Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301 R000300010079-8 i Director of Top Secret QJ Central m _ J Intelligence VG'VI J 1r ' L1fi Bl b National Intelligence Daily Cable 24 May 1982 Top Secret Copy 402 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301R000300010079-8 Approved For Release 2007 0S 04 CIA-RDPS4T00301 R00030001 0079-S Top Secret I SPECIAL ANALYSES UK-ARGENTINA Probable British Strategy London is a m ng at a rapid military victory in the Falklands and its forces are likely to spend only a short time consolidating the beachhead The British probably intend a direct assault against Argentine forces at Stanley even though their forces are substantiaZly outnumbered The government appears ready to accept relatively heavy Zosses in exchange for quick miZitary suocess Prime Minister Thatcher couZd caZl early elections in the event of success but a serious militarr setback or stalemate would probably result in her replacementu r _ ' I The British apparently envision a campaign lasting less than two weeks They probably expect to consolidate their position at San Carlos in short order and are likely to move against Darwin Goose Green less than 32 kilometers away where there are 600 Argentine troops and an airfield Afterward they would move on Stanley about 80 kilometers to the east 25X1 I I 25X1 Darwin Goose Green is important because it is astride the only main route to Port Stanley and because a British victory there would provide continuing psychological momentum The Argentine units there probably will be unable to resist long the 5 000 to 6 000 troops of the British land force I I 25X1 While the main British force is moving toward Stanley small units probably will raid Argentine positions on both East and West Falkland to destroy Argentine aircraft ammunition and supplies British ships and aircraft will attack Stanley to pin down the Argentine troops and soften them up for an assault I I Difficult terrain and poor weather may slow the British advance from Darwin Goose Green to Stanley British forces on the move will be at high risk from Argentine aircraft and Harriers from the British aircraft carriers or possibly from the field at San Carlos will have to provide protection I ' I --continued Top Secret 8 25X1 25X1 25X1 _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved For Release 2007 0S 04 CIA-RDPS4T00301R000300010079-S Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301 R000300010079-8 Top Secret _ _I liThe Argentines probably will place troops on the high ground about 25 kilometers from Stanley--at Mt Challenger for example--to obstruct the advance Argentine forces also could launch a counterattack from Stanley in an attempt to deal with British units piecemeal 11 I I IIAlthough the 3 000 troops aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2 have been qescribed as a garrison force they could become involved if the British troops become bogged down The forces on board the Scots Guards and the Welsh Guards are among the best British units These troops which could arrive as early as Wednesday might be landed in northern or north-central East Falkland to outflank Argentine defenses II I I IIOnce they arrive in the Stanley area the British forces probably will initially establish defensive positions but after a short period of artillery bombardment joined by naval and air attacks they probably will attempt to storm the town spearheaded by Scorpion light tanks The British are better trained and somewhat better equipped than the Argentines and would be supported by air and sea The Argentines however outnumber the British two to one and would be in prepared defensive positions 11 I I liThe Argentines will attack British land and sea forces during the campaign using aircraft from the mainland The British aircraft carriers will continue to be the most attractive target 11 I I liThe British are unlikely to attack mainland bases They apparently can stage only a few Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island to Argentina and British carriers would have to move dangerously close to Argentine defenses to attack with Harriers 11 I I The Political will liAs long as the British see negotiations proposals as detrimental to their interests a short campaign that is proceeding successfully will receive broadbased support in the UK Backed by favorable public opinion Thatcher's government and an overwhelming majority of her party probably are willing to continue to accept relatively heavy losses but only if a clear-cut military victory is the result 11 --contJ nued I I 9 Top Secret _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301 R00030001 0079-8 _ Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301 R00030001 0079-8 Top Secret _ _I IIWithin the Social Democratic - Liberal alliance and even within the Labor Party--which is becoming increasingly divided over how to resolve the crisis--a majority will su ort such a cam ai n for now -g l v e c o mm a n e r s on T a C er an er war ca lne 1 the scene considerable leeway the immediate future 11 I I IIA short successful campaign especially with few new losses would catapult the Tories into a stronger position than at any time since the early 1960s Consequently de pite disclaimers by the Conservative Party chairman chances would increase dramatically for an election as early as late spring with a major Tory victory likely 11 I I IINonetheless Thatcher is following a high-risk strategy Loss of the Sheffield and casualties sustained during and since the invasion sent shockwaves through the UK but they are II acceptable II because of the UK's general military successes Any serious reverses however almost certainly would force Thatcher to reconsider an aggressive military course and would increase pressure for a cease-fire 11 I I IIHeavy losses early in the campaign or a stalemate on the ground could spur the UK to redouble its efforts and even attempt a spectacular military reprisal Within a relatively short time however British reverses probably would seriously erode Thatcher's position as Prime Minister and compel her to accept a cease-fire and UN mediati o n __ while British forces struggled to hold their ground 11 I ---- 25X1 IIIf Thatcher fell she would be replaced by a Tory less clearly locked into hardline military policies There has already been speculation that Foreign Secretary pym is uncomfortable with Thatcher's emphasis on a military victory It is unlikely however that a general election would follow immediately 11 I -I 25X1 IILess dramatic setbacks probably would encourage the military to request more time and the government to grant it Thatcher's position would not be greatly affected at first but the longer a military victory is denied the more constricted her maneuvering room would become 11 I 10 25X1 Top Secret 1__ '-- Approved For Release 2007 08 04 CIA-RDP84T00301 R00030001 0079-8