UNCLASSIF OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY National Guard Bureau Cyber Mission Analysis Assessment Chief of the National Guard Bureau Assessment of the Departmentof Defense s Mission Analysis for Cyber Operations Submitted in compliance with Section 933 6 of Public Law 113-66 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 Generated on 29 September 2014 I OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table of Contents I Executive Summary 3 II National Guard Assessment 4 National Guard Assessment of Findings 5 National Guard Assessment of DoD s Five Key Recommended Ways Forward 8 National Guard Assessment of Red Teams 10 Conclusion 10 Annex I National Guard Cyber Force 12 Air National Guard Cyber Forces 12 Army National Guard Cyber Forces 12 Annex 2 Acronym list 13 Annex 3 Section 933 Reporting Requirement 14 2 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY I Executive Summary This report ful lls the requirement contained in the National Defense Authorization Act N DAA for Fiscal Year FY 2014 Section 933 e National Guard Assessment The results of the National Guard's assessment re ect the Chief of the National Guard Bureau s CNGB view for successfully integrating the National Guard into the Department ol Defense s DOD Cyber Mission Force CMF and across all Cyber missions to create a Whole of Government and Whole of Nation approach to securing U S cyberspace The CNGB appreciates the opportunity to provide the National Guard Assessment required by Section 933 e of the NDAA The CNGB commends the Of ce of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy for its openness transparency and inclusiveness in developing the report Its collaborative approach resulted in the most comprehensive study to date of Reserve Component integration into the Cyber mission To complete this independent assessment of the Secretary of Defense s allusion Analysisfor Cyber Operations of the Department of Defense report the National Guard Bureau NGB consulted with key stakeholders to ensure an equally transparent review The NGB solicited input from the Director of the Army National Guard DARNG Army Cyber Command ARCYBER the Director of the Air National Guard DANG Air Force Cyber Command AFCYBER United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM the National Guard Cyber General Of cer Advisory Council The Adjutants General TAG of the States and Territories the Council of Governors and the Of ce of the Secretary of Defense The input received in these engagements is reflected throughout this report Based on the National Guard s assessment of the Secretary of Defense s ii Iission Anaiysisfor Cyber Operations qfthe Department ofDefense report the CNGB highlighted six speci c areas of the report 1 The CNGB supports the Anny s proposed plan to eld one full-time Army National Guard ARNG CPT and ten part-time ARNG CPTs 2 The CNGB supports the Services plans to develop and integrate cyberspace forces into their respective Reserve Components as part of the DoD s Total Force approach to cyberspace Speci cally the CNGB supports the US Air Force s plan to staff two CMF Cyber Protection Teams CPT and the Cyber Operations portion of one National Mission Team NMT as part of the Air Force s allocation of the CMF 3 The CNGB supports training National Guard cyberspace personnel to joint training standards as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense s approved guidance 4 The CNGB supports the Governors3 ability to employ National Guard cyberspace-trained personnel in State Active Duty SAD and Title 32 status as described in the Council of Governors letter dated August 15 2014 in compliance with Federal and State law to provide State-initiated and State-directed cyberspace support to civil authorities This 3 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFI OFFICIAL USE ONLY would be in roles of expertise such as to coordinate train advise and assist CIT AA The CNGB acknowledges the need for reorganization and realignment of the current Red Team capabilities in the Air National Guard ANG to create a sound program and enduring construct Ul 6 The Services require additional resources to execute their plans to build and train cyberspace forces in the Reserve Component to support the DoD s Total Force approach to cyberspace II National Guard Assessment The National Guard is a natural t for developing cyberspace capabilities that best leverage Federal and State authorities in defending our Nation against evolving cyberspace threats The National Guard stands ready to support the DoD s Total Force approach to addressing CMF and emerging cyberspace requirements with talented professional highly trained National Guard Soldiers and Airmen The National Guard recommends developing National Guard cyberspace capabilities through planned efforts and highlights the challenges in programmed funding training and formalizing National Guard cyberspace requirements Programmed Funding The Army plan is to establish 10 part-time ARNG CPTs starting in FY 2017 The CNGB welcomes the ability to work with the Army to develop this mission The Army s proposal must be completed in the FY 2017 Program and Budget Review cycle which is not projected to start until October 2014 Alternatively the Air Force plans to include the ANG CPTs as part of its delegated CMF requirement for FY 2016 The Air Force submitted a funding request for CPTs in the FY 2016 Program and Budget Review cycle that has not yet been approved To mitigate future funding issues the CNGB requests assistance in programming support The CNGB has directed the ANG and ARNG to continue to engage with their Service counterparts to build a Future Years Defense Program that includes resources essential to organizing training equipping and staf ng National Guard cyberspace forces The National Guard continues to work with the Army and Air Force to secure resources for these critical capabilities during the FY 2017-2021 POM development cycle ruining When the USCYBERCOM CMF construct was established designed training requirements and training slots to support approximately 6 200 cyberspace personnel However CMF initial plan did not account for training approximately 2 000 Reserve Component personnel now included in the Services proposed Reserve Component integration plan Therefore the CNGB request funding to train National Guard cyberspace forces to DoD s joint training standards The Services must identify training slots concurrently and proportionally for the National Guard cyberspace forces 4 OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSI FIEDIIF OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Capabilities Based ilss'essmem C351 To capture requirements appropriate for the National Guard formally NGB will conduct a CBA of National Guard cyberspace forces as directed by Joint Requirements Oversight Memorandum 073-14 This JROCM captured the Councils near-term priorities for development of requirements documents and supporting analyses This National Guard Cyber CBA will leverage the work done to complete this report as well as the Cyber CBAs already completed by the Army and Air Force It will also build upon the ANG and work to develop National Guard Cyber courses of action Although these efforts are meant to examine issues that are unique to the National Guard NGB does not intend to duplicate the Services efforts National Guard Assessment of Findings The CNGB understands that considered many factors to determine how to best integrate National Guard cyberspace forces into in the DoD s Total Force approach to address CMF and emerging cyberspace requirements Those factors included whether the position is military essential peacetime and wartime demands deployment frequency and duration speed of response unit readiness for speci c mission sets and costs The examination of these factors and discussions with key stakeholders led to six ndings and five key recommended ways forward This section assesses the DoD s ndings and key recommended ways forward independently because its report lists them separately DOD Finding The Reserve and Guard can offer load-sharia an sur a a it or the CMF National Guard Asressmem The CNGB concurs with the DoD s nding that Reserve and National Guard cyberspace forces can offer load-sharing and surge capacity for the CMF As the ARNG and ANG stand up their cyberSpace forces with their respective Service the CNGB has directed a build-assess build approach to ensure the National Guard is strengthening critical cyberspace capabilities and capacity with an emphasis on meeting the requirements of a Whole of Government response As stated in the DoD s report it is essential that ensures that all cyberSpace personnel both Active and Reserve Components are trained to the same joint standards ARNG The NGB understands the 11 ARNG CPTs are above the Army s current CMF requirement The NGB agrees that leveraging ARNG cyber personnel to expand the Army s cyberspace capabilities is a starting point to using ARNG Cyber Forces A tti The CNGB concurs with the Air Force s plan to staff two full-time CPTs by leveraging 12 ANG squadrons rotating between activation and dwell status with a 1 5 dwell posture Additionally the CNGB agrees with the Air Force plan to staff the Cyber Operations portion of one CMF NMT by leveraging three ANG squadrons on a rotational basis The ANG fills the CMF CPT and NMT requirement with approximately 600 trained cyberspace professionals which is a mix of full-time and traditional drill status Airmen 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY Additionally the ANG has established ve Cyber Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR units with a total of 435 personnel in ve States that perform Digital Network Intelligence support to 25'h Air Force formally known as the Air Force Intelligence and Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency DNI is a long-term analysis to evaluate attempts to penetrate exploit or disrupt military networks as well as assess adversary and enemy cyberspace capabilities and activity patterns These units are aligned under Air Combat Command s 25 Air Force which is responsible for all Air Force ISR forces The ANG Cyber Operations and ISR squadrons are listed in Annex I DOD Finding The Notionai Guard can offer support to Lt-'noie of Government and Whole ofNotion cyber requirements Nationa Guard Assessment CNGB concurs with the DoD s nding that in addition to providing capability and capacity for the CM F National Guard cyberspace forces are uniquely postured to support critical Whole ofGovemment and Whole of Nation cyberspace requirements The CNGB remains committed to the 2013 State-Federal Consultative Process of Programming and Budgetary Proposals A ecring the Nationa Guard commonly known as the Consultative Process The Consultative Process provides ways for the Governors through the Council of Governors and the CNGB to provide States requirements for consideration in DoD s planning programming budgeting and execution process Finding National Guard personnei under State command and control can support State missions National Guard Assessment The CNGB concurs with the DoD s finding that the National Guard is well-positioned to offer its expertise and support to State missions under State command and control The correctly asserts that US Code provisions permit National Guard forces to support domestic missions related to supporting law enforcement homeland operations and Defense Support of Civil Authorities related cyberspace activities National Guard personnel could be used to perform cyberspace missions in Title 10 or Title 32 status Additionally State National Guard personnel could be used in SAD status to perform related State cyberspace missions in support of civil authorities if authorized by State and Federal law The CNGB recognizes and strongly supports the Governors authority to employ National Guard personnel independently in SAD status possibly to support AA functions in compliance with Federal and State law While under State command and control National Guard personnel operate at the direction and under the command of the Governor concerned It is important to note that use ofNational Guard personnel in a Title 32 status requires approval of the Secretary of Defense to perform purely 6 UN FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY operational missions These unique dual-constitutional authorities allow the National Guard to serve as a bridge across State and Federal government boundaries Finding Greater clarity is needed regarding Command and Contra Var-wt Coordination and Communication National Guard Assessment The CNGB concurs with the DoD s nding that additional work is required to de ne command and control clearly along with chains of communication and coordination for National Guard cyberspace forces when not operating in Title 10 status The inclusion of approximately 2 000 Reserve Component cyberspace forces in the CMF will force key stakeholders to de ne command and control clearly along with communication and coordination policies for National Guard cyberspace forces not operating in Title 10 status reSpectful of the inherent authorities of the Governors The role of the CNGB as a channel of communication between the States and the in domestic operations is well documented The CNGB recommends examining the role of the Dual-Status Commander DSC to determine applicability to both cyberspace operations and-domestic operations with a cyberspace component Federai law Title 10 U S C Section 12304- and policy Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort uprescribe the DSC as the usual-and customary means ot ensuring unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 32 or SAD forces when responding to a domestic incident In addition greater clarity is required regarding coordination and communication versus command and control within domestic cyberspace operations As mentioned in DoD s report the selected its Information Networks Direct-Support C2 model as the framework to achieve uni ed action across the full scope of its cyberspace operations To ensure unity of effort and uni ed action down to the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State and among the Federal State and local mission partners NGB supports further evaluation of the Direct-Support C2 model This evaluation would de ne the lines of communication and coordination for the cyberspace operational domain between the National Guard the supporting emergency operations center the National Guard and the DOD Finding Additional in hmno highly-technicoi Civilian cvher grotessionols likely is required National Guard Assessment The CNGB concurs with the DoD s nding that additional exibility and authorities are likely required to entice individuals from outside of Government to provide subject-matter expert support to USCYBERCOM and other military components 7 OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY The CNGB recommends the consider different Service commitments in critical need cyberspace positions For example instead of a four or six-year active duty commitment consideration should be given to ten year commitments two for active duty and eight for National Guard or other options to season on active duty and then serve the National Guard Finding Training and equipping the cyberspace Total Force may require additional capability National Guard Assessment The CNGB concurs with the Department s nding that training and equipping the cyberspace Total Force likely will require additional capabilities As discussed in the DoD s report USCYBERCOM has heavily relied upon Intelligence Community IC training and platforms to conduct operations The made a number of strategic decisions to invest in training and infrastructure to support the CMF For example the USCYBERCOM CMF training requirements training slots and support infrastructure discussed earlier were envisioned to support approximately 6 200 cyberspace personnel However CMF initial plan did not account for training approximately 2 000 Reserve Component personnel now included in the Services proposed Reserve Component integration plan Therefore the CNGB asserts that Reserve Component forces should receive a concurrent and preportional allocation of training dollars and student slots to integrate these personnel into the DoD s mission- appropriate cyberspace related training programs The CNGB af rms training received from other sources such as the ARNG Professional Education Center PEC and the ANG Regional Training Institute must be considered when building the appropriate equivalency training packages to conform to the joint training standard National Guard Assessment of DoD s Five Key Recommended Ways Forward 000 Recommended Way Forward National Guard personnel may provide a CITAA support roles when directed by their Govemor or The Adjutant General if in SAD status or if authorized by in Title status National Guard Assessment The NGB supports the Governors ability to employ National Guard personnel in SAD status possibly to perform functions in compliance with Federal and State law The NGB agrees that while under State command and control in SAD or Title status National Guard personnel operate at the direction and under the command of the Govemor however the use of National Guard personnel in a Title 32 status to perform purely operational missions requires the Secretary of Defense s approval 8 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recommended Way Forward The Services proposed plan to integrate approximately 2 000 Reserve Component personnel into the e berspace force structure adequately addresses the opportunity for surge support and additional Service CPT support in the near-term National Guard Assessment As stated earlier the CNGB supports the Air Force s plan to staff two CMF CPTs with personnel from twelve ANG squadrons Additionally the CNGB supports the Air Force s plan to ll a portion of one CMF NMT with personnel from three ANG squadrons Additionally the CNGB supports the Army s plan to eld one-full-time ARNG CPT and ten part-time ARNG CPTs The NGB understands the 11 ARNG CPTs are not included in the Army s current CMF requirement but it has a long term plan to align these forces properly to cyberspace requirements Reco mm ended Way Forward Cyberspace forces require consideration of a persistent training environment National Guard Assessment NGB strongly agrees the need for a persistent training environment to provide adequate support for all Service and Reserve Component training activities This capability is long overdue and essential to building the Total Force in Cyber Recommended Way Forward Because there is no command and control over National Guard cyberspace forces in a Title 32 or SAD status policies and processes must be clari ed to ensure unity of effort by forces and State National Guard forces National Guard Assessment The assertion that is no command and control over National Guard cyberSpace forces is incorrect While there is no Federal command and control of National Guard forces under SAD and Title 32 status these forces are under the command and control of the Govemor and his or her assigned of cers In addition the DSC is designed speci cally to provide unity of effort between the Active Component and the NG forces when both are employed Use of the DSC for Cyber Operations should be examined We understand there are concerns regarding current legislation and policies covering cyberspace operations Any modi cations to legislation or policy must improve the National Guard s ability to team with the Federal State local tribal and territorial SLTT capabilities and private sector partners in all areas of domestic and cyberspace operations The CNGB assesses that the authorities used to perform domestic operations are sufficient to include cyberspace operations 9 UN OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DOD Recommended Way Forward The Military Departments Services may require additional exibility in civilian hiring authorities National Guard Assessment The CNGB concurs that the military may require additional exibility in civilian hiring authorities National Guard Assessment of Red Teams With respect to Section 933 c 2 of the NDAA the Secretary of Defense s report did not speci cally address Red Team capabilities beyond their integral part in all 68 CPTs within the CMF structure The existing Red Team capability in the ANG has been a valuable addition to the DoD s cyberspace defense To this end CMF established the requirement for Red Team capability in the CPT This requirement results in a more than a ve fold increase in Red Team capacity across the Speci cally the USCYBERCOM CMF 68 CPTs with embedded Red Team elements acknowledges the requirement for Red Teams The 68 CPTs include 2 ANG CPTs supported by 12 ANG squadrons As a result Red Team personnel and the capacity will increase signi cantly in size and scope across the Nation ANG squadrons supporting CPTs are available to support additional activities including the Red Team when not activated on CPT missions Red Team capability and capacity will no longer reside in only one ANG squadron but in a total of 13 which would more than double ANG Red Team capability To meet future mission tasking and stringent scal constraints the ANG requests the ability to align the existing ANG Red Team force structure to a template that is regular and customary to the principles of the Air Force and ANG The CNGB recognizes the talents skills and training required to develop Red Team capabilities and capacity Concurrently the ANG is evaluating additional options to use and retain the skills of current Red Team personnel affected by changes in unit alignment These options are intended to leverage the Red Team capability and the investment in these valuable Airmen The ANG is also considering the future defensive cyberspace capabilities distributed across as many Federal Emergency Management Area regions as much as practical This optimizes the application of this limited resource and use of developed relationships in defense of Federal State and local networks and critical infrastructure The ANG has addressed this holistically because it plans to expand the cyberspace capability aggressively Conclusion Current and emerging cyber threats require a Whole of Government and Whole of Nation approach which integrates the responses of SLTT governments and private industry The National Guard has unique constitutional and statutory authorities for directly supporting SLTT governments and defense-critical infrastructure This allows the National Guard to build relationships that span organizations and sectors such as the States State law enforcement the the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 10 UN OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY The NGB stands ready to support the DoD s CMF with talented professional highly trained National Guard Soldiers and Airmen The National Guard recognizes and strongly supports the Governors authority to employ National Guard personnel independently in SAD status possibly to perform functions in compliance with Federal and State law In addition CNGB strongly supports the need for a persistent training environment that allows the Services and Reserve components to develop re ne exercises and validate critical cyberspace skills and abilities essential to building the DoD's Cyber Total Force The CNGB appreciates the teamwork transparency and leadership all stakeholders exhibited during the mission analysis and preparation of this report The National Guard understands that while each organization has its unique equities the entire team is working for the good of the Nation The National Guard stands ready as a full partner in the Total Force The CNGB will continue to support this process to ensure that the Nation has a capable flexible balanced and cost-effective cyberSpace force In conclusion this report re ects the View for successfully integrating the National Guard into the DoD s CMF and across all cyberspace missions to provide freedom of action in cyberspace 11 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Annex 1 National Guard Cyber Force Air National Guard Cyber Forces ANG Cyber Operations Squadrons 102 Network Warfare Squadron Rhode Island Mission Air Force Computer Emergency ReSponse Team support and forensics 229 Information Operations Squadron Vermont Mission Cyber training for the Air Force and Army 166' Network Warfare Squadron Delaware and 175' Network Warfare Squadron Maryland Mission Force Application 2253 Information Operation Squadron Texas Mission 24 h Air Force support 262 Network li arjare Squadron Washington Mission Interceptor hunter Industrial Control System Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition missions and AFCYBER support I 43 Information Operations Squadron Washington and 261 Network Warfare Squadron Cali irnia Mission Interceptor hunter missions I 3 7 Information Aggressor Squadron Kansas Mission Red teaming assessments ANG Cyber ISR Squadrons 124th Intelligence Squadron Ohio Mission DNI 218th Intelligence Group Tennessee Mission DNI 223rd Intelligence Flight Kentuclgr Mission DNI 25 6th Intelligence Squadron Washington Mission DNI TBD Intelligence Squadron Maryland Mission DNI Army National Guard Cyber Forces Current ARNG vaer Forces Virginia DPU Manassas Virginia One active duty ARNG CPT Computer Network De fense-Teams Future ARNG Cyber Force 10 part-time ARNG CPTs 12 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY Annex 2 Acronym list AFCYBER Air Force Cyber Command AOS Area of Support ARCYBER Army Cyber Command ARNG Army National Guard ANG Air National Guard C2 Command and Control AA Coordinate Train Advise and Assist CBA Capabilities Based Assessment CMF Cyber Mission Force CND-T - Computer Network Defense Teams CPT Cyber Protection Team CS Civil Support DANG Director of the Air National Guard DARNG Director of the Army National Guard DNI -- Digital Network Intelligence - Department of Defense Department of Defense Information Networks DSC Dual-Status Commander DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities FY Fiscal Year HLD Homeland Defense Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Joint Force Headquarters Directorates of Information Management Joint Force Headquarters State JIE Joint Information Environment ROCM Joint Requirements Oversight Memorandum NDAA National Defense Authorization Act NGB National Guard Bureau NGB-JCC -- National Guard Bureau Joint Cyber Cell NMT National Mission Team PEC Professional Education Center SAD State Active Duty SLTT Federal State Local Tribal and Territorial TAG The Adjutant General USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command l3 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Annex 3 Section 933 Reporting Requirement Reporting Requirement Section 933 of HR 3304 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 Public Law 113-66 SEC 933 MISSION ANALYSIS FOR CYBER OPERATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSION ANALYSIS later than 130 days after the date ofthe enactment of this Act the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a mission analysis of the cyber operations of the Department of Defense mission analysis under subsection shall include the following I The concept of operations and concept of employment for cyber operations forces 2 An assessment of the manpower needs for cyber operations forces including military requirements for both active and reserve components and civilian requirements 3 An assessment of the mechanisms for improving recruitment retention and management of cyber operations forces including through focused recruiting educational training or certi cation scholarships bonuses or the use of short-term or virtual deployments Without the need for permanent relocation 4 A description of the alignment of the organization and reporting chains of the Department the military departments and the combatant commands 5 An assessment of the current as of the date of the analysis and projected equipping needs of cyber Operations forces 6 An analysis of how the Secretary for purposes of cyber operations depends upon organizations outside of the Department including industry and international partners 7 Methods for ensuring resilience mission assurance and continuity of operations for cyber operations 3 An evaluation of the potential roles of the reserve components in the concept of operations and concept of employment for cyber operations forces required under paragraph 1 including - A in consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments and the Commander of the United States Cyber Command an identi cation of the Department 14 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UN 0R OFFICIAL USE ONLY of Defense cyber mission requirements that could be discharged by members of the reserve components B in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security consideration of ways to ensure that the Governors of the several States through the Council of Governors as appropriate have an opportunity to provide the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security an independent evaluation of State cyber capabilities and State cyber needs that cannot be ful lled through the private sector C an identi cation of the existing capabilities facilities and plans for cyber activities of the reserve components including an identi cation of current positions in the reserve components serving Department cyber missions ii an inventory of the existing cyber skills of reserve component personnel including the skills of units and elements of the reserve components that are transitioning to cyber missions an inventory of the existing infrastructure of the reserve components that contributes to the cyber missions of the United States Cyber Command including the infrastructure available to units and elements of the reserve components that are transitioning to such missions and iv an assessment of the manner in which the military departments plan to use the reserve components to meet total force resource requirements and the effect of such plans on the potential ability of members of the reserve components to support the cyber missions of the United States Cyber Command D an assessment of whether the National Guard when activated in a State status either State Active Duty or in a duty status under title 32 United States Code can operate under unique and useful authorities to support domestic cyber missions and requirements of the Department or the United States Cyber Command B an assessment of the appropriateness of hiring on a part-time basis non-dual status technicians who possess appropriate cyber security expertise for purposes of assisting the National Guard in protecting critical infrastructure and carrying out cyber missions F an assessment of the current and potential ability of the reserve components to attract and retain personnel with substantial relevant cyber technical expertise who use those skills in the private sector 15 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii organize such personnel into units at the State regional or national level under command and control arrangements for Department cyber missions meet and sustain the training standards of the United States Cyber Command and iv establish and manage career paths for such personnel G a determination of how the reserve components could contribute to total force solutions to cyber operations requirements of the United States Cyber Command and 1-1 development of an estimate of the personnel infrastructure and training required and the costs that would be incurred in connection with implementing a strategy for integrating the reserve components into the total force for support of the cyber missions of the Department and United States Cyber Command including by taking into account the potential savings under the strategy through use of personnel referred to in subparagraph provided that for speci c cyber units that exist or are transitioning to a cyber mission the estimate shall examine whether there are misalignments in existing plans between unit missions and facility readiness to support such missions LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN 1 REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD CYBER reduction in personnel of a cyber unit of the Air National Guard of the United States may be iinplemented or carried out in scal year 2014 before the submittal of the report required by subsection 2 REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL AND CAPACITY OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD RED reduction in the personnel or capacity of a Red Team of the Air National Guard of the United States may be implemented or carried out unless the report required by subsection includes a certi cation that the personnel or capacity to be reduced is directly related to Red Team capabilities that are no longer required REPORT later than 30 days alter the completion of the mission analysis under subsection the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing 1 the results of the mission analysis 2 recommendations for improving or changing the roles organization missions concept of operations or authorities related to the cyber operations of the Department and 16 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UN CLASSIFIEDIIF 0R OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3 any other matters concerning the mission analysis that the Secretary considers appropriate NATIONAL GUARD later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the report required under subsection the Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall submit to the congressional defense committees an assessment of the role of the National Guard in supporting the cyber operations mission of the Department of Defense as such mission is described in such report FORM he report under subsection shall be submitted in unclassi ed form but may include a classi ed annex 17 OFFICIAL USE ONLY