- 7 7 11 1·· • • The Iraqi Nuclear Program Progress Despite· Setbacks - An Intelligence Assessmart #' - _ • 'J '·· - t ' lln t 83 • ' T-f Key Judgments llJl Ol'm4llotc rl0ll4ble ' '' ' 19'J _ rad lie ' rqon ·- · The Iraqi Nuclear Program Progress Despite Setbacks llla ----- The damagine Israeli airstrike on 7 June 1981 a1ainst the Osirak reactor at Iraq's Tuwaftha Nuclear Research ecDtcr dealt a siiJ iiicant setback to the Iraqi nuclear proeram but probably did not chanae Iiaq's long-range nuclear ambitions The reactor containment vcssc1 and adjacent control room ·both above around were destroyed althougll the many reactor components located undeqround suffered little or no damage Iraq's short - range options for acquiring fissile material-either by producing plutonium in the Osirak reactor or by diverting its hiehly enriched fuel-have been cHminatcd-until rebuilding icts done But Iraq's longer range program to build a siplficant and broad-based domestic nuclear capability-and probably an eventual nuclear weapon capability-is still moving forward steadily Iraq has been worldn1 ha d to acqulttr-primari y from Italy-the neces sary fuel cycle uranium supply fuel fabrication rcproccssing and waste treatment to support a reactor and·to extract Plutonium Iraq wanii to continue negotiations to purchase a naturaf uranium pGWCl' reactor Which if acqafred would be tho source of much larger quailtitics of' plutonium · than be produced In - · - iii JUM198J · • We still sec no identifiable nuclear weapon PfC ilJlm in Iraq But has made a few moves that could take it in that direction in addition to acrvin -Its broad purpose of eventual nuclear indcpcndcnec If forcfan assistance in vital areas such as the uianufacturin1 and testin of hiah explosives and the desien fabrication and t ne of nuclear wcaPonS could ·be obtainc l Iraq possibly could have a viable dcsicn completed on paper within a few years Unless they rcx civc silllificant added forci n bCi lp however the Iraqis 'Wl U not be able to produce the material for a nuclear WeaiteD bcf0rc the 1990s Attaining that capability even then depends critically on the forcip supply of a nuclear reactor-preferably a power reactor-of substantial size fairly soon iv • t • _ ' ' r · _ _ _ J Contents POi iii 1 2 3 4 Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Propam Before the Iran-Iraq War __ -- -- - --- --- · --- ----- Dircction of the Iraqi Nuclear Procnm Alter the Iranian Attack Effects ofthclsracliAttack 7June1981 6 Status of the lraql Nudear Prop-am Beforehand 6 ·- PhysJcaI Effec ts of the Attack 7 Effects OD the Iraqi Program 1 Iraqi Reaction 7 9 - 9 ·10 10 11 12 Prospcds for Iraql-Devclopcd Nuclear Wcapcns 12 Reactors tor Plutoalum Production 12 13 Otbcr Possible Acqufsition oC Fissile Material 141 Nuclear Wcapoo Dcvclopmcnt 14 • - - ----- --··- ---- ----r------· ----· __ ___ _ __________ v iiiiiiiil vi • The Iraqi Nuclear Prop-am Progr Despite Setbacks---' lntrodactloa 93-pcrccnt-cnri¥ uranium Suc i ma1CriaJ is nor mally referred to as JJiibJy enrich ur Iraq's nudcar RAD proiram was started with the and could be used Jn nuclear wca Gns -- establilhmc nt of the Iraqi Atomic EncreY Commfs- • _ sion IAEq in January 1959 In Aueust ot that year • On 5 April 1976• • •••-•U l Iraq the Soviets • Teed to proridc Iraq with a thermal siped a contract with Italy for a radiochemistry ruearch reactor IRT rated at 2 watts thermal laboratory which was completed in April 1978 On 8 MWt a radioisotope production kborator v and February 1978 Iraq signed a contract with the other 1upportin1 facilitics I'he reactor wu UJ Uaded Italians for four additional f aeilitics now completed in 1978 to S M'Wt ud subsequently to 10 MWL a radioisotope producdon laboratory RPL a matcri Subscqueatly the IAEC Cstablishcd the Nuclear Re- als tcstin laboratory a chemical CIJlfnecrin labora IC J'Ch Institute NR zy near the mace or Tuwaltha tory and a fuel fabrication laboratory J'hc as the location for the Soviet-built tadlitics fiPR 1 FF1 bas been referred to as the 30 T IDIIlpZ pro NRl came to be rceopizcd as the most important We do nol know whether the other Italian-built Iraqi sdcntlfic i cscarch faclli1 Y By way or rccoani· faciliticsi arc also1m1't of this project or are desipat tion lraQ apparently decided that proJccts and facili- cd by their own specific project name and number des built at the institute wou1d be dcsiinatcd am mil% toi The Soviet equipment and assistance came · earlier than any other forcian aid to NR I and were called slmpty the Tamm JZ proj 1111l On 18November197 J qrccd t0provtde Iraq with two -nuclear racarch reactors hot cells and fadlltlcs 1 The French assistance has been referred to as the 17 Tammuz project • The 40-to-70-MWt Frcnch-supPucd OsJrak reactor has bc cn dl $fpatcd by the Iraqis u the Tammu-J the smaller 800- ldlowatt·thcrmal kWt Ftcackapplicd Isis rcaccor has been dcsiEDAtcd T Each of Chcso tors wu to be fucicd with about 121 ilopams q of 1 Status of Che Iraqi Nadeu Propam Before Gae Iraa-lraq War 2 _ ·- Pages ' • '· • • · --------- -·----------· -------- s a a• - ·' · · meces or 01e Israeli Aud 1 Jane 1981 _ SUM Gt Che Iraqi Nuclear Proiram BeforeJaand · A few months before the Israeli the Iraq nuclear proiram was sdU at a 111dimcntary stq c as indicated by cxtcnsivc of instruments ad other cqaipmcut abroad Pakistan by way of c ompar kon wu much more advanccd--- -ltr #itr £ ' r U ' ' tm ·· to lime from a Swiss rum or two 500-aram containers of 99 5-pcrcc nt parity calcium metal Calcium metal k an a ccDent redudq aeent and would most likely be used to reduce uranium zirconium or plutonium halldcs to uranium zlrconlam or plutonium metal c J um metal m such a hiP-PuritY form bas no Gthc r uses tban u a red aient · Iraq has been intcrcstcd in obulaini a tacility to coavcn uranium at least to llac metallic f'orm Both J d•llic uranium ·and metallic plutonfum can J c ascd as reactor fuel or in audcar ezplosfvcs Zirco nlum alloys arc used u a daddiq CCIII' rcador fuel clements--- Thc IA EC Jau beca teyiae to upcradc Its computer capabllltla since 1975 lr q's National Computer Center bu nC catbr a prCssecl Interest la acquirlaa the - • J pUICIC ACOS 900 or ACOS 1000 computerS for BaPdad UDlvcnlcy We saspcct daat If' the c omput· • en are ac quircd they will be Used by the ABC The Japuese computers arc c ompan bJc to Ibo mM 3081 · ad 303J eompatcn ln_perf'onnancc and pdc e mid UleJ maid be ud'al la nudear weapon n icarch - One area la wbfcb - shown a ciu t interest WEE I t t UI iVI •is the acquisition of Jasen and associated equipment Bc Causc or the tJPC or equipment beiq souiht and because of an earlier · approach to the Italians for assistance in LIS we --· - l1lSpc d that Iraq Is interested in devdopini an enrich- inent capabllity by this means Evcn with some · t I •'Ill 6 ·' · Effects OD fhe Iraqi Proersl 1 I Ruction The Israeli attack clearly dealt a scvcrc blow to the Iraqi nuclear proeram but docs not appear to have attc rcd IraQ's lon -tcrm plans or 11uclcar indcPcndcncc Iraq has probably eottcn over In addition to the cuthcn berms and camouflqc the initial dlsarr y and morale problems caused by nculns to pl'OICCl apfmt air attack there was an the destruction or·thc Osirak reactor It now appears Intense effort -to aazufrc other security equipment to resolved to 1ct on with lU nuclear proeram but with protect the fac Uity f'rmn a possiDJc lfOUDd attack The JDQl'C attention to covertness and physical scccrlty cqufpmentsouiht •a·11• - · included cquipmeat_to detect an Wceal blastproot and airtidit doors metal and explosive Iraq's initial response to the Israeli attack was un d ud a pcrlmcter security system Such cbaracteristf ed Barhdad neeotfatfnz cll actlvities may bYO been paJ1ial f In rcspoasc to a rectly with the United Staics accepted a compromise reported attack on the facility by Muslim extremists UN Security Council resolution that simply con but le to CDDfirm an sudi auack dcmnCd Israel and called on Tel Aviv to place Its 1 nuclear facilities under internatimial safepards Credit for this moderate pcrformanCCt however was dissipated soon thereafter when Iraqi President Sad dam HUS8 YJ1 appealed Cor lntcrna assistance to help the Arabs acquire nuclear weapons as a dctc rrcat to Istacl Saddam's clumsy attempt to focus world attention ·OD lsraol's nuclear capabilh y broqht un- Publicity to Iraq and made Its Western collab oratois more aware or the proUtc ra1ioo dsb or sup J l 'inc Iraq with nudcar materials and tcchnoJ oa • • ' '· •· · 8 · ' 9 · -Top S CUt - • · · • t Prospeds for Coatiaaed J orelp Asdstaace France and Italy arc unlibly either to default on • c mrcnt Commitments to Iraq or to cut oft' all future nuclear contacts Neither country wants to take tfon that would dama iood relations with Iraq a lon ·tcnn source of oil ad'i'11Jcratfvc market for civilian and mDitary coods Both countria howcYcr m probably be more sc nsitivc In the future to prollf' btcms pards and Insist OD touPct safe- Iraq's oD I with its by nuclear supplicn has bcc1rrcduccd In two ways 'lbc stalemated war Iran has resulted In sharply reduced oil exports mad has undermined Iraq's ability to use the oD weapon apinst France and for JtafJ A second factor Is that world all mrpluses laa made other • C01IDfrics more approachable tlmn Carmer 10 '• ' L---------------------------·-·----··--- • 11 Shortly bctorc the Im ell attack on Tawaltha aocord ine to State Departmc nt J'CP l'thl SNIA·Tcchlnt and the Iraqis had met to firm up final details ot a fcasiDility study for Italian provision to Iraq of a power rp ctor rated at about 300 mepwatu electric MWc equivaleut to about 900 MWL The reactor fnvolTcd--tho Itallan CIRENE hich exists Ollly tn · protot lpC form-is dcsiined to operate OD natural manium fuel althoup the PrototYPe uses sliehdy enriched uranium ' Because the Iraqis arc developlq the capability to produce the necessary fuel dcpcnd cnt upon tbCir obtainhl ' three -nomcmltivc · laboratories this reactor could eivc them a to si nlficant quantities of plutonium startfn ID nine or 10 years The Iraqis ctartlcd the Italians by askinR for a commibnent to build the rcactor-somcthini the FbaaUy - Tcchiat Jaas su mit ed a bid and rcccatly been tclcctcd as OllC or two final candidates for a power reactor site fCUJDility-study This would be a rather innocuous and 1111PfO'VOC1ltivc contract Nevertheless it means that chc company c oatimscs to pursac nucle· ar c ootracts witll Iraq if o6l'y sclcctiVely These · eontracts could lead to a proerc uivcly deeper fnvohtc meat · In SUDUIWY ItaJy will remain the major ltlpplier of · chc Iraqi nudcar Despite the proliferation risb Italy probably 'Will contlnuc hclpin1 Iraq in nwncrous ucu of nuclear tcclmoloa possibly even lndudins rcproccssla1 and plutonium cbcmlstry Be cause Italy is a major Iraqi arms supplier it probably could fmpcsc additianal safcpards without endanecr· mi_ tions with Iraq Ofller CoaaCries Ia addJtioD to conthndnc its relationships with fndus triaBzod W cstcm supplier countric a Iraq probably wDI pat an atcr emphasis on stn n t Jcnjq uudcar · Reactors for Plutonium Proc1acC1on cooperation other fndustriatizcd countries and Iraqi options for acqairiac f assllc matcrial-HBU or with Third World counttics In those situations where plutoafam-f'or weapons are ¥a1' much restricted • Wcstcn1 abllfty to infl nuclcm ttansf'en to Iraq The cmly routes that appear to ofl DJ' dwlce o · Is cvea more limfted lraq mlaht also make srcatcr sacccSs In the late 1980s to early 1990s arc rebaUdlni dl'orcs 16 acquire nac1ear matcrfals covertly bat we Osliat buDdfnc l DOChcr research reactor or bafldlnc would not expect such eft otts to be succcsUuL Na a production rcaClOf or a power rcaccar allot them odicr' country WC bcli Im bccn successful iJi IOUrCei of plUtonfum The daadcstfne acquisition of acquirine nacleu materials c OvertJy_ _ · HEU m plutaalam would be a unc cru n _opdon at · Iraq bu wl DUC1car contacts With t oth Palistan and to an Osirak replac cmcnt Iraq has several options ft may abandon the Osirak project rebuild Osirak with French assistanc c or baDcl an indieenous rcacS tor • N noted cadlcr ft would probably take rrom one Brull -lraqi-Pal istani nuclear contac ts have taken place from time to tfmo cmr the past few ears possibly includini limited c otJaboratioa since the k nell attack We do not blow the exact nature or the recent contacts but they appear to have been related to purchases of uranium and nuclear cquiPmciit Iraqi-Brazilian nuclear contacts have increased since the two conntrics si cd a cooperation IJ'ccmcnt in 12 • t I t· ' • • • • • to three 'C8 1 for the French to rebuild Osirak longer if then were additional Israeli intcd'Crcocc Evco IC the rcactor wcrc rebuilt the French probably would insist oa substitutiq a lower emicbcd fuol This step would climiDJtG the problem or Iraq's divcrtinc fresh HEU fuel for bombmakiq Iraq still could produce plutonium in the reactor either by 111iD1 the Y cant · podtJons in the reactor core or by buDdfai a b af'9UDd the core Loadini natural uranium Into the acant core positionS would produce only about 1 q or plutonlum por year even with the reactor opcratine coastantly at full power Thcrcf'orc Iraq would have · to operate the reactor for several YC1J1 to acquire caoueh plutoniatn for a sinclc device Puttiq a blanket around the core however possibly could However Iraq would still be dependent on forcip enrichment services and hence could not 10 Into overt clivcrsion unless it intended to sacrifice further opera tion of the rcactor lraq midit aitcaJ to avoid sarciu r by comtruct ini a reactor clandestinoly However tho project would be difficult to carry otit clandestinely cspcclal- ly since Iraq would be dcpcn4cut on Brazil or Spain to conceal their own participation With a fac Uit ' of this size and lar1c numbers of pcnonncl and materials it is unlikely that It c ould be kept sccrct for Joni In any case it would be very dftficult to obtain enriched uranium fuel dandcstincly- · ucc as much as 10 q of' plutonium per r· It is unlikely that Iraq could complete construc tiou of -- either a natural-uranium he Y-water power rc CJOr type such as the CIRENE or a PWR before the In dtbcr case Iraq would have to fabricate a lara c early 1990s althHth-cmc or the other probably would number ot natural-uranium fuel assemblies irradiate afford the best chance that Iraq has of ac quirfDI them and reprocess them We stronily believe that cnoqh plutonium for a nuclear dcvic c We do not balldina a blanket around the core would be very know the cmrcnt status ol nCl tiations between Italy diftlcult tor Iraq to do without beinr detected by the and Iraq oa the purchase ot the CIRENB It ap- IAP A or the Frcach In addition to IAEA inspection pcared shortly af'tct the Israeli attact that h'aq was · here would be a Frcn prcseace at the reactor or preparioz to pu rcha sc a PWR since then nceotia maay years Furt licrmorc the Iraqis would need an demi tor this reactor appear to have stalled Mtl t the •bnonnaJbr Jarae amopnt or Frcmch fuel CPrObably six attack Iraq may bavG rcascmod that there was DO core loads instead or three or four to keep the reactor better time than the present to pun hasc a powa- apcratlnc atcadibr at maxhnum pawcr The French reactor that a power reactor could provide access to could not fall to notG such abaonnally Jar c demands some plutonfum ad that Israel would recefve much tor fresh luc1 - · · stron cr CCDSUR if it were to bomb a dYi1ian power Iraq cannot currcat y construct a react or fudt but · rcacror-- BruD or Spain mfdit essfslancc Brazil coald Platcndam Fllfl C de aaly probably In the usiit nqo In or 2 to baUdfai 5 MWt--cnd a racarch iraq reactor but from Iraq has Italy-the been woddq necessary hatd fuel to a c yd uranium suppb' hu its S MWt Sovkt-buflt reactor The Spanish fuel fabrication zeproccsslq1 and waste treatm to coald help Iraq baiJd a power reactor with a consider- Apport a reactor and to extract plutoai1µn The ably higher powct 1cvd 300-to-500-MWc or 900-to- IAEA commncd a recent Iraqi request to placo the l SOO-MWt ranee ii that were what Iraq wanted Jtallan-pnMdcd facilities at Tuwaltbi saf'c Thfs reactor probably would be a pressurized water puds AlrcadA d - -·· reactor PWR Even thoulh h could produce a few Iraq bas produced bollih1 water reactor BWR and hundred kfloirams or plutonium per year Jt is almost PWR nuclear fuel pellets at the fuel fabrication impossible to divert plutonium clandeuincly Crom this • laboratory Iraq also plans to fabricate PWR iind · · · · · · type of reactor An overt diversion would be possible if' BWR fuel rods and test its ability to assemble one Iraq were to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT and deny safC£Uards on the reactor • 13 • ·- -· •• PWR ad one BWR fuel clement Iraq c outd use the araaf um that it hd cl4ndcstfncl ' acquired to fabri cate n ac tor fDcl Iraq still would have to ac qufrc the f'ueJ dcmcnt fabrication fa • that it has discussed with tlic ltanam acquired some ui'anium but we do not bdievc that any o it Jw been weapon-usable material Dlssaiis· faction with what have probably been hoaxes so far will aot be Jikdy to deter Iraq from further Uempts AJtbouih Iraq coatinucs to sho a ircat in what we believe to be laser isotope separation rc scerch it is unlikely that lra Q could use this emcr'°1i tcchnolOIY a5 a so wea n·usde material in the f oreseeablc future Nuclear Weapon l eTelopment No active d'f'ort to develop nuclear weapons ia Iraq is evident but Iraq has shown D interest in several areas relevant to the dcvcloPmcnt of nuclear weapons t As aotcd earlier Iraq has showD a crcat interest in UP TAdinl its computer capability and acquirini a Japancsi compatcr th4t is more than adequate for nuclear weapons dcsiin- H'owe ocr it is unclear wheth er Iraq fs ac quirine a compute specifu ally for ibis pmposc Iraq has also shown interest In another area that Is more dfredly relevant to nudcar weapoas-- convcrtin ur2nium to the metallic form Iraq Jlso has shown an interest in acqubini plutonium In addition as noted earlier Iraq has made attempts to acquire a medimn-ranee ball1stic misdlc possibly for a nuclcar warhead delivery system The prof DOTI llppc an to be dormant mainly because or the inabfllty of the suppliers to provide the missil Even If Iiaq acquired enoueh flSSiJc material for an explosive device it still would need to dcsip and fabricate a nuclear We know of no incfip DOUS proir m In thfs area nor of the clfstencc of any Iraqi nuclear wcapan dcslp lfOUP If rortiin assist ance la litaJ areas such the llUlD1lfacturin and festinc or hieh eipkJsivcs ud the deslen fabrication and tcstine of' nuclear weapons could be obtatncd lraQ possibly could have a mblc dcsfp completed on paper within a few years There is no indication that a Otha'' Posslllle Acqaislflon or 1sslle Material Corcip supplier is willina to assist Iraq in these areas Iraq continues to show a ErC t Interest in obtainiq · Conslderin Iraq's past succ csscs with f ordp sv ppti fissile material clandestinely-cm the black market or crs and its potential oil levcratc however we would dscwhcre For example in 1979 hi h-lradc uranium not t dismiss the possibility of such forcip was oft'crcd to Iraq by swindlers Wlicthcr it was a ssis natural d ctcd or hi hlY enriched is not known to -- us the PfoPOScd price which is known sua1ests · hidllY enriched uranium It is possible that fraq has 14 ° ·· ' I ·