I 'l DECiKssut ma see Aumouw I nonsm rorcaw WM LIMITED DISTRIBUTION DEPARTMENT on sears Tree Daemon or awe Rename Research Memorandum ass-152 September 4 1962 1 5 The Secretary c- THROUGH 3 8 y FROM 7 BR - Roger Hill-agar SUBJECT Soviet Tactics is Talh Non offasion of Nuclear Weapons exaninee the factors which may the on rent phase of the none In accordance with your request we' be influencing the Soviets in their con ne of diffusion talks i CCEECHLIESICEES We conclude that Moscow s most recent August 23 formulation of provisions for a non diffusion agreement reverts to language which does not differ greatly from what the Soviets have in the past been prepare to accept that the timing of this most recent Soviet formula may'be explainea chiefly in terms of Moscow's esti- mate that the US is interested in an agreement and that on the basis of evidence available to us SoViet tactics in these negotim ations do not appear to be materially affected by considerations involving the Chinese Communists 7 a By giving up their insistence of the last several months on specific mention of Germany and on extending the prohibition'of transfer of nuclear weapons to military alliances the Soviets appear to have brought agreement on a formula for a non dissemination arrangement within reach I thstantive or'Tactical Sh ft 7 In attempting to asteraixe the for these adjustments is should he recalled that on several occasions in the_ past the USSR has aivanced or sapported proposals en nonutransfer which die not single out Germany or explicitly extend to military alliancesgr For ex ample Article 16 of the Soviet draft disarmament treaty of March 15 1962 reasons 1 Previous papers dealing-with Soviet attitudes and tactics on the non diffusion issue were as follows on Son Major Issues at the 17th General Assembly July 7 1962 Probable Soviet Position atthe_3esumed Disarmament Conference and January 15 1962 Probable Soviet Position at Forthcomins Disarmament Talks SECRET screen LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - r 383 148 August 27 1962 Soviet Teetics hik ibi 312-1 a rJ ix lbrkafm I I DECLASSIFIED Author-WW' merely provided for a commitnent by nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the control of nonmnuclear powers Likewise the USSR voted for the lrish resolution General Assembly Resolution 1665 last December utich called for agreement on nonmdiffusion without reference to specific countries or alliances Similarly point 6 of the Soviet memorandum sub mitted at the UN on September 26 1961 although referring to-the danger of nuclear weapons being placed at the disposal of the Federal Republic formulated the proposed non transfer undertaking in-general terms Similar general formulations were used in the Soviet disarmament proposals of June 2 and September 23 1960 1 In accepting the universal applicability of a non transfer arrangement the Soviets therefore appear to have returned to terms which they had previously found far as a reference to alliances is con 'cerned by adopting language which Would prohibit indirect transfer to individual states through alliances the Soviets have assumed a position halfway between their occasional demands for outright prohibition of transfer to alliances and their omission on other occasions of references to al liances altogether on the subject has been a bargaining position rather than a risid tive one and that the Soviets are now returning at least most of the way to a formulation previously acceptable to them Indeed in some respects Moscow took a re basic step than the recent one in the evolution of its substantive position when it accepted in December 1961 the concept that a prohibition should apply to the surrender of control over nuclear weapons rather than more ambiguously to the turning over or'giving of nuclear weapons to other countries It should he noted that the Soviet'iugust 23 formulation again reverted to the more aubiguous language New In sum the recent adjustment in the Soviet position appears to be essentially a tactical rather than a substantive one This still however leaves the question of what factor or factors may have produced such a tactical shift at this time In general the long standing Soviet adecacy of some form of non-- ransfer agreement suggests a genuine Soviet interest in'ohtaining one we believe thatihe basis for this interest is Soviet belief that such an agree dent would 1 strengthen the obstacles'to German acquisition of nuclear Kve'pons hamper non aligned-countries in developing nuclear capabilities d I- aoroan snares DISTRIBUEION I DECLS 7 Authority N07 a LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 3 - and provide a platform from which Communist propaganda could seek to belabor Western arrangementS'for the deployment and control of nuclear weapons In addition the type of agreement now under discussion may hold particular attraction to the Soviets because it is declaratory and does not involve inspection Finally the Soviets may feel that an agreement at this time may on the one hand produce an atmosphere in which the West would find it more difficult to mount forceful resistance to Soviet attempts at gradual encroachments of the Western position in Berlin and on the other provide evidence of progress-toward Soviet goals for intra4bloc critics who may be impatient with-Moscow s relative caution in Berlin These considerations would suggest that the Soviets prefer an acceptable agreement sooner rather than later and that having confirmed through the bilateral talks a parallel US interest in an agreement they are now willing to make tactical adjustments in order to move toward a successful outcome Communist China We are inclined to doubt that developments within the Communist Bloc especially in China are playing a decisive role in the determination of Soviet tactics in these negotiations We believe the Soviets are confident they can contain any'East European pressures for a nuclear weapons capacity or for a share over the control over the Soviet capacity without having to rely on an international agreement As regards China the Soviets decided in 1960 to curtail their assistance to the general Chinese nuclear development program and there has been no recent evidence to suggest that they are reconsidering this decision or that they are under pressure from the Chinese to reverse it It seems unlikely therefore that the Soviets would have made a new decision that an international non transfer agreement is now necessary to maintain their pesition vis a-vis the Chinese It is possible on the other hand that because the agreement now under negotiation also includes a provision barring non-nuclear countries from em barking on production of nuclear weapons developments in China are influencing Soviet tactics in the talks with the US Moscow must realize that the US would not permit an agreement to take effect or at least to continue unless China participated By the same token the Soviets must be aware 1 that China would not be willing to enter an agreement preventing it from building a nuclear capability and 2 that they do not have it in their power to strong-arm the Chinese into becoming a party to such an agreement against their will This dilemma would be eased for the Soviets if they thought China was about to detonate a nuclear weapon thereby becoming a nuclear power and thus able to accede to the non-diffusion agreement without detriment to its nuclear ambitions SECRET moron Lumen LIMITED DISERIBUT ION - But our own estimate continues to be that there is only the remotest chance of a Chinese nuclear detonation in the near future while the Soviets may have somewhat better information than we do we doubt that this infor mation wonld lead them-to a substantially different estimate than_our own of the Chinese nuclear weapons time tabled This analysis suggests that the Soviets are not proceeding with their present tactics in the talks because of knowledge that the Chinese are about to remove the disability which as of now would prevent them from acceding to the formula The Soviets might of course reverse their 1960 decision reinstitute an aid program which would speed up Chinese nuclear development and thereby facilitate Chinese acceptance of the non diffusion agreement and remove a new potential apple of discord in the Moscow Peiping relationship Informau tion available to us does not however -indicate a shift in Soviet policy First we are noteware of any intelligence indicating a stepUp in Soviet aid second we see no change either in the general status of Sinc Soviet relations or in_Moscow's intrinsic desire to see a Chinese nuclear capacity postponed as long as possible 'to suggest that the Soviets would be induced to alter their policy on assistance The foregoing leads us to the donclusion'that the Chinese factor probably plays little 0r no role in MOScow's recent tactics in the non diffusion talks and that the Soviets may -in fact be moving toward an agree ment in this field even though they realize that for the present at any rate the Chinese would not-be prepared to join it - 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