuation But 1f the GRC vas rvecessful In securing Anertcen comitment to defend the Offshore Ialands and Increased Americen militery assistance t suffered major setbacks tue Interesting if minor Indication of the syabolfe frportance vhich the GRC attaches to the Offshore Zelands 4s the fact that ORC foreign service officers pay a visit to Quency before leaving on overseas assigments I UNCLASSIFIED UNCA A 1ASSifity I particularly toverd the end of the ertele Although the 1 Dulles visit to Tatwen did not being the pertups feared pressure to absndon the Offshore Islands it did bring the Chinese Nationalists to renounce publicly the use of force in thete effort to return to the metalasd Doles did not get the more aveepng statement he wented from the G2G——a declazetion that the civil var vas over——but the statement he finally exacted vent a Tong way toverd ending the pretense that the Natfonalsts vere scon to return to the mataland with Aserican support What the crtets made eles if the GRC did not already know it was thet the United States was not looking for an excuse to engage the Chinase Commnists On the contrary it ves clearly evident that the United States would go to considerable lengths to prevent a major clash and to assuage vorld optaton even over the strenuous objections of the GRC As already indicated the ceasefize statements of the Chiness Commntate led to heated debates between the United States and the GRC The readiness of the United States to cease escorting vhen the Chinese Commntats demanded it as a price for continuing the ceasefize and its refuss1 to escort on odd days resuited in a Tos of Luce for the GRC Tt must also have brought home to Chiang an avareness of the forces that could drive the f American Government to actions highly detrimental to the GRC‘s prestige The illtngnes of the United States to participate in a new round of talks with Peking ves evaluated by Tepet in the same Light The suspicion aroused particularly among Anerican military officers by the GRC‘# resupply efforts vorsensd I B5 a I D TNCLASSIFE GM0—0 8 relations even further and brought bitterness to Chiang that his word had been questioned In summery the GRC had failed to bring on a major Sinc—American var and 2t vas unlikely that it would be fo a position to try again On the other hand the Aserican tnvolvesent in the defense of the Offshore Talents and tte comituent to the GIC as the sole governsent of China vas Ancreased f hopes of the GRC‘s returning to the mata Jand were daspened its ability to survive aod to hold its terzitory probably increased wexicAt rensrborives of m casts American officials from the President down to the navel officers in the Tetwen Straits case avay frou the erfele with a justifiable feeling of a Job vell done The Untied Siited hes ooserice ange mew densizers Io iis Soe i ho ihe Pntine reignin while eroding a major military confrontation in the Tatwen Straits Auerican policy case under perhaps sore intensive and enreniie sefgicigg Woiees Nie fortes Sroace dhen hen ao other major Anerican policy at the time of its execution Not only nevepapersen but many congressional leaders and poblc figures spoke out vigorously agatnat Anerican dnvolvenent in the defense of Quenoy Within the Adstots— tration there ves agreement on the policy cerzied out but even hare there vere fnportant differences There vere i those sho refusing to believe that the GRC might be trying to drag the United States fnto a wer vere prepared to do what was necessary to defend the GRC There were also those who vere aveptcfous of the GRC and unhappy about the SEresy —— JNCLASSiFIEp Uigysone «as 4 need to defend the Offshore Telends Outside the United States support for Aserican policy wis Minited to a suall maber of publicists and a few poverments in Asta American officials belteved themselves to be confronted by a untted and confident Sino—Soviet bloc Tor dt least scae officials a major problem atemmed fron the difference to objectives between the United States and the GRC and the deste of the Matfonaltats to bring on a major militery confrontation Added to these difficulties were the legal attuetion involving the Congressional Formoss resolution and the inability of the Adainistration as it defined its obiigetions to Congress to declaze firaly that 1t would defend the Offshore Islands Despite these problems the Unized States accouplished ts mejor objectives The Chinese Conmsntats vere not deterzed from begioning the crete but they were forced to absndon thet effort to blockade Quensy and were deterred from the Anvaston that many officials thought they were planning The Chinese Netfonalats were pre— vented from boubing the mainland and whatever their om objectives eventually went stong with the American poltcy of meeting the challenge with the atnimun of force The Git‘@ restraint fs reduction n the atze of the Quescy qetriaco and its remnctation of force made it Tess I likely that the Netfonetsts vould be able to drag the Untzed States into a war and thus made it easter to defend American policy at hou ° Regardless of the success of thetz policy Aserfcen officiate were relteved to see the cetete at an end Civilian offictals in particular believed that the United EEorgr ‘UNCLASSIFIED poke mdg eessrthClAssiicy States had cone very close to muclear wet The President and his chinf advisors apparently believed that the Soviet Union would back the Chinese Coummiste if the United States hit the Chinese metaland with nuclear veepous and thay also belfeved that they had been quite close to ordering euch stzikas The Adntntatzation did not give Joud public utterance to these fears as it later did in the Cuben ertets for fear of Intensifying publie oppost« tion and because t wes unulliing to state publicly thet At would defend Quenoy Dut the United States had moved in such a way as to prevent a clash that might have Jed I to moclear we The Anerican comitsent to the Offshore Telnds had been made clear and the Chinese Commate were unlikely to mfacalculate again At the same time the cepsbiiity of the Chinese Rettonalsts to resupply the Islands under fire vas avbstentiolly Ancreased Dulles came avey from the crfals with the feeling that he had stretched the Mintts of the Adatnfatreton‘s ability to operate without the consent of the public the Congress and Aserica‘s alles He beleved that the GRC a had to make scee concerstons in order to getn public aup— port and he apparently hed his doubts about whether the Dotted States could ageto defend the Offshore Islands in the event of another Chinese Communist probe Other Anerfcan officials do not appear to have shared Duiles® feeling that the United States beroly got by Some including General Mexvell Taylor and Gerard Satth i were ushappy about our excessive and contimulng zeMtance on nuclear weapone others Sncluding Twinning and Rute about our fiiztation with comventionit defense Although one result of the crists was to induce mtlitary plasers BECRET UNCLASSIFIED _ — a ‘UNCLASSIHED nkp # ps i 4 Ligat m to include a conventional annex tn thet opezstional pleas — and sose Sncreate in conventfonel capability the general feeling in potfcy—naking ctzcies seens to have been that the erfete denonstrated the efficacy of relying on meclear throats t whatever feeling of sattsfection there was about the I way in vhich setters had been handled there was a lack of P systematic interest in octets ninagessnt at the civilian devel and Mete attentton pefd to the lessons that the artsts could teach t f — y 2 g UNCLASSTED secarh I —» — UNCLASSIFIED 111 tsssous ror carers muneim In assessing the lessons for ctiets management vhich energe from this study of the 1958 Offshore Telands eriets tt 1s necessary to keep in mind the difficulty of general teng from a stngle case Tt fs also clear that much has changed since 1958 both in the world beyond American bor— ders and in the American approsch to the management of International cetses In fact the very interest in eriate management ‘ at the political level post—dates the erste Much that could have been earned from the crfste— nost obviously the need for a flexible response strstegy——has alzeady been leaned in other ways Nevertheless it seems useful to consider at least sone of the tssues of crisis management which arose because of the Chinese Communist probe in the Taiwan Straits me retarion or nturzary reas to routricar sins The Offshore Islands crete of 1958 represented an extreme instance of general phenomenon that has charee terfzed limited vazs in the nuclear age The battlefield that vas fought over in this case the Quercy Telands was of no Intrinale importance to the United States Its territory and population vere very small tts fndustry Inotgnificant Indeed for some American officials there was a positive interest in having the Offehore elands taken over by the Chinese Communists because it vas recog» nized that a tvo—China solution would be factittated by a Chinese Nattonattse withdraval This lack of intimate value in a territory being Speesr re rmmemane wR HRii itrc uel I UNCLASSHFIE WNOASFE fought over creates the problen of defining those objec tives that are sought only because of thet polttical attecte In approaching this probles the Adatntatratton attempted to assess the defense of the Offstore Islands in terms of the general principles t was prepared to support These vere fizst dts unvilLingness to allow second a determination to 1ive up to Lts comttments mnd defend tts interests Vis—i—vis the Soviet Unton and Cmmntst Chine it was felt to be partfoularly tnportant to denonstrate that the Unted States had not changed Ste comitments tn view of the Sovtet Spotnik and ICM tests tng to defend even those teczitories such as Quemoy to which it was not explicitly committed Tt of course recop— Indtaputably Chinese The Chinese Metfonalate in turn tended to Justify the defense of the Offshore Talend not only because of their intrinsic importance but also be cause losing the Islands vould sectously affect the post tion of the ORC on Tatwan As for the neutral nations and Anertca‘s alles the value of Aserican participation in defense of the Offshore Islands was less clear Almost all of Anerica‘s allies Horton Halperin itnited He in the Nuclear Age Wiley —New York 1963 pp 4—10 I ‘Sucker WNCLAssIFIED park buclassinen probleas there vere st l1 others equally difffeutt One major fesse with viich the State Department greppled throughout the cree was under vhat cfrcmatmces t would be possible and destrable to negotiate a settlement a and what the costs and getme of doing so would be The question that was constantly posed and never anivered vas whether the TeLands could be negotfated out of the control of the Chinese Netfonaltets in a vey that vould avoid the I penalttes mentfoned above It vas generally agreed that during the perfod vien the Chinese Commntate vere apply— Ang miltary force this could not be done without great cost At the same tine vertous dentlitartzation achenes connidered how to Induce the Netfonalate to give up the Islands without allowing the Communtate to getn contro of then Here again there was no aatfafectory vey of assessing the relative conte and gain and the recogni tion that neither the Comuntate nor the Netfonaliate were Mfkely to be Enterented in let alone accept a negottated settlement tended to make this eave less prosinent than At might othervise have been Another sintlar and knotty problen concerned the defense of the smaller Lslands in the Quemoy group The Untied Staten decided easly in the crfete that tt vould lint tts fnvolverent to Big Quenoy and Little Quenoy appazently because the smaller Lelnds vould be difficult Af not fnpossible to defend in the event of a Chinese Communtat attack The fact that the ORG considered these Aslands part of the Quenoy chain and would have defended them againet the Chinese Comuntats had curfous faplica tfons for the United States Since Anerfcen poltcy had not publicly «trgled out these Lessor Lelands in the Quensy a ‘ 136 o m nnoscomcmurrestmnatasoes ntimsmmna UnCIAgnIHEY — «sir and most neutral nations indicated their opposition to the American defense of Quenoy and in fact put pressure on the Untzed Scates to seek a peaceful settlement At the saze time Anerfcan officials probably recopnized that 1f the Untted States did withdraw from the Offshore Telands some countries even thore vho opposed Anercan Anvolvenent in Querey might begin to question whether I the United Scates vould Live up to ts commitments to them American policy thus hinged on evaluating these polit— feal effects As ts generally the case this was extremely difficult to do Most officials seemed to belteve along with the GRC that the future extstence of an independent government on Tatwan might well be called into questton s 1f Quecy were alloued to fall and with t one—third of the combat troops of the GRC There ts no vay to verify whether or not this vould have been the case Certainly the government on Telvan vould have been shaken by a Toss of the Offshore Islands Given the difficulty of making any certain predictions and the genuine uncertainties Involved t was not surprising that the United States acted on the assumption that the fall of Queroy vould Tead to the fall of Taiwan It was safer in this case as it generally to or appears to be to take the pessiatatic vievpoint vhat effect Anertcan involvement had on other countries‘ assessment of American willingness to oppose the use of force and the Anerfcan deternination to live up to dts counttments ts also difficult to gauge Cer« tainly Anerfcen action moved in this direction but by how euch and at vhat cont If the question of vhether the United States should be fivolved at all in the defense of Quenoy posed difficult UNCLASSIFIED chain the refusal to partictpate in thee defense might have created the tupression that the United States vas not f prepared to defend Quenoy itself While this danger seemed to argoe for the defense of all the Offshore Islands my atteopt to defend the smaller Lslands appeezed so absurd to American military planners that nobody pressed ft what seems to have occurzed fs that the uninhabited pieces ro rain Snnimectms mee on somemriats tad igen gio txinate tnportance that the dectaton vas made not to defend then Toe most difficult Lasve for the United States arose I when t appeezed that tes convoys might be unsuccessful in breaking the blockade If this had happened the United States vould have faced the difficult choice of enlarging i the war or efther permitting the Offshore Talents to be captuzed or trying to negotiate thet transfers The war i could have been enlarged efther by permitting the GRC to engage in greater efforts in particular by bonbing the mainland or by greater American tnvolvenent Ancluding convoying all the vay in or at a different level enploy— ment of tactical nuclear weapons The dectstons here be— came more difficult and nore controverstal In a vay that wens typical of linfted var situations the United States very quickly decided to step up ts om Involveent by comvoying up to within three mtles of the Offshore Islands then increased operations of this sort are careied on for «ven a beiet perfod they tend to be vieved as the lintt of vhat can possibly be done without provoking a much larger erteis This happens because expectations ate ‘ bute up on both stdes as to vhat each will and will not _ engage in Thus as September vore on and the blockade seeker UNCLASSIFIED f continued to be successful an Larue arose as to whether there should be a qualitative change in the American in— volvement or an effort to aeek a ceasefire The problen 4 vas one of assessing alternative negative political effects on the one hand to Jes the Islands fall vould be to for fait the principle Gf not allowing force to chenge bound« ustes and to suggest a Lack of Anerican deterntnation On the other hand to being on a lerges crtets vas to give the impression that the United Scates vas reckless an ally who might drag her partners into a ver At the Teast it retsed the possibility that the Untced Stater might 4 have to abandon its Tong reluctance to use nscleas weapons This particutas estate was resolved by breaking the block» ade in Late September but t is not clear what attema— tive would have been adopted had the blockade been succens— ful And At As difficult even vith the benefit of hind — sight to assess which course vould have been less costly The problems discussed here produced a tendency during the Quency crisis and in fact a general tendency in Matted ver attuattons to play 4¢ safe by overestimating the consequences of loving the battle Asong other reasons the difficutttes of assessing the consequences of the lose of Quency for the goverment on Taiven as well as for the Ameccan position in the world 1ed to the Anericm deciston to defend the Offshore Islands In this steue— tion American offictate exaggerated the adverse conse quences of loving the Ielends and ultimately the Rattonal Security Council cese to equate the Toss of Quesey with the collapse of the entie Anerfcan posttton to the estern Pacific som mmmenmmmmmmnemones raze rer ero msr mme nnnnnmenae s UNCLASSIFIED esse UC A It abould be clear thet statements about inevitabi1i ties sountimes have dangerous consequences In this i dnstance because of the consequences that were thought j to attend the Toss of Query the United States cans fatzly close to stag tacticel oucless veepons despite f opposition to fte policy by sost of its elites and many An the United States Tt would appear that a rattonal decison on vhether to use nuclear weapons or othervise to increase the American nvolvenent required a better spprateal of the consequences than one that predicted the worst of all possible worlds The difficulty of seasuring the effects of various Joases can Lead to playing it safe by falling beck upon f extrese formulations If one asserts for example that t the loss of Query will make t harder to hold Tetwen or j nore expensive to maintain the Anezfcen position in the Western Pacific the inevitable question £s how such harder or at how much greater cost Assertions such as the los of Quesoy will nevitably sean the loss of Tetwan or the American position in the Hestern Pacific will collapse 1f Queroy ts alloved to fall seen patently abmurd in retrospect but American officials say have felt that to insert the qulifications which they belteved should be attached to the predictions would be to fail to express the policy intent of thete views In turn it would have been difficult for the menber of the Netfonal Security Council in making a recomente— «tion to the President to agree on a precise assessment of the danger fnvolved A unantzous optafon thit the American position in the Western Pacific would collapse Unciass f uiglasgiptd mus 4f Quenoy fell coud be token and pestups was taken by the President as ndicating that a11 of his eévisers agreed that these costs hovever npossible to specify in any detai1 would be very great Despite the posstb lty of ratfonaltzing this approach particularly in an attempe to build a consensus it ts clear that the Usited Scates would have found t difficult to detersine whether or not t abould altow Quenoy to fell in the face of a much greater and sore determined Chinese Comunitat threst In trying to balance Increased American involvement agetzat the conte of lostng one eleuzly vould have had to ask vat Asecfcen actions could be taken on Tafwen or elsewhere that vould at least tn part coupensate for the loss of Quemsy and how mich these vould cost So Tong as the eituetion ves viewed as an extzese one the tendency was to argue thit the United States should do whatever vas necessary to hold quency A11 of this may serve to explato if not Justify the predictions made coemtcamee iim ns now In the Quency crisis as in all war sttustions the United States forced the question of vhat information I about tts own intentions and capebilities t wished to convey to the enesy and secondly vhat vere the bast A moter of tectnical probless relating to the delays to passing messages back and forth vere identified ducing the erteis and in a nusber of papers veitzen after wards In most cases it wes pointed out that the defi etencies had been noted prior to the crieie but ataply had not been conetdered of sufficient priority to mxit attentton Mone of these technical teaues are considered heve an Ed seane to comey thts——vbather by public statemente by diplomatic messeges or by actions Bescally what the Unteed States wanted to convey was very ataply it would f euploy whatever means vere necessary to defend the Off f shore Telands if the Chinese Commntate sought to take then by military force However there vere difficulties tn making this message unequivocally I The major future of Asercin commntcation during i the crisis cave before the intensive shelling on August 23 f The Chinese Communists begen thet probe because thay $ $ betteved that there vas a substantial possibility that the Untzed States vould persit the Chinese to take Queroy or alternatively vould force a GRC evecustion Neither of these aiternatives vas ever given serfous consideration by the Averican Governsent Yet the United States failed to communicate its deternination to defend Queroy to the Chinese Commntats In past this falluze to communicate was because American officials at the top could not be persuaded that a extete vae woffictently manent thet they should give serfous attention to the question of whether the United States should fueve a public statement of ite position Even tn the days Just preceding the outbreek of intense hostilities vhen top officials were finally alerted they were unable or unvilling to convey a clear message Tt was only on August 23 that Secretary of State Dulles agreed to exchenge letters vith the Chatzman of the House Foreign Affairs Comntttee indicating that the United States would be tnvolved tn the defense of Quenoy Vy was this letter so long in contngt SEcrer ° oan Coe reason the taportance of which tt is difficult to astinate is siaply that the Secretary of State wes wvay on vacation during the tvo weeks prios to the time £ that he agreed to foroe this statement Doring this period more and more officials in Washington became con— winced that sous action was needed by the Anericen Covern— went to deter a Chinese Communist probe At the seme time it wes felt that this action could not be token uoless the g Wnitad Scates were in face prepared to defend Quenoy f Buffing would be extremely dangerous beceuse the Chinese Comuntate vere 1ikely to probe to the point where thay a discovered the bluff and this vould staply add to the poltttcal cost of altering Quemoy to fall Since 1t wes walikely that the President would make any firm dectetons prior to the erfats and was Sndeed reluctint to do so aven after the crisis began vhat wes needed vas an offi— cial conpstent and willing to assuse this authority and to act on dt Short of the President only Dulles could play thie ole Offictale up to the level of the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Secretary of State contsually axpreesed thet recognition of the need for such a high« f level deceton and the difficulty of getting t After the stort of the artiiery fire on August 23 Anericen communication with Chinese Communists vas by end Jerge a succens The United States made clear ts tnvolve— mont and ite willingness to defend Queney in a way which deterred military actions in the Taiwan Straits which ran the risk of bringing Aserfcen forces fnto action and succeeded in deterzing any sore extensive military action by the Chinese Comnists if such had been planned srcker nme —— tism «as — Anerican action after August 23 ves nore exccessful pestly because the Secretary of State now back on the scene ves willing and able to make public statements I suthorftatively interpreting and predicting Asseican policy At the seme time the President mide a sumber of decisions which made t clesr to all officials that the I United States was likely 1f not certain to intervene 1f t Quenoy were ensauized Finally the milttery criste ftoelf occasioned an increase in the activity of Anericm forces tn the Telwen Straits and hence betokeoed Aserican dnvoive« ment f Wevertheless problems remetned ‘There was st111 some hesitation and disagreement about vhat prectsely the United States would do 1f the blockade could not be broken or 1 Quenay were attacked — More fnportantly the United 4 I Scates ves not prepared to defend the saslier fsteods in the Queroy chain but was unwilling to say so publicly 4 lest At invite the Chinese Comniote to take them Any statement which alurred over this questton and ves then followed by an attack cn the auslter Lstands vould give the fupression that the United Scates was gotng back on its word The quertfon of whether or not nucleet veapons would be used wes unsescived because t depeaded on the final dectaton of the President These factors vere probably nuffictent to lesd the United States to decide thet it should tzy to convey ts detersination to defend the Offshore Islands to the Chinese Commate by allitery action rather than by words Hovever there ves a such sore serfous and cxittcel problem which in fact doutnated a this decston This was the problen of multiple audiences roms nmn ememmmmmmmmer—mmmnmcrrro—_ __ pot t—— UNULASSIHEU ——— — I Hy tet‘ ¢ ace I #5 % 1 c Although the stzategy of John Toster Dulles during — the 1958 Tatvan Strato cetete has frequently been des— a eribed as one of calculated enbigutty t wes not aabigus ous when it come to communicating with the Chinese Commu» s S nate In this regard American policy wes guided as sop Dulles wes to arsert many times by the recognition that 6 it was necessary to make absolutely clea to the Chinase # Communists that the United States would intervene to defend the Offshore Telands But tn relation to the GNC to Anerica‘s elites to vorld public opinion in general and of to the public and Congress in the United States the A Adntatatration recognized the need fos anbiguity 4 In 1934 in the face of another threst to the Off« a shore Ielends under the control of the Chinese Nétfonaltats ‘ the United States Government had asked for and received P from the Congress authority to defend the Offshore Telands R whenaver this defense vas necessary for the defense of % Taiwan Thaze was little doubt that the President of the Unteed States had the right to eaploy military force without congressional authorfzetfon vhen the securtty of the United States demanded ft Tt was also possible to Interpret the Congressional Resolution in a way thet would have enabled the United States simply to assert in August 1958 that 1t wes going to defend the Offshore d Telands Even so the Adatntetration chose to interpret R the Resolution n a much narrover way It vas felt specifically and Dotles asserted it privately as vell as 1 me problen in relatton to the GRC will be considered below tn discussing alitence problens stagt SIFIED UNCLAS 5oge sStcare a «se ys publicly that the Resolution made t tnposstle for the 2 Untced States to say unequivocally that 1t vould defend S Quemsy until an ectack had actually begun ageinst the 5 Island and as such threstened Tetvan Thas this reason 5 ing atone vas sufficient to keep the Adaintetzation frou saking an unequtvocst statement that 56 would defend £ Quemoy And in fxce t ts this problen that appears to have been crttical in the thinking of the Secrecary of State — Moreover it was recognized that there was substantial # opposition to the policy of defending Quercy within the # snide $¥60h Sit efeEed Iie Wie aIRie I% nee dientge ds # long as United States poltcy continued to be anbiguous it a was possible to meet some of these criticisms by arguing that the United Scates had simply not yet comteted itself to the defense of Quenoy The hostile public al readin tE NED ResCiIinT aeitentns ar Soane aostents what would have occurred had the Preatdent or the Secre— tary of State Lasued a clear warning to the Chinese f # Communists In conversations with allted diplomats vio I x eriticized American policy 0 8 officials constantly — reiterated that the United Scates had not yet made any — determination to defend Quemoy and that such a deternine stom anid Bniy be Badd bf She Seestdect Hey esule thes £ wste hevig Se Werert the $¥in of crping se held ate % Offshore Islands in the face of a otlitasy onslaught by £ —z ——— f tt vas never nate clear uhy the Administration could not have asserted that given the situation as tt extsted any attack on Queney no matter how mounted would inevi « tably pose a threat to the security of Taiwan and would be resisted ® UNCHASSIF goo e — Mesie «ss ‘ wis x denying that that was thet poltcy The United States t could be urged was merely seeking a diplonatts and i g peaceful solution and rying to avoid the necessity of 1 48 siving a destaies os this Seau he fis she OHG the po tion that the United States vould defend the Offshore po Islands were most clear and to these the discussion now turns fo % aurtuice rronurns too The essence of Lintted war is a combination of con— sx fMcting and cooperative tnterests between constants — The Quemoy crisis exhibited not only this factor but also 3 the phenomenon of conflicting and overlapping objectives anong allies In fact even leaving out the controversial question of Soutet interests one can identify points on which there was a common interest between the United 2 States and the GRC vis—l—via the Chinese Communtatsy but others in which there were comon Lesues between the — Unized Seates and Communs Chine vis—l—vis the GRC and st411 others tn which the two Chinese Covernsencs shared m comon interests visch—vis the Untced Scates To 1ius« erate with some of the main esses both the United States and the GRC wanted to prevent the Chinese Commu nists from capturing the Offshore Tslands the United States and the Chinese Comuntsts wanced to prevent a — sajer military clash between the two countries which t wt was argued the CRC was rying to prosote inally the erorer £ ‘ R t Uno ASSE nmcememins mous ‘ «s — two Chines had a comon interest in avoiding a solution which would lead to a tvo—Chine situation sherens the Untend Scates or at least soue Aserican offictate had an interest in this objective f Anseicen officials in the ield and tn Weshington hat at least some understanding of these conflicting Interests prior to the criets However events of August Septenber and October 1958 brought hoxe to then in a f vivid way the extent to which the objectiver of the United States and tts chief ally were not in perfect hesmony and the need therefore to take these conflicting objectives Anto account in framing policy As time passed t becase clear that in many ways the GRC had to be treated as an adversary even while close military cooperstion vas in process Tor exasple t had to be acknouledged that the i GRC might not share the Anerican urgency about resupplying the Offshore Tstands and in fact might even have reasons to avoid dotng so A major Leove in this regard frequently deboted in « Hashington and in the ield was the question of whether or not the CRC wes in fect making an all—out effort to resupply the Islands This Leave posed a difficult probles for those within the Government who were strongly comitted to Anerfcan support of the GRC These officials who on this fssue included Dulles as well as Walter Robertson and others were unviliing to adatt thet the GIC might be drageing Lts feet To adatt this vould perhaps force a reassessment of American policy On the other hand to deny 1t would make it harder to induce Chiang ket—shek to order an all—out resupply effort Asecican officials mn « ‘UNCLASSIKIED a flow U8 weysgem 0 ick «see i even in recorded conversations with each other did noe frankly accept the existence of conflicting objectives und hence of conflicting polices they thought ft fapos— stble to deal with this situation without thereby calling Into Jeopardy the whole policy of Aserican comttment to — the defense of the GRC a The confitcting objectives were recognized to be of $ ertefeal importance in determining what kind of public in statements the United States could make Tt was feared — by many officials that £ the United States unequivocally I comitted feself to the defense of Quenoy the GRC would simply sit back and force the United States nto a sore active resupply role hoping thereby to provobe a clash between the United Scates and Communtst China Alterns« tively the GRC night boob the mainland or take other action which vould Lead to a major war and so force the Uniced States to cone in because of its public comitsent Since — the United Scates wes unvilitng to comit feself privately or publicly to the GRC it felt unable to nake a cles statement of tts position to the Chinese Comuntats Despite the conpiete dependence of the GRC on the Uniced States for military equipment and for keeping open 25% to exert considerable influence on American poltey 1 Indeed its very weakness was a source of strength since the GRC could point out that 1f its demands vere oC not met the government might collapse Io __ strength in bergatning situations see Thomas C Shelling ol The Stzatesy ot Conflict Nervard University Press Canbri¢ge Hess 1960 pp 21052 stom eLsst ‘ «ss A major means by which the GRC was able to affect American poltey during the crisis vas thete control over ya Information portfcolarly information about the resupply situation on Quercy GRC officials could and did con My stanly point to the danger that the Offshore Talands would iz soon run out of supplies unless a major resupply effort were undectaken Viile Aserican officials increesingly cane to recognize that the figures given by the GRC vere 7 not completely accurate it was difficult to develop alternative figures During much of the ertsts Heshington relted on the GRC estimates even if they had to be taken with a geain of salt Considerable pressure was put on f the GRC to supply nore accurate figures but in the end ap the Adnintstration found it necessary to make their om estimates in Washington estimates that proved to be sore # reltable than Eiguzes contng from the CRC At the same time since the Adaintstzation could not be suze that Lts % figures based stoply on map studies and pensi1 and paper catculartons were correct it was forced to take into account the estimates presented by the Chinese Netfonattsts t Closely related to the estimates that suggested the gravity of the situation on the Offshore Islands were the GRC statements that the Islands were about to collapse In addition to the bed resupply situetion GIC officials also emphasized the critical fector of morale and declared thet the Quenoy defenders could not be expected to hold out under these conditions This factor vas even sore I difficult for American officials to judge Independently and wes in port mantpulatable by the GRC % — SEomme — 5 —— ———iliSm ——— — a Ime The GRC also could and did invoke the threat of wurrender American offictals vere continually confronted bie with the fear that the GRC despetzing of help fron the Unteed States might make a deel with the Chinese Commu nists Peking costtoued to play on this fea by offering in to open negotattons and attacking the United States in ® propaganda to the CRC The United States wes Matted in the extent to which it could negotiate with the Chinese p03 Comuntats since officials feared that such nesortations might trigger Pok Taipei negottactons The othe vw means of nflyencing Anerican policy G which the GRC d wes the theest to expand the wer in % perticular by boobing the mainland Anerfcan offictals I feared that GRC besbing of the mainland would lead to Communist bonbing of Tatwan thus celling into play the bow Anericen poscentees and Tending to a mejor wer betveen — She Heise Stoese aut Comuntse dhies Since is use seosp» io nized that the GRC favored such a waz there wes a reel eer that the GRC would try to provoke tt The United States had Tong recognized this danger and had a musber of formal agreements and understandings with the GNC s about the American right to be consulted and to approve Bs any attacks agatast the mainland Hovever it was — recopnized that even within the sptett of these rather i binding agreements the GRC did have the right to boob po the mainland in the face of heavy artillery fire agatnst the Offshore Telands GRC officials on Tavan and in vk Woshinston continued to ease the threat that they vould be forced into boobing the mainland unless nore vigorous m action vere taken by the United States Anerican officials I % a SEceer y % NO TTT wasst® — woase o —— JNQL GOPHER cn mmmenemmmmrccmee «f % ‘BECRET «ste § tended to counter this by potating out that the United States was ess likely to intervens if tt feared GRC expansion of the war and might not cone to the aid of the e GMG Af they acted in a wey thet seemed to conflict with I the spteit if not with the letter of the Aserfcan—01C I_ agreesents As tn ndcated above American ability to dest with — the GRC was hanpered at least Anttfally by an unwitiing» i ness to recognize the adversary relationship Lnvoived and ® to take the necessary action to deat with £6 Hovever % even when the problem vas recognized and faced up to the GRC control over information fts ability to threaten to 1 collapse or surrender and its abtlity to threaten to expand the war conbined to give the GRC influence over 1 American policy by curtailing Anerican efforts to negotiate # an end to the cetats petzcatton or aymontzy to me reurmuny A major Sssue raised ducing the Offshore Islands exists vas the question of how much suthortty could and should be given to military comers tn Heshington and in the field the fssue atose in two connections The first concerned how mich authority commanders in the field would have in denonstrating the A astcan involvement in the defense of the Offshore Islands The second Involved the question of authority to defend Quenoy and most importantly the rote of nucteas weapons in that defense UnvilUing to make a fim public comitoent to the % defense of the Offshore Islands the Adsintstration ves forced to rely in lerge pert on military actions in order Sgrasdg vecase NESTED —— — ase to convey to the Chinese Communists its involvement in the defense of Quenoy In seeking to taplement this policy sy astion the Adsintatsarion in Weahtogtsn vetted in terge neasure on the inttlative of its comders in the field The eater dedfstonernts disgatch a 340 inte free the United States to add an atzczaft coreier group from the I 6th Fiset to escort to within three miles of Quesoy—— were made in Washington but a host of other decisions dectstons probably crftical in making clear Anertcsn Involvement were made on Tatwan and in CHICPAG hest— quarters in Hawai Questions such as how many ships would be dnsaived in the escors whes saneuseen to coeey out in the Straits and so on were decided there Aneri— can military officers in the field were well avare of the i task which had been given to them and responded with I sensizivity to the problems involved They recognized shee the sbreceive wee uo convey Avertcen dosubsenint a sithout beive posvecetive ane dithout beioging in a mades clash between the United States and Chins They recos 7 nived their sesponstititey and futfiiied is nose eostly i than would have been the case had Weshington officials astelpreq us divest every move dyou the vensages Tf Washington vas prepared to transfer authority for p siiitssy nunsiverieg in the Tatwen Serstte to officers PO in the ield it was deternined to keep dectstons on how 50g to react to tnvaston of Query centered in Washington f The wets Heves aonserned te recesses Segiee of defege tion of authority to the Joint chiefs and the extent to shich the Sresblent had us wake un hits wind In advance Pq These ses geneest aersemene shoe u wesiston tn petuctpts fo bo SEomn‘r SS SONC ASIF iE 4 «ss R Co hid to be mate as 88 Sitthec th€ United Seoten uenced as reast quickly to an tnvaston of the Quenoy Ielands It was agreed that the United Scates would be fovolved tn thet defense and this led to the question of how much advance authorfty had to be given to officials in the ain field or to the military in Weshington Apperently without l any disagreement it vas settled that officals in the field would stmply be told to prepare for the defense of # Quemcy and 1f there wes no time to consult the President i% the Joint Chiefs would be authorized on their o inteta— ® tive to dizect the enploynent of AnerScan conventional forces in the event of an invaston of Quenoy si The authority to use nuclear veapons hovever ss remained finaly in the hands of the President Mich time £5 was spent at high levels in Woshington discussing whether 1 it was necessory to delegate this authortty at least to the Joint Chiefs The tenor of the discussion suggests that the President might at least have considered dete— as gating this authority 1f he had been advised that this was necessary to assuze the defense of the Offshore Islands Movever there wes agreement anong mtlitezy planners thet the Anmediate use of comventfonal force would be sufi— cent to detay any successful invasion long enough for the President to authorize the use of nuctess verpons In this situation the President reserved to himself the dectston to use nuctear weapons Hovever discussions in which he participated and the memorsndums which he signed left Little doubt in the minds of other officials that he was prepared to use oucteas weapons They recog— ar nized as apparently did the President that as long as BEcrst f « ommmmnimrmnnnanr emm arenons nm cmmmenomen c nizar ss ° UNCLASSIFIED # «so the decison to eaploy nuclear veapons was his stone he z could change his afnd in the event that he vas actually _L usted to release nucteaz weapons However the President did substantially increase the cost of deciding not to use nuclear weapons at the mosent of ertsts e authorized the use of American conventional forces in the defense of o Quescy with the clear understanding that they vere to be p0 #4 used ooty in e Last minute effort to deter a Chinese bo ag Communtat invaston or to stow it down long enough to perntt the Asertcan nuclear weapons to cone into play The use 1 of American conventional pover made sense the President had been told only 1f the use of nuclear weapons would — foltow atmost imsediately i The proviems and actions taken tn regard to delege— $ ton of authortty suggest that atlitary officers can at least in some situations be expected to eaploy Linited asounts of political force with sophisticated under l standing of the probleas of communicating resolve and restraint at the same time They also suggest thet the problem of advanced comnttment about the use of nuclear weapons 1s Likely to be a very knotty probles and as Eiserhover tndicated in this case at the heart of the diffiestty in any local ertsis in which major violence threstens to erupt quickly Exmiston — rrovucs ao mcrvtis 10 The overiding principle which gutded Anertcan mili— f tazy moves throughout the erfsis wes that the United 1 States vould apply only thet degree of military force which wos necessary to resolve the crists There vere a — auush p me ‘Eonar If r s — — UNCLASSIFIED — number of possible actions by the United States in the field of increasing allitary force such as escorting all Po the way in or boobing the matnland——not to sperk of the use of nuclear wespons——vhich wild have brought the erfsis to a head more quickly and beought fnto play greater American ailitery power While Anerfcan officials recos an nized these possibilities the pressuzes to keep the war Mtmtzed proved to be extremely arest i Perhaps the major incentive for Liatting Anerfcan involvement was the destre to avoid a major ves There vere tvo different kinds of wees to be avoided here a lexge waz with the Chinese Communists and a wer which im would Lnvolve the Soviet Unton and presumably the use of nuclear weapons against at least Asertcan bases As far ar — written record reveals American offictals did not castinguish these tvo dangers in seeking to avoid a major expmmston of the waz Anertcan officials had no destre dow to provoke a major atlitary confrontation with the Chinese Communists and hence both of these possibilites were viewed ah with aterm While ft was recognized that the Chinese themselves also desired to avoid this sort of major confron tation it was belteved that certain actions might provoke # the Chinese Communists nto bringing on a major wer — Another factor orking against an increased Asectcon f involvement in the war was the recognition of the unpopy— larity of Aneican policy in Congress and with the Anericen public as well as with Anerica‘s allies It ves belteved that the greater the level of Anertcan tnvolve— nene the greater would be the political cost and the —— greater would be the pressures on the United States which Szore@t UNCLASSIFIED __ ae secmer ® « — UNCLASSIFIED __ — might uttteately lead to a destston to change the poltey and agree to abandoning the Offshore Tetands R Two pressures working againat Listing the tnvolve— — went of American forces and for expansion were the destze to make cles to the Chiness Coomuntate that the United States would be prepared to expand tts military effort in as the event of an £nvaston and the need to use Zorce sufi hes cent to break the blockade As Indicated above Asercan 3 officials in the field vere aiven conside able leevey in demonstrating thet tovelvenent The guiding principle was apparently to do things which shoved the £lag withe L2 out directly affecting m litery operations or provoking a possible clash with Chinese Comunitat forces In rete Mimtzed to comoying to within three ntles and to fntensive f trating and encouragement given to the GRC levy Whether i the pressure for greater involvement would have oversidden the pressures agetast expansion 1£ the blockade had seened f to be working ts mposstble to Judge and American I offictats a the time had reat doubes as to vhat would be — done — The pressures for and against expansion of the sili— ice tary conflict and the Arerican reaction to these pressures I — suggest the need for greater understanding of the utility 4 — as welt as the dangers posed by the dectaton to expand a ty Atmized conflict It may not always be in the American # Interest to comvey a determination not to use more tli tary force thin ts necessary to cope with the tmedate danger At the same time a better understanding of the _ way in which a Lintzed wae could explode tnto a major — stoner Ao d mmm onneernirninn on cmmrmmnmmens—ammnazen oom enemee o 0 1g % UNCLASSIFiEp «os E conflict ts needed On this and other Sssues the 1958 Offshore slants crtsts can provide useful insights and illustrations of the problems But the U 5 Governsent will be able to use the lessons of the past to help seet 7 future erfses most effectively only 1f the lessons from P this erfets are conbined with those of other postwar nititary ertses and these are put into a general theoreti— cal framevork jm@te I bus o sEcaEt p % pre igt % car UNOlaSorcey % cont ogemiar LASSiFiEp u socuvent contro oath _ II ug C emmm % me inse zizo semazes casts a muzrsts @ 6 hommmmmnsmmey aiperss 1 % — nome er rmamce mr —rrereven jremrmers sun m saran wrom ve so—ace messoscisa ‘ser omubneatoe wen mroamm ruar rious i npiemmime w immiranne nim In urmer ravrwar «2 A vuty of the 2958 Taivan Straie Inatsonsites caine seme eaatey ate 2 U S government clasei wor 3 materiais as wo CIRCPMG and the Taivan Defense Comnant in Tetpeis 4 unciarsi A Erineeton University and 3 persones a 1 trectay favored in the sriats 0 s w h fe 0 conrmeNprar