M # 0 0 - 2 1 4 r J 5 Tt FELLfcJ CbHK sSW -'O CM o o £ 3 w -rl «-« «Ih ° I s 2 « » •u j O o ° - m A a £ 5 5 '° 0 1° 5 c g N S K3 V H CO 03 CO Ihv i'4 Bci in 4ti5assi TO i Sfueifcj SUMMARY OF FACTS INVESTIGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS 'TaBTe' of Contents Page A 1 2 3 4 CO is 2 The Scope of the Investigation B Determining Jurisdiction Patrice Lumumba President Achmed Sukarno Concurrence of the President on Interpretation of Authority Participation of CIA Personnel in Plans to Attempt to Assassinate Fidel Castro 1 Flying Cuban Exiles into Cuba 2 1960-61 and the Phase I Plans a When the Plans Began b The Development of the Phase I Plans According to the May 14 1962 Memorandum to the Attorney General The Carrying Out of the Phase I Plan d The Balletti Wiretap— Why the May 14 1962 Memorandum was Prepared FBI Memoranda Concerning CIA Assassination Plans f Additional Statements of Colonel Edwards re May 7 1962 Briefing Statements of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge Inside CIA h How the Plans Got Started i Possible White House Direction or Approval of Plans 1 The Testimony of Richard Bissell a Eisenhower Administration Cbl Kennedy Administration C21 The Testimony of Gordon Gray C3I The Testimony of Walt Rostow 41 The Interrogation of the Phase I Case Officer PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD R FORD LIBRARY C R R ’• 1 3 4 “ i “ R cX af i CUt CtA A ssstnob'L V lo js t •• 7 8 10 13 15 19 23 24 24 26 26 26 26 29 29 29 Page C51 The Interrogation of Colonel Edwards 61 The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy 71 The Subsequent Interrogation of McGeorge Bundy 81 Documents of the National Security Council alNovember 3 1960 Minutes of Special Group Meeting Ob Other Documents 32 33 35 36 j June 13 1961 Taylor Report k Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs 1 Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba m Termination of Phase I Plan n Other Plans During Phase I 37 37 38 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans 39 a Possible Authorization— the Testimony of Richard Bissell b The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer 39 1 Developing an Executive Action Capability 2 Discussions with Edwards and He1ms 3 The Phase II Plans c The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II d Knowledge of John McCone Director of Central Intelligence rePhase II e The Testimony of Richard Helms re Phase II f The August 10 1962 Meeting of the Special Group Augmented 36 36 39 39 40 40 43 43 44 45 1 The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer 46 2 Interrogation of Robert M McNamara 47 3 The Testimony of John McCone 49 -ii- PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY 3 29 29 Page 41 The Affi dayit of General Lemnitzer C 5 The Testimony of General Lansdale 6J Additional Testimony of General Lansdale g h 52 Interrogation ofGeneralTaylor Testimony of RichardHelms ReUnseat­ ing Castro Government and Possible Plans 53 1 White House Pressure 2 Possible Assassination Plans 54 55 The August 16 19 63Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I 56 54 The Dominican Republic 70 1 The Chronology 70 The Background The Rifles Explosives Revolvers Carbines Submachine Guns The Policy Statement 65 69 70 71 72 74 77 79 82 2 Summary 85 Conclusion 86 ii v - LIBPARY 59 60 R FORD 4 Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes 5 The Phase III Plan— 1963-1965 6 Miscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban Exile Community 7 Summary a b c d e f g D 51 51 THE GERALD C 50 FROM i 5Q PHOTOCOPY Cal Discussions with and Written Propgsals to President Kennedy B Cuban Exile Groups Ccj Requests for possibility Plans— But No Authority to Carry Out 49 0 3 3 SUMMARY OF FACTS INVESTIGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS The following is a sum m ary of facts gathered by the E xecutive D irector of the CIA C om m ission concerning possible CIA in v olv e­ ment in plans to assassinate foreign leaders The Scope o f the Investigation The first knowledge that the Com m ission had concerning possible involvement of the CIA in assassination plans directed at foreign leaders was when the CIA inform ed the C om m ission staff at the outset of the C om m ission 's work in response to an ov e ra ll staff request for possible unlawful activities of the CIA that such plans existed The C om m ission staff was told that there was no evidence of m urders or plots for m urder against persons in the United States carried on by the CIA However the Com m ission staff was told that there had been discu ssion of plans for assassination attempts involving overt acts occu rrin g within the boundaries o f this country with regard to attempts on the life of Cuban P rem ier F idel Castro I f - S ■ F 'f g 1 S ff O lu 2 CoS 5 s lf I 1 Determining Jurisdiction Although there was som e question whether or not an assassination plan aimed at a foreign leader fell technically within — ------ the charter of the C om m ission even though overt acts may have This sum mary of facts was prepared by David W B elin Executive D irector of the CIA C om m ission except for the portions on pages 7085 pertaining to the Dom inican Republic which was prepared by Marvin L Gray Jr a Counsel to the Com m ission The statem ent of facts has not been reviewed by the staff nor has it been reviewed by the C om m ission PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY A taken place in this country the Com m ission and its staff determined that because of the nature and seriousness of the matters involved the doubts would be resolved in favor of undertaking an investigation of the facts Only after such investigation could the C om m ission make air inform ed decision as to its jurisdiction that agents of the CIA w ere involved in planning in this country with certain citizens and others to seek to assassinate P rem ier C astro The evidence also shows that the CIA was involved in shipping arm s from this country to persons in the Dominican Republic who sought to assassinate G eneralissim o T ru jillo who him self had been involved in an attempt to assassinate the P resident of Venezuela No evidence has been found involving any other attempts to assassinate any other foreign leader which had significant overt activities within the United States However the nature of the activity and the degree of s e c r e c y and compartmentation within the A gency is such that it is difficult to find any evidence of this kind unless s p ecific facts are brought to the attention of an investigative body With regard to activities outside o f the United States no evidence has been found of CIA participation in plans to assassinate foreign lea d ers except as described in the next four paragraphs However the PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY On the basis of th e investigation the evidence shows investigation in such areas which had no dom estic aspect which might bring it within the C om m ission's jurisdictional mandate under the P resident's O rder has not been extensive 2 P a trice Lumumba In the cou rse of the first stage of its investigation to charges that the CIA was involved in the death of P atrice Lumumba who was killed in early 1961 No evidence was found that the CIA participated in that killing although there is evidence that p rio r to Lumumba's death som e CIA personnel and others discussed the possibility of undertaking a plan to assassinate Lumumba # A ccordin g to Richard B is s e ll who was the CIA Deputy D irector of Plans at the tim e he was aware of discussion of plans within the Agency concerning the possible assassination of P atrice Lumumba and that a case o ffice r was directed to look into the possib ilities He reported back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that this was probably unfeasible and probably an undesirable course of action A ccordin g to the case o ffice r who is now retired In an affidavit C Douglas Dillon a m em ber of this C om m ission stated that while he served as Under Secretary of State from June 1959 until early January 1961 he heard no discussion of assassination attempts against anyone except discussions which occu rred in late July or early August of I960 at a meeting at the Pentagon which covered a great variety of m atters in which a question regarding the p os­ sibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not un der­ take this sort of operation This ended consideration of this subject 11 PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY determ ine its ju risd iction a prelim inary investigation was made of B isse ll asked him to go to the Congo and there m urder or arrange for the m urder of Lumumba and the case o ffice r said that he told B isse ll that he refused to be a party to such an a ct B isse ll said the Agency had nothing whatsoever to do with the death o f Lumumba 3 P residen t Achmed Sukarno the Agency of the p ossib ility of an attempt on the life of President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia which p rog ressed as far as the identi­ fication of an asset who it was felt might be recruited fo r this purpose The plan was never reached was never perfected to the point where it seemed fe a s ib le He said the Agency had absolutely nothing to do with the death of Sukarno With regard to both plans he stated that no assassination plans would have been undertaken without authorization outside the Agency and that no such authorization was undertaken fo r plans against either Lumumba or Sukarno 4 C oncurrence of the President on Interpretation of Authority Since no evidence was found to bring the Sukarno and Lumumba m atters within the scope of the C om m ission's investigative The case o ffice r gave this information in an oral telephone conference at which time an appointment was arranged for the taking of his testim ony before a m em ber o f the C om m ission staff and a court rep orter The case officer failed to keep his appointment PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY B is s e ll also testified that there was discussion within authority no further investigation in these two areas was undertaken However sufficient dom estic aspects in the Castro and T ru jillo plans were found to constitute grounds for undertaking additional investiga­ tion The P resident concurred in the approach of the C om m ission to interpret its authority so that the Comm ission would 1 ascertain involve unlawful dom estic CIA activities and 2 determ ine whether existing safeguards would prevent activities of that nature in the future regardless of whether they might involve dom estic or foreign conspiracy The following is a summary of facts pertaining to CIA participation in assassination plans to assassinate P re m ie r Fidel Castro and CIA participation in the shipping o f arms to persons in the Dominican Republic who sought to assassinate G en eralissim o T ru jillo The facts have been developed through a review of the internal investigation of the CIA examination of docum ents and interviews and testim ony The Executive D irector requested com plete a ccess to papers o f the National Security Council including papers of the F orty Com m ittee and its p red ecessors and papers o f any special groups or sp ecial operating groups granted Such a c c e s s was not A lso time did not perm it examination of docum ents that might be available in the Eisenhower Kennedy or Johnson presidential I i PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY whether the charges of assassination plots have a basis in fact and lib ra rie s Consequently the investigation is not com plete with regard to the question of who if anyone outside the CIA authorized or directed the planning of any assassination attempts against foreign leaders However with particular reference to the plans directed against F idel Castro the investigation is sufficiently com plete to B Participation o f CIA P ersonnel in Plans to Attempt to A ssassinate F idel Castro______________________________ In the late nineteen-fifties there was increasin g d iss a tis ­ faction with the government of Cuban leader Batista As C astro's influence increased attempts were made to persuade Batista to resign and turn over the reins of governm ent to a group that was m ore attuned to the needs and d esires o f the Cuban people particularly in areas of d em ocratic government and social re fo rm s A ccordin g to an inter­ view with the form er Chief of the CIA W estern H em isphere D ivision an unofficial am bassador from this country approached B atista in D ecem ber 1958 asking that he resign and turn over th« reins of govern ­ ment to new leadership This request was refused Fidel Castro shortly thereafter took over the Cuban govern­ ment There was great concern on the part of A m erican leadership about the presence of a government so closely aligned with the Soviet Union barely ninety m iles from Am erican shores PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY show that plans were undertaken by the CIA T h erefore the CIA with appropriate authorization under­ took the developm ent of an operation in support of Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow the Castro Governm ent the culmination o f which becam e the Bay of Pigs disaster in A p ril 1961 As the plans fo r the attempted overthrow of the Cuban govern ­ as the dominant figure 1 Flying Cuban Exiles into Cuba There has been testim ony before the C om m ission staff that at the request of the CIA the A ir F o rce provided a plane in late 1959 or early I960 which was used to fly two Cuban exiles into Cuba The witness was unable to provide names of these two Cuban exiles or names o f any CIA person n el which he said w ere involved However at the tim e of the events the witness was an A ir F o rce o ffice r who had liaison functions between the Department of Defense and the CIA He testified that he b elieves a plane was provided and that the two Cuban exiles w ere to c a r r y with them one or m ore rifle s with te le ­ scop ic sites to be used in an attempt to assassinate F idel Castro The C om m ission staff sought to investigate this m atter In a M em orandum for the R e co rd dated May 15 1975 the CIA admitted that in reviewing its files relating to Cuban operations PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY ment w ere developed one o f the considerations related to Fidel Castro during the period 1959-1961 a number of documents w ere found that referred to the intent on the part o f som e of the Cuban teams operating inside Cuba to attempt to assassinate Castro A dditionally the files indicate that there was considerable interest in procurem en t of Helio C ourier the civ il version of the L -28 but there is no A lso there is mention of the air drop of Springfield rifles with te le sco p ic s ig h ts 2 1960-61 and the Phase I Plans The Phase I plans involved the preparation o f poison botulism pills by the CIA the delivery of those pills to organized crim e figures who in turn w ere to get the pills delivered to contacts they had in Cuba for placem ent in a beverage to be drunk by P re m ie r C astro a When the Plans Began There is som e disagreem ent about exactly when the Phase I plans began The two people in the CIA who w ere the m ost intimately involved w ere Richard B isse ll Deputy D ire cto r of Plans who was the person in the CIA who had direct respon sibility fo r the Bay of Pigs operation A pril 17-19 1961 and Colonel Sheffield Edwards the D irector of the O ffice of Security of the CIA PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY definite indication that they w ere intended for Cuban operation s A cco rd in g to R ichard B is s e ll the plans relating to Fidei C astro started in the v e ry beginning of 1961 when he said he b e ca m e aware o f the p o ssib ility that an assassination attempt might be planned using Mafia r e s o u r c e s o r syndicate r e s o u r c e s My v e ry uncertain r e c o l le c t io n is that I first heard of this p o ssib ility f r o m A ccordin g to Sheffield Edwards his first contact with these plans was about the tim e o f the Bay of P igs He said he PHOTOCOPY Shef E dw ards did not re m e m b e r exactly if it was before o r after the Bay o f P igs FROM but when asked whether o r not it was in the Eisenhower Adm inistration THE GERALD or the Kennedy Adm inistration for purposes of determining the time o f the inception o f the plan he said that It was in the Kennedy Although oral testim ony of both said that this began mentation which indicates that these conversations took place in the latter part of I960 during the Eisenhower Adm inistration This documentation includes a May 14 1962 M em orandum for the R ecord entitled A rthur James Balletti et al - - Unauthorized Publication or Use o f C om m u n ication s The opening sentence of the memorandum states T h is m em orandum for the record was prepared at the request LIBPARY in the early stages of the Kennedy Adm inistration there is docu ­ R FORD A dm inistration of the Attorney G eneral o f the United States following a com plete oral briefing of him relevant to a sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period approxim ately August I960 to May 1961 The o ra l briefing actually occu rred in the o ffices of the Attorney General o f the United States Robert Kennedy on May 7 1962 and Attorney General record Attending the ora l briefing w ere three people A ttorney General Kennedy Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston General Counsel o f the CIA b The Development o f the Phase I Plans A ccord in g to the May 14 1962 Memorandum to the A ttorney General The May 14 1962 memorandum was prepared by Sheffield Edwards and continued after the opening sentence In August I960 the undersigned was approached by Mr Richard B is s e ll then Deputy D irector for Plans of CIA to explore the p ossib ility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro It was thought that certain gambling in terests which had form erly been active in Cuba might be willing and able to assist and further might have both in telligence assets in Cuba and communication between M iami F lorida and Cuba The memorandum then related that an interm ediary who was known to the CIA Robert Maheu was approached by C olonel PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY Kennedy received a copy of the May 14 1962 m emorandum fo r the Sheffield Edwards and asked to establish contact with a m em ber or m em bers of the gambling syndicate to explore their ca p a b ilitie s The approach was to be made to the syndicate as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in C uba The contact was made with a syndicate m ember tacts in Miami that he might u s e The syndicate m em ber supposedly told the CIA interm ediary that the syndicate person w as not interested in any rem uneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to p erform the desired p r o je c t The memorandum continued T ow ards the end of September I960 contact with another syndicate m em ber fro m Chicago Sam Giancana was m ade and in turn an arrangement was made through Giancana for the CIA interm ediary and his contact to meet with a 'c o u r ie r 1 who was going back and forth to Havana F rom information received back by the cou rier the proposed operation appeared to be fea sible and it was decided to obtain an o fficia l Agency approval in this regard A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a payment to be made on com pletion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in C uba PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY who show ed interest in the possibility and indicated he had som e con ­ The CIA interm ediary reported that Giancana and the other contact em phatically stated that they wished no part of any payment The undersigned Sheffield Edwards then briefed the proper senior o ffice rs o f this Agency of the proposal Knowledge of this p roject during its life was kept to a total o f six persons and never Cuba T here w ere no m em oranda on the project nor w ere there other written documents or agreem ents The p roject was duly ora lly approved by the said senior officials of the A gency The memorandum continued that during the period from September I960 to 1961 e ffo rts w ere continued by the CIA interm ediary and the Mafia personnel to proceed with the operation The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another principal was selected as has been briefed to the Attorney General Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal He was further furnished with approxim ately one thousand dollars worth o f com m uni­ cation equipment to establish communications between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba syndicate personn el interm ediary No m onies were ever paid to the There was expense money paid to the CIA The memorandum stated that A fter the failu re of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through the CIA interm ediary to the PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY becam e a part of the p ro je ct current at the time for the invasion of syndicate personnel to call off the operation with the further direction that the syndicate person w as told to tell his principal that the p ro­ posal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for com pletion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn Only two copies of the m emorandum w ere prepared - - one for the Attorney General and one c The Carrying Out o f the Phase I Plan The following facts prim arily come from in te r­ rogation of C olonel Edwards and the Phase I case o ffice r The particular means by which the plans w ere to be carried out was b y placing botulism pills in his fo o d The syndicate personnel were to get the pills to a person in Cuba who would have a ccess to Castro Supposedly the reason pills were used was that the syndicate personnel could not recru it personnel to undertake the assassination through gunfire because the chance of survival and escape was sm all However the case o fficer felt that it was the Agency itse lf that desired to have pills used rather than gunfire C olonel Edwards said that he him self checked out the pills on som e guinea pigs because I wanted to be su re they w ork ed i PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY to be retained by the CIA C orroboration of the Phase I plans was also made by another retired m edical officer who was fam iliar with the p r e ­ paration o f the pills inside the Agency Edwards said_he did not know of any plans other than those that involved the use of these botulism p ills Edwards did not have any first-hand knowledge I about whether or not the pills ever got to Cuba J i A ccordin g to the Phase I case o ffice r he d elivered the pills to the syndicate m ember and was subsequently advised by the £ had no d ire ct knowledge of his own that the pills actually got th ere Richard B issell said he did not have any person al recollection as to whether or not poison pills of any kind w ere ever delivered into Cuba A ccordin g to the case office r and the CIA Inspector General file s there w ere two passages of pills to Cuba in the fir s t part of 1961 ±na laiSKALD R FORD LIBPARy syndicate m em ber that the pills w ere in Cuba but the case o ffice r The fir s t passage was in late February or M arch fro m the syndicate through their courier to a Cuban who supposedly had a p o s i t i o n p j m m m m m m w h e r e he F idel C astro a cce ss to A ccordin g to the interview of Sheffield Edwards with the E xecutive D ire cto r the Cuban asset got sca re d and did not try f p to pass the pill P ills w ere subsequently delivered to another a sset who was in a position to slip the pills to Castro at a restaurant where the asset worked This took place in the M arch-A pril 1961 period F idel Castro ceased visiting that particular restaurant at approxi­ m ately the same time the pills purportedly arrived The case officer Cuba the second one which was made to someone who had a ccess to a restaurant which Castro frequented After the second attempt failed the case o ffice r said the p ills were returned to the CIA d The B alletti W iretap - Why the May 14 1962 Memorandum was Prepared___________________ The factual situation underlying the preparation of the May 14 1962 m em orandum was that sometime in the fall o f I960 Sam Giancana asked the CIA interm ediary to arrange fo r putting a listening device in the room o f an entertainer who at the time was in Las Vegas and who Giancana thought was having an affair with another entertainer who was reputed to be Giancana's m istre ss A ccordin g to the Phase I CIA case o ffic e r the request by Giancana cam e at a cru cia l time when plans w ere underway for Phase I Giancana supposedly stated that if he did not get help to install the listening d e v ice he would have to go to Las Vegas PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY s aid it was his recollection that there were two passages of pills to h im self The case office r said this would have interrupted the p ro je ct at a very c ritic a l tim e and therefore he sought the assistan ce of the CIA interm ediary to get a private detective agency to undertake the installation o f the listening device The CIA interm ediary passed the request over to Balletti the name of the subject of the May 14 1962 m emorandum for the record given to Attorney General Kennedy Instead o f putting a listening device in the room Balletti put a listening device on the telephone The listening device was discovered and Balletti was arrested by the sh eriff of Las Vegas Nevada At the tim e of the incident the CIA did not know of the sp ecific proposed w iretap A ccordin g to the Agency investigation by the Inspector G eneral's O ffice in 1967 Edwards had once told the A gency interm ediary that if the interm ediary ever got in trouble he could say to the FBI that he was working on an intelligence operation being handled by the Agency An FBI m emorandum on that matter stated that the in ter­ m ediary claim ed the telephone tap was ordered on behalf o f the A gency's effort to obtain intelligence through hoodlum elements in Cuba The Agency investigation file also states that a M arch 23 1962 FBI memorandum confirm ed a meeting with Sheffield Edwards in which PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY another private investigator who in turn contacted Arthur James Edwards told the FBI that the interm ediary was involved in a sensitive p ro je ct and that the CIA would object to prosecution becau se it would necessitate CIA inform ation and it could em barrass the United States Government Subsequently there was a meeting between Sheffield Edw-ards and Sam Papich the FBI liaison with the A gency in which to p rosecu te At the tim e o f that meeting according to Edwards those who had initially authorized the assassination plans Allen Dulles and Richard B isse ll w ere gone and no one else in authority including Richard Helms who replaced B issell had been cu t in on the op era tion T hereafter Sheffield Edwards briefed Law rence Houston General Counsel for the CIA who in turn b riefed General C arter M cC one's Deputy D irector of Central Intelligence General C arter who is now retired lives in C olorado When interviewed by a m em ber o f the C om m ission staff by long distance telephone General Carter said that he had no recollection of this Edwards in his 1975 recorded interview said that there was nothing that he knew about the plan to assassinate Castro that he didn't tell Attorney General Kennedy and that the briefing lasted'kbout a half an hour at le a s t He said that he told Attorney PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY Edwards advised Papich that it would not be in the national interest General Kennedy e v e ry th in g 11 and that after the briefin g was completed R obert Kennedy had no com m ent to him but R obert Kennedy cautioned L a rry Houston to the effect that he was to know about these things W ords to that e ffe c t When asked whether o r not the A ttorney General had told Colonel Edwards that you shouldn't do this at a l l Colonel When asked whether or not the Attorney G eneral in any way said that he disapproved o f w hatever was done in the p a s t Colonel Edwards said n o Law rence Houston testified I was b riefed on this subject after it was dropped I was not party to nor was I asked in advance about it By the tim e I heard about it I think it had been term inated som e little tim e but there were person a lities in v o lv e d who w ere both regarded as part of the Mafia organization and these w ere people that the CIA interm ediary had introduced to us They had form er gambling in terests in Havana and at one tim e thought they may be able to take action against C astro A fter it fell through j m y recollection is that they had potential crim inal indictm ents against the Mafia people and it seem s to me that the bug in the Las Vegas hotel was involved m o re perip h erally but I cannot rem em ber the details PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY Edwards replied N o Houston also testified that he told Edwards that I thought the only thing to do was to go and tell the whole story to the A ttorney General So with the approval of the D irector at the t im e -- w ell it was '63 it m ust have been McCone We went down to b rie f M r Kennedy on the full story that the Agency had set up a p ro je ct that these following people w ere involved and we gave them the nam es and this is what made him unhappy because at that tim e he felt he was making a very strong drive to try to get after the Mafia And so his com m ent was to us that if we w ere going to get involved with the M afia in the future at any tim e to make sure you see m e fi r s t j This is the only evidence in the record to show that John M cCone knew about the existence o f any specific assassination plan in 1962 There is evidence in the CIA files to show that the actual person with whom the matter was discussed was the Deputy D irector c£ Central Intelligence and this evidence is supported by an August PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY with its aim the dem ise o f Castro that the p roject had fallen through 16 1963 m emorandum from Helms to McCone which w ill be discussed in the Phase II portion of this report e FBI M emoranda Concerning CIA A ssassination Plans A ccordin g to a May 22 1961 FBI memorandum entitled A rthu r James B alletti et a l On May 3 1961 Colonel Sheffield Edwards D irector of Security Central Intelligence Agency CIA furnished the follow ing information C olon el Edwards advised that in connection with CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted R obert Maheu in contacts with Sam Giancana a known hoodlum in the Chicago area Colonel Edwards said that since the underworld controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the Batista governm ent it was assumed that this elem ent would still continue to have sou rces and contacts in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized su ccessfu lly in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government As a resu lt Maheuls serv ices were solicited as a 'cu t-o u t1 because o f his p ossib le entry into underworld c ir c le s Maheu obtained Sam G iancana's assistan ce in this regard and according to Edwards Giancana gave every indication o f cooperating through Maheu in attempting to accom plish several clandestine efforts in Cuba Edwards added that none o f Giancana's efforts have m aterialized to date and that s e v e ra l of the plans still are working and may eventually 'pay off ' The memorandum then went into the B alletti situation and reported that Colonel Edwards had no knowledge o f the w ire tap PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY during the fall of I960 for the purpose o f using Maheu as a 'cu t-ou t' The m emorandum concluded with the following paragraph C olon el Edwards advised that only M r B isse ll Deputy D irector of Plans CIA and two others in CIA w ere aware of the diancana-M aheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and that Allen this connection He added that M r B issell during his recen t briefings of General T aylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation told the Attorney General that som e of the CIA's associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against C a s tro Subsequently on M arch 6 1967 J Edgar Hoover sent to the Attorney General a letter with an accompanying M arch 6 1967 FBI memorandum entitled C entral Intelligence A gen cy's Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to A ssassinate C a s tr o The memorandum referred to the B alletti wiretap matter and stated that the FBI ch eck ed m atter with CIA on 5 3 6 1 and learned CIA was using R obert Maheu as interm ediary with Sam Giancana relative to CIA's 'd irty bu sin ess' anti-C astro activities B y letter 5 2 2 6 1 we furnished fo r m e r Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on CIA's involvement in this The original PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY Dulles was com pletely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing pu rposes A copy of that m em orandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General The memorandum stated that the FBI had learned on June 20 1963 that the CIA contacts with the Mafia had continued up until that tim e when they w ere reportedly cut o ff The FBI memorandum also stated that it appeared that one Mafia m em ber involved in the plans is using his p r io r connections with the CIA to his best advantage A contem poraneous FBI memorandum dated M arch 6 1967 stated that Robert Kennedy following his briefing in May o f 1962 inform ed the FBI on May 9 1962 about the briefing He R obert Kennedy indicated that a few days p rio r thereto he had been advised by CIA that an interm ediary had been hired by CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition o f paying $150 000 to hire som e gunman to go into Cuba and kill Castro The memorandum further continued PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R FORD LIBPARY On 5 9 6 2 Kennedy discussed with the D irector a number of m atters including admission by CIA that R obert Maheu had been hired by that A gency to approach Sam Giancana to have Castro assassinated at a cost o f $150 000 Kennedy stated he had issued orders that CIA should never undertake such steps again without firs t checking with the Departm ent of Justice and stated because of this m atter it would be difficult to prosecu te Giancana or R obert Maheu then or in the fu tu re that M r Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring the interm ediary and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued ord ers that CIA should never take such steps without checking with the Department of Justice M r Kennedy further advised that because of this m atter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosection against Giancana as Giancana could im m ediately bring out the fact that the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of C a s tro f Additional Statements of Colonel Edwards re May 7 1962 B riefing_______________________________________ _ When Sheffield Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel briefed R obert Kennedy on May 7 1962 concerning the Phase I assassination efforts by the CIA there is no evidence to indicate that during that briefing R obert Kennedy told the CIA personnel that he already had known o f this inform ation because of p rior information received from the FBI Colonel Edwards in his 1975 recorded interview confirm ed the statement in the March 6 1967 FBI memorandum that Attorney General Kennedy stated that the CIA should never undertake the use of M afia people again without first checking with the Department o f Justice because it would be difficult to prosecute such people in the future g Statements of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge Inside CIA______________________________________ A ccording to Edwards the CIA people that knew about the plans while they were going on w ere him self his case o ffic e r B iss e ll Allen D ulles D irector of Central Intelligence until N ovem ber 1961 and General Cabell - Deputy D irector o f Intelligence during this period of tim e h Both Dulles and Cabell are now dead How the Plans Got Started There is inconsistency between the testim ony of Richard B iss e ll and Colonel Edwards concerning how the plans got started A ccording to B is s e ll the original approach was made to the A gency by the syndicate personnel because th ey had their own v ery strong motivations for carrying out this th e y had been pow erful under Batista in Cuba and they had a very lucrative set o f interests for the syndicates and they had in effect been thrown out and so they had the strongest sort of reasons for anti-C astro sentim ent on their ow n B is s e ll said he first learned about this from Sheffield Edwards and that he had also talked with Allen Dulles about the m atter W hereas B issell testified that he fir s t heard of this possib ility of using Mafia or syndicate re so u rce s from Sheffield E dw ard s Edwards testified that his first contact was a request by B issell who asked Edwards If I had any assets that would be avail­ able into the syn d ica te When asked about the inconsistency between his own testim ony and that o f Sheffield Edwards concerning whether or not Edwards approached B isse ll first or B isse ll approached Edwards fir s t B issell stated that it is possible that my recollection is wrong 1 think I w ill stand on that as my r e c o lle c tio n but I seem to rem em ber rather cle a rly that it was from him Edwards that I firs t learned o f the possib ility of this operation and that he came to see m e for this purpose rather than my sending for him Now could I just say that I had sev era l conversations with Shef Edwards on this m atter and it is very p ossib le that I that in a subsequent conversation I did take the initiative and send for and discuss it with h im The Phase I case o ffice r stated that he believed it was B isse ll who firs t approached Edwards about making the contacts with a CIA interm ediary The case o ffice r further stated that although he ultim ately becam e aware of the fact that the people cont'acted by the CIA interm ediary w ere syndicate m em bers initially neither he nor the interm ediary knew this to be the fact Rather he said he thought these people whom the interm ediary contacted w ere gangstertype people who w ere not n ecessa rily m em bers of the syndicate i P ossib le White House D irection or Approval o f Plans 1 The Testim ony of Richard B issell a Eisenhower Administration When asked whether or not he had any discussion s with any o fficia l in the Eisenhower Adm inistration con ­ cerning the developm ent o f an execu tive action capability B is s e ll replied not to my recolle ctio n and I think I am alm ost sure that I i did n o t B is s e ll stated that he had no clear recollection of any discu ssion with anyone in the Eisenhower Adm inistration concerning any possible plan to assassinate C a s tro but there could have been He said that if it would have occu rred at all during the Eisenhow er Adm inistration it would have been with Gordon Gray b Kennedy Administration B is s e ll testified that although m y r e c o l­ lection of this is far from cle a r I am satisfied that very ea rly in the Kennedy Adm inistration I did participate in conversations with som eone in the White House concerning the planning o f what was called an executive action capability which was defined in substance as a capability of the A gency to carry out assassinations if required When asked with whom these conversations o ccu rred B is s e ll said I am alm ost certain it was either Walt Rostow Deputy A ssistant to the P resident for National Security or M cG eorge Bundy Presidential A ssistant for National Security or probably the fo rm e r and possibly b o th 11 When asked to state what sp e cifica lly was discussed in these conversations B is s e ll said M y re co lle ctio n w hich isn 't too sp e cific is that this was a discussion o f the d esirab ility o f developing such a capability within the CIA that presum ably would be a sm all special unit and highly compartmented from the r e s t of the organ ization B isse ll said that he had no s p e cific knowledge but that he had a great deal of confidence that the two gentlemen whose names I have mentioned would not have discussed this discussed with m e o r encouraged any cou rse o f action that they w ere not confident the P resident would a p p rov e Later in his testim ony B is s e ll said that the p ossib ility of using syndicate people to c a rry out an assassination attempt against C astro was discussed by m e again I think probably with Walt R ostow It may possibly have been discussed d ire ctly with M cG eorge Bundy but I suspect that it was through Rostow who was then Bundy's assistant and on his staff My im pression but again I must em phasize that this is uncertain im pression was that I was encouraged to go ahead with the investigation and planning of this operation and by investigation I mean sim ply to find out what would be involved to make som e assessm ent of the likelihood of su ccess and other aspects of the m a tter A ccording to B is s e ll he was vague as to the final outcom e o f that attem pt He said that he had no r e c o l­ lection o f a sp e cific authorization that it should go forw ard I believe however that we probably did m ove to be in a position to ca rry it out or authorize it if authorization w ere r e c e iv e d He said that he believed m y own recolle ctio n o f the final stages of the plan is vague because the plan involved furnishing probably som e money and such item s as p ills or other devices through a number of cut-outs or interm ediaries to a group which we ou rselves of cou rse did not in any d irect sen se con trol This was not an operation o f such a character that the comm unications would run through Agency channels or that authorization on the spot would be by Agency personnel or that the Agency could p re cise ly and tightly control i t 2 The Testim ony of Gordon Gray Gordon Gray testified that he had no con v ersa ­ tions with Richard B isse ll or anyone else pertaining to assassination plans 3 The Testim ony o f Walt Rostow Walt Rostow testified that he did not have any recollection o f having any discussions with B issell pertaining to any attempt at assassination plots 4 The Interrogation of the Phase I Case O fficer The case o ffice r stated that he had been told that the p ro je ct had been approved by Allen Dulles D ire cto r o f Central Intelligence but he the case o ffice r had no knowledge of whether or not there had been any discussion or approval from the White House 5 The Interrogation of Colonel Edwards Edwards said that he believed the plans were developed by B is s e ll and that he was s u r e that there w ere not any people in the White House that knew about these plans He also said that he did not know of any attempt o f plans to assassinate people other than Fidel C astro 6 The Testim ony of M cGeorge Bundy ' M cG eorge Bundy said that he was never aware cf any actu al decision to go about seeking to assassinate any foreign leader However he said that he did have a vague re co lle ctio n of the existence or the possible existence of contingency planning in this a re a I am s o rry to say I cannot help you much with details about it because I can't fish them out o f m y'm em ory but I could not exclude that there w ere contingency plans and a contingency capability of som e sort or plans for such a capability at some tim e He said that he did not know of any case where plans went beyond the con ­ tingency stage and I know o f no such authorization o r any involve­ ment by anybody in the White House staff or anybody e ls e fo r that m a tte r When asked whether o r not he ever heard any discussion concerning a plot or plan to assassinate Cuban leaders Bundy replied Not that I can r e m e m b e r 1 certainly cannot exclude the p ossib ility that you could have had the kind of discu ssion in which one or another individual would have said it would be that there is a possib ility that thus and such a Cuban group if landed and infiltrated might have as one o f its m ission s the following which might have included an attack on one or another Cuban leader I do not have any direct re collection that this did happen but I cannot exclude that it did happen Bundy testified that he did not know of any decision to go ahead and actually undertake a plan of assassination That contingent capability m ay have been authorized in this field I cannot exclude although I have no d irect re co lle ctio n of it It is the decision to go ahead that I am sure I do not rem em ber Bundy said that he would have been su rp rise d if any effort to assassin ate a foreign leader had been undertaken without his approval as the P re sid e n t's A ssistant fo r Security A ffa irs and said that he h im self would not have authorized anything of that kind without m uch higher authority than m y own I could not exclude that there would be com m unication with the P resident by other channels Neither P resident Kennedy nor P resident Johnson always used any one channel There was d irect a ccess of the D ire cto r of Central Intelligence to the P resident according to M r Bundy He said that based upon his experien ce I would not have expected the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without d ire ct order fro m higher authority it did not happen in the tim e I was there but I can con ceive o f the P resident saying to som ebody I do not want to make this decision but giving som e indication o f the kind of decision he wanted m a d e 7 The Subsequent Interrogation o f M cG eorge Bundy After M r Bundy completed his testim ony before the Com m ission he contacted the Executive D irector the next m orning and volunteered that in thinking about the m atter overnight I have had a vague recollection which I cannot pinpoint in tim e that there was discussion that I knew about at som e time of a proposal o r schem e o r p roject in relation to the Castro regim e that did involve poison and the ch a ra cteristic that sticks in my m em ory is that it would have involved a rather large scale use o f poison and as I re co lle c t it it never cam e anywhere near approval P rop osals under the overall plan with regard to Cuba w hich did com e from time to tim e m ostly not with resp ect to assassination w ere reviewed in the first instance for practicability and only after that for w isdom or politica l rightness and I r e ca ll no proposal for liquidation that ever got past the firs t stage to the se co n d A memorandum of the interview with the E xec­ utive D irector was prepared the next m orning to record these addi­ tional com m ents In this memorandum which was signed by M r Bundy and sworn to b efore a notary public in the form o f an affidavit Bundy said that I sim ply have no recollection o f plans that existed in January or February 1961 which involved the attempted poisoning of any Cuban leader I believe my m em ory tells m e in a m ore general way that my knowledge of a schem e or idea of using poison probably relates to the year 1962 Bundy further stated I am absolutely certain that I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization to go ahead with an effort to liquidate C astro or any other Cuban le a d e r With re fe re n ce to his testim ony concerning an executive action capability Bundy said that I re ca ll the w ords 'e x e c ­ utive action capability1 m ore cle a rly today than I did yesterd ay but 1 I do not have any re co lle ctio n as to what I knew about that or who j requested it or how much was done under it j I don't r e c a ll having any particular continuing interest in or inform ation about that particular activity which was som ething like a plan to have som e kind of stand-by capability for action against individuals 8 Docum ents of the National Security Council On A p ril 17 1975 the Executive D irector wrote to the National Security Council requesting im m ediate a cce ss to all ► f c £ £ 0 £ files and documents relating to the operations affecting Cuba and the Dom inican Republic during the period 1960-1964 and in particular asked for access to the re co rd s o f the National Security Council the Special Group and the S pecial Group augmented The request of the E xecutive D irector was denied on May 9 1975 H ow ever on May 9 the National Security Council NSC purported to deliver to the Executive Direct all National Security Council documents in its possession which p e r­ tained to the question of possible assassination attempts on the life o f Castro or T ru jillo One of these documents was an excerpt from a paper on United States P o licy Toward Cuba dated May 4 1961 and prepared for discu ssion by the National Security Council at its meeting o n May 5 1961 Paragraphs No 79 and No 80 from this excerpt are as follow s 79 C astro A political vulnerability o f the regim e lies in the person of Castro him self It is not clear whether the regim e could continue to operate for long without him There is no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively freely and probably makes many decision s without con­ sulting Castro However it is equally certain that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important elem ent in maintaining popular support for the regim e If Castro were rem oved from the scene the regim e might collapse for la ck o f this central rallying point On the other hand the bureaucracy m ay now be so firm ly entrenched that it could function independently--although admittedly without the degree of popular support now enjoyed Further by using Castro as a m artyr it might be possible to generate at least at tem porary support for his su cce sso r 80 A further possibility attendant upon the deaith of C astro would be the attitude o f the PSP The party would like to assume a m ore open and dominant role in the Cuban Government C astro's death might fo r c e or encourage the party into a precipitate m ove to seize power If this happened it would probably have an adverse reaction o f Latin A m erican opinion though principally at the governm ent level Subsequently the Executive D irector renewed his request orally and also in writing on May 22 On May 30 the National Security Council stated that it had completed a review of all record s of the p red ece sso r groups of the Forty Committee and tra n s­ mitted som e additional documents although still denying ov era ll a c c e ss Included in the copies of the documents transferred on May 30 1975 w ere the following a Copy of the N ovem ber 3 I960 Minutes of Special Group Meeting attended by M e ssrs Merchant Douglas Gray General Cabell and General Lansdale t The last paragraph stated i¥ F inally M r Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking d irect positive action against Fidel Raul and Che Guevara He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brain less He i ► c £ £ conceded that it would be n ecessary to act against all three sim ultaneously Gen Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain o f results and highly dangerous in conception and execution because the instruments must be Cubans He felt that particularly because of the necessity o f simultaneous action it would have to be concluded that M r M erchant's suggestion is beyond our ca p a b ilitie s b The remaining documents all related to 1964 and w ill be discussed in the concluding part of the section of the Statement o f Facts pertaining to possible assassination plans directed against P rem ier Castro j June 13 1961 T aylor R eport A ccordin g to a June 13 1961 paper Allen Dulles and Richard B is s e ll briefed P re sid e n t-e le ct Kennedy in N ovem ber I960 at Palm Beach about the Bay of Pigs planning The T aylor paper was prepared pursuant to an A pril 22 1961 directivelby the P resident to T aylor Attorney General R obert Kennedy Adm iral A rley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overa ll analysis and study of governm ental practices fo r m ilitary param ilitary g u errilla and an ti-gu errilla activity with sp ecia l attention to the lesson s that can be learned from recent events in C uba There is nothing in the June 13 1961 T aylor report which sp e cifica lly d iscu sses assassination H owever during the tim e the study was being under­ taken the aforem entioned May 22 1961 FBI memorandum was prepared and sent to Attorney General Kennedy k Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs Sheffield Edwards h im self thought that these plans w ere developed in connection with the Bay o f P igs and it was B isse ll who was in charge of the overall coordination of the Bay o f Pigs operation B issell denies that these plans w ere part of the Bay of P igs planning He testified that he was quite cle a r that the plans for attempted assassination o f F idel Castro were not developed as a part o f the Bay of Pigs operation 1 Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba B issell stated that he did not think the actual attempt was ever m ade although it is physically possible that the poison pills did reach Cuba He also said that although he did not rem em ber having any evidence that Castro knew o f these attempts it is p erfectly p ossib le that with som e time lag Castro would have com e on som e evidence of this operation B issell also testified that to the extent individuals in the Cuban exile community in M iami may have been involved ou r b e lie f was that Castro was extrem ely well informed on what was going on m Term ination o f Phase I Plan A fter the Bay o f P ig s operation in A p ril 1961 a cco rd in g to Sheffield Edwards the plan as I r e c a ll petered o u t Edwards said that he did not b e co m e involved with any other p e rso n after the B ay o f P ig s invasion to try to get the pills to Cuba n Other Plans During Phase I While the Phase I plans were underway the Agency received confirmation from contacts in Cuba concerning possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro M ost of these contacts took p la ce in the first part o f 1961 im m ediately preceding the Bay of P igs landing In particu lar there w ere several cables received referrin g to a p ossib le assassination attempt against Fidel Castro on A p ril 9 1961 during a public appearance at the Sports P alace in Havana There w ere also m essages received from d is­ sident Cubans inside Cuba in the fir s t few months after the Bay of Pigs invasion In som e of these m essa ges there w ere references to trying to kill C astro None of these possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside Cuba appear to have been coordinated with the Phase I plans 3 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans a Possible Authorization - the Testimony of Richard Bissell Plans In late 19 61 or early 1962 Deputy Director for Richard Bissell recalled asking a new case officer to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro and the Castro Administration 1 probably urged him to look into this plan which had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it except to look at it as a plan or to proceed with any action along those lines Richard Bissell resigned from the Agency in February 1962 His successor as Deputy Director for Plans was Richard Helms b The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer 1 Developing an Executive Action capability The Phase II case officer in a signed recorded interview said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962 in which Bissell told him in substance that someone in the White House had raised the question whether or not the Agency should develop what was called an executive action capability which was a capability of assassination or 40 liquidation of leaders of foreign countries The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against Castro had been mounted and that it had been handled through Sheffield Edwards 2 Discussions with Edwards and Helms The case officer said he was then briefed by Edwards on the operation that' had been previously conducted Edwards This testimony was corroborated by Colonel Both Edwards and the case officer stated that ■ I i i Edwards did not have any further contact with any ' » involved with Phase I for a briefing The Phase II case The Phase II case officer stated in his T IA Y officer then took over this entire operation for the Agency I n rv«n II case officer in contact with the case officer who had been i • T subsequent phase after Phase I Colonel Edwards put the Phase case officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms The Phase II T W V4Q TH recorded interview that after he was briefed by the previous case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia personne which to the best of his recollection occurred about early April 1962 3 The Phase II Plans The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of assassination rifle fire and the use of poison pills 41 Delivery of funds for the acquisition of rifles and handguns plus some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place in the summer of 1962 According to the case officer it was somewhat less than $5 000 The money was delivered to the Mafia contact and the case officer received a report from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba The case officer stated that he felt he was dealing with a very volatile situation that in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure” was the kind of an operation that the Government the Agency or anybody else could not afford to have surface It was quite obvious that there was an explosion potential here— an explosion not in the technical sense— a flap potential if you will but it took some time to find out just what could be done and how it could be done to try to sanitize the possible reper­ cussions of this He claimed that very shortly after taking over the operation he reached a tentative conclusion that the plans had little chance of success and he decided to wind down the plans gradually The winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and in June 1963 the case officer went abroad to another position wholly uncpnnected with the Cuban operation 42 When asked why the operation did not meet with success the case officer said I don't know if I have any valid opinion why could have happened There are a great many things that It wasn't tried it was choked off it was penetrated from the start— at least on the Cuban end— that is the end in Cuba When I say I have no personal knowledge of this I am aware that Castro has claimed there were a number of attempts on his life I am aware that he has blamed those on the U S in general and the CIA in particular But I have no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever actually if you will a shot fired or any poison administered or any other attempt other than in the inchoate stage j I The case officer also stated that given the capabilities of Castro’s security apparat and the general seive-like character of the community in exile and the i j I 1 l number of people who knew at least something about this J particular incident or operation before I had any connection with it or later as a result of things that occurred before I had any connection with it I think and thought at the time that it was conceivable that it had been penetrated I cannot honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of this operation 43 The Phase II case officer stated that he knew of no other plan to assassinate any other foreign leader except Castro c The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II According to Colonel Edwards at the time of the May 7 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy he did not know that the Phase II case officer whom he had earlier briefed was undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I Therefore he did not tell the Attorney General at the time of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway d Knowledge of John McCone Director of Central Intelligence re Phase II The Phase II case officer stated that sometime prior to August 1962 he had a conversation with Richard Helms who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans The case officer said that the question was raised whether i t t J t or not the new Director of Central Intelligence Mr McCone should be briefed of the operation nI did recommend to Mr Helms that since this ’operation' and the possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection with it and before John McCone had had any connection whatever 44 with the Agency and since the decision had been made at that time that this should be sanitized tied off and terminated as soon as practically feasible I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed on it - and I strongly recommended that he not be IT The case officer said that to the best of his knowledge McCone at no time in 1962 knew of the fact that Phase II of the operations were underway John McCone testified that he first learned about Phase II when he was first interviewed by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission in April 1975 and McCone further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was knowledge he received on August 16 1963 upon receipt of a memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the May 14 19 62 Memorandumfor theRecord delivered General toAttorney Kennedy e The Testimony ofRichard Helms i j j rePhase II Helms was asked whether he remembered any discussions with the case officer concerning the furnishing of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have them try and carry out any assassination plans Helms replied I donTt have any question that we tried to line them in Cuba to bring down this government or to kill anybody they j 45 could lay their hands on But he did not recall that a specific project was approved which was designed for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or do something to Castro Helms testified before the Commission that he was not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any foreign leader I certainly never authorized the execution of any ■ such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and I when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it coming forward Ii I certainly never recommended such an » action to the then Director j Helms said that although he had no recollection of any discussion with the case officer not to tell the i I Director of Central Intelligence Mr McCone in 1962 about ' the existence of plans I have no reason to cavil that this I was the fact c y f The August 10 1962 Meeting of the Special Group Augmented ® £ N The Special Group Augmented was a group of senior people in the Administration who were involved in overall planning with operations directed against Cuba Included in that group were the Secretary of State Dean Rusk the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the Attorney General of the United States Robert Kennedy the Assistant to the President for National Security McGeorge Bundy General Maxwell Taylor and General Lyman Lemn itzer who is a member of the Commission along with sever - 1 others The coordinating 46 officer of the Special Group Augmented was Brigadier General Edward Lansdale Robert Kennedy was not present at the August 10 19 62 meeting 1 The Interrogation of the Phase II Case The Phase II case officer said that he was at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in the State Department in August 1962 when someone brought up the possibility of liquidation of Castro John McCone was at that meeting and according to the case officer John McCone got rather red in the face and made a remark which was a clear effort to stop any such proposals suggestion or any discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum immediately On August 14 1962 the Phase II case officer prepared a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Plans who was Richard Helms in which he attached a copy of an August 13 1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale The CIA case officer's memorandum to Helms said 1 Action None information This memorandum is for your 2 Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962 concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale Attached is a copy of this- memorandum excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1 These four words were including liquidation of leaders 47 3 The question of assassination particularly of Fidel Castro was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August It was the obvious consensus at that meeting in answer to a comment by Mr Ed Murrow that this is not a subject which has been made a matter -of official record I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point and the Special Group Augmented is not expecting any written comments or study on this point 4 Upon receipt of the attached memorandum I called Lansdale s office and in his absence pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document I advised Frank Hand that as far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum including those dissemi­ nated to State Defense and USIA Shortly thereafter Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so I I The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of ' I August 13 1962 had excised from it a phrase The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase including t ► liquidation of leaders 2 Interrogation of Robert M McNamara According to Robert M McNamara in a recorded interview he had no recollection of being present at the August 10 1962 meeting I'm not suggesting I wasn't but I have no recollection of it I do seem to recall that there was such a group I doubt very much if I was a member of it He said that he might have been a participant at one or more 48 meetings When asked whether or not he heard anyone discuss the possibility of assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader McNamara replied No I should interject here another point I made earlier as I have no notes— I did not take notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions and I have no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those years is very bad I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I'm saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in relation to the period McNamara stated that I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated which seems to me extremely unlikely if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr Bundy but other officials at that same level including my deputy I think and my i deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it with me ' Secretary McNamara said that he couldnft imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known to the President and was not known to Mr Bundy I can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr Bundy not known to the President either because they were not that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge I can't imagine Mr Bundy himself supporting assassination I can't i I I J 49 imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without mentioning it to the President even though to do so would by that action involve the President I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known Mr Bundy recognized more than the rest of us the importance of protecting the presidency as well as the particular president and particularly protecting his ability to govern ' 3 The Testimony of John McCone John McCone testified that he was present at the August 10 1962 meeting He said that he objected to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as a possibility of consideration and he later talked with Secretary j I McNamara and expressed the same view and he said Secretary McNamara agreed John McCone testified that at the time of the August 10 1962 meeting he did not know of the existence of the Phase I plans nor did he know that at the very time the meeting was taking place Phase II was underway 4 The Affidavit of General Lemnitzer Lyman Lemnitzer a member of the -CIA Commission was also present on the August 10 1962 meeting In an affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders being discussed i » 50 5 The Testimony of General Lansdale General Lansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10 1962 meeting although he said that it is quite possible” that he might have attended that meeting General Lansdale said that the possibility of assassination may have been discussed at that meeting He also had no specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13 1962 and the words whited out When asked whether or not those words might have been including liquidation of leaders Lansdale replied I doubt i it I just don't recall anything at all on liquidation of J leaders ” However he also said that it was possible that the excised phrase from his memorandum was including liquidation of leaders but he stated that this was merely a matter of considering a possibility one of several alternatives 6 Additional Testimony of General Lansdale According to Lansdale during 1960 he was Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations He said he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders In 19 61 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 51 a Discussions with and Written Proposals to President Kennedy Lansdale said that he had a discussion with President Kennedy I 'do not recall exactly on that He asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and if I could come up with any suggestions or recommendations from such a study but it was to be It was a rather vague assignment by him done for him personally ” Lansdale suggested an intermediary to I whom he would report and Lansdale said the President appointed ' i his brother who was the Attorney General According to Lansdale he made an initial series ofrecommendations in late 1961 or early 19 62 in writing addressed to the President to see if there was a possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their political thinking together to see if there would be any feasibility of a revolution in Cuba He says he thinks he gave the written report to the Attorney General for delivery to the President and that he later saw the paper in the files of the President he received it and he had possession of it b Cuban Exile Groups During the first part of 1962 there were discussions about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass the regime Lansdale stated that the possibility of- these exile groups trying to assassinate Cashro might well have been mentioned However he said that I don't recall a I t 52 single instance of any serious action being undertaken on any plan for assassination He went on to say that whatever discussions took place concerning assassination related to possibilities rather than actualities c Requests for possibility” Plans - but no Authorization to Carry Out • Lansdale said that if there were directions to submit papers it was an authorization for submitting papers i and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the' ■ action Lansdale admitted that there might well have been it i i a request for the CIA to come up with as a possibility a plan for liquidation of leadership i If that request was made he said it could 1 » have been one of his requests and that he quite probably t would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense and f possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact ► Lansdale said that at no time during I960 £ 1961 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or any other leader Lansdale testified that he never heard any discussion of executive action capability 53 g Interrogation of General Taylor General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro He said he did not have any discussions with the President concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans to assassinate Castro However in the case of Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles we talked about so many things at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the table I couldn't say— that the desirability of the disappearance of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba— that was not raised I don't recall He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassination with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow I f couldn't say that discussion in the abstract 'wouldn't it be a nice thing if someone bumped Castro off1 that could well 1 t have been said but I just don't recall it j Taylor said that he never knew of any authorization t for the CIA to undertake any assassination He also said he I I had no knowledge of the phrase executive action capability or any proposal for the CIA to develop a general standby capability to assassinate foreign leaders General Taylor who was at the August 10 1962 meeting said he had no recollection of any assassination plan being discussed although he said that it might have been 54 h Testimony of Richard Helms Re Unseating Castro Government and Possible Plans 1 White House Pressure Richard Helms now Ambassador to Iran testified that there was a flat-out effort ordered by the White House the President Bobby Kennedy who was after all his man his right hand in these matters to unseat the Castro government to do everything possible to get rid of it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this very problem And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed there was even a greater push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles from the United States shores In response to a question concerning Who might have been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do something about Castro Helms responded Well the principal driving force was the Attorney General Robert Kennedy There isn't any question about this Involved in this was a group of individuals who were sort of hired and pulled together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and all those people to get on with this job and as I 55 sit here and start to hink about this Califano was one of them It seems to me Lansdale who had been successful in this kind of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while 2 Possible Assassination Plans Ambassador Helms testified that he did not recall any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro but that there were conversations about it I haven't the slightest doubt The business about the assassination of Castro I have read about this in the papers about it from associates I have heard It has been kicked around whether this was a viable proposition or not I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don't recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained H Ambassador Helms said he did not recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that He did recall that at some juncture a decision was reached that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General about various things that the Agency had had to do with certain Mafia members He did recall that 56 the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but he did not recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination i The August 16 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I According to John McCone the first time he learned about the existence of any assassination plans was on August 16 1963 when he was given a copy of the May 14 1962 Memorandum for the Record prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy The particular events underlying the disclosure i to Director John McCone appear to have started on the evening of August 15 1963 Stanley J Grogan an assistant to the j j » Director in charge of press relations received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith a J reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times According to a memorandum for the record prepared on August 16 1963 by Grogan Sandy e 1 Smith said he was working on a story as a follow-up to the jj revelations by Joe Valachi who is under close guard at Ft Monmouth New Jersey who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision 57 He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba but provided no information of value Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny On August 16 1963 the front page of the Chicago Sun-Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline nCIA Sought Giancana Help for Cuba Spying The i story Btarted with the following paragraphs A fantastic j i i tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang tt boss Momo Salvatore Moe Giancana and the Central Intelligence j Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times 11It was a weird gangland spy case in which 1 ► 4 government official said CIA agents contacted Giancana in an regime came into power in 1959 What the CIA accomplished— if anything— by negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter Richard Helms gave John McCone on August 16 a memorandum dated August 16 under the subject Sam Giancana which stated Attached is the only copy in IW Jd T rr effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro 58 the Agency of a memorandum on subject the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962 I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year ” Richard Helms when interrogated by the Commission staff testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events However when he was shown his memorandum of August 16 1963 addressed to John McCone the Director of Central Intelligence he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr McCone Helms did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16 1963 59 4 Miscellaneous 19 63 Schemes According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga­ tion report during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were developed inside the Agency-for possible use against Pidel Castro Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes which he called hairbrained ” There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion stage One of these schemes the CIA about trying to have involved discussions inside General Donovan who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit skindive It was known that Fidel Castro liked to The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot a disabling and chronic skin disease and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus There i i is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such schemes developed inside the Agency The scheme was dropped because I 1 Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncontaminated skindiving suit as a gesture of friendship 60 During this period of time there were also discussio about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be submerged in an area where Castro often skindived The seashell would be loaded withr explosives to blow apart when the shell was lifted After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean area large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro Also a midget submarine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range 5 The Phase III Plan - 1963 - 1965 In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations Group on Cuba The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase III case officer The task assigned to him was to collect intelligence and to try to organize a group of military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban In the latter part of 1963 while on a trip abroad he met a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact At this first 1963 meeting the Phase III case t officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader j il j I regime-the Castro regime since 1961 j 61 Originally the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member of one of the groups that overthrew Batista However he became disenchanted with Castro shortly after Castro took over because of the harsh police state policies that were being carried out At a subsequent 1963 meeting which took place in Europe the Phase III case officer said that the primary discussion concerned getting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used in an internal coup against the Castro government The subject of assassination was never raised by me It was never discussed in that context In discussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed and that somebody would be killed Their or his opinion was that to even get the internal revolt a coup underway that the leadership— the top leadership— would have to be neutralized Specific assassination of any of the people it was not discussed in those particular terms According to the Phase III case officer the Cuban contact held a relatively high position in the Cuban government The Cuban requested a meeting a high 62 level policy maker in VJashington specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would like to talk to get some assurance that Washington was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation The Cuban also said that they would need some the coup The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said they felt that they could capture sufficient arms to carry on once they started Subsequently a senior CIA officer travelled to Europe to meet the Cuban and assured him that the U S Government was serious about this operation and that the U S Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the U S Government would support them The next meeting took place on November 22 1963 in Europe The Cuban contact had requested some type of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself if there were a confrontation directly with Castro He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or anything that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him into any conference with Castro rnuiiA ut-1 tKUPi THJS ifcKALU R FORD LIBPARY help in-arms probably-in getting started in kicking off 63 Although the Agency did not develop such a device it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone The Phase III case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on November 22 1963 ' The Cuban contact declined the gadget because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person if anything developed in the form of a confrontation with him Instead the Cuban asked for weapons and the case officer told the Cuban that a cache of weapons would be put down for him in Cuba One or two caches of weapons including highpowered rifles with scopes were subsequently placed down in Cuba officer In addition according to thePhase III case he delivered money to help theCuban contact with his living expenses while in Europe It was around 51 000 at one time no more than that The Phase III case officer broke off with the Cuban in the latter part of 1964 and to another task in early 19 65 contact wasreassigned The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group 64 According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation report CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan In March 19 66 a Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro according to a Prensa Latina news release » The mem said In a memorandum to the Secretary of State niTT he received $100 000 toward this plan There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100 000 or any other sizeable sum of money as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact The Agency also said the Agency was not involved with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act The-memorandum to Secretary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6 1966 J The Agency said rrwn and objectives in Cuba XHV THTT was recruited to collect intelligence of military activities M n rrw u in after this news story appeared the CIA said that the contact 6 M iscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban E xile Community On June 10 1964 Richard Helms Deputy D irector for Plains sent to John M cCone DCI a memorandum on the subject P lans of Cuban E xiles to A ssassinate Selected Cuban Government L e a d e r s The opening paragraph of the report declared T h e following report was com piled from inform ation obtained by Agency o ffice rs from persons who were parties to the actions d escrib ed Agency o ffice rs made clear to each of the sou rces that the United States Governm ent would not under any circu m sta n ces condone the planned actions Presum ably the sources o f the report in submitting this inform ation were motivated in part by the b elief that by d isclosin g the inform ation they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan The report then detailed several different reports pertaining to the developm ent of a plan that was still in the em bryonic stage to assassinate Fidel C a stro Some of the plans involved advances o f funds with the m ajor payment to be made upon the consum mation of an assassination The funds w ere to come from either wealthy Cubans or C o s a N ostra elem ents The May 30 1975 letter from the National Security Council to the Executive D irector had several documents attached which 66 pertained to the possibility o f assassination of Castro by Cuban exiles or the Mafia a These papers included the following A June 18 1964 memorandum prepared for M cG eorge Bundy under the subject 303 Committee Cuban R eview The portion o f the m emorandum delivered opened with the following sentence It seem s to me that this meeting might serve to give us a cle a re r picture o f what fo rce s are at work today which might serve to em barrass the USA in the next 120 d a y s The memorandum referred to oth er groups o f adventurers and freeb ooters who have an unknown capability for trouble • MWe also have these reports of MAFIA plans to p erform coup de main operations for cash Who is keeping track of this I Does the grapevine among the em igres keep us well advised o f all impending I I ' t ad ven tu res 11 Attached was the June 10 1964 copy o f the Helms memorandum to the D irector of Central Intelligence b f »I J A M em orandum for the R ecord dated June 22 1964 under the subject P relim in a ry Meeting with Attorney General 19 June 1964 with the R eferen ce Minutes o f Meeting o f 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on O verall Subject of Cuba” was signed by P eter Jessup T he'portion of the memorandum disclosed to the Executive D irector included the follow ing final paragraph 67 'In regard to the m em orandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the C astro regim e it was pointed out that these reports in effect put the United States Government on notice that such plotting was afoot and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation The C om m ittee's b elief that this was essentially a law enforcem ent problem was cited The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the m a tte r 11 c A portion of a m em orandum for the re co rd also dated June 22 1964 and signed by P eter Jessup under the subject M inutes o f the Meeting of the 303 C om m ittee 18 June 1964” showed as present M cG eorge Bundy John M cCone together with 11Mr Vance M r Johnson M r Mann and M r F itzG erald were also p re s e n t 1’ The opening portion of the m em orandum contained the following A general discu ssion was held on problem s arising from increased activities on the part of organized Cuban em igre groups independent adventurers purported plots to assassinate C astro and the general edginess and instability on the island None of these present appeared to feel that it was either re a listic or p ra ctica l to sever connections with o r to withdraw support from the two principal em igre organizations those o f A rtim e and Ray 68 The remaining portion of the memorandum was whited out except fo r the final paragraph A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders Mr McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the m atter further Others including M r Bundy felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its pow er to ascertain prom ptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention It was decided that Mr Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney G eneral’ s attention as a matter of law en fo rce ­ ment d The Executive D ire cto r also received a M em orandum for the R ecord dated July 31 1964 under the subject Minut es o f the Meeting o f the 303 C om m ittee 30 July 1964 showing Bundy Vance McCone and Thomas L Hughes present as well as Desmond Fit Gerald o f the CIA Only two paragraphs of the memorandum w ere disclosed to the E xecutive D irecto r as follow s T h e proposed in filtration exfiltration operations into Cuba for August 1964 w ere approved Mr FitzGerald then addressed him ­ se lf once m ore to the ever present problem of operations by auto­ nomous 'groups he said While under our cognizance they are not controlled 69 It was agreed that Mr F itzG erald would contact Mr Sam Papich o f the FBI in regard to the ea rlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcem ent An August 19 1964 memorandum from John A McCone to M cG eorge Bundy on the subject of Status o f FBI Investigations re Plans by Cuban E xiles to A ssassinate Cuban Government Leaders was also included in the m aterial delivered to the Executive D irector on May 30 The m emorandum sum marized the FBI investigation to date and FBI reports were sum m arized 7 Summary The foregoing fa cts show that the CIA was directly involved in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba There is conflicting evidence concerning whether or not the CIA was directed or encouraged by higher authority to make an actual attempt on the life o f P rem ier Castro or whether this was a m atter developed from with the Agency or whether it was a combination of both 70 C The Dominican Republic 1 The Chronology a The Background Rafael Truj-illo came to power in the Dominican public in 1930 By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrup regressive nature of his regime because of his systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several attempts to overthrow the government sponsored by other Latin American countries The policy of the United States at the beginnin 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's downfall but to identify develop and encourage a moderate group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death flight or overthrow This policy of non-intervention although I clearly required by treaty convinced many Latin Americans i I that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with operations against Castro conditioned their support on U S assistance in toppling Trujillo In April the President approvec contingency planning for a more active U S role in the event the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate 71 b The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican I public returned to Washington for consultations Both State Dept ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons particularly a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses recollection of any such request The Ambassador has no present He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them request went forward Nevertheless the Near the end of June according to CIA files the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs approved the provision of pa small number j of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key j Trujillo people from the scene and requested that they be r i supplied at the earliest possible moment Neither the CIA officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secre now both retired has any recollection of this meeting 72 c Explosives On June 24 1960 Trujillo sponsored an unsucces attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela as a result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August Consular relations were retained The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign ser officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the severance of relations and as Consul General thereafter It was his recollection that the dissidents had no definite assassination plans in mid 1960 although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which they lived It was not until early 1961 as he recalls that the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill Trujillo The cables and memoranda of the period tend to J I confirm this recollection t Nevertheless the CIA continued at intervals dua fc 1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for theassassination j of Trujillo A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb detonated frorn a remote point and then to take over the nation by means of an armed uprising coordinated with other paramilitary action A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears to have been provided by the dissidents in December 73 On December 29 I960 the Deputy Director for P presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow A portion of the program called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-U S successor to the Trujillo regime The plan as initially approved by the Special Group contained no provision for supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents Two weeks later the Department of State on its motion obtained Special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished limited supplies of small arms and other equipment meaning explosives subject to the condition that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point outside the country itself The internal State Department memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be no thought of toppling the government by any such minor J I measure but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U S opposition with a corresponding boost to their morale and their opinion of the United States The station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group action on January 19 1961 the last day of the Eisenhower Administration President Kennedy was informed of the Special Group action not later than mid-February i 74 I d Revolvers During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch with the dissidents and they were aware of their various schemes to assassinate Trujillo Although these officials apparently took no active role in the development of plans they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents In mid- February two members of the dissidents' Action Group which was to carry out the actual assassination came to the United States Department officers They met with both CIA and State During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo The evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department 75 In March matters took an active turn In a cabl on March 4 a letter on March 16 and an airgram on March 22 the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo's assassination were coining to a head He requested additional authority to supply the pro-U S ■ dissidents with weapons Similar requests were made by the CIA Station Chief of his headquarters that it could Three times headquarters responded not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by Americans On March 22 the CIA Station Chief renewed his request that headquarters send him three 38 calibre revolvers a a m i n u n i t i o r m m j j H m m He some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use j p 76 ¥ On the same day March 22 representatives of ti • CIA met with- the State Department officer who served as their point of contact with the Department's Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs Three days later on March 25 the Deputy Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and stating that the revolvers and ammunition would in the near future There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart­ ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on t decision The memories of the participants are hazy on the matter but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and believed it obtained approval The then Deputy Director for I Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery ' of weapons was initially imposed at the request of the Department of State he would have considered the State Depart­ ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authority and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for formal approval He observed that the members of the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were passed to the dissidents and the Department of State files in­ dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other ti by Agency officers Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter » e • Carbines On March 26 the day after CIA decided to fur­ nish the revolvers the station cabled that it had found three M carbines in the consulate left behind by departing naval personnel It requested magazines for the weapons and permission to pass them to the dissidents On March 29 the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he was pouching the magazines and that headquarters was inclined to 78 favor passing the weapons and ammunition Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31 The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons but the Deputy Director for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same day Both the State Department liaison officer who prepared the memorandum of the meeting and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department in Washington did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took place Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was coordinated in advance with the Department of State It is j possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group restriction on importation of weapons did not apply as the f ¥ carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to reques the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the Department that the arms and ammunition were being passed A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received two 79 days later The CIA Station Chief who would not have been involved in any coordination at the headquarters level speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing officially that the weapons were being passed It is clear that the coordination on the deci­ sion to provide the carbines was inadequate It is impossible to determine from this evidence where the fault lies f SubmachiAe Guns As early as March 20 the consulate and the sta­ tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in- j I I tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress— substantial the plan followed some two months later Although the plan i » originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress' residence using silenced weapons the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self defense in case the assassination plans went awry and was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces there In its t ► j 80 but that for security reasons they could The Chief of Station returned to Washington for consultations in early AprilV He was able to convince his superiors t h a t £ m £ w a s the only feasible and secure j means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic for delivery to the dissidents The Deputy Director for Plans approved on April 10 and but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without further approval The files show that there was no coordination with the Department of State in Washington Because of the Bay of Pigs landing on April 17 the station and the consulate i were never given authority to supply the weapons to the i i dissidents and they never did so On May 2 as the result of repeated entreaties f from the station and the consulate the Deputy Director for Plana approved a cable for the DCI's release stating that as it j ¥ appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not the submachineguns were provided the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group Apparently someone decided this decision should not be made without the consent of the Department of State for on May 3 81 the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Latin America According to Berle's memorandum of the interview confirmed by one of the witnesses the initial presentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo After some examination Berle determined that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and that the guns were wanted for that purpose Berle responded that he could not care less for Trujillo but that the United States i did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination i plots anywhere any time The Agency officer who had been i in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for j approximately a year told Berle he felt the same way t State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have referred to In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns and this ended the matter m in t ruled on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high-level • IHWjaTa It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over- 82 g The Policy Statement In mid-May as a result of increasing indications I that events in the Dominican Republic were reaching a climax the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans This exercise was overseen by a member of the National i Security Council Staff A CIA briefing paper prepared for this j purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines ► had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines i c and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization f technically did not apply u The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had al- i the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assassination that the moral posture of the United States could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world that the United States would have encouraged the action x rw j ready been passed and apparently submitted a memorandum outliniig 83 supplied the weapons effected the delivery and then turned over only the final execution to unskilled local triggermen was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing hi that the plans of the pro-U S group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo by any means This memorandum did not call attention to the fact that the United States had supplied weapons to the group In the midst of these discussions the Consul i General who had been in Washington for consultation cabled on I return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group » planned to execute action against Trujillo that evening The Department replied that it would consider this timing t particularly unfortunate in vi w of the juxaposition of the c t Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer The state of the covert action program in the Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18 and again on May 25 the minutes The Commission has not had access to On May 24 the State Department liaison officer provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable stating that the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter­ vention and even more so from political assassination overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissident and with Latin America generally This draft was approved at high levels in the CIA and the State Department and was redrafting in the White House the final version in another hand stated We must not run risk of U S association with approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican Republic It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30 On June 1 the State Department instructed its Consul General if he could do so most inconspicuously to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related matters m jA This version was IW J O T H T policy cannot condone assassination T political assassination since U S as a matter of general 85 2 Summary The investigation disclosed no direct American participation in the assassination The idea originated with the Dominicans they acquired some of the weapons on their own and they did the detailed planning They were never subject to American supervision or control On the other hand CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions The CIA had 1 i told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans it had offered to train a member of the 1 I# group in the use of explosives to kill Trujillo ► i t ► c 1 5 D Conclusion President Ford has firmly announced that assassina­ tion is not and should never Be a tool of United States policy The Executive Director of the Commission joins in this statement It is against the constitutional and moral principles for which this Republic stands for there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime Rockefeller Commission David Belin Assassination Study Investigation in CIA involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders 06 05 1975 Source front