Authority 1 p SE CWW Noli gm 3 18 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH Research Memorandum February 21 1962 TO The Secretary in ggLAwrv meme 53 53 26 FREE INR - Roger Hilsman SUBJECT In response to a request from Under Secretary MoGhee's office we have prepared a brief estimate of probable Soviet reactions is the establish ment of_a multilateral NHTO oontrolled MRBM force 'Our findings are based on the assumptions noted below - I0 For purposes of this paper it is assumed the force would be entirely seaborne of Polaris and or surface vessels that the Soviet Union becomes aware of moves looking to-establiShment of the force gradually and that these moves include the US allowing greater NATO participation in decisions about the deployment of US nuclear forces a decision to commit some US external forces to NATO and NATO progress toward a mmliilaterally controlled and owned force DISCUSSION Soviet propaganda treatment of the series of aad'nees stories in the course of the negotiation and implementation of the_agree went are likely to follow traditional linesu Bloc prepagaadiets will doubtless picture eaoh step in the process as a move to increase tension which is detrimental to the prospects for disarmament and better EasteWest relations VThe bloc ean'be expected to repeat charges that the NATO nuclear force iS s device to provide nuclear weapons to West German militarists and revanehists renewing its catalogue of charges about former Nazis in high places and playing upon lingering antiw erman sentim ment in Europe i DECLASSIFIED I Authorityw 7 1 7 I I A numhsr of advist pelitisal asticns may hs pnrsusd with grsater vigcr in to the process ostrsating a NATO nnslear forceg The USSR is dissmmamsnt pTOpo lS for a ban of nuclear weatsns only ts in ividual natisns but also to alliances far creation of atsmufkss Estes and as banning the use my the first use sf There are hints that the Scwist hisn may be preparing a isarmamsnt package cashining European security prepssals with prmpossls an use 0 weapons and a braadmranging far a general European settlement whether it is tr is not intended to serve as the basis for an agreement ib might play a role in Soviet to inhibit the orsation of a NATO nuclear fsres In addition the Ssviets Can he sxpested to use 0r step up pressuxes and threats in various areas For stepped up threats can he expecte against countries where bases fer the nuclear surface tr submarine fleet are lscatsd l Losal sammunis will certainly tahs advantage sf opportunities far pacifisist against the bases the Sawist Uhisn will probably intensify its at splitting the Western alliance and demarches such as the December 27 I961 to the are likely ts be mars frequentq tilitsi The creation @f'a ms surface seaborne MBBM furss is not likely ts lead the Ssvists t0 bslisvs that West is preparing ts initiate a strategic attack The base their views mili tary an sevsral indisatsrs rather than msreky tn the of ans weapons systems Morssvery 1m this the buil up is likely ts be gradual sn to the Suvists through intelligencs and the p blicity attendant upan the building cummissianing etc sf the In more general Saviet planners are ms s ht attempting as best they can to anticipate the appea ance sf increasing numbers of US suhmsr hes In calculatisns 0f purely military capabilities it will maks ns difference to them whether thsse waspons systems shpsar as a uni lateral US force or as the the destructive-sapacity by the systems will be the same either way Estates the impact upon Ssvist militany thinking msy hs enhanced if the of the farce is spssifically cummitted ts ths defense of Eurspe even thsugh such a might in practics stem lessen the flexibility hf the force Traditicmally9 Savist military planning and the structure sf the Soviet military has emphasised a yassible war ta 1-- - - l 3 on the European continent this hae remeined true despite the advent and political exploitation of Soviet intercontinental strike capability A NATO force to a greater extent than a purely US one would undereoore the feet that the Soviet concept of Western Europe as a hostage would have diminished validity But-whether the force is NATO or US its net effect would he to add materially to Western strength and unless the Soviet Union can offset this effect it will find the credibility of its military threats reduced A Eact Fggpe One possible Soviet reactioe to the creation of the NATO MRBM force might be the creation of a counterpart in the framework of the Warsaw Pact However it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would in fact give Warsaw Pact members a veto over the use of Soviet missiles and the Soviet Uhion would doubtless refrain from giving any of them the right to fire missilee on their own initiative Hence if a WareeW'Paot MRBM force is ereated it will be largely a formality some measure of joint planning and training might be carried out A Warsaw Pact force would serve as a bargaining counter for possible proposals of the mutual abolition of both NATO and WereawePect forces NATO veg Meet Germeg Control Soviet fear of West Germany though exaggerated for propaganda purposes appears to be genuine Onee the USSR accepts the feet of an extensive MRBM force committed to the defense of Europe it will prdbebly prefer NATO control with a US veto to independent national forces While this consideration is not likely to prevent the Soviet hioo from doing all that it can to prevent the creation_of a NATO force it probably will facilitate Soviet acceptance of the arrangement once it is created as the better of two undesirable alternatives CONFIDENTIAL with Statements which might disclose US policy or agreements in the process of formulation or not yet revealed DECLASSIFIED Authority r007 r I A in attachments Report Number INR REPORT AND RELEASE FORM rag Date Completed umber of Pages This form and a distribution list must be completed and submitted in duplicate to Rm 6528 with each INR issuance No classified reports are re- leased outside the Department until specific approval is given Title of Report Requester Requester s Due Data g Producer Extension Distribution by Producer Clearances Date No of Copies Attach List Producing Office Others Recommended for release to other US Government agencies specify on Distribution Form Recommended for release to UK Canada Australia and New Zealand Recommended for release to all NATO countries Australia and New Zealand Recommended for release to USIB contractors specify Recommended for release to other countries specify Not recommended for any distribution other than that indicated by the producing office Not recommended for release outside the Department Not recommended for release outside the US Government Damn Does this Report contain Yes No It Statements about other countries which should not be revealed to foreign recipients I g Information which is the property of private companies or individuals that shOuld not be releasad Classified military information Classified information clearance for which must be obtained from another agency a foreign government or other non-Departmental intel- ligence sourCe prior to release From the intelligence standpoint is there any other reason why this report should not be released Yes No REMARKS It is intended that as many reports will be released as is possible consistent with security and broad policy considerations Accordingly if a report in general seems appropriate for release excepting certain portions which may require excisions or clearances from other agencies the responsible officer should recommend release If any of the preceding questions are answered affirmatively please explain below as may be appropriate citing sources and page numbers and indicating passages suggested for deletion etc ops wows Ropwt urgently needed for delivery to request-ergzl - 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