·· t' • · ' I r OFORN hcT RC - -o_ ·- c 0- J - l N ct'f J1I 0 7 -- -j------ INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 1 July 1981 IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ Su mmaru IsraeZ's raid on Iraq's nucZear faciZity on 7 June couZd be a watershed event in the MiddZe East creatina new miZitary and poZiticaZ reaZiti s The US-IsraeZi r Zationship once more is a central issue in regionaZ poZitics and new strcins have been added to US-Arab r·e Zations Washington 's abi Zi ty to promote Arab coop eration against a Soviet threct or to bring the A abs and IsraeZis to the bargaining tabZe has been struck c hard bZow Arab Zeaders f r from the frontZinas· in the Levant have been shown that their miZitary ar d eco nomic faciZities are not beyond the reach of IsraeZ's striking power Rather than drawing them into a nego tiating process IsraeZ's demonstrated pro ess iZZ onZy speed the arms race TeZ Aviv has madP the poir t that it w ZZ not aZZow an Arab state to dev6Zop a nucZear weapons capabiZity In the absence·oj US restraint on Isra Z Arab Zeaders iZZ intensify their search for aZternative ways to boost their security and protect their interesta this presents opportunitiP s for the USSR 6 Nf' 87 This assessment was prepared under the auspices of the Natio al Intelli gence Officer for Near East and South Asia by the Central IntelligeRce Agency's Office of Political Analysis The assessment responds to a request from NFIB principals It was coordinated informally at the working level with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State the Defense Intelligence Agency the NationaJ Security Agency the Department of Energy a c _th te l l gence organizations of the military services · s - - r · ' -- - O J r - ·--·-- -- - - · t -·----·-·-·--- k · f SE NOFO NTRACT ORCON The nuclear issue alone has far-reaching implications Development of a nuclear weapons option is now part of the public debate in the Middle East Former Defense Mini ter Dayan has dispelled the ambiguity that surround d Israel's nuclear program by acknowledging Israel's capability to produce nuclear weapons and the raid on Iraq has lai -T viv's chall nge before the A rab world in clear terms J Iraq's President Saddam Hu ssein responded by suggesting that wo d governments provide the Arabs with a nuclear deterrent to I el' s formidable nuclear capabilities His message to other Ar s is tha-c they can have no security as long as srael alone co inds t e nuclear threat Saddam Hussein will f d s his position throughout much of the Third World e recent OAU meeting in Nairobi noted that the des rayed Iraqi reactor is now viewed by many conferees as a symbol o f Third World aspirations Anger over its de truction taints general attitudes toward the United States and Egypt as well as toward Israel Arab reaction will indicate if Isr l's raid was a turning point or simply anot her example of the region's instability On the popular level Arab anger will be directed at the United States fer being responsible for Israel's ascendancy and at Arab leaders for havin· r failed to protect Arab interests Unde r such pressures Arab leaders will seek protection in the always nebulous Arab unity intensify their conventional arms buildup look for new ways to restr in Israeli power and in some cases might reevaluate their relations with Washington and alter their view of th ole the United States should play_ in the Middle East Arab Reactions so Far Neither deep-seated anger nor widespread conviction within t i e Arab world that the United States was somehow involved has been translated into action Calls for retaliation have come from some Arab radicals and Arab media but Iraq's agreement to the compromise resolution at the United Nations Security Council undercut demands for the use of the oil weapon Use o-f oil or financial leverage would i n any case probably require a n Arab consensus similar to t at reached in Baghdad followi g Egypt's signing of th Camp David accords An Arab summit meeting for late summer to discuss th raid is being consid red in some circles y f' ' 1· ' I I '· ' NOFORN OR CON Immediate Repercussions The immediate political consequences of the raid have been along predictable lines Iraqi President Saddam Hussei11 has suffered a blow to his prestige and to his ambitions to be leader of the Arab world and the nonaligned movement It will take Iraq several years to rebuild its nuclear facilities even i7 - Baghdad finds cooperative suppliers of nuclear·techriology A related consequence of the raid is damage to the Non Proliferation Treaty NPT and to the IAE A safeguards system The full scope of the damage is not yet clear The Israelis have precipitated a debate over the effectiveness of-the safe guards system by justifying their raid on the grounds that the IAEA safeguards system is a sham This debate probably will have a detrimental impact The safeguards system--though un able to prevent a nation from developing a nuclear weapon--has long been assumed to have a deterrent value because it raises the political costs of a weapons development decision S NF The Iraqis have had the support of most IAEA members be cause of general acceptance that international and bilateral s feguards over Iraq's program were sufficient to guard against the diversion of fissile material for a nuclear device Saddam's statemeots about the need for an Arab weapons capa bility however probably will in ibit future transfers of nuclear technology t• Iraq from ma riy IAEA members The raid has damaged the rationale for a US Middle East policy based on cooperation against threats fro m the USSR Arab le ders will claim even more forcefully than bef re that Israeli aggression and frustrated Palestinian aspirations are the central issues causing instability and that the United States holds the key to both US requests for cooperation in countering the Soviet threat are now more likely to be met with counterdemands than with sympathy - I f f ' ' I SECRE- NOFORN NOce1N TRACT ORCON · Israel's raid on Iraq gives the USSR an opportunity to improve its position in the Middle East and to further d s credi t the Camp David process The Soviets have encouraaed the view that the United States was involved in the atta k in an attempt to unify the Arabs against Washington and Tel Aviv Moscow will also try to exploit the added strains in relations between the United States and tile conservative rab states such a Jordan and Sau i Ar a- promote its own relations with those countries c Although the Soviets are disappointed with US-Iraqi cooperation at the UN in the wake of the Israeli attack they are using raid to demonstrate Soviet support of Baghdad and to to reverse Iraq's shift toward the West Iraq probably will pursue its openi g to the West despite the Soviet effo ts E NC OC' - · · The USSR is unlikely radicall ito ch nge its cautious policy toward providing nuclear technology to other countries Moscow's perceptions of the dangers of nuclear weapons pro liferation coincide in many respects with US concerns Soviet nuclear exports generally carry controls at least as stringent as those a plied to US nuclear transfers The·rsrueli attack on Iraq will reinforce these Soviet concerns about the prob lems inherent in nuclear proliferatio especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East LJ --NF anger Term Problems Israel's raid will produce in the Arab world a deep ened skepticism that the United States can or intends to play an unbiased peacemaking role in the Middle East In Arab eyes Washington has transformed Israel into a major military power that threatens Arab security and then r efused to restrain Tel Aviv'g use of that power The Soviets will e loit this sentiment A SES R ET NOFO OCONTRACT OR CON At the same time the raid dem0nstrates--to moderate Arab leaders at least--that they have few if any immedi ate ways themselves to check Israel's power and few al ternatives to continued US involvement in the peace proc ess The raid then will cause them to redouble their efforts to influence the Middle East policy of the Reagan administration especially if they believe that policy is in its formative stage F -r-- Danger of New Shocks Dramatic Arab action against US 1nterests does not seem likely in the near term but Arab policymakers and public opinion will be highly sensitive to new shocks for several mantes The greatest dunger is that some new Israeli action or us position which the Arabs regard as inimical will develop before the anger over the ·raid on Iraq has subsided If such actions occ r risks to US interests in rease substantially Terrorist actions are of course an always present danger Events such as these could make the pressures on Arab governments to retal j ate against the United States irresistible Domestic opinion would be an important factor It is virtually impossible to predict when Arab leaders either individually or collectively will judge that their political survival depends on more forceful action to placate popular sentiments It is likely how ever that Israel's raid on Iraq has moved some Arab leaders closer to that theoretical point ' Protests From us Friends The most heated Arab reactions to the raid have come from goverrunents in the Middle East generally supportive of the United States Each presumably believes its US ties make it especially vulnerable to critics Jcr·dan Jordan's reaction was highly· emotional and strongly anti-US Many prominent Jordanians have called for review of the regime's ties to the United States They argue that Washington must have known about the raid in advance and that Jordan's close link to the gpited States is an embarrassment and a liability j The initial likely to remain ' - - ' Nonetheless Sadat seems resigned to Begin's reelec tion and he probably is prepared to resume the stalled autonomy negotiations The Egyptian leader does not want to give Tel Aviv any excuse for refusing to r urn the eastern Sinai on sci1edule in April 1982 j S'r The raid probably has increased the chances howe ·er t hat after April Egypt will look for new alternatives to the autonomy talks and seek to reestablish its position in the Arab world by substantially cutting back its ties to Israel Egypt will not abrogate the peace treaty but Sadat may be prepared to halt the normalization process if provoked further Saudi Arabia The impact of the raid on US-Saudi relations will not be fulli felt until Saudi leaders can more comp etely assens attitudes within the royal family among the Saudi public and in Arab councils Saudi leaders have been able to use US support for the UN reso lution condemning Israel to deflect questions about the value of close ties to the United States J S-'r ' 7 T I SEC NOFO KACT ORCON Iraq and Libya Saddam Hussein's reacr ion to the raid has been governed largely by his concern over he war with Iran He is tryiL g o use the heightened anti Israeli sentiment to im rove Iraq's ties with Syria and Libya Iran's principal Arab backers He would like to end Libyan and Syrian military aid to Iran to create a solid Arab front against Tehran and to put pressure on Tehran to negotiate an end to the war He also hopes to unify the Arabs against Israel A more realistic objec tive is simply to gain greater sympathy for Iraq's strug gle aqainst Iran and to embarrass the Syrians and Libyans for their continuing support fo Tehran s1' Saddam Hussein's temperate behavior has probably strengthened his ties with moderate Arab states which have supported his moves away· from Moscow and his war ef fort against Iran It also has drawn favor from West European and Third World states'· 1hich a i e accustomed to more extreme Iraqi reactions Saddam Russeir has per mitted criticism of the United States for its role in arming Israel but he did not repeat even standard crit ici3rns of the United States in 'his first public speech after the raid This restraint may reflect his continu ing determination to balance his relations with the super powers Israel's raid however plus deep suspicion that the United State was an accomplice have bolstered the hand of hardline Ba'thist's who oppose Saddam Hussein's recent tilt toward the 'llest 3 NE It is too early to judge how seriously Saddam· Hussein's domestic position has been damaged by the raid His de cision to accept a compromise resolution at the UN was opposed by some Iraqi officials The raid also intensi fied dissatisfaction over the war with Iran I SE 6 NOFO CONTRACT ORCON Libyan Pre ident Qadhafi quickly saw in the raid an opportunity to refurbish his regional credentials and to regain entry into Arab councils Playing upon the theme of Arab unity in the face of Israeli and US aggression Libya is moving aggressively to reestablish relations with a number of Ara b states includi g Morocco Jordan Iraq and Saudi Arabia Underlying motives fer his ac tions may be fear of US intentiQns as well as of an Is raeli attack on Libya To facilitate his reentry into the Arab mainstream and establish a greater degree of regional respectability it is possible although by no means certain that Qadhafi will temporarily moderate his support or subversion of his Arab neighbors J e1