DJ CLASSIFIED Authority kl® t eJ'l 7 OQ_0773 OUTGOING N 0 D - I Is -2 ocT aoz 22 1 s Department of State N00261 6 1 NODS•00 STcoPy 035 5 z INFO ocr-00 AOS- 0 00 R O AFTED BY ACOA NP NXCRLWilLIAMSON OES JBORlGHT APP OVED BV ACDA NP CVANDOREN OES N LNOSENZO OES NEC GHEL FRICH PM NPP L WARREN 5 P RGAL L UCC I I N R lP M_ 4 I G F O X AR f'i' ITZER EUR WE EBEIGEL S S•OIOASA OBERG TELEGRAM ··············--•-065267 0222127 6 F 022139Z OCT 80 ZFF6 FM SEC TATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY PARIS P IORITV INFO USI T BAGHDAD PRIORITV AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY SECRET STATE 26 575 NODIS USIAEA - E O 12065 RDS 1 3 9 30 2000 TAGsr PARM TECH FR 17 IAEA SUBJECT SAFEGUARDS•RELE ANT TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON OSIRA RE AC TOP ___ - - -« - _ r _ _ - -- ·• _ •• - - · ·• ' t- ·· - -x 01 a• • · -•- 'CC ''·-- 1 cs AS E BASSV ANn GOF KNOW US HAS A MAJOR 0 PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTiNCE TD AEA SAFEGUARDS ONE ELEMENT OF TMIS P OG AM RELATES TO SAFEGUAROS FOR RESEARCH REACTORS IAEA hAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN SAFEGUARDS A PROACHES FOR SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DJ CLASSIFIED Authority t UID t eJ' 7 ·I Department of State OUTGOING TELEGRAM 'D I -i---------- S N 0 D I s J '-- l -- PAGE 02 SECRET STATE 263515 so E TYPES OF FACILITIES INCLUDING LARGE LIGHT WATER MODERATEn HEU ESEARCH REACTORS DURING INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH IAEA PERSONN L IT RECAME CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT SURE OF MO 10 DESIGN SAFEGUARDS APPROACH FOR OSIRAK REACTOR IN PART ECAUSE OP INSUFFICIENT Ok COhFLICTING INFOR ATION AVAlLAB t FROM IRAQ I PARTICULAR WE UNDERSTAND LARGE APPARENT AM8lGUlTY IN POTENTIAL POWER AND FLUX LEVE S CREATES MAJOR UNCERTAINTY AS TD WHETHER PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION IGHT BE SUSSTANTlAL1 21 S FYI DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES SENSITIVITY OF ENTIRE QllEST ON OF FRANCE IRAQ NUCLEAR COOPERATION ANO THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NDT TO COMPLICATE OR DELAV THE PROCESS OF OBTAININGANSWERS TO THE SENSiiIVEQUESTlONS WEHAVE PUT TO FRENCH ON E TENT OF THEIR OeLIGATIONS TO IRAQ ANO T EIR PLANS FOR HEU S IPMENT ENO FYI wE KNOW FREN H WILL WANT TO FACILITATE MOST EFFECTIVE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT THE OSIRAK REACTOR ANO WE BELIEVE AN IM Pr RTANT STEP TO THAT ENO WOULD BE fOR FRANCE TO ASSURE THAT IAEA HAS ACCURATE AND CO PLETE TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO SAFEGUARDS THE IAEA'S NEED FOR SUCH I FO • MATION WILL CONTINUE DESPITE THE CURRENT FIGHTING IN THE REGION 3 Sl ONE POSSIB E WAY TO PURSUE THIS POINT MIGHT BE FOR EMBASSY TO D SCUSS MATTER WITH LOWET MAKING POINTS IN PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE ANO SEEK H S VIEWS ON HOW TO ENSURE TMAT INFOR ATION SUCH AS THAT LISTED IN PARA 4 oE OW 15 FROV DEv TO IAEA FOR EXAMPLt FRANCE MIGHT PROVIDE INFORMATION OIRECTLY TO IAE• NOTlFYI G IRAQ Y U M•Y PROVlDE LIST OF QUESTIONS IN PARA 4 TO LOUET OR OTHERS AT VOUR DISCRETION IN DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION ITH GOF SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIV1E SECRETARY Df CLASSIFIED Authority 1 JMD t eJ' 7 I 1 c 6 Department of State OUTGOING # TELEGRAM 'fr-- TEsO_ ------- s N 0 D I - SECRET STATE 26 575 YOU MAY ISH TO EMPHASIZE T AT THE lNfORMATtO REQUESTED S TEC N CAL DATA OF A TYPE WHICH IS ORMALLV AVAILABLE ON MOST REACTORS FROM PEN PUBL SHtD SOURCES 6UT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED TO THE eEST OF OUR KNOWLEOGf ON THE OSlRAK SOME FORMATION IS AVAILAB E PUBLICLY ON THE DSIRAK REACTOR IN FRANCE UT AGENCV S UNDOUBTEDLY NOT CLEAR ON DIFFERENCES IF A Y WH CM lGHT EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO RE ACTORS 4 cc FDLLO ING ARE THE QUESTIONS HlCh OCCUR TO US lN CONSIDERING TASK OF IAEA lN SAFEGUARDING OSI AK EFFtCTIVELY Al WHAT CAPACITY DOES THE OSIRAK HlVE FOR INSERTING NATURAL OR DEPLETED UR NIU FUEL 1 IN THE CORE REGIONJ 2 IN TME PNEUMAiICIHYORAU IC TRANSFER TUBE5J AND 3 AROUND THE CORE hAT IS TME ACCESS TO MATERIAL IN EACH OF THESE REGIONS ce WMAT S TME MAXIMUM POTENTIAL PO ER LEVEL OF THE OSIRAK BASED ON CORE SIZE AND HEAT TRANFER HOW MANY ASSEMBLIES REFLECTOR CONF GUR•T ONS ETC WHAT IS THE NOFMAL FUEL ELEMENT LOADING AT RATED POWER CC IS THE OSIRAK IDENTICAL TO THE OS RIS IN ITS REACTOR INTERNALS CE G 55 GRID POSITION 10 HYDRAULIC RESEARCH TUBES 1 PNEUMATIC TUBE CO wHAT IS THE MAXIMUM HEAT REMOVAL CAPACITY PR MARY AND SECO D•RY AND AT IS THE POTENTlA fOR UPGRADING THE INSTALLED SYSTEM E wHAT IS THE APPROXIMATE GEOMETRY ANO ReACiIVITY ORTH OF THE 6ERY LIUM REf ECTnR HO MUCH OPERATION f EXI8IL TY POWER LEVEL FEFUELING NT RVAL' REMAINS FOR PERATION WITHOUT A EF ECTOR CA TME RERYLL UM ELEME TS BE REMOVED wITH THE CRANE OR ARE THEY WELDED INTO PLACE SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY oicLASSIFIED Authority kl® t eJ' 7 -- -----•-·l a - I D r----- Department of State OUTGOING TELEGRAM s j 'N 0 D J s N 0 D I s SECRET STATE 263515 CF WHAT IS THE FUEL ANAGEMENT PROGRAM SPENT FUE DISCMARGE VS TI E SHUFFLING PATTERN ETC FOR HIGH POWER OPERATION WHAT IS THE E PECTED CAPACITY FACTOR OPERATION AL POWF R LEVE AND DOWN•T ME FOR REFUELING A D MAINTENANCE WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM CRED BLE SUSTAINED DUTY CYCLE CGl WHAi ARE THE FAST AND THERMAL FLUX DISTRIBUTIONS lN•CORE AND Ex coRE1 HOW ARE THESE AFFECTED ev THE PRESENCE OF A REFLECTOR H w AT ARE THE EXPECTED RANGES BURNUP AND RlSIDUAL ENRICH ENT' Of DISCHARGED FUfL CI S TrlERE READY ACCESS TO THE R ACTOR POOL IN PARTICULAR COULD THE lAEA EAS LV INSTALL SURVEILLANCE CA ERAS HOW ANY WOULD BE REOU REO TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS SU VEILLANCE UF THE REACTO HEAD REFLECTOR AND PENT FUEL POOL HOW MANY SPENT FUEL ELEMtNTS CAN BE STOREO IS THERE PR V SION FOR PLACING SPENT FUEL IN A SEALED STORE CJ CAN THE TOP OF THE REACTOR Bl SEALED BET EEN FUEL RELOADS F NOT WOULD IT BE DIFFICULT TO MOCIFY THE STRUeTU E TO FER IT THE EASY USE OF IAEA SEALS W ICH wOULD ASSURE TMAT NOTHING EXTRA HAD 9EEN LOADED INTO THE REACTOR BETWEEN PUE CHANGES CK IS THERE A CENTRAL LOAD•OUT STATION OR CELL THROUGH HICH ALL R A IATED SAMPLES FRO THE PNEUMATIC AND MYORAULIC TUBES MOST PASS IF SO lS THERE SUFFICIENT ROOM TO INSTALL A SURVE LANCE CAMERA ANO OR GAMMA MONITORINi UNIT lF HOT CAN UNUSED TUBES BE SEALED BY IAEA SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY D CLASSIFIED Authority MD t N 0 0 I s 0 0 N 0 D I s t Department of State SECRET STATE 263575 OUTGOING TELEGRAM CL' IS THERE A TRANSFER CHANNEL BF TWEEN THE OSIRAK ANO THE ITALIAN•SUPPLIED LABORATORitS ARE THERE ANY SrlIELOED TRANSFER CASKS AT THE SITE CHRISTOPHER SECRET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I