NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EYE S ONLY WASHING TON D C 20506 April 10 1991 MEMORANDUM FOR J OHN t ERS ON DDCI FROM DAVID SUBJ ECT The Gorbachev Succession GOMPERT ED This is a reque st for an analy sis of the Gorbachev s u cce s s i on We ask that the analy sis be undertaken only in the CIA t hat it involve judgements of SOVA LDA an d nd that it involve bJ 3 Robert Blackwell and Fritz Ermarth as individual s rathe r than in the ir officia l capacities in the NIC The rep ort will b e addressed only t o the two of us Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates The fa ct that you are prepa ring the report fo r u s should be c l os e l y held We need the report by April 29 The major questions we ask you to a d d re s s a r e the fo llowing 1 What are the potent i al t r i g g e rs which c oul d pre cipitate Go r b a c h e v's d e p a r t u r e or removal Are t he re indi cat ors we should monitor in order to a ssess the likelihood of Gorbachev 's depart ur e 2 How are t he dynam i c s o f the suc ce ssion l ikely t o play out a What a r e the conditi ons and scenarios f o r s u cces sion a nd the probabi lities a s s o c i a t e d with them A successi on acc ording to the new c onstitution a l p r o c edu re s i s one p oss ibility but wha t are t he ot he r s b Wha t a r e the p o litics o f su ccession li k e l y t o b e Wh o f o r e x a mp l e a r e t h e k ey p olit ical p laye rs in t h e su cce ss i on pr oces s c Wh a t pa rticu l a r r o l e are repub lican l e a d e rs li ke ly t o pla y in the succe s s ion proces s What op p o r t u n i t i e s and ris ks d o r epublics face i n t h i s proce s s d How wi l l the re la ti onsh ip o f the CPSU a n d the gove r nment be a f f ect e d by t h e succession Is the r e f or example a p ossibili ty that Gorbac h e v wi l l leave a s Pres ident but r e ma i n a s p a r t y le a de r DECLASSIFIED PER E G 12958 SE C De c l as si f v on OADR Cjt t- 030't-F 2 30 1 '1 olf L -r -S t C'R E'P 3 What is the nature of potential successor governments Their political cast The key personalities Their political life expectancy Their internal and external policy predispositions Please call either of us if you need any clarification Withdra allRedaction Sheet G orge Bush Library Documcnl '0 and TlPC Subject Tit le of Documen t R The Go rba hev uccession 14 pp 0 1 Rep rt I I Da te R est r iction 4129191 b l b 3 50 U C 40 3g j 13 I I I I I I I Collec tion Bush Presidential Records ationaJ Security Co unci l Bums R icho las Files and He en Ed Files Subject Files File Location Document Partially Declassified Copy of Document Follo By NLGB on Z 0' 6'f 4J- Gorbachev ucc ess ion CFO 1486-016 Rele RE ed in Part IU Freednm of Inf r m tlon cl · 15 L r the f 1 1 nnel ru le lind pra ctice of II Cb U 1 t' i Central Intelligence Agency shingion fo u C 20505 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 29 April 1991 The Gorbachev SuccessioIl iJ ti The Gorbachev era is effectively over Even if Gorbachev remains in now real ower is likely to be in the hands the the republics bill b 3 rnco-e-oeo trom The Gorbachev succession is directly linked to the fate of the political system If traditionalists oust him it will be to seek to preserve the empire and auto cratic rule through tougher means They would move quickly to suppress the opposition arresting or conceivably even executing its leaders starting with Yel 'tsin and to roll back newly won freedoms They would adopt a m ore truculent public posture toward the United States and seek opportunities to assert their influence abroad Even if they were willingto rely on a massive use of force and repression traditionalists would have difficulty maintaining power because they lack a credible program to address the country's m oun ting problems and would have difficulty overcoming internal divisions Under such a regime the economy would continu e to deteriorate and social alienation would increase sharply ensuring that eventually democratic and nationalist m ovem ents would reem erge b 1 b 31 SO Y M 9 1-20070 bj lj b 3j b l b 3 DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E O 12958 AS AMENDED l'1'1q - 030 - F 2- 3 05 btL- I b i lJ • l b 1· b 3 E C RET cy J t- t o5j Yqooetodq werth laimabieei 8118 2 Diem independent pat 1s even if they remained in a reconstituted nion Many republics would move quickly ahead with democratic arket refOnns but some 1d likely be whitest to some new fonns g angled diarian Altlzougn loose confederation remained wou centrolgtheim im and could probably meet most of the Soviet Union 5 current mt ional commitments each republic would quickly develop its own independent foreign policy and take Mpomlbf es m the KGB iexa In shod %now in a revolutionary situatto and the current center-domino system appears oomexi As appened in Eastern Europe over the past two years all the ingredients now present in the USSR that could lead not only 9 a rag ege in th regime but quickly sweep away the cur-mm political system 1sz 1 SEeltEI I I'X'I Moving Toward Succ sian i' lAS q'h j ttlvl J 1n- '77- h In recent month Presi Gorbachev himself h e to be the center of the e calating oviet crisis r UTes have been mOUDtin from all si es or IS remova he has almost no popular uppo enter groun e as een rying to occupy IS rapidly eroding Although their olutions for a po t-Gorbachev regime are diametricall oppo ed influential players in both the r formist and traditionalist camps are now working to get rid of him or to get him to do what they want These efforts will almost certainly continue to gain strength l b 1 0 3 The traditionalists on whom Gorbachev has been politically dependent are openly distancing themselves from him The leadership of the KGB the military and the CPSU blame him for the current crisis as well as for undermining their institutions The thrust of statements about Gorbacbev's policies made to former President Nixon during hi recent visit to Moscow by KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and Minister of Defense Yazov provide further evidence of a lack of confidence in the Soviet President on the part of the security services Ib 1 b 3 Many traditionalists at lower levels are actively organizing against Gorbachev The increasingly influential traditionali t group of legislators Soyuz is collecting signatures to call a special Congre s of Peoples Deputies aimed at removing Gorbachev Its most outspoken 1 ader ha e been openly pressing for Gorbachev's removal since late last year Gorbachev's position in the party also continue to deteriorate At the April Central Committee plenum he turned back a drive to unseat him as General Secretary with the help of the party leader hi but he still face a growing and increasingly threatening rebellion in the party Ii fn ib 8 The reformers' drive to remove Gorbachev became more serious after Yel'tsin's nationally televised call for Gorbachev's resignation in mid-February Although Yel'tsin has recently been more accommodating the removal of Gorbachev and his government h ecome the principal demand of the ongoing miners strike and their call is now resona· In ot er In us fla sec rs Mo t of these group are calling for power to be rans erred to the rl ub lCS in t e abolition of the SSR Supreme So iet and Congress of Peoples Deputies b b J Gorbachev has gotten into this po ition becau e hi policie are generally blamed for the di as ter in the country and he is not offering any credible way out • He has destroyed the old Leninist political ne political tructur to replace It _ tern and not creat ed 'viable l c ' '- ' ' b i b 3 lif 'vii J f Ji I Last week G orbache aine a political respite with the aborted effo by hardliners to unseat him at t e SU plenum and his accord with republi leadeQ 1 including Yel'tsin These developments came as the political situatio was rapidly deteriorating and sugge st that none of the key players felt ready to e alate the power struggle • Yel'tsin and the republic leaders apparently feared tha f the y ushed too hard now G orbachev could be forced out by hardli A t a j 16- 3 meeting with Ru ssian legislators Yel'tsin indicated hi may ha -_ a tactic al move saying the time was not ripe for an all-ou t confront ati on • The initi ative against G orbachev at the plenum does little to alleviate pressure on him from hardliners The move came from disgruntled mid-level party officials not their traditionalist leaders who would ' I try to seiz e power in a coup if they dec ided to act against him bIn Xb b If only because of the cont inued economic disin tegration Gorbach ev will find the political walls closing in on him again soon The republic leaders particularly Yel't sin will want to see a meaningful political shift by Gorbachev while the trad itionalists will be an gered bv the further slow erosion of central control and even mo re so by any sharp shift in this direction by Gorbachev • To reach a lasting accommodation with the republics G or bachev would need to concede considerable power to them substan tially red ucing the center's au thority and his own political role in effect acceding to th eir de ma nds for a loose confederat ion If he does not agree to this his struggle wit h the republics will almost certainly resume an d inte nsify His ability to cou nt on the republics' fear of a tradi tionalist coup an d conse que nt willingness to reach agreements to save him indefinitely is a weak reed to depe nd on • Any serious att em pt by G orbache v to accommodate the republics however will alar m trad itionalists who continue to have a ce nterdomina ted unio n as their top priority Fear that Gorbachev is abou t to e nter a real power-sharing arrange ment with the re ublics would be the most likely ca talyst for them to try to seize power b fi M 6 Thi s box is classified I r b 1 5 j ' C I r i 1 t ti ' ti b 3 --5ECRE F- ' 'J SEGRET -- • The workers no longer trust Gorbachev's government Labor unrest is likely to grow as the population begins to feel the effects of recent price hikes and owin shortages of consumer goods Gorbach e unation to hold a center-dominated union together at almost any price will continue to exacerbate conflicts between the center and the republics h 3 The growing influence of popularly elected local leaders and legislatures will also continue to undermine Gorbachev's little remaining authority They enjoy much greater legitimacy than the central leadership and have made implementation of Gorbachev's policies almost impossible without their cooperation If Yel'tsin succeeds in his effort to create a strong popularly elected Russian presidency and wins the election tentatively planned for June he will strengthen his hand in challenging the center while underscoring ptcy of Gorbachev's position and increasing popular pressure for his removal b 1 bJt3 ca Gorbachev's political position is likely to go from bad to worse Although he willingly entered into alliance with leaders of the KGB the military and the CPSU and is fully behind current traditionalist policies he has become politically dependent on them and will find it increasingly difficult to ignore their demands As a result of his turn to the traditionalists most reformers no longer trust Gorbachev Yel'tsin and eight other republic leaders reached an accord with Gorbachev last week that could provide the basis for renewed cooperation but it is unlikely to last unless Gorbachev accepts a sharply reduced role and cedes real power to the republics Although he can still use the power of the presidency to set the center's a enda issuing decrees or vetoing decisions by subordinates he has few other political assets left He has lost the political initiative and is now primarily reacting to events without any realistic longterm gameplan 1 kh 3 The essence of the current crisis is that neither the existing political system Gorbachev is attempting to preserve nor the partially emerging new system is able to cope effectively with newly mobilized popular demands and the deepening economic crisis In short the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation As happened in E astern Europe over the past two years all the ingredients are now present in the USSR that could lead not onlv to a rapid change in the regime but quickly sweep away the current political system b 1 L xihp The Key Players Reformers and traditionalists appear to be squaring off for a showdown The outcome will depend in large part on the ability of each side to overcome deep internal differences and act cohesively and resolutely The stakes are extremely high and both sides probably realize that once they make their final push for power they will begin what could wen be a life and de ath strugg le b fH X YC3 G orbachev G orbach ev's actions will play a critical role in how this struggle plays out Th e longer he stays in office the worse the political and economic situa tion is likely to become increasing the chances that the current political system will be swept away If he left office now however there would still be a possibility that his succe ssion could take 4 ' l· 1 b 3 _ SF £RET f J place more or less within the old system although the new regime would still be unstable His retirement alone would solve n ' wever and there is no certainty that whoever replaced him would do any better b iMf3 Gorbachev's recent statements and actions su est that he desperately wants to hold on to power and will be extremely reluctant to step aside voluntarily He and his advisors r Ie and he rna still believe he can turn thin around appear 1 bXID oon r 1 J • b 3 The Traditionalists Traditionalists increasingly blame Gorbachev for going against their advice and pursuing policies that are now destro g the union and the Communist party Mindful of the fate of their counterparts ill Eastern Europe-the execution of Ceausescu in Romania Zhivkov's trial in Bulgaria and Honecker's similar fate if he had not been smuggled out by the Soviets-the are no doubt aware of the deep hatred of the CPSU in the USSR and some have bT 1 b a indicated they fear for their lives While they want to return to a center dommate system at least some of themparticularly those near retirement age-may be willing to settle for a solution that protects their lives and pensions E6 1 Mcl The traditionalists who now dominate the top level leadership have been trying to get Gorbachev to go along on the issues they consider most critical By retaining him as president they have a more legitimate front for their creeping crackdown and can avoid the risks that an outright play for power would entail However there are growing indications that they are dissatisfied with Gorbachev for not moving forcefully enough against the opposition For example the black colonels who have been leading the drive to replace Gorbachev with a more hardline regime claim they have tacit approval for their activities from Yazov There is ne love lost between Gorbachev and his current allies and they could well move to try to dump him if they strongly opposed steps they believed he was prepared to take such as a coalition with reformers or if he failed to cooperate on what they see as an essential issue such as using force to hold the union together b t11 bl 3 With the changes that have taken place in the top Soviet leadership in recent months the most critical levers of power and repression are all in the hands of traditionalists • Vice President Yanayev is the legal successor to Gorbachev for up to 90 days while a new president is elected He is new to the top echelons of power and is not likely to lead a conspiracy but he has ties to the KGB and would probably be a willing accomplice 5 I b 1 b bKl b 3 - BECRn I 66cnCf • Deputy G eneral Secretary Ivashko the next in line to replace Gorbachev as head of the CPSU is not a strong leader and would not likely last long as head of the party if it were to again assume an important role • Russian Communist Party leader Polozkov is the leader of the traditionalist forces in the CPSU and could lead a drive to try to revitalize the party if he became general secretary • KGB Chief Kryuchkov who has impressed observers as the smartest and most dynamic member of this rouF' is the most influential of the traditionalist leaders and will be cntica in any move against Gorbachev He has been increasingly pushing Gorbachev to take a hard er line • Defense Minister Yazov does not appear to be a dynamic leader who would take the initiative in a coup but would be a willing accomplice if the other key players are on board • Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev has openly supporte d tougher action against ind ependen t-minded rep ublics but has also appa rently cooperated with Yel'tsin in helping to carve out a larger Russian role in defense issues At age 52 he may be willing to cut a deal with the opposition to save the army and his career • Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo has a KGB background he would be a willing accomplice but not a key actor • First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Gromov was lionized as the last commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan At 48 he could emerge as a key player in any upheaval • Prime Minister Pavlov has impressed no one since takin g office in January and is unlikely to be a key actor • Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet An atoliy Luky an ov is being incre asingly tou ted in tradition alist circles as Gorbachev's most likely successor They see him as more resolute than Gorbachev an more credibility with tbe reformers than otber traditionalists b 'e1 ' b 3 Th e Reformers Most reformers do not merely want to re place Gorbachev their goal is now to disman tle the en tire political system he heads Many ar e calling for steps along tbe lines of Yel'tsin's plan for abolishing the presidency or at a minimum reducing it to a technical position with no real power and disbanding the USSR legislatures Th ey would transfer power to the rep ublics in a European Community type arrangement dominated bv Russia All that would remain of the center would be some sort of m enting republi cs that wou ld probably coordinatingbody of repr esenjati Oversee overall for eign pol' defense poli common econom ic issues such as monetary policy and trade an d ot r ed to it by the republics Yel'tsin and some ot her reformers see thi trans fer of power taking place through ro undtable talks that would have full decisionma g autho rity with Gorbachev the republic residents and representa tives of 0 er political groups such as the miners 1j b 3 A fl a v - 6 SECRET Reformers have demonstrated the ability to mobilize the population and call out huge crowds in their support in Moscow and other major cities Despite an official ban and threats of police actions over 200 000 people turned out in a pro-Yel'tsin demonstration last month Many workers look to Yel'tsin for leadershi p s UCh the striking Kuzbass miners and with his support reformers could probabl ull off an I extended general strike that could paralyze huge parts of the country jftj ttf 3 II C I - Many reformers however do not yet feel strong enough for a showdown with the government Although they are making progress overcoming their differences they are divided into numerous opposition groups and are not well organized across republic lines Yel'tsin recently talked about the need for a well organized opposition party but so far he has not taken steps to join forces with other reformers some of whom distrust him and see him as an opportunist Aside from Yel'tsin there is no other figure among the reformers who is currently in a position to assume a broad leadership role People like Shevardnadze and Yakovlev are too closely associated with Gorbachev although they could emerge as important figures if there were a search for compromise candidates for leadership positions acceptable to both reformers and traditionalists 1ffi11 J The key players if the reformers come to power will be the republic leaders • Yel'tsin has said he does not want to become USSR president and given the weakness of the office and the unsolvable problems that go with it he would be unlikely to change his mind unless he saw it as the only way to prevent it from falling into the hands of someone who might be able to use the office against him In that case he would probably also hold on to the Russian presidency • The other leadin e - evel ev of w type of Kazakhstan and ave u t e Ukraine Both wan that their interests not be overwhelmed by union but are c those of Russia and Yel'tsin Nazarbayev appears to aspire to a nationalleve d could be a candidate for a weakened technocratic presidency b 1' bj 3 The Reliability of the Instruments of Repression The ability of the traditionalists to act will depend largely on the reliability of their instruments of repression-sthe KGB the military and the MVD Internal Troops Although the security services certainly have enough loyal troops to execute a coup imposing martial law throughout the country would be difficult Moreover if the opp osition succeeds in its goal of neutralizing the security forces' ability to impose broad political repression-or raising sufficient doubts as to their reliability am ong the leadership so that it be comes reluctant to use force-the game would be up for th e traditionalists Once the opposition realized that the center would not make broad use of force a ains t it the breakdown of the union and the demise of the regime would accelerate 6 ¥t bjeo Yel'tsin and other reformers have been working to deepen fissures in the military and KGB Although the top leadership of both organizations appears to be solidly committed to the traditionalist course many officers and rank- and-file members appear to 7 • I i t 1 b 3 SECRET f I I b 1 _ SEC R E'f £1 3 tJ Jl b l tI 11 b ' e be sympathizing with the reformers This already appears to be having an impact and there are growing numbers of unconfmned reports that some soldier _ units balked at orders to use force in the Baltic republics and Azerbaijan l M '3 The reliability of military forces for internal use appears to be a critical and growing concern for the leadership and it is taking steps to address it • The CPSU has launched a new drive to reassert its influence in the military and propagandize traditionalist values • A campaign is under way to purge the anned forces of reformist officers or at least move them out of sensitive positions b 1 b 3 Gorbachev's Downfall Gorbachev's terms as president and general secretary do not expire until 1995 As a result of changes he initiated in the Constitution and the party rules be can no longer easily be dumped by other members of the leadership the way Khrushchev was in 1964 Legally removing Gorbachev against his will would be a difficult and cumbersome process • He can only be removed as president if he is impeached for violating the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of the Congress of Peoples Deputies • Only a CPSU Congress can replace him as party leader and that would §ffi3 f 1 require a long process of electing about 6 000 de legates 1 As a result if Gorbachev oes he is most likely to resign under pressure Depending on whether the initiative came from the reformers traditionalists voluntarily stepped down the consequences could be dramatically differ ent b 1 t6X3 A Reformist Initiative Reformers could succeed in driving Gorbachev from office and creating a new political system in a number of ways which are not mutually exclusive • Most likely tbis would come about as a result of massive ongoing national strikes and demonstrations aimed at toppling his government This is the aim of the current miners strike and has been the cry at rece nt eds of thousands T hese demonstrations in d there are growing ties grassro orts have been aining stren vJ e --- UJJ Jong opposition groups thr e country If coercive steps are f O not taken against the m it will be only a matt er of time before the f Y ' opp osition can paralyze the country and force major political ' concessions poss ibly including Gorbachev's resignat ion Ye l'tsin could hasten th is process if he began to actively encourage such actions 8 of ' ' bR i b 3 -8ECltE'P- SECREt • Gorbachev might also be forced out by an ultimatum from the unified leadership of the key republics Although they have not gon e as far as Yel 'tsin in demanding Gorbachev's removal other republic leaders supe0rt YeI'tsin's goal of a wholesale transfer of power to the republics Yel tsin and the leaders of Kazakhstan the Ukraine and Belorussia are already negotiating a quadripartite treaty that could be the basis for a new political system that excludes the current central government For such a move to succeed it would be important to gain the support of the security forces probably by offering assurances that the military would remain intact and there would not be any retribution against the KGB Some military leaders might even welcome a Slavic union because it would keep the bulk of Soviet forces intact while helping defu se some of its key problems such as ethnic tensions • Gorbachev might also be forced out through t roundtable process a desperate effort to try to defuse rising tensio o rUb Ea -t OIJlU agree to the roundtable talks being demanded by the opposition Such a move would probably be a miscalculation and Gorbachev would likely find himself confronted with an opposition united in its dem an ds that he step down or effectively give up power Having agreed to roundtable discussions he might not be able to ignore the _ _ _ without provoking massive national unrest and strikes b5 1iIill 3 A Traditionalist Initiative To take the tough steps they believe are necessary to forestall a reformist victory traditionalists may try to remove Gorbachev and install a more hardline regime Such a move would be conspiratorial and could unfold in several ways • They would prefer to oust Gorbachev with a legal veneer by getting him to agree to step down and installing their own candidate Most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death Yanayev would initially take over as president and Ivashko as general secretary The traditionalist Congress of Peoples Deputies would then be used to install the hardliners' preferred candidate-this was the way Gorbachev was elected to th e post-using the vagueness of the Constitution to postpone a popular election until 1995 • They could bypass established procedures and use the crisis situation to justify the Congress of Peoples Deputies and Central Committee rem oving Gorbachev and installing hardline leaders previously agre ed on Given the traditionalist majority in both institutions they would almo st certainly endorse the choice of a united leadership although there would be loud protests from the reformers in those bodies • They could move decisively to regain control by declari ng a state of emergen cy throughout the count ry installing some sort of Nationa l Salvation Co mmittee likely dominated by security officials an d moving forcefully against the opposition • T hey could arrange an ac t l tJw of the procedur es ab ove 9 bi iJX b 3 S S 11 1 -SECKEl A Temporary Compromise A5 happened in most of the transitions from Communism in Eastern Europe the dismantling of the current Soviet political system might be a multistage process and could begin WIth Gorbachev's participation A half-way solution is most likely If neither side is sure of its strength and is therefore willing to compromise Any compromise however would mean a significant degree of power shanng With the reformer s and would be a ajor step on t e Ir ro d to powe Once such concessions were made It would be more difficult for traditionalists to regain the initiative but fear of a coalition that sha 1 ly reduces their influence might be a catalyst for them to act Such a coalition would be highly unstable and would not last long It might happen under the following conditions • Gorbachev agrees to step aside but insists on having a role in the transition perhaps playing for time and still hoping to stay in office • Gorbachev resigns before he is confronted with an ultimatum and neither traditionalist nor reformers are strong enough to take control on their own • Gorbachev steps aside under pressure or dies in office but the current political system remains with traditionalists retaining control of some key posit ions while other important portfolios are given to reformers • Gorbachev is forced out as president by democrats but he or another traditionalist remains as head of the CPSU which is able to retain the loyalty of the leadership of the KGB military and MVD Thi create a situation of dual power in at least parts of the country b H Xfii 3 Indicators and Triggers The current political situation is highly volatile and could quickly unravel and throw the country into a succession crisis with few indicators While the reformers' drive to unseat Gorbachev will continue to be fairly public a traditionalist initiati ve would be a secret conspiracy executed suddenly Military activity would no doubt be associated with it and while preparations for a nationwide state of emergency could probably be detected the moves precedin a coup probably would not and even if they were their intent would not be clear b i M '3 Any of the following developments could precip itate a crisis that could bring the leadership situation to an immediate head • Gorb achev's death or sudden incapacitation would give the trad itionalists some advantages if they were able to keep the information secret and then tried to present the succession as a fait accompli • The curre nt labor situation could quickly escalate into a national general ' strike aimed at bringing down the government • The death of Yel'tsin whether or not by natural causes would spark massive demonstrations against the regime if it is attributed to the KG B as it most likely would 10 • The belief by tradition alis ts that their days are qu ickly coming to an end could prompt them to make a preemptive move • After he wins the Russian presidency Yel'tsin and reformers could mobilize th e populace to press for the removal of Gorbachev • Another confrontation between security forces and civilians result ing in _ nd in a Sla vic civilian deaths especially if it is much mo ' region could spark widespread protests 15 1 l b 3 Policy Implications No matter wbat type of succession takes place initially tbe new political arrangements are not likely to be stable At a minimum elements of the losing side are unlikely to relinquish power smoothly so there could be a period of intensified struggle tbat could escalate into widespread upheaval Under such unstable conditions a reformist or traditionalist regnne would focus on consolidating power and put otber issues on the back burner Nevertheless tbere would uickly be some distinct differences between bow each would deal with the most pressing domestic and fore ign policy issues ¥ 1 ib i# The Reformers The exact course of events if reformers took over would depend on circumstances and who the new leaders would be The result bowever would be a more or less rapid devolution of power to the republics • For a t least a transition period a reconstituted center wou ld exist but its policies would be set by collective decisions of the participating republics This would likely be an unwieldy arrangement dominated by Russia It would control the military and limited aspects of foreign policy but decisions over most domestic ma tters wou ld be transferr ed to the republics One of the first targets of the new regime wou ld be dismantling the repressive capabilities of the KGB • Different domestic policies would quickly emerge in various republics In most of the European parts of the USSR democratic institutions would develop and there would be a transition to a market economy In Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus authoritarian regimes would likely emerge • The military would be under the jo int control of the republics but Russia would hav e the predomina nt role While the Slavic core might agree to support a comm on military effort each repu blic would pro ba bly devel op some of its own forces possibly allowing for some ce nt ralized command Sovie t nucl ear capabilities would remain under a single command R epublics not participat ing in joint military operatio ns alm ost certainly th e Baltics and the Caucasus would raise their 0 l 'TI small armi es with small conventional arms but some mi h t maint ain some so rt of bilate ral defense arrangements with th e SlaVIC core that cou ld allow bases to continue to ope ra te on their soil II J • Alth ough a reconstituted center would probably re tain an overall coordinating role in foreign policy it would be difficult for it to conclude international negotiations WIthout active republic participation The republics would probably uphold existing international obligations and treaties although the dispersion of authority could make implementation and enforcement difficult The republics would also quickly begin to pursue independent foreign policies and would be particularly anxious to move ahead in establishing forei n economic relations as w II as in some cases defense agreements WIth their neighbors btUl b 8 The Traditionalists the opposition Traditionalists would try to move quickly to clamp down on • They would immediately arrest and conceivably even execute key leaders of the opposition including Yel'tsin reimpose strict medi a censorship ban activities by opposition political groups and revert to tight central cont rol over the economy • Although there would be severe economic constraints the decline in defense spending would probably stop • While the main focus would be on reestablishing control at home foreign policy would become less flexible Progress on arms control would be extremely difficult but existing agreements probably would be observed Soviet active measures would increase and if the domestic situation were temporarily stabilized the leadership would probably look for targets of opportunity to reassert Soviet influence abroad provided the political and economic costs are not too high • The regime would adopt a much more truculent public posture toward the West and there would be an internal campaign blaming the country's problems on Western subversion Although the re ime would still be interested in pursuing economic cooperation it policies would create a very unfavorable climate for 'oint economic ventures and other cooperative efforts M 1 ln ti 3 A Temporary Compro mise Because it would be so unstable a temporary political compromise would make any major shifts in policy difficult especia lly in foreign an d defense policy Such a coalition would be preoccupied with the domestic struggle and would be unlikely to focus on foreign policy making it difficult to come to closure on arms control negotiations Individual republics however would use the opportunity to pres s their own agendas abroad an d push for recognition as independ ent states Reformers might be able to make som e progress in advancing their domestic initiatives and the shift of power to the republics would be accelera ted giving them greater latitude to pursue their own agendas Jb ' b 3j 12 • BECItE'f' - Prospects A Messy Transition No matter what happens the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed If traditionalists seize power with massive use of force and repression they might temporarily reestablish control of most of the country Under such a regime the economy would continue to deteriorate and social alienation would increas almost certainly democratic and nationalist movements would reemerge Time is work 'in against the traditionalists however The longer force is not used the weaker their position will become The security services will continue to fracture while democratic and nationalist forces continue to gain strength and organize Moreover as workers increasingly feel the pinch of recent pnce hikes and the economy continues its downward spiral labor unrest is almost certain to become more serious fueling pressures to change the system tljN' i b 3 Even if Gorbachev mana es to remain in office a year from now the Gorbachev era is over The sharp decline In his power will be almost impossible to reverse and a de facto transfer of power wililike1y have taken place to either the reformers or traditionalists ch v _ much the same policy consequences if they had come to power without him b' 1 ' b 3 13 -sECRET Withdrawal Redaetion Sheet George Bush Library Durumcnl and Type 02 Note From Nicholas Burns to Ed llcwiti Subject Title of Document Date Restriction hit ll Re Report on Gorbachex Successmn I pp Collection Bush Presidential Records National Security Council Record Group Of ce Series Subserics Subject Files WHORM Cat File Location Gorbachev Succession 1 999-0 3 0-1 - Date losedi Case Re-revicw Case 3 Review Case #2 AR Case 7 AR Disposition AR Disposition Date Fl 28 00 Rclcascd in l- ull 7 2002 Burns R Nicholas Files and Hewett Ed Files 051i Number - Ke lode oi Document Deelaeei ed Document Follows By 55L NLGB on 3 09 croyiuaom Appeal Case Appeal Disposition Disposition Dale MR Case MR Disposition MR Disposition Date CODES l rnidrntiul th ul dh rl - P l ulionnl Security 'lasxi rd lulurniallou lull ll of the PR l'-2 eralinu to 1hr nppointmrut In l-cdrrul olTn'r IluHZl of l -3 erruw would Nolan 3 l-cdrral slatutr all o the Rclraw would disc-lost lradc or con drntial conimrrciul or nancial information lull-l o th ercnw would disclosi- con dential advicr lit-merit the President and his udusurs or bclutrn such advisors all5 of the Release constilulc a clear unwarranted imaaion of irrsoual prii-ar allhl oi llir PR 1 lint-d In au ordani'r uitli Intriclious common In donor' Ilrrd of El ermnl In a prnunnl rrciu'il Inis lr oi lnformalum 5 1 552lhll hill National srruril t'laswi cd Inlortuziliuu of i Rtlcasc would disclose inli'rnal rules and pi'aclicu an nal of the thJI erraw would iiulalc a lalulr Hi l blH Rclcasc would disclusc scum or con drntiul or nancial information bu-1 urlhc lhll l Rclcasr would constitute a clearly immion oi prrsonal print ihmo ofthc ercusr would information rompiltd for In purplish Hill-l o the Rclcaw would disclow information conccruinu rrgulutlon of financial iimiluliom ofllir l lhll'h erczur uuld discluw urnln lrul nl' grophuual inlormulinn April 30 1991 Ed Here are some thoughts for your Scowcroft letter to Webster on the CIA study 1 The paper is out-dated It was conceived and written before the agreement of the nine and Gorbachev's apparent shift in course In my view those events argue for a rethinking of some of the major points in the paper They should at least give the CIA pause in their stark view of Soviet internal affairs 2 I see this as essentially two different papers The first part is a concerted attempt to make an airtight case that Gorbachev has no chance of surviving and that Soviet politics will be a struggle between reformers and traditionalists They ought to think carefully about infusing this section with a more nuanced approach The second part of the paper is much more useful--it describes the process by which Gorbachev could be ousted and indicates who might do it and how I think this is by far the more relevant and interesting for policymakers 3 In the interest of objectivity they ought to at least make a try at the possibility that Gorbachev might survive The paper needs to be buttressed by a section on how he might survive a nd the impact his continued rule could have on both left and right NB tJ