SYSTEM II 90475 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON April 30 1985 Dear Mr General Secretary ' As I mentioned in my letter of April 4 delivered by Speaker O'Neill I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly I write in that spirit I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our cg ntries and I welcomed your judgment that it is' possible to do so Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us and -- as you pointed out -- the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus'to move these relations in a positive direction Unfortunately certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations In particular I have in mind the public retraction of the commitment made earlier by a esponsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany Mr General Secretary this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in' our countries' relations For ' - 1-H L 2 this reason I will give you my views in detail The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity The current Soviet position recognizes neithe of these principles Now I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities But hen they do it is the responsibility of the re evant political authorities to take appropriate cgrrective action For decades members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing in order provided to your commander never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission regardless of circumstances Our forces in the Federal RJpublic of Germany have never done so even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas In fact some Soviet officers were discovered in a prQhibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area The position which your Government most recently presented to us therefore is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission what we see is the assertion of a right to use lethal force under certain circumstances determined unilaterally by the Soviet side and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers -- to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations If 3 you choose to permit this that is your prerogative But in that case your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of jUdgment by individuals acting in accord with standing' orders r hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has t ken on this matter and take steps to see to t that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American British and French counte parts in Germany just as American British and French military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other issues The American people see this tragedy through the eyes of the widow and an eight-yearold child Consequently it will remain a penetrating and enduring problem until it is properly resolved - Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in our opinion the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side For example I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force but 'by peaceful competition and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside But if this is true what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force Can this be considered consistent with that important principle Mr General Secretary my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing and practical efforts to apply it another Since we seem to agree on many principles we must · ' - 4 devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice In this regard I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more'direct consultation on various regio al issues That is a healthy sign and r would hope that these consu tations can be used to avoid the development of s uations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations I believe we should not be discouraged it at present our positions seem far apart This is to be expected given our differing interests and the impact of past events The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the ot er One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan Isn't it long overdue to reach 'a political resolution mf this tragic affair I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties that of the Afghan people- to live in peace under a government of their own choosing and that of the Soviet Union ta ensure that its southern border is secure We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated se tlement and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace if you desire Above all we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country Turning to another of your comments I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust Till not be enhanced - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - 5 if for example one were to talk as if in two languages • ••• It Of course this is true And if I am to be candid I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language But I knowt hat this is not what you intended to suggest I also am sure that you did not iptend to suggest that· expressing our respective philosophies or our viek s of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship For after all it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle However this may be your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it In this regard I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it was made -- unhelpful As for the substance of the proposal I find no significant element in it which we'have not made clear in the past is unacceptable to us I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons since I am certain your experts are well · ware of them I cannot help but wonde r what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is in its essence not only an old one but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation • Certainly it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions Past experience suggests that th best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately This brings me to the negotiations which have begun in Geneva They have not made the progress we had hoped It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them First the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met even though each side may in some instances - 6 interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics The problem is rather that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete practical agreements - A particular obst cle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that in effect the United-States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point because i f that is the Soviet position no progress will be possible For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be v rified Indeed in Geneva foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged the difficulty of verifying such a ban on research Nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of pur countries To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demRnd creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset I sincerely hope that this is not your intent since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries In facti it is inconsistent with your own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defehse In this egard I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation that this res arch program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point The truth is precisely the opposite We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of nuclear'weapons an objective on which we are agreed I must ask you how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations 7 have 'no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear'weapons the technology of which is already unfortunately far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from Human minds - This point seems ' at one time to have been clearly understoqd by the soviet Government I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles They would he said then gua rd against the eventuality • of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircra t Not only has your government said that missile defenses are good you have acted on this belief as well Not only have you deployed an operational ABM system but you have upgraded it and you are pursuing an active research program ' ' Of course I recognize that in theory ' 'the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characte ized by large numbers of first-strike weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side Nevertheless such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality at least so far as the United States is concerned Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment If some options should at some time in the future be identified development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries including your own and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself And if the decision to deploy should be positive then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed So there is no possibility of a sudden secretive destabilizing move by the United States During the research period our governments will have ample time to phase out 8 systems which could pose a first-strike threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer more stable arrangement If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the un ted States intends to follow the procedures agreeo upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972 In particular Agreed Statement D attached o that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV I presume that it continues to be the intention of the SovIet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results I hope this discussion will assist you in jo n ng me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva One approach which I believe holds promise would be· for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening while the negotiqtors dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete practical solutions which'meet the concerns of both sides I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences An - -- ' 9 agree ent should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors Specifically we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that rinciple Unfortunately the response of your tepresentatives to this offer has not been encourag ng up to now 'I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war This situation illustrate the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic A verifiable complete global ban o these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution and I would ask you therefore to give further study to t e draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Steps to improve our bilateral relationshIp are also important not only because of the benefits which agreeme ts in themselves can bring but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship xn general Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement For example we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have after six months reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved But if I had to characterize these remaining issues I would say that they result from efforts on our side to raise our sights and look to more not fewer exchanges Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area I am also hopeful · ' 10 that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May w ll succeed in identifying areas in Thich trade can increase substantially but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere Finally let me ' urn to an issue of great • importance to me@nd to all Americans As the Vice President informed you in Moscow we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human 'Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings Whatever procedures we Ultimately establish I hope we can agree to try each in accord with his own legal structure to resolve problems in this area If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which giv rise to public recrimination we will have takena giant step forward in creating an atmosphere cohducive to solving many other problems I was glad to receive your views on a meeting' between the two of us and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to justify one I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us As I stated at the outset I have written you in candor I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement I sincerely hope that 11 we can use impetus to confidence which have coun tries this correspondence t9 provide a new the whole range of efforts to build and to solve the critical problems increased tension between our sincerely Q • His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Kremlin Moscow -