- I D a an a Author I rm inis ocument consists of es 04- Cepies eeries DEPARTMENT or stirs THE DIRECTOR or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH I Research Memorandum REU425 January 31 1962 immense UM TO EUR Mr Kohler 0' FROM IKE Roger Hilsman u SUBJECT European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability In response to your memorandum of December 27 1961 we have been -making a study of EurOpean attitudes toward an independent nuclear capability for Europe and of the specific related questions you raised Attached is a draft embodying the results of this study to date Because of the complexity of the questions and their implications we View this as a continuing study The present paper is therefore pre- liminary and some of the conClusions are tentative we would hope to be able later to provide more on this general subject - It should be noted that this paper was drafted before replies to the questions sent to the field by circular cable began to be received and no effort has been made specifically and completely to incorporate these replies into this draft However -we note that there seems to be no discrepancy between the draft and such replies as have reached us may I also add that this draft is divided into four sections of which not all may be of equal interest The second section briefly summarizes the series of proposals which are no doubt familiar to anyone who has worked in this field and the country views outlined in the third section are largely reflected in the last section headed 4 Conclusions which could be read independently Attachment - Study on Western European Views on Nuclear weapons Capabilities SECRET than - CH EELLIGENCE AND Ransom Memgranowa This document consists of Zpages No ZL of jg _Copies Series A WESTERN EUROPEAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES This paper was prepared in response to a request for an analysis of European views on an independent European nuclear weapons capability Specifically REU was asked to assess present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities and to estimate whether an enhancement of nuclear role would be likely to deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs In order to answer the Questions it is necessary to consider the situation which has given rise to them to review the several proposals put forward to deal with various aspects of this situation and to analyse the positions of the several European nations with respect to these proposals The General Situation As a result of reports of the development of long range missiles by the USSR it is now generally believed in Europe that the USSR has available enough nuclear missiles of sufficient range virtually to destroy western Europe and that if it does not have them already it soon will have enough misSiles of sufficient range to cause widespread destruction in the US In this situation of existing or anticipated nuclear equipoise between the US and the USSR there has arisen in western Europe concern about the credibility of the NATO deterrent which in effect has been based upon the idea of massive retaliation by the US Speci i cally there is apprehension that the Soviets may not believe now or 1 This apprehension is not necessarily related to what the European nations believe the US would do in fact however there is some skepticism in Europe about US intentions Authority Mu a example because European-based can reach targets in the USSR some Europeans consider them to be strategic and hence inapprOpriate to the NATO shield Others fear that their mere preSence might be provocative to the USSR or that being in Europe they would be more likely to be used too early in what was intended to be a limited conflict thus caus- ing rapid and otherwise unnecessary escalation to general war Nevertheless since SACEUR might reasonably be expected to use all weapons in Europe in the defense of Europe the assignment to SACEUR of capable of reaching the USSR might be thought to add to the credibility of the deterrent particularly in a situation where the Russians might doubt that there would be massive retaliation from the US to an attack on Europe Some Europeans seem to believe that the contribu- tion of to the credibility would be even greater if they were part of a multilateral NATO MRBM force and also that such a force would add to the cohesiveness or'NATo The location of in Europe under SACEUR or as part of a NATO MRBM force would also raise questions of NATO planning--how would they be fitted into NATO's plans for responding to a Soviet attack In turn the pattern of NATO's probable response in Europe to a Russian attack there is relevant to the European estimate of credibility in that Russian eXpectation of this or that kind of response would be presumed to be a factor in the Russian decision to attack or not In addition to the matter of physical position in Europe and their role there also arises the question of control of these MRBM's and this SECRETINOFORN Au m'g 1 is also relevant to the credibility of their role as a deterrent as well as to NATO weapons systems and planning The question of whether the US is to have exclusive custody and the ultimate power of decision with respect to all nuclear warheads in Europe for tactical system and for whether the control is to be lodged elsewhere thus becomes of critical concern in European considerations of credibility These broadly are the_origins of and the main elements in the general situation These elements have not always been isolated nor presented in the context in which they have been presented here however most frequently they have been presented in the context of various proposals put forward at various times chiefly terms of reactions to these proposals that the positions of the several 4 countries have largely been developed and can best be understood wuw _Au_ lofiyll hj i - 5 SUMMARY or EVENTS AND PROPOSALS It is convenient as a point of departure to go back to the 1957 meeting of the NATO Heads of Government where it was agreed in principle that as they were developed intermediate range ballistic missiles should be made available to SACEUR In keeping with this agree- ment Jupiter weapons were assigned to NATO commands As new MRBM's mid range ballistic missiles with a range of 1 000 1 500 miles were developed SACEUR The Supreme Allied Commander Europe set forth a requirement for these beginning in 1963 as part of his modernization program In the spring of 1960 the so-called Gates' proposals were made to the North Atlantic Council with a View to fulfillment of SACEUR's state- ment of need The alternative in the Gates proposals which was preferred by the US included an offer to sell MRBM's to individual NATO members for use under SACEUR's control and with the nuclear warheads in US custody and control None of the Gates proposals was ever approved by the NAC In November 1960 General Nerstad as SACEUR made a speech to the NATO parliamentarians in which he distinguished three areas of concern First was his requirement for land and sea based for NATO commands in Europe beginning in 19631 these were to be provided under existing 1 This requirement was embodied in a document of NATO's-Military Committee designated this requirement is also referred to as end-1966 requirement - Abe'in snow rosem- 5 arrangements that is control by SACEUR with custody and ultimate decision over use resting with the US A second was the matter of Alliance participation in the decision to use the US strategic force Norstad dismissed this idea as interesting The third was the matter of giving NATO members an equal voice in the control of those atomic weapons essential to the direct defense of Europe that is tactical nuclear weapons and presumably the MRBM's requested by SACEUR Norsted suggested that consideration be given to this problem In the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 1960 Secretary Herter suggested that Norstad's SACEUR's end-1966 MRBM requirements might be met by a multilateral NATO MRBM force for the creation of which the US would be willing to sell MRBM's and to provide warheads under us custody As interim satisfaction of SACEUR's requirements Herter offered to commit -5 Polaris equipped submarines to NATO under suitable but unspecified control arrangements Addressing himself to the problem of sharing control of nuclear weapons Herter Said that the multilateral ownership and control of the NATO MRBM force would be a step in this direction but would not preclude the idea of increasing Alliance authority over the atomic stockpile as a whole Secretary Herter's presentation linked together several diverse elements SACEUR's MRBM requirements were_linked to the idea of sharing control by way of the proposed multilateral MRBM force Sharing con- trol d the NATO MRBM force was related to sharing control of the entire Alliance stockpile The offer of Polaris subs was a completely new notion 13 -The linking of all elemonts seeme to cause some confusion and so apparently did the presentation NATO members were hot sure what was meant by the word commit used in referonco to Polaris subs thore wos unceriainty whether the Polaris offer was absolute or was upon the purchaoe of for a NATO MRBM force Similor 2y momboro seemod confused as to whether the ouggootion of a NATO MRBM force woo a proposal or only a concept and uncertain as in whore the next initiaiive lay Thoro was also confusion over what was meant by sharing control and Skeptical referoncos wore made to 15 fingers on the trigger -4 and or on the safety catch I In April 1961 the US Permanooi Representative to the NAG Advisory Council repeated the Polaris offer but wiihout adiing any precision to the word oommitmont or to the NATO guidelines for their moo Instead of efforing Pblario as interim satisfaction of MRBM reqairoments however as Secretary Herter had dono tho US Representative suggeoiod tha this offer made it possible to postpone dealing wiih those MRBM requirements Wiih regard toia NATO MRBM fooco ho said that if NATO members were interestod the Us would be glad to hear their views on Secretary Herier's DecaMber concept but only after non-nuclear fOroe goals had been mot He stroosed the new A ministration's emphasis an the priority of the build-up of'Niio-s conventional forces on the question of sharing controlg-the US representative istinguished botwoon militany oontrol and the I to use a d laid down the principlos which the US thought should govoin tho to uso He said toga tho US would woloome suggestions for - first ij - 8 - a system of NATO control over use and suggested that a beginning might be made by establishing guidelines for their employment At Ottawa President Kennedy repeated the Polaris offer but with- out any additional details He said that beyond this the US looked to the eventual establishment of'a NATO seahorse force truly multilateral in ownership and control if such a force were desired and feasible after NATO's conventional goals had been met President Kennedy made no mention of MRBM requirements -- although Secretary Herter had said that it was to meet these requirements that he preposed the NATO MRBM force and made the Polaris offer President Kennedy also said in Ottawa that the US was prepared to join the Allies in working out political controls of nuclear weapons that would meet the needs of all NATO countries In the ensuing months of 1961 there was almostno discussion in the NAG of the Polaris offer and very little of the NATO MRBM ferce in spite of several exhortations by the US Permanent Representative to the effect that members should put forward proposals on this subject The members' apparent reluctance may have reflected basic doubts and reserve itions particularly about a NATO MRBM force in addition members may have expected additional details from the US In any case members were I disconcerted at the new Administration's emphasis on conventional weapons which gave rise to doubts about US intentions and to preoccupation with questions of NATO strategy_and long range planning 1 Extended discussion of long range planning might presumably have encompassed such subjects as a NATO MRBM force and sharing control of - '7 BECLASSIED - Authority pj g I I -9- nuclear weapons as well as end-1966 MRBM requirements In September 1961 however the NAG was informed that the US had decided to give priority to Berlin planning and would be unable to submit com- prehensive proposals on long-range planning As a result NAG discussion of long range planning was deferred although most reluctantly and the NRC concentrated upon MC-96 on which action was overdue and which included SACEUR's end-1966 requirements for The US indicated however that it was not ready to submit its views on MRBM's and after a rather stormy session was approved but with reservations with respect to the requirements for MRBM's I Early in DeoeMber at German initiative the Military Committee of NATO agreed to undertake immediately a study of the military aspects of the integration of MRBM's into NATO forces At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December German Defense Minister Strauss proposed the creation of a group to study problems of the control of nuclear weapons Within NATO and of the introduction of MM's into Allied Comma Europe -- that is SACEUR's command At the request of Norway supported by the UK and Strauss proposal was referred to the Permanent Representatives Also at the December NATO Ministerial meeting Secretaries Rusk and haoNamara made formal statements setting forth the U S estimate of the strategic situation indicating what the U S was prepared to do and pointing out some of the things which it thought ought to be done These statements were intended to and no doubt did clarify in the minds of the NATO partners the U S position However they were made in SECRET morass DECLASSIFIED Wt 7 7 1 7 restricted session and not released to the public and although much of the drift of them has been discussed in he press here and in Europe there has not yet been time for their impact to have registered Coeseqeently the following discussion of country reactions to U S pro posale reflects only the previous U93 statements Nevertheless although Government poeitione will no doubt be influenced in some measure by the Rusk-MecNamara presentations the underlying reflected in reactions to previous U S initiatives are likely to persist swam women -11 SUMMARY or COUNTRY POSITIONS The views expressed by the NATO Governments have reflected in large part the several US presentations There was however a degree of imprecision in certain of these presentations In addition some of then repeated earlier proposals but pith new conditions or qualifications Again some of the presentations lumped together elements of proposals which elsewhere had been treated separately Finally none of them was really explicit or detailed In any case discussion within the NAG was limited due to the preoccupation first with the conventional buildup and then with Berlin planning All these circumstances gays rise to certain reservations on the part of NATO members with respect to US proposals and to some confusion which was often compounded by a plain lack of information about or understanding of important terms and concepts Nevertheless NATO Governments did respond to the US proposals although in varying degrees and it is convenient to group these responses in terms of major issues that is the assignment of to SACEUR the sharing of control and use of nuclear weapons and the creation of a multilateral NATO force I Not surprisingly perhaps there is no one subject on which all the NATO Governments have been agreed Nevertheless on two proposals there has been almost complete accord Except by the U K there has been '7 o hj 03 5'4 Author i SECRET morons -12- approval of MRBM requirements some members however seem not to have attempted a considered military judgment but to have supported the idea simply because SACEUR recommended and still recommends that he have There is also general agreement with reservations by the UK on the idea of sharing in the control and use of nuclear weapons it is not always clear however whether the governments are thinking of the-strategy of use or the actual decision to use or whatever they have in mind -- all nuclear weapons or only those in Europe The issue on which there is least agreement is the concept of a nultilateral NATO MRBM force Here in particular there seems to be considerable uncertainty partly'because of a lack of about what such a force might entail especially'with'respect to cost control deployment and use 7 What does emerge is that Germany and only Germany has set forth clear and unambiguous notions of what it wants and why only Germany has pressed consistently for SACEUR's for a NATO MRBM force and for a NATO share in control and in the decision to use nuclear weapons in Europe -- and has done so as a matter of urgency SACEUR's MRBM Reggirements So far as requirements for under existing arrangements for control and use are concerned there is general approval except from the UK The UK considers in part that there is no military - SECRET screen I Authorg mz 103 '4 gia EE E m m' -13 need for MRBM's in Europe on the grounds that the Soviet bloc targets which these would threaten are already covered by the US strategic force In any case the British believe this question should be con- sidered as part of ab overall review of NATO weapon and strategy The other members apparently accept the military need but only Germany and to a lesser degree France and Belgium seem to have consciously worked out their rationale The rest seem to accept recommenda- tions on general grounds such as the need for modernization of nuclear forces and to have been influenced above all by the fact that SACEUR has said and still says that he has a military requirement for Germany together with France and Belgium actively support rationale that are necessary to replace planes made vulnerable by the new Soviet mieeilee and to give SACEUR the full range rof nuclear response to an attack In addition however Germany and France relate their views to the idea of credibility of the deterrent they consider that SACEUR moot have available in Europe a weapons system'which threatens targets in the USSR in order to maintain the credibility of the NATO deterrent Others make the some relation but more on the grounds that the presence of MRBM's demonstrates the US nuclear commitment to Europe With regard to the composition of an MRBM system nder SACEUR and its deployment and manning oat even Germany seems to have Completely worked out its ideas France has specifically rejected-the idea of a DECLASSIFIED - Authoritymm - 1a - wholly seaborne force but has not-altered its position against the stationing of nuclear weapons in France Germany has indicated a preference for seaborne missiles and has said that it would not wish mobile MRBM's in Germany Others are impressed by the fact that sea borne missiles would aVoid the problem of deployment in Germany which concerns them greatly Proposals for mixed manning of seaborne missiles have aroused skepticism and there are reservations in most NATO countries about manning any MRBM's with German units Germany has indicated how ever that it does not expect to have discriminatory treatment imposed npon it Except for Germany all NATO members seem concerned in vary- ing degrees with the costs of procuring MRBM's for SACEUR and Use Arrangements I With the exception of the UK and of France for reasons peculiar to it -- all NATO Governments have indicated an interest in participating in arrangements for the control and use of nuclear weapons Confusion is especially rampant here however it is frequently not clear which nuclear weapons are under consideration -- that is the tactical weapons now available to NATO commands the MRBM's requested the preposed NATO force's the US strategic weapons or all four -- nor is it always clear whether the aim is participation in establishing the strategy fer usa in the decision to use or in actual custody and use Again the German position is the clearest The Germans would like to see NATO Commanders control the logistics and have the authority to decide when to nee NATO's tactical weapons systems they would also like SECRET neon Hos uiissisisty 771eew_ - 15 - NATO members to share in the control and in the decision to use any MRBM's stationed in Europe - With regard to the latter it seems that the Germans would prefer an arrangement which would permit the country attacked in conjunction with SACEUR or SACEUR acting alone on behalf of NATO to take the decision for use The German aim in any case seems to be to insure that the decision to use will be _at an appropriate military level In German minds this question too bears on the credibility of the deterrent France seems to be really interested only in a tripartite sharing arrangement which would give France together with the US and the UK the control of and the decision to use all nuclear weapons including _the US strategic force The UK possessing a nuclear ferce of its own seems generally satisfied with existing control arrangements The British would welcome a voice in the decision to use the US strategic forces but they are concerned at the prospect of general participation in such a decision fearing that this might allow irrespOnsible -- notably German -- fingers on the trigger To the British the fear that nuclear 'neapons may be used irresponsibly is a real one and they wish above all to be sure that the decision on use is taken by a responsible political authority such as the Americsn President or the British Cabinet Hone ever the UK would be willing to have broader participation in the development of guidelines for use Like the British the remaining NATO members are equally concerned that the decision to use should be taken by a responsible political DECLASSIFIED Authority -16 authority ideally it seems they would all like to participate in this decision and with respect to all nuclear weapons including the British and American strategic forces Preposals for weighted voting or for decision by the big powers have been cocly reviewed They are all con- cerned however at_the implications and difficulties of any formula for truly multilateral participation in the decision to use nuclear weapons Most doubt its military feasibility some seem to be frightened at the responsibility and all have reservations about German participation On balance it seems that many and particularly the Scandinavians may conclude that existing arrangements are not so bad provided how ever that all NATO meshers could participate acre in determining the strategy of use and would be consulted where possible in advance of the decision to use especially for those nuclear weapons in Europe The question of sharing the decision to use tactical weapons or MRBM's stationed in Europe is not usually considered separately except with regard to a NATO MRBM force To the extent that the control question is considered separately for the weapons assigned to SACEUR there seems to be some sentiment for a kind of host veto arrangement that is an arrangement in which the country directly affected would have a determining voice I NATO MRBM Force I Only the Germans and the Belgians have been really enthusiastic about a multilateral NATO MRBM force To the Germans a force of this kind - Authority 0 - 17 - stationed in Europe under multilateral NATO control and able to threaten targets in the USSR is important to maintain the credibility of the NATO 'deterrent Belgian enthusiasm seems to be largely that of Prime Minister Speak and he seems to be motivated in part if not primarily by political considerations chiefly the idea that such a force Would contribute to the cohesiveness of NATO and perhaps the unity of Enrepe Italy is in favor of such a force in principle as is the Netherlands The UK has not opposed the idea openly but is apparently againet it The British have already indicated that they see no need for station ing strategic nuclear weapons which they censider to be in Europe and that they have doubts about sharing control and use of any nuclear weapons In additien the British are concerned that a NATO MRBM force might be provocative to the USSR and disturbed at the share it would give Germany in the control of nuclear weaponSa- France considers a NATO MRBM ferce largely irrelevant to France s concerns France might support the idea of such_a ferce if it-seemei the only way to locate MRBM's in Europe it is not certain that the French would participate however nor allow the MEBM's on French soil The remaining NATO members are sympathetic to the idea of such a force in that it seems to accord with their desire to participate in I the control and decision to use nuclear seapens and have MRBM's in Europe As indicated earlier however these NATO members have reservations about the problems of deployment and manning of any MRBM's stationed in annaatnnroam ASSNIED a grease gr 1p - 18 - IEurope and they are also concerned at the implications particularly with respect to Germany of any multilateral control arrangement Denmark has already indicated that it sould wish additional details before framing a position on the NATO MRBM force It seems that the Danish position and probably that of Norway will depend very much upon the control and-deploy-l meet arrangements proposed Belgium Italy and the Netherlands although favorable in principle will probably also be influenced in their final judgment by control and deployment arrangements Cost is a factor to all nations except perhaps Germany Another consideration important to all is their concern to avoid the spread of national nuclear weapons capabilities particularly to Germany To the extent that a German ntclear force seemed imminent and a NATO MRBM force seemed likely to prevent it this consideration might resolve all doubts So far however none seems to be convinced that this is the situation and the British are openly skeptical The British and others also fear that a NATO MRBM force would complicate the question of disarmament and arms control I Finally it should be noted that there seem to be latent fears that such a force might eventually lead to U S withdrawal from Europe The Europeans are Well aware that they rely ultimately on the U S and except perhaps in the case of the French will continue to do so Anything therefore which raises the spectre of v 5 disengagement is likely to arouse apprehension and opposition and this may come to be reflected in European views on a NATO MRBM force - 19 - CONCLUSIONS 1 The Special Problem The questions posed relate to European drives for independent national or collective European nuclear weapons capabilities and to possible means for diverting or heading them eff They also relate to the more general and much larger problem of national security but be fore commenting on this it may be useful to recapitulate our findings on the subsidiary question of desires for independent capabilities a Attitudes Toward National Capabilities The UK already has a national nuclear weapons capability and France is striving to achieve one The UK began its program in 1946 and in spite of the consider able financial burden the British Government has indicated clearly that it has no present intention of abandoning it Official circles in the UK do not openly relate the maintenance of the British nuclear force to doubts about the credibility of the U S deterrent but it seems that this is a factor in the UK however this notion is usually expressed positively that is by saying that-the credibility of the allied deterrent is reinforced by reason of the contribution Political considerations are also important however in the British motivation The British maintain that their possession of an indepen dent capability gives the special place in the councikaof the world and in particular of the US Nevertheless the has strong views about the spread of nuclear capabilities and is particularly alarmed at any suggestion or move which might aid Germany to achieve run um-dw wan-H w - 20 - such a capability or bring Germany closer to possession or control of nuclear weapons I In France has made the achievement of an independent nuclear capability the keystone of his foreign policy and has stead- fastly pursued this goal in the face cf many competing claims There is no reason to believe that he will abandon this objective so long as France is able to pursue it and he seems willing to make sacrifices in order to sustain the economic burden De Gaulle's motivation is a mixture of military_considerations and considerations of power and prestige often expressed in near mystical fashion To him it is sim- ply intolerable that a great nation should depend for its defense on another nation however friendly the prime characteristic of a great and sovereign nation in his view is its ability to defend itself France has not seemed very much dismayed in principle at the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons' capabilities though the thought of spread to Germany causes some concern The remaining NATO members including Germany have so far displayed no interest in achieving an independent nuclear capability in fact except for Germany and perhaps Canada they would probably find it econom- ically impossible to undertake nuclear weapons programs of their cwn l Not only have they shown no interest in independent programs but all of them leaving aside Germany are much opposed to the-spread of national nuclear capabilities They view with alarm the French effort and with much greater alarm any suggestion of a German effort 1 7 See NIE September 1961 Nuclear'weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Countries - 21 - Germany has so far shown no intention of undertaking or planning a nuclear program but there is apprehension obviously that it might do so In part this apprehension seems to be based on the fact that Germany presumably has the economic capability and on the assumption that- it will wish in time for military independence or at least for military equality with France and the UK In part this apprehension is based on recent events It seems that Germany is dissatiSfied with existing NATO arrangements with regard to nuclear weapons Germanyhasactively supported all proposals designed to place in'Western Europe it has advocated a control formula which would give the decision to use tactical weapons to NATO field commanders and the decision to use any MRBM's in Europe to the country attacked in conjunction with lastly Germany has been the foremost supporter of a NATO MRBM force ' It appears therefore that the question which concerns us might be rephrased to read -- would the enhancement of role serve to deter German drives toward an independent nuclear weapons capability Possibility of Independent German Effort Germany has indicated that it would like NATG's nuclear role enhanced most importantly by the assignment of SACEUR and further by the creation of a multilateral NATO MREM force Presumably -if this enhancement takes - place German concerns and desires would-be met -- at least to the can tent that these concerns and desires have been made known Even if its desires should not be fully met however it is most unlikely that - Germany would undertake an independent effort at least in the short SECRET screen SECRET acacia 22 run which may be defined as the tine required for NATO consideration of the entire subject or about two years Germany has based its post war foreign and defense policies upon close association with the'West and in particular upon membership in NATO It has done so essentially because NATO engages the US in the defense of Europe and Germany For Germany to undertake a nuclear weapons program of its own would not only be in conflict nith existing limitations on_its armament production it would also be a move which would arouse the suspicions and probably the open disapproval of the other western European Coun- tries and the US and hazard German participation in the affairs and councils of the west including NATO at the same time such a more would undoubtedly be considered highly provocative by the Ger many is not likely to embark upon a course which would risk these con- sequences and would mean in effect a reversal of its foreign and defense policies simply because its desires with regard to nuclear role are not fully met Rather Germany is likely in the short run if its desires are not fulfilled to intensify its efforts within NATO to achieve fulfillment A German nuclear effort within the framework of the EEC' European Economic Community or the WEU western European Union would presum-l ably seem more reepectable and German Defense Minister Strauss has hinted at this possibility Such a program would however almost certainly meet with the opposition of the UK and the other members of these groups except perhaps France which place their reliance upon 23 NATO and the US and would fear that a program of this kind would weak _en NATO and the US commitment to Europe Further in the EEC where the matter of common defense strategy is in any case only beginning to be talked about the members except for France hare been careful to stipu-I late that any EEC defense measures must be taken in common with NATO There remains the idea of German cooperation with France and French officials have hinted that this is a possibility Such an effort hone ever would expose Germany to much the same consequences as would an independent German effort and seems equally unlikely in our short run 2 The General Problem The question of enhancing nuclear role has arisen as part of a more general problem of European security it the core of the general problem is the qneetion of maintaining the credibility of the deterrent and to all NATO members the deterrent_ still rests on the US strategic forces Related to this is the question of reassuring NATO nembers themselves about US intentions On both counts a key question is that of alliance participation in the control and use of nuclear weapons including the US strategic force A second key question is that of NATO's nuclear role- including the balance between conventional and nuclear forces and the kind of nuclear weapons which should be made available to NATO specifically - whether should be made available to SACEUR and whether there should be a NATO MRBH force Introduction of this last idea however seems to have been unnecessary at this time to deal with the two key questions 4 such a force is actively supported only by Germany and Mr Speak - and in fact seems to have complicated finding answers to these questions Setting 1 a - Ssn - I hf err Anthem sew esaside the idea of a NATO MRBM force might create a problem with respect to Germany but on the other questions too there is a special German point of view For the sake of analysis it is fruitful not only to set aside the NATO MRBM force concept but also to abstract Germany from dis- cussion of the two key questions and then to recognize and try to deal with a special German problem This approach conforms to the real- ity of the situation Ia Control and Use With regard to control and use all NATO I members seem reasonably satisfied with existing arrangements where custody is in US hands and the decision to use rests ultimately with the American President f Their satisfaction is not complete but they see no really feasible formula for sharing in control and the decision to use and the present system does meet their overriding require 'ment that the decision to use should be made by a reaponsible political authority All of them do wish however to share equally in determin- ing policy with respect to use and in establishing guidelines for use A limited directorship of any kind for_this purpose would not be accept able All of them wou1d like too to establish some arrangement which I would insure that they would be consulted where possible in adVance of use None would wish to make this consultation an absolute prencon- dition however except perhaps for nuclear weapons stationed on their own soil a 11' The French of course are a special case but their dissatisfaction is not so much with existing arrangements as with the inadequacy of of their own independent capability which they would like the U S to help them Overcome - Wm senses Noreen - 25 - b NATO's Nuclear Role The question of the balance between conventional and nuclear weapons involves considerations outside the scope of this paper but it is possible to deal with the cuestion of SACEUR's requirement for land and sea based Differences of opinion exist with respect to these MRBM's because of different concepts of what they are The UK regards then as strategic weapons and considers that they have no place in ACE Allied Command Europe SACEUR con siders them replacements for obsolescent aircraft committed to the support of the shield forces and says that he needs them The other members support SACEUR's requirements and his rationale in part it seems because of their regard for SACEURA-- and in spite of reservations hav- ing to do with costs deployment and manning particularly with respect to land based MRBM's I Support for the idea of MRBM's in ACE is also related to the idea of credibility and the desire for reassurance about US intentions Periodic statements by leading US officials reaffirming the US inten- tion to defend Europe with the full range of its nuclear weapons v coupled with greater Alliance participation in framing guidelines for their use would help to deal with apprehensions on these two counts and so undermine that part of the motivation for supporting MRBM's for_ SACEUR The question of the purely military requirement would remain however -- so long as SACEUR maintained that it did and perhaps even if he withdrew it in any case it seems unlikely that SACEUR having maintained the requirement so firmly and so long would now conclude DECLAssli m 0 II '7 7% nahgh- 7 7_ zen ass - 26 - that the need does not exist It seems therefore that satisfaction of this requirement at least in part is likely to continue to be regarded as essential If it is not satisfied some formula such as the Polaris 7 offer but with more direct participation by SACEUR will probably have to be devised to convince NATO members that the need set forth by SACEUR is in fact being met I Action along the lines above accompanied by closer consultation on all aspects of NATO planning and US planning particularly with respect to targetting wonld probably meet the immediate concerns of all meMbers except Germany and for different reasons France 3 The German Problem There would remain a Germen_preb1em In the short run at least this is not the problem of side tracking German drives for an independent nuclear capability these do not now exist Rather it is the problem of meeting within NATO and in a manner accept able to the US and other members the apprehensions which have been expressed with particular emphasis if not solely by the Germans Basically these apprehensions are the same that is they have to do with maintaining the credibility of the deterrent and with the nature of response in the event of a Soviet attack According to the Germans it is essential that the NATO military commanders should have control of the logistics of warheads and the decision ever use The Germans have emphasized the point that the Soviets must realize that an attack on Europe - whatever the US response - a would be met with widespread to the USSR To this end they a - 1 on ma Bin-1m must-q - 27 consider it essential to have MRBM's in Europe under a control arrange- ment by which the country attacked acting with SACEUR or SACEUR alone Could direct their use MRBM's assigned to SACEUR would meet this need 1_in theory however SACEUR envisages the use of these MRBM's in direct support of the NATO shield forces and not against strategic targets in -the USSR so that their assignment would not necessarily satis y the requirement set forth by the Germans A NATO MRBM force in the sense that it would be a strategic force would meet this need under certain control arragements It seems that the Germans would not wish a veto arrangement except a military veto on the part of SACEUR Apparently _' they Would be satisfied if SACEUR were an American and they would expect him in fact but not in form to consult with'the American President These Germans views it should be noted have been put forward in a purely military context and without any reference to considerations of power or prestige The need for an effective defense of Germany has been offered as the sole consideration In the German View this is the basic consideration the need to demonstrate to the USSR the effective defense of Germany - and so to deter a Soviet attack or threat to which the Germans feel they are peculiarly vulnerable Actions which would meet the other NATO members concerns that is sharing in guidelines for use of all_nuclear weapons and the assignment of MRBM's to SACEUR coupled with_periodic_and unambiguous US assurances would to some extent meet the requirements set forth by the Germans but not fully ' 0n the other hand fully to meet the German requirements SECREr Noroan 3 DECL Author-1W -28 nould raise problems with other members of the Alliance to whom most of the German proposals_are unacceptable undesirable or not feasible If Germany is not to remain a dissatisfied member of the Alliance however presumably some-effert must be made to deal with its concerns In doing so however it ma help to recognize that while they are similar in kind to the concerns of-the other members they differ in degree to the point of being a separate problem -- and that at the basis of these concerns is the need for reassurance about US intentions and the need for evidence of US intentions demonstrable to qr van cfi gr I -29 time 'We have thus far been discussing present views of the Europeans regarding national nuclear capabilities and have indicated that they are likely to persist in the short run for the next two years we have noted that the U K and France have national capabilities which they wish to maintain and develop and that the only other country which might have the urge and ability to undertake the deveIOpment of one has at present and for the near future at least no intent in doing so At the same time we have indicated that there is no perceptible drive for an independent European capability in any configurations of national states now organized or in prospect This leaves however the question of whether in the longer run beyond the next two years some such interest might develop What are the possibilities or probabilities that the present complex of considera- tions which actuates and limits the motives and policies of the European states may undergo substantial change And more Specifically how might the potentialities for change be affected by an enhancement of NATO's nuclear role I i It seems clear that any longer-tern estimate on these points must be based in some if not considerable measure on speculation and conjecture Whether or not there remains an area in which useful esti jmates may be formed can be determined only after further study and extended analysis in which we are now engaged Meanwhile we would offer the following preliminary and very-tentative judgments Authority an men a It hardly need be said that the_development of European views as to the most appropriate policies for national survival u- including the whole spectrum of questions about nuclear capabilities will be greatly affected bv the behavior and policies of both the USSR and the US -In the present state of Eastewest relations and of intra-European reollaboration there is as stated above no indication of any move toward a Euro ean answer to these uestions Nor do we perceive any 9 clear outlines of a basis for the development of one in the next several years This point deserves and in a later paper will be given cone siderable elaboration here we can but briefly note that the distance between the measures of economic collaboration thus far adepted and the political and military measures involved in an independent joint European nuclear effort is indeed great and the steps needed to traverse it would be many and difficult Nevertheless-some impetus for independent national or European solutions will remain we strongly suspect that this is inherent in the situation and reflects a problem for which there is quite literally no solution So long as Russia threatens there will be misgivings about the state or form of NATO defenses Mbreover these misgivings are likely to continue to be voiced most loudly and explicitly by the Germans who may also develop an increasing interest in nuclear capabilities fer reasons of national prestige as well as those of strictly military security But controlling the misgivings and thus curbing the impetus which they may give to the development of an independent German capability or If DECLA881W 3 Authoriwm 31 of a multinational European force is essentially a matter of persuading the Garmens and the Europeans that sueh_a force is superfluous because the U S is committed to the defense of Europe -- and that this commitq ment is credible to the USSR A NATO multilateral force would be but one means of persuasion and might not be the best in View of the many problems it raises There are other means of demonstrating the commitment Enhancing NATO's nuclear role but short of'a NATO force sharing in formulation of policy fer the use of nuclear weapons periodic reassurances to the NATO allies these have been suggested Equally important however is the demonstration that the US in all fields has a concern for European interests and that the global interests of the US are not in basic conflict_with European national interests '9 C Authoflwm I with attachments Report Number INR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM Research MemDate Cempleted This form and a distribution list must be completed and submitted 1n duplicate to Rm 6528 with each INR issuance No classified reports are re- January 31 3962 leased outside the Department until specific approval is given Number of Pages Title 0 Report Allis littlest 31 33 a am last firm as i lanahi '1 t3 Requester EUR - Mr Kohler Requester s Due Date M1962 Name Agency Unit if State Producer - John McGrath Extension Ali ll Office Division Projecr Sup ervr sor P reject Distrib tion by Producer EUR - Mr Kohler Mi Clearances Wan Dare No ofpopies Attacfl List 0 a Recommended for release to other US Government agencies specify on Distribution Form Recommended for release to UK Canada Australia and New Zealand l Recommended for release to all NATO countries Australia and New 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