UNCLASSINED U S Deparment of State Case No 1200008703 Doc No C0s820520 Date Otze2018 T reusemmarene wore ts» T oor s W CD G 0 — wor—provzremntzon mexzcarrons or mu Alka me #$ zsmmz avence on me rmaor reactor $o svoll % ms ¢ 8 8 1 summary and Introduction BIR OF R Apazt from its impact on US security interests b in the Middle Bast on US relations with teract and EWGA some of the Rzab countries and on Us Wilddre rast _ B peace efforts the Ieraeli aid on the Iraqi nucleas MD RGGNQ I reactor near Baghdad on dune 7 2981 4s likely to B have an anbiguous influence on U5 not—proliferation § — selle 3 on the negative side the raid t CORR B ——undernines the credibility of the IPR—tARA non I protiferation reine MASS — F oscapasenbe a precedent or mtasbary attach on — Icleas fectlihioss 4 ——widens the opportunity for Soviet penetration — j sf the Sideln Rask via sustomr socperations ant ——veakens the credibility ‘of the Reagan adinistra E tion‘s non—proliferation policy 6 on the positive side the raid i ——underscores the nuclear protiferation threat to M world peace and regional stability © 3 reptonides a now beveing as or stegs custecs ausece i controls on sensitive items to problem countries ——my provide new opportunitice to improve the — R WPr—ThEX resine by focusing attention on sone j of its inadequacies and ——sets back Traq‘s questionable nucteas research Progr 6° Review mony E Manta Russa ser j asenes finimer 6 mos—s — 2 27 02 stoadarc 2 f it Report 190—0h — August 17 150 UNCLASSIRED U S Deparmentof Slate Case No 120008703 Doe No COSS20520 Date ot20z018 UNCLASSIRED U S Deparmentof State Case No 1200008703 Deco Codéz020 Date oxzerzte secres can Initially many if not most US nuclear policy experts per— ceived the raid as counterproductive to the goal of limiting nuclear weapons proliferation Yet the raid may well prove to have been the catalyst for a nore effective international consensus i to inhibit the spread of nuclear werpons—capable materials and 1 technology to politically unstable regions kkk k % I Io ‘ I UNCLASGINED US Deparment of lite Case No 20008733 Doc No C0eS20520 bate odzezote — unictaSsIeD US Deparmentat ute Case No M2000 dre Dec No Goseatezo Date cernaoté szcre negative Aspects of the tata 5 uz tt undermines the credibility of the NPP—TAEN non poitoneaet natin e i nan intinaee ferael‘t raid and dubsequent attempts to justify it is the serious damage done to the credibility of the NPTAEA Non—Proliferation Rreaty International Atomic mergy Agency resine 5 1 teract has openty challenged the effectivencss of taz safeguards to monitor NPP compliance in a potential proliterant nation In addition it has questioned whether the MBM as an International organization reflecting Bstoilest and Norti—bouth tensions would ever manifest the political will to report and act wpon saféquards violations in infloential ‘Third forld nations Despite efforts by IAEA and Us officials to rebut the Ternelt allegations the TMB‘ reputation undoubtediy has suffered fron the PubMctly TAEA effectiveness so likely to be hanperea by now Rorth—Bouth straine resulting from the raid and the perception by sone nations of tacit U5 support for the action of Tersel a nonNP party widety beleved to have a nucieas weapons capabiiity S F me Teras action also calls attention to an unpleasant possibility for proiiteration that exists within the IPM—IN regime frag‘s experience susgests that an NPP signatory can obtain under requisite TAA safeguards sensitive nuclear facilities which sould eventually give it access to nuclear weapons—usenle material The possibility that countries may facilitate their development of a mueleas weapons capability——or the basis for itwuhile remaining within the NPR regime piaces greater strain on the TMR and its system 65 international safeguards Long before the Teraeld raid « the InzM‘s ability to monitor NPM conpidance vae subject to some doubt This doubt will increase as nore sensitive facilities some of which are inherently difficutt to safegaard e g ceprocess ing and enzichnont facilities are brought into the inspection systen The recent allegations by the teraoii Government and others thas tim safeguards in feaq were inadequate to detect or deter proliferation fay weaken lotertanding V6 efforts to sain universal adherence to the tbr—tAz regine 2 I S7IEY Deiylte increased US pressure An recent years the otz renstang now Wet etpnatocien with the srescons noctons verpons pocenttal have act bete perssaded to adhere to the trentys— Argentina Beast Teenel Todia Pakistan and South Africa Nowe of thane chrestold nations is Attely to advere to the PR Sn the foresceable fuesce secrsz mon reszasanis so rorston mnctounts UnCLaSSI RED U Deparmentat ute Case No 2000 0073 Doc o C0Be20520 Date Otre2ote — UNCLASSINED US Depatmentaf Slate Case No 1 2000 007B3 Do No Co#s20sz0 Date Oezerzote store a 6 i® _ an unfortunate lesson that sone may draw from this affair is that adhering to the NBR and accepting TAEM safeguards a do not alvays suftice to reassure others of one‘s peaceful nuclear intentions Mations with incipient nuclear prograns may now be nore reluctant to accept IAEA safeguards because suspicious neighboring countries may still attack their facilities Or the raid may inspize countries seeking to acquire the basis for a nuclear weapons option to place exphasie on clandestine facilities 8 8 _ Athough the Iraqis apparently were not in violation of any safeguards requiremente the controversy over the Terai Justification for the raid underscores the lack of an effective intesnationg» consensus to deal with safeguards violations or Np withdravad 9 8 0 1f at some future date Traq or some other country decided to abrogate safeguards develop nuclear weapons and with— draw ron the NpZ the international community would be unlikely to take foreeful collective action to restrain it Future nuclear — assistance might be withneld by most supplier nations but nore 37 67k Haeng the wore troublesome political problezs of TABA safepuerding dn the Lack of credible international sections to force coupttance by taze that have abrogated thete NPT apreesent or stuply refused to adhere « to 18A safopuerde The TAEBM‘s Htatted over to initiate smetions has never been tested but there should be no great confidence that the system woud restrain a determined viotator Tn some cases material suspected of diversion to vespous proprans could be dectared stoten or missing Inspectors could detect nonecoopezstion but not necessortly prove sr wish to prove—non—coupt ance ‘ime—1ag could becone an iuportane factor an problems of translation couptlation and Snterpretation of daca and — bureaseratie detays might prevent prospt announcement of noo—coupitance or asspected violation 8 °% Any decteton by the A84 to report safepsarts vietstions or to proceed with sanctions vould be highly political probably following a dong persed of cautious deliberation Under the 1484 Statute the Dizector Genera could report nowconpliance to the Boaed of Governors which could in tuzn dnform the UX Secueity Gouneih and General Asserly It a country faited to comply within a resonable time the Agency Board could 2a or avepond TMA asststonce call for a return of msteriate and equipment made avaiable to the state and evepend LMA mesbership As many have noted there ds no expiicle provision nade for rbysical recovery by the TiB of satertats and or eqvipment that have been diverted to mfldzery purposes and ouch recovery vould have to avait action by the UJ Security ComeH2 Znsofar as the Security Cometh vould be Mighty unlikely to agree on effective paotaive measures against the recalcitzent state especially Af dt vere a developing country the TIGA senctiont would provide no moze than the protest for a pressptive aili tary steike by one of the superpovers on a neighboring state szorer nor resensace to rorsron nrromis UNCLABSINED US Departmento State Case No 1200008700 Doc No COSE20520 Date 424201 UNCLASSIED U S Deparment of Site Case No M2009—0872® Doe No Co#S20520 Date cerante — secrse 4« «— atzeet coltective intervention to disrupt the offenging state‘s nuclear weapons capability ds difficult to imagine « 5 7 the Nez—IAEA regime cannot enhance international security unless there is a credible mechanism for enforcement of its provisions Deipite #11 the International criticien of © Iseaei‘s unilateral action no nation or international organtza tion has yet dealt adequately with the question of how 16 would have responded to stop tzag if in two or three years Zerael‘s Aeta ae iaiaaie Aitsling cote ans ond fol oad acquized one or more nuclear devices 8 4 EstabMizhes a precedent for military attack on nuctear reoufties whe poscsspfel ereol progepeie ale strike Sn the Traqt nuclear reactor along with the uniccessful presin— ably Tranian attack in September 1980 has established the precedent for conventional military atiacks on nuclear targets Though the Oetrak reactor was not yet operational when attacked the raids could contribute to an international environment nore tolerant of attacks on such facilities ‘The international systam vould be subject to unacceptable disordar if such anarchic air strikes were to becote commonplace Unfortunately the com petitive international military assistance policies of the Soviet Union and Hestern nations have placed hish—performance deep penetration strike aircraft in the hands of niserous governments many in unstable regions This expanding capability of third world nations to project air pover adds another disturbing safety element to the problen of siting nuolear research or nuclear poser facilities in unstable regions 5 12 iidens opportunity for Soviet penstriation of the mane fess Re revise inon il stent to mnipiists feds anger and huniMation over the Terseli raid to expand ite intin— ence in the region and to veaken 08 ties with rab nations How ‘that Hestern nuclear suppliers are beconing sommet nore cautious in their dealing with Iraq the Soviets have offered to upgrade their own assistance although their capabilities to do so are limited by the higher priority need to conplete lagging domestic and Bast uropean projects fraq and other Arab states my be tempted by Soviet—supplied nuclear facilities On the other hand most potential Arab recipients would be very reluctant to broaden Soviet influence in their countries would prefer Nestern nucteaz technology and have noted that past Soviet safeguards 37° GeT AE present Th mont plausible method of enforcement 4s untiaterst action by the nuelour supplier state apatast the offending zectptent state Recavse sone bitstera nuclear agreements provide for suppiter retrieval rights to ateused nocleas technology and material this vould offer a Justification for direct intervention against a protfferane comery« szcrer nor reteasaais zo rorston intiomse UNCLASSMIED U S Depatmentof State Case No 1200000703 Doc No C0B520520 Date Odpeiote unctassiriep U S Deparmentof ute Case No 1200008703 Deciio Cossare20 Date otzszote secues — a requirenents have beep at least as stringent as those required by Western supptiors t S 0P Meakens the adainistration‘s credibility with consressitne DB pobfte ‘ant other mations on gon peciiferacion © ST Ht taf fefimaaient armani fin Ea 25 meen ctessiy articulated before the teroels raid the complicated and at times contradictory official 08 responses © to the teraeli raid may have further confused observers The administrations approach to the raid sought to balance several 1 conticting interests ——preserve Us—hzab ties US regionl secusity goals and the middie East peace process — —reassure terael and its sipporters of icontinied Us _ commitment ——refrain from appeazing to support an Israeli military action the timing of which may have been dictated by Erime Minister Begin‘s wish to enhance his party‘s fortunes in the pariia mentary election off ——admonish Terae for an adtion inifcal‘ to certain Us interests i £ 14s ——preserve the credibility of the Noz—Th¥h system 4 ——gefeng the expanded prosotion of safeguarded nuclear power in thizd world countries i S 0z US spokermen criticized the eraoli raid ite Justi fication and Sts timing tn the UW Security Counil the 09 voted to condemn the rmeseli raid The coherence and credibility of the Us position were vitiated however by President Reagan‘s wigely quoted public expression of understanding for terncl‘s self—Gefense sustification for the raid by the 0s failure to take any significant concrete actions to punizh Israel and by the impression created by come administration officials during 1 congressional testimony that they were attempting to gloss over IT TEH The BovIEEZ ive been generalty more cautious thin sone Hestern nations 49 supplying nuetese technology asd maceriats to itddle Eastern states hey have hovever supplied saat entepiarted research « resctore to feaq and Beype ind are constructing a nuctesr research conter Znctuding a sufepuarded research reactou for Libya They have dtscussed providing pover reactors to Syeia and Libya secast mor retensiaze to soteron meronis unctassiED U S Deparmentot State Case No 1200008703 Deco Coeszosz0 Sate otmezote UNCtaSSIIED U S Deparmantof Sate Case No 12000 0873s Doo Cosé20s20 Date xazo1e © secase —5 in proviousty expressed serious U9 concerns abogy the ultimate inter tions of traq regarding Sts nuctear program © 5 82 arab and many other Thixd Mosld nations are unlikely t be satisfied by the U8 simple condemnation of zerael in the Ul and detayed shipment of military aircraft They will see the mid UB rebuke to i non — tion nypecriay In the Tong sun sone of these rre vore ne az30—became more discontented with vhat they perceive to be discriminatory aspects of the NIPP—INEA regine sme us policy tovard Pakistan may further confuse observers — about the nature and depth of the Reagan administration‘s connit a ment to non—proliferation The U8 response to the eraeld raid along with the $3 billon US military and economic aid offer to Pakistan despite its nuclear explosive program underlines the persistent tension between nom—protiferation and other U5 foreign policy goats observers nay draw the conclusion that recent US policy Spposes proliferation in general terms but has not yet effectively focused on specific cases me 377 67° WiZTe The UB Tat mo hand evidence prior to the Terneld raid of an Heaqt decision to acqutze nochear weapons Zeaq was and 2s still seeking to acqutze far nove sophisticated nuclear factitttes then sto serpy neds atone would appesz to justify The U9 assessuent vas and remains that the Trapt propeen ts dasigned to provide the option to develop nucless weapons at sone point in the future Bren 15 the Onfzak reactor had not been dasaged Zraq probably vould not have had enough Eisstle material for a sustatind nuclese vearons program until late in the decade If it had been willing to pot aside its safepnards and treaty conmteaants and them vourd have depended on supply from outside Teag —te could have attained sutttetent materiat for a few nuclear explostve devices within f these to five years ware its esrrent nascent condieion the Traqt nuclonn propran fo a dead tn factor in the reston Tre Teast nucieas center vas struck by rotate in the vae with Trans Thls eateed for the Aizst tine the probien of tit Hnspections dveing wartime f Teaq does acaufee nuclear weapons the Anpitcations would be serious for Bs Inttrests in the ares — secrez nor resensaize zo ronston mnszouncs i UNCLASSITED US Deparment of tate Case No 1200008703 Doc No CO8s202z0 Date Oezeore UNCLASSINED US Deparment of State Case No 1 200000703 Doc No COSS20R20 Date drets secren 4 rositive Aspects of the Teraelt rata 0 the raid underscores the nuclear proliferation threat to vorld peach eptrregiontt Stabiner Efe the 1998 Incton resten tose Ee fecrert Geld appetze to have been one 0f those vatersied evens that vividly dramatizes the threat of nuclear proliferation to world peace and regional stability The pupMctty surrounting the raid should stimulate interest anong adninistration officials and congressional leaders to develop even tougher nom—proliferation proposais 0 _ the meagan adninistration‘s non—proliferation policy guiderines place oreater emphasis than did those of the previous adninistzation on fitting nonproliferation into on overall national security franevork Non—proliferation policy is to be more carefully adjusted to energy and political nilitary security requirements of particular regions 0 the previous administration sought often unnecessfully to obtain nuclear supplier cooperation in denying transfers of sensitive nuclear materials and technology to proiiferation—risk nattons C _ the current approach seeks to shift emphasis from muctea technology denial to expanded donestic and foreign ironotion of safeguarded nuclear power progran The adainistra Eien belfeves the 00 can pest retard the spread of nucteat — weaponsy by fostering strong regional security arrangements and by maintaining the credibility of its security comitmants in i order to reduce the pressure on some states to develop their win nustear weapons Moreover the US will seek to become perceived as a nore reliable nicleas supplier in order to have Greater intiuence over the scope and safety of international mucteas sates i s n my not having promulgated a non—proliferation policy and by expressing a positive attitude tovard nucieas pover develop mont the administration had unfortunately left the impression that‘1t was tess interested than its predecessor in monitoring prodiferant countries Since the teraeli raid on Iraq however the adainistration has taken a harder look at the security risks of nuclear proliferation in unstable regions Observers may now believe that the adrinistration will deal more carefully with — countries of great proliferation risk 5 nz _ trag‘s questionable nuclear research progran uas deravedcrpennace seriously ane destructive sesctes of the — TERI HEHE nly have seriously retarded the progress of a nuclear progran about which the Us had repeatedly expressed concern the Osizak research reactor has been severely danaged sscren mor resrasaze to rorston mstomme unctassiiEp US Depatmontat Sate Case No M2000 0870s Doc No CosBz020 Dat Otzszote unctassirien U S Deparmentat ute Case No 1200008703 Deeilo Cossate20 bare otmsrzote secure —i— a « and——if teaq wishes to continue this portion of its nustear pro— gran——may have to be entizely rebuilt Rebuilding could cost s Freq 2 to 3 or even nore years If traq were serious about acquizing a small arsenal of nuclear weapons hovever it vould derive most benefit from a natural urantum—fieled power reactor producing greater quantities of werpons—usable ptutoniun Though possession of such a pover reactor in which Traq has shou sone interest rather than the ostzak research reastor would be Teaq‘s best and fastest route to a viable nuclear weapons program — Hestern countries should now be extremely reluctant to supply Traq with a naturat uranium reactor the rafd may have increased the aesige of sone traqt leaders eventuatiy to acquire nuclear — weapons 57 yet in the current politicat ateospnere ireq and other Acab nations will not easily find willing suppliers C Potential proliferators must be nore discreet the destruction of the Sbtvat reactor pute potentint molfforetore on notice that their ostensibly pescefut nuclear progeans are no Monger beyond attack both nuclear supplier and recipient countries are now Likely to be more cautious in the future deverping countries may find St harder to Justity establishing broad—based nuclear research programs before they can identity realistic nuctear energy applications the tersciis have denonstrated by their action that even safeguarded nucloir facil Mttes can generate serious regional tension C fsracl slay have offered a negative axanple to other pations wotsied sbobe the fectens tetiiiores—or thers malgtbove Trasis sale nay have aveccesse in cetaying the reses nottess — program but 1t also brought universal opprobrium upon the Resin governnont Other nations with potentiai long—tern proliferation Problens on —theis— borders e g ‘zndta — Pakistan Chind — India — ——— Eoypt — Libya China — taivan Argentina Brazil my hesitate in the future‘ to 2sunch preesptive attacks which could subject A thom to an unwanted comparison with isnot actions they had thenseives condemned 8 z the raid provides a now impetus to tighten export controfe on «enirtive Eiowe to feitres Eomerics intent —— idtsttions Are that both France and Italy wiil be more cautious about providing future nuclear technology and material to 2z0q This may carsy over into a nuclear supplier consensus to get 57 SM TeX FeSeTHeme Sadan Ruoseto stated publicly on June 23 2981 that other nations stoutd help the Arabs to acqotre atontc bosbe in orice to ensure a Hidde East strategie batance with Isreet lossein‘s rests shoud probaby be seen nore as a clusey atceapt to draw world attention to Zesacata nucleus capabilities thin as an tnpiictt dectaration of Traq‘s intention to acqutze nucleons vespos secren nor reueasaste to roweron inrtoincs uncuassiNED US Deparment ot State Case No 1200008703 Des o Cosszosz0 par oxrezore UNCLASSINED U Deparment af Site Case No 120000733 Doeo Coss205z0 bate odzezore secmee i 4 tousher regarding proliferation—rizk recipient countries Given the Us adninistration‘s clear support for nuclear pover and for — renewed US nuctear exports U5 credibility with other nuclear suppMer states may afford it the opportunity to help forge an i improved nuctess supplier consensus to retard nuclear wesions i proliferation The US might also be able to encourage the fashioning of a special code of conduct for nuclear supply to the volatile Middle Bast region 6 0 Continued U5 support for a Middle Bast Mucteas weapons Free Zone MEMIPZ could help further this end the current atmosphere in the region however militates against any innediate prospect of eMPs success The lack of a con— prehensive Middre Bast peace settrenent limits the practical baste for such a zone Israel remains reluctant at a tine when some neighboring states are still officiaily comitted t denying tts legitimoy to __ 296 accept international strequares on att sts nusteas rasurstres or formvens a nuclear weapons option Moreover several key Arab nations have consistently refused to discuss the limite f or any proposal directly with zersel i S E Even 4f all nations in the Middle Bast region vere anenable to direct negotiations serious proplens could remain me ——Leraed would not want certain facilities at its Dinona mutes research center to be open to MEA inspection and resects the effectiveness or poiitical will of the 18h to detect nucteax weapons—related activities in Arab nations freeze thatz nuclear weapons potential in a position Inferior to terael‘s § N7 the raid may provide new opportunities to improve the i a aaa cei ongol a amia 1 deteteriots initial erfect on to NPM—IMEh resine Neverthcions no country is likely to withdraw from the NPR or to terminate Thzh safeguards as a consequence of the zaid Us chanses of expanding NPC menbership anong protiferationcrisk countries certainly will not improve but no such expansion was really in prospect before June 7 C »The most satutary effect of the raid nay be to bring again the proliferation problen unavoidably before the nuclear supplier nations With the deficiencies of the current system secree nor reteasnme to rotor introuie UNCLASSINED US Depatmentof Sate Case No M200808703 Dec No Co8620s20 Date ourezote UNCLASSINED U S Deparmentot ute Case No 200B—0873S Doe No Co#S20R20 ate ereaore tos b 4 seczer os — w — subject to intense pubMc seruting more political and inanotal support may be forthcoming © 8 42 tn the aftermath of the Termeli action all nuclear supplier nations have publicly reaffimed their strong support for the znh and attempted to defend its credibility hs a result some nations could decide to upseade thotx financial commitment to the ThA in order to increase the nuber of inspectors and to subsidize the accelerated development of nore effective safé— i quarding techniques 36th the President‘s recent nor—proliferation quidetines and congressional resotutions support strengthened safequards The ThEA may iteelt take action to improve the thoroughness of its monitoring of and reporting on safeguarded facilities in potentially sensitive countries As a result of recent publicity given to some disagreement aong AEA inspectors regarding the adequacy of safeguarding procedures n Zraq the i Thin Inspectorate may now take a greater interest in promoting a frank internal exchange of views on alleged safeguards dofi ciencies in specific countries 5 nz Eventually bowever the U8 and other nuclear suppliers must come to orips with the problen of designing credible international sanctions and additional measures to — restrain nations that may attempt to leave the NPP—IARA regine after using 1t to achieve a nuclear weapons capability I prepared by Charles 2 Cohen xzz0ss § Approved by Robert A Martin x2z04s stcres nor revensinte so roneton inrtoumce UnciassINED U S Deparment of Suite Case No 1200008703 Doeo C0#S20520 Date Otrszdre